instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::DisplayPrintJobError() {
WebView* web_view = print_web_view_;
if (!web_view)
web_view = render_view()->webview();
render_view()->runModalAlertDialog(
web_view->mainFrame(),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_PRINT_SPOOL_FAILED_ERROR_TEXT));
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AwWebPreferencesPopulater* AwMainDelegate::CreateWebPreferencesPopulater() {
return new AwWebPreferencesPopulaterImpl();
}
Commit Message: [Android WebView] Fix a couple of typos
Fix a couple of typos in variable names/commentary introduced in:
https://codereview.chromium.org/1315633003/
No functional effect.
BUG=156062
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1331943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#348175}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int adev_open(const hw_module_t* module, const char* name,
hw_device_t** device)
{
struct a2dp_audio_device *adev;
int ret;
INFO(" adev_open in A2dp_hw module");
FNLOG();
if (strcmp(name, AUDIO_HARDWARE_INTERFACE) != 0)
{
ERROR("interface %s not matching [%s]", name, AUDIO_HARDWARE_INTERFACE);
return -EINVAL;
}
adev = calloc(1, sizeof(struct a2dp_audio_device));
if (!adev)
return -ENOMEM;
adev->device.common.tag = HARDWARE_DEVICE_TAG;
adev->device.common.version = AUDIO_DEVICE_API_VERSION_2_0;
adev->device.common.module = (struct hw_module_t *) module;
adev->device.common.close = adev_close;
adev->device.init_check = adev_init_check;
adev->device.set_voice_volume = adev_set_voice_volume;
adev->device.set_master_volume = adev_set_master_volume;
adev->device.set_mode = adev_set_mode;
adev->device.set_mic_mute = adev_set_mic_mute;
adev->device.get_mic_mute = adev_get_mic_mute;
adev->device.set_parameters = adev_set_parameters;
adev->device.get_parameters = adev_get_parameters;
adev->device.get_input_buffer_size = adev_get_input_buffer_size;
adev->device.open_output_stream = adev_open_output_stream;
adev->device.close_output_stream = adev_close_output_stream;
adev->device.open_input_stream = adev_open_input_stream;
adev->device.close_input_stream = adev_close_input_stream;
adev->device.dump = adev_dump;
adev->output = NULL;
*device = &adev->device.common;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjDoubleSequenceAttr(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSValue result = jsArray(exec, castedThis->globalObject(), impl->doubleSequenceAttr());
return result;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ComputeWebKitPrintParamsInDesiredDpi(
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params,
WebPrintParams* webkit_print_params) {
int dpi = GetDPI(&print_params);
webkit_print_params->printerDPI = dpi;
webkit_print_params->printScalingOption = print_params.print_scaling_option;
webkit_print_params->printContentArea.width =
ConvertUnit(print_params.content_size.width(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->printContentArea.height =
ConvertUnit(print_params.content_size.height(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->printableArea.x =
ConvertUnit(print_params.printable_area.x(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->printableArea.y =
ConvertUnit(print_params.printable_area.y(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->printableArea.width =
ConvertUnit(print_params.printable_area.width(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->printableArea.height =
ConvertUnit(print_params.printable_area.height(),
dpi, print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->paperSize.width =
ConvertUnit(print_params.page_size.width(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
webkit_print_params->paperSize.height =
ConvertUnit(print_params.page_size.height(), dpi,
print_params.desired_dpi);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int MagickDLLCall PDFDelegateMessage(void *handle,const char *message,
int length)
{
char
**messages;
ssize_t
offset;
offset=0;
messages=(char **) handle;
if (*messages == (char *) NULL)
*messages=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+1,sizeof(char *));
else
{
offset=strlen(*messages);
*messages=(char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(*messages,offset+length+1,
