instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: extractContigSamplesBytes (uint8 *in, uint8 *out, uint32 cols,
tsample_t sample, uint16 spp, uint16 bps,
tsample_t count, uint32 start, uint32 end)
{
int i, bytes_per_sample, sindex;
uint32 col, dst_rowsize, bit_offset;
uint32 src_byte /*, src_bit */;
uint8 *src = in;
uint8 *dst = out;
if ((src == NULL) || (dst == NULL))
{
TIFFError("extractContigSamplesBytes","Invalid input or output buffer");
return (1);
}
if ((start > end) || (start > cols))
{
TIFFError ("extractContigSamplesBytes",
"Invalid start column value %d ignored", start);
start = 0;
}
if ((end == 0) || (end > cols))
{
TIFFError ("extractContigSamplesBytes",
"Invalid end column value %d ignored", end);
end = cols;
}
dst_rowsize = (bps * (end - start) * count) / 8;
bytes_per_sample = (bps + 7) / 8;
/* Optimize case for copying all samples */
if (count == spp)
{
src = in + (start * spp * bytes_per_sample);
_TIFFmemcpy (dst, src, dst_rowsize);
}
else
{
for (col = start; col < end; col++)
{
for (sindex = sample; (sindex < spp) && (sindex < (sample + count)); sindex++)
{
bit_offset = col * bps * spp;
if (sindex == 0)
{
src_byte = bit_offset / 8;
/* src_bit = bit_offset % 8; */
}
else
{
src_byte = (bit_offset + (sindex * bps)) / 8;
/* src_bit = (bit_offset + (sindex * bps)) % 8; */
}
src = in + src_byte;
for (i = 0; i < bytes_per_sample; i++)
*dst++ = *src++;
}
}
}
return (0);
} /* end extractContigSamplesBytes */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 48,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void re_yyset_extra (YY_EXTRA_TYPE user_defined , yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
yyextra = user_defined ;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::LoadedShader(int32_t client_id,
const std::string& key,
const std::string& data) {
std::string prefix = GetShaderPrefixKey();
bool prefix_ok = !key.compare(0, prefix.length(), prefix);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.ShaderLoadPrefixOK", prefix_ok);
if (prefix_ok) {
std::string key_no_prefix = key.substr(prefix.length() + 1);
gpu_service_ptr_->LoadedShader(client_id, key_no_prefix, data);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool within_margin(int value, int margin)
{
return ((unsigned int)(value + margin - 1) < (2 * margin - 1));
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _epilog_complete_msg_setup(
slurm_msg_t *msg, epilog_complete_msg_t *req, uint32_t jobid, int rc)
{
slurm_msg_t_init(msg);
memset(req, 0, sizeof(epilog_complete_msg_t));
req->job_id = jobid;
req->return_code = rc;
req->node_name = conf->node_name;
msg->msg_type = MESSAGE_EPILOG_COMPLETE;
msg->data = req;
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SocketStream::ResponseHeaders::Realloc(size_t new_size) {
headers_.reset(static_cast<char*>(realloc(headers_.release(), new_size)));
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MultibufferDataSource::UpdateLoadingState_Locked(bool force_loading) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
lock_.AssertAcquired();
if (assume_fully_buffered())
return;
bool is_loading = !!reader_ && reader_->IsLoading();
if (force_loading || is_loading != loading_) {
bool loading = is_loading || force_loading;
if (!loading && cancel_on_defer_) {
if (read_op_) {
return;
}
reader_.reset(nullptr);
}
loading_ = loading;
downloading_cb_.Run(loading_);
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* MediaMetadataRetriever::extractMetadata(int keyCode)
{
ALOGV("extractMetadata(%d)", keyCode);
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
if (mRetriever == 0) {
ALOGE("retriever is not initialized");
return NULL;
}
return mRetriever->extractMetadata(keyCode);
}
Commit Message: Get service by value instead of reference
to prevent a cleared service binder from being used.
Bug: 26040840
Change-Id: Ifb5483c55b172d3553deb80dbe27f2204b86ecdb
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::ReadLocalOutOfBandPairingData(
const BluetoothAdapter::BluetoothOutOfBandPairingDataCallback& callback,
const ErrorCallback& error_callback) {
error_callback.Run();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionHasLockedFullscreenPermission(const Extension* extension) {
return extension->permissions_data()->HasAPIPermission(
APIPermission::kLockWindowFullscreenPrivate);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::vector<TargetHandler*> TargetHandler::ForAgentHost(
DevToolsAgentHostImpl* host) {
return DevToolsSession::HandlersForAgentHost<TargetHandler>(
host, Target::Metainfo::domainName);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *x25_find_listener(struct x25_address *addr,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *s;
struct sock *next_best;
read_lock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
next_best = NULL;
sk_for_each(s, &x25_list)
if ((!strcmp(addr->x25_addr,
x25_sk(s)->source_addr.x25_addr) ||
!strcmp(addr->x25_addr,
null_x25_address.x25_addr)) &&
s->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
/*
* Found a listening socket, now check the incoming
* call user data vs this sockets call user data
*/
if (x25_sk(s)->cudmatchlength > 0 &&
skb->len >= x25_sk(s)->cudmatchlength) {
if((memcmp(x25_sk(s)->calluserdata.cuddata,
skb->data,
x25_sk(s)->cudmatchlength)) == 0) {
sock_hold(s);
goto found;
}
} else
next_best = s;
}
if (next_best) {
s = next_best;
sock_hold(s);
goto found;
}
s = NULL;
found:
read_unlock_bh(&x25_list_lock);
return s;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofpact_format(const struct ofpact *a, struct ds *s)
{
switch (a->type) {
#define OFPACT(ENUM, STRUCT, MEMBER, NAME) \
case OFPACT_##ENUM: \
format_##ENUM(ALIGNED_CAST(const struct STRUCT *, a), s); \
break;
OFPACTS
#undef OFPACT
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sec_decrypt(uint8 * data, int length)
{
if (g_sec_decrypt_use_count == 4096)
{
sec_update(g_sec_decrypt_key, g_sec_decrypt_update_key);
rdssl_rc4_set_key(&g_rc4_decrypt_key, g_sec_decrypt_key, g_rc4_key_len);
g_sec_decrypt_use_count = 0;
}
rdssl_rc4_crypt(&g_rc4_decrypt_key, data, data, length);
g_sec_decrypt_use_count++;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionService::InitializePermissions(const Extension* extension) {
scoped_refptr<ExtensionPermissionSet> active_permissions =
extension_prefs()->GetActivePermissions(extension->id());
if (active_permissions.get()) {
scoped_refptr<ExtensionPermissionSet> total_permissions =
ExtensionPermissionSet::CreateUnion(
extension->required_permission_set(),
extension->optional_permission_set());
scoped_refptr<ExtensionPermissionSet> adjusted_active =
ExtensionPermissionSet::CreateIntersection(
total_permissions.get(), active_permissions.get());
adjusted_active = ExtensionPermissionSet::CreateUnion(
extension->required_permission_set(), adjusted_active.get());
UpdateActivePermissions(extension, adjusted_active);
}
const Extension* old = GetExtensionByIdInternal(extension->id(),
true, true, false);
bool is_extension_upgrade = old != NULL;
bool is_privilege_increase = false;
if (!extension->CanSilentlyIncreasePermissions()) {
scoped_refptr<ExtensionPermissionSet> granted_permissions =
extension_prefs_->GetGrantedPermissions(extension->id());
CHECK(granted_permissions.get());
is_privilege_increase =
granted_permissions->HasLessPrivilegesThan(
extension->GetActivePermissions());
}
if (is_extension_upgrade) {
if (extension->location() != Extension::LOAD)
CHECK(extension->version()->CompareTo(*(old->version())) >= 0);
if (!is_privilege_increase) {
SetBeingUpgraded(old, true);
SetBeingUpgraded(extension, true);
}
UnloadExtension(old->id(), extension_misc::UNLOAD_REASON_UPDATE);
old = NULL;
}
if (is_privilege_increase) {
if (!extension_prefs_->DidExtensionEscalatePermissions(extension->id())) {
RecordPermissionMessagesHistogram(
extension, "Extensions.Permissions_AutoDisable");
}
extension_prefs_->SetExtensionState(extension->id(), Extension::DISABLED);
extension_prefs_->SetDidExtensionEscalatePermissions(extension, true);
}
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ap_configuration_available(void)
{
return test_facility(2) && test_facility(12);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Gfx::doGouraudTriangleShFill(GfxGouraudTriangleShading *shading) {
double x0, y0, x1, y1, x2, y2;
GfxColor color0, color1, color2;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < shading->getNTriangles(); ++i) {
shading->getTriangle(i, &x0, &y0, &color0,
&x1, &y1, &color1,
&x2, &y2, &color2);
gouraudFillTriangle(x0, y0, &color0, x1, y1, &color1, x2, y2, &color2,
shading->getColorSpace()->getNComps(), 0);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
{
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
if (!ctx) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
return ctx;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 5,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int irda_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, self);
lock_sock(sk);
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
sk->sk_shutdown |= SEND_SHUTDOWN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
if (self->iriap) {
iriap_close(self->iriap);
self->iriap = NULL;
}
if (self->tsap) {
irttp_disconnect_request(self->tsap, NULL, P_NORMAL);
irttp_close_tsap(self->tsap);
self->tsap = NULL;
}
/* A few cleanup so the socket look as good as new... */
self->rx_flow = self->tx_flow = FLOW_START; /* needed ??? */
self->daddr = DEV_ADDR_ANY; /* Until we get re-connected */
self->saddr = 0x0; /* so IrLMP assign us any link */
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
/*
* We subtract one from sk_wmem_alloc and can know if
* some packets are still in some tx queue.
