instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* UpdateStatusToString(
UpdateEngineClient::UpdateStatusOperation status) {
switch (status) {
case UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_IDLE:
return "idle";
case UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_CHECKING_FOR_UPDATE:
return "checking for update";
case UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_UPDATE_AVAILABLE:
return "update available";
case UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_DOWNLOADING:
return "downloading";
case UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_VERIFYING:
return "verifying";
case UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_FINALIZING:
return "finalizing";
case UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_UPDATED_NEED_REBOOT:
return "updated need reboot";
case UpdateEngineClient::UPDATE_STATUS_REPORTING_ERROR_EVENT:
return "reporting error event";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLFormControlElement::supportsFocus() const
{
return !isDisabledFormControl();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _tcp_tl_close_sockinfo (struct _tcp_stream *sockinfo)
{
closesocket (sockinfo->socket);
if (sockinfo->buf != NULL)
osip_free (sockinfo->buf);
if (sockinfo->sendbuf != NULL)
osip_free (sockinfo->sendbuf);
#ifdef MULTITASKING_ENABLED
if (sockinfo->readStream != NULL) {
CFReadStreamClose (sockinfo->readStream);
CFRelease (sockinfo->readStream);
}
if (sockinfo->writeStream != NULL) {
CFWriteStreamClose (sockinfo->writeStream);
CFRelease (sockinfo->writeStream);
}
#endif
memset (sockinfo, 0, sizeof (*sockinfo));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 17,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalRTCStatsRequest::LocalRTCStatsRequest() {}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TCGMemOp gen_pop_T0(DisasContext *s)
{
TCGMemOp d_ot = mo_pushpop(s, s->dflag);
gen_lea_v_seg(s, mo_stacksize(s), cpu_regs[R_ESP], R_SS, -1);
gen_op_ld_v(s, d_ot, cpu_T0, cpu_A0);
return d_ot;
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94 | 0 | 66,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_ccm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *pctx = crypto_ccm_reqctx(req);
struct ablkcipher_request *abreq = &pctx->abreq;
struct scatterlist *dst;
unsigned int cryptlen = req->cryptlen;
u8 *odata = pctx->odata;
u8 *iv = req->iv;
int err;
err = crypto_ccm_check_iv(iv);
if (err)
return err;
pctx->flags = aead_request_flags(req);
err = crypto_ccm_auth(req, req->src, cryptlen);
if (err)
return err;
/* Note: rfc 3610 and NIST 800-38C require counter of
* zero to encrypt auth tag.
*/
memset(iv + 15 - iv[0], 0, iv[0] + 1);
sg_init_table(pctx->src, 2);
sg_set_buf(pctx->src, odata, 16);
scatterwalk_sg_chain(pctx->src, 2, req->src);
dst = pctx->src;
if (req->src != req->dst) {
sg_init_table(pctx->dst, 2);
sg_set_buf(pctx->dst, odata, 16);
scatterwalk_sg_chain(pctx->dst, 2, req->dst);
dst = pctx->dst;
}
ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(abreq, ctx->ctr);
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(abreq, pctx->flags,
crypto_ccm_encrypt_done, req);
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(abreq, pctx->src, dst, cryptlen + 16, iv);
err = crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(abreq);
if (err)
return err;
/* copy authtag to end of dst */
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(odata, req->dst, cryptlen,
crypto_aead_authsize(aead), 1);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::CreatePreviewDocument(
PrintMsg_Print_Params* print_params,
const std::vector<int>& pages,
bool ignore_css_margins) {
DCHECK_EQ(INITIALIZED, state_);
state_ = RENDERING;
metafile_.reset(new printing::PreviewMetafile);
if (!metafile_->Init()) {
set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_METAFILE_INIT_FAILED);
LOG(ERROR) << "PreviewMetafile Init failed";
return false;
}
prep_frame_view_.reset(new PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint(*print_params, frame(),
node()));
UpdateFrameAndViewFromCssPageLayout(frame_, node_, prep_frame_view_.get(),
*print_params, ignore_css_margins);
print_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_Print_Params(*print_params));
total_page_count_ = prep_frame_view_->GetExpectedPageCount();
if (total_page_count_ == 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "CreatePreviewDocument got 0 page count";
set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_ZERO_PAGES);
return false;
}
int selected_page_count = pages.size();
current_page_index_ = 0;
print_ready_metafile_page_count_ = selected_page_count;
pages_to_render_ = pages;
if (selected_page_count == 0) {
print_ready_metafile_page_count_ = total_page_count_;
for (int i = 0; i < total_page_count_; ++i)
pages_to_render_.push_back(i);
} else if (generate_draft_pages_) {
int pages_index = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < total_page_count_; ++i) {
if (pages_index < selected_page_count && i == pages[pages_index]) {
pages_index++;
continue;
}
pages_to_render_.push_back(i);
}
}
document_render_time_ = base::TimeDelta();
begin_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fd_readline (int fdi, int fdo, char *b, int bsz)
{
int r;
unsigned char c;
unsigned char *bp, *bpe;
bp = (unsigned char *)b;
bpe = (unsigned char *)b + bsz - 1;
while (1) {
r = read(fdi, &c, 1);
if ( r <= 0 ) { r = -1; goto out; }
switch (c) {
case '\b':
case '\x7f':
if ( bp > (unsigned char *)b ) {
bp--;
cput(fdo, '\b'); cput(fdo, ' '); cput(fdo, '\b');
} else {
cput(fdo, '\x07');
}
break;
case '\x03': /* CTRL-c */
r = -1;
errno = EINTR;
goto out;
case '\r':
*bp = '\0';
r = bp - (unsigned char *)b;
goto out;
default:
if ( bp < bpe ) { *bp++ = c; cput(fdo, c); }
else { cput(fdo, '\x07'); }
break;
}
}
out:
return r;
}
Commit Message: Do not use "/bin/sh" to run external commands.
Picocom no longer uses /bin/sh to run external commands for
file-transfer operations. Parsing the command line and spliting it into
arguments is now performed internally by picocom, using quoting rules
very similar to those of the Unix shell. Hopefully, this makes it
impossible to inject shell-commands when supplying filenames or
extra arguments to the send- and receive-file commands.
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 73,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_device_finalize(const gs_memory_t *cmem, void *vptr)
{
gx_device * const dev = (gx_device *)vptr;
pdf14_device * pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
pdf14_cleanup_parent_color_profiles (pdev);
if (pdev->ctx) {
pdf14_ctx_free(pdev->ctx);
pdev->ctx = NULL;
}
while (pdev->trans_group_parent_cmap_procs) {
pdf14_pop_parent_color(dev, NULL);
}
gx_device_finalize(cmem, vptr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: spnego_gss_inquire_cred(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t cred_handle,
gss_name_t *name,
OM_uint32 *lifetime,
int *cred_usage,
gss_OID_set *mechanisms)
{
OM_uint32 status;
spnego_gss_cred_id_t spcred = NULL;
gss_cred_id_t creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
OM_uint32 tmp_minor_status;
OM_uint32 initiator_lifetime, acceptor_lifetime;
dsyslog("Entering inquire_cred\n");
/*
* To avoid infinite recursion, if GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL is
* supplied we call gss_inquire_cred_by_mech() on the
* first non-SPNEGO mechanism.
*/
spcred = (spnego_gss_cred_id_t)cred_handle;
if (spcred == NULL) {
status = get_available_mechs(minor_status,
GSS_C_NO_NAME,
GSS_C_BOTH,
GSS_C_NO_CRED_STORE,
&creds,
mechanisms, NULL);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
dsyslog("Leaving inquire_cred\n");
return (status);
}
if ((*mechanisms)->count == 0) {
gss_release_cred(&tmp_minor_status, &creds);
gss_release_oid_set(&tmp_minor_status, mechanisms);
dsyslog("Leaving inquire_cred\n");
return (GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL);
}
assert((*mechanisms)->elements != NULL);
status = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(minor_status,
creds,
&(*mechanisms)->elements[0],
name,
&initiator_lifetime,
&acceptor_lifetime,
cred_usage);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
gss_release_cred(&tmp_minor_status, &creds);
dsyslog("Leaving inquire_cred\n");
return (status);
}
if (lifetime != NULL)
*lifetime = (*cred_usage == GSS_C_ACCEPT) ?
acceptor_lifetime : initiator_lifetime;
gss_release_cred(&tmp_minor_status, &creds);
} else {
status = gss_inquire_cred(minor_status, spcred->mcred,
name, lifetime,
cred_usage, mechanisms);
}
dsyslog("Leaving inquire_cred\n");
return (status);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18 | 0 | 43,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GestureSequence::ScrollEnd(const TouchEvent& event,
GesturePoint& point, Gestures* gestures) {
DCHECK(state_ == GS_SCROLL);
if (point.IsInFlickWindow(event)) {
AppendScrollGestureEnd(point, point.last_touch_position(), gestures,
point.XVelocity(), point.YVelocity());
} else {
AppendScrollGestureEnd(point, point.last_touch_position(), gestures,
0.f, 0.f);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PlatformSensorProviderLinux::OnDeviceRemoved(
mojom::SensorType type,
const std::string& device_node) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
auto it = sensor_devices_by_type_.find(type);
if (it != sensor_devices_by_type_.end() &&
it->second->device_node == device_node) {
sensor_devices_by_type_.erase(it);
}
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 148,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int opstos(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
if (!strcmp(op->mnemonic, "stosw")) {
data[l++] = 0x66;
}
if (!strcmp(op->mnemonic, "stosb")) {
data[l++] = 0xaa;
} else if (!strcmp(op->mnemonic, "stosw")) {
data[l++] = 0xab;
} else if (!strcmp(op->mnemonic, "stosd")) {
data[l++] = 0xab;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_mod_append_features(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value mod)
{
mrb_value klass;
mrb_check_type(mrb, mod, MRB_TT_MODULE);
mrb_get_args(mrb, "C", &klass);
mrb_include_module(mrb, mrb_class_ptr(klass), mrb_class_ptr(mod));
return mod;
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int efx_set_features(struct net_device *net_dev, u32 data)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
/* If disabling RX n-tuple filtering, clear existing filters */
if (net_dev->features & ~data & NETIF_F_NTUPLE)
efx_filter_clear_rx(efx, EFX_FILTER_PRI_MANUAL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* Type_Text_Description_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void *Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return (void*) cmsMLUdup((cmsMLU*) Ptr);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct hstate *kobj_to_hstate(struct kobject *kobj, int *nidp)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < HUGE_MAX_HSTATE; i++)
if (hstate_kobjs[i] == kobj) {
if (nidp)
*nidp = NUMA_NO_NODE;
return &hstates[i];
}
return kobj_to_node_hstate(kobj, nidp);
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmx_dump_sel(char *name, uint32_t sel)
{
pr_err("%s sel=0x%04x, attr=0x%05x, limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\n",
name, vmcs_read16(sel),
vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_LIMIT - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
vmcs_readl(sel + GUEST_ES_BASE - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR));
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 63,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cryptd_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req,
struct crypto_aead *child,
int err,
int (*crypt)(struct aead_request *req))
{
struct cryptd_aead_request_ctx *rctx;
rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
if (unlikely(err == -EINPROGRESS))
goto out;
aead_request_set_tfm(req, child);
err = crypt( req );
req->base.complete = rctx->complete;
out:
local_bh_disable();
rctx->complete(&req->base, err);
local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShowDownloadInShell(
DownloadItem* download) {
platform_util::ShowItemInFolder(download->GetFullPath());
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_sess_establish_session(struct SMB2_sess_data *sess_data)
{
int rc = 0;
struct cifs_ses *ses = sess_data->ses;
mutex_lock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
if (ses->server->ops->generate_signingkey) {
rc = ses->server->ops->generate_signingkey(ses);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI,
"SMB3 session key generation failed\n");
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
return rc;
}
}
if (!ses->server->session_estab) {
ses->server->sequence_number = 0x2;
ses->server->session_estab = true;
}
mutex_unlock(&ses->server->srv_mutex);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "SMB2/3 session established successfully\n");
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
ses->status = CifsGood;
ses->need_reconnect = false;
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,092 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreateFromGd2 (FILE * inFile)
{
_noLibzError();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074)
Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks.
Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> for indepth report
and reproducer information. Made for easy test case writing :).
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 54,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hfs_get_idxkeylen(HFS_INFO * hfs, uint16_t keylen,
const hfs_btree_header_record * header)
{
TSK_FS_INFO *fs = (TSK_FS_INFO *) & (hfs->fs_info);
if (tsk_getu32(fs->endian, header->attr) & HFS_BT_HEAD_ATTR_VARIDXKEYS)
return keylen;
else
return tsk_getu16(fs->endian, header->maxKeyLen);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int reds_expects_link_id(uint32_t connection_id)
{
spice_info("TODO: keep a list of connection_id's from migration, compare to them");
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::AddMessageToConsole(
blink::mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel level,
const std::string& message) {
Send(new FrameMsg_AddMessageToConsole(routing_id_, level, message));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VRDisplay::ContextDestroyed(ExecutionContext*) {
ForceExitPresent();
scripted_animation_controller_.Clear();
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PredictorDecodeTile(TIFF* tif, uint8* op0, tmsize_t occ0, uint16 s)
{
TIFFPredictorState *sp = PredictorState(tif);
assert(sp != NULL);
assert(sp->decodetile != NULL);
if ((*sp->decodetile)(tif, op0, occ0, s)) {
tmsize_t rowsize = sp->rowsize;
assert(rowsize > 0);
if((occ0%rowsize) !=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "PredictorDecodeTile",
"%s", "occ0%rowsize != 0");
return 0;
}
assert(sp->decodepfunc != NULL);
while (occ0 > 0) {
if( !(*sp->decodepfunc)(tif, op0, rowsize) )
return 0;
occ0 -= rowsize;
op0 += rowsize;
}
return 1;
} else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: call_start(struct rpc_task *task)
{
struct rpc_clnt *clnt = task->tk_client;
dprintk("RPC: %5u call_start %s%d proc %s (%s)\n", task->tk_pid,
clnt->cl_protname, clnt->cl_vers,
rpc_proc_name(task),
(RPC_IS_ASYNC(task) ? "async" : "sync"));
/* Increment call count */
task->tk_msg.rpc_proc->p_count++;
clnt->cl_stats->rpccnt++;
task->tk_action = call_reserve;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IndexedDBTransaction::AbortOperation IndexedDBTransaction::TaskStack::pop() {
DCHECK(!stack_.empty());
AbortOperation task = std::move(stack_.top());
stack_.pop();
return task;
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::didMatchCSS(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebVector<blink::WebString>& newly_matching_selectors,
const blink::WebVector<blink::WebString>& stopped_matching_selectors) {
DCHECK(!frame_ || frame_ == frame);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, render_view_->observers(),
DidMatchCSS(frame,
newly_matching_selectors,
stopped_matching_selectors));
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state2 *ps)
{
int r = 0, start = 0;
u32 prev_legacy, cur_legacy;
mutex_lock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
prev_legacy = kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
cur_legacy = ps->flags & KVM_PIT_FLAGS_HPET_LEGACY;
if (!prev_legacy && cur_legacy)
start = 1;
memcpy(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels, &ps->channels,
sizeof(kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels));
kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.flags = ps->flags;
kvm_pit_load_count(kvm, 0, kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.channels[0].count, start);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state.lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_ctx(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
ctx = container_of(head, struct perf_event_context, rcu_head);
kfree(ctx->task_ctx_data);
kfree(ctx);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::RendererIsResponsive() {
if (is_unresponsive_) {
is_unresponsive_ = false;
NotifyRendererResponsive();
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int load_xbzrle(QEMUFile *f, ram_addr_t addr, void *host)
{
unsigned int xh_len;
int xh_flags;
if (!xbzrle_decoded_buf) {
xbzrle_decoded_buf = g_malloc(TARGET_PAGE_SIZE);
}
/* extract RLE header */
xh_flags = qemu_get_byte(f);
xh_len = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (xh_flags != ENCODING_FLAG_XBZRLE) {
error_report("Failed to load XBZRLE page - wrong compression!");
return -1;
}
if (xh_len > TARGET_PAGE_SIZE) {
error_report("Failed to load XBZRLE page - len overflow!");
return -1;
}
/* load data and decode */
qemu_get_buffer(f, xbzrle_decoded_buf, xh_len);
/* decode RLE */
if (xbzrle_decode_buffer(xbzrle_decoded_buf, xh_len, host,
TARGET_PAGE_SIZE) == -1) {
error_report("Failed to load XBZRLE page - decode error!");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void edge_interrupt_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct edgeport_serial *edge_serial = urb->context;
struct usb_serial_port *port;
struct edgeport_port *edge_port;
struct device *dev;
unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
int length = urb->actual_length;
int port_number;
int function;
int retval;
__u8 lsr;
__u8 msr;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0:
/* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* this urb is terminated, clean up */
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n",
__func__, status);
return;
default:
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - nonzero urb status received: "
"%d\n", __func__, status);
goto exit;
}
if (!length) {
dev_dbg(&urb->dev->dev, "%s - no data in urb\n", __func__);
goto exit;
}
dev = &edge_serial->serial->dev->dev;
usb_serial_debug_data(dev, __func__, length, data);
if (length != 2) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - expecting packet of size 2, got %d\n", __func__, length);
goto exit;
}
port_number = TIUMP_GET_PORT_FROM_CODE(data[0]);
function = TIUMP_GET_FUNC_FROM_CODE(data[0]);
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - port_number %d, function %d, info 0x%x\n", __func__,
port_number, function, data[1]);
if (port_number >= edge_serial->serial->num_ports) {
dev_err(dev, "bad port number %d\n", port_number);
goto exit;
}
port = edge_serial->serial->port[port_number];
edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
if (!edge_port) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - edge_port not found\n", __func__);
return;
}
switch (function) {
case TIUMP_INTERRUPT_CODE_LSR:
lsr = map_line_status(data[1]);
if (lsr & UMP_UART_LSR_DATA_MASK) {
/*
* Save the LSR event for bulk read completion routine
*/
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - LSR Event Port %u LSR Status = %02x\n",
__func__, port_number, lsr);
edge_port->lsr_event = 1;
edge_port->lsr_mask = lsr;
} else {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - ===== Port %d LSR Status = %02x ======\n",
__func__, port_number, lsr);
handle_new_lsr(edge_port, 0, lsr, 0);
}
break;
case TIUMP_INTERRUPT_CODE_MSR: /* MSR */
/* Copy MSR from UMP */
msr = data[1];
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - ===== Port %u MSR Status = %02x ======\n",
__func__, port_number, msr);
handle_new_msr(edge_port, msr);
break;
default:
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
"%s - Unknown Interrupt code from UMP %x\n",
__func__, data[1]);
break;
}
exit:
retval = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (retval)
dev_err(&urb->dev->dev,
"%s - usb_submit_urb failed with result %d\n",
__func__, retval);
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 0 | 66,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMXCodec::findTargetColorFormat(
const sp<MetaData>& meta, OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE *colorFormat) {
ALOGV("findTargetColorFormat");
CHECK(mIsEncoder);
*colorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar;
int32_t targetColorFormat;
if (meta->findInt32(kKeyColorFormat, &targetColorFormat)) {
*colorFormat = (OMX_COLOR_FORMATTYPE) targetColorFormat;
}
return isColorFormatSupported(*colorFormat, kPortIndexInput);
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tcp_v4_do_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *rsk;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) { /* Fast path */
struct dst_entry *dst = sk->sk_rx_dst;
sock_rps_save_rxhash(sk, skb);
sk_mark_napi_id(sk, skb);
if (dst) {
if (inet_sk(sk)->rx_dst_ifindex != skb->skb_iif ||
!dst->ops->check(dst, 0)) {
dst_release(dst);
sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL;
}
}
tcp_rcv_established(sk, skb, tcp_hdr(skb), skb->len);
return 0;
}
if (tcp_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_err;
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
struct sock *nsk = tcp_v4_cookie_check(sk, skb);
if (!nsk)
goto discard;
if (nsk != sk) {
sock_rps_save_rxhash(nsk, skb);
sk_mark_napi_id(nsk, skb);
if (tcp_child_process(sk, nsk, skb)) {
rsk = nsk;
goto reset;
}
return 0;
}
} else
sock_rps_save_rxhash(sk, skb);
if (tcp_rcv_state_process(sk, skb)) {
rsk = sk;
goto reset;
}
return 0;
reset:
tcp_v4_send_reset(rsk, skb);
discard:
kfree_skb(skb);
/* Be careful here. If this function gets more complicated and
* gcc suffers from register pressure on the x86, sk (in %ebx)
* might be destroyed here. This current version compiles correctly,
* but you have been warned.