sizeof(char *));
}
(void) memcpy(*messages+offset,message,length);
(*messages)[length+offset] ='\0';
return(length);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/576
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType CorrectPSDAlphaBlend(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image,ExceptionInfo* exception)
{
const char
*option;
MagickBooleanType
status;
ssize_t
y;
if (image->alpha_trait != BlendPixelTrait || image->colorspace != sRGBColorspace)
return(MagickTrue);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"psd:alpha-unblend");
if (IsStringFalse(option) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
status=MagickTrue;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
gamma;
register ssize_t
i;
gamma=QuantumScale*GetPixelAlpha(image, q);
if (gamma != 0.0 && gamma != 1.0)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
if (channel != AlphaPixelChannel)
q[i]=ClampToQuantum((q[i]-((1.0-gamma)*QuantumRange))/gamma);
}
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Slightly different fix for #714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 95,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enforce_filters(void) {
arg_nonewprivs = 1;
force_nonewprivs = 1;
fmessage("\n** Warning: dropping all Linux capabilities **\n");
arg_caps_drop_all = 1;
arg_nogroups = 1;
}
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 89,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int git_smart__push(git_transport *transport, git_push *push, const git_remote_callbacks *cbs)
{
transport_smart *t = (transport_smart *)transport;
struct push_packbuilder_payload packbuilder_payload = {0};
git_buf pktline = GIT_BUF_INIT;
int error = 0, need_pack = 0;
push_spec *spec;
unsigned int i;
packbuilder_payload.pb = push->pb;
if (cbs && cbs->push_transfer_progress) {
packbuilder_payload.cb = cbs->push_transfer_progress;
packbuilder_payload.cb_payload = cbs->payload;
}
#ifdef PUSH_DEBUG
{
git_remote_head *head;
char hex[GIT_OID_HEXSZ+1]; hex[GIT_OID_HEXSZ] = '\0';
git_vector_foreach(&push->remote->refs, i, head) {
git_oid_fmt(hex, &head->oid);
fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s)\n", hex, head->name);
}
git_vector_foreach(&push->specs, i, spec) {
git_oid_fmt(hex, &spec->roid);
fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s) -> ", hex, spec->lref);
git_oid_fmt(hex, &spec->loid);
fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s)\n", hex, spec->rref ?
spec->rref : spec->lref);
}
}
#endif
/*
* Figure out if we need to send a packfile; which is in all
* cases except when we only send delete commands
*/
git_vector_foreach(&push->specs, i, spec) {
if (spec->refspec.src && spec->refspec.src[0] != '\0') {
need_pack = 1;
break;
}
}
if ((error = git_smart__get_push_stream(t, &packbuilder_payload.stream)) < 0 ||
(error = gen_pktline(&pktline, push)) < 0 ||
(error = packbuilder_payload.stream->write(packbuilder_payload.stream, git_buf_cstr(&pktline), git_buf_len(&pktline))) < 0)
goto done;
if (need_pack &&
(error = git_packbuilder_foreach(push->pb, &stream_thunk, &packbuilder_payload)) < 0)
goto done;
/* If we sent nothing or the server doesn't support report-status, then
* we consider the pack to have been unpacked successfully */
if (!push->specs.length || !push->report_status)
push->unpack_ok = 1;
else if ((error = parse_report(t, push)) < 0)
goto done;
/* If progress is being reported write the final report */
if (cbs && cbs->push_transfer_progress) {
error = cbs->push_transfer_progress(
push->pb->nr_written,
push->pb->nr_objects,
packbuilder_payload.last_bytes,
cbs->payload);
if (error < 0)
goto done;
}
if (push->status.length) {
error = update_refs_from_report(&t->refs, &push->specs, &push->status);
if (error < 0)
goto done;
error = git_smart__update_heads(t, NULL);
}
done:
git_buf_free(&pktline);
return error;
}
Commit Message: smart_pkt: treat empty packet lines as error
The Git protocol does not specify what should happen in the case
of an empty packet line (that is a packet line "0004"). We
currently indicate success, but do not return a packet in the
case where we hit an empty line. The smart protocol was not
prepared to handle such packets in all cases, though, resulting
in a `NULL` pointer dereference.
