instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXID AXObjectCacheImpl::getOrCreateAXID(AXObject* obj) {
const AXID existingAXID = obj->axObjectID();
if (existingAXID) {
DCHECK(m_idsInUse.contains(existingAXID));
return existingAXID;
}
const AXID newAXID = generateAXID();
m_idsInUse.insert(newAXID);
obj->setAXObjectID(newAXID);
m_objects.set(newAXID, obj);
return newAXID;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
const struct cred *cred;
if (task) {
if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) ||
task_dumpable(task)) {
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(task);
inode->i_uid = cred->euid;
inode->i_gid = cred->egid;
rcu_read_unlock();
} else {
inode->i_uid = 0;
inode->i_gid = 0;
}
inode->i_mode &= ~(S_ISUID | S_ISGID);
security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
put_task_struct(task);
return 1;
}
d_drop(dentry);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compat_sioc_ifmap(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd,
struct compat_ifreq __user *uifr32)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
struct compat_ifmap __user *uifmap32;
int err;
uifmap32 = &uifr32->ifr_ifru.ifru_map;
err = copy_from_user(&ifr, uifr32, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
err |= get_user(ifr.ifr_map.mem_start, &uifmap32->mem_start);
err |= get_user(ifr.ifr_map.mem_end, &uifmap32->mem_end);
err |= get_user(ifr.ifr_map.base_addr, &uifmap32->base_addr);
err |= get_user(ifr.ifr_map.irq, &uifmap32->irq);
err |= get_user(ifr.ifr_map.dma, &uifmap32->dma);
err |= get_user(ifr.ifr_map.port, &uifmap32->port);
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
err = dev_ioctl(net, cmd, &ifr, NULL);
if (cmd == SIOCGIFMAP && !err) {
err = copy_to_user(uifr32, &ifr, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name));
err |= put_user(ifr.ifr_map.mem_start, &uifmap32->mem_start);
err |= put_user(ifr.ifr_map.mem_end, &uifmap32->mem_end);
err |= put_user(ifr.ifr_map.base_addr, &uifmap32->base_addr);
err |= put_user(ifr.ifr_map.irq, &uifmap32->irq);
err |= put_user(ifr.ifr_map.dma, &uifmap32->dma);
err |= put_user(ifr.ifr_map.port, &uifmap32->port);
if (err)
err = -EFAULT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 82,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalDOMWindow::scrollTo(double x, double y) const {
ScrollToOptions options;
options.setLeft(x);
options.setTop(y);
scrollTo(options);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,971 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lrmd_tls_server_destroy(void)
{
if (psk_cred_s) {
gnutls_psk_free_server_credentials(psk_cred_s);
psk_cred_s = 0;
}
if (ssock > 0) {
close(ssock);
ssock = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: remote: cl#5269 - Notify other clients of a new connection only if the handshake has completed (bsc#967388)
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 73,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *netdev_lower_get_next(struct net_device *dev, struct list_head **iter)
{
struct netdev_adjacent *lower;
lower = list_entry(*iter, struct netdev_adjacent, list);
if (&lower->list == &dev->adj_list.lower)
return NULL;
*iter = lower->list.next;
return lower->dev;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHost::DidFailToInitializeCompositorFrameSink() {
DCHECK(new_compositor_frame_sink_);
current_compositor_frame_sink_ = nullptr;
new_compositor_frame_sink_ = nullptr;
client_->DidFailToInitializeCompositorFrameSink();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int init_hyp_mode(void)
{
int cpu;
int err = 0;
/*
* Allocate Hyp PGD and setup Hyp identity mapping
*/
err = kvm_mmu_init();
if (err)
goto out_err;
/*
* It is probably enough to obtain the default on one
* CPU. It's unlikely to be different on the others.
*/
hyp_default_vectors = __hyp_get_vectors();
/*
* Allocate stack pages for Hypervisor-mode
*/
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
unsigned long stack_page;
stack_page = __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!stack_page) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_stack_pages;
}
per_cpu(kvm_arm_hyp_stack_page, cpu) = stack_page;
}
/*
* Map the Hyp-code called directly from the host
*/
err = create_hyp_mappings(__kvm_hyp_code_start, __kvm_hyp_code_end);
if (err) {
kvm_err("Cannot map world-switch code\n");
goto out_free_mappings;
}
/*
* Map the Hyp stack pages
*/
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
char *stack_page = (char *)per_cpu(kvm_arm_hyp_stack_page, cpu);
err = create_hyp_mappings(stack_page, stack_page + PAGE_SIZE);
if (err) {
kvm_err("Cannot map hyp stack\n");
goto out_free_mappings;
}
}
/*
* Map the host CPU structures
*/
kvm_host_cpu_state = alloc_percpu(kvm_cpu_context_t);
if (!kvm_host_cpu_state) {
err = -ENOMEM;
kvm_err("Cannot allocate host CPU state\n");
goto out_free_mappings;
}
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
kvm_cpu_context_t *cpu_ctxt;
cpu_ctxt = per_cpu_ptr(kvm_host_cpu_state, cpu);
err = create_hyp_mappings(cpu_ctxt, cpu_ctxt + 1);
if (err) {
kvm_err("Cannot map host CPU state: %d\n", err);
goto out_free_context;
}
}
/*
* Execute the init code on each CPU.
*/
on_each_cpu(cpu_init_hyp_mode, NULL, 1);
/*
* Init HYP view of VGIC
*/
err = kvm_vgic_hyp_init();
if (err)
goto out_free_context;
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_ARM_VGIC
vgic_present = true;
#endif
/*
* Init HYP architected timer support
*/
err = kvm_timer_hyp_init();
if (err)
goto out_free_mappings;
#ifndef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
free_boot_hyp_pgd();
#endif
kvm_perf_init();
kvm_info("Hyp mode initialized successfully\n");
return 0;
out_free_context:
free_percpu(kvm_host_cpu_state);
out_free_mappings:
free_hyp_pgds();
out_free_stack_pages:
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
free_page(per_cpu(kvm_arm_hyp_stack_page, cpu));
out_err:
kvm_err("error initializing Hyp mode: %d\n", err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FT_Stream_GetChar( FT_Stream stream )
{
FT_Char result;
FT_ASSERT( stream && stream->cursor );
result = 0;
if ( stream->cursor < stream->limit )
result = *stream->cursor++;
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret, i;
size_t n;
size_t ext_len;
unsigned char *buf, *ext;
unsigned char comp;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
int accept_comp;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
#endif
int handshake_failure = 0;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello" ) );
buf = ssl->in_msg;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
/* No alert on a read error. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
{
ssl->renego_records_seen++;
if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 &&
ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation requested, "
"but not honored by server" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-handshake message during renego" ) );
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( buf[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received hello verify request" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
return( ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( ssl ) );
}
else
{
/* We made it through the verification process */
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie );
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = NULL;
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
if( ssl->in_hslen < 38 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
/*
* 0 . 1 server_version
* 2 . 33 random (maybe including 4 bytes of Unix time)
* 34 . 34 session_id length = n
* 35 . 34+n session_id
* 35+n . 36+n cipher_suite
* 37+n . 37+n compression_method
*
* 38+n . 39+n extensions length (optional)
* 40+n . .. extensions
*/
buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, version", buf + 0, 2 );
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver,
ssl->conf->transport, buf + 0 );
if( ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver ||
ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ||
ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver ||
ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server version out of bounds - "
" min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]",
ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver,
ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
ssl->conf->max_major_ver, ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu",
( (uint32_t) buf[2] << 24 ) |
( (uint32_t) buf[3] << 16 ) |
( (uint32_t) buf[4] << 8 ) |
( (uint32_t) buf[5] ) ) );
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 );
n = buf[34];
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 );
if( n > 32 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
if( ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 39 + n )
{
ext_len = ( ( buf[38 + n] << 8 )
| ( buf[39 + n] ) );
if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) ||
ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 40 + n + ext_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
}
else if( ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 38 + n )
{
ext_len = 0;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
/* ciphersuite (used later) */
i = ( buf[35 + n] << 8 ) | buf[36 + n];
/*
* Read and check compression
*/
comp = buf[37 + n];
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
/* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
accept_comp = 0;
else
#endif
accept_comp = 1;
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL &&
( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE || accept_comp == 0 ) )
#else /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL )
#endif/* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
/*
* Initialize update checksum functions
*/
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i );
if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", i ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n );
/*
* Check if the session can be resumed
*/
if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 || n == 0 ||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ||
#endif
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != i ||
ssl->session_negotiate->compression != comp ||
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n ||
memcmp( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ) != 0 )
{
ssl->state++;
ssl->handshake->resume = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL );
#endif
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i;
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp;
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n;
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n );
}
else
{
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( ret );
}
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", i ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d", buf[37 + n] ) );
suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite );
if( suite_info == NULL
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C)
|| ( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled &&
suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
#endif
)
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) );
i = 0;
while( 1 )
{
if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i] == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i++] ==
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite )
{
break;
}
}
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
&& comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE
#endif
)
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp;
ext = buf + 40 + n;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) );
while( ext_len )
{
unsigned int ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 )
| ( ext[1] ) );
unsigned int ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 )
| ( ext[3] ) );
if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
switch( ext_id )
{
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
#endif
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4,
ext_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated_hmac extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt_then_mac extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session_ticket extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)",
ext_id ) );
}
ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
ext += 4 + ext_size;
if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
}
/*
* Renegotiation security checks
*/
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
renegotiation_info_seen == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
renegotiation_info_seen == 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
if( handshake_failure == 1 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationRequest::SetOriginPolicy(const std::string& policy) {
common_params_.origin_policy = policy;
}
Commit Message: Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dictSdsKeyCompare(void *privdata, const void *key1,
const void *key2)
{
int l1,l2;
DICT_NOTUSED(privdata);
l1 = sdslen((sds)key1);
l2 = sdslen((sds)key2);
if (l1 != l2) return 0;
return memcmp(key1, key2, l1) == 0;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 70,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
bool already_loaded = vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu == cpu;
if (!already_loaded) {
loaded_vmcs_clear(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
local_irq_disable();
crash_disable_local_vmclear(cpu);
/*
* Read loaded_vmcs->cpu should be before fetching
* loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link.
* See the comments in __loaded_vmcs_clear().
*/
smp_rmb();
list_add(&vmx->loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link,
&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu);
local_irq_enable();
}
if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
}
if (!already_loaded) {
void *gdt = get_current_gdt_ro();
unsigned long sysenter_esp;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
/*
* Linux uses per-cpu TSS and GDT, so set these when switching
* processors. See 22.2.4.
*/
vmcs_writel(HOST_TR_BASE,
(unsigned long)this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss));
vmcs_writel(HOST_GDTR_BASE, (unsigned long)gdt); /* 22.2.4 */
/*
* VM exits change the host TR limit to 0x67 after a VM
* exit. This is okay, since 0x67 covers everything except
* the IO bitmap and have have code to handle the IO bitmap
* being lost after a VM exit.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(IO_BITMAP_OFFSET - 1 != 0x67);
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp); /* 22.2.3 */
vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu = cpu;
}
/* Setup TSC multiplier */
if (kvm_has_tsc_control &&
vmx->current_tsc_ratio != vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio)
decache_tsc_multiplier(vmx);
vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
vmx->host_pkru = read_pkru();
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 63,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gdImagePtr gdImageCreateFromGd2PartCtx (gdIOCtx * in, int srcx, int srcy, int w, int h)
{
int scx, scy, ecx, ecy, fsx, fsy;
int nc, ncx, ncy, cs, cx, cy;
int x, y, ylo, yhi, xlo, xhi;
int dstart, dpos;
int i;
/* 2.0.12: unsigned is correct; fixes problems with color munging. Thanks to Steven Brown. */
unsigned int ch;
int vers, fmt;
t_chunk_info *chunkIdx = NULL;
unsigned char *chunkBuf = NULL;
int chunkNum;
int chunkMax = 0;
uLongf chunkLen;
int chunkPos = 0;
int compMax;
char *compBuf = NULL;
gdImagePtr im;
if (w<1 || h <1) {
return 0;
}
/* The next few lines are basically copied from gd2CreateFromFile
* we change the file size, so don't want to use the code directly.
* but we do need to know the file size.