* If not null, sock_wfree() will call __sk_free(sk) later
*/
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc))
__sk_free(sk);
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EC_ec_pre_comp_free(EC_PRE_COMP *pre)
{
int i;
if (pre == NULL)
return;
CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&pre->references, &i, pre->lock);
REF_PRINT_COUNT("EC_ec", pre);
if (i > 0)
return;
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
if (pre->points != NULL) {
EC_POINT **pts;
for (pts = pre->points; *pts != NULL; pts++)
EC_POINT_free(*pts);
OPENSSL_free(pre->points);
}
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(pre->lock);
OPENSSL_free(pre);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 15,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
size_t i, n;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client key exchange" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA )
{
/*
* DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P
*/
n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
ssl->out_msg[4] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
ssl->out_msg[5] = (unsigned char)( n );
i = 6;
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
&ssl->out_msg[i], n,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
ssl->handshake->premaster,
MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE,
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
/*
* ECDH key exchange -- send client public value
*/
i = 4;
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&n,
&ssl->out_msg[i], 1000,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Q", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Q );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->handshake->premaster,
MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "ECDH: z", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.z );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
/*
* opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for PSK" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
i = 4;
n = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity too long or "
"SSL buffer too short" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n );
memcpy( ssl->out_msg + i, ssl->conf->psk_identity, ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
i += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK )
{
n = 0;
}
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, i, &n, 2 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
/*
* ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P)
*/
n = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
if( i + 2 + n > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "psk identity or DHM size too long"
" or SSL buffer too short" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n >> 8 );
ssl->out_msg[i++] = (unsigned char)( n );
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
&ssl->out_msg[i], n,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
/*
* ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
*/
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &n,
&ssl->out_msg[i], MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - i,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Q", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Q );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
i = 4;
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, i, &n, 0 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
i = 4;
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
ssl->out_msg + i, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - i, &n,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret );
return( ret );
}
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
{
((void) ciphersuite_info);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ssl->out_msglen = i + n;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
ssl->state++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client key exchange" ) );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AudioSystemImpl::~AudioSystemImpl() {
AudioSystem::ClearInstance(this);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_proc_renew(struct nfs_client *clp, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_RENEW],
.rpc_argp = clp,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
unsigned long now = jiffies;
int status;
status = rpc_call_sync(clp->cl_rpcclient, &msg, RPC_TASK_TIMEOUT);
if (status < 0)
return status;
do_renew_lease(clp, now);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ossl_statem_set_in_init(SSL *s, int init)
{
s->statem.in_init = init;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::HandleCompositorProto(
const std::vector<uint8_t>& proto) {
DCHECK(!proto.empty());
Send(new ViewMsg_HandleCompositorProto(GetRoutingID(), proto));
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static rfc_slot_t *find_rfc_slot_by_id(uint32_t id) {
assert(id != 0);
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rfc_slots); ++i)
if (rfc_slots[i].id == id)
return &rfc_slots[i];
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to find RFCOMM slot id: %d", __func__, id);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fz_set_cmm_engine(fz_context *ctx, const fz_cmm_engine *engine)
{
fz_colorspace_context *cct;
if (!ctx)
return;
cct = ctx->colorspace;
if (!cct)
return;
#ifdef NO_ICC
if (engine)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "ICC workflow not supported in NO_ICC build");
#else
if (cct->cmm == engine)
return;
fz_drop_cmm_context(ctx);
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, cct->gray);
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, cct->rgb);
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, cct->bgr);
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, cct->cmyk);
fz_drop_colorspace(ctx, cct->lab);
cct->gray = NULL;
cct->rgb = NULL;
cct->bgr = NULL;
cct->cmyk = NULL;
cct->lab = NULL;
cct->cmm = engine;
fz_new_cmm_context(ctx);
if (engine)
{
cct->gray = fz_new_icc_colorspace(ctx, FZ_ICC_PROFILE_GRAY, 1, NULL);
cct->rgb = fz_new_icc_colorspace(ctx, FZ_ICC_PROFILE_RGB, 3, NULL);
cct->bgr = fz_new_icc_colorspace(ctx, FZ_ICC_PROFILE_BGR, 3, NULL);
cct->cmyk = fz_new_icc_colorspace(ctx, FZ_ICC_PROFILE_CMYK, 4, NULL);
cct->lab = fz_new_icc_colorspace(ctx, FZ_ICC_PROFILE_LAB, 3, NULL);
}
else
set_no_icc(cct);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: markEmphases(const TranslationTableHeader *table, const InString *input,
formtype *typebuf, unsigned int *wordBuffer, EmphasisInfo *emphasisBuffer,
int haveEmphasis) {
/* Relies on the order of typeforms emph_1..emph_10. */
int caps_start = -1, last_caps = -1, caps_cnt = 0;
int emph_start[10] = { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 };
int i, j;
if (haveEmphasis && !emphClasses) {
initEmphClasses();
}
for (i = 0; i < input->length; i++) {
if (!checkAttr(input->chars[i], CTC_Space, 0, table)) {
wordBuffer[i] |= WORD_CHAR;
} else if (caps_cnt > 0) {
last_caps = i;
caps_cnt = 0;
}
if (checkAttr(input->chars[i], CTC_UpperCase, 0, table)) {
if (caps_start < 0) caps_start = i;
caps_cnt++;
} else if (caps_start >= 0) {
/* caps should keep going until this */
if (checkAttr(input->chars[i], CTC_Letter, 0, table) &&
checkAttr(input->chars[i], CTC_LowerCase, 0, table)) {
emphasisBuffer[caps_start].begin |= capsEmphClass;
if (caps_cnt > 0)
emphasisBuffer[i].end |= capsEmphClass;
else
emphasisBuffer[last_caps].end |= capsEmphClass;
caps_start = -1;
last_caps = -1;
caps_cnt = 0;
}
}
if (!haveEmphasis) continue;
for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
if (typebuf[i] & (emph_1 << j)) {
if (emph_start[j] < 0) emph_start[j] = i;
} else if (emph_start[j] >= 0) {
emphasisBuffer[emph_start[j]].begin |= emphClasses[j];
emphasisBuffer[i].end |= emphClasses[j];
emph_start[j] = -1;
}
}
}
/* clean up input->length */
if (caps_start >= 0) {
emphasisBuffer[caps_start].begin |= capsEmphClass;
if (caps_cnt > 0)
emphasisBuffer[input->length].end |= capsEmphClass;
else
emphasisBuffer[last_caps].end |= capsEmphClass;
}
if (haveEmphasis) {
for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
if (emph_start[j] >= 0) {
emphasisBuffer[emph_start[j]].begin |= emphClasses[j];
emphasisBuffer[input->length].end |= emphClasses[j];
}
}
}
/* Handle capsnocont */
if (table->capsNoCont) {
int inCaps = 0;
for (i = 0; i < input->length; i++) {
if (emphasisBuffer[i].end & capsEmphClass) {
inCaps = 0;
} else {
if ((emphasisBuffer[i].begin & capsEmphClass) &&
!(emphasisBuffer[i + 1].end & capsEmphClass))
inCaps = 1;
if (inCaps) typebuf[i] |= no_contract;
}
}
}
if (table->emphRules[capsRule][begWordOffset]) {
resolveEmphasisWords(emphasisBuffer, capsEmphClass, input, wordBuffer);
if (table->emphRules[capsRule][lenPhraseOffset])
resolveEmphasisPassages(
emphasisBuffer, capsRule, capsEmphClass, table, input, wordBuffer);
resolveEmphasisResets(emphasisBuffer, capsEmphClass, table, input, wordBuffer);
} else if (table->emphRules[capsRule][letterOffset]) {
if (table->capsNoCont) /* capsnocont and no capsword */
resolveEmphasisAllCapsSymbols(emphasisBuffer, typebuf, input);
else
resolveEmphasisSingleSymbols(emphasisBuffer, capsEmphClass, input);
}
if (!haveEmphasis) return;
for (j = 0; j < 10; j++) {
if (table->emphRules[emph1Rule + j][begWordOffset]) {
resolveEmphasisWords(emphasisBuffer, emphClasses[j], input, wordBuffer);
if (table->emphRules[emph1Rule + j][lenPhraseOffset])
resolveEmphasisPassages(emphasisBuffer, emph1Rule + j, emphClasses[j],
table, input, wordBuffer);
} else if (table->emphRules[emph1Rule + j][letterOffset])
resolveEmphasisSingleSymbols(emphasisBuffer, emphClasses[j], input);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rdp_recv(uint8 * type)
{
RD_BOOL is_fastpath;
static STREAM rdp_s;
uint16 length;
while (1)
{
/* fill stream with data if needed for parsing a new packet */
if ((rdp_s == NULL) || (g_next_packet >= rdp_s->end) || (g_next_packet == NULL))
{
rdp_s = sec_recv(&is_fastpath);
if (rdp_s == NULL)
return NULL;
if (is_fastpath == True)
{
/* process_ts_fp_updates moves g_next_packet */
process_ts_fp_updates(rdp_s);
continue;
}
g_next_packet = rdp_s->p;
}
else
{
rdp_s->p = g_next_packet;
}
/* parse a TS_SHARECONTROLHEADER */
if (rdp_ts_in_share_control_header(rdp_s, type, &length) == False)
continue;
break;
}
logger(Protocol, Debug, "rdp_recv(), RDP packet #%d, type 0x%x", ++g_packetno, *type);
g_next_packet += length;
return rdp_s;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *vnc_worker_thread(void *arg)
{
VncJobQueue *queue = arg;
qemu_thread_get_self(&queue->thread);
while (!vnc_worker_thread_loop(queue)) ;
vnc_queue_clear(queue);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 17,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
size_t list_len, name_len;
const char **p;
/* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching ALPN extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
/*
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
*
* struct {
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
