instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: evdns_base_load_hosts_impl(struct evdns_base *base, const char *hosts_fname)
{
char *str=NULL, *cp, *eol;
size_t len;
int err=0;
ASSERT_LOCKED(base);
if (hosts_fname == NULL ||
(err = evutil_read_file_(hosts_fname, &str, &len, 0)) < 0) {
char tmp[64];
strlcpy(tmp, "127.0.0.1 localhost", sizeof(tmp));
evdns_base_parse_hosts_line(base, tmp);
strlcpy(tmp, "::1 localhost", sizeof(tmp));
evdns_base_parse_hosts_line(base, tmp);
return err ? -1 : 0;
}
/* This will break early if there is a NUL in the hosts file.
* Probably not a problem.*/
cp = str;
for (;;) {
eol = strchr(cp, '\n');
if (eol) {
*eol = '\0';
evdns_base_parse_hosts_line(base, cp);
cp = eol+1;
} else {
evdns_base_parse_hosts_line(base, cp);
break;
}
}
mm_free(str);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cpu_pmu_reset(void)
{
if (cpu_pmu && cpu_pmu->reset)
return on_each_cpu(cpu_pmu->reset, NULL, 1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 56,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, int nbytes)
{
u_int32_t rnd = 0;
int r, i;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, compat20 ?
SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rnd = arc4random();
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
rnd >>= 8;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PluginInfoMessageFilter::GotPluginFinder(
const GetPluginInfo_Params& params,
IPC::Message* reply_msg,
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Output output,
PluginFinder* plugin_finder) {
context_.DecidePluginStatus(params, output.plugin, plugin_finder,
&output.status, &output.group_identifier,
&output.group_name);
ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo::WriteReplyParams(reply_msg, output);
Send(reply_msg);
}
Commit Message: Handle crashing Pepper plug-ins the same as crashing NPAPI plug-ins.
BUG=151895
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10956065
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158364 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *get_rundir()
{
char *rundir;
const char *homedir;
if (geteuid() == 0) {
rundir = strdup(RUNTIME_PATH);
return rundir;
}
rundir = getenv("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR");
if (rundir) {
rundir = strdup(rundir);
return rundir;
}
INFO("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR isn't set in the environment.");
homedir = getenv("HOME");
if (!homedir) {
ERROR("HOME isn't set in the environment.");
return NULL;
}
rundir = malloc(sizeof(char) * (17 + strlen(homedir)));
sprintf(rundir, "%s/.cache/lxc/run/", homedir);
return rundir;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dev_hard_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct netdev_queue *txq)
{
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
int rc = NETDEV_TX_OK;
if (likely(!skb->next)) {
if (!list_empty(&ptype_all))
dev_queue_xmit_nit(skb, dev);
/*
* If device doesnt need skb->dst, release it right now while
* its hot in this cpu cache
*/
if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE)
skb_dst_drop(skb);
skb_orphan_try(skb);
if (netif_needs_gso(dev, skb)) {
if (unlikely(dev_gso_segment(skb)))
goto out_kfree_skb;
if (skb->next)
goto gso;
} else {
if (skb_needs_linearize(skb, dev) &&
__skb_linearize(skb))
goto out_kfree_skb;
/* If packet is not checksummed and device does not
* support checksumming for this protocol, complete
* checksumming here.
*/
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
skb_set_transport_header(skb, skb->csum_start -
skb_headroom(skb));
if (!dev_can_checksum(dev, skb) &&
skb_checksum_help(skb))
goto out_kfree_skb;
}
}
rc = ops->ndo_start_xmit(skb, dev);
if (rc == NETDEV_TX_OK)
txq_trans_update(txq);
return rc;
}
gso:
do {
struct sk_buff *nskb = skb->next;
skb->next = nskb->next;
nskb->next = NULL;
/*
* If device doesnt need nskb->dst, release it right now while
* its hot in this cpu cache
*/
if (dev->priv_flags & IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE)
skb_dst_drop(nskb);
rc = ops->ndo_start_xmit(nskb, dev);
if (unlikely(rc != NETDEV_TX_OK)) {
if (rc & ~NETDEV_TX_MASK)
goto out_kfree_gso_skb;
nskb->next = skb->next;
skb->next = nskb;
return rc;
}
txq_trans_update(txq);
if (unlikely(netif_tx_queue_stopped(txq) && skb->next))
return NETDEV_TX_BUSY;
} while (skb->next);
out_kfree_gso_skb:
if (likely(skb->next == NULL))
skb->destructor = DEV_GSO_CB(skb)->destructor;
out_kfree_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: netdevice.h net/core/dev.c: Convert netdev_<level> logging macros to functions
Reduces an x86 defconfig text and data ~2k.
text is smaller, data is larger.
$ size vmlinux*
text data bss dec hex filename
7198862 720112 1366288 9285262 8dae8e vmlinux
7205273 716016 1366288 9287577 8db799 vmlinux.device_h
Uses %pV and struct va_format
Format arguments are verified before printk
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 37,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::FilePath DatabaseUtil::GetFullFilePathForVfsFile(
DatabaseTracker* db_tracker, const string16& vfs_file_name) {
string16 origin_identifier;
string16 database_name;
string16 sqlite_suffix;
if (!CrackVfsFileName(vfs_file_name, &origin_identifier,
&database_name, &sqlite_suffix)) {
return base::FilePath(); // invalid vfs_file_name
}
base::FilePath full_path = db_tracker->GetFullDBFilePath(
origin_identifier, database_name);
if (!full_path.empty() && !sqlite_suffix.empty()) {
DCHECK(full_path.Extension().empty());
full_path = full_path.InsertBeforeExtensionASCII(
UTF16ToASCII(sqlite_suffix));
}
if (full_path.value().find(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("..")) !=
base::FilePath::StringType::npos)
return base::FilePath();
return full_path;
}
Commit Message: WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 116,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: on_sl(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LSEG *lseg = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(0);
LINE *line = PG_GETARG_LINE_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(DatumGetBool(DirectFunctionCall2(on_pl,
PointPGetDatum(&lseg->p[0]),
LinePGetDatum(line))) &&
DatumGetBool(DirectFunctionCall2(on_pl,
PointPGetDatum(&lseg->p[1]),
LinePGetDatum(line))));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pn_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 40,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void netlink_ack(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int err)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *rep;
struct nlmsgerr *errmsg;
size_t payload = sizeof(*errmsg);
/* error messages get the original request appened */
if (err)
payload += nlmsg_len(nlh);
skb = netlink_alloc_skb(in_skb->sk, nlmsg_total_size(payload),
NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb) {
struct sock *sk;
sk = netlink_lookup(sock_net(in_skb->sk),
in_skb->sk->sk_protocol,
NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid);
if (sk) {
sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
return;
}
rep = __nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NLMSG_ERROR, payload, 0);
errmsg = nlmsg_data(rep);
errmsg->error = err;
memcpy(&errmsg->msg, nlh, err ? nlh->nlmsg_len : sizeof(*nlh));
netlink_unicast(in_skb->sk, skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClientControlledShellSurface::OnBoundsChangeEvent(
ash::WindowStateType current_state,
ash::WindowStateType requested_state,
int64_t display_id,
const gfx::Rect& window_bounds,
int bounds_change) {
if (!geometry().IsEmpty() && !window_bounds.IsEmpty() &&
(!widget_->IsMinimized() ||
requested_state != ash::WindowStateType::kMinimized) &&
bounds_changed_callback_) {
ash::NonClientFrameViewAsh* frame_view = GetFrameView();
const bool becoming_snapped =
requested_state == ash::WindowStateType::kLeftSnapped ||
requested_state == ash::WindowStateType::kRightSnapped;
const bool is_tablet_mode =
WMHelper::GetInstance()->IsTabletModeWindowManagerEnabled();
gfx::Rect client_bounds =
becoming_snapped && is_tablet_mode
? window_bounds
: frame_view->GetClientBoundsForWindowBounds(window_bounds);
gfx::Size current_size = frame_view->GetBoundsForClientView().size();
bool is_resize = client_bounds.size() != current_size &&
!widget_->IsMaximized() && !widget_->IsFullscreen();
bounds_changed_callback_.Run(current_state, requested_state, display_id,
client_bounds, is_resize, bounds_change);
auto* window_state = GetWindowState();
if (server_reparent_window_ &&
window_state->GetDisplay().id() != display_id) {
ScopedSetBoundsLocally scoped_set_bounds(this);
int container_id = window_state->window()->parent()->id();
aura::Window* new_parent =
ash::Shell::GetRootWindowControllerWithDisplayId(display_id)
->GetContainer(container_id);
new_parent->AddChild(window_state->window());
}
}
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 172,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int netlink_has_listeners(struct sock *sk, unsigned int group)
{
int res = 0;
struct listeners *listeners;
BUG_ON(!netlink_is_kernel(sk));
rcu_read_lock();
listeners = rcu_dereference(nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].listeners);
if (group - 1 < nl_table[sk->sk_protocol].groups)
res = test_bit(group - 1, listeners->masks);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLFormControlElement* HTMLFormControlElement::enclosingFormControlElement(
Node* node) {
if (!node)
return nullptr;
return Traversal<HTMLFormControlElement>::firstAncestorOrSelf(*node);
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021 | 0 | 139,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void find_new_snapshot_id(BlockDriverState *bs,
char *id_str, int id_str_size)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
QCowSnapshot *sn;
int i;
unsigned long id, id_max = 0;
for(i = 0; i < s->nb_snapshots; i++) {
sn = s->snapshots + i;
id = strtoul(sn->id_str, NULL, 10);
if (id > id_max)
id_max = id;
}
snprintf(id_str, id_str_size, "%lu", id_max + 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 16,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadController::~DownloadController() {
if (java_object_) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
env->DeleteWeakGlobalRef(java_object_->obj_);
delete java_object_;
base::android::CheckException(env);
}
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SETDEFAULTS_FUNC(mod_alias_set_defaults) {
plugin_data *p = p_d;
size_t i = 0;
config_values_t cv[] = {
{ "alias.url", NULL, T_CONFIG_ARRAY, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION }, /* 0 */
{ NULL, NULL, T_CONFIG_UNSET, T_CONFIG_SCOPE_UNSET }
};
if (!p) return HANDLER_ERROR;
p->config_storage = calloc(1, srv->config_context->used * sizeof(plugin_config *));
for (i = 0; i < srv->config_context->used; i++) {
data_config const* config = (data_config const*)srv->config_context->data[i];
plugin_config *s;
s = calloc(1, sizeof(plugin_config));
s->alias = array_init();
cv[0].destination = s->alias;
p->config_storage[i] = s;
if (0 != config_insert_values_global(srv, config->value, cv, i == 0 ? T_CONFIG_SCOPE_SERVER : T_CONFIG_SCOPE_CONNECTION)) {
return HANDLER_ERROR;
}
if (!array_is_kvstring(s->alias)) {
log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "s",
"unexpected value for alias.url; expected list of \"urlpath\" => \"filepath\"");
return HANDLER_ERROR;
}
if (s->alias->used >= 2) {
const array *a = s->alias;
size_t j, k;
for (j = 0; j < a->used; j ++) {
const buffer *prefix = a->data[a->sorted[j]]->key;
for (k = j + 1; k < a->used; k ++) {
const buffer *key = a->data[a->sorted[k]]->key;
if (buffer_string_length(key) < buffer_string_length(prefix)) {
break;
}
if (memcmp(key->ptr, prefix->ptr, buffer_string_length(prefix)) != 0) {
break;
}
/* ok, they have same prefix. check position */
if (a->sorted[j] < a->sorted[k]) {
log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SBSBS",
"url.alias: `", key, "' will never match as `", prefix, "' matched first");
return HANDLER_ERROR;
}
}
}
}
}
return HANDLER_GO_ON;
}
Commit Message: [mod_alias] security: potential path traversal with specific configs
Security: potential path traversal of a single directory above the alias
target with a specific mod_alias config where the alias which is matched
does not end in '/', but alias target filesystem path does end in '/'.
e.g. server.docroot = "/srv/www/host/HOSTNAME/docroot"
alias.url = ( "/img" => "/srv/www/hosts/HOSTNAME/images/" )
If a malicious URL "/img../" were passed, the request would be
for directory "/srv/www/hosts/HOSTNAME/images/../" which would resolve
to "/srv/www/hosts/HOSTNAME/". If mod_dirlisting were enabled, which
is not the default, this would result in listing the contents of the
directory above the alias. An attacker might also try to directly
access files anywhere under that path, which is one level above the
intended aliased path.
credit: Orange Tsai(@orange_8361) from DEVCORE
CWE ID: | 0 | 75,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sctp_generate_proto_unreach_event(unsigned long data)
{
struct sctp_transport *transport = (struct sctp_transport *) data;
struct sctp_association *asoc = transport->asoc;
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
bh_lock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(asoc->base.sk)) {
pr_debug("%s: sock is busy\n", __func__);
/* Try again later. */
if (!mod_timer(&transport->proto_unreach_timer,
jiffies + (HZ/20)))
sctp_association_hold(asoc);
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Is this structure just waiting around for us to actually
* get destroyed?
