instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ip_vs_service_net_cleanup(struct net *net)
{
EnterFunction(2);
/* Check for "full" addressed entries */
mutex_lock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
ip_vs_flush(net);
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
LeaveFunction(2);
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vfio_pci_nointx(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
switch (pdev->vendor) {
case PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL:
switch (pdev->device) {
/* All i40e (XL710/X710) 10/20/40GbE NICs */
case 0x1572:
case 0x1574:
case 0x1580 ... 0x1581:
case 0x1583 ... 0x1589:
case 0x37d0 ... 0x37d2:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 48,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourcePrefetchPredictor::DeleteAllUrls() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (initialization_state_ != INITIALIZED) {
delete_all_data_requested_ = true;
return;
}
host_redirect_data_->DeleteAllData();
origin_data_->DeleteAllData();
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netlbl_cipsov4_listall_cb(struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, void *arg)
{
int ret_val = -ENOMEM;
struct netlbl_cipsov4_doiwalk_arg *cb_arg = arg;
void *data;
data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).pid,
cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_cipsov4_gnl_family,
NLM_F_MULTI, NLBL_CIPSOV4_C_LISTALL);
if (data == NULL)
goto listall_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put_u32(cb_arg->skb, NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_DOI, doi_def->doi);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto listall_cb_failure;
ret_val = nla_put_u32(cb_arg->skb,
NLBL_CIPSOV4_A_MTYPE,
doi_def->type);
if (ret_val != 0)
goto listall_cb_failure;
return genlmsg_end(cb_arg->skb, data);
listall_cb_failure:
genlmsg_cancel(cb_arg->skb, data);
return ret_val;
}
Commit Message: NetLabel: correct CIPSO tag handling when adding new DOI definitions
The current netlbl_cipsov4_add_common() function has two problems which are
fixed with this patch. The first is an off-by-one bug where it is possibile to
overflow the doi_def->tags[] array. The second is a bug where the same
doi_def->tags[] array was not always fully initialized, which caused sporadic
failures.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asn1_item_flags_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out,
const ASN1_ITEM *it, int flags)
{
if (out && !*out) {
unsigned char *p, *buf;
int len;
len = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, NULL, it, -1, flags);
if (len <= 0)
return len;
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
if (!buf)
return -1;
p = buf;
ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, &p, it, -1, flags);
*out = buf;
return len;
}
return ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&val, out, it, -1, flags);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_cryp_derive_key(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
unsigned long param_count, unsigned long derived_key)
{
TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *ko;
struct tee_obj *so;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *sk;
const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *type_props;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
params = malloc(sizeof(TEE_Attribute) * param_count);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, param_count, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Get key set in operation */
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &ko);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(derived_key), &so);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Find information needed about the object to initialize */
sk = so->attr;
/* Find description of object */
type_props = tee_svc_find_type_props(so->info.objectType);
if (!type_props) {
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto out;
}
if (cs->algo == TEE_ALG_DH_DERIVE_SHARED_SECRET) {
size_t alloc_size;
struct bignum *pub;
struct bignum *ss;
if (param_count != 1 ||
params[0].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
alloc_size = params[0].content.ref.length * 8;
pub = crypto_bignum_allocate(alloc_size);
ss = crypto_bignum_allocate(alloc_size);
if (pub && ss) {
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[0].content.ref.buffer,
params[0].content.ref.length, pub);
res = crypto_acipher_dh_shared_secret(ko->attr,
pub, ss);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = crypto_bignum_num_bytes(ss);
crypto_bignum_bn2bin(ss, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1));
so->info.handleFlags |=
TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props,
TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
} else {
res = TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
crypto_bignum_free(pub);
crypto_bignum_free(ss);
} else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_ECDH) {
size_t alloc_size;
struct ecc_public_key key_public;
uint8_t *pt_secret;
unsigned long pt_secret_len;
if (param_count != 2 ||
params[0].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_X ||
params[1].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_Y) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
switch (cs->algo) {
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P192:
alloc_size = 192;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P224:
alloc_size = 224;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P256:
alloc_size = 256;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P384:
alloc_size = 384;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P521:
alloc_size = 521;
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
goto out;
}
/* Create the public key */
res = crypto_acipher_alloc_ecc_public_key(&key_public,
alloc_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
key_public.curve = ((struct ecc_keypair *)ko->attr)->curve;
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[0].content.ref.buffer,
params[0].content.ref.length,
key_public.x);
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[1].content.ref.buffer,
params[1].content.ref.length,
key_public.y);
pt_secret = (uint8_t *)(sk + 1);
pt_secret_len = sk->alloc_size;
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_shared_secret(ko->attr, &key_public,
pt_secret,
&pt_secret_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = pt_secret_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
/* free the public key */
crypto_acipher_free_ecc_public_key(&key_public);
}
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_HKDF)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_HKDF) {
void *salt, *info;
size_t salt_len, info_len, okm_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ik = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *ikm = (const uint8_t *)(ik + 1);
res = get_hkdf_params(params, param_count, &salt, &salt_len,
&info, &info_len, &okm_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (okm_len > ik->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_hkdf(hash_id, ikm, ik->key_size, salt, salt_len,
info, info_len, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1),
okm_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = okm_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_CONCAT_KDF)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_CONCAT_KDF) {
void *info;
size_t info_len, derived_key_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ss = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *shared_secret = (const uint8_t *)(ss + 1);
res = get_concat_kdf_params(params, param_count, &info,
&info_len, &derived_key_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (derived_key_len > ss->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_concat_kdf(hash_id, shared_secret, ss->key_size,
info, info_len, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1),
derived_key_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = derived_key_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_PBKDF2)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_PBKDF2) {
void *salt;
size_t salt_len, iteration_count, derived_key_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ss = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *password = (const uint8_t *)(ss + 1);
res = get_pbkdf2_params(params, param_count, &salt, &salt_len,
&derived_key_len, &iteration_count);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (derived_key_len > ss->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_pbkdf2(hash_id, password, ss->key_size, salt,
salt_len, iteration_count,
(uint8_t *)(sk + 1), derived_key_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = derived_key_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
else
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
out:
free(params);
return res;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0010: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void module_register (void)
{
plugin_register_complex_config ("network", network_config);
plugin_register_init ("network", network_init);
plugin_register_flush ("network", network_flush,
/* user_data = */ NULL);
} /* void module_register */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxyIOData::OnEffectiveConnectionTypeChanged(
net::EffectiveConnectionType type) {
DCHECK(io_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
effective_connection_type_ = type;
UpdateCustomProxyConfig();
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ext4_set_inode_flags(struct inode *inode)
{
unsigned int flags = EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags;
inode->i_flags &= ~(S_SYNC|S_APPEND|S_IMMUTABLE|S_NOATIME|S_DIRSYNC);
if (flags & EXT4_SYNC_FL)
inode->i_flags |= S_SYNC;
if (flags & EXT4_APPEND_FL)
inode->i_flags |= S_APPEND;
if (flags & EXT4_IMMUTABLE_FL)
inode->i_flags |= S_IMMUTABLE;
if (flags & EXT4_NOATIME_FL)
inode->i_flags |= S_NOATIME;
if (flags & EXT4_DIRSYNC_FL)
inode->i_flags |= S_DIRSYNC;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigatorImpl::DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidFailProvisionalLoadWithError_Params& params) {
VLOG(1) << "Failed Provisional Load: " << params.url.possibly_invalid_spec()
<< ", error_code: " << params.error_code
<< ", error_description: " << params.error_description
<< ", showing_repost_interstitial: " <<
params.showing_repost_interstitial
<< ", frame_id: " << render_frame_host->GetRoutingID();
GURL validated_url(params.url);
RenderProcessHost* render_process_host = render_frame_host->GetProcess();
render_process_host->FilterURL(false, &validated_url);
if (net::ERR_ABORTED == params.error_code) {
FrameTreeNode* root =
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree()->root();
if (root->render_manager()->interstitial_page() != NULL) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Discarding message during interstitial.";
return;
}
}
DiscardPendingEntryIfNeeded(render_frame_host->navigation_handle());
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: free_history_entry(krb5_context context, osa_pw_hist_ent *hist)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < hist->n_key_data; i++)
krb5_free_key_data_contents(context, &hist->key_data[i]);
free(hist->key_data);
}
Commit Message: Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking
KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB
module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent
kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a
type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256
in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type
numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()).