Fix the issue by returning an error instead. As such kind of
packets is not even specified by upstream, this is the right
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 71,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int free_swap_and_cache(swp_entry_t entry)
{
struct swap_info_struct *p;
struct page *page = NULL;
if (non_swap_entry(entry))
return 1;
p = swap_info_get(entry);
if (p) {
if (swap_entry_free(p, entry, 1) == SWAP_HAS_CACHE) {
page = find_get_page(&swapper_space, entry.val);
if (page && !trylock_page(page)) {
page_cache_release(page);
page = NULL;
}
}
spin_unlock(&swap_lock);
}
if (page) {
/*
* Not mapped elsewhere, or swap space full? Free it!
* Also recheck PageSwapCache now page is locked (above).
*/
if (PageSwapCache(page) && !PageWriteback(page) &&
(!page_mapped(page) || vm_swap_full())) {
delete_from_swap_cache(page);
SetPageDirty(page);
}
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
}
return p != NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dput(struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(!dentry))
return;
repeat:
rcu_read_lock();
if (likely(fast_dput(dentry))) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
/* Slow case: now with the dentry lock held */
rcu_read_unlock();
/* Unreachable? Get rid of it */
if (unlikely(d_unhashed(dentry)))
goto kill_it;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_DISCONNECTED))
goto kill_it;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_DELETE)) {
if (dentry->d_op->d_delete(dentry))
goto kill_it;
}
if (!(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_REFERENCED))
dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_REFERENCED;
dentry_lru_add(dentry);
dentry->d_lockref.count--;
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
return;
kill_it:
dentry = dentry_kill(dentry);
if (dentry)
goto repeat;
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 94,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cpu_util(double pcpu[3])
{
static struct timeval last;
static clock_t clast;
static struct rusage rlast;
struct timeval temp;
clock_t ctemp;
struct rusage rtemp;
double timediff;
double userdiff;
double systemdiff;
if (pcpu == NULL) {
gettimeofday(&last, NULL);
clast = clock();
getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rlast);
return;
}
gettimeofday(&temp, NULL);
ctemp = clock();
getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rtemp);
timediff = ((temp.tv_sec * 1000000.0 + temp.tv_usec) -
(last.tv_sec * 1000000.0 + last.tv_usec));
userdiff = ((rtemp.ru_utime.tv_sec * 1000000.0 + rtemp.ru_utime.tv_usec) -
(rlast.ru_utime.tv_sec * 1000000.0 + rlast.ru_utime.tv_usec));
systemdiff = ((rtemp.ru_stime.tv_sec * 1000000.0 + rtemp.ru_stime.tv_usec) -
(rlast.ru_stime.tv_sec * 1000000.0 + rlast.ru_stime.tv_usec));
pcpu[0] = (((ctemp - clast) * 1000000.0 / CLOCKS_PER_SEC) / timediff) * 100;
pcpu[1] = (userdiff / timediff) * 100;
pcpu[2] = (systemdiff / timediff) * 100;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t mptsas_config_sas_io_unit_0(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
size_t size = MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK_EXT(0, MPI_CONFIG_EXTPAGETYPE_SAS_IO_UNIT, 0x04,
"*w*wb*b*w"
repl(MPTSAS_NUM_PORTS, "*s16"),
MPTSAS_NUM_PORTS);
if (data) {
size_t ofs = size - MPTSAS_NUM_PORTS * MPTSAS_CONFIG_SAS_IO_UNIT_0_SIZE;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MPTSAS_NUM_PORTS; i++) {
int phy_handle, dev_handle;
SCSIDevice *dev = mptsas_phy_get_device(s, i, &phy_handle, &dev_handle);
fill(*data + ofs, MPTSAS_CONFIG_SAS_IO_UNIT_0_SIZE,
"bbbblwwl", i, 0, 0,
(dev
? MPI_SAS_IOUNIT0_RATE_3_0
: MPI_SAS_IOUNIT0_RATE_FAILED_SPEED_NEGOTIATION),
(dev
? MPI_SAS_DEVICE_INFO_END_DEVICE | MPI_SAS_DEVICE_INFO_SSP_TARGET
: MPI_SAS_DEVICE_INFO_NO_DEVICE),
dev_handle,
dev_handle,
0);
ofs += MPTSAS_CONFIG_SAS_IO_UNIT_0_SIZE;
}
assert(ofs == size);
}
return size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_v4_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
struct flowi *fl, struct sock *sk)
{
struct sctp_association *asoc = t->asoc;
struct rtable *rt;
struct flowi4 *fl4 = &fl->u.ip4;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *laddr;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
union sctp_addr *daddr = &t->ipaddr;
union sctp_addr dst_saddr;
memset(fl4, 0x0, sizeof(struct flowi4));
fl4->daddr = daddr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
fl4->fl4_dport = daddr->v4.sin_port;
fl4->flowi4_proto = IPPROTO_SCTP;
if (asoc) {
fl4->flowi4_tos = RT_CONN_FLAGS(asoc->base.sk);
fl4->flowi4_oif = asoc->base.sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl4->fl4_sport = htons(asoc->base.bind_addr.port);
}
if (saddr) {
fl4->saddr = saddr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
fl4->fl4_sport = saddr->v4.sin_port;
}
pr_debug("%s: dst:%pI4, src:%pI4 - ", __func__, &fl4->daddr,
&fl4->saddr);
rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), fl4);
if (!IS_ERR(rt))
dst = &rt->dst;
/* If there is no association or if a source address is passed, no
* more validation is required.