*/
if (asoc->base.dead)
goto out_unlock;
sctp_do_sm(net, SCTP_EVENT_T_OTHER,
SCTP_ST_OTHER(SCTP_EVENT_ICMP_PROTO_UNREACH),
asoc->state, asoc->ep, asoc, transport, GFP_ATOMIC);
out_unlock:
bh_unlock_sock(asoc->base.sk);
sctp_association_put(asoc);
}
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 167,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: schedule_call_ready_callbacks (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
if (directory->details->call_ready_idle_id == 0)
{
directory->details->call_ready_idle_id
= g_idle_add (call_ready_callbacks_at_idle, directory);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::getTrackCount() const {
return mSources.size();
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<MessagePump> ReturnPump(std::unique_ptr<MessagePump> pump) {
return pump;
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,557 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> HeapAlloc(const BucketRanges* ranges) {
return WrapUnique(new Histogram(name_, minimum_, maximum_, ranges));
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
struct mm_struct *mm;
int err;
err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm && mm != current->mm &&
!ptrace_may_access(task, mode)) {
mmput(mm);
mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
}
mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
return mm;
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void __d_add(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
{
struct inode *dir = NULL;
unsigned n;
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
if (unlikely(d_in_lookup(dentry))) {
dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
n = start_dir_add(dir);
__d_lookup_done(dentry);
}
if (inode) {
unsigned add_flags = d_flags_for_inode(inode);
hlist_add_head(&dentry->d_u.d_alias, &inode->i_dentry);
raw_write_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
__d_set_inode_and_type(dentry, inode, add_flags);
raw_write_seqcount_end(&dentry->d_seq);
fsnotify_update_flags(dentry);
}
__d_rehash(dentry);
if (dir)
end_dir_add(dir, n);
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
if (inode)
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StackOverflow(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
printk(KERN_CRIT "Kernel stack overflow in process %p, r1=%lx\n",
current, regs->gpr[1]);
debugger(regs);
show_regs(regs);
panic("kernel stack overflow");
}
Commit Message: [POWERPC] Never panic when taking altivec exceptions from userspace
At the moment we rely on a cpu feature bit or a firmware property to
detect altivec. If we dont have either of these and the cpu does in fact
support altivec we can cause a panic from userspace.
It seems safer to always send a signal if we manage to get an 0xf20
exception from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 74,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::IsFeatureEnabled(
blink::mojom::FeaturePolicyFeature feature) {
return feature_policy_ && feature_policy_->IsFeatureEnabledForOrigin(
feature, GetLastCommittedOrigin());
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *pace;
struct posix_acl *pacl;
int nace;
int i;
/*
* ACLs with no ACEs are treated differently in the inheritable
* and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs,
* calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure.
*/
if (state->empty && (flags & NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT))
return NULL;
/*
* When there are no effective ACEs, the following will end
* up setting a 3-element effective posix ACL with all
* permissions zero.
*/
if (!state->users->n && !state->groups->n)
nace = 3;
else /* Note we also include a MASK ACE in this case: */
nace = 4 + state->users->n + state->groups->n;
pacl = posix_acl_alloc(nace, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pacl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
pace = pacl->a_entries;
pace->e_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->owner.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
for (i=0; i < state->users->n; i++) {
pace++;
pace->e_tag = ACL_USER;
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->users->aces[i].perms.allow,
&pace->e_perm, flags);
pace->e_uid = state->users->aces[i].uid;
add_to_mask(state, &state->users->aces[i].perms);
}
pace++;
pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->group.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
add_to_mask(state, &state->group);
for (i=0; i < state->groups->n; i++) {
pace++;
pace->e_tag = ACL_GROUP;
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->groups->aces[i].perms.allow,
&pace->e_perm, flags);
pace->e_gid = state->groups->aces[i].gid;
add_to_mask(state, &state->groups->aces[i].perms);
}
if (state->users->n || state->groups->n) {
pace++;
pace->e_tag = ACL_MASK;
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->mask.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
}
pace++;
pace->e_tag = ACL_OTHER;
low_mode_from_nfs4(state->other.allow, &pace->e_perm, flags);
return pacl;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 55,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorResourceAgent::willSendWebSocketHandshakeRequest(Document*, unsigned long identifier, const WebSocketHandshakeRequest* request)
{
ASSERT(request);
RefPtr<TypeBuilder::Network::WebSocketRequest> requestObject = TypeBuilder::Network::WebSocketRequest::create()
.setHeaders(buildObjectForHeaders(request->headerFields()));
m_frontend->webSocketWillSendHandshakeRequest(IdentifiersFactory::requestId(identifier), currentTime(), requestObject);
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: transit_hash_key_make (void *p)
{
const struct transit * transit = p;
return jhash(transit->val, transit->length, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DrawingBuffer::FinishPrepareTextureMailboxSoftware(
viz::TextureMailbox* out_mailbox,
std::unique_ptr<cc::SingleReleaseCallback>* out_release_callback) {
DCHECK(state_restorer_);
std::unique_ptr<viz::SharedBitmap> bitmap = CreateOrRecycleBitmap();
if (!bitmap)
return false;
{
unsigned char* pixels = bitmap->pixels();
DCHECK(pixels);
bool need_premultiply = want_alpha_channel_ && !premultiplied_alpha_;
WebGLImageConversion::AlphaOp op =
need_premultiply ? WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoPremultiply
: WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing;
state_restorer_->SetFramebufferBindingDirty();
gl_->BindFramebuffer(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, fbo_);
ReadBackFramebuffer(pixels, Size().Width(), Size().Height(), kReadbackSkia,
op);
}
*out_mailbox = viz::TextureMailbox(bitmap.get(), size_);
out_mailbox->set_color_space(color_space_);
auto func = WTF::Bind(&DrawingBuffer::MailboxReleasedSoftware,
RefPtr<DrawingBuffer>(this),
WTF::Passed(std::move(bitmap)), size_);
*out_release_callback =
cc::SingleReleaseCallback::Create(ConvertToBaseCallback(std::move(func)));
if (preserve_drawing_buffer_ == kDiscard) {
SetBufferClearNeeded(true);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void MeasureMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
impl->measureMethod();
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void register_disk(struct device *parent, struct gendisk *disk)
{
struct device *ddev = disk_to_dev(disk);
struct block_device *bdev;
struct disk_part_iter piter;
struct hd_struct *part;
int err;
ddev->parent = parent;
dev_set_name(ddev, "%s", disk->disk_name);
/* delay uevents, until we scanned partition table */
dev_set_uevent_suppress(ddev, 1);
if (device_add(ddev))
return;
if (!sysfs_deprecated) {
err = sysfs_create_link(block_depr, &ddev->kobj,
kobject_name(&ddev->kobj));
if (err) {
device_del(ddev);
return;
}
}
/*
* avoid probable deadlock caused by allocating memory with
* GFP_KERNEL in runtime_resume callback of its all ancestor
* devices
*/
pm_runtime_set_memalloc_noio(ddev, true);
disk->part0.holder_dir = kobject_create_and_add("holders", &ddev->kobj);
disk->slave_dir = kobject_create_and_add("slaves", &ddev->kobj);
/* No minors to use for partitions */
if (!disk_part_scan_enabled(disk))
goto exit;
/* No such device (e.g., media were just removed) */
if (!get_capacity(disk))
goto exit;
bdev = bdget_disk(disk, 0);
if (!bdev)
goto exit;
bdev->bd_invalidated = 1;
err = blkdev_get(bdev, FMODE_READ, NULL);
if (err < 0)
goto exit;
blkdev_put(bdev, FMODE_READ);
exit:
/* announce disk after possible partitions are created */
dev_set_uevent_suppress(ddev, 0);
kobject_uevent(&ddev->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
/* announce possible partitions */
disk_part_iter_init(&piter, disk, 0);
while ((part = disk_part_iter_next(&piter)))
kobject_uevent(&part_to_dev(part)->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
disk_part_iter_exit(&piter);
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ThreadHeap::AllocationPointAdjusted(int arena_index) {
arena_ages_[arena_index] = ++current_arena_ages_;
if (vector_backing_arena_index_ == arena_index) {
vector_backing_arena_index_ = ArenaIndexOfVectorArenaLeastRecentlyExpanded(
BlinkGC::kVector1ArenaIndex, BlinkGC::kVector4ArenaIndex);
}
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit MockServiceObserver(AppCacheStorageImplTest* test) : test_(test) {}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 151,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _out_mio_callback(mio_t m, mio_action_t a, mio_fd_t fd, void *data, void *arg) {
conn_t out = (conn_t) arg;
char ipport[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 17];
int nbytes;
switch(a) {
case action_READ:
log_debug(ZONE, "read action on fd %d", fd->fd);
/* they did something */
out->last_activity = time(NULL);
ioctl(fd->fd, FIONREAD, &nbytes);
if(nbytes == 0) {
sx_kill(out->s);
return 0;
}
return sx_can_read(out->s);
case action_WRITE:
log_debug(ZONE, "write action on fd %d", fd->fd);
/* update activity timestamp */
out->last_activity = time(NULL);
return sx_can_write(out->s);
case action_CLOSE:
log_debug(ZONE, "close action on fd %d", fd->fd);
jqueue_push(out->s2s->dead, (void *) out->s, 0);
log_write(out->s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%d] [%s, port=%d] disconnect, packets: %i", fd->fd, out->ip, out->port, out->packet_count);
if (out->s2s->out_reuse) {
/* generate the ip/port pair */
snprintf(ipport, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 16, "%s/%d", out->ip, out->port);
xhash_zap(out->s2s->out_host, ipport);
}
if (xhash_iter_first(out->routes)) {
char *rkey;
int rkeylen;
char *c;
int c_len;
/* remove all the out_dest entries */
do {
xhash_iter_get(out->routes, (const char **) &rkey, &rkeylen, NULL);
c = memchr(rkey, '/', rkeylen);
c++;
c_len = rkeylen - (c - rkey);
log_debug(ZONE, "route '%.*s'", rkeylen, rkey);
if (xhash_getx(out->s2s->out_dest, c, c_len) != NULL) {
log_debug(ZONE, "removing dest entry for '%.*s'", c_len, c);
xhash_zapx(out->s2s->out_dest, c, c_len);
}
} while(xhash_iter_next(out->routes));
}
if (xhash_iter_first(out->routes)) {
char *rkey;
int rkeylen;
jqueue_t q;
int npkt;
/* retry all the routes */
do {
xhash_iter_get(out->routes, (const char **) &rkey, &rkeylen, NULL);
q = xhash_getx(out->s2s->outq, rkey, rkeylen);
if (out->s2s->retry_limit > 0 && q != NULL && jqueue_age(q) > out->s2s->retry_limit) {
log_write(out->s2s->log, LOG_NOTICE, "[%d] [%s, port=%d] retry limit reached for '%.*s' queue", fd->fd, out->ip, out->port, rkeylen, rkey);
q = NULL;
}
if (q != NULL && (npkt = jqueue_size(q)) > 0 && xhash_get(out->states, rkey) != (void*) conn_INPROGRESS) {
conn_t retry;
log_debug(ZONE, "retrying connection for '%.*s' queue", rkeylen, rkey);
if (!out_route(out->s2s, rkey, rkeylen, &retry, 0)) {
log_debug(ZONE, "retry successful");
if (retry != NULL) {
/* flush queue */
out_flush_route_queue(out->s2s, rkey, rkeylen);
}
} else {
log_debug(ZONE, "retry failed");
/* bounce queue */
out_bounce_route_queue(out->s2s, rkey, rkeylen, stanza_err_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
_out_dns_mark_bad(out);
}
} else {
/* bounce queue */
out_bounce_route_queue(out->s2s, rkey, rkeylen, stanza_err_REMOTE_SERVER_TIMEOUT);
_out_dns_mark_bad(out);
}
} while(xhash_iter_next(out->routes));
}
jqueue_push(out->s2s->dead_conn, (void *) out, 0);
case action_ACCEPT:
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed possibility of Unsolicited Dialback Attacks
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform4iv(const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
const FlexibleInt32ArrayView& v) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateUniformParameters<WTF::Int32Array>(
"uniform4iv", location, v, 4, 0, v.length()))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform4iv(location->Location(), v.length() >> 2,
v.DataMaybeOnStack());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_header_get_flag (DBusHeader *header,
dbus_uint32_t flag)
{
const unsigned char *flags_p;
flags_p = _dbus_string_get_const_data_len (&header->data, FLAGS_OFFSET, 1);
return (*flags_p & flag) != 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: doWorkByList( StringList* ids, CondorError *errstack )
{
ClassAd* rval = 0;
switch( mode ) {
case JA_RELEASE_JOBS:
rval = schedd->releaseJobs( ids, actionReason, errstack );
break;
case JA_REMOVE_X_JOBS:
rval = schedd->removeXJobs( ids, actionReason, errstack );
break;
case JA_VACATE_JOBS:
rval = schedd->vacateJobs( ids, VACATE_GRACEFUL, errstack );
break;
case JA_VACATE_FAST_JOBS:
rval = schedd->vacateJobs( ids, VACATE_FAST, errstack );
break;
case JA_REMOVE_JOBS:
rval = schedd->removeJobs( ids, actionReason, errstack );
break;
case JA_HOLD_JOBS:
rval = schedd->holdJobs( ids, actionReason, holdReasonSubCode, errstack );
break;
case JA_SUSPEND_JOBS:
rval = schedd->suspendJobs( ids, actionReason, errstack );
break;
case JA_CONTINUE_JOBS:
rval = schedd->continueJobs( ids, actionReason, errstack );
break;
default:
EXCEPT( "impossible: unknown mode in doWorkByList" );
}
if( ! rval ) {
had_error = true;
} else {
int result = FALSE;
if( !rval->LookupInteger(ATTR_ACTION_RESULT, result) || !result ) {
had_error = true;
}
}
return rval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SynchronousCompositorImpl::DidOverscroll(
const DidOverscrollParams& params) {
if (registered_with_client_) {
compositor_client_->DidOverscroll(params.accumulated_overscroll,
params.latest_overscroll_delta,
params.current_fling_velocity);
}
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void t2p_free(T2P* t2p)
{
int i = 0;
if (t2p != NULL) {
if(t2p->pdf_xrefoffsets != NULL){
_TIFFfree( (tdata_t) t2p->pdf_xrefoffsets);
}
if(t2p->tiff_pages != NULL){
_TIFFfree( (tdata_t) t2p->tiff_pages);
}
for(i=0;i<t2p->tiff_pagecount;i++){
if(t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tiles != NULL){