* } ProtocolNameList;
*
* the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName"
*/
/* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */
if( len < 4 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1];
if( list_len != len - 2 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
name_len = buf[2];
if( name_len != list_len - 1 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
/* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */
for( p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++ )
{
if( name_len == strlen( *p ) &&
memcmp( buf + 3, *p, name_len ) == 0 )
{
ssl->alpn_chosen = *p;
return( 0 );
}
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ALPN extension: no matching protocol" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
Commit Message: Add bounds check before length read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_completion_runner(
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted,
host_id_, params.route_id, params.surface_id,
true, base::TimeTicks(), base::TimeDelta()));
gfx::PluginWindowHandle handle =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceWindowHandle(params.surface_id);
if (!handle) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "SurfaceIDNotFound_RoutingToUI",
"surface_id", params.surface_id);
#if defined(USE_AURA)
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
RouteOnUIThread(GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(params));
#endif
return;
}
scoped_refptr<AcceleratedPresenter> presenter(
AcceleratedPresenter::GetForWindow(handle));
if (!presenter) {
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "EarlyOut_NativeWindowNotFound", "handle", handle);
return;
}
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
presenter->AsyncPresentAndAcknowledge(
params.size,
params.surface_handle,
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompleted,
host_id_,
params.route_id,
params.surface_id));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform4iv(
GLint fake_location, GLsizei count, const GLint* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform4iv",
Program::kUniform4i,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
glUniform4iv(real_location, count, value);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetUserSelectedDefaultSearchProvider(const std::string& base_url,
const std::string& ntp_url) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
TemplateURLData data;
data.SetShortName(base::UTF8ToUTF16(base_url));
data.SetKeyword(base::UTF8ToUTF16(base_url));
data.SetURL(base_url + "url?bar={searchTerms}");
data.new_tab_url = ntp_url;
TemplateURLService* template_url_service =
TemplateURLServiceFactory::GetForProfile(browser()->profile());
TemplateURL* template_url =
template_url_service->Add(base::MakeUnique<TemplateURL>(data));
template_url_service->SetUserSelectedDefaultSearchProvider(template_url);
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 127,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool proc_sys_link_fill_cache(struct file *file,
struct dir_context *ctx,
struct ctl_table_header *head,
struct ctl_table *table)
{
bool ret = true;
head = sysctl_head_grab(head);
if (S_ISLNK(table->mode)) {
/* It is not an error if we can not follow the link ignore it */
int err = sysctl_follow_link(&head, &table);
if (err)
goto out;
}
ret = proc_sys_fill_cache(file, ctx, head, table);
out:
sysctl_head_finish(head);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DidNavigate(uint32_t next_source_id) {
current_content_source_id_ = next_source_id;
did_receive_first_frame_after_navigation_ = false;
if (enable_surface_synchronization_) {
visual_properties_ack_pending_ = false;
viz::LocalSurfaceId old_surface_id = view_->GetLocalSurfaceId();
if (view_)
view_->DidNavigate();
viz::LocalSurfaceId new_surface_id = view_->GetLocalSurfaceId();
if (old_surface_id == new_surface_id)
return;
} else {
if (last_received_content_source_id_ >= current_content_source_id_)
return;
}
if (!new_content_rendering_timeout_)
return;
new_content_rendering_timeout_->Start(new_content_rendering_delay_);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool Splash::gouraudTriangleShadedFill(SplashGouraudColor *shading)
{
double xdbl[3] = {0., 0., 0.};
double ydbl[3] = {0., 0., 0.};
int x[3] = {0, 0, 0};
int y[3] = {0, 0, 0};
double xt=0., xa=0., yt=0.;
double ca=0., ct=0.;
double scanLimitMapL[2] = {0., 0.};
double scanLimitMapR[2] = {0., 0.};
double scanColorMapL[2] = {0., 0.};
double scanColorMapR[2] = {0., 0.};
double scanColorMap[2] = {0., 0.};
int scanEdgeL[2] = { 0, 0 };
int scanEdgeR[2] = { 0, 0 };
GBool hasFurtherSegment = gFalse;
int scanLineOff = 0;
int bitmapOff = 0;
int scanLimitR = 0, scanLimitL = 0;
int bitmapWidth = bitmap->getWidth();
SplashClip* clip = getClip();
SplashBitmap *blitTarget = bitmap;
SplashColorPtr bitmapData = bitmap->getDataPtr();
SplashColorPtr bitmapAlpha = bitmap->getAlphaPtr();
SplashColorPtr cur = NULL;
SplashCoord* userToCanvasMatrix = getMatrix();
SplashColorMode bitmapMode = bitmap->getMode();
GBool hasAlpha = (bitmapAlpha != NULL);
int rowSize = bitmap->getRowSize();
int colorComps = 0;
switch (bitmapMode) {
case splashModeMono1:
break;
case splashModeMono8:
colorComps=1;
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
colorComps=3;
break;
case splashModeBGR8:
colorComps=3;
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
colorComps=4;
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
colorComps=4;
break;
case splashModeDeviceN8:
colorComps=SPOT_NCOMPS+4;
break;
#endif
}
SplashPipe pipe;
SplashColor cSrcVal;
pipeInit(&pipe, 0, 0, NULL, cSrcVal, (Guchar)splashRound(state->strokeAlpha * 255), gFalse, gFalse);
if (vectorAntialias) {
if (aaBuf == NULL)
return gFalse; // fall back to old behaviour
drawAAPixelInit();
}
GBool bDirectBlit = vectorAntialias ? gFalse : pipe.noTransparency && !state->blendFunc;
if (!bDirectBlit) {
blitTarget = new SplashBitmap(bitmap->getWidth(),
bitmap->getHeight(),
bitmap->getRowPad(),
bitmap->getMode(),
gTrue,
bitmap->getRowSize() >= 0);
bitmapData = blitTarget->getDataPtr();
bitmapAlpha = blitTarget->getAlphaPtr();
int S = bitmap->getWidth() * bitmap->getHeight();
for (int i = 0; i < S; ++i)
bitmapAlpha[i] = 0;
hasAlpha = gTrue;
}
if (shading->isParameterized()) {
double color[3];
double colorinterp;
for (int i = 0; i < shading->getNTriangles(); ++i) {
shading->getTriangle(i,
xdbl + 0, ydbl + 0, color + 0,
xdbl + 1, ydbl + 1, color + 1,
xdbl + 2, ydbl + 2, color + 2);
for (int m = 0; m < 3; ++m) {
xt = xdbl[m] * (double)userToCanvasMatrix[0] + ydbl[m] * (double)userToCanvasMatrix[2] + (double)userToCanvasMatrix[4];
yt = xdbl[m] * (double)userToCanvasMatrix[1] + ydbl[m] * (double)userToCanvasMatrix[3] + (double)userToCanvasMatrix[5];
xdbl[m] = xt;
ydbl[m] = yt;
x[m] = splashRound(xt);
y[m] = splashRound(yt);
}
if (y[0] > y[1]) {
Guswap(x[0], x[1]);
Guswap(y[0], y[1]);
Guswap(color[0], color[1]);
}
assert(y[0] <= y[1]);
if (y[1] > y[2]) {
int tmpX = x[2];
int tmpY = y[2];
double tmpC = color[2];
x[2] = x[1]; y[2] = y[1]; color[2] = color[1];
if (y[0] > tmpY) {
x[1] = x[0]; y[1] = y[0]; color[1] = color[0];
x[0] = tmpX; y[0] = tmpY; color[0] = tmpC;
} else {
x[1] = tmpX; y[1] = tmpY; color[1] = tmpC;
}
}
assert(y[0] <= y[1]);
assert(y[1] <= y[2]);
if ((x[0] - x[2]) * (y[1] - y[2]) - (x[1] - x[2]) * (y[0] - y[2]) == 0)
continue; // degenerate triangle.
scanEdgeL[0] = 0;
scanEdgeR[0] = 0;
if (y[0] == y[1]) {
scanEdgeL[0] = 1;
scanEdgeL[1] = scanEdgeR[1] = 2;
} else {
scanEdgeL[1] = 1; scanEdgeR[1] = 2;
}
assert(y[scanEdgeL[0]] < y[scanEdgeL[1]]);
assert(y[scanEdgeR[0]] < y[scanEdgeR[1]]);
scanLimitMapL[0] = double(x[scanEdgeL[1]] - x[scanEdgeL[0]]) / (y[scanEdgeL[1]] - y[scanEdgeL[0]]);
scanLimitMapL[1] = x[scanEdgeL[0]] - y[scanEdgeL[0]] * scanLimitMapL[0];
scanLimitMapR[0] = double(x[scanEdgeR[1]] - x[scanEdgeR[0]]) / (y[scanEdgeR[1]] - y[scanEdgeR[0]]);
scanLimitMapR[1] = x[scanEdgeR[0]] - y[scanEdgeR[0]] * scanLimitMapR[0];
xa = y[1] * scanLimitMapL[0] + scanLimitMapL[1];
xt = y[1] * scanLimitMapR[0] + scanLimitMapR[1];
if (xa > xt) {
Guswap(scanEdgeL[0], scanEdgeR[0]);
Guswap(scanEdgeL[1], scanEdgeR[1]);
Guswap(scanLimitMapL[0], scanLimitMapR[0]);
Guswap(scanLimitMapL[1], scanLimitMapR[1]);
}
scanColorMapL[0] = (color[scanEdgeL[1]] - color[scanEdgeL[0]]) / (y[scanEdgeL[1]] - y[scanEdgeL[0]]);
scanColorMapL[1] = color[scanEdgeL[0]] - y[scanEdgeL[0]] * scanColorMapL[0];
scanColorMapR[0] = (color[scanEdgeR[1]] - color[scanEdgeR[0]]) / (y[scanEdgeR[1]] - y[scanEdgeR[0]]);
scanColorMapR[1] = color[scanEdgeR[0]] - y[scanEdgeR[0]] * scanColorMapR[0];
hasFurtherSegment = (y[1] < y[2]);
scanLineOff = y[0] * rowSize;
for (int Y = y[0]; Y <= y[2]; ++Y, scanLineOff += rowSize) {
if (hasFurtherSegment && Y == y[1]) {
if (scanEdgeL[1] == 1) {
scanEdgeL[0] = 1;
scanEdgeL[1] = 2;
scanLimitMapL[0] = double(x[scanEdgeL[1]] - x[scanEdgeL[0]]) / (y[scanEdgeL[1]] - y[scanEdgeL[0]]);
scanLimitMapL[1] = x[scanEdgeL[0]] - y[scanEdgeL[0]] * scanLimitMapL[0];
scanColorMapL[0] = (color[scanEdgeL[1]] - color[scanEdgeL[0]]) / (y[scanEdgeL[1]] - y[scanEdgeL[0]]);
scanColorMapL[1] = color[scanEdgeL[0]] - y[scanEdgeL[0]] * scanColorMapL[0];
} else if (scanEdgeR[1] == 1) {
scanEdgeR[0] = 1;
scanEdgeR[1] = 2;
scanLimitMapR[0] = double(x[scanEdgeR[1]] - x[scanEdgeR[0]]) / (y[scanEdgeR[1]] - y[scanEdgeR[0]]);
scanLimitMapR[1] = x[scanEdgeR[0]] - y[scanEdgeR[0]] * scanLimitMapR[0];
scanColorMapR[0] = (color[scanEdgeR[1]] - color[scanEdgeR[0]]) / (y[scanEdgeR[1]] - y[scanEdgeR[0]]);
scanColorMapR[1] = color[scanEdgeR[0]] - y[scanEdgeR[0]] * scanColorMapR[0];
}
assert( y[scanEdgeL[0]] < y[scanEdgeL[1]] );
assert( y[scanEdgeR[0]] < y[scanEdgeR[1]] );
hasFurtherSegment = gFalse;
}
yt = Y;
xa = yt * scanLimitMapL[0] + scanLimitMapL[1];
xt = yt * scanLimitMapR[0] + scanLimitMapR[1];
ca = yt * scanColorMapL[0] + scanColorMapL[1];
ct = yt * scanColorMapR[0] + scanColorMapR[1];
scanLimitL = splashRound(xa);
scanLimitR = splashRound(xt);
scanColorMap[0] = (scanLimitR == scanLimitL) ? 0. : ((ct - ca) / (scanLimitR - scanLimitL));
scanColorMap[1] = ca - scanLimitL * scanColorMap[0];
assert(scanLimitL <= scanLimitR || abs(scanLimitL - scanLimitR) <= 2); // allow rounding inaccuracies
assert(scanLineOff == Y * rowSize);
colorinterp = scanColorMap[0] * scanLimitL + scanColorMap[1];
bitmapOff = scanLineOff + scanLimitL * colorComps;
for (int X = scanLimitL; X <= scanLimitR; ++X, colorinterp += scanColorMap[0], bitmapOff += colorComps) {
if (!clip->test(X, Y))
continue;
assert(fabs(colorinterp - (scanColorMap[0] * X + scanColorMap[1])) < 1e-10);
assert(bitmapOff == Y * rowSize + colorComps * X && scanLineOff == Y * rowSize);
shading->getParameterizedColor(colorinterp, bitmapMode, &bitmapData[bitmapOff]);
if (hasAlpha)
bitmapAlpha[Y * bitmapWidth + X] = 255;
}
}
}
} else {
return gFalse;
}
if (!bDirectBlit) {
int W = blitTarget->getWidth();
int H = blitTarget->getHeight();
cur = cSrcVal;
for (int X = 0; X < W; ++X) {
for (int Y = 0; Y < H; ++Y) {
if (!bitmapAlpha[Y * bitmapWidth + X])
continue; // draw only parts of the shading!