In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified
in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed
standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor
out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable
client-influenced DNs.
CVE-2018-5729:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null
dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by
supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module.
Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential
null dereference.
CVE-2018-5730:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN
containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn"
database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left
extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within
the container DN.
ticket: 8643 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.16-next
target_version: 1.15-next
CWE ID: CWE-90 | 0 | 84,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataDirectoryService::FindEntryByPathAndRunSync(
const FilePath& search_file_path,
const FindEntryCallback& callback) {
GDataEntry* entry = FindEntryByPathSync(search_file_path);
callback.Run(entry ? GDATA_FILE_OK : GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND, entry);
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagerotate)
{
zval *SIM;
gdImagePtr im_dst, im_src;
double degrees;
long color;
long ignoretransparent = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rdl|l", &SIM, °rees, &color, &ignoretransparent) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im_src, gdImagePtr, &SIM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
im_dst = gdImageRotateInterpolated(im_src, (const float)degrees, color);
if (im_dst != NULL) {
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, im_dst, le_gd);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72730 - imagegammacorrect allows arbitrary write access
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 50,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sync_super(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev)
{
if (mddev->sync_super) {
mddev->sync_super(mddev, rdev);
return;
}
BUG_ON(mddev->major_version >= ARRAY_SIZE(super_types));
super_types[mddev->major_version].sync_super(mddev, rdev);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_foreign_save_build( VipsObject *object )
{
VipsForeignSave *save = VIPS_FOREIGN_SAVE( object );
if( save->in ) {
VipsForeignSaveClass *class =
VIPS_FOREIGN_SAVE_GET_CLASS( save );
VipsImage *ready;
if( vips__foreign_convert_saveable( save->in, &ready,
class->saveable, class->format_table, class->coding,
save->background ) )
return( -1 );
if( save->page_height )
vips_image_set_int( ready,
VIPS_META_PAGE_HEIGHT, save->page_height );
VIPS_UNREF( save->ready );
save->ready = ready;
}
if( VIPS_OBJECT_CLASS( vips_foreign_save_parent_class )->
build( object ) )
return( -1 );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 83,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebURLRequest WebLocalFrameImpl::RequestForReload(
WebFrameLoadType load_type,
const WebURL& override_url) const {
DCHECK(GetFrame());
ResourceRequest request = GetFrame()->Loader().ResourceRequestForReload(
static_cast<FrameLoadType>(load_type), override_url);
return WrappedResourceRequest(request);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::SetActivatedSubmit(bool flag) {
is_activated_submit_ = flag;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(const char*) ap_get_server_protocol(server_rec* s)
{
core_server_config *conf = ap_get_core_module_config(s->module_config);
return conf->protocol;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaStreamDevices MediaStreamManager::ConvertToMediaStreamDevices(
MediaStreamType stream_type,
const MediaDeviceInfoArray& device_infos) {
MediaStreamDevices devices;
for (const auto& info : device_infos)
devices.emplace_back(stream_type, info.device_id, info.label,
info.video_facing);
if (stream_type != MEDIA_DEVICE_VIDEO_CAPTURE)
return devices;
for (auto& device : devices) {
device.camera_calibration =
video_capture_manager()->GetCameraCalibration(device.id);
}
return devices;
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __usbnet_queue_skb(struct sk_buff_head *list,
struct sk_buff *newsk, enum skb_state state)
{
struct skb_data *entry = (struct skb_data *) newsk->cb;
__skb_queue_tail(list, newsk);
entry->state = state;
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 94,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssh_throttle_conn(Ssh ssh, int adjust)
{
int old_count = ssh->conn_throttle_count;
ssh->conn_throttle_count += adjust;
assert(ssh->conn_throttle_count >= 0);
if (ssh->conn_throttle_count && !old_count) {
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void megasas_handle_frame(MegasasState *s, uint64_t frame_addr,
uint32_t frame_count)
{
uint8_t frame_status = MFI_STAT_INVALID_CMD;
uint64_t frame_context;
MegasasCmd *cmd;
/*
* Always read 64bit context, top bits will be
* masked out if required in megasas_enqueue_frame()
*/
frame_context = megasas_frame_get_context(s, frame_addr);
cmd = megasas_enqueue_frame(s, frame_addr, frame_context, frame_count);
if (!cmd) {
/* reply queue full */
trace_megasas_frame_busy(frame_addr);
megasas_frame_set_scsi_status(s, frame_addr, BUSY);
megasas_frame_set_cmd_status(s, frame_addr, MFI_STAT_SCSI_DONE_WITH_ERROR);
megasas_complete_frame(s, frame_context);
s->event_count++;
return;
}
switch (cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd) {
case MFI_CMD_INIT:
frame_status = megasas_init_firmware(s, cmd);
break;
case MFI_CMD_DCMD:
frame_status = megasas_handle_dcmd(s, cmd);
break;
case MFI_CMD_ABORT:
frame_status = megasas_handle_abort(s, cmd);
break;
case MFI_CMD_PD_SCSI_IO:
frame_status = megasas_handle_scsi(s, cmd, 0);
break;
case MFI_CMD_LD_SCSI_IO:
frame_status = megasas_handle_scsi(s, cmd, 1);
break;
case MFI_CMD_LD_READ:
case MFI_CMD_LD_WRITE:
frame_status = megasas_handle_io(s, cmd);
break;
default:
trace_megasas_unhandled_frame_cmd(cmd->index,
cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd);
s->event_count++;
break;
}
if (frame_status != MFI_STAT_INVALID_STATUS) {
if (cmd->frame) {
cmd->frame->header.cmd_status = frame_status;
} else {
megasas_frame_set_cmd_status(s, frame_addr, frame_status);
}
megasas_unmap_frame(s, cmd);
megasas_complete_frame(s, cmd->context);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InterfaceLuid(const char *iface_name, PNET_LUID luid)
{
NETIO_STATUS status;
LPWSTR wide_name = utf8to16(iface_name);
if (wide_name)
{
status = ConvertInterfaceAliasToLuid(wide_name, luid);
free(wide_name);
}
else
{
status = ERROR_OUTOFMEMORY;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <jbaines@tenable.com>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::OnUploadProgressACK(int request_id) {
int child_id = filter_->child_id();
PendingRequestList::iterator i = pending_requests_.find(
GlobalRequestID(child_id, request_id));
if (i == pending_requests_.end())
return;
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info =
ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(i->second);
info->set_waiting_for_upload_progress_ack(false);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *ion_buffer_kmap_get(struct ion_buffer *buffer)
{
void *vaddr;
if (buffer->kmap_cnt) {
buffer->kmap_cnt++;
return buffer->vaddr;
}
vaddr = buffer->heap->ops->map_kernel(buffer->heap, buffer);
if (WARN_ONCE(vaddr == NULL,
"heap->ops->map_kernel should return ERR_PTR on error"))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (IS_ERR(vaddr))
return vaddr;
buffer->vaddr = vaddr;
buffer->kmap_cnt++;
return vaddr;
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 48,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char**argv)
{
blkid_cache cache = NULL;
int ret;
blkid_init_debug(BLKID_DEBUG_ALL);
if (argc > 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [filename]\n"
"Test parsing of the cache (filename)\n", argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
if ((ret = blkid_get_cache(&cache, argv[1])) < 0)
fprintf(stderr, "error %d reading cache file %s\n", ret,
argv[1] ? argv[1] : blkid_get_cache_filename(NULL));
blkid_put_cache(cache);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 74,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnTextSurroundingSelectionResponse(
const base::string16& content,
uint32_t start_offset,
uint32_t end_offset) {
text_surrounding_selection_callback_.Run(content, start_offset, end_offset);
text_surrounding_selection_callback_.Reset();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Window* RootWindow::GetFocusedWindow() {
return focused_window_;
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Rotation XRRConfigRotations(XRRScreenConfiguration *config, Rotation *current_rotation)
{
*current_rotation = config->current_rotation;
return config->rotations;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* TabNavigationToValue(
const sync_pb::TabNavigation& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET_STR(virtual_url);
SET_STR(referrer);
SET_STR(title);
SET_STR(state);
SET_ENUM(page_transition, GetPageTransitionString);
SET_ENUM(navigation_qualifier, GetPageTransitionQualifierString);
SET_INT32(unique_id);
SET_INT64(timestamp);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ProcessAckedTouchEvent(
const WebKit::WebTouchEvent& touch_event, InputEventAckState ack_result) {
ScopedVector<ui::TouchEvent> events;
if (!MakeUITouchEventsFromWebTouchEvents(touch_event, &events))
return;
aura::RootWindow* root = window_->GetRootWindow();
if (!root)
return;
ui::EventResult result = (ack_result ==
INPUT_EVENT_ACK_STATE_CONSUMED) ? ui::ER_HANDLED : ui::ER_UNHANDLED;
for (ScopedVector<ui::TouchEvent>::iterator iter = events.begin(),
end = events.end(); iter != end; ++iter) {
root->ProcessedTouchEvent((*iter), window_, result);
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ACodec::BaseState::PortMode ACodec::ExecutingState::getPortMode(
OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
return RESUBMIT_BUFFERS;
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FakeCentral::StopScan(DiscoverySessionResultCallback callback) {
if (!IsPresent()) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
std::move(callback), /*is_error=*/false,
device::UMABluetoothDiscoverySessionOutcome::ADAPTER_NOT_PRESENT));
return;
}
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
std::move(callback), /*is_error=*/false,
device::UMABluetoothDiscoverySessionOutcome::ADAPTER_NOT_PRESENT));
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_movbe(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u32 ebx, ecx, edx, eax = 1;
u16 tmp;
/*
* Check MOVBE is set in the guest-visible CPUID leaf.