*/
return 0;
csum_err:
TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_CSUMERRORS);
TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_INERRS);
goto discard;
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 49,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int l2tp_ip6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 *) uaddr;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
__be32 v4addr = 0;
int addr_type;
int err;
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->l2tp_family != AF_INET6)
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_len < sizeof(*addr))
return -EINVAL;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&addr->l2tp_addr);
/* l2tp_ip6 sockets are IPv6 only */
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
/* L2TP is point-point, not multicast */
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
err = -EADDRINUSE;
read_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
if (__l2tp_ip6_bind_lookup(net, &addr->l2tp_addr,
sk->sk_bound_dev_if, addr->l2tp_conn_id))
goto out_in_use;
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
lock_sock(sk);
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE)
goto out_unlock;
/* Check if the address belongs to the host. */
rcu_read_lock();
if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) {
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
if (addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
addr->l2tp_scope_id) {
/* Override any existing binding, if another
* one is supplied by user.
*/
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = addr->l2tp_scope_id;
}
/* Binding to link-local address requires an
interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if)
goto out_unlock_rcu;
err = -ENODEV;
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (!dev)
goto out_unlock_rcu;
}
/* ipv4 addr of the socket is invalid. Only the
* unspecified and mapped address have a v4 equivalent.
*/
v4addr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!ipv6_chk_addr(sock_net(sk), &addr->l2tp_addr, dev, 0))
goto out_unlock_rcu;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = inet->inet_saddr = v4addr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = addr->l2tp_addr;
np->saddr = addr->l2tp_addr;
l2tp_ip6_sk(sk)->conn_id = addr->l2tp_conn_id;
write_lock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
sk_add_bind_node(sk, &l2tp_ip6_bind_table);
sk_del_node_init(sk);
write_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
out_unlock_rcu:
rcu_read_unlock();
out_unlock:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
out_in_use:
read_unlock_bh(&l2tp_ip6_lock);
return err;
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
[<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
[< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
[<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
[< inline >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
[< inline >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
[< inline >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
[<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
[<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.
Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 168,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuotaTaskObserver::RegisterTask(QuotaTask* task) {
running_quota_tasks_.insert(task);
}
Commit Message: Quota double-delete fix
BUG=142310
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10832407
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@152532 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::haveStylesheetsLoaded() const
{
return !m_styleEngine->hasPendingSheets() || m_ignorePendingStylesheets;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gro_result_t napi_gro_frags(struct napi_struct *napi)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = napi_frags_skb(napi);
if (!skb)
return GRO_DROP;
trace_napi_gro_frags_entry(skb);
return napi_frags_finish(napi, skb, dev_gro_receive(napi, skb));
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int udhcpd_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
{
int server_socket = -1, retval;
uint8_t *state;
unsigned timeout_end;
unsigned num_ips;
unsigned opt;
struct option_set *option;
char *str_I = str_I;
const char *str_a = "2000";
unsigned arpping_ms;
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(char *str_P;)
setup_common_bufsiz();
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(SERVER_PORT = 67;)
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(CLIENT_PORT = 68;)
opt = getopt32(argv, "^"
"fSI:va:"IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT("P:")
"\0"
#if defined CONFIG_UDHCP_DEBUG && CONFIG_UDHCP_DEBUG >= 1
"vv"
#endif
, &str_I
, &str_a
IF_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT(, &str_P)
IF_UDHCP_VERBOSE(, &dhcp_verbose)
);
if (!(opt & 1)) { /* no -f */
bb_daemonize_or_rexec(0, argv);
logmode = LOGMODE_NONE;
}
/* update argv after the possible vfork+exec in daemonize */
argv += optind;
if (opt & 2) { /* -S */
openlog(applet_name, LOG_PID, LOG_DAEMON);
logmode |= LOGMODE_SYSLOG;
}
if (opt & 4) { /* -I */
len_and_sockaddr *lsa = xhost_and_af2sockaddr(str_I, 0, AF_INET);
server_config.server_nip = lsa->u.sin.sin_addr.s_addr;
free(lsa);
}
#if ENABLE_FEATURE_UDHCP_PORT
if (opt & 32) { /* -P */
SERVER_PORT = xatou16(str_P);
CLIENT_PORT = SERVER_PORT + 1;
}
#endif
arpping_ms = xatou(str_a);
/* Would rather not do read_config before daemonization -
* otherwise NOMMU machines will parse config twice */
read_config(argv[0] ? argv[0] : DHCPD_CONF_FILE);
/* prevent poll timeout overflow */
if (server_config.auto_time > INT_MAX / 1000)
server_config.auto_time = INT_MAX / 1000;
/* Make sure fd 0,1,2 are open */
bb_sanitize_stdio();
/* Create pidfile */
write_pidfile(server_config.pidfile);
/* if (!..) bb_perror_msg("can't create pidfile %s", pidfile); */
bb_error_msg("started, v"BB_VER);
option = udhcp_find_option(server_config.options, DHCP_LEASE_TIME);
server_config.max_lease_sec = DEFAULT_LEASE_TIME;
if (option) {
move_from_unaligned32(server_config.max_lease_sec, option->data + OPT_DATA);
server_config.max_lease_sec = ntohl(server_config.max_lease_sec);
}
/* Sanity check */
num_ips = server_config.end_ip - server_config.start_ip + 1;
if (server_config.max_leases > num_ips) {
bb_error_msg("max_leases=%u is too big, setting to %u",
(unsigned)server_config.max_leases, num_ips);
server_config.max_leases = num_ips;
}
/* this sets g_leases */
SET_PTR_TO_GLOBALS(xzalloc(server_config.max_leases * sizeof(g_leases[0])));
read_leases(server_config.lease_file);
if (udhcp_read_interface(server_config.interface,
&server_config.ifindex,
(server_config.server_nip == 0 ? &server_config.server_nip : NULL),
server_config.server_mac)
) {
retval = 1;
goto ret;
}
/* Setup the signal pipe */
udhcp_sp_setup();
continue_with_autotime:
timeout_end = monotonic_sec() + server_config.auto_time;
while (1) { /* loop until universe collapses */
struct pollfd pfds[2];
struct dhcp_packet packet;
int bytes;
int tv;
uint8_t *server_id_opt;
uint8_t *requested_ip_opt;
uint32_t requested_nip = requested_nip; /* for compiler */
uint32_t static_lease_nip;
struct dyn_lease *lease, fake_lease;
if (server_socket < 0) {
server_socket = udhcp_listen_socket(/*INADDR_ANY,*/ SERVER_PORT,
server_config.interface);
}
udhcp_sp_fd_set(pfds, server_socket);
new_tv:
tv = -1;
if (server_config.auto_time) {
tv = timeout_end - monotonic_sec();
if (tv <= 0) {
write_leases:
write_leases();
goto continue_with_autotime;
}
tv *= 1000;
}
/* Block here waiting for either signal or packet */
retval = poll(pfds, 2, tv);
if (retval <= 0) {
if (retval == 0)
goto write_leases;
if (errno == EINTR)
goto new_tv;
/* < 0 and not EINTR: should not happen */
bb_perror_msg_and_die("poll");
}
if (pfds[0].revents) switch (udhcp_sp_read()) {
case SIGUSR1:
bb_error_msg("received %s", "SIGUSR1");
write_leases();
/* why not just reset the timeout, eh */
goto continue_with_autotime;
case SIGTERM:
bb_error_msg("received %s", "SIGTERM");
write_leases();
goto ret0;
}
/* Is it a packet? */
if (!pfds[1].revents)
continue; /* no */
/* Note: we do not block here, we block on poll() instead.
* Blocking here would prevent SIGTERM from working:
* socket read inside this call is restarted on caught signals.
*/
bytes = udhcp_recv_kernel_packet(&packet, server_socket);
if (bytes < 0) {
/* bytes can also be -2 ("bad packet data") */
if (bytes == -1 && errno != EINTR) {
log1("read error: "STRERROR_FMT", reopening socket" STRERROR_ERRNO);
close(server_socket);
server_socket = -1;
}
continue;
}
if (packet.hlen != 6) {
bb_error_msg("MAC length != 6, ignoring packet");
continue;
}
if (packet.op != BOOTREQUEST) {
bb_error_msg("not a REQUEST, ignoring packet");
continue;
}
state = udhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_MESSAGE_TYPE);
if (state == NULL || state[0] < DHCP_MINTYPE || state[0] > DHCP_MAXTYPE) {
bb_error_msg("no or bad message type option, ignoring packet");
continue;
}
/* Get SERVER_ID if present */
server_id_opt = udhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_SERVER_ID);
if (server_id_opt) {
uint32_t server_id_network_order;
move_from_unaligned32(server_id_network_order, server_id_opt);
if (server_id_network_order != server_config.server_nip) {
/* client talks to somebody else */
log1("server ID doesn't match, ignoring");
continue;
}
}
/* Look for a static/dynamic lease */
static_lease_nip = get_static_nip_by_mac(server_config.static_leases, &packet.chaddr);
if (static_lease_nip) {
bb_error_msg("found static lease: %x", static_lease_nip);
memcpy(&fake_lease.lease_mac, &packet.chaddr, 6);
fake_lease.lease_nip = static_lease_nip;
fake_lease.expires = 0;
lease = &fake_lease;
} else {
lease = find_lease_by_mac(packet.chaddr);
}
/* Get REQUESTED_IP if present */
requested_ip_opt = udhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_REQUESTED_IP);
if (requested_ip_opt) {
move_from_unaligned32(requested_nip, requested_ip_opt);
}
switch (state[0]) {
case DHCPDISCOVER:
log1("received %s", "DISCOVER");
send_offer(&packet, static_lease_nip, lease, requested_ip_opt, arpping_ms);
break;
case DHCPREQUEST:
log1("received %s", "REQUEST");
/* RFC 2131:
o DHCPREQUEST generated during SELECTING state:
Client inserts the address of the selected server in 'server
identifier', 'ciaddr' MUST be zero, 'requested IP address' MUST be
filled in with the yiaddr value from the chosen DHCPOFFER.
Note that the client may choose to collect several DHCPOFFER
messages and select the "best" offer. The client indicates its
selection by identifying the offering server in the DHCPREQUEST
message. If the client receives no acceptable offers, the client
may choose to try another DHCPDISCOVER message. Therefore, the
servers may not receive a specific DHCPREQUEST from which they can
decide whether or not the client has accepted the offer.
o DHCPREQUEST generated during INIT-REBOOT state:
'server identifier' MUST NOT be filled in, 'requested IP address'
option MUST be filled in with client's notion of its previously
assigned address. 'ciaddr' MUST be zero. The client is seeking to
verify a previously allocated, cached configuration. Server SHOULD
send a DHCPNAK message to the client if the 'requested IP address'
is incorrect, or is on the wrong network.
Determining whether a client in the INIT-REBOOT state is on the
correct network is done by examining the contents of 'giaddr', the
'requested IP address' option, and a database lookup. If the DHCP
server detects that the client is on the wrong net (i.e., the
result of applying the local subnet mask or remote subnet mask (if
'giaddr' is not zero) to 'requested IP address' option value
doesn't match reality), then the server SHOULD send a DHCPNAK
message to the client.