*/
if (_gd2GetHeader(in, &fsx, &fsy, &cs, &vers, &fmt, &ncx, &ncy, &chunkIdx) != 1) {
goto fail1;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("File size is %dx%d", fsx, fsy));
/* This is the difference - make a file based on size of chunks. */
if (gd2_truecolor(fmt)) {
im = gdImageCreateTrueColor(w, h);
} else {
im = gdImageCreate(w, h);
}
if (im == NULL) {
goto fail1;
}
if (!_gdGetColors(in, im, vers == 2)) {
goto fail2;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Image palette completed: %d colours", im->colorsTotal));
/* Process the header info */
nc = ncx * ncy;
if (gd2_compressed(fmt)) {
/* Find the maximum compressed chunk size. */
compMax = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < nc); i++) {
if (chunkIdx[i].size > compMax) {
compMax = chunkIdx[i].size;
}
}
compMax++;
if (im->trueColor) {
chunkMax = cs * cs * 4;
} else {
chunkMax = cs * cs;
}
if (chunkMax <= 0) {
goto fail2;
}
chunkBuf = gdCalloc(chunkMax, 1);
compBuf = gdCalloc(compMax, 1);
}
/* Work out start/end chunks */
scx = srcx / cs;
scy = srcy / cs;
if (scx < 0) {
scx = 0;
}
if (scy < 0) {
scy = 0;
}
ecx = (srcx + w) / cs;
ecy = (srcy + h) / cs;
if (ecx >= ncx) {
ecx = ncx - 1;
}
if (ecy >= ncy) {
ecy = ncy - 1;
}
/* Remember file position of image data. */
dstart = gdTell(in);
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Data starts at %d", dstart));
/* Loop through the chunks. */
for (cy = scy; (cy <= ecy); cy++) {
ylo = cy * cs;
yhi = ylo + cs;
if (yhi > fsy) {
yhi = fsy;
}
for (cx = scx; cx <= ecx; cx++) {
xlo = cx * cs;
xhi = xlo + cs;
if (xhi > fsx) {
xhi = fsx;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Processing Chunk (%d, %d), from %d to %d", cx, cy, ylo, yhi));
if (!gd2_compressed(fmt)) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Using raw format data"));
if (im->trueColor) {
dpos = (cy * (cs * fsx) * 4 + cx * cs * (yhi - ylo) * 4) + dstart;
} else {
dpos = cy * (cs * fsx) + cx * cs * (yhi - ylo) + dstart;
}
/* gd 2.0.11: gdSeek returns TRUE on success, not 0. Longstanding bug. 01/16/03 */
if (!gdSeek(in, dpos)) {
php_gd_error_ex(E_WARNING, "Error from seek: %d", errno);
goto fail2;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading (%d, %d) from position %d", cx, cy, dpos - dstart));
} else {
chunkNum = cx + cy * ncx;
chunkLen = chunkMax;
if (!_gd2ReadChunk (chunkIdx[chunkNum].offset, compBuf, chunkIdx[chunkNum].size, (char *)chunkBuf, &chunkLen, in)) {
php_gd_error("Error reading comproessed chunk");
goto fail2;
}
chunkPos = 0;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Reading (%d, %d) from chunk %d", cx, cy, chunkNum));
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error(" into (%d, %d) - (%d, %d)", xlo, ylo, xhi, yhi));
for (y = ylo; (y < yhi); y++) {
for (x = xlo; x < xhi; x++) {
if (!gd2_compressed(fmt)) {
if (im->trueColor) {
if (!gdGetInt((int *)&ch, in)) {
ch = 0;
}
} else {
ch = gdGetC(in);
if ((int)ch == EOF) {
ch = 0;
}
}
} else {
if (im->trueColor) {
ch = chunkBuf[chunkPos++];
ch = (ch << 8) + chunkBuf[chunkPos++];
ch = (ch << 8) + chunkBuf[chunkPos++];
ch = (ch << 8) + chunkBuf[chunkPos++];
} else {
ch = chunkBuf[chunkPos++];
}
}
/* Only use a point that is in the image. */
if ((x >= srcx) && (x < (srcx + w)) && (x < fsx) && (x >= 0) && (y >= srcy) && (y < (srcy + h)) && (y < fsy) && (y >= 0)) {
if (im->trueColor) {
im->tpixels[y - srcy][x - srcx] = ch;
} else {
im->pixels[y - srcy][x - srcx] = ch;
}
}
}
}
}
}
if (chunkBuf) {
gdFree(chunkBuf);
}
if (compBuf) {
gdFree(compBuf);
}
if (chunkIdx) {
gdFree(chunkIdx);
}
return im;
fail2:
gdImageDestroy(im);
fail1:
if (chunkBuf) {
gdFree(chunkBuf);
}
if (compBuf) {
gdFree(compBuf);
}
if (chunkIdx) {
gdFree(chunkIdx);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PluginObserver::OnMissingPluginStatus(int status) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (status == webkit::npapi::default_plugin::MISSING_PLUGIN_AVAILABLE) {
tab_contents_->AddInfoBar(
new PluginInstallerInfoBarDelegate(tab_contents()));
return;
}
DCHECK_EQ(webkit::npapi::default_plugin::MISSING_PLUGIN_USER_STARTED_DOWNLOAD,
status);
for (size_t i = 0; i < tab_contents_->infobar_count(); ++i) {
InfoBarDelegate* delegate = tab_contents_->GetInfoBarDelegateAt(i);
if (delegate->AsPluginInstallerInfoBarDelegate() != NULL) {
tab_contents_->RemoveInfoBar(delegate);
return;
}
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 97,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DoTest(ExternalProtocolHandler::BlockState block_state,
shell_integration::DefaultWebClientState os_state,
Action expected_action) {
GURL url("mailto:test@test.com");
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate_.has_prompted());
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate_.has_launched());
EXPECT_FALSE(delegate_.has_blocked());
delegate_.set_block_state(block_state);
delegate_.set_os_state(os_state);
ExternalProtocolHandler::LaunchUrlWithDelegate(
url, 0, 0, ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK, true, &delegate_);
content::RunAllTasksUntilIdle();
EXPECT_EQ(expected_action == Action::PROMPT, delegate_.has_prompted());
EXPECT_EQ(expected_action == Action::LAUNCH, delegate_.has_launched());
EXPECT_EQ(expected_action == Action::BLOCK, delegate_.has_blocked());
}
Commit Message: Reland "Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL."
This is a reland of 2401e58572884b3561e4348d64f11ac74667ef02
Original change's description:
> Launching an external protocol handler now escapes the URL.
>
> Fixes bug introduced in r102449.
>
> Bug: 785809
> Change-Id: I9e6dd1031dd7e7b8d378b138ab151daefdc0c6dc
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/778747
> Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518848}
Bug: 785809
Change-Id: Ib8954584004ff5681654398db76d48cdf4437df7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/788551
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519203}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::setDefersLoading(bool defers)
{
if (m_loaders)
m_loaders->setAllDefersLoading(defers);
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 121,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HttpBridge::RequestContextGetter::GetIOMessageLoopProxy() const {
return BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(BrowserThread::IO);
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void wdm_rxwork(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct wdm_device *desc = container_of(work, struct wdm_device, rxwork);
unsigned long flags;
int rv;
spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->iuspin, flags);
if (test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->iuspin, flags);
} else {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->iuspin, flags);
rv = usb_submit_urb(desc->response, GFP_KERNEL);
if (rv < 0 && rv != -EPERM) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&desc->iuspin, flags);
if (!test_bit(WDM_DISCONNECTING, &desc->flags))
schedule_work(&desc->rxwork);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->iuspin, flags);
}
}
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-wdm: fix buffer overflow
The buffer for responses must not overflow.
If this would happen, set a flag, drop the data and return
an error after user space has read all remaining data.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
CC: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const KURL ContentSecurityPolicy::url() const {
return m_executionContext->contextURL();
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::bufferSubData(GLenum target,
long long offset,
DOMArrayBuffer* data) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
DCHECK(data);
BufferSubDataImpl(target, offset, data->ByteLength(), data->Data());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void handle_init_section_args(struct init_section_info *info, const char *key,
int key_len, char **dest, int *dest_len)
{
if (!strncmp(key, "URI=", key_len)) {
*dest = info->uri;
*dest_len = sizeof(info->uri);
} else if (!strncmp(key, "BYTERANGE=", key_len)) {
*dest = info->byterange;
*dest_len = sizeof(info->byterange);
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 61,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int qeth_create_skb_frag(struct qeth_qdio_buffer *qethbuffer,
struct qdio_buffer_element *element,
struct sk_buff **pskb, int offset, int *pfrag, int data_len)
{
struct page *page = virt_to_page(element->addr);
if (*pskb == NULL) {
if (qethbuffer->rx_skb) {
/* only if qeth_card.options.cq == QETH_CQ_ENABLED */
*pskb = qethbuffer->rx_skb;
qethbuffer->rx_skb = NULL;
} else {
*pskb = dev_alloc_skb(QETH_RX_PULL_LEN + ETH_HLEN);
if (!(*pskb))
return -ENOMEM;
}
skb_reserve(*pskb, ETH_HLEN);
if (data_len <= QETH_RX_PULL_LEN) {
memcpy(skb_put(*pskb, data_len), element->addr + offset,
data_len);
} else {
get_page(page);
memcpy(skb_put(*pskb, QETH_RX_PULL_LEN),
element->addr + offset, QETH_RX_PULL_LEN);
skb_fill_page_desc(*pskb, *pfrag, page,
offset + QETH_RX_PULL_LEN,
data_len - QETH_RX_PULL_LEN);
(*pskb)->data_len += data_len - QETH_RX_PULL_LEN;
(*pskb)->len += data_len - QETH_RX_PULL_LEN;
(*pskb)->truesize += data_len - QETH_RX_PULL_LEN;
(*pfrag)++;
}
} else {
get_page(page);
skb_fill_page_desc(*pskb, *pfrag, page, offset, data_len);
(*pskb)->data_len += data_len;
(*pskb)->len += data_len;
(*pskb)->truesize += data_len;
(*pfrag)++;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType EncodeImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
const size_t data_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxCode(number_bits) ((one << (number_bits))-1)
#define MaxHashTable 5003
#define MaxGIFBits 12UL
#define MaxGIFTable (1UL << MaxGIFBits)
#define GIFOutputCode(code) \
{ \
/* \
Emit a code. \
*/ \
if (bits > 0) \
datum|=(code) << bits; \
else \
datum=code; \
bits+=number_bits; \
while (bits >= 8) \
{ \
/* \
Add a character to current packet. \
*/ \
packet[length++]=(unsigned char) (datum & 0xff); \
if (length >= 254) \
{ \
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length); \
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet); \
length=0; \
} \
datum>>=8; \
bits-=8; \
} \
if (free_code > max_code) \
{ \
number_bits++; \
if (number_bits == MaxGIFBits) \
max_code=MaxGIFTable; \
else \
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits); \
} \
}
Quantum
index;
short
*hash_code,
*hash_prefix,
waiting_code;
size_t
bits,
clear_code,
datum,
end_of_information_code,
free_code,
length,
max_code,
next_pixel,
number_bits,
one,
pass;
ssize_t
displacement,
offset,
k,
y;
unsigned char
*packet,
*hash_suffix;
/*
Allocate encoder tables.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
one=1;
packet=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(256,sizeof(*packet));
hash_code=(short *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,sizeof(*hash_code));
hash_prefix=(short *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,sizeof(*hash_prefix));
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxHashTable,
sizeof(*hash_suffix));
if ((packet == (unsigned char *) NULL) || (hash_code == (short *) NULL) ||
(hash_prefix == (short *) NULL) ||
(hash_suffix == (unsigned char *) NULL))
{
if (packet != (unsigned char *) NULL)
packet=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packet);
if (hash_code != (short *) NULL)
hash_code=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_code);
if (hash_prefix != (short *) NULL)
hash_prefix=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_prefix);
if (hash_suffix != (unsigned char *) NULL)
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_suffix);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/*
Initialize GIF encoder.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(hash_code,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_code));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(hash_prefix,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_prefix));
(void) ResetMagickMemory(hash_suffix,0,MaxHashTable*sizeof(*hash_suffix));
number_bits=data_size;
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits);
clear_code=((short) one << (data_size-1));
end_of_information_code=clear_code+1;
free_code=clear_code+2;
length=0;
datum=0;
bits=0;
GIFOutputCode(clear_code);
/*
Encode pixels.
*/
offset=0;
pass=0;
waiting_code=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (y == 0)
{
waiting_code=(short) GetPixelIndex(image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for (x=(ssize_t) (y == 0 ? 1 : 0); x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
/*
Probe hash table.