*/
if (!asoc || saddr)
goto out;
bp = &asoc->base.bind_addr;
if (dst) {
/* Walk through the bind address list and look for a bind
* address that matches the source address of the returned dst.
*/
sctp_v4_dst_saddr(&dst_saddr, fl4, htons(bp->port));
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(laddr, &bp->address_list, list) {
if (!laddr->valid || (laddr->state == SCTP_ADDR_DEL) ||
(laddr->state != SCTP_ADDR_SRC &&
!asoc->src_out_of_asoc_ok))
continue;
if (sctp_v4_cmp_addr(&dst_saddr, &laddr->a))
goto out_unlock;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
/* None of the bound addresses match the source address of the
* dst. So release it.
*/
dst_release(dst);
dst = NULL;
}
/* Walk through the bind address list and try to get a dst that
* matches a bind address as the source address.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(laddr, &bp->address_list, list) {
struct net_device *odev;
if (!laddr->valid)
continue;
if (laddr->state != SCTP_ADDR_SRC ||
AF_INET != laddr->a.sa.sa_family)
continue;
fl4->fl4_sport = laddr->a.v4.sin_port;
flowi4_update_output(fl4,
asoc->base.sk->sk_bound_dev_if,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(asoc->base.sk),
daddr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr,
laddr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr);
rt = ip_route_output_key(sock_net(sk), fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
continue;
if (!dst)
dst = &rt->dst;
/* Ensure the src address belongs to the output
* interface.
*/
odev = __ip_dev_find(sock_net(sk), laddr->a.v4.sin_addr.s_addr,
false);
if (!odev || odev->ifindex != fl4->flowi4_oif) {
if (&rt->dst != dst)
dst_release(&rt->dst);
continue;
}
if (dst != &rt->dst)
dst_release(dst);
dst = &rt->dst;
break;
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
out:
t->dst = dst;
if (dst)
pr_debug("rt_dst:%pI4, rt_src:%pI4\n",
&fl4->daddr, &fl4->saddr);
else
pr_debug("no route\n");
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CallTask() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (render_process_host_->IsReady())
std::move(task_).Run();
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ppr_get(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
return user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.ppr, 0, sizeof(u64));
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,797 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FetchManager::ContextDestroyed(ExecutionContext*) {
for (auto& loader : loaders_)
loader->Dispose();
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_dsack_extend(struct sock *sk, u32 seq, u32 end_seq)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
if (!tp->rx_opt.dsack)
tcp_dsack_set(sk, seq, end_seq);
else
tcp_sack_extend(tp->duplicate_sack, seq, end_seq);
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint64_t virtio_net_guest_offloads_by_features(uint32_t features)
{
static const uint64_t guest_offloads_mask =
(1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_CSUM) |
(1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO4) |
(1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_TSO6) |
(1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_ECN) |
(1ULL << VIRTIO_NET_F_GUEST_UFO);
return guest_offloads_mask & features;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int splashRound(SplashCoord x) {
return (int)floor(x + 0.5);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SynchronousCompositorImpl::DidChangeRootLayerScrollOffset(
const gfx::ScrollOffset& root_offset) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
if (!synchronous_input_handler_proxy_)
return;
synchronous_input_handler_proxy_->SynchronouslySetRootScrollOffset(
root_offset);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int StreamTcpTest13 (void)
{
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
TCPHdr tcph;
uint8_t payload[4];
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof (StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_seq = htonl(10);
tcph.th_ack = htonl(11);
tcph.th_flags = TH_ACK;
p->tcph = &tcph;
int ret = 0;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(10);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x42, 3, 4); /*BBB*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(6);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x42, 3, 4); /*BBB*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
if (stream_config.async_oneside != TRUE) {
ret = 1;
goto end;
}