bitmapOff = Y * rowSize + colorComps * X;
for (int m = 0; m < colorComps; ++m)
cur[m] = bitmapData[bitmapOff + m];
if (vectorAntialias) {
drawAAPixel(&pipe, X, Y);
} else {
drawPixel(&pipe, X, Y, gTrue); // no clipping - has already been done.
}
}
}
delete blitTarget;
blitTarget = NULL;
}
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sg_unlink_reserve(Sg_fd * sfp, Sg_request * srp)
{
Sg_scatter_hold *req_schp = &srp->data;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(4, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, srp->parentfp->parentdp,
"sg_unlink_reserve: req->k_use_sg=%d\n",
(int) req_schp->k_use_sg));
req_schp->k_use_sg = 0;
req_schp->bufflen = 0;
req_schp->pages = NULL;
req_schp->page_order = 0;
req_schp->sglist_len = 0;
sfp->save_scat_len = 0;
srp->res_used = 0;
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 42,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void XMPChunk::write(WEBP_MetaHandler* handler)
{
XMP_IO* file = handler->parent->ioRef;
this->size = handler->xmpPacket.size();
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, this->tag);
XIO::WriteUns32_LE(file, (XMP_Uns32) this->size);
file->Write(handler->xmpPacket.data(), (XMP_Int32) this->size);
if (this->size & 1) {
const XMP_Uns8 zero = 0;
file->Write(&zero, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 9,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_page_copy_to_pixbuf(PopplerPage *page,
GdkPixbuf *pixbuf,
OutputDevData *data)
{
SplashOutputDev *output_dev;
SplashBitmap *bitmap;
SplashColorPtr color_ptr;
int splash_width, splash_height, splash_rowstride;
int pixbuf_rowstride, pixbuf_n_channels;
guchar *pixbuf_data, *dst;
int x, y;
output_dev = page->document->output_dev;
bitmap = output_dev->getBitmap ();
color_ptr = bitmap->getDataPtr ();
splash_width = bitmap->getWidth ();
splash_height = bitmap->getHeight ();
splash_rowstride = bitmap->getRowSize ();
pixbuf_data = gdk_pixbuf_get_pixels (pixbuf);
pixbuf_rowstride = gdk_pixbuf_get_rowstride (pixbuf);
pixbuf_n_channels = gdk_pixbuf_get_n_channels (pixbuf);
if (splash_width > gdk_pixbuf_get_width (pixbuf))
splash_width = gdk_pixbuf_get_width (pixbuf);
if (splash_height > gdk_pixbuf_get_height (pixbuf))
splash_height = gdk_pixbuf_get_height (pixbuf);
SplashColorPtr pixel = new Guchar[4];
for (y = 0; y < splash_height; y++)
{
dst = pixbuf_data + y * pixbuf_rowstride;
for (x = 0; x < splash_width; x++)
{
output_dev->getBitmap()->getPixel(x, y, pixel);
dst[0] = pixel[0];
dst[1] = pixel[1];
dst[2] = pixel[2];
if (pixbuf_n_channels == 4)
dst[3] = 0xff;
dst += pixbuf_n_channels;
}
}
delete [] pixel;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa)
{
return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(DSA,i2d_DSA_PUBKEY,bp,dsa);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 94,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ahci_write_fis_sdb(AHCIState *s, NCQTransferState *ncq_tfs)
{
AHCIDevice *ad = ncq_tfs->drive;
AHCIPortRegs *pr = &ad->port_regs;
IDEState *ide_state;
SDBFIS *sdb_fis;
if (!ad->res_fis ||
!(pr->cmd & PORT_CMD_FIS_RX)) {
return;
}
sdb_fis = (SDBFIS *)&ad->res_fis[RES_FIS_SDBFIS];
ide_state = &ad->port.ifs[0];
sdb_fis->type = SATA_FIS_TYPE_SDB;
/* Interrupt pending & Notification bit */
sdb_fis->flags = 0x40; /* Interrupt bit, always 1 for NCQ */
sdb_fis->status = ide_state->status & 0x77;
sdb_fis->error = ide_state->error;
/* update SAct field in SDB_FIS */
sdb_fis->payload = cpu_to_le32(ad->finished);
/* Update shadow registers (except BSY 0x80 and DRQ 0x08) */
pr->tfdata = (ad->port.ifs[0].error << 8) |
(ad->port.ifs[0].status & 0x77) |
(pr->tfdata & 0x88);
pr->scr_act &= ~ad->finished;
ad->finished = 0;
/* Trigger IRQ if interrupt bit is set (which currently, it always is) */
if (sdb_fis->flags & 0x40) {
ahci_trigger_irq(s, ad, PORT_IRQ_SDB_FIS);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderProcessHost::ShouldTryToUseExistingProcessHost(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) {
if (run_renderer_in_process())
return true;
if (g_all_hosts.Get().size() >= GetMaxRendererProcessCount())
return true;
return GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldTryToUseExistingProcessHost(
browser_context, url);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: g_NPN_UserAgent(NPP instance)
{
if (!thread_check()) {
npw_printf("WARNING: NPN_UserAgent not called from the main thread\n");
return NULL;
}
D(bugiI("NPN_UserAgent instance=%p\n", instance));
if (g_user_agent == NULL)
g_user_agent = invoke_NPN_UserAgent();
D(bugiD("NPN_UserAgent return: '%s'\n", g_user_agent));
return g_user_agent;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FFmpegVideoDecodeEngine::Initialize(
MessageLoop* message_loop,
VideoDecodeEngine::EventHandler* event_handler,
VideoDecodeContext* context,
const VideoDecoderConfig& config) {
static const int kDecodeThreads = 2;
static const int kMaxDecodeThreads = 16;
codec_context_ = avcodec_alloc_context();
codec_context_->pix_fmt = PIX_FMT_YUV420P;
codec_context_->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO;
codec_context_->codec_id = VideoCodecToCodecID(config.codec());
codec_context_->coded_width = config.width();
codec_context_->coded_height = config.height();
frame_rate_numerator_ = config.frame_rate_numerator();
frame_rate_denominator_ = config.frame_rate_denominator();
if (config.extra_data() != NULL) {
codec_context_->extradata_size = config.extra_data_size();
codec_context_->extradata =
reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(av_malloc(config.extra_data_size()));
memcpy(codec_context_->extradata, config.extra_data(),
config.extra_data_size());
}
codec_context_->error_concealment = FF_EC_GUESS_MVS | FF_EC_DEBLOCK;
codec_context_->error_recognition = FF_ER_CAREFUL;
AVCodec* codec = avcodec_find_decoder(codec_context_->codec_id);
int decode_threads = (codec_context_->codec_id == CODEC_ID_THEORA) ?
1 : kDecodeThreads;
const CommandLine* cmd_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
std::string threads(cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kVideoThreads));
if ((!threads.empty() &&
!base::StringToInt(threads, &decode_threads)) ||
decode_threads < 0 || decode_threads > kMaxDecodeThreads) {
decode_threads = kDecodeThreads;
}
av_frame_.reset(avcodec_alloc_frame());
VideoCodecInfo info;
info.success = false;
info.provides_buffers = true;
info.stream_info.surface_type = VideoFrame::TYPE_SYSTEM_MEMORY;
info.stream_info.surface_format = GetSurfaceFormat();
info.stream_info.surface_width = config.surface_width();
info.stream_info.surface_height = config.surface_height();
bool buffer_allocated = true;
frame_queue_available_.clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < Limits::kMaxVideoFrames; ++i) {
scoped_refptr<VideoFrame> video_frame;
VideoFrame::CreateFrame(VideoFrame::YV12,
config.width(),
config.height(),
kNoTimestamp,
kNoTimestamp,
&video_frame);
if (!video_frame.get()) {
buffer_allocated = false;
break;
}
frame_queue_available_.push_back(video_frame);
}
if (codec &&
avcodec_thread_init(codec_context_, decode_threads) >= 0 &&
avcodec_open(codec_context_, codec) >= 0 &&
av_frame_.get() &&
buffer_allocated) {
info.success = true;
}
event_handler_ = event_handler;
event_handler_->OnInitializeComplete(info);
}
Commit Message: Don't forget the ffmpeg input buffer padding when allocating a codec's
extradata buffer.