_TIFFfree( (tdata_t) t2p->tiff_tiles[i].tiles_tiles);
}
}
if(t2p->tiff_tiles != NULL){
_TIFFfree( (tdata_t) t2p->tiff_tiles);
}
if(t2p->pdf_palette != NULL){
_TIFFfree( (tdata_t) t2p->pdf_palette);
}
#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_ojpegdata != NULL){
_TIFFfree( (tdata_t) t2p->pdf_ojpegdata);
}
#endif
_TIFFfree( (tdata_t) t2p );
}
return;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,344 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_v6_gso_send_check(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h;
struct tcphdr *th;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*th)))
return -EINVAL;
ipv6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
th = tcp_hdr(skb);
th->check = 0;
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
__tcp_v6_send_check(skb, &ipv6h->saddr, &ipv6h->daddr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_setup_super(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_super_block *es,
int read_only)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
int res = 0;
if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_rev_level) > EXT4_MAX_SUPP_REV) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "revision level too high, "
"forcing read-only mode");
res = MS_RDONLY;
}
if (read_only)
goto done;
if (!(sbi->s_mount_state & EXT4_VALID_FS))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING, "warning: mounting unchecked fs, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
else if (sbi->s_mount_state & EXT4_ERROR_FS)
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"warning: mounting fs with errors, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
else if ((__s16) le16_to_cpu(es->s_max_mnt_count) > 0 &&
le16_to_cpu(es->s_mnt_count) >=
(unsigned short) (__s16) le16_to_cpu(es->s_max_mnt_count))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"warning: maximal mount count reached, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
else if (le32_to_cpu(es->s_checkinterval) &&
(le32_to_cpu(es->s_lastcheck) +
le32_to_cpu(es->s_checkinterval) <= get_seconds()))
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_WARNING,
"warning: checktime reached, "
"running e2fsck is recommended");
if (!sbi->s_journal)
es->s_state &= cpu_to_le16(~EXT4_VALID_FS);
if (!(__s16) le16_to_cpu(es->s_max_mnt_count))
es->s_max_mnt_count = cpu_to_le16(EXT4_DFL_MAX_MNT_COUNT);
le16_add_cpu(&es->s_mnt_count, 1);
es->s_mtime = cpu_to_le32(get_seconds());
ext4_update_dynamic_rev(sb);
if (sbi->s_journal)
ext4_set_feature_journal_needs_recovery(sb);
ext4_commit_super(sb, 1);
done:
if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG))
printk(KERN_INFO "[EXT4 FS bs=%lu, gc=%u, "
"bpg=%lu, ipg=%lu, mo=%04x, mo2=%04x]\n",
sb->s_blocksize,
sbi->s_groups_count,
EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP(sb),
EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb),
sbi->s_mount_opt, sbi->s_mount_opt2);
cleancache_init_fs(sb);
return res;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *tcp_get_idx(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t pos)
{
void *rc;
struct tcp_iter_state *st = seq->private;
st->state = TCP_SEQ_STATE_LISTENING;
rc = listening_get_idx(seq, &pos);
if (!rc) {
st->state = TCP_SEQ_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
rc = established_get_idx(seq, pos);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindTexture(GLenum target, GLuint client_id) {
TextureRef* texture_ref = nullptr;
GLuint service_id = 0;
if (client_id != 0) {
texture_ref = GetTexture(client_id);
if (!texture_ref) {
if (!group_->bind_generates_resource()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glBindTexture",
"id not generated by glGenTextures");
return;
}
api()->glGenTexturesFn(1, &service_id);
DCHECK_NE(0u, service_id);
CreateTexture(client_id, service_id);
texture_ref = GetTexture(client_id);
}
} else {
texture_ref = texture_manager()->GetDefaultTextureInfo(target);
}
if (texture_ref) {
Texture* texture = texture_ref->texture();
if (texture->target() != 0 && texture->target() != target) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glBindTexture",
"texture bound to more than 1 target.");
return;
}
LogClientServiceForInfo(texture, client_id, "glBindTexture");
api()->glBindTextureFn(target, texture->service_id());
if (texture->target() == 0) {
texture_manager()->SetTarget(texture_ref, target);
if (!gl_version_info().BehavesLikeGLES() &&
gl_version_info().IsAtLeastGL(3, 2)) {
api()->glTexParameteriFn(target, GL_DEPTH_TEXTURE_MODE, GL_RED);
}
}
} else {
api()->glBindTextureFn(target, 0);
}
TextureUnit& unit = state_.texture_units[state_.active_texture_unit];
unit.bind_target = target;
unit.SetInfoForTarget(target, texture_ref);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtnl_net_valid_getid_req(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **tb,
struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
{
int i, err;
if (!netlink_strict_get_check(skb))
return nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb, NETNSA_MAX,
rtnl_net_policy, extack);
err = nlmsg_parse_strict(nlh, sizeof(struct rtgenmsg), tb, NETNSA_MAX,
rtnl_net_policy, extack);
if (err)
return err;
for (i = 0; i <= NETNSA_MAX; i++) {
if (!tb[i])
continue;
switch (i) {
case NETNSA_PID:
case NETNSA_FD:
case NETNSA_NSID:
case NETNSA_TARGET_NSID:
break;
default:
NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Unsupported attribute in peer netns getid request");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 91,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnReadDirectory(
const ReadDirectoryWithSettingCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
GDataEntry* entry) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error,
hide_hosted_docs_,
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProtoVector>());
return;
}
DCHECK(entry);
GDataDirectory* directory = entry->AsGDataDirectory();
if (!directory) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND,
hide_hosted_docs_,
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProtoVector>());
return;
}
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProtoVector> entries(directory->ToProtoVector());
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(GDATA_FILE_OK, hide_hosted_docs_, entries.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit ShortcutOverlayImageSource(const gfx::ImageSkia& icon)
: gfx::CanvasImageSource(icon.size(), false),
icon_(icon) {
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int on_frame_send_cb(nghttp2_session *ngh2,
const nghttp2_frame *frame,
void *user_data)
{
h2_session *session = user_data;
if (APLOGcdebug(session->c)) {
char buffer[256];
h2_util_frame_print(frame, buffer, sizeof(buffer)/sizeof(buffer[0]));
ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, session->c, APLOGNO(03068)
"h2_session(%ld): sent FRAME[%s], frames=%ld/%ld (r/s)",
session->id, buffer, (long)session->frames_received,
(long)session->frames_sent);
}
++session->frames_sent;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2016-8740
mod_http2: properly crafted, endless HTTP/2 CONTINUATION frames could be used to exhaust all server's memory.
Reported by: Naveen Tiwari <naveen.tiwari@asu.edu> and CDF/SEFCOM at Arizona State University
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1772576 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 48,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u16 tcm_loop_set_fabric_sense_len(struct se_cmd *se_cmd, u32 sense_length)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TEE_Result op_attr_bignum_to_binary(void *attr, void *data,
size_t data_len, size_t *offs)
{
TEE_Result res;
struct bignum **bn = attr;
uint32_t n = crypto_bignum_num_bytes(*bn);
size_t next_offs;
res = op_u32_to_binary_helper(n, data, data_len, offs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
if (ADD_OVERFLOW(*offs, n, &next_offs))
return TEE_ERROR_OVERFLOW;
if (data && next_offs <= data_len)
crypto_bignum_bn2bin(*bn, (uint8_t *)data + *offs);
(*offs) = next_offs;
return TEE_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *ip6mr_vif_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ipmr_vif_iter *iter = seq->private;
struct net *net = seq_file_net(seq);
struct mr6_table *mrt = iter->mrt;
++*pos;
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
return ip6mr_vif_seq_idx(net, iter, 0);
while (++iter->ct < mrt->maxvif) {
if (!MIF_EXISTS(mrt, iter->ct))
continue;
return &mrt->vif6_table[iter->ct];
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *get_media_descr(unsigned char media)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(mediabytes) / sizeof(*mediabytes); ++i) {
if (mediabytes[i].media == media)
return (mediabytes[i].descr);
}
return ("undefined");
}
Commit Message: read_boot(): Handle excessive FAT size specifications
The variable used for storing the FAT size (in bytes) was an unsigned
int. Since the size in sectors read from the BPB was not sufficiently
checked, this could end up being zero after multiplying it with the
sector size while some offsets still stayed excessive. Ultimately it
would cause segfaults when accessing FAT entries for which no memory
was allocated.
Make it more robust by changing the types used to store FAT size to
off_t and abort if there is no room for data clusters. Additionally
check that FAT size is not specified as zero.
Fixes #25 and fixes #26.
Reported-by: Hanno Böck
Signed-off-by: Andreas Bombe <aeb@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CreateWinMemoryPressureMonitor(const base::CommandLine& parsed_command_line) {
std::vector<std::string> thresholds =
base::SplitString(parsed_command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kMemoryPressureThresholdsMb),
",", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
int moderate_threshold_mb = 0;
int critical_threshold_mb = 0;
if (thresholds.size() == 2 &&
base::StringToInt(thresholds[0], &moderate_threshold_mb) &&
base::StringToInt(thresholds[1], &critical_threshold_mb) &&
moderate_threshold_mb >= critical_threshold_mb &&
critical_threshold_mb >= 0) {
return std::make_unique<base::win::MemoryPressureMonitor>(
moderate_threshold_mb, critical_threshold_mb);
}
return std::make_unique<base::win::MemoryPressureMonitor>();
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_256(const u_char *data)
{
static char buf[4][sizeof("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef")];
static int i = 0;
i = (i + 1) % 4;
snprintf(buf[i], sizeof(buf[i]), "%016" PRIx64 "%016" PRIx64 "%016" PRIx64 "%016" PRIx64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(data),
EXTRACT_64BITS(data + 8),
EXTRACT_64BITS(data + 16),
EXTRACT_64BITS(data + 24)
);
return buf[i];
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13044/HNCP: add DHCPv4-Data bounds checks
dhcpv4_print() in print-hncp.c had the same bug as dhcpv6_print(), apply
a fix along the same lines.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int pkt_type_offset(void)
{
struct sk_buff skb_probe = { .pkt_type = ~0, };
u8 *ct = (u8 *) &skb_probe;
unsigned int off;
for (off = 0; off < sizeof(struct sk_buff); off++) {
if (ct[off] == PKT_TYPE_MAX)
return off;
}
pr_err_once("Please fix %s, as pkt_type couldn't be found!\n", __func__);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: filter: prevent nla extensions to peek beyond the end of the message
The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR and BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extensions fail to check
for a minimal message length before testing the supplied offset to be
within the bounds of the message. This allows the subtraction of the nla
header to underflow and therefore -- as the data type is unsigned --
allowing far to big offset and length values for the search of the
netlink attribute.
The remainder calculation for the BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension is
also wrong. It has the minuend and subtrahend mixed up, therefore
calculates a huge length value, allowing to overrun the end of the
message while looking for the netlink attribute.
The following three BPF snippets will trigger the bugs when attached to
a UNIX datagram socket and parsing a message with length 1, 2 or 3.
,-[ PoC for missing size check in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nla
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for the same bug in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for wrong remainder calculation in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ; (needs a fake netlink header at offset 0)
| ld #0
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
Fix the first issue by ensuring the message length fulfills the minimal
size constrains of a nla header. Fix the second bug by getting the math
for the remainder calculation right.
Fixes: 4738c1db15 ("[SKFILTER]: Add SKF_ADF_NLATTR instruction")
Fixes: d214c7537b ("filter: add SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST to look for nested..")
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XMLRPC_CASE XMLRPC_GetDefaultIdCase() {
XMLRPC_OPTIONS options = XMLRPC_GetDefaultOptions();
return options->id_case;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_NEQ( FT_Long* args )
{
args[0] = ( args[0] != args[1] );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void json_tokener_reset_level(struct json_tokener *tok, int depth)
{
tok->stack[depth].state = json_tokener_state_eatws;
tok->stack[depth].saved_state = json_tokener_state_start;
json_object_put(tok->stack[depth].current);
tok->stack[depth].current = NULL;
free(tok->stack[depth].obj_field_name);
tok->stack[depth].obj_field_name = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mpage_add_bh_to_extent(struct mpage_da_data *mpd,
sector_t logical, size_t b_size,
unsigned long b_state)
{
sector_t next;
int nrblocks = mpd->b_size >> mpd->inode->i_blkbits;
/* check if thereserved journal credits might overflow */
if (!(EXT4_I(mpd->inode)->i_flags & EXT4_EXTENTS_FL)) {
if (nrblocks >= EXT4_MAX_TRANS_DATA) {
/*
* With non-extent format we are limited by the journal
* credit available. Total credit needed to insert
* nrblocks contiguous blocks is dependent on the
* nrblocks. So limit nrblocks.
*/
goto flush_it;
} else if ((nrblocks + (b_size >> mpd->inode->i_blkbits)) >
EXT4_MAX_TRANS_DATA) {
/*
* Adding the new buffer_head would make it cross the
* allowed limit for which we have journal credit
* reserved. So limit the new bh->b_size
*/
b_size = (EXT4_MAX_TRANS_DATA - nrblocks) <<
mpd->inode->i_blkbits;
/* we will do mpage_da_submit_io in the next loop */
}
}
/*
* First block in the extent
*/
if (mpd->b_size == 0) {
mpd->b_blocknr = logical;
mpd->b_size = b_size;
mpd->b_state = b_state & BH_FLAGS;
return;
}
next = mpd->b_blocknr + nrblocks;
/*
* Can we merge the block to our big extent?