if (! (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_ASYNC)) {
printf("failed in setting asynchronous session\n");
goto end;
}
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
printf("failed in setting state\n");
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(9);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK|TH_PUSH;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x42, 3, 4); /*BBB*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->client.last_ack != 9 &&
((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->server.next_seq != 14) {
printf("failed in seq %"PRIu32" match\n",
((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->client.last_ack);
goto end;
}
StreamTcpSessionPktFree(p);
ret = 1;
end:
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputDispatcher::logOutboundKeyDetailsLocked(const char* prefix, const KeyEntry* entry) {
#if DEBUG_OUTBOUND_EVENT_DETAILS
ALOGD("%seventTime=%lld, deviceId=%d, source=0x%x, policyFlags=0x%x, "
"action=0x%x, flags=0x%x, keyCode=0x%x, scanCode=0x%x, metaState=0x%x, "
"repeatCount=%d, downTime=%lld",
prefix,
entry->eventTime, entry->deviceId, entry->source, entry->policyFlags,
entry->action, entry->flags, entry->keyCode, entry->scanCode, entry->metaState,
entry->repeatCount, entry->downTime);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void m_cache_vma(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (m->count < m->size) /* vma is copied successfully */
m->version = m_next_vma(m->private, vma) ? vma->vm_end : -1UL;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_pathname(__be32 *p, char **namp, unsigned int *lenp)
{
char *name;
unsigned int i;
if ((p = xdr_decode_string_inplace(p, namp, lenp, NFS_MAXPATHLEN)) != NULL) {
for (i = 0, name = *namp; i < *lenp; i++, name++) {
if (*name == '\0')
return NULL;
}
}
return p;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProfilingService::ProfilingService() : weak_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 150,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorController::connectFrontend(InspectorFrontendChannel* frontendChannel)
{
ASSERT(frontendChannel);
initializeDeferredAgents();
m_inspectorFrontend = adoptPtr(new InspectorFrontend(frontendChannel));
m_state->unmute();
m_agents.setFrontend(m_inspectorFrontend.get());
InspectorInstrumentation::registerInstrumentingAgents(m_instrumentingAgents.get());
InspectorInstrumentation::frontendCreated();
ASSERT(m_inspectorClient);
m_inspectorBackendDispatcher = InspectorBackendDispatcher::create(frontendChannel);
m_agents.registerInDispatcher(m_inspectorBackendDispatcher.get());
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Range::textNodeSplit(Text* oldNode)
{
ASSERT(oldNode);
ASSERT(oldNode->document() == m_ownerDocument);
ASSERT(oldNode->parentNode());
ASSERT(oldNode->isTextNode());
ASSERT(oldNode->nextSibling());
ASSERT(oldNode->nextSibling()->isTextNode());
boundaryTextNodesSplit(m_start, oldNode);
boundaryTextNodesSplit(m_end, oldNode);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::DidStopFlinging() {
selection_controller_client_->OnScrollCompleted();
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vfs_kern_mount(struct file_system_type *type, int flags, const char *name, void *data)
{
struct mount *mnt;
struct dentry *root;
if (!type)
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
mnt = alloc_vfsmnt(name);
if (!mnt)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
mnt->mnt.mnt_flags = MNT_INTERNAL;
root = mount_fs(type, flags, name, data);
if (IS_ERR(root)) {
mnt_free_id(mnt);
free_vfsmnt(mnt);
return ERR_CAST(root);
}
mnt->mnt.mnt_root = root;
mnt->mnt.mnt_sb = root->d_sb;
mnt->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt.mnt_root;
mnt->mnt_parent = mnt;
lock_mount_hash();
list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_instance, &root->d_sb->s_mounts);
unlock_mount_hash();
return &mnt->mnt;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type, void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack = NULL;
struct sctp_paramhdr *err_param = NULL;
sctp_addiphdr_t *hdr;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
__u32 serial;
int length;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* ADD-IP: Section 4.1.1
* This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using
* the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk
* is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as
* described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth].