*/
ctxt->ops->get_cpuid(ctxt, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
if (!(ecx & FFL(MOVBE)))
return emulate_ud(ctxt);
switch (ctxt->op_bytes) {
case 2:
/*
* From MOVBE definition: "...When the operand size is 16 bits,
* the upper word of the destination register remains unchanged
* ..."
*
* Both casting ->valptr and ->val to u16 breaks strict aliasing
* rules so we have to do the operation almost per hand.
*/
tmp = (u16)ctxt->src.val;
ctxt->dst.val &= ~0xffffUL;
ctxt->dst.val |= (unsigned long)swab16(tmp);
break;
case 4:
ctxt->dst.val = swab32((u32)ctxt->src.val);
break;
case 8:
ctxt->dst.val = swab64(ctxt->src.val);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebURLLoaderImpl::loadSynchronously(const WebURLRequest& request,
WebURLResponse& response,
WebURLError& error,
WebData& data) {
ResourceLoaderBridge::SyncLoadResponse sync_load_response;
context_->Start(request, &sync_load_response, platform_);
const GURL& final_url = sync_load_response.url;
int error_code = sync_load_response.error_code;
if (error_code != net::OK) {
response.setURL(final_url);
error.domain = WebString::fromUTF8(net::kErrorDomain);
error.reason = error_code;
error.unreachableURL = final_url;
return;
}
PopulateURLResponse(final_url, sync_load_response, &response);
data.assign(sync_load_response.data.data(),
sync_load_response.data.size());
}
Commit Message: Protect WebURLLoaderImpl::Context while receiving responses.
A client's didReceiveResponse can cancel a request; by protecting the
Context we avoid a use after free in this case.
Interestingly, we really had very good warning about this problem, see
https://codereview.chromium.org/11900002/ back in January.
R=darin
BUG=241139
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15738007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClearStates() {
state_ = NULL;
deleted_ = NULL;
delegate_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcXFixesDestroyPointerBarrier(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXFixesDestroyPointerBarrierReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXFixesDestroyPointerBarrierReq);
swapl(&stuff->barrier);
return ProcXFixesVector[stuff->xfixesReqType] (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cmd_status(const char *s)
{
s = imap_next_word((char *) s);
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("OK", s, 2) == 0)
return IMAP_CMD_OK;
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp("NO", s, 2) == 0)
return IMAP_CMD_NO;
return IMAP_CMD_BAD;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 79,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutRect FrameSelection::AbsoluteUnclippedBounds() const {
LocalFrameView* view = frame_->View();
LayoutView* layout_view = frame_->ContentLayoutObject();
if (!view || !layout_view)
return LayoutRect();
view->UpdateLifecycleToLayoutClean();
return LayoutRect(layout_selection_->AbsoluteSelectionBounds());
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::setSelectionDirectionForBinding(const String& direction, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!m_inputType->supportsSelectionAPI()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, "The input element's type ('" + m_inputType->formControlType() + "') does not support selection.");
return;
}
HTMLTextFormControlElement::setSelectionDirection(direction);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 114,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadTXTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
colorspace[MaxTextExtent],
text[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*image;
IndexPacket
*indexes;
long
x_offset,
y_offset;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickPixelPacket
pixel;
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
count,
type,
y;
unsigned long
depth,
height,
max_value,
width;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(text,0,sizeof(text));
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
width=0;
height=0;
max_value=0;
*colorspace='\0';
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(text+32,"%lu,%lu,%lu,%s",&width,&height,&max_value,
colorspace);
if ((count != 4) || (width == 0) || (height == 0) || (max_value == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->columns=width;
image->rows=height;
for (depth=1; (GetQuantumRange(depth)+1) < max_value; depth++)
if (depth >= 64)
break;
image->depth=depth;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
LocaleLower(colorspace);
i=(ssize_t) strlen(colorspace)-1;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
if ((i > 0) && (colorspace[i] == 'a'))
{
colorspace[i]='\0';
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
type=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,colorspace);
if (type < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
image->colorspace=(ColorspaceType) type;
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
range=GetQuantumRange(image->depth);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
double
blue,
green,
index,
opacity,
red;
red=0.0;
green=0.0;
blue=0.0;
index=0.0;
opacity=0.0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (ReadBlobString(image,text) == (char *) NULL)
break;
switch (image->colorspace)
{
case GRAYColorspace:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&opacity);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
(void) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,&y_offset,&red);
green=red;
blue=red;
break;
}
case CMYKColorspace:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&index,&opacity);
break;
}
(void) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",&x_offset,
&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&index);
break;
}
default:
{
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) sscanf(text,
"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue,&opacity);
break;
}
(void) sscanf(text,"%ld,%ld: (%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]%lf%*[%,]",
&x_offset,&y_offset,&red,&green,&blue);
break;
}
}
if (strchr(text,'%') != (char *) NULL)
{
red*=0.01*range;
green*=0.01*range;
blue*=0.01*range;
index*=0.01*range;
opacity*=0.01*range;
}
if (image->colorspace == LabColorspace)
{
green+=(range+1)/2.0;
blue+=(range+1)/2.0;
}
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (red+0.5),
range);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (green+0.5),
range);
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (blue+0.5),
range);
pixel.index=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (index+0.5),
range);
pixel.opacity=(MagickRealType) ScaleAnyToQuantum((QuantumAny) (opacity+
0.5),range);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,(ssize_t) x_offset,(ssize_t) y_offset,1,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
continue;
SetPixelRed(q,pixel.red);
SetPixelGreen(q,pixel.green);
SetPixelBlue(q,pixel.blue);
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
SetPixelIndex(indexes,pixel.index);
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,pixel.opacity);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
(void) ReadBlobString(image,text);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (LocaleNCompare((char *) text,MagickID,strlen(MagickID)) == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/713
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void crypto_rfc4543_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
struct crypto_rfc4543_instance_ctx *ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
crypto_drop_aead(&ctx->aead);
crypto_drop_skcipher(&ctx->null);
kfree(inst);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Extension* ExtensionContextMenuModel::GetExtension() const {
ExtensionService* extension_service = profile_->GetExtensionService();
return extension_service->GetExtensionById(extension_id_, false);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::~DataPipeConsumerDispatcher() {
DCHECK(is_closed_ && !shared_ring_buffer_.IsValid() &&
!ring_buffer_mapping_.IsValid() && !in_transit_);
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 154,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BOOLEAN BTM_GetSecurityFlagsByTransport (BD_ADDR bd_addr, UINT8 * p_sec_flags,
tBT_TRANSPORT transport)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec;
if ((p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev (bd_addr)) != NULL)
{