*/
if (logical == next && (b_state & BH_FLAGS) == mpd->b_state) {
mpd->b_size += b_size;
return;
}
flush_it:
/*
* We couldn't merge the block to our extent, so we
* need to flush current extent and start new one
*/
if (mpage_da_map_blocks(mpd) == 0)
mpage_da_submit_io(mpd);
mpd->io_done = 1;
return;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainDelIOThread(virDomainPtr domain,
unsigned int iothread_id,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "iothread_id=%u, flags=%x", iothread_id, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(domain->conn->flags, error);
virCheckNonZeroArgGoto(iothread_id, error);
conn = domain->conn;
if (conn->driver->domainDelIOThread) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainDelIOThread(domain, iothread_id, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadOneMNGImage(MngInfo* mng_info, const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
page_geometry[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging;
volatile int
first_mng_object,
object_id,
term_chunk_found,
skip_to_iend;
volatile ssize_t
image_count=0;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MngBox
default_fb,
fb,
previous_fb;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
PixelPacket
mng_background_color;
#endif
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count;
ssize_t
loop_level;
volatile short
skipping_loop;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
unsigned int
mandatory_back=0;
#endif
volatile unsigned int
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
mng_background_object=0,
#endif
mng_type=0; /* 0: PNG or JNG; 1: MNG; 2: MNG-LC; 3: MNG-VLC */
size_t
default_frame_timeout,
frame_timeout,
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
image_height,
image_width,
#endif
length;
/* These delays are all measured in image ticks_per_second,
* not in MNG ticks_per_second
*/
volatile size_t
default_frame_delay,
final_delay,
final_image_delay,
frame_delay,
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
insert_layers,
#endif
mng_iterations=1,
simplicity=0,
subframe_height=0,
subframe_width=0;
previous_fb.top=0;
previous_fb.bottom=0;
previous_fb.left=0;
previous_fb.right=0;
default_fb.top=0;
default_fb.bottom=0;
default_fb.left=0;
default_fb.right=0;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOneMNGImage()");
image=mng_info->image;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
char
magic_number[MaxTextExtent];
/* Verify MNG signature. */
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (memcmp(magic_number,"\212MNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Initialize some nonzero members of the MngInfo structure. */
for (i=0; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
{
mng_info->object_clip[i].right=(ssize_t) PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
mng_info->object_clip[i].bottom=(ssize_t) PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
}
mng_info->exists[0]=MagickTrue;
}
skipping_loop=(-1);
first_mng_object=MagickTrue;
mng_type=0;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
insert_layers=MagickFalse; /* should be False when converting or mogrifying */
#endif
default_frame_delay=0;
default_frame_timeout=0;
frame_delay=0;
final_delay=1;
mng_info->ticks_per_second=1UL*image->ticks_per_second;
object_id=0;
skip_to_iend=MagickFalse;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
mng_info->framing_mode=1;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
mandatory_back=MagickFalse;
#endif
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
mng_background_color=image->background_color;
#endif
default_fb=mng_info->frame;
previous_fb=mng_info->frame;
do
{
char
type[MaxTextExtent];
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
unsigned char
*chunk;
/*
Read a new chunk.
*/
type[0]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"errr",MaxTextExtent);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading MNG chunk type %c%c%c%c, length: %.20g",
type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3],(double) length);
if (length > PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (count == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p=NULL;
chunk=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (length != 0)
{
if (length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
chunk=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*chunk));
if (chunk == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
chunk[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
p=chunk;
}
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image); /* read crc word */
#if !defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
if (memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->jhdr_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"JNGCompressNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->jhdr_warning++;
}
#endif
if (memcmp(type,mng_DHDR,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->dhdr_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"DeltaPNGNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->dhdr_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MEND,4) == 0)
break;
if (skip_to_iend)
{
if (memcmp(type,mng_IEND,4) == 0)
skip_to_iend=MagickFalse;
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skip to IEND.");
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MHDR,4) == 0)
{
if (length != 28)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
mng_info->mng_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
mng_info->mng_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MNG width: %.20g",(double) mng_info->mng_width);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MNG height: %.20g",(double) mng_info->mng_height);
}
p+=8;
mng_info->ticks_per_second=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second == 0)
default_frame_delay=0;
else
default_frame_delay=1UL*image->ticks_per_second/
mng_info->ticks_per_second;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
simplicity=0;
/* Skip nominal layer count, frame count, and play time */
p+=16;
simplicity=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
mng_type=1; /* Full MNG */
if ((simplicity != 0) && ((simplicity | 11) == 11))
mng_type=2; /* LC */
if ((simplicity != 0) && ((simplicity | 9) == 9))
mng_type=3; /* VLC */
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (mng_type != 3)
insert_layers=MagickTrue;
#endif
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
mng_info->image=image;
}
if ((mng_info->mng_width > 65535L) ||
(mng_info->mng_height > 65535L))
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g+0+0",(double) mng_info->mng_width,(double)
mng_info->mng_height);
mng_info->frame.left=0;
mng_info->frame.right=(ssize_t) mng_info->mng_width;
mng_info->frame.top=0;
mng_info->frame.bottom=(ssize_t) mng_info->mng_height;
mng_info->clip=default_fb=previous_fb=mng_info->frame;
for (i=0; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
mng_info->object_clip[i]=mng_info->frame;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_TERM,4) == 0)
{
int
repeat=0;
if (length != 0)
repeat=p[0];
if (repeat == 3 && length > 8)
{
final_delay=(png_uint_32) mng_get_long(&p[2]);
mng_iterations=(png_uint_32) mng_get_long(&p[6]);
if (mng_iterations == PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
mng_iterations=0;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickTrue;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" repeat=%d, final_delay=%.20g, iterations=%.20g",
repeat,(double) final_delay, (double) image->iterations);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_DEFI,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_type == 3)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"DEFI chunk found in MNG-VLC datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (length > 1)
{
object_id=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (mng_type == 2 && object_id != 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Nonzero object_id in MNG-LC datastream",
"`%s'", image->filename);
if (object_id > MNG_MAX_OBJECTS)
{
/*
Instead of using a warning we should allocate a larger
MngInfo structure and continue.
*/
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(), CoderError,
"object id too large","`%s'",image->filename);
object_id=MNG_MAX_OBJECTS;
}
if (mng_info->exists[object_id])
if (mng_info->frozen[object_id])
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"DEFI cannot redefine a frozen MNG object","`%s'",
image->filename);
continue;
}
mng_info->exists[object_id]=MagickTrue;
if (length > 2)
mng_info->invisible[object_id]=p[2];
/*
Extract object offset info.
*/
if (length > 11)
{
mng_info->x_off[object_id]=(ssize_t) ((p[4] << 24) |
(p[5] << 16) | (p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
mng_info->y_off[object_id]=(ssize_t) ((p[8] << 24) |
(p[9] << 16) | (p[10] << 8) | p[11]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" x_off[%d]: %.20g, y_off[%d]: %.20g",
object_id,(double) mng_info->x_off[object_id],
object_id,(double) mng_info->y_off[object_id]);
}
}
/*
Extract object clipping info.
*/
if (length > 27)
mng_info->object_clip[object_id]=
mng_read_box(mng_info->frame,0, &p[12]);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_bKGD,4) == 0)
{
mng_info->have_global_bkgd=MagickFalse;
if (length > 5)
{
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[0] << 8) | p[1]));
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[2] << 8) | p[3]));
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[4] << 8) | p[5]));
mng_info->have_global_bkgd=MagickTrue;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_BACK,4) == 0)
{
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (length > 6)
mandatory_back=p[6];
else
mandatory_back=0;
if (mandatory_back && length > 5)
{
mng_background_color.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[0] << 8) | p[1]));
mng_background_color.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[2] << 8) | p[3]));
mng_background_color.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[4] << 8) | p[5]));
mng_background_color.opacity=OpaqueOpacity;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (length > 8)
mng_background_object=(p[7] << 8) | p[8];
#endif
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_PLTE,4) == 0)
{
/* Read global PLTE. */
if (length && (length < 769))
{
if (mng_info->global_plte == (png_colorp) NULL)
mng_info->global_plte=(png_colorp) AcquireQuantumMemory(256,
sizeof(*mng_info->global_plte));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length/3); i++)
{
mng_info->global_plte[i].red=p[3*i];
mng_info->global_plte[i].green=p[3*i+1];
mng_info->global_plte[i].blue=p[3*i+2];
}
mng_info->global_plte_length=(unsigned int) (length/3);
}
#ifdef MNG_LOOSE
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
{
mng_info->global_plte[i].red=i;
mng_info->global_plte[i].green=i;
mng_info->global_plte[i].blue=i;
}
if (length != 0)
mng_info->global_plte_length=256;
#endif
else
mng_info->global_plte_length=0;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_tRNS,4) == 0)
{
/* read global tRNS */
if (length > 0 && length < 257)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
mng_info->global_trns[i]=p[i];
#ifdef MNG_LOOSE
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
mng_info->global_trns[i]=255;
#endif
mng_info->global_trns_length=(unsigned int) length;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_gAMA,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 4)
{
ssize_t
igamma;
igamma=mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_gamma=((float) igamma)*0.00001;
mng_info->have_global_gama=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_gama=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_cHRM,4) == 0)
{
/* Read global cHRM */
if (length == 32)
{
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[4]);
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[8]);
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[12]);
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.x=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[16]);
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[20]);
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.x=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[24]);
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[28]);
mng_info->have_global_chrm=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_chrm=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sRGB,4) == 0)
{
/*
Read global sRGB.
*/
if (length != 0)
{
mng_info->global_srgb_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(p[0]);
mng_info->have_global_srgb=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_srgb=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_iCCP,4) == 0)
{
/* To do: */
/*
Read global iCCP.
*/
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_FRAM,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_type == 3)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"FRAM chunk found in MNG-VLC datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
if ((mng_info->framing_mode == 2) || (mng_info->framing_mode == 4))
image->delay=frame_delay;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
frame_timeout=default_frame_timeout;
fb=default_fb;
if (length > 0)
if (p[0])
mng_info->framing_mode=p[0];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_mode=%d",mng_info->framing_mode);
if (length > 6)
{
/* Note the delay and frame clipping boundaries. */
p++; /* framing mode */
while (*p && ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) length))
p++; /* frame name */
p++; /* frame name terminator */
if ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
int
change_delay,
change_timeout,
change_clipping;
change_delay=(*p++);
change_timeout=(*p++);
change_clipping=(*p++);
p++; /* change_sync */
if (change_delay && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
frame_delay=1UL*image->ticks_per_second*
mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second != 0)
frame_delay/=mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
frame_delay=PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
if (change_delay == 2)
default_frame_delay=frame_delay;
p+=4;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_delay=%.20g",(double) frame_delay);
}
if (change_timeout && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
frame_timeout=1UL*image->ticks_per_second*
mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second != 0)
frame_timeout/=mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
frame_timeout=PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
if (change_timeout == 2)
default_frame_timeout=frame_timeout;
p+=4;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_timeout=%.20g",(double) frame_timeout);
}
if (change_clipping && (p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-17))
{
fb=mng_read_box(previous_fb,(char) p[0],&p[1]);
p+=17;
previous_fb=fb;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Frame_clip: L=%.20g R=%.20g T=%.20g B=%.20g",
(double) fb.left,(double) fb.right,(double) fb.top,
(double) fb.bottom);
if (change_clipping == 2)
default_fb=fb;
}
}
}
mng_info->clip=fb;
mng_info->clip=mng_minimum_box(fb,mng_info->frame);
subframe_width=(size_t) (mng_info->clip.right
-mng_info->clip.left);
subframe_height=(size_t) (mng_info->clip.bottom
-mng_info->clip.top);
/*
Insert a background layer behind the frame if framing_mode is 4.
*/
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" subframe_width=%.20g, subframe_height=%.20g",(double)
subframe_width,(double) subframe_height);
if (insert_layers && (mng_info->framing_mode == 4) &&
(subframe_width) && (subframe_height))
{
/* Allocate next image structure. */
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
image->columns=subframe_width;
image->rows=subframe_height;
image->page.width=subframe_width;
image->page.height=subframe_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->clip.left;
image->page.y=mng_info->clip.top;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
image->delay=0;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Insert backgd layer, L=%.20g, R=%.20g T=%.20g, B=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->clip.left,(double) mng_info->clip.right,
(double) mng_info->clip.top,(double) mng_info->clip.bottom);
}
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_CLIP,4) == 0)
{
unsigned int
first_object,
last_object;
/*
Read CLIP.