If the network is correct, then the DHCP server should check if
the client's notion of its IP address is correct. If not, then the
server SHOULD send a DHCPNAK message to the client. If the DHCP
server has no record of this client, then it MUST remain silent,
and MAY output a warning to the network administrator. This
behavior is necessary for peaceful coexistence of non-
communicating DHCP servers on the same wire.
If 'giaddr' is 0x0 in the DHCPREQUEST message, the client is on
the same subnet as the server. The server MUST broadcast the
DHCPNAK message to the 0xffffffff broadcast address because the
client may not have a correct network address or subnet mask, and
the client may not be answering ARP requests.
If 'giaddr' is set in the DHCPREQUEST message, the client is on a
different subnet. The server MUST set the broadcast bit in the
DHCPNAK, so that the relay agent will broadcast the DHCPNAK to the
client, because the client may not have a correct network address
or subnet mask, and the client may not be answering ARP requests.
o DHCPREQUEST generated during RENEWING state:
'server identifier' MUST NOT be filled in, 'requested IP address'
option MUST NOT be filled in, 'ciaddr' MUST be filled in with
client's IP address. In this situation, the client is completely
configured, and is trying to extend its lease. This message will
be unicast, so no relay agents will be involved in its
transmission. Because 'giaddr' is therefore not filled in, the
DHCP server will trust the value in 'ciaddr', and use it when
replying to the client.
A client MAY choose to renew or extend its lease prior to T1. The
server may choose not to extend the lease (as a policy decision by
the network administrator), but should return a DHCPACK message
regardless.
o DHCPREQUEST generated during REBINDING state:
'server identifier' MUST NOT be filled in, 'requested IP address'
option MUST NOT be filled in, 'ciaddr' MUST be filled in with
client's IP address. In this situation, the client is completely
configured, and is trying to extend its lease. This message MUST
be broadcast to the 0xffffffff IP broadcast address. The DHCP
server SHOULD check 'ciaddr' for correctness before replying to
the DHCPREQUEST.
The DHCPREQUEST from a REBINDING client is intended to accommodate
sites that have multiple DHCP servers and a mechanism for
maintaining consistency among leases managed by multiple servers.
A DHCP server MAY extend a client's lease only if it has local
administrative authority to do so.
*/
if (!requested_ip_opt) {
requested_nip = packet.ciaddr;
if (requested_nip == 0) {
log1("no requested IP and no ciaddr, ignoring");
break;
}
}
if (lease && requested_nip == lease->lease_nip) {
/* client requested or configured IP matches the lease.
* ACK it, and bump lease expiration time. */
send_ACK(&packet, lease->lease_nip);
break;
}
/* No lease for this MAC, or lease IP != requested IP */
if (server_id_opt /* client is in SELECTING state */
|| requested_ip_opt /* client is in INIT-REBOOT state */
) {
/* "No, we don't have this IP for you" */
send_NAK(&packet);
} /* else: client is in RENEWING or REBINDING, do not answer */
break;
case DHCPDECLINE:
/* RFC 2131:
* "If the server receives a DHCPDECLINE message,
* the client has discovered through some other means
* that the suggested network address is already
* in use. The server MUST mark the network address
* as not available and SHOULD notify the local
* sysadmin of a possible configuration problem."
*
* SERVER_ID must be present,
* REQUESTED_IP must be present,
* chaddr must be filled in,
* ciaddr must be 0 (we do not check this)
*/
log1("received %s", "DECLINE");
if (server_id_opt
&& requested_ip_opt
&& lease /* chaddr matches this lease */
&& requested_nip == lease->lease_nip
) {
memset(lease->lease_mac, 0, sizeof(lease->lease_mac));
lease->expires = time(NULL) + server_config.decline_time;
}
break;
case DHCPRELEASE:
/* "Upon receipt of a DHCPRELEASE message, the server
* marks the network address as not allocated."
*
* SERVER_ID must be present,
* REQUESTED_IP must not be present (we do not check this),
* chaddr must be filled in,
* ciaddr must be filled in
*/
log1("received %s", "RELEASE");
if (server_id_opt
&& lease /* chaddr matches this lease */
&& packet.ciaddr == lease->lease_nip
) {
lease->expires = time(NULL);
}
break;
case DHCPINFORM:
log1("received %s", "INFORM");
send_inform(&packet);
break;
}
}
ret0:
retval = 0;
ret:
/*if (server_config.pidfile) - server_config.pidfile is never NULL */
remove_pidfile(server_config.pidfile);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 165,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ucma_set_option_ib(struct ucma_context *ctx, int optname,
void *optval, size_t optlen)
{
int ret;
switch (optname) {
case RDMA_OPTION_IB_PATH:
ret = ucma_set_ib_path(ctx, optval, optlen);
break;
default:
ret = -ENOSYS;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs4_transform_lock_offset(struct file_lock *lock)
{
if (lock->fl_start < 0)
lock->fl_start = OFFSET_MAX;
if (lock->fl_end < 0)
lock->fl_end = OFFSET_MAX;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::ExecuteExtensionCommand(
const extensions::Extension* extension,
const extensions::Command& command) {
extension_keybinding_registry_->ExecuteCommand(extension->id(),
command.accelerator());
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Browser::CanReloadContents(TabContents* source) const {
return type() != TYPE_DEVTOOLS;
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PersistentHistogramAllocator::GetOrCreateStatisticsRecorderHistogram(
const HistogramBase* histogram) {
DCHECK_NE(GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get(), this);
DCHECK(histogram);
HistogramBase* existing =
StatisticsRecorder::FindHistogram(histogram->histogram_name());
if (existing)
return existing;
base::Pickle pickle;
histogram->SerializeInfo(&pickle);
PickleIterator iter(pickle);
existing = DeserializeHistogramInfo(&iter);
if (!existing)
return nullptr;
DCHECK_EQ(0, existing->flags() & HistogramBase::kIPCSerializationSourceFlag);
return StatisticsRecorder::RegisterOrDeleteDuplicate(existing);
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void HasMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "has");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
int32_t key;
key = NativeValueTraits<IDLLongEnforceRange>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
bool result = impl->hasForBinding(script_state, key, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException()) {
return;
}
V8SetReturnValueBool(info, result);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,734 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static pid_t get_task_reaper_pid(pid_t task)
{
int sock[2];
pid_t pid;
pid_t ret = -1;
char v = '0';
struct ucred cred;
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sock) < 0) {
perror("socketpair");
return -1;
}
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0)
goto out;
if (!pid) {
close(sock[1]);
write_task_init_pid_exit(sock[0], task);
}
if (!recv_creds(sock[1], &cred, &v))
goto out;
ret = cred.pid;
out:
close(sock[0]);
close(sock[1]);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofpacts_verify_nested(const struct ofpact *a, enum ofpact_type outer_action)
{
const struct mf_field *field = ofpact_get_mf_dst(a);
if (field && field_requires_ct(field->id) && outer_action != OFPACT_CT) {
VLOG_WARN("cannot set CT fields outside of ct action");
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_SET_ARGUMENT;
}
if (a->type == OFPACT_NAT) {
if (outer_action != OFPACT_CT) {
VLOG_WARN("Cannot have NAT action outside of \"ct\" action");
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_SET_ARGUMENT;
}
return 0;
}
if (outer_action) {
ovs_assert(outer_action == OFPACT_WRITE_ACTIONS
|| outer_action == OFPACT_CT);
if (outer_action == OFPACT_CT) {
if (!field) {
return unsupported_nesting(a->type, outer_action);
} else if (!field_requires_ct(field->id)) {
VLOG_WARN("%s action doesn't support nested modification "
"of %s", ofpact_name(outer_action), field->name);
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 77,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long nr_pages)
{
struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
/*
* We can shrink the pipe, if arg >= pipe->nrbufs. Since we don't
* expect a lot of shrink+grow operations, just free and allocate
* again like we would do for growing. If the pipe currently
* contains more buffers than arg, then return busy.
*/
if (nr_pages < pipe->nrbufs)
return -EBUSY;
bufs = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(*bufs), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (unlikely(!bufs))
return -ENOMEM;
/*
* The pipe array wraps around, so just start the new one at zero
* and adjust the indexes.
*/
if (pipe->nrbufs) {
unsigned int tail;
unsigned int head;
tail = pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs;
if (tail < pipe->buffers)
tail = 0;
else
tail &= (pipe->buffers - 1);
head = pipe->nrbufs - tail;
if (head)
memcpy(bufs, pipe->bufs + pipe->curbuf, head * sizeof(struct pipe_buffer));
if (tail)
memcpy(bufs + head, pipe->bufs, tail * sizeof(struct pipe_buffer));
}
pipe->curbuf = 0;
kfree(pipe->bufs);
pipe->bufs = bufs;
pipe->buffers = nr_pages;
return nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
}
Commit Message: pipe: limit the per-user amount of pages allocated in pipes
On no-so-small systems, it is possible for a single process to cause an
OOM condition by filling large pipes with data that are never read. A
typical process filling 4000 pipes with 1 MB of data will use 4 GB of
memory. On small systems it may be tricky to set the pipe max size to
prevent this from happening.
This patch makes it possible to enforce a per-user soft limit above
which new pipes will be limited to a single page, effectively limiting
them to 4 kB each, as well as a hard limit above which no new pipes may
be created for this user. This has the effect of protecting the system
against memory abuse without hurting other users, and still allowing
pipes to work correctly though with less data at once.
The limit are controlled by two new sysctls : pipe-user-pages-soft, and
pipe-user-pages-hard. Both may be disabled by setting them to zero. The
default soft limit allows the default number of FDs per process (1024)
to create pipes of the default size (64kB), thus reaching a limit of 64MB
before starting to create only smaller pipes. With 256 processes limited
to 1024 FDs each, this results in 1024*64kB + (256*1024 - 1024) * 4kB =
1084 MB of memory allocated for a user. The hard limit is disabled by
default to avoid breaking existing applications that make intensive use
of pipes (eg: for splicing).
Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 167,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_gc_signal(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, int value)
{
gs_memory_gc_status_t stat;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < countof(idmemory->spaces_indexed); i++) {
gs_ref_memory_t *mem = idmemory->spaces_indexed[i];
gs_ref_memory_t *mem_stable;
if (mem == 0)
continue;
for (;; mem = mem_stable) {
mem_stable = (gs_ref_memory_t *)
gs_memory_stable((gs_memory_t *)mem);
gs_memory_gc_status(mem, &stat);
stat.signal_value = value;
gs_memory_set_gc_status(mem, &stat);
if (mem_stable == mem)
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tar_sparse_member_p (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
if (file->optab->sparse_member_p)
return file->optab->sparse_member_p (file);
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType SyncAuthenticPixelsCache(Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
MagickBooleanType
status;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads);
status=SyncAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(image,cache_info->nexus_info[id],
exception);
return(status);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 73,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sd_major(int major_idx)
{
switch (major_idx) {
case 0:
return SCSI_DISK0_MAJOR;
case 1 ... 7:
return SCSI_DISK1_MAJOR + major_idx - 1;
case 8 ... 15:
return SCSI_DISK8_MAJOR + major_idx - 8;
default:
BUG();
return 0; /* shut up gcc */
}
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int notify_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
int ret = 0;
/* kprobe_running() needs smp_processor_id() */
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
preempt_disable();
if (kprobe_running() && kprobe_fault_handler(regs, 11))
ret = 1;
preempt_enable();
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ChildProcessLauncherHelper::TerminateProcess(const base::Process& process,
int exit_code) {
GetProcessLauncherTaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&StopChildProcess, process.Handle()));
return true;
}
Commit Message: android: Stop child process in GetTerminationInfo
Android currently abuses TerminationStatus to pass whether process is
"oom protected" rather than whether it has died or not. This confuses
cross-platform code about the state process.
Only TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING is treated as still running, which
android never passes. Also it appears to be ok to kill the process in
getTerminationInfo as it's only called when the child process is dead or
dying. Also posix kills the process on some calls.
Bug: 940245
Change-Id: Id165711848c279bbe77ef8a784c8cf0b14051877
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1516284
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Bo <boliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639639}
CWE ID: CWE-664 | 0 | 151,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: x86_get_event_constraints(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc, struct perf_event *event)
{
struct event_constraint *c;
if (x86_pmu.event_constraints) {
for_each_event_constraint(c, x86_pmu.event_constraints) {
if ((event->hw.config & c->cmask) == c->code)
return c;
}
}
return &unconstrained;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadRequestLimiter::CanDownload(
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& web_contents_getter,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& request_method,
const Callback& callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
content::WebContents* originating_contents = web_contents_getter.Run();
if (!originating_contents) {
callback.Run(false);
return;
}
if (!originating_contents->GetDelegate()) {
callback.Run(false);
return;
}
base::Callback<void(bool)> can_download_callback = base::Bind(
&DownloadRequestLimiter::OnCanDownloadDecided, factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
web_contents_getter, request_method, callback);
originating_contents->GetDelegate()->CanDownload(url, request_method,
can_download_callback);
}
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: name_parse(u8 *packet, int length, int *idx, char *name_out, int name_out_len) {
int name_end = -1;
int j = *idx;
int ptr_count = 0;
#define GET32(x) do { if (j + 4 > length) goto err; memcpy(&t32_, packet + j, 4); j += 4; x = ntohl(t32_); } while (0)
#define GET16(x) do { if (j + 2 > length) goto err; memcpy(&t_, packet + j, 2); j += 2; x = ntohs(t_); } while (0)
#define GET8(x) do { if (j >= length) goto err; x = packet[j++]; } while (0)
char *cp = name_out;
const char *const end = name_out + name_out_len;
/* Normally, names are a series of length prefixed strings terminated */
/* with a length of 0 (the lengths are u8's < 63). */
/* However, the length can start with a pair of 1 bits and that */
/* means that the next 14 bits are a pointer within the current */
/* packet. */
for (;;) {
u8 label_len;
if (j >= length) return -1;
GET8(label_len);
if (!label_len) break;
if (label_len & 0xc0) {
u8 ptr_low;
GET8(ptr_low);
if (name_end < 0) name_end = j;
j = (((int)label_len & 0x3f) << 8) + ptr_low;
/* Make sure that the target offset is in-bounds. */
if (j < 0 || j >= length) return -1;
/* If we've jumped more times than there are characters in the
* message, we must have a loop. */
if (++ptr_count > length) return -1;
continue;
}
if (label_len > 63) return -1;
if (cp != name_out) {
if (cp + 1 >= end) return -1;
*cp++ = '.';
}
if (cp + label_len >= end) return -1;
memcpy(cp, packet + j, label_len);
cp += label_len;
j += label_len;
}
if (cp >= end) return -1;
*cp = '\0';
if (name_end < 0)
*idx = j;
else
*idx = name_end;
return 0;
err:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: evdns: name_parse(): fix remote stack overread
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"the name_parse() function in libevent's DNS code is vulnerable to a buffer overread.
971 if (cp != name_out) {
972 if (cp + 1 >= end) return -1;
973 *cp++ = '.';
974 }
975 if (cp + label_len >= end) return -1;
976 memcpy(cp, packet + j, label_len);
977 cp += label_len;
978 j += label_len;
No check is made against length before the memcpy occurs.
This was found through the Tor bug bounty program and the discovery should be credited to 'Guido Vranken'."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/e4fcf540e9b89ab86d02):
set $PROT_NONE=0x0
set $PROT_READ=0x1
set $PROT_WRITE=0x2
set $MAP_ANONYMOUS=0x20
set $MAP_SHARED=0x01
set $MAP_FIXED=0x10
set $MAP_32BIT=0x40
start
set $length=202
# overread
set $length=2
# allocate with mmap to have a seg fault on page boundary
set $l=(1<<20)*2
p mmap(0, $l, $PROT_READ|$PROT_WRITE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $packet=(char *)$1+$l-$length
# hack the packet
set $packet[0]=63
set $packet[1]='/'
p malloc(sizeof(int))
set $idx=(int *)$2
set $idx[0]=0
set $name_out_len=202
p malloc($name_out_len)
set $name_out=$3
# have WRITE only mapping to fail on read
set $end=$1+$l
p (void *)mmap($end, 1<<12, $PROT_NONE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_FIXED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $m=$4
p name_parse($packet, $length, $idx, $name_out, $name_out_len)
x/2s (char *)$name_out
Before this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:33
After this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
$5 = -1
0x633030: "/"
0x633032: ""
(gdb) p $m
$6 = (void *) 0x40200000
(gdb) p $1
$7 = 1073741824
(gdb) p/x $1
$8 = 0x40000000
(gdb) quit
P.S. plus drop one condition duplicate.
Fixes: #317
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalFrameClientImpl::LocalFrameClientImpl(WebLocalFrameImpl* frame)
: web_frame_(frame) {}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TEE_Result op_attr_secret_value_from_user(void *attr, const void *buffer,
size_t size)
{
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *key = attr;
/* Data size has to fit in allocated buffer */
if (size > key->alloc_size)
return TEE_ERROR_SECURITY;
memcpy(key + 1, buffer, size);
key->key_size = size;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoEndRasterCHROMIUM() {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool testToStringHelper(const wchar_t * text) {
UriParserStateW state;
UriUriW uri;
state.uri = &uri;
int res = uriParseUriW(&state, text);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
wchar_t shouldbeTheSame[1024 * 8];
res = uriToStringW(shouldbeTheSame, &uri, 1024 * 8, NULL);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
bool equals = (0 == wcscmp(shouldbeTheSame, text));
if (!equals) {
#ifdef HAVE_WPRINTF
wprintf(L"\n\n\nExpected: \"%s\"\nReceived: \"%s\"\n\n\n", text, shouldbeTheSame);
#endif
}
const int len = static_cast<int>(wcslen(text));
int charsWritten;
res = uriToStringW(shouldbeTheSame, &uri, len + 1, &charsWritten);
if ((res != 0) || (charsWritten != len + 1)) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
res = uriToStringW(shouldbeTheSame, &uri, len, &charsWritten);
if ((res == 0) || (charsWritten >= len + 1)) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return equals;
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 75,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_seq_hdr(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
UWORD16 u2_height;
UWORD16 u2_width;
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN) != SEQUENCE_HEADER_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_START_CODE_NOT_FOUND;
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_LEN);
u2_width = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
u2_height = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,12);
if (0 == u2_width || 0 == u2_height)
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_DECODE_ERR;
return e_error;
}
if ((u2_width != ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size)
|| (u2_height != ps_dec->u2_vertical_size))
{
if (0 == ps_dec->u2_header_done)
{
/* This is the first time we are reading the resolution */
ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size = u2_width;
ps_dec->u2_vertical_size = u2_height;
if (0 == ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride)
{
ps_dec->u4_frm_buf_stride = (UWORD32) (u2_width);
}
}
else
{
if (0 == ps_dec->i4_pic_count)
{
/* Decoder has not decoded a single frame since the last
* reset/init. This implies that we have two headers in the
* input stream. So, do not indicate a resolution change, since
* this can take the decoder into an infinite loop.
*/
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T) IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_DECODE_ERR;
}
else if((u2_width > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (u2_height > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height = u2_height;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width = u2_width;
return e_error;
}
else
{
/* The resolution has changed */
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_RES_CHANGED;
}
}
}
if((ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_width)
|| (ps_dec->u2_vertical_size > ps_dec->u2_create_max_height))
{
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = IMPEG2D_UNSUPPORTED_DIMENSIONS;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_height = ps_dec->u2_vertical_size;
ps_dec->u2_reinit_max_width = ps_dec->u2_horizontal_size;
return e_error;
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* aspect_ratio_info (4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_aspect_ratio_info = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Frame rate code(4 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,4);
if (ps_dec->u2_frame_rate_code > MPEG2_MAX_FRAME_RATE_CODE)
{
return IMPEG2D_FRM_HDR_DECODE_ERR;
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* bit_rate_value (18 bits) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,18);
GET_MARKER_BIT(ps_dec,ps_stream);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Flush the following as they are not being used */
/* vbv_buffer_size_value(10 bits), constrained_parameter_flag (1 bit) */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,11);
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the intra blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_intra_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_intra_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quantization matrix for the inter blocks */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
if(impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream) == 1)
{
UWORD16 i;
for(i = 0; i < NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK; i++)
{
ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix[gau1_impeg2_inv_scan_zig_zag[i]] = (UWORD8)impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,8);
}
}
else
{
memcpy(ps_dec->au1_inter_quant_matrix,gau1_impeg2_inter_quant_matrix_default,
NUM_PELS_IN_BLOCK);
}
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Adding Error Check for f_code Parameters
In MPEG1, the valid range for the forward and backward f_code parameters
is [1, 7]. Adding a check to enforce this. Without the check, the value
could be 0. We read (f_code - 1) bits from the stream and reading a
negative number of bits from the stream is undefined.