*/
index=(Quantum) ((size_t) GetPixelIndex(image,p) & 0xff);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
k=(ssize_t) (((size_t) index << (MaxGIFBits-8))+waiting_code);
if (k >= MaxHashTable)
k-=MaxHashTable;
next_pixel=MagickFalse;
displacement=1;
if (hash_code[k] > 0)
{
if ((hash_prefix[k] == waiting_code) &&
(hash_suffix[k] == (unsigned char) index))
{
waiting_code=hash_code[k];
continue;
}
if (k != 0)
displacement=MaxHashTable-k;
for ( ; ; )
{
k-=displacement;
if (k < 0)
k+=MaxHashTable;
if (hash_code[k] == 0)
break;
if ((hash_prefix[k] == waiting_code) &&
(hash_suffix[k] == (unsigned char) index))
{
waiting_code=hash_code[k];
next_pixel=MagickTrue;
break;
}
}
if (next_pixel != MagickFalse)
continue;
}
GIFOutputCode((size_t) waiting_code);
if (free_code < MaxGIFTable)
{
hash_code[k]=(short) free_code++;
hash_prefix[k]=waiting_code;
hash_suffix[k]=(unsigned char) index;
}
else
{
/*
Fill the hash table with empty entries.
*/
for (k=0; k < MaxHashTable; k++)
hash_code[k]=0;
/*
Reset compressor and issue a clear code.
*/
free_code=clear_code+2;
GIFOutputCode(clear_code);
number_bits=data_size;
max_code=MaxCode(number_bits);
}
waiting_code=(short) index;
}
if (image_info->interlace == NoInterlace)
offset++;
else
switch (pass)
{
case 0:
default:
{
offset+=8;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=4;
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
offset+=8;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=2;
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
offset+=4;
if (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows)
{
pass++;
offset=1;
}
break;
}
case 3:
{
offset+=2;
break;
}
}
}
/*
Flush out the buffered code.
*/
GIFOutputCode((size_t) waiting_code);
GIFOutputCode(end_of_information_code);
if (bits > 0)
{
/*
Add a character to current packet.
*/
packet[length++]=(unsigned char) (datum & 0xff);
if (length >= 254)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet);
length=0;
}
}
/*
Flush accumulated data.
*/
if (length > 0)
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,(unsigned char) length);
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,packet);
}
/*
Free encoder memory.
*/
hash_suffix=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_suffix);
hash_prefix=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_prefix);
hash_code=(short *) RelinquishMagickMemory(hash_code);
packet=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(packet);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/592
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 60,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int lxc_requests_empty_network(struct lxc_handler *handler)
{
struct lxc_list *network = &handler->conf->network;
struct lxc_list *iterator;
struct lxc_netdev *netdev;
bool found_none = false, found_nic = false;
if (lxc_list_empty(network))
return 0;
lxc_list_for_each(iterator, network) {
netdev = iterator->elem;
if (netdev->type == LXC_NET_NONE)
found_none = true;
else
found_nic = true;
}
if (found_none && !found_nic)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RemoveActionCallback(const ActionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get());
DCHECK(g_task_runner.Get()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
std::vector<ActionCallback>* callbacks = g_callbacks.Pointer();
for (size_t i = 0; i < callbacks->size(); ++i) {
if ((*callbacks)[i].Equals(callback)) {
callbacks->erase(callbacks->begin() + i);
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Convert Uses of base::RepeatingCallback<>::Equals to Use == or != in //base
Staging this change because some conversions will have semantic changes.
BUG=937566
Change-Id: I2d4950624c0fab00e107814421a161e43da965cc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1507245
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639702}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_encode_set_async_config(const struct ofputil_async_cfg *ac,
uint32_t oams, enum ofp_version ofp_version)
{
enum ofpraw raw = (ofp_version >= OFP14_VERSION ? OFPRAW_OFPT14_SET_ASYNC
: oams & OAM_EXTENSIONS ? OFPRAW_NXT_SET_ASYNC_CONFIG2
: ofp_version >= OFP13_VERSION ? OFPRAW_OFPT13_SET_ASYNC
: OFPRAW_NXT_SET_ASYNC_CONFIG);
struct ofpbuf *request = ofpraw_alloc(raw, ofp_version, 0);
ofputil_put_async_config__(ac, request,
(raw == OFPRAW_OFPT14_SET_ASYNC ||
raw == OFPRAW_NXT_SET_ASYNC_CONFIG2),
ofp_version, oams);
return request;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BeforeHeadersSentHandler()
: observed_before_headers_sent_with_proxy_(false),
observed_before_headers_sent_(false) {}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,776 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_correct_host_mode(
int token
)
{
switch (token) {
case T_Server:
case T_Pool:
case T_Manycastclient:
return MODE_CLIENT;
case T_Peer:
return MODE_ACTIVE;
case T_Broadcast:
return MODE_BROADCAST;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderViewHost* render_view_host() {
return browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetActiveWebContents()->
GetRenderViewHost();
}
Commit Message: Fix OS_MACOS typos. Should be OS_MACOSX.
BUG=163208
TEST=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12829005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@189130 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 118,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Histogram::AddSamplesFromPickle(PickleIterator* iter) {
return samples_->AddFromPickle(iter);
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_subrs( T1_Face face,
T1_Loader loader )
{
T1_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
PS_Table table = &loader->subrs;
FT_Memory memory = parser->root.memory;
FT_Error error;
FT_Int num_subrs;
PSAux_Service psaux = (PSAux_Service)face->psaux;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
/* test for empty array */
if ( parser->root.cursor < parser->root.limit &&
*parser->root.cursor == '[' )
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser );
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor >= parser->root.limit ||
*parser->root.cursor != ']' )
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
num_subrs = (FT_Int)T1_ToInt( parser );
/* position the parser right before the `dup' of the first subr */
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* `array' */
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces( parser );
/* initialize subrs array -- with synthetic fonts it is possible */
/* we get here twice */
if ( !loader->num_subrs )
{
error = psaux->ps_table_funcs->init( table, num_subrs, memory );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
}
/* the format is simple: */
/* */
/* `index' + binary data */
/* */
for (;;)
{
FT_Long idx, size;
FT_Byte* base;
/* If we are out of data, or if the next token isn't `dup', */
/* we are done. */
if ( parser->root.cursor + 4 >= parser->root.limit ||
ft_strncmp( (char*)parser->root.cursor, "dup", 3 ) != 0 )
break;
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* `dup' */
idx = T1_ToInt( parser );
if ( !read_binary_data( parser, &size, &base, IS_INCREMENTAL ) )
return;
/* The binary string is followed by one token, e.g. `NP' */
/* (bound to `noaccess put') or by two separate tokens: */
/* `noaccess' & `put'. We position the parser right */
/* before the next `dup', if any. */
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* `NP' or `|' or `noaccess' */
if ( parser->root.error )
return;
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
if ( parser->root.cursor + 4 < parser->root.limit &&
ft_strncmp( (char*)parser->root.cursor, "put", 3 ) == 0 )
{
T1_Skip_PS_Token( parser ); /* skip `put' */
T1_Skip_Spaces ( parser );
}
/* with synthetic fonts it is possible we get here twice */
if ( loader->num_subrs )
continue;
/* some fonts use a value of -1 for lenIV to indicate that */
/* the charstrings are unencoded */
/* */
/* thanks to Tom Kacvinsky for pointing this out */
/* */
if ( face->type1.private_dict.lenIV >= 0 )
{
FT_Byte* temp;
/* some fonts define empty subr records -- this is not totally */
/* compliant to the specification (which says they should at */
/* least contain a `return'), but we support them anyway */
if ( size < face->type1.private_dict.lenIV )
{
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Fail;
}
/* t1_decrypt() shouldn't write to base -- make temporary copy */
if ( FT_ALLOC( temp, size ) )
goto Fail;
FT_MEM_COPY( temp, base, size );
psaux->t1_decrypt( temp, size, 4330 );
size -= face->type1.private_dict.lenIV;
error = T1_Add_Table( table, (FT_Int)idx,
temp + face->type1.private_dict.lenIV, size );
FT_FREE( temp );
}
else
error = T1_Add_Table( table, (FT_Int)idx, base, size );
if ( error )
goto Fail;
}
if ( !loader->num_subrs )
loader->num_subrs = num_subrs;
return;
Fail:
parser->root.error = error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::UpdateAcceleratorMetrics(
const ui::Accelerator& accelerator, int command_id) {
const ui::KeyboardCode key_code = accelerator.key_code();
if (command_id == IDC_HELP_PAGE_VIA_KEYBOARD && key_code == ui::VKEY_F1)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ShowHelpTabViaF1"));
if (command_id == IDC_BOOKMARK_PAGE)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bookmarks.EntryPoint",
bookmark_utils::ENTRY_POINT_ACCELERATOR,
bookmark_utils::ENTRY_POINT_LIMIT);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
switch (command_id) {
case IDC_BACK:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_BACK)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Back_Backspace"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_F1)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Back_F1"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_LEFT)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Back_Left"));
break;
case IDC_FORWARD:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_BACK)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Forward_Backspace"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_F2)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Forward_F2"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_RIGHT)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Forward_Right"));
break;
case IDC_RELOAD:
case IDC_RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_R)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Reload_R"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_F3)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Reload_F3"));
break;
case IDC_FULLSCREEN:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_F4)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Fullscreen_F4"));
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_LOCATION:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_D)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_FocusLocation_D"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_L)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_FocusLocation_L"));
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_SEARCH:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_E)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_FocusSearch_E"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_K)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_FocusSearch_K"));
break;
default:
break;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: read_image_data(Gif_Context *gfc, Gif_Reader *grr)
{
/* we need a bit more than GIF_MAX_BLOCK in case a single code is split
across blocks */
uint8_t buffer[GIF_MAX_BLOCK + 5];
int i;
uint32_t accum;
int bit_position;
int bit_length;
Gif_Code code;
Gif_Code old_code;
Gif_Code clear_code;
Gif_Code eoi_code;
Gif_Code next_code;
#define CUR_BUMP_CODE (1 << bits_needed)
#define CUR_CODE_MASK ((1 << bits_needed) - 1)
int min_code_size;
int bits_needed;
gfc->decodepos = 0;
min_code_size = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("\n\nmin_code_size(%d) ", min_code_size));
if (min_code_size >= GIF_MAX_CODE_BITS) {
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, "image corrupted, min_code_size too big");
min_code_size = GIF_MAX_CODE_BITS - 1;
} else if (min_code_size < 2) {
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, "image corrupted, min_code_size too small");
min_code_size = 2;
}
clear_code = 1 << min_code_size;
for (code = 0; code < clear_code; code++) {
gfc->prefix[code] = 49428;
gfc->suffix[code] = (uint8_t)code;
gfc->length[code] = 1;
}
eoi_code = clear_code + 1;
next_code = eoi_code;
bits_needed = min_code_size + 1;
code = clear_code;
bit_length = bit_position = 0;
/* Thus the 'Read in the next data block.' code below will be invoked on the
first time through: exactly right! */
while (1) {
old_code = code;
/* GET A CODE INTO THE 'code' VARIABLE.
*
* 9.Dec.1998 - Rather than maintain a byte pointer and a bit offset into
* the current byte (and the processing associated with that), we maintain
* one number: the offset, in bits, from the beginning of 'buffer'. This
* much cleaner choice was inspired by Patrick J. Naughton
* <naughton@wind.sun.com>'s GIF-reading code, which does the same thing.
* His code distributed as part of XV in xvgif.c. */
if (bit_position + bits_needed > bit_length)
/* Read in the next data block. */
if (!read_image_block(grr, buffer, &bit_position, &bit_length,
bits_needed))
goto zero_length_block;
i = bit_position / 8;
accum = buffer[i] + (buffer[i+1] << 8);
if (bits_needed >= 8)
accum |= (buffer[i+2]) << 16;
code = (Gif_Code)((accum >> (bit_position % 8)) & CUR_CODE_MASK);
bit_position += bits_needed;
GIF_DEBUG(("%d ", code));
/* CHECK FOR SPECIAL OR BAD CODES: clear_code, eoi_code, or a code that is
* too large. */
if (code == clear_code) {
GIF_DEBUG(("clear "));
bits_needed = min_code_size + 1;
next_code = eoi_code;
continue;
} else if (code == eoi_code)
break;
else if (code > next_code && next_code && next_code != clear_code) {
/* code > next_code: a (hopefully recoverable) error.
Bug fix, 5/27: Do this even if old_code == clear_code, and set code
to 0 to prevent errors later. (If we didn't zero code, we'd later set
old_code = code; then we had old_code >= next_code; so the prefixes
array got all screwed up!)