if (transport == BT_TRANSPORT_BR_EDR)
*p_sec_flags = (UINT8) p_dev_rec->sec_flags;
else
*p_sec_flags = (UINT8) (p_dev_rec->sec_flags >> 8);
return(TRUE);
}
BTM_TRACE_ERROR ("BTM_GetSecurityFlags false");
return(FALSE);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodSerializedScriptValueArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodSerializedScriptValueArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsAppShimsEnabled() {
return !(CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kTestType) ||
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAppShims));
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip_vs_genl_set_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
struct ip_vs_service *svc = NULL;
struct ip_vs_service_user_kern usvc;
struct ip_vs_dest_user_kern udest;
int ret = 0, cmd;
int need_full_svc = 0, need_full_dest = 0;
struct net *net;
net = skb_sknet(skb);
cmd = info->genlhdr->cmd;
mutex_lock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
if (cmd == IPVS_CMD_FLUSH) {
ret = ip_vs_flush(net);
goto out;
} else if (cmd == IPVS_CMD_SET_CONFIG) {
ret = ip_vs_genl_set_config(net, info->attrs);
goto out;
} else if (cmd == IPVS_CMD_ZERO &&
!info->attrs[IPVS_CMD_ATTR_SERVICE]) {
ret = ip_vs_zero_all(net);
goto out;
}
/* All following commands require a service argument, so check if we
* received a valid one. We need a full service specification when
* adding / editing a service. Only identifying members otherwise. */
if (cmd == IPVS_CMD_NEW_SERVICE || cmd == IPVS_CMD_SET_SERVICE)
need_full_svc = 1;
ret = ip_vs_genl_parse_service(net, &usvc,
info->attrs[IPVS_CMD_ATTR_SERVICE],
need_full_svc, &svc);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Unless we're adding a new service, the service must already exist */
if ((cmd != IPVS_CMD_NEW_SERVICE) && (svc == NULL)) {
ret = -ESRCH;
goto out;
}
/* Destination commands require a valid destination argument. For
* adding / editing a destination, we need a full destination
* specification. */
if (cmd == IPVS_CMD_NEW_DEST || cmd == IPVS_CMD_SET_DEST ||
cmd == IPVS_CMD_DEL_DEST) {
if (cmd != IPVS_CMD_DEL_DEST)
need_full_dest = 1;
ret = ip_vs_genl_parse_dest(&udest,
info->attrs[IPVS_CMD_ATTR_DEST],
need_full_dest);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
switch (cmd) {
case IPVS_CMD_NEW_SERVICE:
if (svc == NULL)
ret = ip_vs_add_service(net, &usvc, &svc);
else
ret = -EEXIST;
break;
case IPVS_CMD_SET_SERVICE:
ret = ip_vs_edit_service(svc, &usvc);
break;
case IPVS_CMD_DEL_SERVICE:
ret = ip_vs_del_service(svc);
/* do not use svc, it can be freed */
break;
case IPVS_CMD_NEW_DEST:
ret = ip_vs_add_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IPVS_CMD_SET_DEST:
ret = ip_vs_edit_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IPVS_CMD_DEL_DEST:
ret = ip_vs_del_dest(svc, &udest);
break;
case IPVS_CMD_ZERO:
ret = ip_vs_zero_service(svc);
break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport VirtualPixelMethod SetPixelCacheVirtualMethod(const Image *image,
const VirtualPixelMethod virtual_pixel_method)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
VirtualPixelMethod
method;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
method=cache_info->virtual_pixel_method;
cache_info->virtual_pixel_method=virtual_pixel_method;
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
switch (virtual_pixel_method)
{
case BackgroundVirtualPixelMethod:
{
if ((image->background_color.opacity != OpaqueOpacity) &&
(image->matte == MagickFalse))
(void) SetCacheAlphaChannel((Image *) image,OpaqueOpacity);
if ((IsPixelGray(&image->background_color) == MagickFalse) &&
(IsGrayColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse))
(void) SetImageColorspace((Image *) image,sRGBColorspace);
break;
}
case TransparentVirtualPixelMethod:
{
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetCacheAlphaChannel((Image *) image,OpaqueOpacity);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
return(method);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 73,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewWin::UpdatePopup() {
ScopedFreeze freeze(this, GetTextObjectModel());
model_->SetInputInProgress(true);
if (ime_candidate_window_open_)
return;
if (!model_->has_focus()) {
return;
}
CHARRANGE sel;
GetSel(sel);
model_->StartAutocomplete(sel.cpMax != sel.cpMin,
(sel.cpMax < GetTextLength()) || IsImeComposing());
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_intrmgr_fire_all_timers(E1000ECore *core)
{
int i;
uint32_t val = e1000e_intmgr_collect_delayed_causes(core);
trace_e1000e_irq_adding_delayed_causes(val, core->mac[ICR]);
core->mac[ICR] |= val;
if (core->itr.running) {
timer_del(core->itr.timer);
e1000e_intrmgr_on_throttling_timer(&core->itr);
}
for (i = 0; i < E1000E_MSIX_VEC_NUM; i++) {
if (core->eitr[i].running) {
timer_del(core->eitr[i].timer);
e1000e_intrmgr_on_msix_throttling_timer(&core->eitr[i]);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void LongOrNullAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
bool is_null = false;
int32_t cpp_value(impl->longOrNullAttribute(is_null));
if (is_null) {
V8SetReturnValueNull(info);
return;
}
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool SetSelectionToDragCaret(LocalFrame* frame,
VisibleSelection& drag_caret,
Range*& range,
const LayoutPoint& point) {
frame->Selection().SetSelectionAndEndTyping(drag_caret.AsSelection());
if (frame->Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.IsNone()) {
frame->GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const PositionWithAffinity& position = frame->PositionForPoint(point);
if (!position.IsConnected())
return false;
frame->Selection().SetSelectionAndEndTyping(
SelectionInDOMTree::Builder().Collapse(position).Build());
drag_caret =
frame->Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated();
range = CreateRange(drag_caret.ToNormalizedEphemeralRange());
}
return !frame->Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.IsNone() &&
frame->Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.IsContentEditable();
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
{
int word, bit;
if (val > 0xffffffff)
return false;
word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
return false;
bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
return rule->mask[word] & bit;
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 51,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_undef_class_method(mrb_state *mrb, struct RClass *c, const char *name)
{
mrb_undef_method(mrb, mrb_class_ptr(mrb_singleton_class(mrb, mrb_obj_value(c))), name);
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_pixels8_c(uint8_t *av_restrict pixels,
int16_t *block,
int line_size)
{
int i;
for(i=0;i<8;i++) {
pixels[0] += block[0];
pixels[1] += block[1];
pixels[2] += block[2];
pixels[3] += block[3];
pixels[4] += block[4];
pixels[5] += block[5];
pixels[6] += block[6];
pixels[7] += block[7];
pixels += line_size;
block += 8;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sort_pairs(gconstpointer a, gconstpointer b)
{
int rc = 0;
const name_value_t *pair_a = a;
const name_value_t *pair_b = b;
CRM_ASSERT(a != NULL);
CRM_ASSERT(pair_a->name != NULL);
CRM_ASSERT(b != NULL);
CRM_ASSERT(pair_b->name != NULL);
rc = strcmp(pair_a->name, pair_b->name);
if (rc < 0) {
return -1;
} else if (rc > 0) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lexer_construct_function_object (parser_context_t *context_p, /**< context */
uint32_t extra_status_flags) /**< extra status flags */
{
ecma_compiled_code_t *compiled_code_p;
lexer_literal_t *literal_p;
uint16_t result_index;
if (context_p->literal_count >= PARSER_MAXIMUM_NUMBER_OF_LITERALS)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_LITERAL_LIMIT_REACHED);
}
if (context_p->status_flags & PARSER_RESOLVE_THIS_FOR_CALLS)
{
extra_status_flags |= PARSER_RESOLVE_THIS_FOR_CALLS;
}
literal_p = (lexer_literal_t *) parser_list_append (context_p, &context_p->literal_pool);
literal_p->type = LEXER_UNUSED_LITERAL;
literal_p->status_flags = 0;
result_index = context_p->literal_count;
context_p->literal_count++;
compiled_code_p = parser_parse_function (context_p, extra_status_flags);
literal_p->u.bytecode_p = compiled_code_p;
literal_p->type = LEXER_FUNCTION_LITERAL;
return result_index;
} /* lexer_construct_function_object */
Commit Message: Do not allocate memory for zero length strings.