*/
if (length > 3)
{
first_object=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
last_object=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
p+=4;
for (i=(int) first_object; i <= (int) last_object; i++)
{
if (mng_info->exists[i] && !mng_info->frozen[i])
{
MngBox
box;
box=mng_info->object_clip[i];
if ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-17))
mng_info->object_clip[i]=
mng_read_box(box,(char) p[0],&p[1]);
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_SAVE,4) == 0)
{
for (i=1; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
if (mng_info->exists[i])
{
mng_info->frozen[i]=MagickTrue;
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (mng_info->ob[i] != (MngBuffer *) NULL)
mng_info->ob[i]->frozen=MagickTrue;
#endif
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((memcmp(type,mng_DISC,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_SEEK,4) == 0))
{
/* Read DISC or SEEK. */
if ((length == 0) || !memcmp(type,mng_SEEK,4))
{
for (i=1; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
MngInfoDiscardObject(mng_info,i);
}
else
{
register ssize_t
j;
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=2)
{
i=p[j-1] << 8 | p[j];
MngInfoDiscardObject(mng_info,i);
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MOVE,4) == 0)
{
size_t
first_object,
last_object;
/* read MOVE */
if (length > 3)
{
first_object=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
last_object=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
p+=4;
for (i=(ssize_t) first_object; i <= (ssize_t) last_object; i++)
{
if ((i < 0) || (i >= MNG_MAX_OBJECTS))
continue;
if (mng_info->exists[i] && !mng_info->frozen[i] &&
(p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-8))
{
MngPair
new_pair;
MngPair
old_pair;
old_pair.a=mng_info->x_off[i];
old_pair.b=mng_info->y_off[i];
new_pair=mng_read_pair(old_pair,(int) p[0],&p[1]);
mng_info->x_off[i]=new_pair.a;
mng_info->y_off[i]=new_pair.b;
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_LOOP,4) == 0)
{
ssize_t loop_iters=1;
if (length > 4)
{
loop_level=chunk[0];
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=1; /* mark loop active */
/* Record starting point. */
loop_iters=mng_get_long(&chunk[1]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" LOOP level %.20g has %.20g iterations ",
(double) loop_level, (double) loop_iters);
if (loop_iters == 0)
skipping_loop=loop_level;
else
{
mng_info->loop_jump[loop_level]=TellBlob(image);
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]=loop_iters;
}
mng_info->loop_iteration[loop_level]=0;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_ENDL,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 0)
{
loop_level=chunk[0];
if (skipping_loop > 0)
{
if (skipping_loop == loop_level)
{
/*
Found end of zero-iteration loop.
*/
skipping_loop=(-1);
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=0;
}
}
else
{
if (mng_info->loop_active[loop_level] == 1)
{
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]--;
mng_info->loop_iteration[loop_level]++;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ENDL: LOOP level %.20g has %.20g remaining iters ",
(double) loop_level,(double)
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]);
if (mng_info->loop_count[loop_level] != 0)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image,
mng_info->loop_jump[loop_level], SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
else
{
short
last_level;
/*
Finished loop.
*/
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=0;
last_level=(-1);
for (i=0; i < loop_level; i++)
if (mng_info->loop_active[i] == 1)
last_level=(short) i;
loop_level=last_level;
}
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_CLON,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->clon_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"CLON is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->clon_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MAGN,4) == 0)
{
png_uint_16
magn_first,
magn_last,
magn_mb,
magn_ml,
magn_mr,
magn_mt,
magn_mx,
magn_my,
magn_methx,
magn_methy;
if (length > 1)
magn_first=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
else
magn_first=0;
if (length > 3)
magn_last=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
else
magn_last=magn_first;
#ifndef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (magn_first || magn_last)
if (mng_info->magn_warning == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"MAGN is not implemented yet for nonzero objects",
"`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->magn_warning++;
}
#endif
if (length > 4)
magn_methx=p[4];
else
magn_methx=0;
if (length > 6)
magn_mx=(p[5] << 8) | p[6];
else
magn_mx=1;
if (magn_mx == 0)
magn_mx=1;
if (length > 8)
magn_my=(p[7] << 8) | p[8];
else
magn_my=magn_mx;
if (magn_my == 0)
magn_my=1;
if (length > 10)
magn_ml=(p[9] << 8) | p[10];
else
magn_ml=magn_mx;
if (magn_ml == 0)
magn_ml=1;
if (length > 12)
magn_mr=(p[11] << 8) | p[12];
else
magn_mr=magn_mx;
if (magn_mr == 0)
magn_mr=1;
if (length > 14)
magn_mt=(p[13] << 8) | p[14];
else
magn_mt=magn_my;
if (magn_mt == 0)
magn_mt=1;
if (length > 16)
magn_mb=(p[15] << 8) | p[16];
else
magn_mb=magn_my;
if (magn_mb == 0)
magn_mb=1;
if (length > 17)
magn_methy=p[17];
else
magn_methy=magn_methx;
if (magn_methx > 5 || magn_methy > 5)
if (mng_info->magn_warning == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"Unknown MAGN method in MNG datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->magn_warning++;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
/* Magnify existing objects in the range magn_first to magn_last */
#endif
if (magn_first == 0 || magn_last == 0)
{
/* Save the magnification factors for object 0 */
mng_info->magn_mb=magn_mb;
mng_info->magn_ml=magn_ml;
mng_info->magn_mr=magn_mr;
mng_info->magn_mt=magn_mt;
mng_info->magn_mx=magn_mx;
mng_info->magn_my=magn_my;
mng_info->magn_methx=magn_methx;
mng_info->magn_methy=magn_methy;
}
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_PAST,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->past_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"PAST is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->past_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_SHOW,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->show_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"SHOW is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->show_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sBIT,4) == 0)
{
if (length < 4)
mng_info->have_global_sbit=MagickFalse;
else
{
mng_info->global_sbit.gray=p[0];
mng_info->global_sbit.red=p[0];
mng_info->global_sbit.green=p[1];
mng_info->global_sbit.blue=p[2];
mng_info->global_sbit.alpha=p[3];
mng_info->have_global_sbit=MagickTrue;
}
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
mng_info->global_x_pixels_per_unit=
(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_y_pixels_per_unit=
(size_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
mng_info->global_phys_unit_type=p[8];
mng_info->have_global_phys=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_phys=MagickFalse;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYg,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->phyg_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"pHYg is not implemented.","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->phyg_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_BASI,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->basi_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"BASI is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->basi_warning++;
#ifdef MNG_BASI_SUPPORTED
if (length > 11)
{
basi_width=(size_t) ((p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) |
(p[2] << 8) | p[3]);
basi_height=(size_t) ((p[4] << 24) | (p[5] << 16) |
(p[6] << 8) | p[7]);
basi_color_type=p[8];
basi_compression_method=p[9];
basi_filter_type=p[10];
basi_interlace_method=p[11];
}
if (length > 13)
basi_red=(p[12] << 8) & p[13];
else
basi_red=0;
if (length > 15)
basi_green=(p[14] << 8) & p[15];
else
basi_green=0;
if (length > 17)
basi_blue=(p[16] << 8) & p[17];
else
basi_blue=0;
if (length > 19)
basi_alpha=(p[18] << 8) & p[19];
else
{
if (basi_sample_depth == 16)
basi_alpha=65535L;
else
basi_alpha=255;
}
if (length > 20)
basi_viewable=p[20];
else
basi_viewable=0;
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_IHDR,4)
#if defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
&& memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4)
#endif
)
{
/* Not an IHDR or JHDR chunk */
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
/* Process IHDR */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Processing %c%c%c%c chunk",type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3]);
mng_info->exists[object_id]=MagickTrue;
mng_info->viewable[object_id]=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->invisible[object_id])
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skipping invisible object");
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (length < 8)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
image_width=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
image_height=(size_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
/*
Insert a transparent background layer behind the entire animation
if it is not full screen.
*/
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (insert_layers && mng_type && first_mng_object)
{
if ((mng_info->clip.left > 0) || (mng_info->clip.top > 0) ||
(image_width < mng_info->mng_width) ||
(mng_info->clip.right < (ssize_t) mng_info->mng_width) ||
(image_height < mng_info->mng_height) ||
(mng_info->clip.bottom < (ssize_t) mng_info->mng_height))
{
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
/* Make a background rectangle. */
image->delay=0;
image->columns=mng_info->mng_width;
image->rows=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Inserted transparent background layer, W=%.20g, H=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->mng_width,(double) mng_info->mng_height);
}
}
/*
Insert a background layer behind the upcoming image if
framing_mode is 3, and we haven't already inserted one.
*/
if (insert_layers && (mng_info->framing_mode == 3) &&
(subframe_width) && (subframe_height) && (simplicity == 0 ||
(simplicity & 0x08)))
{
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
image->delay=0;
image->columns=subframe_width;
image->rows=subframe_height;
image->page.width=subframe_width;
image->page.height=subframe_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->clip.left;
image->page.y=mng_info->clip.top;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Insert background layer, L=%.20g, R=%.20g T=%.20g, B=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->clip.left,(double) mng_info->clip.right,
(double) mng_info->clip.top,(double) mng_info->clip.bottom);
}
#endif /* MNG_INSERT_LAYERS */
first_mng_object=MagickFalse;
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
if (mng_info->framing_mode == 1 || mng_info->framing_mode == 3)
{
image->delay=frame_delay;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
}
else
image->delay=0;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->x_off[object_id];
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[object_id];
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
/*
Seek back to the beginning of the IHDR or JHDR chunk's length field.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Seeking back to beginning of %c%c%c%c chunk",type[0],type[1],
type[2],type[3]);
offset=SeekBlob(image,-((ssize_t) length+12),SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
mng_info->image=image;
mng_info->mng_type=mng_type;
mng_info->object_id=object_id;
if (memcmp(type,mng_IHDR,4) == 0)
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
#if defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
else
image=ReadOneJNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
#endif
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (mng_type)
{
MngBox
crop_box;
if (mng_info->magn_methx || mng_info->magn_methy)
{
png_uint_32
magnified_height,
magnified_width;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Processing MNG MAGN chunk");
if (mng_info->magn_methx == 1)
{
magnified_width=mng_info->magn_ml;
if (image->columns > 1)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_mr;
if (image->columns > 2)
magnified_width += (png_uint_32)
((image->columns-2)*(mng_info->magn_mx));
}
else
{
magnified_width=(png_uint_32) image->columns;
if (image->columns > 1)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_ml-1;
if (image->columns > 2)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_mr-1;
if (image->columns > 3)
magnified_width += (png_uint_32)
((image->columns-3)*(mng_info->magn_mx-1));
}
if (mng_info->magn_methy == 1)
{
magnified_height=mng_info->magn_mt;
if (image->rows > 1)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mb;
if (image->rows > 2)
magnified_height += (png_uint_32)
((image->rows-2)*(mng_info->magn_my));
}
else
{
magnified_height=(png_uint_32) image->rows;
if (image->rows > 1)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mt-1;
if (image->rows > 2)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mb-1;
if (image->rows > 3)
magnified_height += (png_uint_32)
((image->rows-3)*(mng_info->magn_my-1));
}
if (magnified_height > image->rows ||
magnified_width > image->columns)
{
Image
*large_image;
int
yy;
ssize_t
m,
y;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*n,
*q;
PixelPacket
*next,
*prev;
png_uint_16
magn_methx,
magn_methy;
/* Allocate next image structure. */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Allocate magnified image");
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
large_image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
large_image->columns=magnified_width;
large_image->rows=magnified_height;
magn_methx=mng_info->magn_methx;
magn_methy=mng_info->magn_methy;
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
#define QM unsigned short
if (magn_methx != 1 || magn_methy != 1)
{
/*
Scale pixels to unsigned shorts to prevent
overflow of intermediate values of interpolations
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelRed(q)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelGreen(q)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelBlue(q)));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelOpacity(q)));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#else
#define QM Quantum
#endif
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(large_image);
else
{
large_image->background_color.opacity=OpaqueOpacity;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(large_image);
if (magn_methx == 4)
magn_methx=2;
if (magn_methx == 5)
magn_methx=3;
if (magn_methy == 4)
magn_methy=2;
if (magn_methy == 5)
magn_methy=3;
}
/* magnify the rows into the right side of the large image */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Magnify the rows to %.20g",(double) large_image->rows);
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;
yy=0;
length=(size_t) image->columns;
next=(PixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*next));
prev=(PixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*prev));
if ((prev == (PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(next == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,0,image->columns,1,exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(next,n,length);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (y == 0)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;
else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-2)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;
else if (magn_methy <= 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;
else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
m=1;
else
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_my;
n=prev;
prev=next;
next=n;
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
{
n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y+1,image->columns,1,
exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(next,n,length);
}
for (i=0; i < m; i++, yy++)
{
register PixelPacket
*pixels;
assert(yy < (ssize_t) large_image->rows);
pixels=prev;
n=next;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(large_image,0,yy,large_image->columns,
1,exception);
q+=(large_image->columns-image->columns);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
/* To do: get color as function of indexes[x] */
/*
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
}
*/
if (magn_methy <= 1)
{
/* replicate previous */
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else if (magn_methy == 2 || magn_methy == 4)
{
if (i == 0)
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelRed(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelRed(n)
-GetPixelRed(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelRed(pixels)))));
SetPixelGreen(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelGreen(n)
-GetPixelGreen(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelGreen(pixels)))));
SetPixelBlue(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelBlue(n)
-GetPixelBlue(pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelBlue(pixels)))));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,
((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels)+m))
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)))));
}
if (magn_methy == 4)
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(*pixels).opacity+0);
else
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(*n).opacity+0);
}
}
else /* if (magn_methy == 3 || magn_methy == 5) */
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(n));
}
if (magn_methy == 5)
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) (((ssize_t) (2*i*
(GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))
+m))/((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
}
n++;
q++;
pixels++;
} /* x */
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(large_image,exception) == 0)
break;
} /* i */
} /* y */
prev=(PixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(prev);
next=(PixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(next);
length=image->columns;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Delete original image");
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
image=large_image;
mng_info->image=image;
/* magnify the columns */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Magnify the columns to %.20g",(double) image->columns);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*pixels;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
pixels=q+(image->columns-length);
n=pixels+1;
for (x=(ssize_t) (image->columns-length);
x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
/* To do: Rewrite using Get/Set***PixelComponent() */
if (x == (ssize_t) (image->columns-length))
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_ml;
else if (magn_methx > 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-2)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mr;
else if (magn_methx <= 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-1)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mr;
else if (magn_methx > 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-1)
m=1;
else
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mx;
for (i=0; i < m; i++)
{
if (magn_methx <= 1)
{
/* replicate previous */
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else if (magn_methx == 2 || magn_methx == 4)
{
if (i == 0)
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
/* To do: Rewrite using Get/Set***PixelComponent() */
else
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelRed(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelRed(n)
-GetPixelRed(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelRed(pixels)));
SetPixelGreen(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelGreen(n)
-GetPixelGreen(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelGreen(pixels)));
SetPixelBlue(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelBlue(n)
-GetPixelBlue(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelBlue(pixels)));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
if (magn_methx == 4)
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
GetPixelOpacity(pixels)+0);
}
else
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,
GetPixelOpacity(n)+0);
}
}
}
else /* if (magn_methx == 3 || magn_methx == 5) */
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(pixels));
}
else
{
SetPixelRGBO(q,(n));
}
if (magn_methx == 5)
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelOpacity(q,
(QM) ((2*i*( GetPixelOpacity(n)
-GetPixelOpacity(pixels))+m)/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelOpacity(pixels)));
}
}
q++;
}
n++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
if (magn_methx != 1 || magn_methy != 1)
{
/*
Rescale pixels to Quantum
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelRed(q)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelGreen(q)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelBlue(q)));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelOpacity(q)));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#endif
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished MAGN processing");
}
}
/*
Crop_box is with respect to the upper left corner of the MNG.