BUG=82438
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7137002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn,
channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id);
return;
}
c->input_filter = ifn;
c->output_filter = ofn;
c->filter_ctx = ctx;
c->filter_cleanup = cfn;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: user_extension_set_property (User *user,
Daemon *daemon,
GDBusInterfaceInfo *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation)
{
const GDBusPropertyInfo *property = g_dbus_method_invocation_get_property_info (invocation);
g_autoptr(GVariant) value = NULL;
g_autofree gchar *printed = NULL;
g_autofree gchar *prev = NULL;
g_variant_get_child (g_dbus_method_invocation_get_parameters (invocation), 2, "v", &value);
/* We'll always have the type when we parse it back so
* we don't need it to be printed with annotations.
*/
printed = g_variant_print (value, FALSE);
/* May as well try to avoid the thrashing... */
prev = g_key_file_get_value (user->keyfile, interface->name, property->name, NULL);
if (!prev || !g_str_equal (printed, prev)) {
g_key_file_set_value (user->keyfile, interface->name, property->name, printed);
/* Emit a change signal. Use invalidation
* because the data may not be world-readable.
*/
g_dbus_connection_emit_signal (g_dbus_method_invocation_get_connection (invocation),
NULL, /* destination_bus_name */
g_dbus_method_invocation_get_object_path (invocation),
"org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties", "PropertiesChanged",
g_variant_new_parsed ("( %s, %a{sv}, [ %s ] )",
interface->name, NULL, property->name),
NULL);
accounts_user_emit_changed (ACCOUNTS_USER (user));
save_extra_data (user);
}
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value (invocation, g_variant_new ("()"));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 4,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLCanvasElement::UpdateMemoryUsage() {
int non_gpu_buffer_count = 0;
int gpu_buffer_count = 0;
if (!Is2d() && !Is3d())
return;
if (ResourceProvider()) {
non_gpu_buffer_count++;
if (IsAccelerated()) {
gpu_buffer_count += 2;
}
}
if (Is3d())
non_gpu_buffer_count += context_->ExternallyAllocatedBufferCountPerPixel();
const int bytes_per_pixel = ColorParams().BytesPerPixel();
if (gpu_buffer_count && !gpu_memory_usage_) {
base::CheckedNumeric<intptr_t> checked_usage =
gpu_buffer_count * bytes_per_pixel;
checked_usage *= width();
checked_usage *= height();
intptr_t gpu_memory_usage =
checked_usage.ValueOrDefault(std::numeric_limits<intptr_t>::max());
global_gpu_memory_usage_ += (gpu_memory_usage - gpu_memory_usage_);
gpu_memory_usage_ = gpu_memory_usage;
global_accelerated_context_count_++;
} else if (!gpu_buffer_count && gpu_memory_usage_) {
DCHECK_GT(global_accelerated_context_count_, 0u);
global_accelerated_context_count_--;
global_gpu_memory_usage_ -= gpu_memory_usage_;
gpu_memory_usage_ = 0;
}
base::CheckedNumeric<intptr_t> checked_usage =
non_gpu_buffer_count * bytes_per_pixel;
checked_usage *= width();
checked_usage *= height();
checked_usage += gpu_memory_usage_;
intptr_t externally_allocated_memory =
checked_usage.ValueOrDefault(std::numeric_limits<intptr_t>::max());
v8::Isolate::GetCurrent()->AdjustAmountOfExternalAllocatedMemory(
externally_allocated_memory - externally_allocated_memory_);
externally_allocated_memory_ = externally_allocated_memory;
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct acpi_generic_address *einj_get_trigger_parameter_region(
struct acpi_einj_trigger *trigger_tab, u64 param1, u64 param2)
{
int i;
struct acpi_whea_header *entry;
entry = (struct acpi_whea_header *)
((char *)trigger_tab + sizeof(struct acpi_einj_trigger));
for (i = 0; i < trigger_tab->entry_count; i++) {
if (entry->action == ACPI_EINJ_TRIGGER_ERROR &&
entry->instruction == ACPI_EINJ_WRITE_REGISTER_VALUE &&
entry->register_region.space_id ==
ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY &&
(entry->register_region.address & param2) == (param1 & param2))
return &entry->register_region;
entry++;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable APEI error injection if securelevel is set
ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features. If
supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.
Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
indistinguishable from real hardware errors. This can have undesirable
side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
replacement.
While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-74 | 0 | 73,885 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool vfio_pci_dev_below_slot(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct pci_slot *slot)
{
for (; pdev; pdev = pdev->bus->self)
if (pdev->bus == slot->bus)
return (pdev->slot == slot);
return false;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 48,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: array_indexed_param_read(iparam_list * plist, const ref * pkey, iparam_loc * ploc)
{
ref *const arr = &((dict_param_list *) plist)->dict;
check_type(*pkey, t_integer);
if (pkey->value.intval < 0 || pkey->value.intval >= r_size(arr))
return 1;
ploc->pvalue = arr->value.refs + pkey->value.intval;
ploc->presult = &plist->results[pkey->value.intval];
*ploc->presult = 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserTabStripController::UpdateLayoutType() {
bool adjust_layout = false;
TabStripLayoutType layout_type =
DetermineTabStripLayout(g_browser_process->local_state(), &adjust_layout);
tabstrip_->SetLayoutType(layout_type, adjust_layout);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pfkey_spdadd(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg *hdr, void * const *ext_hdrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
int err = 0;
struct sadb_lifetime *lifetime;
struct sadb_address *sa;
struct sadb_x_policy *pol;
struct xfrm_policy *xp;
struct km_event c;
struct sadb_x_sec_ctx *sec_ctx;
if (!present_and_same_family(ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC-1],
ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST-1]) ||
!ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY-1])
return -EINVAL;
pol = ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_POLICY-1];
if (pol->sadb_x_policy_type > IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC)
return -EINVAL;
if (!pol->sadb_x_policy_dir || pol->sadb_x_policy_dir >= IPSEC_DIR_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
xp = xfrm_policy_alloc(net, GFP_KERNEL);
if (xp == NULL)
return -ENOBUFS;
xp->action = (pol->sadb_x_policy_type == IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD ?
XFRM_POLICY_BLOCK : XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW);
xp->priority = pol->sadb_x_policy_priority;
sa = ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC-1],
xp->family = pfkey_sadb_addr2xfrm_addr(sa, &xp->selector.saddr);
if (!xp->family) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
xp->selector.family = xp->family;
xp->selector.prefixlen_s = sa->sadb_address_prefixlen;
xp->selector.proto = pfkey_proto_to_xfrm(sa->sadb_address_proto);
xp->selector.sport = ((struct sockaddr_in *)(sa+1))->sin_port;
if (xp->selector.sport)
xp->selector.sport_mask = htons(0xffff);
sa = ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST-1],
pfkey_sadb_addr2xfrm_addr(sa, &xp->selector.daddr);
xp->selector.prefixlen_d = sa->sadb_address_prefixlen;
/* Amusing, we set this twice. KAME apps appear to set same value
* in both addresses.