Fixes #1821.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Zoltan Herczeg zherczeg.u-szeged@partner.samsung.com
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 64,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::setFlickableViewportEnabled(bool enable)
{
s_flickableViewportEnabled = enable;
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init usbnet_init(void)
{
/* Compiler should optimize this out. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(
FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, cb) < sizeof(struct skb_data));
eth_random_addr(node_id);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: usbnet: cleanup after bind() in probe()
In case bind() works, but a later error forces bailing
in probe() in error cases work and a timer may be scheduled.
They must be killed. This fixes an error case related to
the double free reported in
http://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg367669.html
and needs to go on top of Linus' fix to cdc-ncm.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 94,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int amd_gpio_set_debounce(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned offset,
unsigned debounce)
{
u32 time;
u32 pin_reg;
int ret = 0;
unsigned long flags;
struct amd_gpio *gpio_dev = gpiochip_get_data(gc);
spin_lock_irqsave(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
pin_reg = readl(gpio_dev->base + offset * 4);
if (debounce) {
pin_reg |= DB_TYPE_REMOVE_GLITCH << DB_CNTRL_OFF;
pin_reg &= ~DB_TMR_OUT_MASK;
/*
Debounce Debounce Timer Max
TmrLarge TmrOutUnit Unit Debounce
Time
0 0 61 usec (2 RtcClk) 976 usec
0 1 244 usec (8 RtcClk) 3.9 msec
1 0 15.6 msec (512 RtcClk) 250 msec
1 1 62.5 msec (2048 RtcClk) 1 sec
*/
if (debounce < 61) {
pin_reg |= 1;
pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF);
pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF);
} else if (debounce < 976) {
time = debounce / 61;
pin_reg |= time & DB_TMR_OUT_MASK;
pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF);
pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF);
} else if (debounce < 3900) {
time = debounce / 244;
pin_reg |= time & DB_TMR_OUT_MASK;
pin_reg |= BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF);
pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF);
} else if (debounce < 250000) {
time = debounce / 15600;
pin_reg |= time & DB_TMR_OUT_MASK;
pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF);
pin_reg |= BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF);
} else if (debounce < 1000000) {
time = debounce / 62500;
pin_reg |= time & DB_TMR_OUT_MASK;
pin_reg |= BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF);
pin_reg |= BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF);
} else {
pin_reg &= ~DB_CNTRl_MASK;
ret = -EINVAL;
}
} else {
pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF);
pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF);
pin_reg &= ~DB_TMR_OUT_MASK;
pin_reg &= ~DB_CNTRl_MASK;
}
writel(pin_reg, gpio_dev->base + offset * 4);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: pinctrl/amd: Drop pinctrl_unregister for devm_ registered device
It's not necessary to unregister pin controller device registered
with devm_pinctrl_register() and using pinctrl_unregister() leads
to a double free.
Fixes: 3bfd44306c65 ("pinctrl: amd: Add support for additional GPIO")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 86,168 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init hugetlb_init(void)
{
/* Some platform decide whether they support huge pages at boot
* time. On these, such as powerpc, HPAGE_SHIFT is set to 0 when
* there is no such support
*/
if (HPAGE_SHIFT == 0)
return 0;
if (!size_to_hstate(default_hstate_size)) {
default_hstate_size = HPAGE_SIZE;
if (!size_to_hstate(default_hstate_size))
hugetlb_add_hstate(HUGETLB_PAGE_ORDER);
}
default_hstate_idx = size_to_hstate(default_hstate_size) - hstates;
if (default_hstate_max_huge_pages)
default_hstate.max_huge_pages = default_hstate_max_huge_pages;
hugetlb_init_hstates();
gather_bootmem_prealloc();
report_hugepages();
hugetlb_sysfs_init();
hugetlb_register_all_nodes();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_ace(struct xdr_stream *xdr, void *ace, struct nfs_client *clp)
{
__be32 *p;
unsigned int strlen;
char *str;
p = xdr_inline_decode(xdr, 12);
if (likely(p))
return decode_opaque_inline(xdr, &strlen, &str);
print_overflow_msg(__func__, xdr);
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::RespondToChangedContents(const Position& position) {
if (GetFrame().GetSettings() &&
GetFrame().GetSettings()->GetAccessibilityEnabled()) {
Node* node = position.AnchorNode();
if (AXObjectCache* cache =
GetFrame().GetDocument()->ExistingAXObjectCache())
cache->HandleEditableTextContentChanged(node);
}
GetSpellChecker().RespondToChangedContents();
Client().RespondToChangedContents();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GesturePoint::DidScroll(const TouchEvent& event, int dist) const {
return abs(last_touch_position_.x() - first_touch_position_.x()) > dist ||
abs(last_touch_position_.y() - first_touch_position_.y()) > dist;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void computeInlineStaticDistance(Length& logicalLeft, Length& logicalRight, const RenderBox* child, const RenderBoxModelObject* containerBlock, LayoutUnit containerLogicalWidth)
{
if (!logicalLeft.isAuto() || !logicalRight.isAuto())
return;
if (child->parent()->style()->direction() == LTR) {
LayoutUnit staticPosition = child->layer()->staticInlinePosition() - containerBlock->borderLogicalLeft();
for (RenderObject* curr = child->parent(); curr && curr != containerBlock; curr = curr->container()) {
if (curr->isBox()) {
staticPosition += toRenderBox(curr)->logicalLeft();
if (toRenderBox(curr)->isRelPositioned())
staticPosition += toRenderBox(curr)->relativePositionOffset().width();
} else if (curr->isInline()) {
if (curr->isRelPositioned()) {
if (!curr->style()->logicalLeft().isAuto())
staticPosition += curr->style()->logicalLeft().value();
else
staticPosition -= curr->style()->logicalRight().value();
}
}
}
logicalLeft.setValue(Fixed, staticPosition);
} else {
RenderBox* enclosingBox = child->parent()->enclosingBox();
LayoutUnit staticPosition = child->layer()->staticInlinePosition() + containerLogicalWidth + containerBlock->borderLogicalLeft();
for (RenderObject* curr = child->parent(); curr; curr = curr->container()) {
if (curr->isBox()) {
if (curr != containerBlock) {
staticPosition -= toRenderBox(curr)->logicalLeft();
if (toRenderBox(curr)->isRelPositioned())
staticPosition -= toRenderBox(curr)->relativePositionOffset().width();
}
if (curr == enclosingBox)
staticPosition -= enclosingBox->logicalWidth();
} else if (curr->isInline()) {
if (curr->isRelPositioned()) {
if (!curr->style()->logicalLeft().isAuto())
staticPosition -= curr->style()->logicalLeft().value();
else
staticPosition += curr->style()->logicalRight().value();
}
}
if (curr == containerBlock)
break;
}
logicalRight.setValue(Fixed, staticPosition);
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GpuChannelHost* RenderThreadImpl::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
content::CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kUnconnected ||
gpu_channel_->state() == GpuChannelHost::kConnected)
return GetGpuChannel();
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
}
int client_id = 0;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process_for_gpu;
content::GPUInfo gpu_info;
if (!Send(new GpuHostMsg_EstablishGpuChannel(cause_for_gpu_launch,
&client_id,
&channel_handle,
&renderer_process_for_gpu,
&gpu_info)) ||
channel_handle.name.empty() ||
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
channel_handle.socket.fd == -1 ||
#endif
renderer_process_for_gpu == base::kNullProcessHandle) {
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
return NULL;
}
gpu_channel_ = new GpuChannelHost(this, 0, client_id);
gpu_channel_->set_gpu_info(gpu_info);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
gpu_channel_->Connect(channel_handle, renderer_process_for_gpu);
return GetGpuChannel();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::IncrementFeatureObservationDuration(
SiteCharacteristicsFeatureProto* feature_proto,
base::TimeDelta extra_observation_duration) {
if (!feature_proto->has_use_timestamp() ||
InternalRepresentationToTimeDelta(feature_proto->use_timestamp())
.is_zero()) {
feature_proto->set_observation_duration(TimeDeltaToInternalRepresentation(
InternalRepresentationToTimeDelta(
feature_proto->observation_duration()) +
extra_observation_duration));
}
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EventQueue* Document::eventQueue() const
{
return m_eventQueue.get();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dx_countlimit *get_dx_countlimit(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent,
int *offset)
{
struct ext4_dir_entry *dp;
struct dx_root_info *root;
int count_offset;
if (le16_to_cpu(dirent->rec_len) == EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb))
count_offset = 8;
else if (le16_to_cpu(dirent->rec_len) == 12) {
dp = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(((void *)dirent) + 12);
if (le16_to_cpu(dp->rec_len) !=
EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - 12)
return NULL;
root = (struct dx_root_info *)(((void *)dp + 12));
if (root->reserved_zero ||
root->info_length != sizeof(struct dx_root_info))
return NULL;
count_offset = 32;
} else
return NULL;
if (offset)
*offset = count_offset;