*/
crop_box.left=mng_info->image_box.left+mng_info->x_off[object_id];
crop_box.right=mng_info->image_box.right+mng_info->x_off[object_id];
crop_box.top=mng_info->image_box.top+mng_info->y_off[object_id];
crop_box.bottom=mng_info->image_box.bottom+mng_info->y_off[object_id];
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->clip);
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->frame);
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->object_clip[object_id]);
if ((crop_box.left != (mng_info->image_box.left
+mng_info->x_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.right != (mng_info->image_box.right
+mng_info->x_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.top != (mng_info->image_box.top
+mng_info->y_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.bottom != (mng_info->image_box.bottom
+mng_info->y_off[object_id])))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Crop the PNG image");
if ((crop_box.left < crop_box.right) &&
(crop_box.top < crop_box.bottom))
{
Image
*im;
RectangleInfo
crop_info;
/*
Crop_info is with respect to the upper left corner of
the image.
*/
crop_info.x=(crop_box.left-mng_info->x_off[object_id]);
crop_info.y=(crop_box.top-mng_info->y_off[object_id]);
crop_info.width=(size_t) (crop_box.right-crop_box.left);
crop_info.height=(size_t) (crop_box.bottom-crop_box.top);
image->page.width=image->columns;
image->page.height=image->rows;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
im=CropImage(image,&crop_info,exception);
if (im != (Image *) NULL)
{
image->columns=im->columns;
image->rows=im->rows;
im=DestroyImage(im);
image->page.width=image->columns;
image->page.height=image->rows;
image->page.x=crop_box.left;
image->page.y=crop_box.top;
}
}
else
{
/*
No pixels in crop area. The MNG spec still requires
a layer, though, so make a single transparent pixel in
the top left corner.
*/
image->columns=1;
image->rows=1;
image->colors=2;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
image->page.width=1;
image->page.height=1;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
}
}
#ifndef PNG_READ_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED
image=mng_info->image;
#endif
}
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
/* PNG does not handle depths greater than 16 so reduce it even
* if lossy, and promote any depths > 8 to 16.
*/
if (image->depth > 16)
image->depth=16;
#endif
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 8)
if (image->depth > 8)
{
/* To do: fill low byte properly */
image->depth=16;
}
if (LosslessReduceDepthOK(image) != MagickFalse)
image->depth = 8;
#endif
GetImageException(image,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (mng_info->scenes_found >
(ssize_t) (image_info->first_scene+image_info->number_scenes))
break;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished reading image datastream.");
} while (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished reading all image datastreams.");
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (insert_layers && !mng_info->image_found && (mng_info->mng_width) &&
(mng_info->mng_height))
{
/*
Insert a background layer if nothing else was found.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No images found. Inserting a background layer.");
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Allocation failed, returning NULL.");
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
image->columns=mng_info->mng_width;
image->rows=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->matte=MagickFalse;
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image);
mng_info->image_found++;
}
#endif
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
if (mng_iterations == 1)
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
while (GetPreviousImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image_count++;
if (image_count > 10*mng_info->image_found)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," No beginning");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Linked list is corrupted, beginning of list not found",
"`%s'",image_info->filename);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
image=GetPreviousImageInList(image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Corrupt list");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Linked list is corrupted; next_image is NULL","`%s'",
image_info->filename);
}
}
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second && mng_info->image_found > 1 &&
GetNextImageInList(image) ==
(Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" First image null");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"image->next for first image is NULL but shouldn't be.",
"`%s'",image_info->filename);
}
if (mng_info->image_found == 0)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No visible images found.");
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"No visible images in file","`%s'",image_info->filename);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second)
final_delay=1UL*MagickMax(image->ticks_per_second,1L)*
final_delay/mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
/* Find final nonzero image delay */
final_image_delay=0;
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (image->delay)
final_image_delay=image->delay;
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
}
if (final_delay < final_image_delay)
final_delay=final_image_delay;
image->delay=final_delay;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->delay=%.20g, final_delay=%.20g",(double) image->delay,
(double) final_delay);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
int
scene;
scene=0;
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Before coalesce:");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene 0 delay=%.20g",(double) image->delay);
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene %.20g delay=%.20g",(double) scene++,(double) image->delay);
}
}
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
#ifdef MNG_COALESCE_LAYERS
if (insert_layers)
{
Image
*next_image,
*next;
size_t
scene;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Coalesce Images");
scene=image->scene;
next_image=CoalesceImages(image,&image->exception);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
image=DestroyImageList(image);
image=next_image;
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next_image)
{
next->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
next->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
next->page.x=0;
next->page.y=0;
next->scene=scene++;
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (next->delay == 0)
{
scene--;
next_image->previous=GetPreviousImageInList(next);
if (GetPreviousImageInList(next) == (Image *) NULL)
image=next_image;
else
next->previous->next=next_image;
next=DestroyImage(next);
}
}
}
#endif
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
image->dispose=BackgroundDispose;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
int
scene;
scene=0;
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" After coalesce:");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene 0 delay=%.20g dispose=%.20g",(double) image->delay,
(double) image->dispose);
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene %.20g delay=%.20g dispose=%.20g",(double) scene++,
(double) image->delay,(double) image->dispose);
}
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOneJNGImage();");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/550
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qtdemux_parse_udta (GstQTDemux * qtdemux, GNode * udta)
{
GNode *meta;
GNode *ilst;
GNode *node;
gint i;
meta = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (udta, FOURCC_meta);
if (meta != NULL) {
ilst = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (meta, FOURCC_ilst);
if (ilst == NULL) {
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "no ilst");
return;
}
} else {
ilst = udta;
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "no meta so using udta itself");
}
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "new tag list");
qtdemux->tag_list = gst_tag_list_new ();
for (i = 0; i < G_N_ELEMENTS (add_funcs); ++i) {
node = qtdemux_tree_get_child_by_type (ilst, add_funcs[i].fourcc);
if (node) {
add_funcs[i].func (qtdemux, add_funcs[i].gst_tag,
add_funcs[i].gst_tag_bis, node);
g_node_destroy (node);
}
}
/* parsed nodes have been removed, pass along remainder as blob */
g_node_children_foreach (ilst, G_TRAVERSE_ALL,
(GNodeForeachFunc) qtdemux_tag_add_blob, qtdemux);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline MagickBooleanType IsFloatDefined(const float value)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
float
float_value;
} quantum;
quantum.unsigned_value=0U;
quantum.float_value=value;
if (quantum.unsigned_value == 0U)
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetChannelID(gpu::CommandBufferId command_buffer_id) {
return static_cast<int>(command_buffer_id.GetUnsafeValue() >> 32);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mwifiex_uap_bss_param_prepare(u8 *tlv, void *cmd_buf, u16 *param_size)
{
struct host_cmd_tlv_dtim_period *dtim_period;
struct host_cmd_tlv_beacon_period *beacon_period;
struct host_cmd_tlv_ssid *ssid;
struct host_cmd_tlv_bcast_ssid *bcast_ssid;
struct host_cmd_tlv_channel_band *chan_band;
struct host_cmd_tlv_frag_threshold *frag_threshold;
struct host_cmd_tlv_rts_threshold *rts_threshold;
struct host_cmd_tlv_retry_limit *retry_limit;
struct host_cmd_tlv_encrypt_protocol *encrypt_protocol;
struct host_cmd_tlv_auth_type *auth_type;
struct host_cmd_tlv_rates *tlv_rates;
struct host_cmd_tlv_ageout_timer *ao_timer, *ps_ao_timer;
struct host_cmd_tlv_power_constraint *pwr_ct;
struct mwifiex_ie_types_htcap *htcap;
struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmmcap *wmm_cap;
struct mwifiex_uap_bss_param *bss_cfg = cmd_buf;
int i;
u16 cmd_size = *param_size;
if (bss_cfg->ssid.ssid_len) {
ssid = (struct host_cmd_tlv_ssid *)tlv;
ssid->header.type = cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_SSID);
ssid->header.len = cpu_to_le16((u16)bss_cfg->ssid.ssid_len);
memcpy(ssid->ssid, bss_cfg->ssid.ssid, bss_cfg->ssid.ssid_len);
cmd_size += sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header) +
bss_cfg->ssid.ssid_len;
tlv += sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header) +
bss_cfg->ssid.ssid_len;
bcast_ssid = (struct host_cmd_tlv_bcast_ssid *)tlv;
bcast_ssid->header.type = cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_BCAST_SSID);
bcast_ssid->header.len =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(bcast_ssid->bcast_ctl));
bcast_ssid->bcast_ctl = bss_cfg->bcast_ssid_ctl;
cmd_size += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_bcast_ssid);
tlv += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_bcast_ssid);
}
if (bss_cfg->rates[0]) {
tlv_rates = (struct host_cmd_tlv_rates *)tlv;
tlv_rates->header.type = cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_RATES);
for (i = 0; i < MWIFIEX_SUPPORTED_RATES && bss_cfg->rates[i];
i++)
tlv_rates->rates[i] = bss_cfg->rates[i];
tlv_rates->header.len = cpu_to_le16(i);
cmd_size += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_rates) + i;
tlv += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_rates) + i;
}
if (bss_cfg->channel &&
(((bss_cfg->band_cfg & BIT(0)) == BAND_CONFIG_BG &&
bss_cfg->channel <= MAX_CHANNEL_BAND_BG) ||
((bss_cfg->band_cfg & BIT(0)) == BAND_CONFIG_A &&
bss_cfg->channel <= MAX_CHANNEL_BAND_A))) {
chan_band = (struct host_cmd_tlv_channel_band *)tlv;
chan_band->header.type = cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_CHANNELBANDLIST);
chan_band->header.len =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_channel_band) -
sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header));
chan_band->band_config = bss_cfg->band_cfg;
chan_band->channel = bss_cfg->channel;
cmd_size += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_channel_band);
tlv += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_channel_band);
}
if (bss_cfg->beacon_period >= MIN_BEACON_PERIOD &&
bss_cfg->beacon_period <= MAX_BEACON_PERIOD) {
beacon_period = (struct host_cmd_tlv_beacon_period *)tlv;
beacon_period->header.type =
cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_BEACON_PERIOD);
beacon_period->header.len =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_beacon_period) -
sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header));
beacon_period->period = cpu_to_le16(bss_cfg->beacon_period);
cmd_size += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_beacon_period);
tlv += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_beacon_period);
}
if (bss_cfg->dtim_period >= MIN_DTIM_PERIOD &&
bss_cfg->dtim_period <= MAX_DTIM_PERIOD) {
dtim_period = (struct host_cmd_tlv_dtim_period *)tlv;
dtim_period->header.type =
cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_DTIM_PERIOD);
dtim_period->header.len =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_dtim_period) -
sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header));
dtim_period->period = bss_cfg->dtim_period;
cmd_size += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_dtim_period);
tlv += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_dtim_period);
}
if (bss_cfg->rts_threshold <= MWIFIEX_RTS_MAX_VALUE) {
rts_threshold = (struct host_cmd_tlv_rts_threshold *)tlv;
rts_threshold->header.type =
cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_RTS_THRESHOLD);
rts_threshold->header.len =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_rts_threshold) -
sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header));
rts_threshold->rts_thr = cpu_to_le16(bss_cfg->rts_threshold);
cmd_size += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_frag_threshold);
tlv += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_frag_threshold);
}
if ((bss_cfg->frag_threshold >= MWIFIEX_FRAG_MIN_VALUE) &&
(bss_cfg->frag_threshold <= MWIFIEX_FRAG_MAX_VALUE)) {
frag_threshold = (struct host_cmd_tlv_frag_threshold *)tlv;
frag_threshold->header.type =
cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_FRAG_THRESHOLD);
frag_threshold->header.len =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_frag_threshold) -
sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header));
frag_threshold->frag_thr = cpu_to_le16(bss_cfg->frag_threshold);
cmd_size += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_frag_threshold);
tlv += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_frag_threshold);
}
if (bss_cfg->retry_limit <= MWIFIEX_RETRY_LIMIT) {
retry_limit = (struct host_cmd_tlv_retry_limit *)tlv;
retry_limit->header.type =
cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_RETRY_LIMIT);
retry_limit->header.len =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_retry_limit) -
sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header));
retry_limit->limit = (u8)bss_cfg->retry_limit;
cmd_size += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_retry_limit);
tlv += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_retry_limit);
}
if ((bss_cfg->protocol & PROTOCOL_WPA) ||
(bss_cfg->protocol & PROTOCOL_WPA2) ||
(bss_cfg->protocol & PROTOCOL_EAP))
mwifiex_uap_bss_wpa(&tlv, cmd_buf, &cmd_size);
else
mwifiex_uap_bss_wep(&tlv, cmd_buf, &cmd_size);
if ((bss_cfg->auth_mode <= WLAN_AUTH_SHARED_KEY) ||
(bss_cfg->auth_mode == MWIFIEX_AUTH_MODE_AUTO)) {
auth_type = (struct host_cmd_tlv_auth_type *)tlv;
auth_type->header.type = cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_AUTH_TYPE);