Bug: 64550583
Test: monitored temp ALOGD() output
Change-Id: Ia452cd43a28e9d566401f515947164635361782f
(cherry picked from commit 71d734b83d72e8a59f73f1230982da97615d2689)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 163,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fpm_stdio_child_use_pipes(struct fpm_child_s *child) /* {{{ */
{
if (child->wp->config->catch_workers_output) {
dup2(fd_stdout[1], STDOUT_FILENO);
dup2(fd_stderr[1], STDERR_FILENO);
close(fd_stdout[0]); close(fd_stdout[1]);
close(fd_stderr[0]); close(fd_stderr[1]);
} else {
/* stdout of parent is always /dev/null */
dup2(STDOUT_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO);
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 86,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_apply_with_argument(HashTable *ht, apply_func_arg_t apply_func, void *argument)
{
uint32_t idx;
Bucket *p;
int result;
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
HT_ASSERT(GC_REFCOUNT(ht) == 1);
HASH_PROTECT_RECURSION(ht);
for (idx = 0; idx < ht->nNumUsed; idx++) {
p = ht->arData + idx;
if (UNEXPECTED(Z_TYPE(p->val) == IS_UNDEF)) continue;
result = apply_func(&p->val, argument);
if (result & ZEND_HASH_APPLY_REMOVE) {
_zend_hash_del_el(ht, HT_IDX_TO_HASH(idx), p);
}
if (result & ZEND_HASH_APPLY_STOP) {
break;
}
}
HASH_UNPROTECT_RECURSION(ht);
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold void init_uni_mpeg4_rl_tab(RLTable *rl, uint32_t *bits_tab,
uint8_t *len_tab)
{
int slevel, run, last;
av_assert0(MAX_LEVEL >= 64);
av_assert0(MAX_RUN >= 63);
for (slevel = -64; slevel < 64; slevel++) {
if (slevel == 0)
continue;
for (run = 0; run < 64; run++) {
for (last = 0; last <= 1; last++) {
const int index = UNI_MPEG4_ENC_INDEX(last, run, slevel + 64);
int level = slevel < 0 ? -slevel : slevel;
int sign = slevel < 0 ? 1 : 0;
int bits, len, code;
int level1, run1;
len_tab[index] = 100;
/* ESC0 */
code = get_rl_index(rl, last, run, level);
bits = rl->table_vlc[code][0];
len = rl->table_vlc[code][1];
bits = bits * 2 + sign;
len++;
if (code != rl->n && len < len_tab[index]) {
bits_tab[index] = bits;
len_tab[index] = len;
}
/* ESC1 */
bits = rl->table_vlc[rl->n][0];
len = rl->table_vlc[rl->n][1];
bits = bits * 2;
len++; // esc1
level1 = level - rl->max_level[last][run];
if (level1 > 0) {
code = get_rl_index(rl, last, run, level1);
bits <<= rl->table_vlc[code][1];
len += rl->table_vlc[code][1];
bits += rl->table_vlc[code][0];
bits = bits * 2 + sign;
len++;
if (code != rl->n && len < len_tab[index]) {
bits_tab[index] = bits;
len_tab[index] = len;
}
}
/* ESC2 */
bits = rl->table_vlc[rl->n][0];
len = rl->table_vlc[rl->n][1];
bits = bits * 4 + 2;
len += 2; // esc2
run1 = run - rl->max_run[last][level] - 1;
if (run1 >= 0) {
code = get_rl_index(rl, last, run1, level);
bits <<= rl->table_vlc[code][1];
len += rl->table_vlc[code][1];
bits += rl->table_vlc[code][0];
bits = bits * 2 + sign;
len++;
if (code != rl->n && len < len_tab[index]) {
bits_tab[index] = bits;
len_tab[index] = len;
}
}
/* ESC3 */
bits = rl->table_vlc[rl->n][0];
len = rl->table_vlc[rl->n][1];
bits = bits * 4 + 3;
len += 2; // esc3
bits = bits * 2 + last;
len++;
bits = bits * 64 + run;
len += 6;
bits = bits * 2 + 1;
len++; // marker
bits = bits * 4096 + (slevel & 0xfff);
len += 12;
bits = bits * 2 + 1;
len++; // marker
if (len < len_tab[index]) {
bits_tab[index] = bits;
len_tab[index] = len;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videoenc: Use 64 bit for times in mpeg4_encode_gop_header()
Fixes truncation
Fixes Assertion n <= 31 && value < (1U << n) failed at libavcodec/put_bits.h:169
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_2.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 81,771 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::OverlapsWithOrigin(const GURL& origin) const {
if (url() == origin)
return true;
if (web_extent().is_empty())
return false;
URLPattern origin_only_pattern(kValidWebExtentSchemes);
if (!origin_only_pattern.SetScheme(origin.scheme()))
return false;
origin_only_pattern.SetHost(origin.host());
origin_only_pattern.SetPath("/*");
URLPatternSet origin_only_pattern_list;
origin_only_pattern_list.AddPattern(origin_only_pattern);
return web_extent().OverlapsWith(origin_only_pattern_list);
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_parse_stsd_data(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb,
AVStream *st, MOVStreamContext *sc,
int64_t size)
{
int ret;
if (st->codecpar->codec_tag == MKTAG('t','m','c','d')) {
if ((int)size != size)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
ret = ff_get_extradata(c->fc, st->codecpar, pb, size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (size > 16) {
MOVStreamContext *tmcd_ctx = st->priv_data;
int val;
val = AV_RB32(st->codecpar->extradata + 4);
tmcd_ctx->tmcd_flags = val;
st->avg_frame_rate.num = st->codecpar->extradata[16]; /* number of frame */
st->avg_frame_rate.den = 1;
#if FF_API_LAVF_AVCTX
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
st->codec->time_base = av_inv_q(st->avg_frame_rate);
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
/* adjust for per frame dur in counter mode */
if (tmcd_ctx->tmcd_flags & 0x0008) {
int timescale = AV_RB32(st->codecpar->extradata + 8);
int framedur = AV_RB32(st->codecpar->extradata + 12);
st->avg_frame_rate.num *= timescale;
st->avg_frame_rate.den *= framedur;
#if FF_API_LAVF_AVCTX
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
st->codec->time_base.den *= timescale;
st->codec->time_base.num *= framedur;
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
}
if (size > 30) {
uint32_t len = AV_RB32(st->codecpar->extradata + 18); /* name atom length */
uint32_t format = AV_RB32(st->codecpar->extradata + 22);
if (format == AV_RB32("name") && (int64_t)size >= (int64_t)len + 18) {
uint16_t str_size = AV_RB16(st->codecpar->extradata + 26); /* string length */
if (str_size > 0 && size >= (int)str_size + 26) {
char *reel_name = av_malloc(str_size + 1);
if (!reel_name)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
memcpy(reel_name, st->codecpar->extradata + 30, str_size);
reel_name[str_size] = 0; /* Add null terminator */
/* don't add reel_name if emtpy string */
if (*reel_name == 0) {
av_free(reel_name);
} else {
av_dict_set(&st->metadata, "reel_name", reel_name, AV_DICT_DONT_STRDUP_VAL);
}
}
}
}
}
} else {
/* other codec type, just skip (rtp, mp4s ...) */
avio_skip(pb, size);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem)
{
u32 valid_flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
#ifdef KVM_CAP_READONLY_MEM
valid_flags |= KVM_MEM_READONLY;
#endif
if (mem->flags & ~valid_flags)
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendIO::ReadData(EntryImpl* entry, int index, int offset,
net::IOBuffer* buf, int buf_len) {
operation_ = OP_READ;
entry_ = entry;
index_ = index;
offset_ = offset;
buf_ = buf;
buf_len_ = buf_len;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VREye StringToVREye(const String& which_eye) {
if (which_eye == "left")
return kVREyeLeft;
if (which_eye == "right")
return kVREyeRight;
return kVREyeNone;
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_trak_tag(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb, MOVMuxContext *mov,
MOVTrack *track, AVStream *st)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
int entry_backup = track->entry;
int chunk_backup = track->chunkCount;
int ret;
/* If we want to have an empty moov, but some samples already have been
* buffered (delay_moov), pretend that no samples have been written yet. */
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_EMPTY_MOOV)
track->chunkCount = track->entry = 0;
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "trak");
mov_write_tkhd_tag(pb, mov, track, st);
av_assert2(mov->use_editlist >= 0);
if (track->start_dts != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
if (mov->use_editlist)
mov_write_edts_tag(pb, mov, track); // PSP Movies and several other cases require edts box
else if ((track->entry && track->cluster[0].dts) || track->mode == MODE_PSP || is_clcp_track(track))
av_log(mov->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Not writing any edit list even though one would have been required\n");
}
if (track->tref_tag)
mov_write_tref_tag(pb, track);
if ((ret = mov_write_mdia_tag(s, pb, mov, track)) < 0)
return ret;
if (track->mode == MODE_PSP)
mov_write_uuid_tag_psp(pb, track); // PSP Movies require this uuid box
if (track->tag == MKTAG('r','t','p',' '))
mov_write_udta_sdp(pb, track);
if (track->mode == MODE_MOV) {
if (track->par->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) {
double sample_aspect_ratio = av_q2d(st->sample_aspect_ratio);
if (st->sample_aspect_ratio.num && 1.0 != sample_aspect_ratio) {
mov_write_tapt_tag(pb, track);
}
}
if (is_clcp_track(track) && st->sample_aspect_ratio.num) {
mov_write_tapt_tag(pb, track);
}
}
mov_write_track_udta_tag(pb, mov, st);
track->entry = entry_backup;
track->chunkCount = chunk_backup;
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: service_manager::InterfaceProvider* Document::GetInterfaceProvider() {
if (!GetFrame())
return nullptr;
return &GetFrame()->GetInterfaceProvider();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _launch_complete_log(char *type, uint32_t job_id)
{
#if 0
int j;
info("active %s %u", type, job_id);
slurm_mutex_lock(&job_state_mutex);
for (j = 0; j < JOB_STATE_CNT; j++) {
if (active_job_id[j] != 0) {
info("active_job_id[%d]=%u", j, active_job_id[j]);
}
}
slurm_mutex_unlock(&job_state_mutex);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int req_ssl_is_https_field(request_rec *r)
{
return ap_lua_ssl_is_https(r->connection);
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 45,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int getfrag(void *from, char *to,
int offset, int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
int hlimit, int tclass, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct rt6_info *rt, unsigned int flags, int dontfrag)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_cork *cork;
struct sk_buff *skb, *skb_prev = NULL;
unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen;
int exthdrlen;
int dst_exthdrlen;
int hh_len;
int mtu;
int copy;
int err;
int offset = 0;
__u8 tx_flags = 0;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
return 0;
cork = &inet->cork.base;
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)) {
/*
* setup for corking
*/
if (opt) {
if (WARN_ON(np->cork.opt))
return -EINVAL;
np->cork.opt = kzalloc(opt->tot_len, sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(np->cork.opt == NULL))
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->tot_len = opt->tot_len;
np->cork.opt->opt_flen = opt->opt_flen;
np->cork.opt->opt_nflen = opt->opt_nflen;
np->cork.opt->dst0opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst0opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst0opt && !np->cork.opt->dst0opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->dst1opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst1opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst1opt && !np->cork.opt->dst1opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->hopopt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->hopopt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->hopopt && !np->cork.opt->hopopt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->srcrt = ip6_rthdr_dup(opt->srcrt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->srcrt && !np->cork.opt->srcrt)
return -ENOBUFS;
/* need source address above miyazawa*/
}
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
cork->dst = &rt->dst;
inet->cork.fl.u.ip6 = *fl6;
np->cork.hop_limit = hlimit;
np->cork.tclass = tclass;
if (rt->dst.flags & DST_XFRM_TUNNEL)
mtu = np->pmtudisc == IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
else
mtu = np->pmtudisc == IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
if (np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
cork->fragsize = mtu;
if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path))
cork->flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG;
cork->length = 0;
exthdrlen = (opt ? opt->opt_flen : 0);
length += exthdrlen;
transhdrlen += exthdrlen;
dst_exthdrlen = rt->dst.header_len - rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
} else {
rt = (struct rt6_info *)cork->dst;
fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
opt = np->cork.opt;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
dst_exthdrlen = 0;
mtu = cork->fragsize;
}
hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len +
(opt ? opt->opt_nflen : 0);
maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (mtu <= sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
if (cork->length + length > sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN - fragheaderlen) {
ipv6_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
}
/* For UDP, check if TX timestamp is enabled */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &tx_flags);
/*
* Let's try using as much space as possible.