Bug fix, 4/12/2010: It is not an error if next_code == clear_code.
This happens at the end of a large GIF: see the next comment ("If no
meaningful next code should be defined...."). */
if (gfc->errors[1] < 20)
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, "image corrupted, code out of range");
else if (gfc->errors[1] == 20)
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, "(not reporting more errors)");
code = 0;
}
/* PROCESS THE CURRENT CODE and define the next code. If no meaningful
* next code should be defined, then we have set next_code to either
* 'eoi_code' or 'clear_code' -- so we'll store useless prefix/suffix data
* in a useless place. */
/* *First,* set up the prefix and length for the next code
(in case code == next_code). */
gfc->prefix[next_code] = old_code;
gfc->length[next_code] = gfc->length[old_code] + 1;
/* Use one_code to process code. It's nice that it returns the first
pixel in code: that's what we need. */
gfc->suffix[next_code] = one_code(gfc, code);
/* Special processing if code == next_code: we didn't know code's final
suffix when we called one_code, but we do now. */
/* 7.Mar.2014 -- Avoid error if image has zero width/height. */
if (code == next_code && gfc->image + gfc->decodepos <= gfc->maximage)
gfc->image[gfc->decodepos - 1] = gfc->suffix[next_code];
/* Increment next_code except for the 'clear_code' special case (that's
when we're reading at the end of a GIF) */
if (next_code != clear_code) {
next_code++;
if (next_code == CUR_BUMP_CODE) {
if (bits_needed < GIF_MAX_CODE_BITS)
bits_needed++;
else
next_code = clear_code;
}
}
}
/* read blocks until zero-length reached. */
i = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("\nafter_image(%d)\n", i));
while (i > 0) {
gifgetblock(buffer, i, grr);
i = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("\nafter_image(%d)\n", i));
}
/* zero-length block reached. */
zero_length_block: {
long delta = (long) (gfc->maximage - gfc->image) - (long) gfc->decodepos;
char buf[BUFSIZ];
if (delta > 0) {
sprintf(buf, "missing %ld %s of image data", delta,
delta == 1 ? "pixel" : "pixels");
gif_read_error(gfc, 1, buf);
memset(&gfc->image[gfc->decodepos], 0, delta);
} else if (delta < -1) {
/* One pixel of superfluous data is OK; that could be the
code == next_code case. */
sprintf(buf, "%ld superfluous pixels of image data", -delta);
gif_read_error(gfc, 0, buf);
}
}
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 86,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Render_Gray_Glyph( RAS_ARG )
{
FT_UNUSED_RASTER;
return FT_THROW( Unsupported );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __be32 nfsd4_bind_conn_to_session(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_bind_conn_to_session *bcts)
{
__be32 status;
struct nfsd4_conn *conn;
struct nfsd4_session *session;
struct net *net = SVC_NET(rqstp);
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
if (!nfsd4_last_compound_op(rqstp))
return nfserr_not_only_op;
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
session = find_in_sessionid_hashtbl(&bcts->sessionid, net, &status);
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
if (!session)
goto out_no_session;
status = nfserr_wrong_cred;
if (!nfsd4_mach_creds_match(session->se_client, rqstp))
goto out;
status = nfsd4_map_bcts_dir(&bcts->dir);
if (status)
goto out;
conn = alloc_conn(rqstp, bcts->dir);
status = nfserr_jukebox;
if (!conn)
goto out;
nfsd4_init_conn(rqstp, conn, session);
status = nfs_ok;
out:
nfsd4_put_session(session);
out_no_session:
return status;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_arch_commit_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
const struct kvm_memory_slot *old,
enum kvm_mr_change change)
{
}
Commit Message: ARM: KVM: prevent NULL pointer dereferences with KVM VCPU ioctl
Some ARM KVM VCPU ioctls require the vCPU to be properly initialized
with the KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT ioctl before being used with further
requests. KVM_RUN checks whether this initialization has been
done, but other ioctls do not.
Namely KVM_GET_REG_LIST will dereference an array with index -1
without initialization and thus leads to a kernel oops.
Fix this by adding checks before executing the ioctl handlers.
[ Removed superflous comment from static function - Christoffer ]
Changes from v1:
* moved check into a static function with a meaningful name
Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@cs.columbia.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 28,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void replace_mount_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)
{
char *old = sb->s_options;
rcu_assign_pointer(sb->s_options, options);
if (old) {
synchronize_rcu();
kfree(old);
}
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void RuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
scheduler::CooperativeSchedulingManager::Instance()->Safepoint();
bool is_arity_error = false;
switch (std::min(1, info.Length())) {
case 1:
if (info[0]->IsNumber()) {
RuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod2Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
RuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod1Method(info);
return;
}
if (true) {
RuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod2Method(info);
return;
}
break;
default:
is_arity_error = true;
}
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "runtimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod");
if (is_arity_error) {
if (info.Length() < 1) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
}
exception_state.ThrowTypeError("No function was found that matched the signature provided.");
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *ask_new_field(struct chfn_control *ctl, const char *question,
char *def_val)
{
int len;
char *ans;
char buf[MAX_FIELD_SIZE + 2];
if (!def_val)
def_val = "";
while (true) {
printf("%s [%s]: ", question, def_val);
__fpurge(stdin);
if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("Aborted."));
ans = buf;
/* remove white spaces from string end */
ltrim_whitespace((unsigned char *) ans);
len = rtrim_whitespace((unsigned char *) ans);
if (len == 0)
return xstrdup(def_val);
if (!strcasecmp(ans, "none")) {
ctl->changed = 1;
return xstrdup("");
}
if (check_gecos_string(question, ans) >= 0)
break;
}
ctl->changed = 1;
return xstrdup(ans);
}
Commit Message: chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 74,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TextureManager::RemoveTextureInfo(GLuint client_id) {
TextureInfoMap::iterator it = texture_infos_.find(client_id);
if (it != texture_infos_.end()) {
TextureInfo* info = it->second;
info->MarkAsDeleted();
texture_infos_.erase(it);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_swevent_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 event_id = event->attr.config;
if (event->attr.type != PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE)
return -ENOENT;
/*
* no branch sampling for software events
*/
if (has_branch_stack(event))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
switch (event_id) {
case PERF_COUNT_SW_CPU_CLOCK:
case PERF_COUNT_SW_TASK_CLOCK:
return -ENOENT;
default:
break;
}
if (event_id >= PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX)
return -ENOENT;
if (!event->parent) {
int err;
err = swevent_hlist_get(event);
if (err)
return err;
static_key_slow_inc(&perf_swevent_enabled[event_id]);
event->destroy = sw_perf_event_destroy;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AckFeature(PPARANDIS_ADAPTER pContext, UINT32 Feature)
{
if (VirtIOIsFeatureEnabled(pContext->u32HostFeatures, Feature))
{
VirtIOFeatureEnable(pContext->u32GuestFeatures, Feature);
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void init_timeout(struct aio_timeout *to)
{
setup_timer_on_stack(&to->timer, timeout_func, (unsigned long) to);
to->timed_out = 0;
to->p = current;
}
Commit Message: Unused iocbs in a batch should not be accounted as active.
commit 69e4747ee9727d660b88d7e1efe0f4afcb35db1b upstream.
Since commit 080d676de095 ("aio: allocate kiocbs in batches") iocbs are
allocated in a batch during processing of first iocbs. All iocbs in a
batch are automatically added to ctx->active_reqs list and accounted in
ctx->reqs_active.
If one (not the last one) of iocbs submitted by an user fails, further
iocbs are not processed, but they are still present in ctx->active_reqs
and accounted in ctx->reqs_active. This causes process to stuck in a D
state in wait_for_all_aios() on exit since ctx->reqs_active will never
go down to zero. Furthermore since kiocb_batch_free() frees iocb
without removing it from active_reqs list the list become corrupted
which may cause oops.
Fix this by removing iocb from ctx->active_reqs and updating
ctx->reqs_active in kiocb_batch_free().
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip6_finish_output2(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
struct neighbour *neigh;
struct in6_addr *nexthop;
int ret;
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
skb->dev = dev;
if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr)) {
struct inet6_dev *idev = ip6_dst_idev(skb_dst(skb));
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) && sk_mc_loop(skb->sk) &&
((mroute6_socket(dev_net(dev), skb) &&
!(IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)) ||
ipv6_chk_mcast_addr(dev, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr))) {
struct sk_buff *newskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* Do not check for IFF_ALLMULTI; multicast routing
is not supported in any case.
*/
if (newskb)
NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
newskb, NULL, newskb->dev,
dev_loopback_xmit);
if (ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit == 0) {
IP6_INC_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev,
IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
}
IP6_UPD_PO_STATS(dev_net(dev), idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTMCAST,
skb->len);
if (IPV6_ADDR_MC_SCOPE(&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr) <=
IPV6_ADDR_SCOPE_NODELOCAL &&
!(dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
}
rcu_read_lock_bh();
nexthop = rt6_nexthop((struct rt6_info *)dst, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr);
neigh = __ipv6_neigh_lookup_noref(dst->dev, nexthop);
if (unlikely(!neigh))
neigh = __neigh_create(&nd_tbl, nexthop, dst->dev, false);
if (!IS_ERR(neigh)) {
ret = dst_neigh_output(dst, neigh, skb);
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return ret;
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
IP6_INC_STATS_BH(dev_net(dst->dev),
ip6_dst_idev(dst), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp packets following an UFO enqueued packet need also be handled by UFO
In the following scenario the socket is corked:
If the first UDP packet is larger then the mtu we try to append it to the
write queue via ip6_ufo_append_data. A following packet, which is smaller
than the mtu would be appended to the already queued up gso-skb via
plain ip6_append_data. This causes random memory corruptions.
In ip6_ufo_append_data we also have to be careful to not queue up the
same skb multiple times. So setup the gso frame only when no first skb
is available.
This also fixes a shortcoming where we add the current packet's length to
cork->length but return early because of a packet > mtu with dontfrag set
(instead of sutracting it again).
Found with trinity.
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: des_encrypt_cbc(const unsigned char *key, int keysize, unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH],
const unsigned char *input, size_t length, unsigned char *output)
{
return openssl_enc(EVP_des_cbc(), key, iv, input, length, output);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff **ipv6_gro_receive(struct sk_buff **head,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct net_offload *ops;
struct sk_buff **pp = NULL;
struct sk_buff *p;
struct ipv6hdr *iph;
unsigned int nlen;
unsigned int hlen;
unsigned int off;
u16 flush = 1;
int proto;
off = skb_gro_offset(skb);
hlen = off + sizeof(*iph);
iph = skb_gro_header_fast(skb, off);
if (skb_gro_header_hard(skb, hlen)) {
iph = skb_gro_header_slow(skb, hlen, off);
if (unlikely(!iph))
goto out;
}
skb_set_network_header(skb, off);
skb_gro_pull(skb, sizeof(*iph));
skb_set_transport_header(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
flush += ntohs(iph->payload_len) != skb_gro_len(skb);
rcu_read_lock();
proto = iph->nexthdr;
ops = rcu_dereference(inet6_offloads[proto]);
if (!ops || !ops->callbacks.gro_receive) {
__pskb_pull(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
skb_gro_frag0_invalidate(skb);
proto = ipv6_gso_pull_exthdrs(skb, proto);
skb_gro_pull(skb, -skb_transport_offset(skb));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
__skb_push(skb, skb_gro_offset(skb));
ops = rcu_dereference(inet6_offloads[proto]);
if (!ops || !ops->callbacks.gro_receive)
goto out_unlock;
iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
}
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->proto = proto;
flush--;
nlen = skb_network_header_len(skb);
for (p = *head; p; p = p->next) {
const struct ipv6hdr *iph2;
__be32 first_word; /* <Version:4><Traffic_Class:8><Flow_Label:20> */
if (!NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow)
continue;
iph2 = (struct ipv6hdr *)(p->data + off);
first_word = *(__be32 *)iph ^ *(__be32 *)iph2;
/* All fields must match except length and Traffic Class.
* XXX skbs on the gro_list have all been parsed and pulled
* already so we don't need to compare nlen
* (nlen != (sizeof(*iph2) + ipv6_exthdrs_len(iph2, &ops)))
* memcmp() alone below is suffcient, right?
*/
if ((first_word & htonl(0xF00FFFFF)) ||
memcmp(&iph->nexthdr, &iph2->nexthdr,
nlen - offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr))) {
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->same_flow = 0;
continue;
}
/* flush if Traffic Class fields are different */
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->flush |= !!(first_word & htonl(0x0FF00000));
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->flush |= flush;
/* If the previous IP ID value was based on an atomic
* datagram we can overwrite the value and ignore it.