return (struct dx_countlimit *)(((void *)dirent) + count_offset);
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OneClickSigninHelper::~OneClickSigninHelper() {
content::WebContents* contents = web_contents();
if (contents) {
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(contents->GetBrowserContext());
ProfileSyncService* sync_service =
ProfileSyncServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
if (sync_service && sync_service->HasObserver(this))
sync_service->RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 112,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2tp_ip_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_l2tpip *addr = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip *) uaddr;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int ret;
int chk_addr_ret;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_l2tpip))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->l2tp_family != AF_INET)
return -EINVAL;
ret = -EADDRINUSE;
read_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
if (__l2tp_ip_bind_lookup(net, addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr,
sk->sk_bound_dev_if, addr->l2tp_conn_id))
goto out_in_use;
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_l2tpip))
goto out;
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr);
ret = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr && chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_MULTICAST && chk_addr_ret != RTN_BROADCAST)
goto out;
if (addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr)
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr = addr->l2tp_addr.s_addr;
if (chk_addr_ret == RTN_MULTICAST || chk_addr_ret == RTN_BROADCAST)
inet->inet_saddr = 0; /* Use device */
sk_dst_reset(sk);
l2tp_ip_sk(sk)->conn_id = addr->l2tp_conn_id;
write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
sk_add_bind_node(sk, &l2tp_ip_bind_table);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
ret = 0;
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
out_in_use:
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
[<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
[< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
[<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
[< inline >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
[< inline >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
[< inline >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
[<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
[<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.
Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 168,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::CustomImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_customImplementedAsLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
V8TestObject::CustomImplementedAsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCustom(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputMethodDescriptors* ChromeOSGetSupportedInputMethodDescriptors() {
InputMethodDescriptors* input_methods = new InputMethodDescriptors;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(chromeos::kIBusEngines); ++i) {
if (InputMethodIdIsWhitelisted(chromeos::kIBusEngines[i].name)) {
input_methods->push_back(chromeos::CreateInputMethodDescriptor(
chromeos::kIBusEngines[i].name,
chromeos::kIBusEngines[i].longname,
chromeos::kIBusEngines[i].layout,
chromeos::kIBusEngines[i].language));
}
}
return input_methods;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: encode_SET_QUEUE(const struct ofpact_queue *queue,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
put_OFPAT_SET_QUEUE(out, ofp_version, queue->queue_id);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mii_get_media_pcs (struct net_device *dev)
{
__u16 negotiate;
__u16 bmsr;
int phy_addr;
struct netdev_private *np;
np = netdev_priv(dev);
phy_addr = np->phy_addr;
bmsr = mii_read (dev, phy_addr, PCS_BMSR);
if (np->an_enable) {
if (!(bmsr & BMSR_ANEGCOMPLETE)) {
/* Auto-Negotiation not completed */
return -1;
}
negotiate = mii_read (dev, phy_addr, PCS_ANAR) &
mii_read (dev, phy_addr, PCS_ANLPAR);
np->speed = 1000;
if (negotiate & PCS_ANAR_FULL_DUPLEX) {
printk (KERN_INFO "Auto 1000 Mbps, Full duplex\n");
np->full_duplex = 1;
} else {
printk (KERN_INFO "Auto 1000 Mbps, half duplex\n");
np->full_duplex = 0;
}
if (negotiate & PCS_ANAR_PAUSE) {
np->tx_flow &= 1;
np->rx_flow &= 1;
} else if (negotiate & PCS_ANAR_ASYMMETRIC) {
np->tx_flow = 0;
np->rx_flow &= 1;
}
/* else tx_flow, rx_flow = user select */
} else {
__u16 bmcr = mii_read (dev, phy_addr, PCS_BMCR);
printk (KERN_INFO "Operating at 1000 Mbps, ");
if (bmcr & BMCR_FULLDPLX) {
printk (KERN_CONT "Full duplex\n");
} else {
printk (KERN_CONT "Half duplex\n");
}
}
if (np->tx_flow)
printk(KERN_INFO "Enable Tx Flow Control\n");
else
printk(KERN_INFO "Disable Tx Flow Control\n");
if (np->rx_flow)
printk(KERN_INFO "Enable Rx Flow Control\n");
else
printk(KERN_INFO "Disable Rx Flow Control\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dl2k: Clean up rio_ioctl
The dl2k driver's rio_ioctl call has a few issues:
- No permissions checking
- Implements SIOCGMIIREG and SIOCGMIIREG using the SIOCDEVPRIVATE numbers
- Has a few ioctls that may have been used for debugging at one point
but have no place in the kernel proper.
This patch removes all but the MII ioctls, renumbers them to use the
standard ones, and adds the proper permission check for SIOCSMIIREG.
We can also get rid of the dl2k-specific struct mii_data in favor of
the generic struct mii_ioctl_data.
Since we have the phyid on hand, we can add the SIOCGMIIPHY ioctl too.
Most of the MII code for the driver could probably be converted to use
the generic MII library but I don't have a device to test the results.
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <stephan.mueller@atsec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response InspectorNetworkAgent::enable(Maybe<int> total_buffer_size,
Maybe<int> resource_buffer_size) {
Enable(total_buffer_size.fromMaybe(g_maximum_total_buffer_size),
resource_buffer_size.fromMaybe(g_maximum_resource_buffer_size));
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_disconnectsignal(struct usb_dev_state *ps, void __user *arg)
{
struct usbdevfs_disconnectsignal ds;
if (copy_from_user(&ds, arg, sizeof(ds)))
return -EFAULT;
ps->discsignr = ds.signr;
ps->disccontext = ds.context;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: data_header_print(netdissect_options *ndo, uint16_t fc, const u_char *p)
{
u_int subtype = FC_SUBTYPE(fc);
if (DATA_FRAME_IS_CF_ACK(subtype) || DATA_FRAME_IS_CF_POLL(subtype) ||
DATA_FRAME_IS_QOS(subtype)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CF "));
if (DATA_FRAME_IS_CF_ACK(subtype)) {
if (DATA_FRAME_IS_CF_POLL(subtype))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Ack/Poll"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Ack"));
} else {
if (DATA_FRAME_IS_CF_POLL(subtype))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Poll"));
}
if (DATA_FRAME_IS_QOS(subtype))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+QoS"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
}
#define ADDR1 (p + 4)
#define ADDR2 (p + 10)
#define ADDR3 (p + 16)
#define ADDR4 (p + 24)
if (!FC_TO_DS(fc) && !FC_FROM_DS(fc)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "DA:%s SA:%s BSSID:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR1), etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR2),
etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR3)));
} else if (!FC_TO_DS(fc) && FC_FROM_DS(fc)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "DA:%s BSSID:%s SA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR1), etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR2),
etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR3)));
} else if (FC_TO_DS(fc) && !FC_FROM_DS(fc)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BSSID:%s SA:%s DA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR1), etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR2),
etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR3)));
} else if (FC_TO_DS(fc) && FC_FROM_DS(fc)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RA:%s TA:%s DA:%s SA:%s ",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR1), etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR2),
etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR3), etheraddr_string(ndo, ADDR4)));
}
#undef ADDR1
#undef ADDR2
#undef ADDR3
#undef ADDR4
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MediaPlayer::isLooping() {
ALOGV("isLooping");
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
if (mPlayer != 0) {
return mLoop;
}
ALOGV("isLooping: no active player");
return false;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 159,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parse_clock_source_unit(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
void *_ftr)
{
struct uac_clock_source_descriptor *hdr = _ftr;
struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval;
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
char name[SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ID_NAME_MAXLEN];
int ret;
if (state->mixer->protocol != UAC_VERSION_2)
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr->bLength != sizeof(*hdr)) {
usb_audio_dbg(state->chip,
"Bogus clock source descriptor length of %d, ignoring.\n",
hdr->bLength);
return 0;
}
/*
* The only property of this unit we are interested in is the
* clock source validity. If that isn't readable, just bail out.