*/
if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !chunk->auth)
return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)chunk->skb->data;
serial = ntohl(hdr->serial);
addr_param = (union sctp_addr_param *)hdr->params;
length = ntohs(addr_param->p.length);
if (length < sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)addr_param, commands);
/* Verify the ASCONF chunk before processing it. */
if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc,
(sctp_paramhdr_t *)((void *)addr_param + length),
(void *)chunk->chunk_end,
&err_param))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)err_param, commands);
/* ADDIP 5.2 E1) Compare the value of the serial number to the value
* the endpoint stored in a new association variable
* 'Peer-Serial-Number'.
*/
if (serial == asoc->peer.addip_serial + 1) {
/* If this is the first instance of ASCONF in the packet,
* we can clean our old ASCONF-ACKs.
*/
if (!chunk->has_asconf)
sctp_assoc_clean_asconf_ack_cache(asoc);
/* ADDIP 5.2 E4) When the Sequence Number matches the next one
* expected, process the ASCONF as described below and after
* processing the ASCONF Chunk, append an ASCONF-ACK Chunk to
* the response packet and cache a copy of it (in the event it
* later needs to be retransmitted).
*
* Essentially, do V1-V5.
*/
asconf_ack = sctp_process_asconf((struct sctp_association *)
asoc, chunk);
if (!asconf_ack)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
} else if (serial < asoc->peer.addip_serial + 1) {
/* ADDIP 5.2 E2)
* If the value found in the Sequence Number is less than the
* ('Peer- Sequence-Number' + 1), simply skip to the next
* ASCONF, and include in the outbound response packet
* any previously cached ASCONF-ACK response that was
* sent and saved that matches the Sequence Number of the
* ASCONF. Note: It is possible that no cached ASCONF-ACK
* Chunk exists. This will occur when an older ASCONF
* arrives out of order. In such a case, the receiver
* should skip the ASCONF Chunk and not include ASCONF-ACK
* Chunk for that chunk.
*/
asconf_ack = sctp_assoc_lookup_asconf_ack(asoc, hdr->serial);
if (!asconf_ack)
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
/* Reset the transport so that we select the correct one
* this time around. This is to make sure that we don't
* accidentally use a stale transport that's been removed.
*/
asconf_ack->transport = NULL;
} else {
/* ADDIP 5.2 E5) Otherwise, the ASCONF Chunk is discarded since
* it must be either a stale packet or from an attacker.
*/
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
/* ADDIP 5.2 E6) The destination address of the SCTP packet
* containing the ASCONF-ACK Chunks MUST be the source address of
* the SCTP packet that held the ASCONF Chunks.
*
* To do this properly, we'll set the destination address of the chunk
* and at the transmit time, will try look up the transport to use.
* Since ASCONFs may be bundled, the correct transport may not be
* created until we process the entire packet, thus this workaround.