*/
xp->selector.proto = pfkey_proto_to_xfrm(sa->sadb_address_proto);
xp->selector.dport = ((struct sockaddr_in *)(sa+1))->sin_port;
if (xp->selector.dport)
xp->selector.dport_mask = htons(0xffff);
sec_ctx = ext_hdrs[SADB_X_EXT_SEC_CTX - 1];
if (sec_ctx != NULL) {
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx = pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx(sec_ctx);
if (!uctx) {
err = -ENOBUFS;
goto out;
}
err = security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&xp->security, uctx);
kfree(uctx);
if (err)
goto out;
}
xp->lft.soft_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
xp->lft.hard_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
xp->lft.soft_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
xp->lft.hard_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
if ((lifetime = ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD-1]) != NULL) {
xp->lft.hard_packet_limit = _KEY2X(lifetime->sadb_lifetime_allocations);
xp->lft.hard_byte_limit = _KEY2X(lifetime->sadb_lifetime_bytes);
xp->lft.hard_add_expires_seconds = lifetime->sadb_lifetime_addtime;
xp->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds = lifetime->sadb_lifetime_usetime;
}
if ((lifetime = ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT-1]) != NULL) {
xp->lft.soft_packet_limit = _KEY2X(lifetime->sadb_lifetime_allocations);
xp->lft.soft_byte_limit = _KEY2X(lifetime->sadb_lifetime_bytes);
xp->lft.soft_add_expires_seconds = lifetime->sadb_lifetime_addtime;
xp->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds = lifetime->sadb_lifetime_usetime;
}
xp->xfrm_nr = 0;
if (pol->sadb_x_policy_type == IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC &&
(err = parse_ipsecrequests(xp, pol)) < 0)
goto out;
err = xfrm_policy_insert(pol->sadb_x_policy_dir-1, xp,
hdr->sadb_msg_type != SADB_X_SPDUPDATE);
xfrm_audit_policy_add(xp, err ? 0 : 1,
audit_get_loginuid(current),
audit_get_sessionid(current), 0);
if (err)
goto out;
if (hdr->sadb_msg_type == SADB_X_SPDUPDATE)
c.event = XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY;
else
c.event = XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY;
c.seq = hdr->sadb_msg_seq;
c.portid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid;
km_policy_notify(xp, pol->sadb_x_policy_dir-1, &c);
xfrm_pol_put(xp);
return 0;
out:
xp->walk.dead = 1;
xfrm_policy_destroy(xp);
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tty_add_file(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file)
{
struct tty_file_private *priv = file->private_data;
priv->tty = tty;
priv->file = file;
spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
list_add(&priv->list, &tty->tty_files);
spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, isCompressed)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->flags & PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_GZ) {
RETURN_LONG(PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_GZ);
}
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->flags & PHAR_FILE_COMPRESSED_BZ2) {
RETURN_LONG(PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSED_BZ2);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(snmp2_walk)
{
php_snmp(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, (SNMP_CMD_WALK | SNMP_NUMERIC_KEYS), SNMP_VERSION_2c);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShellSurface::WidgetHasHitTestMask() const {
return surface_ ? surface_->HasHitTestMask() : false;
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: purge_diff_markers(xmlNode * a_node)
{
xmlNode *child = NULL;
CRM_CHECK(a_node != NULL, return);
xml_remove_prop(a_node, XML_DIFF_MARKER);
for (child = __xml_first_child(a_node); child != NULL; child = __xml_next(child)) {
purge_diff_markers(child);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PeopleHandler::HandlePauseSync(const base::ListValue* args) {
DCHECK(AccountConsistencyModeManager::IsDiceEnabledForProfile(profile_));
SigninManager* signin_manager = SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
DCHECK(signin_manager->IsAuthenticated());
ProfileOAuth2TokenServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->UpdateCredentials(
signin_manager->GetAuthenticatedAccountId(),
OAuth2TokenServiceDelegate::kInvalidRefreshToken);
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
{
unsigned long old_cr0 = kvm_read_cr0(vcpu);
unsigned long update_bits = X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_WP;
cr0 |= X86_CR0_ET;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (cr0 & 0xffffffff00000000UL)
return 1;
#endif
cr0 &= ~CR0_RESERVED_BITS;
if ((cr0 & X86_CR0_NW) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_CD))
return 1;
if ((cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
return 1;
if (!is_paging(vcpu) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if ((vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME)) {
int cs_db, cs_l;
if (!is_pae(vcpu))
return 1;
kvm_x86_ops->get_cs_db_l_bits(vcpu, &cs_db, &cs_l);
if (cs_l)
return 1;
} else
#endif
if (is_pae(vcpu) && !load_pdptrs(vcpu, vcpu->arch.walk_mmu,
kvm_read_cr3(vcpu)))
return 1;
}
if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) && kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE))
return 1;
kvm_x86_ops->set_cr0(vcpu, cr0);
if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & X86_CR0_PG) {
kvm_clear_async_pf_completion_queue(vcpu);
kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(vcpu);
}
if ((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & update_bits)
kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
if (((cr0 ^ old_cr0) & X86_CR0_CD) &&
kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm) &&
!kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
kvm_zap_gfn_range(vcpu->kvm, 0, ~0ULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bochs_read(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t sector_num,
uint8_t *buf, int nb_sectors)
{
int ret;
while (nb_sectors > 0) {
int64_t block_offset = seek_to_sector(bs, sector_num);
if (block_offset >= 0) {
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, block_offset, buf, 512);
if (ret != 512) {
return -1;
}
} else
memset(buf, 0, 512);
nb_sectors--;
sector_num++;
buf += 512;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnPrintPreviewRequest(int request_id) {
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(preview_ui_addr_str_, request_id);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 170,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtio_gpu_object_free_sg_table(struct virtio_gpu_object *bo)
{
sg_free_table(bo->pages);
kfree(bo->pages);
bo->pages = NULL;
}
Commit Message: drm/virtio: don't leak bo on drm_gem_object_init failure
Reported-by: 李强 <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20170406155941.458-1-kraxel@redhat.com
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 63,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_recv_NPSavedData(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
NPSavedData *save_area;
int error;
int32_t len;
unsigned char *buf;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &len)) < 0)
return error;
if (len == 0)
save_area = NULL;
else {
if ((save_area = NPN_MemAlloc(sizeof(*save_area))) == NULL)
return RPC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if ((buf = NPN_MemAlloc(len)) == NULL)
return RPC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_bytes(message, buf, len)) < 0)
return error;
save_area->len = len;
save_area->buf = buf;
}
if (p_value)
*((NPSavedData **)p_value) = save_area;
else if (save_area) {
NPN_MemFree(save_area->buf);
NPN_MemFree(save_area);
}
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DoScheme(const CHAR* spec,
const Component& scheme,
CanonOutput* output,
Component* out_scheme) {
if (scheme.len <= 0) {
*out_scheme = Component(output->length(), 0);
output->push_back(':');
return false;
}
out_scheme->begin = output->length();
bool success = true;
int end = scheme.end();
for (int i = scheme.begin; i < end; i++) {
UCHAR ch = static_cast<UCHAR>(spec[i]);
char replacement = 0;
if (ch < 0x80) {
if (i == scheme.begin) {
if (IsSchemeFirstChar(static_cast<unsigned char>(ch)))
replacement = kSchemeCanonical[ch];
} else {
replacement = kSchemeCanonical[ch];
}
}
if (replacement) {
output->push_back(replacement);
} else if (ch == '%') {
success = false;
output->push_back('%');
} else {
success = false;
AppendUTF8EscapedChar(spec, &i, end, output);
}
}
out_scheme->len = output->length() - out_scheme->begin;
output->push_back(':');
return success;
}
Commit Message: Percent-encode UTF8 characters in URL fragment identifiers.
This brings us into line with Firefox, Safari, and the spec.
Bug: 758523
Change-Id: I7e354ab441222d9fd08e45f0e70f91ad4e35fafe
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/668363
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507481}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 149,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_postcreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
struct msr_data msr;
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
r = vcpu_load(vcpu);
if (r)
return r;
msr.data = 0x0;
msr.index = MSR_IA32_TSC;
msr.host_initiated = true;
kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, &msr);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
schedule_delayed_work(&kvm->arch.kvmclock_sync_work,
KVMCLOCK_SYNC_PERIOD);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 35,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: onig_statistics_init(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
OpCounter[i] = OpPrevCounter[i] = 0; OpTime[i] = 0;
}
MaxStackDepth = 0;
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 64,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ehci_process_itd(EHCIState *ehci,
EHCIitd *itd,
uint32_t addr)
{
USBDevice *dev;
USBEndpoint *ep;
uint32_t i, len, pid, dir, devaddr, endp;
uint32_t pg, off, ptr1, ptr2, max, mult;
ehci->periodic_sched_active = PERIODIC_ACTIVE;
dir =(itd->bufptr[1] & ITD_BUFPTR_DIRECTION);
devaddr = get_field(itd->bufptr[0], ITD_BUFPTR_DEVADDR);
endp = get_field(itd->bufptr[0], ITD_BUFPTR_EP);
max = get_field(itd->bufptr[1], ITD_BUFPTR_MAXPKT);
mult = get_field(itd->bufptr[2], ITD_BUFPTR_MULT);
for(i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_ACTIVE) {
pg = get_field(itd->transact[i], ITD_XACT_PGSEL);
off = itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_OFFSET_MASK;
len = get_field(itd->transact[i], ITD_XACT_LENGTH);
if (len > max * mult) {
len = max * mult;
}
if (len > BUFF_SIZE || pg > 6) {
return -1;
}
ptr1 = (itd->bufptr[pg] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);
qemu_sglist_init(&ehci->isgl, ehci->device, 2, ehci->as);
if (off + len > 4096) {
/* transfer crosses page border */
if (pg == 6) {
qemu_sglist_destroy(&ehci->isgl);
return -1; /* avoid page pg + 1 */
}
ptr2 = (itd->bufptr[pg + 1] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);
uint32_t len2 = off + len - 4096;
uint32_t len1 = len - len2;
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr1 + off, len1);
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr2, len2);
} else {
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr1 + off, len);
}
pid = dir ? USB_TOKEN_IN : USB_TOKEN_OUT;
dev = ehci_find_device(ehci, devaddr);
ep = usb_ep_get(dev, pid, endp);
if (ep && ep->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC) {
usb_packet_setup(&ehci->ipacket, pid, ep, 0, addr, false,
(itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_IOC) != 0);