*/
if (NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_atomic)
NAPI_GRO_CB(p)->flush_id = 0;
}
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->is_atomic = true;
NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush |= flush;
skb_gro_postpull_rcsum(skb, iph, nlen);
pp = call_gro_receive(ops->callbacks.gro_receive, head, skb);
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
skb_gro_flush_final(skb, pp, flush);
return pp;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program. The reproducer is basically:
int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.
This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.
[ 42.361487] ==================================================================
[ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[ 42.366469]
[ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 42.368824] Call Trace:
[ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[ 42.397257]
[ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.403718]
[ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.409513]
[ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 42.415604]
[ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 42.418273] ^
[ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 65,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dump_config_tree(
config_tree *ptree,
FILE *df,
int comment
)
{
peer_node *peern;
unpeer_node *unpeern;
attr_val *atrv;
address_node *addr;
address_node *peer_addr;
address_node *fudge_addr;
filegen_node *fgen_node;
restrict_node *rest_node;
addr_opts_node *addr_opts;
setvar_node *setv_node;
nic_rule_node *rule_node;
int_node *i_n;
int_node *flags;
string_node *str_node;
const char *s;
char *s1;
char *s2;
char timestamp[80];
int enable;
DPRINTF(1, ("dump_config_tree(%p)\n", ptree));
if (comment) {
if (!strftime(timestamp, sizeof(timestamp),
"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S",
localtime(&ptree->timestamp)))
timestamp[0] = '\0';
fprintf(df, "# %s %s %s\n",
timestamp,
(CONF_SOURCE_NTPQ == ptree->source.attr)
? "ntpq remote config from"
: "startup configuration file",
ptree->source.value.s);
}
/* For options I didn't find documentation I'll just output its name and the cor. value */
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->vars);
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link) {
switch (atrv->type) {
#ifdef DEBUG
default:
fprintf(df, "\n# dump error:\n"
"# unknown vars type %d (%s) for %s\n",
atrv->type, token_name(atrv->type),
token_name(atrv->attr));
break;
#endif
case T_Double:
fprintf(df, "%s %s\n", keyword(atrv->attr),
normal_dtoa(atrv->value.d));
break;
case T_Integer:
fprintf(df, "%s %d\n", keyword(atrv->attr),
atrv->value.i);
break;
case T_String:
fprintf(df, "%s \"%s\"", keyword(atrv->attr),
atrv->value.s);
if (T_Driftfile == atrv->attr &&
atrv->link != NULL &&
T_WanderThreshold == atrv->link->attr) {
atrv = atrv->link;
fprintf(df, " %s\n",
normal_dtoa(atrv->value.d));
} else {
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
break;
}
}
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->logconfig);
if (atrv != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "logconfig");
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link)
fprintf(df, " %c%s", atrv->attr, atrv->value.s);
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
if (ptree->stats_dir)
fprintf(df, "statsdir \"%s\"\n", ptree->stats_dir);
i_n = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->stats_list);
if (i_n != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "statistics");
for ( ; i_n != NULL; i_n = i_n->link)
fprintf(df, " %s", keyword(i_n->i));
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
fgen_node = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->filegen_opts);
for ( ; fgen_node != NULL; fgen_node = fgen_node->link) {
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(fgen_node->options);
if (atrv != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "filegen %s",
keyword(fgen_node->filegen_token));
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link) {
switch (atrv->attr) {
#ifdef DEBUG
default:
fprintf(df, "\n# dump error:\n"
"# unknown filegen option token %s\n"
"filegen %s",
token_name(atrv->attr),
keyword(fgen_node->filegen_token));
break;
#endif
case T_File:
fprintf(df, " file %s",
atrv->value.s);
break;
case T_Type:
fprintf(df, " type %s",
keyword(atrv->value.i));
break;
case T_Flag:
fprintf(df, " %s",
keyword(atrv->value.i));
break;
}
}
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
}
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->auth.crypto_cmd_list);
if (atrv != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "crypto");
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link) {
fprintf(df, " %s %s", keyword(atrv->attr),
atrv->value.s);
}
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
if (ptree->auth.revoke != 0)
fprintf(df, "revoke %d\n", ptree->auth.revoke);
if (ptree->auth.keysdir != NULL)
fprintf(df, "keysdir \"%s\"\n", ptree->auth.keysdir);
if (ptree->auth.keys != NULL)
fprintf(df, "keys \"%s\"\n", ptree->auth.keys);
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->auth.trusted_key_list);
if (atrv != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "trustedkey");
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link) {
if (T_Integer == atrv->type)
fprintf(df, " %d", atrv->value.i);
else if (T_Intrange == atrv->type)
fprintf(df, " (%d ... %d)",
atrv->value.r.first,
atrv->value.r.last);
#ifdef DEBUG
else
fprintf(df, "\n# dump error:\n"
"# unknown trustedkey attr type %d\n"
"trustedkey", atrv->type);
#endif
}
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
if (ptree->auth.control_key)
fprintf(df, "controlkey %d\n", ptree->auth.control_key);
if (ptree->auth.request_key)
fprintf(df, "requestkey %d\n", ptree->auth.request_key);
/* dump enable list, then disable list */
for (enable = 1; enable >= 0; enable--) {
atrv = (enable)
? HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->enable_opts)
: HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->disable_opts);
if (atrv != NULL) {
fprintf(df, (enable)
? "enable"
: "disable");
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link)
fprintf(df, " %s",
keyword(atrv->value.i));
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
}
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->orphan_cmds);
if (atrv != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "tos");
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link) {
switch (atrv->type) {
#ifdef DEBUG
default:
fprintf(df, "\n# dump error:\n"
"# unknown tos attr type %d %s\n"
"tos", atrv->type,
token_name(atrv->type));
break;
#endif
case T_Double:
fprintf(df, " %s %s",
keyword(atrv->attr),
normal_dtoa(atrv->value.d));
break;
}
}
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->tinker);
if (atrv != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "tinker");
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link) {
NTP_INSIST(T_Double == atrv->type);
fprintf(df, " %s %s", keyword(atrv->attr),
normal_dtoa(atrv->value.d));
}
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
if (ptree->broadcastclient)
fprintf(df, "broadcastclient\n");
peern = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->peers);
for ( ; peern != NULL; peern = peern->link) {
addr = peern->addr;
fprintf(df, "%s", keyword(peern->host_mode));
switch (addr->type) {
#ifdef DEBUG
default:
fprintf(df, "# dump error:\n"
"# unknown peer family %d for:\n"
"%s", addr->type,
keyword(peern->host_mode));
break;
#endif
case AF_UNSPEC:
break;
case AF_INET:
fprintf(df, " -4");
break;
case AF_INET6:
fprintf(df, " -6");
break;
}
fprintf(df, " %s", addr->address);
if (peern->minpoll != 0)
fprintf(df, " minpoll %u", peern->minpoll);
if (peern->maxpoll != 0)
fprintf(df, " maxpoll %u", peern->maxpoll);
if (peern->ttl != 0) {
if (strlen(addr->address) > 8
&& !memcmp(addr->address, "127.127.", 8))
fprintf(df, " mode %u", peern->ttl);
else
fprintf(df, " ttl %u", peern->ttl);
}
if (peern->peerversion != NTP_VERSION)
fprintf(df, " version %u", peern->peerversion);
if (peern->peerkey != 0)
fprintf(df, " key %u", peern->peerkey);
if (peern->group != NULL)
fprintf(df, " ident \"%s\"", peern->group);
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(peern->peerflags);
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link) {
NTP_INSIST(T_Flag == atrv->attr);
NTP_INSIST(T_Integer == atrv->type);
fprintf(df, " %s", keyword(atrv->value.i));
}
fprintf(df, "\n");
addr_opts = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->fudge);
for ( ; addr_opts != NULL; addr_opts = addr_opts->link) {
peer_addr = peern->addr;
fudge_addr = addr_opts->addr;
s1 = peer_addr->address;
s2 = fudge_addr->address;
if (strcmp(s1, s2))
continue;
fprintf(df, "fudge %s", s1);
for (atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(addr_opts->options);
atrv != NULL;
atrv = atrv->link) {
switch (atrv->type) {
#ifdef DEBUG
default:
fprintf(df, "\n# dump error:\n"
"# unknown fudge atrv->type %d\n"
"fudge %s", atrv->type,
s1);
break;
#endif
case T_Double:
fprintf(df, " %s %s",
keyword(atrv->attr),
normal_dtoa(atrv->value.d));
break;
case T_Integer:
fprintf(df, " %s %d",
keyword(atrv->attr),
atrv->value.i);
break;
case T_String:
fprintf(df, " %s %s",
keyword(atrv->attr),
atrv->value.s);
break;
}
}
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
}
addr = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->manycastserver);
if (addr != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "manycastserver");
for ( ; addr != NULL; addr = addr->link)
fprintf(df, " %s", addr->address);
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
addr = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->multicastclient);
if (addr != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "multicastclient");
for ( ; addr != NULL; addr = addr->link)
fprintf(df, " %s", addr->address);
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
for (unpeern = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->unpeers);
unpeern != NULL;
unpeern = unpeern->link)
fprintf(df, "unpeer %s\n", unpeern->addr->address);
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->mru_opts);
if (atrv != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "mru");
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link)
fprintf(df, " %s %d", keyword(atrv->attr),
atrv->value.i);
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->discard_opts);
if (atrv != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "discard");
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link)
fprintf(df, " %s %d", keyword(atrv->attr),
atrv->value.i);
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
for (rest_node = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->restrict_opts);
rest_node != NULL;
rest_node = rest_node->link) {
if (NULL == rest_node->addr) {
s = "default";
flags = HEAD_PFIFO(rest_node->flags);
for ( ; flags != NULL; flags = flags->link)
if (T_Source == flags->i) {
s = "source";
break;
}
} else {
s = rest_node->addr->address;
}
fprintf(df, "restrict %s", s);
if (rest_node->mask != NULL)
fprintf(df, " mask %s",
rest_node->mask->address);
flags = HEAD_PFIFO(rest_node->flags);
for ( ; flags != NULL; flags = flags->link)
if (T_Source != flags->i)
fprintf(df, " %s", keyword(flags->i));
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
rule_node = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->nic_rules);
for ( ; rule_node != NULL; rule_node = rule_node->link) {
fprintf(df, "interface %s %s\n",
keyword(rule_node->action),
(rule_node->match_class)
? keyword(rule_node->match_class)
: rule_node->if_name);
}
str_node = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->phone);
if (str_node != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "phone");
for ( ; str_node != NULL; str_node = str_node->link)
fprintf(df, " \"%s\"", str_node->s);
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->qos);
if (atrv != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "qos");
for (; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link)
fprintf(df, " %s", atrv->value.s);
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
setv_node = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->setvar);
for ( ; setv_node != NULL; setv_node = setv_node->link) {
s1 = quote_if_needed(setv_node->var);
s2 = quote_if_needed(setv_node->val);
fprintf(df, "setvar %s = %s", s1, s2);
free(s1);
free(s2);
if (setv_node->isdefault)
fprintf(df, " default");
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
i_n = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->ttl);
if (i_n != NULL) {
fprintf(df, "ttl");
for( ; i_n != NULL; i_n = i_n->link)
fprintf(df, " %d", i_n->i);
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
addr_opts = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->trap);
for ( ; addr_opts != NULL; addr_opts = addr_opts->link) {
addr = addr_opts->addr;
fprintf(df, "trap %s", addr->address);
atrv = HEAD_PFIFO(addr_opts->options);
for ( ; atrv != NULL; atrv = atrv->link) {
switch (atrv->attr) {
#ifdef DEBUG
default:
fprintf(df, "\n# dump error:\n"
"# unknown trap token %d\n"
"trap %s", atrv->attr,
addr->address);
break;
#endif
case T_Port:
fprintf(df, " port %d", atrv->value.i);
break;
case T_Interface:
fprintf(df, " interface %s",
atrv->value.s);
break;
}
}
fprintf(df, "\n");
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_pre_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long flags;
unsigned int dest;
struct pi_desc old, new;
struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm) ||
!irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP))
return 0;
vcpu->pre_pcpu = vcpu->cpu;
spin_lock_irqsave(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
list_add_tail(&vcpu->blocked_vcpu_list,
&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu,
vcpu->pre_pcpu));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
do {
old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control;
/*
* We should not block the vCPU if
* an interrupt is posted for it.