* Use MTU if total length of the message fits into the MTU.
* Otherwise, we need to reserve fragment header and
* fragment alignment (= 8-15 octects, in total).
*
* Note that we may need to "move" the data from the tail of
* of the buffer to the new fragment when we split
* the message.
*
* FIXME: It may be fragmented into multiple chunks
* at once if non-fragmentable extension headers
* are too large.
* --yoshfuji
*/
cork->length += length;
if (length > mtu) {
int proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (dontfrag && (proto == IPPROTO_UDP || proto == IPPROTO_RAW)){
ipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO)) {
err = ip6_ufo_append_data(sk, getfrag, from, length,
hh_len, fragheaderlen,
transhdrlen, mtu, flags, rt);
if (err)
goto error;
return 0;
}
}
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL)
goto alloc_new_skb;
while (length > 0) {
/* Check if the remaining data fits into current packet. */
copy = (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - skb->len;
if (copy < length)
copy = maxfraglen - skb->len;
if (copy <= 0) {
char *data;
unsigned int datalen;
unsigned int fraglen;
unsigned int fraggap;
unsigned int alloclen;
alloc_new_skb:
/* There's no room in the current skb */
if (skb)
fraggap = skb->len - maxfraglen;
else
fraggap = 0;
/* update mtu and maxfraglen if necessary */
if (skb == NULL || skb_prev == NULL)
ip6_append_data_mtu(&mtu, &maxfraglen,
fragheaderlen, skb, rt);
skb_prev = skb;
/*
* If remaining data exceeds the mtu,
* we know we need more fragment(s).
*/
datalen = length + fraggap;
if (datalen > (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - fragheaderlen)
datalen = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen - rt->dst.trailer_len;
if ((flags & MSG_MORE) &&
!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG))
alloclen = mtu;
else
alloclen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
alloclen += dst_exthdrlen;
if (datalen != length + fraggap) {
/*
* this is not the last fragment, the trailer
* space is regarded as data space.
*/
datalen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
}
alloclen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
fraglen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
/*
* We just reserve space for fragment header.
* Note: this may be overallocation if the message
* (without MSG_MORE) fits into the MTU.
*/
alloclen += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (transhdrlen) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
alloclen + hh_len,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
} else {
skb = NULL;
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) <=
2 * sk->sk_sndbuf)
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk,
alloclen + hh_len, 1,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(skb == NULL))
err = -ENOBUFS;
else {
/* Only the initial fragment
* is time stamped.
*/
tx_flags = 0;
}
}
if (skb == NULL)
goto error;
/*
* Fill in the control structures
*/
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->csum = 0;
/* reserve for fragmentation and ipsec header */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len + sizeof(struct frag_hdr) +
dst_exthdrlen);
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags = tx_flags;
/*
* Find where to start putting bytes
*/
data = skb_put(skb, fraglen);
skb_set_network_header(skb, exthdrlen);
data += fragheaderlen;
skb->transport_header = (skb->network_header +
fragheaderlen);
if (fraggap) {
skb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(
skb_prev, maxfraglen,
data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0);
skb_prev->csum = csum_sub(skb_prev->csum,
skb->csum);
data += fraggap;
pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
}
copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
if (copy < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
} else if (copy > 0 && getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset, copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
offset += copy;
length -= datalen - fraggap;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
dst_exthdrlen = 0;
/*
* Put the packet on the pending queue
*/
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
continue;
}
if (copy > length)
copy = length;
if (!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG)) {
unsigned int off;
off = skb->len;
if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
__skb_trim(skb, off);
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
} else {
int i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
struct page_frag *pfrag = sk_page_frag(sk);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!sk_page_frag_refill(sk, pfrag))
goto error;
if (!skb_can_coalesce(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset)) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (i == MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
goto error;
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, pfrag->page,
pfrag->offset, 0);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = ++i;
get_page(pfrag->page);
}
copy = min_t(int, copy, pfrag->size - pfrag->offset);
if (getfrag(from,
page_address(pfrag->page) + pfrag->offset,
offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0)
goto error_efault;
pfrag->offset += copy;
skb_frag_size_add(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i - 1], copy);
skb->len += copy;
skb->data_len += copy;
skb->truesize += copy;
atomic_add(copy, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
}
offset += copy;
length -= copy;
}
return 0;
error_efault:
err = -EFAULT;
error:
cork->length -= length;
IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: ip6_sk_dst_check() must not assume ipv6 dst
It's possible to use AF_INET6 sockets and to connect to an IPv4
destination. After this, socket dst cache is a pointer to a rtable,
not rt6_info.
ip6_sk_dst_check() should check the socket dst cache is IPv6, or else
various corruptions/crashes can happen.
Dave Jones can reproduce immediate crash with
trinity -q -l off -n -c sendmsg -c connect
With help from Hannes Frederic Sowa
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 31,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs7_sign)
{
zval * zcert, * zprivkey, * zheaders;
zval * hval;
X509 * cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY * privkey = NULL;
zend_long flags = PKCS7_DETACHED;
PKCS7 * p7 = NULL;
BIO * infile = NULL, * outfile = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *others = NULL;
zend_resource *certresource = NULL, *keyresource = NULL;
zend_string * strindex;
char * infilename;
size_t infilename_len;
char * outfilename;
size_t outfilename_len;
char * extracertsfilename = NULL;
size_t extracertsfilename_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "ppzza!|lp!",
&infilename, &infilename_len, &outfilename, &outfilename_len,
&zcert, &zprivkey, &zheaders, &flags, &extracertsfilename,
&extracertsfilename_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (extracertsfilename) {
others = load_all_certs_from_file(extracertsfilename);
if (others == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
privkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(zprivkey, 0, "", 0, 0, &keyresource);
if (privkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "error getting private key");
goto clean_exit;
}
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcert, 0, &certresource);
if (cert == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "error getting cert");
goto clean_exit;
}
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(infilename) || php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(outfilename)) {
goto clean_exit;
}
infile = BIO_new_file(infilename, PHP_OPENSSL_BIO_MODE_R(flags));
if (infile == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "error opening input file %s!", infilename);
goto clean_exit;
}
outfile = BIO_new_file(outfilename, "w");
if (outfile == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "error opening output file %s!", outfilename);
goto clean_exit;
}
p7 = PKCS7_sign(cert, privkey, others, infile, (int)flags);
if (p7 == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "error creating PKCS7 structure!");
goto clean_exit;
}
(void)BIO_reset(infile);
/* tack on extra headers */
if (zheaders) {
int ret;
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_STR_KEY_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(zheaders), strindex, hval) {
convert_to_string_ex(hval);
if (strindex) {
ret = BIO_printf(outfile, "%s: %s\n", ZSTR_VAL(strindex), Z_STRVAL_P(hval));
} else {
ret = BIO_printf(outfile, "%s\n", Z_STRVAL_P(hval));
}
if (ret < 0) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
}
/* write the signed data */
if (!SMIME_write_PKCS7(outfile, p7, infile, (int)flags)) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
goto clean_exit;
}
RETVAL_TRUE;
clean_exit:
PKCS7_free(p7);
BIO_free(infile);
BIO_free(outfile);
if (others) {
sk_X509_pop_free(others, X509_free);
}
if (privkey && keyresource == NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(privkey);
}
if (cert && certresource == NULL) {
X509_free(cert);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FcDirCacheOpenFile (const FcChar8 *cache_file, struct stat *file_stat)
{
int fd;
#ifdef _WIN32
if (FcStat (cache_file, file_stat) < 0)
return -1;
#endif
fd = FcOpen((char *) cache_file, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY);
if (fd < 0)
return fd;
#ifndef _WIN32
if (fstat (fd, file_stat) < 0)
{
close (fd);
return -1;
}
#endif
return fd;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 10,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebBluetoothServiceImpl::RemoteCharacteristicStopNotifications(
const std::string& characteristic_instance_id,
RemoteCharacteristicStopNotificationsCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
const CacheQueryResult query_result =
QueryCacheForCharacteristic(characteristic_instance_id);
if (query_result.outcome == CacheQueryOutcome::BAD_RENDERER) {
return;
}
auto notify_session_iter =
characteristic_id_to_notify_session_.find(characteristic_instance_id);
if (notify_session_iter == characteristic_id_to_notify_session_.end()) {
std::move(callback).Run();
return;
}
notify_session_iter->second->gatt_notify_session->Stop(
base::Bind(&WebBluetoothServiceImpl::OnStopNotifySessionComplete,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), characteristic_instance_id,
base::Passed(&callback)));
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagepsencodefont)
{
zval *fnt;
char *enc, **enc_vector;
int enc_len, *f_ind;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rp", &fnt, &enc, &enc_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(f_ind, int *, &fnt, -1, "Type 1 font", le_ps_font);
if ((enc_vector = T1_LoadEncoding(enc)) == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Couldn't load encoding vector from %s", enc);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
T1_DeleteAllSizes(*f_ind);
if (T1_ReencodeFont(*f_ind, enc_vector)) {
T1_DeleteEncoding(enc_vector);
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Couldn't re-encode font");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
zend_list_insert(enc_vector, le_ps_enc TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72730 - imagegammacorrect allows arbitrary write access
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 50,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendDoomAll() {
InitCache();
disk_cache::Entry *entry1, *entry2;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("first", &entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("second", &entry2), IsOk());
entry1->Close();
entry2->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("fourth", &entry2), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(4, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(0, cache_->GetEntryCount());
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
disk_cache::Entry *entry3, *entry4;
EXPECT_NE(net::OK, OpenEntry("third", &entry3));
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry3), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("fourth", &entry4), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(0, cache_->GetEntryCount());
entry1->Close();
entry2->Close();
entry3->Doom(); // The entry should be already doomed, but this must work.