*/
if (!uac2_control_is_readable(hdr->bmControls,
ilog2(UAC2_CS_CONTROL_CLOCK_VALID)))
return 0;
cval = kzalloc(sizeof(*cval), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cval)
return -ENOMEM;
snd_usb_mixer_elem_init_std(&cval->head, state->mixer, hdr->bClockID);
cval->min = 0;
cval->max = 1;
cval->channels = 1;
cval->val_type = USB_MIXER_BOOLEAN;
cval->control = UAC2_CS_CONTROL_CLOCK_VALID;
if (uac2_control_is_writeable(hdr->bmControls,
ilog2(UAC2_CS_CONTROL_CLOCK_VALID)))
kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&usb_feature_unit_ctl, cval);
else {
cval->master_readonly = 1;
kctl = snd_ctl_new1(&usb_feature_unit_ctl_ro, cval);
}
if (!kctl) {
kfree(cval);
return -ENOMEM;
}
kctl->private_free = snd_usb_mixer_elem_free;
ret = snd_usb_copy_string_desc(state, hdr->iClockSource,
name, sizeof(name));
if (ret > 0)
snprintf(kctl->id.name, sizeof(kctl->id.name),
"%s Validity", name);
else
snprintf(kctl->id.name, sizeof(kctl->id.name),
"Clock Source %d Validity", hdr->bClockID);
return snd_usb_mixer_add_control(&cval->head, kctl);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bta_av_rc_free_browse_msg(UNUSED_ATTR tBTA_AV_CB* p_cb,
tBTA_AV_DATA* p_data) {
if (p_data->rc_msg.opcode == AVRC_OP_BROWSE) {
osi_free_and_reset((void**)&p_data->rc_msg.msg.browse.p_browse_pkt);
}
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_mov(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
ctxt->dst.val = ctxt->src.val;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static irqreturn_t snd_msnd_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct snd_msnd *chip = dev_id;
void *pwDSPQData = chip->mappedbase + DSPQ_DATA_BUFF;
/* Send ack to DSP */
/* inb(chip->io + HP_RXL); */
/* Evaluate queued DSP messages */
while (readw(chip->DSPQ + JQS_wTail) != readw(chip->DSPQ + JQS_wHead)) {
u16 wTmp;
snd_msnd_eval_dsp_msg(chip,
readw(pwDSPQData + 2 * readw(chip->DSPQ + JQS_wHead)));
wTmp = readw(chip->DSPQ + JQS_wHead) + 1;
if (wTmp > readw(chip->DSPQ + JQS_wSize))
writew(0, chip->DSPQ + JQS_wHead);
else
writew(wTmp, chip->DSPQ + JQS_wHead);
}
/* Send ack to DSP */
inb(chip->io + HP_RXL);
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: msnd: Optimize / harden DSP and MIDI loops
The ISA msnd drivers have loops fetching the ring-buffer head, tail
and size values inside the loops. Such codes are inefficient and
fragile.
This patch optimizes it, and also adds the sanity check to avoid the
endless loops.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196131
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196133
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *skip_over_word(char *cp)
{
char ch;
while ((ch = *cp)) {
/* If we see a backslash, skip the next character */
if (ch == '\\') {
cp++;
if (*cp == '\0')
break;
cp++;
continue;
}
if (isspace(ch) || ch == '<' || ch == '>')
break;
cp++;
}
return cp;
}
Commit Message: libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 74,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode,
const struct fscrypt_str *iname,
struct fscrypt_str *oname)
{
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
int res = 0;
char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned lim;
lim = inode->i_sb->s_cop->max_namelen(inode);
if (iname->len <= 0 || iname->len > lim)
return -EIO;
/* Allocate request */
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
if (!req) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
"%s: crypto_request_alloc() failed\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
fname_crypt_complete, &ecr);
/* Initialize IV */
memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Create decryption request */
sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len);
sg_init_one(&dst_sg, oname->name, oname->len);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, iname->len, iv);
res = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
res = ecr.res;
}
skcipher_request_free(req);
if (res < 0) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
"%s: Error (error code %d)\n", __func__, res);
return res;
}
oname->len = strnlen(oname->name, iname->len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 67,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoEnable(GLenum cap) {
if (SetCapabilityState(cap, true)) {
glEnable(cap);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool JSTestActiveDOMObject::getOwnPropertySlot(JSCell* cell, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertySlot& slot)
{
JSTestActiveDOMObject* thisObject = jsCast<JSTestActiveDOMObject*>(cell);
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(thisObject, &s_info);
return getStaticValueSlot<JSTestActiveDOMObject, Base>(exec, &JSTestActiveDOMObjectTable, thisObject, propertyName, slot);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int FS_Write( const void *buffer, int len, fileHandle_t h ) {
int block, remaining;
int written;
byte *buf;
int tries;
FILE *f;
if ( !fs_searchpaths ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization" );
}
if ( !h ) {
return 0;
}
f = FS_FileForHandle( h );
buf = (byte *)buffer;
remaining = len;
tries = 0;
while ( remaining ) {
block = remaining;
written = fwrite( buf, 1, block, f );
if ( written == 0 ) {
if ( !tries ) {
tries = 1;
} else {
Com_Printf( "FS_Write: 0 bytes written\n" );
return 0;
}
}
if ( written == -1 ) {
Com_Printf( "FS_Write: -1 bytes written\n" );
return 0;
}
remaining -= written;
buf += written;
}
if ( fsh[h].handleSync ) {
fflush( f );
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_arch_end_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
{
atomic_dec(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned hash_init(Hash* hash, unsigned windowsize)
{
unsigned i;
hash->head = (int*)calloc(sizeof(int), HASH_NUM_VALUES);
hash->val = (int*)calloc(sizeof(int), windowsize);
hash->chain = (unsigned short*)calloc(sizeof(unsigned short), windowsize);
hash->zeros = (unsigned short*)calloc(sizeof(unsigned short), windowsize);
hash->headz = (int*)calloc(sizeof(int), (MAX_SUPPORTED_DEFLATE_LENGTH + 1));
hash->chainz = (unsigned short*)calloc(sizeof(unsigned short), windowsize);
if(!hash->head || !hash->chain || !hash->val || !hash->headz|| !hash->chainz || !hash->zeros)
{
return 83; /*alloc fail*/
}
/*initialize hash table*/
for(i = 0; i < HASH_NUM_VALUES; i++) hash->head[i] = -1;
for(i = 0; i < windowsize; i++) hash->val[i] = -1;
for(i = 0; i < windowsize; i++) hash->chain[i] = i; /*same value as index indicates uninitialized*/
for(i = 0; i <= MAX_SUPPORTED_DEFLATE_LENGTH; i++) hash->headz[i] = -1;
for(i = 0; i < windowsize; i++) hash->chainz[i] = i; /*same value as index indicates uninitialized*/
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GahpClient::ec2_vm_create_keypair( const char *service_url, const char * publickeyfile, const char * privatekeyfile,
const char * keyname, const char * outputfile, char* & error_code)
{
static const char* command = "EC2_VM_CREATE_KEYPAIR";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if ( (service_url == NULL) || (publickeyfile == NULL) || (privatekeyfile == NULL) || (keyname == NULL) || (outputfile == NULL) ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
std::string reqline;
char* esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service_url) );
char* esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(publickeyfile) );
char* esc3 = strdup( escapeGahpString(privatekeyfile) );
char* esc4 = strdup( escapeGahpString(keyname) );
char* esc5 = strdup( escapeGahpString(outputfile) );
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %s %s %s %s", esc1, esc2, esc3, esc4, esc5);
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
free( esc3 );
free( esc4 );
free( esc5 );