*/
if (pi_test_on(pi_desc) == 1) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
list_del(&vcpu->blocked_vcpu_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(
&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock,
vcpu->pre_pcpu), flags);
vcpu->pre_pcpu = -1;
return 1;
}
WARN((pi_desc->sn == 1),
"Warning: SN field of posted-interrupts "
"is set before blocking\n");
/*
* Since vCPU can be preempted during this process,
* vcpu->cpu could be different with pre_pcpu, we
* need to set pre_pcpu as the destination of wakeup
* notification event, then we can find the right vCPU
* to wakeup in wakeup handler if interrupts happen
* when the vCPU is in blocked state.
*/
dest = cpu_physical_id(vcpu->pre_pcpu);
if (x2apic_enabled())
new.ndst = dest;
else
new.ndst = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00;
/* set 'NV' to 'wakeup vector' */
new.nv = POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR;
} while (cmpxchg(&pi_desc->control, old.control,
new.control) != old.control);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_preempt_tick(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *curr)
{
unsigned long ideal_runtime, delta_exec;
struct sched_entity *se;
s64 delta;
ideal_runtime = sched_slice(cfs_rq, curr);
delta_exec = curr->sum_exec_runtime - curr->prev_sum_exec_runtime;
if (delta_exec > ideal_runtime) {
resched_curr(rq_of(cfs_rq));
/*
* The current task ran long enough, ensure it doesn't get
* re-elected due to buddy favours.
*/
clear_buddies(cfs_rq, curr);
return;
}
/*
* Ensure that a task that missed wakeup preemption by a
* narrow margin doesn't have to wait for a full slice.
* This also mitigates buddy induced latencies under load.
*/
if (delta_exec < sysctl_sched_min_granularity)
return;
se = __pick_first_entity(cfs_rq);
delta = curr->vruntime - se->vruntime;
if (delta < 0)
return;
if (delta > ideal_runtime)
resched_curr(rq_of(cfs_rq));
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int common_perm_create(int op, const struct path *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
{
struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
if (!mediated_filesystem(dir->dentry))
return 0;
return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void omx_vdec::adjust_timestamp(OMX_S64 &act_timestamp)
{
if (rst_prev_ts && VALID_TS(act_timestamp)) {
prev_ts = act_timestamp;
rst_prev_ts = false;
} else if (VALID_TS(prev_ts)) {
bool codec_cond = (drv_ctx.timestamp_adjust)?
(!VALID_TS(act_timestamp) || act_timestamp < prev_ts || llabs(act_timestamp - prev_ts) <= 2000) :
(!VALID_TS(act_timestamp) || act_timestamp <= prev_ts);
if (frm_int > 0 && codec_cond) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("adjust_timestamp: original ts[%lld]", act_timestamp);
act_timestamp = prev_ts + frm_int;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("adjust_timestamp: predicted ts[%lld]", act_timestamp);
prev_ts = act_timestamp;
} else {
if (drv_ctx.picture_order == VDEC_ORDER_DISPLAY && act_timestamp < prev_ts) {
act_timestamp = prev_ts;
}
set_frame_rate(act_timestamp);
}
} else if (frm_int > 0) // In this case the frame rate was set along
{ // with the port definition, start ts with 0
act_timestamp = prev_ts = 0; // and correct if a valid ts is received.
rst_prev_ts = true;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int unimac_mdio_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
struct unimac_mdio_priv *priv = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
mdiobus_unregister(priv->mii_bus);
mdiobus_free(priv->mii_bus);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: phy: mdio-bcm-unimac: fix potential NULL dereference in unimac_mdio_probe()
platform_get_resource() may fail and return NULL, so we should
better check it's return value to avoid a NULL pointer dereference
a bit later in the code.
This is detected by Coccinelle semantic patch.
@@
expression pdev, res, n, t, e, e1, e2;
@@
res = platform_get_resource(pdev, t, n);
+ if (!res)
+ return -EINVAL;
... when != res == NULL
e = devm_ioremap(e1, res->start, e2);
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 83,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rede_get_entry(struct file_info *re)
{
struct file_info *file;
if ((file = re->rede_files.first) != NULL) {
re->rede_files.first = file->re_next;
if (re->rede_files.first == NULL)
re->rede_files.last =
&(re->rede_files.first);
}
return (file);
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight(WebKitWebViewBase* webkitWebViewBase, unsigned height)
{
if (!webkitWebViewBase->priv->inspectorView)
return;
if (webkitWebViewBase->priv->inspectorViewHeight == height)
return;
webkitWebViewBase->priv->inspectorViewHeight = height;
gtk_widget_queue_resize_no_redraw(GTK_WIDGET(webkitWebViewBase));
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LowBatteryObserver::Show(base::TimeDelta remaining, bool urgent) {
notification_.Show(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_LOW_BATTERY_MESSAGE,
TimeFormat::TimeRemaining(remaining)), urgent, true);
remaining_ = remaining.InMinutes();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainIsUpdated(virDomainPtr dom)
{
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(dom);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(dom, -1);
if (dom->conn->driver->domainIsUpdated) {
int ret;
ret = dom->conn->driver->domainIsUpdated(dom);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(dom->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::GetContentLengths(
unsigned int days,
int64_t* original_content_length,
int64_t* received_content_length,
int64_t* last_update_time) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats());
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()->GetContentLengths(
days, original_content_length, received_content_length, last_update_time);
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ManifestUmaUtil::FetchSucceeded() {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kUMANameFetchResult,
MANIFEST_FETCH_SUCCESS,
MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT);
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID: | 0 | 150,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *trak_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TrackBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TRAK);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int loadFile(const sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card, const sc_path_t *path,
u8 *buf, const size_t buflen)
{
int sc_res;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(p15card->card->ctx, 1);
sc_res = sc_select_file(p15card->card, path, NULL);
if(sc_res != SC_SUCCESS)
return sc_res;
sc_res = sc_read_binary(p15card->card, 0, buf, buflen, 0);
return sc_res;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS parse_sinar_ia()
{
int entries, off;
char str[8], *cp;
order = 0x4949;
fseek (ifp, 4, SEEK_SET);
entries = get4();
fseek (ifp, get4(), SEEK_SET);
while (entries--) {
off = get4(); get4();
fread (str, 8, 1, ifp);
if (!strcmp(str,"META")) meta_offset = off;
if (!strcmp(str,"THUMB")) thumb_offset = off;
if (!strcmp(str,"RAW0")) data_offset = off;
}
fseek (ifp, meta_offset+20, SEEK_SET);
fread (make, 64, 1, ifp);
make[63] = 0;
if ((cp = strchr(make,' '))) {
strcpy (model, cp+1);
*cp = 0;
}
raw_width = get2();
raw_height = get2();
load_raw = &CLASS unpacked_load_raw;
thumb_width = (get4(),get2());
thumb_height = get2();
write_thumb = &CLASS ppm_thumb;
maximum = 0x3fff;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_fmt(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
regex_t rx;
int rc, rv = -1;
if (strchr(m->desc, '%') == NULL)
return 0;
(void)setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C");
rc = regcomp(&rx, "%[-0-9\\.]*s", REG_EXTENDED|REG_NOSUB);
if (rc) {
char errmsg[512];
(void)regerror(rc, &rx, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg));
file_magerror(ms, "regex error %d, (%s)", rc, errmsg);
} else {
rc = regexec(&rx, m->desc, 0, 0, 0);
regfree(&rx);
rv = !rc;
}
(void)setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
return rv;
}
Commit Message: PR/313: Aaron Reffett: Check properly for exceeding the offset.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 39,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InitAsPopup(
RenderWidgetHostView* parent_host_view,
const gfx::Rect& bounds_in_screen) {
popup_parent_host_view_ =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewAura*>(parent_host_view);
RenderWidgetHostViewAura* old_child =
popup_parent_host_view_->popup_child_host_view_;
if (old_child) {
DCHECK(old_child->popup_parent_host_view_ == popup_parent_host_view_);
old_child->popup_parent_host_view_ = NULL;
}
popup_parent_host_view_->popup_child_host_view_ = this;
window_->SetType(aura::client::WINDOW_TYPE_MENU);
window_->Init(ui::LAYER_TEXTURED);
window_->SetName("RenderWidgetHostViewAura");
aura::RootWindow* root = popup_parent_host_view_->window_->GetRootWindow();
window_->SetDefaultParentByRootWindow(root, bounds_in_screen);
aura::client::ScreenPositionClient* screen_position_client =
aura::client::GetScreenPositionClient(root);
gfx::Point origin_in_parent(bounds_in_screen.origin());
if (screen_position_client) {
screen_position_client->ConvertPointFromScreen(
window_->parent(), &origin_in_parent);
}
SetBounds(gfx::Rect(origin_in_parent, bounds_in_screen.size()));
Show();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsBackForwardNavigationInProgress(LocalFrame* local_frame) {
return local_frame &&
IsBackForwardLoadType(
local_frame->Loader().GetDocumentLoader()->LoadType()) &&
!local_frame->GetDocument()->LoadEventFinished();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CSPSource::pathMatches(const KURL& url) const
{
if (m_path.isEmpty())
return true;
String path = decodeURLEscapeSequences(url.path());
if (m_path.endsWith("/"))
return path.startsWith(m_path, TextCaseInsensitive);
return path == m_path;
}
Commit Message: CSP: Source expressions can no longer lock sites into insecurity.
CSP's matching algorithm has been updated to make clever folks like Yan
slightly less able to gather data on user's behavior based on CSP
reports[1]. This matches Firefox's existing behavior (they apparently
changed this behavior a few months ago, via a happy accident[2]), and
mitigates the CSP-variant of Sniffly[3].
On the dashboard at https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/6653486812889088.
[1]: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/commit/0e81d81b64c42ca3c81c048161162b9697ff7b60
[2]: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1218524#c2
[3]: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1218778#c7
BUG=544765,558232
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1455973003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360562}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 132,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bsg_add_command(struct bsg_device *bd, struct request_queue *q,
struct bsg_command *bc, struct request *rq)
{
int at_head = (0 == (bc->hdr.flags & BSG_FLAG_Q_AT_TAIL));
/*
* add bc command to busy queue and submit rq for io
*/
bc->rq = rq;
bc->bio = rq->bio;
if (rq->next_rq)
bc->bidi_bio = rq->next_rq->bio;
bc->hdr.duration = jiffies;
spin_lock_irq(&bd->lock);
list_add_tail(&bc->list, &bd->busy_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&bd->lock);
dprintk("%s: queueing rq %p, bc %p\n", bd->name, rq, bc);
rq->end_io_data = bc;
blk_execute_rq_nowait(q, NULL, rq, at_head, bsg_rq_end_io);
}
Commit Message: sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload;
worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad
API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS.
Bail out early if that happens.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 47,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FlipContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
uint8_t *inrow, *outrow;
int i, j, plane, step;
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
/* copy palette if required */
if (av_pix_fmt_desc_get(inlink->format)->flags & AV_PIX_FMT_FLAG_PAL)
memcpy(out->data[1], in->data[1], AVPALETTE_SIZE);
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && in->data[plane]; plane++) {
const int width = (plane == 1 || plane == 2) ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, s->hsub) : inlink->w;
const int height = (plane == 1 || plane == 2) ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, s->vsub) : inlink->h;
step = s->max_step[plane];
outrow = out->data[plane];
inrow = in ->data[plane] + (width - 1) * step;
for (i = 0; i < height; i++) {
switch (step) {
case 1:
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow[j] = inrow[-j];
break;
case 2:
{
uint16_t *outrow16 = (uint16_t *)outrow;
uint16_t * inrow16 = (uint16_t *) inrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow16[j] = inrow16[-j];
}
break;
case 3:
{
uint8_t *in = inrow;
uint8_t *out = outrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++, out += 3, in -= 3) {
int32_t v = AV_RB24(in);
AV_WB24(out, v);
}
}
break;
case 4:
{
uint32_t *outrow32 = (uint32_t *)outrow;
uint32_t * inrow32 = (uint32_t *) inrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow32[j] = inrow32[-j];
}
break;
default:
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
memcpy(outrow + j*step, inrow - j*step, step);
}
inrow += in ->linesize[plane];
outrow += out->linesize[plane];
}
}
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 166,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int h2_wake(struct connection *conn)
{
struct h2c *h2c = conn->mux_ctx;
struct session *sess = conn->owner;
if (h2c->dbuf->i && !(h2c->flags & H2_CF_DEM_BLOCK_ANY)) {
h2_process_demux(h2c);
if (h2c->st0 >= H2_CS_ERROR || conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR)
h2c->dbuf->i = 0;
if (h2c->dbuf->i != h2c->dbuf->size)
h2c->flags &= ~H2_CF_DEM_DFULL;
}
if (sess && unlikely(sess->fe->state == PR_STSTOPPED)) {
/* frontend is stopping, reload likely in progress, let's try
* to announce a graceful shutdown if not yet done. We don't
* care if it fails, it will be tried again later.