*/
asconf_ack->dest = chunk->source;
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(asconf_ack));
if (asoc->new_transport) {
sctp_sf_heartbeat(ep, asoc, type, asoc->new_transport,
commands);
((struct sctp_association *)asoc)->new_transport = NULL;
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ff_amf_write_null(uint8_t **dst)
{
bytestream_put_byte(dst, AMF_DATA_TYPE_NULL);
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Convert ff_amf_get_field_value() to bytestream2
Fixes: out of array accesses
Found-by: JunDong Xie of Ant-financial Light-Year Security Lab
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 63,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::DidOverscroll(
const blink::WebFloatSize& overscrollDelta,
const blink::WebFloatSize& accumulatedOverscroll,
const blink::WebFloatPoint& positionInViewport,
const blink::WebFloatSize& velocityInViewport,
const blink::WebOverscrollBehavior& behavior) {
RenderWidget::DidOverscroll(overscrollDelta, accumulatedOverscroll,
positionInViewport, velocityInViewport, behavior);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string Get(int64 metahandle, syncable::StringField field) {
return GetField(metahandle, field, string());
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int samldb_fill_foreignSecurityPrincipal_object(struct samldb_ctx *ac)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb;
const struct ldb_val *rdn_value;
struct dom_sid *sid;
int ret;
ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(ac->module);
sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(ac->msg, ac->msg, "objectSid");
if (sid == NULL) {
rdn_value = ldb_dn_get_rdn_val(ac->msg->dn);
if (rdn_value == NULL) {
return ldb_operr(ldb);
}
sid = dom_sid_parse_talloc(ac->msg,
(const char *)rdn_value->data);
if (sid == NULL) {
ldb_set_errstring(ldb,
"samldb: No valid SID found in ForeignSecurityPrincipal CN!");
return LDB_ERR_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION;
}
if (! samldb_msg_add_sid(ac->msg, "objectSid", sid)) {
return ldb_operr(ldb);
}
}
/* finally proceed with adding the entry */
ret = samldb_add_step(ac, samldb_add_entry);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) return ret;
return samldb_first_step(ac);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 9 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint64_t openpic_gbl_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned len)
{
OpenPICState *opp = opaque;
uint32_t retval;
DPRINTF("%s: addr %#" HWADDR_PRIx "\n", __func__, addr);
retval = 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (addr & 0xF) {
return retval;
}
switch (addr) {
case 0x1000: /* FRR */
retval = opp->frr;
break;
case 0x1020: /* GCR */
retval = opp->gcr;
break;
case 0x1080: /* VIR */
retval = opp->vir;
break;
case 0x1090: /* PIR */
retval = 0x00000000;
break;
case 0x00: /* Block Revision Register1 (BRR1) */
retval = opp->brr1;
break;
case 0x40:
case 0x50:
case 0x60:
case 0x70:
case 0x80:
case 0x90:
case 0xA0:
case 0xB0:
retval = openpic_cpu_read_internal(opp, addr, get_current_cpu());
break;
case 0x10A0: /* IPI_IVPR */
case 0x10B0:
case 0x10C0:
case 0x10D0:
{
int idx;
idx = (addr - 0x10A0) >> 4;
retval = read_IRQreg_ivpr(opp, opp->irq_ipi0 + idx);
}
break;
case 0x10E0: /* SPVE */
retval = opp->spve;
break;
default:
break;
}
DPRINTF("%s: => 0x%08x\n", __func__, retval);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nested_ept_ad_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return nested_ept_get_cr3(vcpu) & VMX_EPTP_AD_ENABLE_BIT;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 62,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ActivityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::ActivityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterForMainWorld(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionDevToolsInfoBarDelegate::Cancel() {
InfoBarDismissed();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline double GetFITSPixel(Image *image,int bits_per_pixel)
{
switch (image->depth >> 3)
{
case 1:
return((double) ReadBlobByte(image));