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command, buf, deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command, buf);
if ( result ) {
int rc = 0;
if (result->argc == 2) {
rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
if (rc == 1) {
error_string = "";
}
}
else if ( result->argc == 4 ) {
rc = atoi( result->argv[1] );
error_code = strdup(result->argv[2]);
error_string = result->argv[3];
} else {
EXCEPT( "Bad %s result", command );
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command, buf) )
{
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderBox::needsPreferredWidthsRecalculation() const
{
return style()->paddingStart().isPercent() || style()->paddingEnd().isPercent();
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestProcessOverflow() {
int tab_count = 1;
int host_count = 1;
WebContents* tab1 = NULL;
WebContents* tab2 = NULL;
content::RenderProcessHost* rph1 = NULL;
content::RenderProcessHost* rph2 = NULL;
content::RenderProcessHost* rph3 = NULL;
const extensions::Extension* extension =
LoadExtension(test_data_dir_.AppendASCII("options_page"));
GURL omnibox(chrome::kChromeUIOmniboxURL);
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), omnibox);
EXPECT_EQ(tab_count, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
tab1 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(tab_count - 1);
rph1 = tab1->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess();
EXPECT_EQ(omnibox, tab1->GetURL());
EXPECT_EQ(host_count, RenderProcessHostCount());
GURL page1("data:text/html,hello world1");
ui_test_utils::WindowedTabAddedNotificationObserver observer1(
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
::ShowSingletonTab(browser(), page1);
observer1.Wait();
tab_count++;
host_count++;
EXPECT_EQ(tab_count, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
tab1 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(tab_count - 1);
rph2 = tab1->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess();
EXPECT_EQ(tab1->GetURL(), page1);
EXPECT_EQ(host_count, RenderProcessHostCount());
EXPECT_NE(rph1, rph2);
GURL page2("data:text/html,hello world2");
ui_test_utils::WindowedTabAddedNotificationObserver observer2(
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
::ShowSingletonTab(browser(), page2);
observer2.Wait();
tab_count++;
EXPECT_EQ(tab_count, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
tab2 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(tab_count - 1);
EXPECT_EQ(tab2->GetURL(), page2);
EXPECT_EQ(host_count, RenderProcessHostCount());
EXPECT_EQ(tab2->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess(), rph2);
GURL history(chrome::kChromeUIHistoryURL);
ui_test_utils::WindowedTabAddedNotificationObserver observer3(
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
::ShowSingletonTab(browser(), history);
observer3.Wait();
tab_count++;
EXPECT_EQ(tab_count, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
tab2 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(tab_count - 1);
EXPECT_EQ(tab2->GetURL(), GURL(history));
EXPECT_EQ(host_count, RenderProcessHostCount());
EXPECT_EQ(tab2->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess(), rph1);
GURL extension_url("chrome-extension://" + extension->id());
ui_test_utils::WindowedTabAddedNotificationObserver observer4(
content::NotificationService::AllSources());
::ShowSingletonTab(browser(), extension_url);
observer4.Wait();
tab_count++;
host_count++;
EXPECT_EQ(tab_count, browser()->tab_strip_model()->count());
tab1 = browser()->tab_strip_model()->GetWebContentsAt(tab_count - 1);
rph3 = tab1->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess();
EXPECT_EQ(tab1->GetURL(), extension_url);
EXPECT_EQ(host_count, RenderProcessHostCount());
EXPECT_NE(rph1, rph3);
EXPECT_NE(rph2, rph3);
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 1 | 173,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct qeth_reply *qeth_alloc_reply(struct qeth_card *card)
{
struct qeth_reply *reply;
reply = kzalloc(sizeof(struct qeth_reply), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (reply) {
atomic_set(&reply->refcnt, 1);
atomic_set(&reply->received, 0);
reply->card = card;
}
return reply;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static JsVarRef jsvInitJsVars(JsVarRef start, unsigned int count) {
JsVarRef i;
for (i=start;i<start+count;i++) {
JsVar *v = jsvGetAddressOf(i);
v->flags = JSV_UNUSED;
jsvSetNextSibling(v, (JsVarRef)(i+1)); // link to next
}
jsvSetNextSibling(jsvGetAddressOf((JsVarRef)(start+count-1)), (JsVarRef)0); // set the final one to 0
return start;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_rs_to_sig(const char* r, const char* s, byte* out, word32* outlen)
{
int err;
mp_int rtmp;
mp_int stmp;
if (r == NULL || s == NULL || out == NULL || outlen == NULL)
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
err = mp_init_multi(&rtmp, &stmp, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (err != MP_OKAY)
return err;
err = mp_read_radix(&rtmp, r, MP_RADIX_HEX);
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = mp_read_radix(&stmp, s, MP_RADIX_HEX);
/* convert mp_ints to ECDSA sig, initializes rtmp and stmp internally */
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = StoreECC_DSA_Sig(out, outlen, &rtmp, &stmp);
if (err == MP_OKAY) {
if (mp_iszero(&rtmp) == MP_YES || mp_iszero(&stmp) == MP_YES)
err = MP_ZERO_E;
}
mp_clear(&rtmp);
mp_clear(&stmp);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,917 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_nop(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FilePath::StringType NaClProcessHost::GetIrtLibraryFilename() {
bool on_x86_64 = running_on_wow64_;
#if defined(__x86_64__)
on_x86_64 = true;
#endif
if (on_x86_64) {
return FILE_PATH_LITERAL("nacl_irt_x86_64.nexe");
} else {
return FILE_PATH_LITERAL("nacl_irt_x86_32.nexe");
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_alloc_file_blocks(struct file *file, ext4_lblk_t offset,
ext4_lblk_t len, loff_t new_size,
int flags, int mode)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
handle_t *handle;
int ret = 0;
int ret2 = 0;
int retries = 0;
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
unsigned int credits;
loff_t epos;
map.m_lblk = offset;
map.m_len = len;
/*
* Don't normalize the request if it can fit in one extent so
* that it doesn't get unnecessarily split into multiple
* extents.
*/
if (len <= EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN)
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_NO_NORMALIZE;
/*
* credits to insert 1 extent into extent tree
*/
credits = ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, len);
retry:
while (ret >= 0 && len) {
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_MAP_BLOCKS,
credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
break;
}
ret = ext4_map_blocks(handle, inode, &map, flags);
if (ret <= 0) {
ext4_debug("inode #%lu: block %u: len %u: "
"ext4_ext_map_blocks returned %d",
inode->i_ino, map.m_lblk,
map.m_len, ret);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
break;
}
map.m_lblk += ret;
map.m_len = len = len - ret;
epos = (loff_t)map.m_lblk << inode->i_blkbits;
inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
if (new_size) {
if (epos > new_size)
epos = new_size;
if (ext4_update_inode_size(inode, epos) & 0x1)
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime;
} else {
if (epos > inode->i_size)
ext4_set_inode_flag(inode,
EXT4_INODE_EOFBLOCKS);
}
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ret2 = ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (ret2)
break;
}
if (ret == -ENOSPC &&
ext4_should_retry_alloc(inode->i_sb, &retries)) {
ret = 0;
goto retry;
}
return ret > 0 ? ret2 : ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,858 |
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