usb_packet_map(&ehci->ipacket, &ehci->isgl);
usb_handle_packet(dev, &ehci->ipacket);
usb_packet_unmap(&ehci->ipacket, &ehci->isgl);
} else {
DPRINTF("ISOCH: attempt to addess non-iso endpoint\n");
ehci->ipacket.status = USB_RET_NAK;
ehci->ipacket.actual_length = 0;
}
qemu_sglist_destroy(&ehci->isgl);
switch (ehci->ipacket.status) {
case USB_RET_SUCCESS:
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected iso usb result: %d\n",
ehci->ipacket.status);
/* Fall through */
case USB_RET_IOERROR:
case USB_RET_NODEV:
/* 3.3.2: XACTERR is only allowed on IN transactions */
if (dir) {
itd->transact[i] |= ITD_XACT_XACTERR;
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
}
break;
case USB_RET_BABBLE:
itd->transact[i] |= ITD_XACT_BABBLE;
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
break;
case USB_RET_NAK:
/* no data for us, so do a zero-length transfer */
ehci->ipacket.actual_length = 0;
break;
}
if (!dir) {
set_field(&itd->transact[i], len - ehci->ipacket.actual_length,
ITD_XACT_LENGTH); /* OUT */
} else {
set_field(&itd->transact[i], ehci->ipacket.actual_length,
ITD_XACT_LENGTH); /* IN */
}
if (itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_IOC) {
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_INT);
}
itd->transact[i] &= ~ITD_XACT_ACTIVE;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int switch_pg_num(struct multipath *m, const char *pgstr)
{
struct priority_group *pg;
unsigned pgnum;
unsigned long flags;
if (!pgstr || (sscanf(pgstr, "%u", &pgnum) != 1) || !pgnum ||
(pgnum > m->nr_priority_groups)) {
DMWARN("invalid PG number supplied to switch_pg_num");
return -EINVAL;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&m->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(pg, &m->priority_groups, list) {
pg->bypassed = 0;
if (--pgnum)
continue;
m->current_pgpath = NULL;
m->current_pg = NULL;
m->next_pg = pg;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&m->lock, flags);
schedule_work(&m->trigger_event);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::popFullscreenElementStack()
{
if (m_fullScreenElementStack.isEmpty())
return;
m_fullScreenElementStack.removeLast();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct userfaultfd_wait_queue *find_userfault(
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx)
{
return find_userfault_in(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh);
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: encode_CT(const struct ofpact_conntrack *conntrack,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct nx_action_conntrack *nac;
const size_t ofs = out->size;
size_t len;
nac = put_NXAST_CT(out);
nac->flags = htons(conntrack->flags);
if (conntrack->zone_src.field) {
nac->zone_src = htonl(nxm_header_from_mff(conntrack->zone_src.field));
nac->zone_ofs_nbits = nxm_encode_ofs_nbits(conntrack->zone_src.ofs,
conntrack->zone_src.n_bits);
} else {
nac->zone_src = htonl(0);
nac->zone_imm = htons(conntrack->zone_imm);
}
nac->recirc_table = conntrack->recirc_table;
nac->alg = htons(conntrack->alg);
len = ofpacts_put_openflow_actions(conntrack->actions,
ofpact_ct_get_action_len(conntrack),
out, ofp_version);
len += sizeof(*nac);
nac = ofpbuf_at(out, ofs, sizeof(*nac));
nac->len = htons(len);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hci_sock_dev_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, int event)
{
struct hci_ev_si_device ev;
BT_DBG("hdev %s event %d", hdev->name, event);
/* Send event to monitor */
if (atomic_read(&monitor_promisc)) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = create_monitor_event(hdev, event);
if (skb) {
send_monitor_event(skb);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
/* Send event to sockets */
ev.event = event;
ev.dev_id = hdev->id;
hci_si_event(NULL, HCI_EV_SI_DEVICE, sizeof(ev), &ev);
if (event == HCI_DEV_UNREG) {
struct sock *sk;
struct hlist_node *node;
/* Detach sockets from device */
read_lock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
sk_for_each(sk, node, &hci_sk_list.head) {
bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
if (hci_pi(sk)->hdev == hdev) {
hci_pi(sk)->hdev = NULL;
sk->sk_err = EPIPE;
sk->sk_state = BT_OPEN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
hci_dev_put(hdev);
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
}
read_unlock(&hci_sk_list.lock);
}
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jffs2_readdir(struct file *filp, void *dirent, filldir_t filldir)
{
struct jffs2_inode_info *f;
struct jffs2_sb_info *c;
struct inode *inode = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
struct jffs2_full_dirent *fd;
unsigned long offset, curofs;
D1(printk(KERN_DEBUG "jffs2_readdir() for dir_i #%lu\n", filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino));
f = JFFS2_INODE_INFO(inode);
c = JFFS2_SB_INFO(inode->i_sb);
offset = filp->f_pos;
if (offset == 0) {
D1(printk(KERN_DEBUG "Dirent 0: \".\", ino #%lu\n", inode->i_ino));
if (filldir(dirent, ".", 1, 0, inode->i_ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
goto out;
offset++;
}
if (offset == 1) {
unsigned long pino = parent_ino(filp->f_path.dentry);
D1(printk(KERN_DEBUG "Dirent 1: \"..\", ino #%lu\n", pino));
if (filldir(dirent, "..", 2, 1, pino, DT_DIR) < 0)
goto out;
offset++;
}
curofs=1;
down(&f->sem);
for (fd = f->dents; fd; fd = fd->next) {
curofs++;
/* First loop: curofs = 2; offset = 2 */
if (curofs < offset) {
D2(printk(KERN_DEBUG "Skipping dirent: \"%s\", ino #%u, type %d, because curofs %ld < offset %ld\n",
fd->name, fd->ino, fd->type, curofs, offset));
continue;
}
if (!fd->ino) {
D2(printk(KERN_DEBUG "Skipping deletion dirent \"%s\"\n", fd->name));
offset++;
continue;
}
D2(printk(KERN_DEBUG "Dirent %ld: \"%s\", ino #%u, type %d\n", offset, fd->name, fd->ino, fd->type));
if (filldir(dirent, fd->name, strlen(fd->name), offset, fd->ino, fd->type) < 0)
break;
offset++;
}
up(&f->sem);
out:
filp->f_pos = offset;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 1,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
if (svm->vmcb->control.next_rip != 0)
svm->next_rip = svm->vmcb->control.next_rip;
if (!svm->next_rip) {
if (emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP) !=
EMULATE_DONE)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: NOP\n", __func__);
return;
}
if (svm->next_rip - kvm_rip_read(vcpu) > MAX_INST_SIZE)
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: ip 0x%lx next 0x%llx\n",
__func__, kvm_rip_read(vcpu), svm->next_rip);
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, svm->next_rip);
svm_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ahash_nosetkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void load_vmcs12_mmu_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
u32 entry_failure_code;
nested_ept_uninit_mmu_context(vcpu);
/*
* Only PDPTE load can fail as the value of cr3 was checked on entry and
* couldn't have changed.
*/
if (nested_vmx_load_cr3(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr3, false, &entry_failure_code))
nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_PDPTE_FAIL);
if (!enable_ept)
vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->inject_page_fault = kvm_inject_page_fault;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 80,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DevToolsWindowBeforeUnloadObserver::DevToolsWindowBeforeUnloadObserver(
DevToolsWindow* devtools_window)
: WebContentsObserver(devtools_window->web_contents()),
m_fired(false) {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: command_key_event (FepClient *client,
FepControlMessage *request,
FepControlMessage *response)
{
FepEventKey event;
int retval;
uint32_t intval;
retval = _fep_control_message_read_uint32_arg (request, 0, &intval);
if (retval < 0)
{
fep_log (FEP_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "can't read keyval");
goto out;
}
event.keyval = intval;
retval = _fep_control_message_read_uint32_arg (request, 1, &intval);
if (retval < 0)
{
fep_log (FEP_LOG_LEVEL_WARNING, "can't read modifiers");
goto out;
}
event.modifiers = intval;
out:
response->command = FEP_CONTROL_RESPONSE;
_fep_control_message_alloc_args (response, 2);
_fep_control_message_write_uint8_arg (response, 0, FEP_CONTROL_KEY_EVENT);
intval = retval;
if (retval == 0 && client->filter)
{
event.event.type = FEP_KEY_PRESS;
event.source = request->args[2].str;
event.source_length = request->args[2].len;
intval = client->filter ((FepEvent *) &event, client->filter_data);
_fep_control_message_write_uint32_arg (response, 1, intval);
}
/* If key is not handled, send back the original input to the server. */
if (intval == 0)
fep_client_send_data (client, request->args[2].str, request->args[2].len);
}
Commit Message: Don't use abstract Unix domain sockets
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SurfaceHitTestReadyNotifier::SurfaceHitTestReadyNotifier(
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* target_view)
: target_view_(target_view) {
surface_manager_ = GetFrameSinkManager()->surface_manager();
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostImpl::AccessibilityGetNativeViewAccessible() {
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* view = static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
render_view_host_->GetWidget()->GetView());
if (view)
return view->AccessibilityGetNativeViewAccessible();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HeadlessDevToolsManagerDelegate::HandleAsyncCommand(
content::DevToolsAgentHost* agent_host,
int session_id,
base::DictionaryValue* command,
const CommandCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
if (!browser_)
return false;
int id;
std::string method;
if (!command->GetInteger("id", &id) || !command->GetString("method", &method))
return false;
auto find_it = async_command_map_.find(method);
if (find_it == async_command_map_.end())
return false;
const base::DictionaryValue* params = nullptr;
command->GetDictionary("params", ¶ms);
find_it->second.Run(agent_host, session_id, id, params, callback);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove some unused includes in headless/
Bug:
Change-Id: Icb5351bb6112fc89e36dab82c15f32887dab9217
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/720594
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Iris Uy <irisu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#509313}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 133,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::HandleCancelPendingPrintRequest(
const ListValue* /*args*/) {
TabContents* initiator_tab = GetInitiatorTab();
if (initiator_tab)
ClearInitiatorTabDetails();
gfx::NativeWindow parent = initiator_tab ?
initiator_tab->web_contents()->GetView()->GetTopLevelNativeWindow() :
NULL;
chrome::ShowPrintErrorDialog(parent);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RcdBetterThan(const std::string& a, const std::string& b) {
if (a == b)
return false;
if (a == "com")
return true;
if (a == "net")
return b != "com";
if (a == "org")
return b != "com" && b != "net";
return false;
}
Commit Message: Ensure IDN domains are in punycode format in extension host permissions
Today in extension dialogs and bubbles, IDN domains in host permissions
are not displayed in punycode format. There is a low security risk that
granting such permission would allow extensions to interact with pages
using spoofy IDN domains. Note that this does not affect the omnibox,
which would represent the origin properly.
To address this issue, this CL converts IDN domains in host permissions
to punycode format.