entry3->Close();
entry4->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("third", &entry1), IsOk());
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("fourth", &entry2), IsOk());
entry1->Close();
entry2->Close();
ASSERT_EQ(2, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(0, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static GtkAdjustment* getVerticalAdjustment(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
Page* page = core(webView);
if (page)
return static_cast<WebKit::ChromeClient*>(page->chrome()->client())->adjustmentWatcher()->verticalAdjustment();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cdc_ncm_status(struct usbnet *dev, struct urb *urb)
{
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx;
struct usb_cdc_notification *event;
ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
if (urb->actual_length < sizeof(*event))
return;
/* test for split data in 8-byte chunks */
if (test_and_clear_bit(EVENT_STS_SPLIT, &dev->flags)) {
cdc_ncm_speed_change(dev,
(struct usb_cdc_speed_change *)urb->transfer_buffer);
return;
}
event = urb->transfer_buffer;
switch (event->bNotificationType) {
case USB_CDC_NOTIFY_NETWORK_CONNECTION:
/*
* According to the CDC NCM specification ch.7.1
* USB_CDC_NOTIFY_NETWORK_CONNECTION notification shall be
* sent by device after USB_CDC_NOTIFY_SPEED_CHANGE.
*/
netif_info(dev, link, dev->net,
"network connection: %sconnected\n",
!!event->wValue ? "" : "dis");
usbnet_link_change(dev, !!event->wValue, 0);
break;
case USB_CDC_NOTIFY_SPEED_CHANGE:
if (urb->actual_length < (sizeof(*event) +
sizeof(struct usb_cdc_speed_change)))
set_bit(EVENT_STS_SPLIT, &dev->flags);
else
cdc_ncm_speed_change(dev,
(struct usb_cdc_speed_change *)&event[1]);
break;
default:
dev_dbg(&dev->udev->dev,
"NCM: unexpected notification 0x%02x!\n",
event->bNotificationType);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool isfirstidchar(int c)
{
return !isdigit(c) && ismiddle(c);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pgoff_t get_next_page_offset(struct dnode_of_data *dn, pgoff_t pgofs)
{
const long direct_index = ADDRS_PER_INODE(dn->inode);
const long direct_blks = ADDRS_PER_BLOCK;
const long indirect_blks = ADDRS_PER_BLOCK * NIDS_PER_BLOCK;
unsigned int skipped_unit = ADDRS_PER_BLOCK;
int cur_level = dn->cur_level;
int max_level = dn->max_level;
pgoff_t base = 0;
if (!dn->max_level)
return pgofs + 1;
while (max_level-- > cur_level)
skipped_unit *= NIDS_PER_BLOCK;
switch (dn->max_level) {
case 3:
base += 2 * indirect_blks;
case 2:
base += 2 * direct_blks;
case 1:
base += direct_index;
break;
default:
f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_I_SB(dn->inode), 1);
}
return ((pgofs - base) / skipped_unit + 1) * skipped_unit + base;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XML_ExpatVersionInfo(void)
{
XML_Expat_Version version;
version.major = XML_MAJOR_VERSION;
version.minor = XML_MINOR_VERSION;
version.micro = XML_MICRO_VERSION;
return version;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: findForPassRule(const TranslationTableHeader *table, int pos, int currentPass,
const InString *input, int *transOpcode, const TranslationTableRule **transRule,
int *transCharslen, int *passCharDots, widechar const **passInstructions,
int *passIC, PassRuleMatch *match, TranslationTableRule **groupingRule,
widechar *groupingOp) {
int save_transCharslen = *transCharslen;
const TranslationTableRule *save_transRule = *transRule;
TranslationTableOpcode save_transOpcode = *transOpcode;
TranslationTableOffset ruleOffset;
ruleOffset = table->forPassRules[currentPass];
*transCharslen = 0;
while (ruleOffset) {
*transRule = (TranslationTableRule *)&table->ruleArea[ruleOffset];
*transOpcode = (*transRule)->opcode;
if (passDoTest(table, pos, input, *transOpcode, *transRule, passCharDots,
passInstructions, passIC, match, groupingRule, groupingOp))
return 1;
ruleOffset = (*transRule)->charsnext;
}
*transCharslen = save_transCharslen;
*transRule = save_transRule;
*transOpcode = save_transOpcode;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ssl_set_ca_chain( ssl_context *ssl, x509_cert *ca_chain,
x509_crl *ca_crl, const char *peer_cn )
{
ssl->ca_chain = ca_chain;
ssl->ca_crl = ca_crl;
ssl->peer_cn = peer_cn;
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode imap_dophase_done(struct connectdata *conn,
bool connected)
{
struct FTP *imap = conn->data->state.proto.imap;
(void)connected;
if(imap->transfer != FTPTRANSFER_BODY)
/* no data to transfer */
Curl_setup_transfer(conn, -1, -1, FALSE, NULL, -1, NULL);
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: URL sanitize: reject URLs containing bad data
Protocols (IMAP, POP3 and SMTP) that use the path part of a URL in a
decoded manner now use the new Curl_urldecode() function to reject URLs
with embedded control codes (anything that is or decodes to a byte value
less than 32).
URLs containing such codes could easily otherwise be used to do harm and
allow users to do unintended actions with otherwise innocent tools and
applications. Like for example using a URL like
pop3://pop3.example.com/1%0d%0aDELE%201 when the app wants a URL to get
a mail and instead this would delete one.
This flaw is considered a security vulnerability: CVE-2012-0036
Security advisory at: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20120124.html
Reported by: Dan Fandrich
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 22,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rt_tgsigqueueinfo,
compat_pid_t, tgid,
compat_pid_t, pid,
int, sig,
struct compat_siginfo __user *, uinfo)
{
siginfo_t info;
if (copy_siginfo_from_user32(&info, uinfo))
return -EFAULT;
return do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(tgid, pid, sig, &info);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uri_decoded_copy (const char *part,
gsize length)
{
unsigned char *s, *d;
char *decoded = g_strndup (part, length);
s = d = (unsigned char *)decoded;
do {
if (*s == '%') {
if (!g_ascii_isxdigit (s[1]) ||
!g_ascii_isxdigit (s[2])) {
*d++ = *s;
continue;
}
*d++ = HEXCHAR (s);
s += 2;
} else {
*d++ = *s;
}
} while (*s++);
return decoded;
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible credentials leaking reported by Alex Birsan.
CWE ID: | 0 | 96,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::UpdateFrameArrivalMap(QuicStreamOffset offset) {
auto next_frame = frame_arrival_time_map_.upper_bound(offset);
DCHECK(next_frame != frame_arrival_time_map_.begin());
auto iter = frame_arrival_time_map_.begin();
while (iter != next_frame) {
auto erased = *iter;
iter = frame_arrival_time_map_.erase(iter);
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Removed FrameInfo with offset: " << erased.first
<< " and length: " << erased.second.length;
if (erased.first + erased.second.length > offset) {
auto updated = std::make_pair(
offset, FrameInfo(erased.first + erased.second.length - offset,
erased.second.timestamp));
QUIC_DVLOG(1) << "Inserted FrameInfo with offset: " << updated.first
<< " and length: " << updated.second.length;
frame_arrival_time_map_.insert(updated);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB Write in QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData
BUG=778505
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I1dfd1d26a2c7ee8fe047f7fe6e4ac2e9b97efa52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748282
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513144}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsProfileChooser(profiles::BubbleViewMode mode) {
return mode == profiles::BUBBLE_VIEW_MODE_PROFILE_CHOOSER;
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_resume(void)
{
if (kvm_usage_count) {
WARN_ON(raw_spin_is_locked(&kvm_lock));
hardware_enable_nolock(NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_move_mount(struct path *path, const char *old_name)
{
struct path old_path, parent_path;
struct mount *p;
struct mount *old;
struct mountpoint *mp;
int err;
if (!old_name || !*old_name)
return -EINVAL;
err = kern_path(old_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
if (err)
return err;
mp = lock_mount(path);
err = PTR_ERR(mp);
if (IS_ERR(mp))
goto out;
old = real_mount(old_path.mnt);
p = real_mount(path->mnt);
err = -EINVAL;
if (!check_mnt(p) || !check_mnt(old))
goto out1;
if (old->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED)
goto out1;
err = -EINVAL;
if (old_path.dentry != old_path.mnt->mnt_root)
goto out1;
if (!mnt_has_parent(old))
goto out1;
if (S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) !=
S_ISDIR(old_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
goto out1;
/*
* Don't move a mount residing in a shared parent.
*/
if (IS_MNT_SHARED(old->mnt_parent))
goto out1;
/*
* Don't move a mount tree containing unbindable mounts to a destination
* mount which is shared.
*/
if (IS_MNT_SHARED(p) && tree_contains_unbindable(old))
goto out1;
err = -ELOOP;
for (; mnt_has_parent(p); p = p->mnt_parent)
if (p == old)
goto out1;
err = attach_recursive_mnt(old, real_mount(path->mnt), mp, &parent_path);
if (err)
goto out1;
/* if the mount is moved, it should no longer be expire
* automatically */
list_del_init(&old->mnt_expire);
out1:
unlock_mount(mp);
out:
if (!err)
path_put(&parent_path);
path_put(&old_path);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssl_update_checksum_md5sha1( ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
md5_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_md5 , buf, len );
sha1_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha1, buf, len );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,046 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderProcessHostImpl::GetRenderWidgetHostsIterator() {
return RenderWidgetHostsIterator(&render_widget_hosts_);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::PurgeAndSuspend() {
GetRendererInterface()->ProcessPurgeAndSuspend();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,316 |
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