auth_type->header.len =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_auth_type) -
sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header));
auth_type->auth_type = (u8)bss_cfg->auth_mode;
cmd_size += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_auth_type);
tlv += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_auth_type);
}
if (bss_cfg->protocol) {
encrypt_protocol = (struct host_cmd_tlv_encrypt_protocol *)tlv;
encrypt_protocol->header.type =
cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_ENCRY_PROTOCOL);
encrypt_protocol->header.len =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_encrypt_protocol)
- sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header));
encrypt_protocol->proto = cpu_to_le16(bss_cfg->protocol);
cmd_size += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_encrypt_protocol);
tlv += sizeof(struct host_cmd_tlv_encrypt_protocol);
}
if (bss_cfg->ht_cap.cap_info) {
htcap = (struct mwifiex_ie_types_htcap *)tlv;
htcap->header.type = cpu_to_le16(WLAN_EID_HT_CAPABILITY);
htcap->header.len =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct ieee80211_ht_cap));
htcap->ht_cap.cap_info = bss_cfg->ht_cap.cap_info;
htcap->ht_cap.ampdu_params_info =
bss_cfg->ht_cap.ampdu_params_info;
memcpy(&htcap->ht_cap.mcs, &bss_cfg->ht_cap.mcs,
sizeof(struct ieee80211_mcs_info));
htcap->ht_cap.extended_ht_cap_info =
bss_cfg->ht_cap.extended_ht_cap_info;
htcap->ht_cap.tx_BF_cap_info = bss_cfg->ht_cap.tx_BF_cap_info;
htcap->ht_cap.antenna_selection_info =
bss_cfg->ht_cap.antenna_selection_info;
cmd_size += sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_htcap);
tlv += sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_htcap);
}
if (bss_cfg->wmm_info.qos_info != 0xFF) {
wmm_cap = (struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmmcap *)tlv;
wmm_cap->header.type = cpu_to_le16(WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC);
wmm_cap->header.len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(wmm_cap->wmm_info));
memcpy(&wmm_cap->wmm_info, &bss_cfg->wmm_info,
sizeof(wmm_cap->wmm_info));
cmd_size += sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmmcap);
tlv += sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_wmmcap);
}
if (bss_cfg->sta_ao_timer) {
ao_timer = (struct host_cmd_tlv_ageout_timer *)tlv;
ao_timer->header.type = cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_AO_TIMER);
ao_timer->header.len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(*ao_timer) -
sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header));
ao_timer->sta_ao_timer = cpu_to_le32(bss_cfg->sta_ao_timer);
cmd_size += sizeof(*ao_timer);
tlv += sizeof(*ao_timer);
}
if (bss_cfg->power_constraint) {
pwr_ct = (void *)tlv;
pwr_ct->header.type = cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_PWR_CONSTRAINT);
pwr_ct->header.len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(u8));
pwr_ct->constraint = bss_cfg->power_constraint;
cmd_size += sizeof(*pwr_ct);
tlv += sizeof(*pwr_ct);
}
if (bss_cfg->ps_sta_ao_timer) {
ps_ao_timer = (struct host_cmd_tlv_ageout_timer *)tlv;
ps_ao_timer->header.type =
cpu_to_le16(TLV_TYPE_UAP_PS_AO_TIMER);
ps_ao_timer->header.len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(*ps_ao_timer) -
sizeof(struct mwifiex_ie_types_header));
ps_ao_timer->sta_ao_timer =
cpu_to_le32(bss_cfg->ps_sta_ao_timer);
cmd_size += sizeof(*ps_ao_timer);
tlv += sizeof(*ps_ao_timer);
}
*param_size = cmd_size;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-120 | 0 | 88,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::Close() {
frame_->Close();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __vma_adjust_trans_huge(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long start,
unsigned long end,
long adjust_next)
{
/*
* If the new start address isn't hpage aligned and it could
* previously contain an hugepage: check if we need to split
* an huge pmd.
*/
if (start & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK &&
(start & HPAGE_PMD_MASK) >= vma->vm_start &&
(start & HPAGE_PMD_MASK) + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE <= vma->vm_end)
split_huge_page_address(vma->vm_mm, start);
/*
* If the new end address isn't hpage aligned and it could
* previously contain an hugepage: check if we need to split
* an huge pmd.
*/
if (end & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK &&
(end & HPAGE_PMD_MASK) >= vma->vm_start &&
(end & HPAGE_PMD_MASK) + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE <= vma->vm_end)
split_huge_page_address(vma->vm_mm, end);
/*
* If we're also updating the vma->vm_next->vm_start, if the new
* vm_next->vm_start isn't page aligned and it could previously
* contain an hugepage: check if we need to split an huge pmd.
*/
if (adjust_next > 0) {
struct vm_area_struct *next = vma->vm_next;
unsigned long nstart = next->vm_start;
nstart += adjust_next << PAGE_SHIFT;
if (nstart & ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK &&
(nstart & HPAGE_PMD_MASK) >= next->vm_start &&
(nstart & HPAGE_PMD_MASK) + HPAGE_PMD_SIZE <= next->vm_end)
split_huge_page_address(next->vm_mm, nstart);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid::OnFindResultAvailable(
WebContents* web_contents,
const FindNotificationDetails* find_result) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> obj = GetJavaDelegate(env);
if (obj.is_null())
return;
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> selection_rect = CreateJavaRect(
env, find_result->selection_rect());
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> details_object =
Java_ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid_createFindNotificationDetails(
env,
find_result->number_of_matches(),
selection_rect.obj(),
find_result->active_match_ordinal(),
find_result->final_update());
Java_ChromeWebContentsDelegateAndroid_onFindResultAvailable(
env,
obj.obj(),
details_object.obj());
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MYSQLND_METHOD(mysqlnd_conn_data, restart_psession)(MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * conn TSRMLS_DC)
{
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_conn_data::restart_psession");
MYSQLND_INC_CONN_STATISTIC(conn->stats, STAT_CONNECT_REUSED);
/* Free here what should not be seen by the next script */
if (conn->last_message) {
mnd_pefree(conn->last_message, conn->persistent);
conn->last_message = NULL;
}
DBG_RETURN(PASS);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 14,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool isStretchingColumnFlexItem(const RenderObject* flexitem)
{
RenderObject* parent = flexitem->parent();
if (parent->isDeprecatedFlexibleBox() && parent->style()->boxOrient() == VERTICAL && parent->style()->boxAlign() == BSTRETCH)
return true;
if (parent->isFlexibleBox() && parent->style()->flexWrap() == FlexNoWrap && parent->style()->isColumnFlexDirection() && columnFlexItemHasStretchAlignment(flexitem))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int AppLayerProtoDetectTest01(void)
{
AppLayerProtoDetectUnittestCtxBackup();
AppLayerProtoDetectSetup();
const char *buf;
int r = 0;
buf = "HTTP";
AppLayerProtoDetectPMRegisterPatternCS(IPPROTO_TCP, ALPROTO_HTTP, buf, 4, 0, STREAM_TOCLIENT);
buf = "GET";
AppLayerProtoDetectPMRegisterPatternCS(IPPROTO_TCP, ALPROTO_HTTP, buf, 4, 0, STREAM_TOSERVER);
AppLayerProtoDetectPrepareState();
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].max_pat_id != 1) {
printf("Failure - "
"alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].max_pat_id != 1\n");
goto end;
}
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[1].max_pat_id != 1) {
printf("Failure - "
"alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[1].max_pat_id != 1\n");
goto end;
}
r = 1;
end:
AppLayerProtoDetectDeSetup();
AppLayerProtoDetectUnittestCtxRestore();
return r;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PromoResourceService::Unpack(const DictionaryValue& parsed_json) {
NotificationPromo notification_promo(profile_);
notification_promo.InitFromJson(parsed_json);
if (notification_promo.new_notification()) {
ScheduleNotification(notification_promo.StartTimeForGroup(),
notification_promo.EndTime());
}
}
Commit Message: Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched
The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormControlElement::setNeedsWillValidateCheck()
{
bool newWillValidate = recalcWillValidate();
if (m_willValidateInitialized && m_willValidate == newWillValidate)
return;
m_willValidateInitialized = true;
m_willValidate = newWillValidate;
setNeedsValidityCheck();
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
if (!m_willValidate)
hideVisibleValidationMessage();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderClientCallback (CallbackListPtr *list,
pointer closure,
pointer data)
{
NewClientInfoRec *clientinfo = (NewClientInfoRec *) data;
ClientPtr pClient = clientinfo->client;
RenderClientPtr pRenderClient = GetRenderClient (pClient);
pRenderClient->major_version = 0;
pRenderClient->minor_version = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::ClearMainResourceHandle() {
if (!main_resource_)
return;
main_resource_->RemoveClient(this);
main_resource_ = nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::PageSizeAndMarginsInPixels(int page_index,
WebDoubleSize& page_size,
int& margin_top,
int& margin_right,
int& margin_bottom,
int& margin_left) {
DoubleSize size = page_size;
GetFrame()->GetDocument()->PageSizeAndMarginsInPixels(
page_index, size, margin_top, margin_right, margin_bottom, margin_left);
page_size = size;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct page **__iommu_alloc_buffer(struct device *dev, size_t size,
gfp_t gfp, struct dma_attrs *attrs)
{
struct page **pages;
int count = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int array_size = count * sizeof(struct page *);
int i = 0;
if (array_size <= PAGE_SIZE)
pages = kzalloc(array_size, gfp);
else
pages = vzalloc(array_size);
if (!pages)
return NULL;
if (dma_get_attr(DMA_ATTR_FORCE_CONTIGUOUS, attrs))
{
unsigned long order = get_order(size);
struct page *page;
page = dma_alloc_from_contiguous(dev, count, order);
if (!page)
goto error;
__dma_clear_buffer(page, size);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
pages[i] = page + i;
return pages;
}
/*
* IOMMU can map any pages, so himem can also be used here
*/
gfp |= __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_HIGHMEM;
while (count) {
int j, order = __fls(count);
pages[i] = alloc_pages(gfp, order);
while (!pages[i] && order)
pages[i] = alloc_pages(gfp, --order);
if (!pages[i])
goto error;
if (order) {
split_page(pages[i], order);
j = 1 << order;
while (--j)
pages[i + j] = pages[i] + j;
}
__dma_clear_buffer(pages[i], PAGE_SIZE << order);
i += 1 << order;
count -= 1 << order;
}
return pages;
error:
while (i--)
if (pages[i])
__free_pages(pages[i], 0);
if (array_size <= PAGE_SIZE)
kfree(pages);
else
vfree(pages);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::UpdateCommandsForBookmarkBar() {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
const bool show_main_ui = is_type_tabbed() &&
(!window_ || !window_->IsFullscreen());
#else
const bool show_main_ui = is_type_tabbed();
#endif
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_SHOW_BOOKMARK_BAR,
browser_defaults::bookmarks_enabled &&
!profile_->GetPrefs()->IsManagedPreference(prefs::kEnableBookmarkBar) &&
show_main_ui);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebGLRenderingContextBase::ClearIfComposited(GLbitfield mask) {
if (isContextLost())
return kSkipped;
GLbitfield buffers_needing_clearing =
GetDrawingBuffer()->GetBuffersToAutoClear();
if (buffers_needing_clearing == 0 || (mask && framebuffer_binding_))
return kSkipped;
base::Optional<WebGLContextAttributes> context_attributes;
getContextAttributes(context_attributes);
if (!context_attributes) {
return kSkipped;
}
bool combined_clear = mask && !scissor_enabled_;
ContextGL()->Disable(GL_SCISSOR_TEST);
if (combined_clear && (mask & GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT)) {
ContextGL()->ClearColor(color_mask_[0] ? clear_color_[0] : 0,
color_mask_[1] ? clear_color_[1] : 0,
color_mask_[2] ? clear_color_[2] : 0,
color_mask_[3] ? clear_color_[3] : 0);
} else {
ContextGL()->ClearColor(0, 0, 0, 0);
}
ContextGL()->ColorMask(
true, true, true,
!GetDrawingBuffer()->RequiresAlphaChannelToBePreserved());
GLbitfield clear_mask = GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT;
if (context_attributes->depth()) {
if (!combined_clear || !depth_mask_ || !(mask & GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT))
ContextGL()->ClearDepthf(1.0f);
clear_mask |= GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT;
ContextGL()->DepthMask(true);
}
if (context_attributes->stencil() ||
GetDrawingBuffer()->HasImplicitStencilBuffer()) {
if (combined_clear && (mask & GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT))
ContextGL()->ClearStencil(clear_stencil_ & stencil_mask_);
else
ContextGL()->ClearStencil(0);
clear_mask |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
ContextGL()->StencilMaskSeparate(GL_FRONT, 0xFFFFFFFF);
}
ContextGL()->ColorMask(
true, true, true,
!GetDrawingBuffer()->DefaultBufferRequiresAlphaChannelToBePreserved());
GetDrawingBuffer()->ClearFramebuffers(clear_mask & buffers_needing_clearing);
DrawingBufferClientRestoreScissorTest();
DrawingBufferClientRestoreMaskAndClearValues();
GetDrawingBuffer()->SetBuffersToAutoClear(0);
return combined_clear ? kCombinedClear : kJustClear;
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 153,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int lxc_attach_run_command(void* payload)
{
lxc_attach_command_t* cmd = (lxc_attach_command_t*)payload;
execvp(cmd->program, cmd->argv);
SYSERROR("failed to exec '%s'", cmd->program);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1334: Don't use the container's /proc during attach
A user could otherwise over-mount /proc and prevent the apparmor profile
or selinux label from being written which combined with a modified
/bin/sh or other commonly used binary would lead to unconfined code
execution.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::TreatNullAsEmptyStringStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_treatNullAsEmptyStringStringAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::TreatNullAsEmptyStringStringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip_mc_config(struct sock *sk, bool join, const struct in_ifaddr *ifa)
{
struct ip_mreqn mreq = {
.imr_multiaddr.s_addr = ifa->ifa_address,
.imr_ifindex = ifa->ifa_dev->dev->ifindex,
};
int ret;
ASSERT_RTNL();
lock_sock(sk);
if (join)
ret = ip_mc_join_group(sk, &mreq);
else
ret = ip_mc_leave_group(sk, &mreq);
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 54,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u16 rtnl_calcit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct net_device *dev;
struct nlattr *tb[IFLA_MAX+1];
u32 ext_filter_mask = 0;
u16 min_ifinfo_dump_size = 0;
int hdrlen;
/* Same kernel<->userspace interface hack as in rtnl_dump_ifinfo. */
hdrlen = nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(struct ifinfomsg) ?
sizeof(struct rtgenmsg) : sizeof(struct ifinfomsg);
if (nlmsg_parse(nlh, hdrlen, tb, IFLA_MAX, ifla_policy) >= 0) {
if (tb[IFLA_EXT_MASK])
ext_filter_mask = nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_EXT_MASK]);
}
if (!ext_filter_mask)
return NLMSG_GOODSIZE;
/*
* traverse the list of net devices and compute the minimum
* buffer size based upon the filter mask.