Bug: 745580
Change-Id: Ifc04030fae645f8a78ac8fde170660f2d514acce
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/644140
Commit-Queue: catmullings <catmullings@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Istiaque Ahmed <lazyboy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#499090}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long nsecs_to_usecs(unsigned long nsecs)
{
return nsecs / 1000;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport ImageType IdentifyImageGray(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
ImageType
type;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->type == BilevelType) || (image->type == GrayscaleType) ||
(image->type == GrayscaleMatteType))
return(image->type);
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
return(UndefinedType);
type=BilevelType;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (IsPixelGray(p) == MagickFalse)
{
type=UndefinedType;
break;
}
if ((type == BilevelType) && (IsPixelMonochrome(p) == MagickFalse))
type=GrayscaleType;
p++;
}
if (type == UndefinedType)
break;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if ((type == GrayscaleType) && (image->matte != MagickFalse))
type=GrayscaleMatteType;
return(type);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/281
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 73,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameFetchContext::CreateWebSocketHandshakeThrottle() {
if (IsDetached()) {
return nullptr;
}
if (!GetFrame())
return nullptr;
return WebFrame::FromFrame(GetFrame())
->ToWebLocalFrame()
->Client()
->CreateWebSocketHandshakeThrottle();
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u64 vcpu_tsc_khz(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz)
return vcpu->arch.virtual_tsc_khz;
else
return __this_cpu_read(cpu_tsc_khz);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsreq_print_noaddr(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, u_int length,
register const u_char *bp2)
{
register const struct sunrpc_msg *rp;
register const uint32_t *dp;
nfs_type type;
int v3;
uint32_t proc;
uint32_t access_flags;
struct nfsv3_sattr sa3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%d", length));
nfserr = 0; /* assume no error */
rp = (const struct sunrpc_msg *)bp;
if (!xid_map_enter(ndo, rp, bp2)) /* record proc number for later on */
goto trunc;
v3 = (EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_vers) == NFS_VER3);
proc = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_proc);
if (!v3 && proc < NFS_NPROCS)
proc = nfsv3_procid[proc];
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(nfsproc_str, "proc-%u", proc)));
switch (proc) {
case NFSPROC_GETATTR:
case NFSPROC_SETATTR:
case NFSPROC_READLINK:
case NFSPROC_FSSTAT:
case NFSPROC_FSINFO:
case NFSPROC_PATHCONF:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
parsefh(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_LOOKUP:
case NFSPROC_CREATE:
case NFSPROC_MKDIR:
case NFSPROC_REMOVE:
case NFSPROC_RMDIR:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_ACCESS:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
access_flags = EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0]);
if (access_flags & ~NFSV3ACCESS_FULL) {
/* NFSV3ACCESS definitions aren't up to date */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %04x", access_flags));
} else if ((access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_FULL) == NFSV3ACCESS_FULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NFS_ACCESS_FULL"));
} else {
char separator = ' ';
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_READ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NFS_ACCESS_READ"));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_LOOKUP) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_LOOKUP", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_MODIFY) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_MODIFY", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_EXTEND) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_EXTEND", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_DELETE) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_DELETE", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_EXECUTE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_EXECUTE", separator));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_READ:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
if (v3) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
} else {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_WRITE:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
if (v3) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[4]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u (%u) bytes @ %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <%s>",
tok2str(nfsv3_writemodes,
NULL, EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[3]))));
}
} else {
ND_TCHECK(dp[3]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u (%u) bytes @ %u (%u)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[3]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_SYMLINK:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ->"));
if (v3 && (dp = parse_sattr3(ndo, dp, &sa3)) == NULL)
break;
if (parsefn(ndo, dp) == NULL)
break;
if (v3 && ndo->ndo_vflag)
print_sattr3(ndo, &sa3, ndo->ndo_vflag);
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_MKNOD:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(*dp);
type = (nfs_type)EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
if ((dp = parse_sattr3(ndo, dp, &sa3)) == NULL)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(type2str, "unk-ft %d", type)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && (type == NFCHR || type == NFBLK)) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1])));
dp += 2;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
print_sattr3(ndo, &sa3, ndo->ndo_vflag);
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_RENAME:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ->"));
if (parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_LINK:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ->"));
if (parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_READDIR:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
if (v3) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[4]);
/*
* We shouldn't really try to interpret the
* offset cookie here.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRId64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " verf %08x%08x", dp[2], dp[3]));
} else {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
/*
* Print the offset as signed, since -1 is
* common, but offsets > 2^31 aren't.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %d",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_READDIRPLUS:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[4]);
/*
* We don't try to interpret the offset
* cookie here.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRId64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[5]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " max %u verf %08x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[5]), dp[2], dp[3]));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_COMMIT:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
return;
}
break;
default:
return;
}
trunc:
if (!nfserr)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13005/NFS: Add two bounds checks before fetching data
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::setDir(const AtomicString& value) {
Element* root_element = documentElement();
if (auto* html = ToHTMLHtmlElementOrNull(root_element))
html->setDir(value);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameView::setCanHaveScrollbars(bool canHaveScrollbars)
{
m_canHaveScrollbars = canHaveScrollbars;
ScrollView::setCanHaveScrollbars(canHaveScrollbars);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool pmu_access_event_counter_el0_disabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u64 reg = vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, PMUSERENR_EL0);
return !((reg & (ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_ER | ARMV8_PMU_USERENR_EN))
|| vcpu_mode_priv(vcpu));
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_givcipher_default(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct rtattr *tb[3];
struct {
struct rtattr attr;
struct crypto_attr_type data;
} ptype;
struct {
struct rtattr attr;
struct crypto_attr_alg data;
} palg;
struct crypto_template *tmpl;
struct crypto_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *larval;
const char *geniv;
int err;
larval = crypto_larval_lookup(alg->cra_driver_name,
(type & ~CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) |
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_GIVCIPHER,
mask | CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
err = PTR_ERR(larval);
if (IS_ERR(larval))
goto out;
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!crypto_is_larval(larval))
goto drop_larval;
ptype.attr.rta_len = sizeof(ptype);
ptype.attr.rta_type = CRYPTOA_TYPE;
ptype.data.type = type | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV;
/* GENIV tells the template that we're making a default geniv. */
ptype.data.mask = mask | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV;
tb[0] = &ptype.attr;
palg.attr.rta_len = sizeof(palg);
palg.attr.rta_type = CRYPTOA_ALG;
/* Must use the exact name to locate ourselves. */
memcpy(palg.data.name, alg->cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
tb[1] = &palg.attr;
tb[2] = NULL;
if ((alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) ==
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_BLKCIPHER)
geniv = alg->cra_blkcipher.geniv;
else
geniv = alg->cra_ablkcipher.geniv;
if (!geniv)
geniv = crypto_default_geniv(alg);
tmpl = crypto_lookup_template(geniv);
err = -ENOENT;
if (!tmpl)
goto kill_larval;
inst = tmpl->alloc(tb);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto put_tmpl;
if ((err = crypto_register_instance(tmpl, inst))) {
tmpl->free(inst);
goto put_tmpl;
}
/* Redo the lookup to use the instance we just registered. */
err = -EAGAIN;
put_tmpl:
crypto_tmpl_put(tmpl);
kill_larval:
crypto_larval_kill(larval);
drop_larval:
crypto_mod_put(larval);
out:
crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, nonOpt, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() <= 1)) {
imp->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg(nonOpt);
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, opt, toInt32(info[1], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg(nonOpt, opt);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
handle_t *handle;
struct inode *inode;
struct buffer_head *dir_block = NULL;
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de;
struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *t;
unsigned int blocksize = dir->i_sb->s_blocksize;
int csum_size = 0;
int err, retries = 0;
if (EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(dir->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
csum_size = sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail);
if (EXT4_DIR_LINK_MAX(dir))
return -EMLINK;
dquot_initialize(dir);
retry:
handle = ext4_journal_start(dir, EXT4_DATA_TRANS_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb) +
EXT4_INDEX_EXTRA_TRANS_BLOCKS + 3 +
EXT4_MAXQUOTAS_INIT_BLOCKS(dir->i_sb));
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return PTR_ERR(handle);
if (IS_DIRSYNC(dir))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
inode = ext4_new_inode(handle, dir, S_IFDIR | mode,
&dentry->d_name, 0, NULL);
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
goto out_stop;
inode->i_op = &ext4_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &ext4_dir_operations;
inode->i_size = EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;
dir_block = ext4_bread(handle, inode, 0, 1, &err);
if (!dir_block)
goto out_clear_inode;
BUFFER_TRACE(dir_block, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, dir_block);
if (err)
goto out_clear_inode;
de = (struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *) dir_block->b_data;
de->inode = cpu_to_le32(inode->i_ino);
de->name_len = 1;
de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(de->name_len),
blocksize);
strcpy(de->name, ".");
ext4_set_de_type(dir->i_sb, de, S_IFDIR);
de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize);
de->inode = cpu_to_le32(dir->i_ino);
de->rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(blocksize -
(csum_size + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1)),
blocksize);
de->name_len = 2;
strcpy(de->name, "..");
ext4_set_de_type(dir->i_sb, de, S_IFDIR);
set_nlink(inode, 2);
if (csum_size) {
t = EXT4_DIRENT_TAIL(dir_block->b_data, blocksize);
initialize_dirent_tail(t, blocksize);
}
BUFFER_TRACE(dir_block, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata");
err = ext4_handle_dirty_dirent_node(handle, inode, dir_block);
if (err)
goto out_clear_inode;
set_buffer_verified(dir_block);
err = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
if (!err)
err = ext4_add_entry(handle, dentry, inode);
if (err) {
out_clear_inode:
clear_nlink(inode);
unlock_new_inode(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
iput(inode);
goto out_stop;
}
ext4_inc_count(handle, dir);
ext4_update_dx_flag(dir);
err = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir);
if (err)
goto out_clear_inode;
unlock_new_inode(inode);
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
out_stop:
brelse(dir_block);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
if (err == -ENOSPC && ext4_should_retry_alloc(dir->i_sb, &retries))
goto retry;
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: make orphan functions be no-op in no-journal mode
Instead of checking whether the handle is valid, we check if journal
is enabled. This avoids taking the s_orphan_lock mutex in all cases
when there is no journal in use, including the error paths where
ext4_orphan_del() is called with a handle set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Anatol Pomozov <anatol.pomozov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 42,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ps_files_valid_key(const char *key)
{
size_t len;
const char *p;
char c;
int ret = 1;
for (p = key; (c = *p); p++) {
/* valid characters are a..z,A..Z,0..9 */
if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
|| (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
|| (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
|| c == ','
|| c == '-')) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
len = p - key;
/* Somewhat arbitrary length limit here, but should be way more than
anyone needs and avoids file-level warnings later on if we exceed MAX_PATH */
if (len == 0 || len > 128) {
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 164,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: STDMETHODIMP UrlmonUrlRequest::GetWindow(const GUID& guid_reason,
HWND* parent_window) {
if (!parent_window)
return E_INVALIDARG;
#ifndef NDEBUG
wchar_t guid[40] = {0};
::StringFromGUID2(guid_reason, guid, arraysize(guid));
const wchar_t* str = guid;
if (guid_reason == IID_IAuthenticate)
str = L"IAuthenticate";
else if (guid_reason == IID_IHttpSecurity)
str = L"IHttpSecurity";
else if (guid_reason == IID_IWindowForBindingUI)
str = L"IWindowForBindingUI";
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << me() << "GetWindow: " << str;
#endif
DLOG_IF(WARNING, !::IsWindow(parent_window_))
<< "UrlmonUrlRequest::GetWindow - no window!";
*parent_window = parent_window_;
return S_OK;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t strlcat(char *d, const char *s, size_t bufsize)
{
size_t len1 = strlen(d);
size_t len2 = strlen(s);
size_t ret = len1 + len2;
if (len1+len2 >= bufsize) {
if (bufsize < (len1+1)) {
return ret;
}
len2 = bufsize - (len1+1);
}
if (len2 > 0) {
memcpy(d+len1, s, len2);
d[len1+len2] = 0;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 12,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetAfterValues(Layer* layer) {
switch (static_cast<Properties>(index_)) {
case STARTUP:
case DONE:
break;
case BOUNDS:
layer->SetBounds(gfx::Size(20, 20));
break;
case HIDE_LAYER_AND_SUBTREE:
layer->SetHideLayerAndSubtree(true);
break;
case DRAWS_CONTENT:
layer->SetIsDrawable(true);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,462 |
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