*/
if (!(h2c->flags & (H2_CF_GOAWAY_SENT|H2_CF_GOAWAY_FAILED))) {
if (h2c->last_sid < 0)
h2c->last_sid = (1U << 31) - 1;
h2c_send_goaway_error(h2c, NULL);
}
}
/*
* If we received early data, and the handshake is done, wake
* any stream that was waiting for it.
*/
if (!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_WAIT_FOR_HS) &&
(conn->flags & (CO_FL_EARLY_SSL_HS | CO_FL_HANDSHAKE | CO_FL_EARLY_DATA)) == CO_FL_EARLY_DATA) {
struct eb32_node *node;
struct h2s *h2s;
h2c->flags |= H2_CF_WAIT_FOR_HS;
node = eb32_lookup_ge(&h2c->streams_by_id, 1);
while (node) {
h2s = container_of(node, struct h2s, by_id);
if (h2s->cs->flags & CS_FL_WAIT_FOR_HS)
h2s->cs->data_cb->wake(h2s->cs);
node = eb32_next(node);
}
}
if (conn->flags & CO_FL_ERROR || conn_xprt_read0_pending(conn) ||
h2c->st0 == H2_CS_ERROR2 || h2c->flags & H2_CF_GOAWAY_FAILED ||
(eb_is_empty(&h2c->streams_by_id) && h2c->last_sid >= 0 &&
h2c->max_id >= h2c->last_sid)) {
h2_wake_some_streams(h2c, 0, 0);
if (eb_is_empty(&h2c->streams_by_id)) {
/* no more stream, kill the connection now */
h2_release(conn);
return -1;
}
else {
/* some streams still there, we need to signal them all and
* wait for their departure.
*/
__conn_xprt_stop_recv(conn);
__conn_xprt_stop_send(conn);
return 0;
}
}
if (!h2c->dbuf->i)
h2_release_buf(h2c, &h2c->dbuf);
/* stop being notified of incoming data if we can't process them */
if (!h2_recv_allowed(h2c)) {
__conn_xprt_stop_recv(conn);
}
else {
__conn_xprt_want_recv(conn);
}
/* adjust output polling */
if (!(conn->flags & CO_FL_SOCK_WR_SH) &&
(h2c->st0 == H2_CS_ERROR ||
h2c->mbuf->o ||
(h2c->mws > 0 && !LIST_ISEMPTY(&h2c->fctl_list)) ||
(!(h2c->flags & H2_CF_MUX_BLOCK_ANY) && !LIST_ISEMPTY(&h2c->send_list)))) {
__conn_xprt_want_send(conn);
}
else {
h2_release_buf(h2c, &h2c->mbuf);
__conn_xprt_stop_send(conn);
}
if (h2c->task) {
if (eb_is_empty(&h2c->streams_by_id) || h2c->mbuf->o) {
h2c->task->expire = tick_add(now_ms, h2c->last_sid < 0 ? h2c->timeout : h2c->shut_timeout);
task_queue(h2c->task);
}
else
h2c->task->expire = TICK_ETERNITY;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ax25_shutdown(struct socket *sk, int how)
{
/* FIXME - generate DM and RNR states */
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: ax25: fix info leak via msg_name in ax25_recvmsg()
When msg_namelen is non-zero the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Additionally the
msg_namelen value is updated to sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25) but is
not always filled up to this size.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static AVDictionaryEntry *get_metadata_lang(AVFormatContext *s,
const char *tag, int *lang)
{
int l, len, len2;
AVDictionaryEntry *t, *t2 = NULL;
char tag2[16];
*lang = 0;
if (!(t = av_dict_get(s->metadata, tag, NULL, 0)))
return NULL;
len = strlen(t->key);
snprintf(tag2, sizeof(tag2), "%s-", tag);
while ((t2 = av_dict_get(s->metadata, tag2, t2, AV_DICT_IGNORE_SUFFIX))) {
len2 = strlen(t2->key);
if (len2 == len + 4 && !strcmp(t->value, t2->value)
&& (l = ff_mov_iso639_to_lang(&t2->key[len2 - 3], 1)) >= 0) {
*lang = l;
return t;
}
}
return t;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UsbDeviceImpl::~UsbDeviceImpl() {
libusb_unref_device(platform_device_);
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace::getGrayLine(Guchar *in, Guchar *out, int length) {
memcpy (out, in, length);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr pscratch = esp - 2;
file_enum *pfen = r_ptr(esp - 1, file_enum);
int devlen = esp[-3].value.intval;
gx_io_device *iodev = r_ptr(esp - 4, gx_io_device);
uint len = r_size(pscratch);
uint code;
if (len < devlen)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck); /* not even room for device len */
do {
memcpy((char *)pscratch->value.bytes, iodev->dname, devlen);
code = iodev->procs.enumerate_next(pfen, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes + devlen,
len - devlen);
if (code == ~(uint) 0) { /* all done */
esp -= 5; /* pop proc, pfen, devlen, iodev , mark */
return o_pop_estack;
} else if (code > len) /* overran string */
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
else if (iodev != iodev_default(imemory)
|| (check_file_permissions(i_ctx_p, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes, code + devlen, iodev, "PermitFileReading")) == 0) {
push(1);
ref_assign(op, pscratch);
r_set_size(op, code + devlen);
push_op_estack(file_continue); /* come again */
*++esp = pscratch[2]; /* proc */
return o_push_estack;
}
} while(1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void uas_xfer_data(struct urb *urb, struct scsi_cmnd *cmnd,
unsigned direction)
{
struct uas_cmd_info *cmdinfo = (void *)&cmnd->SCp;
int err;
cmdinfo->state |= direction | SUBMIT_STATUS_URB;
err = uas_submit_urbs(cmnd, cmnd->device->hostdata);
if (err) {
uas_add_work(cmdinfo);
}
}
Commit Message: USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int patternbasecolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, int base, int *stage, int *cont, int *stack_depth)
{
os_ptr op;
int i, components=0;
if (r_size(space) > 1) {
const gs_color_space * pcs = gs_currentcolorspace(igs);
const gs_client_color * pcc = gs_currentcolor(igs);
int n = cs_num_components(pcs);
bool push_pattern = n < 0;
gs_pattern_instance_t * pinst = pcc->pattern;
if (pinst != 0 && pattern_instance_uses_base_space(pinst)) {
/* check for pattern */
if (push_pattern)
pop(1); /* The pattern instance */
*stage = 0;
*cont = 1;
return 0;
}
/* If the pattern isn't yet initialised, or doesn't use the
* base space, treat as uncolored and return defaults below
* Fall Through.
*/
}
pop(1);
op = osp;
switch(base) {
case 0:
components = 1;
break;
case 1:
case 2:
components = 3;
break;
case 3:
components = 4;
break;
}
push(components);
op -= components-1;
for (i=0;i<components;i++) {
make_real(op, (float)0);
op++;
}
if (components == 4) {
op--;
make_real(op, (float)1);
}
*stage = 0;
*cont = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *realloc_strcat(char *ptr, char *s)
{
size_t old = 0, len = strlen(s);
char *ret;
if (!len)
return ptr;
if (ptr)
old = strlen(ptr);
len += old + 1;
align_len(&len);
ret = malloc(len);
if (unlikely(!ret))
quithere(1, "Failed to malloc");
if (ptr) {
sprintf(ret, "%s%s", ptr, s);
free(ptr);
} else
sprintf(ret, "%s", s);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 36,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: linux_md_create_device_not_seen_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
LinuxMdCreateData *data = user_data;
throw_error (data->context, ERROR_FAILED, "Error assembling array: timeout (10s) waiting for array to show up");
g_signal_handler_disconnect (data->daemon, data->device_added_signal_handler_id);
linux_md_create_data_unref (data);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *sdp_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_SDPBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SDP);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetAccessibilityMode(AccessibilityMode mode) {
if (mode == accessibility_mode_)
return;
if (IsNeverVisible())
return;
accessibility_mode_ = mode;
for (FrameTreeNode* node : frame_tree_.Nodes()) {
UpdateAccessibilityModeOnFrame(node->current_frame_host());
RenderFrameHost* pending_frame_host =
node->render_manager()->pending_frame_host();
if (pending_frame_host)
UpdateAccessibilityModeOnFrame(pending_frame_host);
}
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WT_NoiseGenerator (S_WT_VOICE *pWTVoice, S_WT_INT_FRAME *pWTIntFrame)
{
EAS_PCM *pOutputBuffer;
EAS_I32 phaseInc;
EAS_I32 tmp0;
EAS_I32 tmp1;
EAS_I32 nInterpolatedSample;
EAS_I32 numSamples;
/* initialize some local variables */
numSamples = pWTIntFrame->numSamples;
if (numSamples <= 0) {
ALOGE("b/26366256");
return;
}
pOutputBuffer = pWTIntFrame->pAudioBuffer;
phaseInc = pWTIntFrame->frame.phaseIncrement;
/* get last two samples generated */
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp0 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->phaseAccum) >> 18;
/*lint -e{704} <avoid divide for performance>*/
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
/* generate a buffer of noise */
while (numSamples--) {
nInterpolatedSample = MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp0, (PHASE_ONE - pWTVoice->phaseFrac));
nInterpolatedSample += MULT_AUDIO_COEF( tmp1, pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
*pOutputBuffer++ = (EAS_PCM) nInterpolatedSample;
/* update PRNG */
pWTVoice->phaseFrac += (EAS_U32) phaseInc;
if (GET_PHASE_INT_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac)) {
tmp0 = tmp1;
pWTVoice->phaseAccum = pWTVoice->loopEnd;
pWTVoice->loopEnd = (5 * pWTVoice->loopEnd + 1);
tmp1 = (EAS_I32) (pWTVoice->loopEnd) >> 18;
pWTVoice->phaseFrac = GET_PHASE_FRAC_PART(pWTVoice->phaseFrac);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Sonivox: add SafetyNet log.
Bug: 26366256
Change-Id: Ief72e01b7cc6d87a015105af847a99d3d9b03cb0
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int catc_tx_run(struct catc *catc)
{
int status;
if (catc->is_f5u011)
catc->tx_ptr = (catc->tx_ptr + 63) & ~63;
catc->tx_urb->transfer_buffer_length = catc->tx_ptr;
catc->tx_urb->transfer_buffer = catc->tx_buf[catc->tx_idx];
catc->tx_urb->dev = catc->usbdev;
if ((status = usb_submit_urb(catc->tx_urb, GFP_ATOMIC)) < 0)
dev_err(&catc->usbdev->dev, "submit(tx_urb), status %d\n",
status);
catc->tx_idx = !catc->tx_idx;
catc->tx_ptr = 0;
netif_trans_update(catc->netdev);
return status;
}
Commit Message: catc: Use heap buffer for memory size test
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TabsCreateFunction::RunImpl() {
DictionaryValue* args = NULL;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetDictionary(0, &args));
int window_id = extension_misc::kCurrentWindowId;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kWindowIdKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetInteger(
keys::kWindowIdKey, &window_id));
Browser* browser = NULL;
if (!GetBrowserFromWindowID(this, window_id, &browser))
return false;
if (!browser->is_type_tabbed() && browser->IsAttemptingToCloseBrowser())
browser = chrome::FindTabbedBrowser(profile(), include_incognito(),
browser->host_desktop_type());
if (!browser || !browser->window())
return false;
WebContents* opener = NULL;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kOpenerTabIdKey)) {
int opener_id = -1;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetInteger(
keys::kOpenerTabIdKey, &opener_id));
if (!ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabById(
opener_id, profile(), include_incognito(),
NULL, NULL, &opener, NULL))
return false;
}
std::string url_string;
GURL url;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kUrlKey)) {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetString(keys::kUrlKey,
&url_string));
url = ExtensionTabUtil::ResolvePossiblyRelativeURL(url_string,
GetExtension());
if (!url.is_valid()) {
error_ = ErrorUtils::FormatErrorMessage(keys::kInvalidUrlError,
url_string);
return false;
}
}
if (ExtensionTabUtil::IsCrashURL(url)) {
error_ = keys::kNoCrashBrowserError;
return false;
}
bool active = true;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kSelectedKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetBoolean(keys::kSelectedKey, &active));
if (args->HasKey(keys::kActiveKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetBoolean(keys::kActiveKey, &active));
bool pinned = false;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kPinnedKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetBoolean(keys::kPinnedKey, &pinned));
if (url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme) &&
!extensions::IncognitoInfo::IsSplitMode(GetExtension()) &&
browser->profile()->IsOffTheRecord()) {
Profile* profile = browser->profile()->GetOriginalProfile();
chrome::HostDesktopType desktop_type = browser->host_desktop_type();
browser = chrome::FindTabbedBrowser(profile, false, desktop_type);
if (!browser) {
browser = new Browser(Browser::CreateParams(Browser::TYPE_TABBED,
profile, desktop_type));
browser->window()->Show();
}
}
int index = -1;
if (args->HasKey(keys::kIndexKey))
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args->GetInteger(keys::kIndexKey, &index));
TabStripModel* tab_strip = browser->tab_strip_model();
index = std::min(std::max(index, -1), tab_strip->count());
int add_types = active ? TabStripModel::ADD_ACTIVE : TabStripModel::ADD_NONE;
add_types |= TabStripModel::ADD_FORCE_INDEX;
if (pinned)
add_types |= TabStripModel::ADD_PINNED;
chrome::NavigateParams params(browser, url, content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK);
params.disposition = active ? NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB : NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB;
params.tabstrip_index = index;
params.tabstrip_add_types = add_types;
chrome::Navigate(¶ms);
tab_strip = params.browser->tab_strip_model();
int new_index = tab_strip->GetIndexOfWebContents(params.target_contents);
if (opener)
tab_strip->SetOpenerOfWebContentsAt(new_index, opener);
if (active) {
params.target_contents->GetDelegate()->ActivateContents(
params.target_contents);
}
if (has_callback()) {
SetResult(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
params.target_contents,
tab_strip, new_index, GetExtension()));
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow extensions to take screenshots of interstitial pages. Branched from
https://codereview.chromium.org/14885004/ which is trying to test it.