*/
list_for_each_entry(dev, &net->dev_base_head, dev_list) {
min_ifinfo_dump_size = max_t(u16, min_ifinfo_dump_size,
if_nlmsg_size(dev,
ext_filter_mask));
}
return min_ifinfo_dump_size;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TopSitesImpl::num_results_to_request_from_history() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
const base::DictionaryValue* blacklist =
pref_service_->GetDictionary(kMostVisitedURLsBlacklist);
return kNonForcedTopSitesNumber + (blacklist ? blacklist->size() : 0);
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 147,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_proc_access(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_access_entry *entry)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(inode),
_nfs4_proc_access(inode, entry),
&exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ttfFont__destroy(ttfFont *self, gs_font_dir *dir)
{
gs_memory_t *mem = dir->memory->stable_memory;
ttfFont__finit(self);
gs_free_object(mem, self, "ttfFont__destroy");
ttfInterpreter__release(&dir->tti);
gx_san__release(&dir->san);
if (dir->tti == NULL && dir->ttm != NULL) {
gs_free_object(mem, dir->ttm, "ttfFont__destroy(gx_ttfMemory)");
dir->ttm = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
/* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_chunkhdr_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
/* Although we do have an association in this case, it corresponds
* to a restarted association. So the packet is treated as an OOTB
* packet and the state function that handles OOTB SHUTDOWN_ACK is
* called with a NULL association.
*/
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES);
return sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(net, ep, NULL, type, arg, commands);
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t aio_setup_iocb(struct kiocb *kiocb, bool compat)
{
struct file *file = kiocb->ki_filp;
ssize_t ret = 0;
switch (kiocb->ki_opcode) {
case IOCB_CMD_PREAD:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)))
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_left)))
break;
ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_READ);
if (unlikely(ret))
break;
ret = aio_setup_single_vector(kiocb);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_read)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITE:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
break;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, kiocb->ki_buf,
kiocb->ki_left)))
break;
ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret))
break;
ret = aio_setup_single_vector(kiocb);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_write)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_PREADV:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)))
break;
ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_READ);
if (unlikely(ret))
break;
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(READ, kiocb, compat);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_read)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV:
ret = -EBADF;
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)))
break;
ret = security_file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret))
break;
ret = aio_setup_vectored_rw(WRITE, kiocb, compat);
if (ret)
break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_write)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_rw_vect_retry;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FDSYNC:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_fsync)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_fdsync;
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FSYNC:
ret = -EINVAL;
if (file->f_op->aio_fsync)
kiocb->ki_retry = aio_fsync;
break;
default:
dprintk("EINVAL: io_submit: no operation provided\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
if (!kiocb->ki_retry)
return ret;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: make AIO use the proper rw_verify_area() area helpers
We had for some reason overlooked the AIO interface, and it didn't use
the proper rw_verify_area() helper function that checks (for example)
mandatory locking on the file, and that the size of the access doesn't
cause us to overflow the provided offset limits etc.
Instead, AIO did just the security_file_permission() thing (that
rw_verify_area() also does) directly.
This fixes it to do all the proper helper functions, which not only
means that now mandatory file locking works with AIO too, we can
actually remove lines of code.
Reported-by: Manish Honap <manish_honap_vit@yahoo.co.in>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 1 | 167,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(recv, int, fd, void __user *, ubuf, size_t, size,
unsigned int, flags)
{
return __sys_recvfrom(fd, ubuf, size, flags, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 82,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void n_tty_receive_overrun(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
ldata->num_overrun++;
if (time_after(jiffies, ldata->overrun_time + HZ) ||
time_after(ldata->overrun_time, jiffies)) {
tty_warn(tty, "%d input overrun(s)\n", ldata->num_overrun);
ldata->overrun_time = jiffies;
ldata->num_overrun = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 76,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::cream_job_status_all(const char *service,
GahpClient::CreamJobStatusMap & results)
{
static const char* command = "CREAM_JOB_STATUS";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
std::string reqline;
char *esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service) );
int job_number = 0; // "all"
int x = sprintf(reqline, "%s %d", esc1, job_number);
ASSERT( x > 0 );
free( esc1 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy,high_prio);
}
const int FIRST_RESULT = 3; // Field 3 (0 indexed) is the first
const int RECORD_FIELDS = 4; // How many fields in a record?
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
int num_results = 0;
if (result->argc > 2) {
num_results = atoi(result->argv[2]);
if( result->argc != FIRST_RESULT + num_results * RECORD_FIELDS) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
}
else if (result->argc != 2) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc;
if (strcmp(result->argv[1], NULLSTRING) == 0) {
rc = 0;
} else {
rc = 1;
error_string = result->argv[1];
}
if ( rc == 0 ) {
for(int i = 0; i < num_results; i++) {
CreamJobStatus status;
int offset = FIRST_RESULT + i * RECORD_FIELDS;
status.job_id = result->argv[offset + 0];
status.job_status = result->argv[offset + 1];
status.exit_code = atoi(result->argv[offset + 2]);
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[offset + 3], NULLSTRING) ) {
status.failure_reason = result->argv[offset + 3];
}
results[status.job_id] = status;
}
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int patternvalidate(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, ref *space, float *values, int num_comps)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
check_op(1);
if (!r_has_type(op, t_dictionary) && !r_has_type(op, t_null))
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Browser::UseVerticalTabs() const {
return use_vertical_tabs_.GetValue();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int read_header(struct pstore *ps, int *new_snapshot)
{
int r;
struct disk_header *dh;
unsigned chunk_size;
int chunk_size_supplied = 1;
char *chunk_err;
/*
* Use default chunk size (or logical_block_size, if larger)
* if none supplied
*/
if (!ps->store->chunk_size) {
ps->store->chunk_size = max(DM_CHUNK_SIZE_DEFAULT_SECTORS,
bdev_logical_block_size(dm_snap_cow(ps->store->snap)->
bdev) >> 9);
ps->store->chunk_mask = ps->store->chunk_size - 1;
ps->store->chunk_shift = ffs(ps->store->chunk_size) - 1;
chunk_size_supplied = 0;
}
ps->io_client = dm_io_client_create();
if (IS_ERR(ps->io_client))
return PTR_ERR(ps->io_client);
r = alloc_area(ps);
if (r)
return r;
r = chunk_io(ps, ps->header_area, 0, READ, 1);
if (r)
goto bad;
dh = ps->header_area;
if (le32_to_cpu(dh->magic) == 0) {
*new_snapshot = 1;
return 0;
}
if (le32_to_cpu(dh->magic) != SNAP_MAGIC) {
DMWARN("Invalid or corrupt snapshot");
r = -ENXIO;
goto bad;
}
*new_snapshot = 0;
ps->valid = le32_to_cpu(dh->valid);
ps->version = le32_to_cpu(dh->version);
chunk_size = le32_to_cpu(dh->chunk_size);
if (ps->store->chunk_size == chunk_size)
return 0;
if (chunk_size_supplied)
DMWARN("chunk size %u in device metadata overrides "
"table chunk size of %u.",
chunk_size, ps->store->chunk_size);
/* We had a bogus chunk_size. Fix stuff up. */
free_area(ps);
r = dm_exception_store_set_chunk_size(ps->store, chunk_size,
&chunk_err);
if (r) {
DMERR("invalid on-disk chunk size %u: %s.",
chunk_size, chunk_err);
return r;
}
r = alloc_area(ps);
return r;
bad:
free_area(ps);
return r;
}
Commit Message: dm snapshot: fix data corruption
This patch fixes a particular type of data corruption that has been
encountered when loading a snapshot's metadata from disk.
When we allocate a new chunk in persistent_prepare, we increment
ps->next_free and we make sure that it doesn't point to a metadata area
by further incrementing it if necessary.
When we load metadata from disk on device activation, ps->next_free is
positioned after the last used data chunk. However, if this last used
data chunk is followed by a metadata area, ps->next_free is positioned
erroneously to the metadata area. A newly-allocated chunk is placed at
the same location as the metadata area, resulting in data or metadata
corruption.
This patch changes the code so that ps->next_free skips the metadata
area when metadata are loaded in function read_exceptions.
The patch also moves a piece of code from persistent_prepare_exception
to a separate function skip_metadata to avoid code duplication.
CVE-2013-4299
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Resource::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(loader_);
visitor->Trace(cache_handler_);
visitor->Trace(clients_);
visitor->Trace(clients_awaiting_callback_);
visitor->Trace(finished_clients_);
visitor->Trace(finish_observers_);
MemoryCoordinatorClient::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vp8_read_mv_component(VP56RangeCoder *c, const uint8_t *p)
{
return read_mv_component(c, p, 0);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 64,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: krb5_gss_inquire_attrs_for_mech(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_const_OID mech,
gss_OID_set *mech_attrs,
gss_OID_set *known_mech_attrs)
{
OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
if (mech_attrs == NULL) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
major = gss_create_empty_oid_set(minor_status, mech_attrs);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
#define MA_SUPPORTED(ma) do { \
major = gss_add_oid_set_member(minor_status, (gss_OID)ma, \
mech_attrs); \
if (GSS_ERROR(major)) \
goto cleanup; \
} while (0)
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_MECH_CONCRETE);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_ITOK_FRAMED);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_AUTH_INIT);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_AUTH_TARG);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_DELEG_CRED);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_INTEG_PROT);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_CONF_PROT);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_MIC);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_WRAP);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_PROT_READY);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_REPLAY_DET);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_OOS_DET);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_CBINDINGS);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_CTX_TRANS);
if (g_OID_equal(mech, gss_mech_iakerb)) {
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_AUTH_INIT_INIT);
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_NOT_DFLT_MECH);
} else if (!g_OID_equal(mech, gss_mech_krb5)) {
MA_SUPPORTED(GSS_C_MA_DEPRECATED);
}
cleanup:
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
gss_release_oid_set(&tmpMinor, mech_attrs);
return major;
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698]
The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly
added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could
cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly
dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it.
Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context()
function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context
would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB
contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment.
CVE-2015-2698:
In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an
application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory
corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism.
Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated
into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be
tailored to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8273 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect TestRenderWidgetHostView::GetBoundsInRootWindow() {
return gfx::Rect();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::DataReceivedACK(int child_id,
int request_id) {
PendingRequestList::iterator i = pending_requests_.find(
GlobalRequestID(child_id, request_id));
if (i == pending_requests_.end())
return;
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info =
ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(i->second);
info->DecrementPendingDataCount();
if (info->pending_data_count() == kMaxPendingDataMessages) {
info->DecrementPendingDataCount();
PauseRequest(child_id, request_id, false);
}
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DoCanonicalizePathComponent(const CHAR* source,
const Component& component,
char separator,
CanonOutput* output,
Component* new_component) {
bool success = true;
if (component.is_valid()) {
if (separator)
output->push_back(separator);
new_component->begin = output->length();
int end = component.end();
for (int i = component.begin; i < end; i++) {
UCHAR uch = static_cast<UCHAR>(source[i]);
if (uch < 0x20 || uch >= 0x80)
success &= AppendUTF8EscapedChar(source, &i, end, output);
else
output->push_back(static_cast<char>(uch));
}
new_component->len = output->length() - new_component->begin;
} else {
new_component->reset();
}
return success;
}
Commit Message: [url] Make path URL parsing more lax
Parsing the path component of a non-special URL like javascript or data
should not fail for invalid URL characters like \uFFFF. See this bit
in the spec:
https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#cannot-be-a-base-url-path-state
Note: some failing WPTs are added which are because url parsing
replaces invalid characters (e.g. \uFFFF) with the replacement char
\uFFFD, when that isn't in the spec.
Bug: 925614
Change-Id: I450495bfdfa68dc70334ebed16a3ecc0d5737e88
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1551917
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Harrison <csharrison@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#648155}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameSelection::ClearDocumentCachedRange() {
selection_editor_->ClearDocumentCachedRange();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,751 |
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