BUG=229504
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14954004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@198297 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidNavigateMainFramePreCommit(
bool navigation_is_within_page) {
if (navigation_is_within_page) {
return;
}
if (IsFullscreenForCurrentTab(GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget()))
ExitFullscreen(false);
DCHECK(!IsFullscreenForCurrentTab(GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget()));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: put_queue_get_config_reply(struct ofport *port, uint32_t queue,
struct ovs_list *replies)
{
struct ofputil_queue_config qc;
/* None of the existing queues have compatible properties, so we hard-code
* omitting min_rate and max_rate. */
qc.port = port->ofp_port;
qc.queue = queue;
qc.min_rate = UINT16_MAX;
qc.max_rate = UINT16_MAX;
ofputil_append_queue_get_config_reply(&qc, replies);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void opj_pi_emit_error(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi, const char* msg)
{
(void)pi;
(void)msg;
}
Commit Message: [OPENJP2] change the way to compute *p_tx0, *p_tx1, *p_ty0, *p_ty1 in function
opj_get_encoding_parameters
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 92,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __must_check int do_mlock(unsigned long start, size_t len, vm_flags_t flags)
{
unsigned long locked;
unsigned long lock_limit;
int error = -ENOMEM;
if (!can_do_mlock())
return -EPERM;
lru_add_drain_all(); /* flush pagevec */
len = PAGE_ALIGN(len + (offset_in_page(start)));
start &= PAGE_MASK;
lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK);
lock_limit >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
locked = len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (down_write_killable(¤t->mm->mmap_sem))
return -EINTR;
locked += current->mm->locked_vm;
if ((locked > lock_limit) && (!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))) {
/*
* It is possible that the regions requested intersect with
* previously mlocked areas, that part area in "mm->locked_vm"
* should not be counted to new mlock increment count. So check
* and adjust locked count if necessary.
*/
locked -= count_mm_mlocked_page_nr(current->mm,
start, len);
}
/* check against resource limits */
if ((locked <= lock_limit) || capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK))
error = apply_vma_lock_flags(start, len, flags);
up_write(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
if (error)
return error;
error = __mm_populate(start, len, 0);
if (error)
return __mlock_posix_error_return(error);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mlock: fix mlock count can not decrease in race condition
Kefeng reported that when running the follow test, the mlock count in
meminfo will increase permanently:
[1] testcase
linux:~ # cat test_mlockal
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
for j in `seq 0 10`
do
for i in `seq 4 15`
do
./p_mlockall >> log &
done
sleep 0.2
done
# wait some time to let mlock counter decrease and 5s may not enough
sleep 5
grep Mlocked /proc/meminfo
linux:~ # cat p_mlockall.c
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define SPACE_LEN 4096
int main(int argc, char ** argv)
{
int ret;
void *adr = malloc(SPACE_LEN);
if (!adr)
return -1;
ret = mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE);
printf("mlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
ret = munlockall();
printf("munlcokall ret = %d\n", ret);
free(adr);
return 0;
}
In __munlock_pagevec() we should decrement NR_MLOCK for each page where
we clear the PageMlocked flag. Commit 1ebb7cc6a583 ("mm: munlock: batch
NR_MLOCK zone state updates") has introduced a bug where we don't
decrement NR_MLOCK for pages where we clear the flag, but fail to
isolate them from the lru list (e.g. when the pages are on some other
cpu's percpu pagevec). Since PageMlocked stays cleared, the NR_MLOCK
accounting gets permanently disrupted by this.
Fix it by counting the number of page whose PageMlock flag is cleared.
Fixes: 1ebb7cc6a583 (" mm: munlock: batch NR_MLOCK zone state updates")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1495678405-54569-1-git-send-email-xieyisheng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yisheng Xie <xieyisheng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Cc: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 85,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_metadata_int(AVDictionary **dict, const char *key, int value, int allow_zero)
{
if (value || allow_zero) {
return av_dict_set_int(dict, key, value, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/cinedec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.cine
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::setJavaScriptCanAccessClipboard(bool enabled)
{
d->m_page->settings()->setJavaScriptCanAccessClipboard(enabled);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_lapic_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_lapic *apic;
int i;
apic_debug("%s\n", __func__);
ASSERT(vcpu);
apic = vcpu->arch.apic;
ASSERT(apic != NULL);
/* Stop the timer in case it's a reset to an active apic */
hrtimer_cancel(&apic->lapic_timer.timer);
kvm_apic_set_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
kvm_apic_set_version(apic->vcpu);
for (i = 0; i < APIC_LVT_NUM; i++)
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVTT + 0x10 * i, APIC_LVT_MASKED);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_LVT0,
SET_APIC_DELIVERY_MODE(0, APIC_MODE_EXTINT));
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_DFR, 0xffffffffU);
apic_set_spiv(apic, 0xff);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TASKPRI, 0);
kvm_apic_set_ldr(apic, 0);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ESR, 0);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ICR, 0);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ICR2, 0);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TDCR, 0);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TMICT, 0);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_IRR + 0x10 * i, 0);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_ISR + 0x10 * i, 0);
apic_set_reg(apic, APIC_TMR + 0x10 * i, 0);
}
apic->irr_pending = kvm_apic_vid_enabled(vcpu->kvm);
apic->isr_count = kvm_apic_vid_enabled(vcpu->kvm);
apic->highest_isr_cache = -1;
update_divide_count(apic);
atomic_set(&apic->lapic_timer.pending, 0);
if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(vcpu))
kvm_lapic_set_base(vcpu,
vcpu->arch.apic_base | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP);
vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val = 0;
apic_update_ppr(apic);
vcpu->arch.apic_arb_prio = 0;
vcpu->arch.apic_attention = 0;
apic_debug(KERN_INFO "%s: vcpu=%p, id=%d, base_msr="
"0x%016" PRIx64 ", base_address=0x%0lx.\n", __func__,
vcpu, kvm_apic_id(apic),
vcpu->arch.apic_base, apic->base_address);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GIT_INLINE(bool) valid_filemode(const int filemode)
{
return (is_file_or_link(filemode) || filemode == GIT_FILEMODE_COMMIT);
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32_t GenerateNextFlushId() {
return static_cast<uint32_t>(g_flush_id.GetNext());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::registerFormElement(FormAssociatedElement* e)
{
m_associatedElements.insert(formElementIndex(e), e);
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: handle_features_request(struct ofconn *ofconn, const struct ofp_header *oh)
{
struct ofproto *ofproto = ofconn_get_ofproto(ofconn);
struct ofputil_switch_features features;
struct ofport *port;
bool arp_match_ip;
struct ofpbuf *b;
query_switch_features(ofproto, &arp_match_ip, &features.ofpacts);
features.datapath_id = ofproto->datapath_id;
features.n_buffers = 0;
features.n_tables = ofproto_get_n_visible_tables(ofproto);
features.capabilities = (OFPUTIL_C_FLOW_STATS | OFPUTIL_C_TABLE_STATS |
OFPUTIL_C_PORT_STATS | OFPUTIL_C_QUEUE_STATS |
OFPUTIL_C_GROUP_STATS | OFPUTIL_C_BUNDLES);
if (arp_match_ip) {
features.capabilities |= OFPUTIL_C_ARP_MATCH_IP;
}
/* FIXME: Fill in proper features.auxiliary_id for auxiliary connections */
features.auxiliary_id = 0;
b = ofputil_encode_switch_features(&features, ofconn_get_protocol(ofconn),
oh->xid);
HMAP_FOR_EACH (port, hmap_node, &ofproto->ports) {
ofputil_put_switch_features_port(&port->pp, b);
}
ofconn_send_reply(ofconn, b);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChromeClientImpl::requestPointerLock()
{
return m_webView->requestPointerLock();
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReleaseModalDialogEvent(gfx::NativeViewId containing_window) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(modal_dialog_event_map_lock_);
if (!modal_dialog_event_map_.count(containing_window)) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (--(modal_dialog_event_map_[containing_window].refcount))
return;
MessageLoop::current()->DeleteSoon(
FROM_HERE, modal_dialog_event_map_[containing_window].event);
modal_dialog_event_map_.erase(containing_window);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::processHttpEquivContentSecurityPolicy(const String& equiv, const String& content)
{
if (equalIgnoringCase(equiv, "content-security-policy"))
contentSecurityPolicy()->didReceiveHeader(content, ContentSecurityPolicy::Enforce);
else if (equalIgnoringCase(equiv, "content-security-policy-report-only"))
contentSecurityPolicy()->didReceiveHeader(content, ContentSecurityPolicy::Report);
else if (equalIgnoringCase(equiv, "x-webkit-csp"))
UseCounter::countDeprecation(this, UseCounter::PrefixedContentSecurityPolicy);
else if (equalIgnoringCase(equiv, "x-webkit-csp-report-only"))
UseCounter::countDeprecation(this, UseCounter::PrefixedContentSecurityPolicyReportOnly);
else
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid,
struct robust_list_head __user * __user *, head_ptr,
size_t __user *, len_ptr)
{
struct robust_list_head __user *head;
unsigned long ret;
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred;
if (!futex_cmpxchg_enabled)
return -ENOSYS;
if (!pid)
head = current->robust_list;
else {
struct task_struct *p;
ret = -ESRCH;
rcu_read_lock();
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto err_unlock;
ret = -EPERM;
pcred = __task_cred(p);
if (cred->euid != pcred->euid &&
cred->euid != pcred->uid &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto err_unlock;
head = p->robust_list;
rcu_read_unlock();
}
if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr))
return -EFAULT;
return put_user(head, head_ptr);
err_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 39,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void freeClientsInAsyncFreeQueue(void) {
while (listLength(server.clients_to_close)) {
listNode *ln = listFirst(server.clients_to_close);
client *c = listNodeValue(ln);
c->flags &= ~CLIENT_CLOSE_ASAP;
freeClient(c);
listDelNode(server.clients_to_close,ln);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 69,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsTagTypeSignature DecideCurveType(cmsFloat64Number ICCVersion, const void *Data)
{
cmsToneCurve* Curve = (cmsToneCurve*) Data;
if (ICCVersion < 4.0) return cmsSigCurveType;
if (Curve ->nSegments != 1) return cmsSigCurveType; // Only 1-segment curves can be saved as parametric
if (Curve ->Segments[0].Type < 0) return cmsSigCurveType; // Only non-inverted curves
if (Curve ->Segments[0].Type > 5) return cmsSigCurveType; // Only ICC parametric curves
return cmsSigParametricCurveType;
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,931 |
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