case 2:
return((double) ((short) ReadBlobShort(image)));
case 4:
{
if (bits_per_pixel > 0)
return((double) ((int) ReadBlobLong(image)));
return((double) ReadBlobFloat(image));
}
case 8:
{
if (bits_per_pixel > 0)
return((double) ((MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLongLong(image)));
}
default:
break;
}
return(ReadBlobDouble(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void Run() {
browser_->CloseWindow();
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void copy_name(struct dentry *dentry, struct dentry *target)
{
struct external_name *old_name = NULL;
if (unlikely(dname_external(dentry)))
old_name = external_name(dentry);
if (unlikely(dname_external(target))) {
atomic_inc(&external_name(target)->u.count);
dentry->d_name = target->d_name;
} else {
memcpy(dentry->d_iname, target->d_name.name,
target->d_name.len + 1);
dentry->d_name.name = dentry->d_iname;
dentry->d_name.hash_len = target->d_name.hash_len;
}
if (old_name && likely(atomic_dec_and_test(&old_name->u.count)))
kfree_rcu(old_name, u.head);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void do_one_tree(struct dentry *dentry)
{
shrink_dcache_parent(dentry);
d_walk(dentry, dentry, umount_check, NULL);
d_drop(dentry);
dput(dentry);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bta_av_rc_browse_opened(tBTA_AV_DATA* p_data) {
tBTA_AV_CB* p_cb = &bta_av_cb;
tBTA_AV_RC_CONN_CHG* p_msg = (tBTA_AV_RC_CONN_CHG*)p_data;
tBTA_AV_RC_BROWSE_OPEN rc_browse_open;
LOG_INFO(LOG_TAG, "%s: peer_addr: %s rc_handle:%d", __func__,
p_msg->peer_addr.ToString().c_str(), p_msg->handle);
rc_browse_open.status = BTA_AV_SUCCESS;
rc_browse_open.rc_handle = p_msg->handle;
rc_browse_open.peer_addr = p_msg->peer_addr;
tBTA_AV bta_av_data;
bta_av_data.rc_browse_open = rc_browse_open;
(*p_cb->p_cback)(BTA_AV_RC_BROWSE_OPEN_EVT, &bta_av_data);
}
Commit Message: Check packet length in bta_av_proc_meta_cmd
Bug: 111893951
Test: manual - connect A2DP
Change-Id: Ibbf347863dfd29ea3385312e9dde1082bc90d2f3
(cherry picked from commit ed51887f921263219bcd2fbf6650ead5ec8d334e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHPAPI void var_destroy(php_unserialize_data_t *var_hashx)
{
void *next;
zend_long i;
var_entries *var_hash = (*var_hashx)->first;
var_dtor_entries *var_dtor_hash = (*var_hashx)->first_dtor;
zend_bool wakeup_failed = 0;
zval wakeup_name;
ZVAL_UNDEF(&wakeup_name);
#if VAR_ENTRIES_DBG
fprintf(stderr, "var_destroy(%ld)\n", var_hash?var_hash->used_slots:-1L);
#endif
while (var_hash) {
next = var_hash->next;
efree_size(var_hash, sizeof(var_entries));
var_hash = next;
}
while (var_dtor_hash) {
for (i = 0; i < var_dtor_hash->used_slots; i++) {
zval *zv = &var_dtor_hash->data[i];
#if VAR_ENTRIES_DBG
fprintf(stderr, "var_destroy dtor(%p, %ld)\n", var_dtor_hash->data[i], Z_REFCOUNT_P(var_dtor_hash->data[i]));
#endif
/* Perform delayed __wakeup calls */
if (Z_VAR_FLAGS_P(zv) == VAR_WAKEUP_FLAG) {
if (!wakeup_failed) {
zval retval;
if (Z_ISUNDEF(wakeup_name)) {
ZVAL_STRINGL(&wakeup_name, "__wakeup", sizeof("__wakeup") - 1);
}
BG(serialize_lock)++;
if (call_user_function_ex(CG(function_table), zv, &wakeup_name, &retval, 0, 0, 1, NULL) == FAILURE || Z_ISUNDEF(retval)) {
wakeup_failed = 1;
GC_FLAGS(Z_OBJ_P(zv)) |= IS_OBJ_DESTRUCTOR_CALLED;
}
BG(serialize_lock)--;
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
} else {
GC_FLAGS(Z_OBJ_P(zv)) |= IS_OBJ_DESTRUCTOR_CALLED;
}
}
zval_ptr_dtor(zv);
}
next = var_dtor_hash->next;
efree_size(var_dtor_hash, sizeof(var_dtor_entries));
var_dtor_hash = next;
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&wakeup_name);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #74103 and bug #75054
Directly fail unserialization when trying to acquire an r/R
reference to an UNDEF HT slot. Previously this left an UNDEF and
later deleted the index/key from the HT.
What actually caused the issue here is a combination of two
factors: First, the key deletion was performed using the hash API,
rather than the symtable API, such that the element was not actually
removed if it used an integral string key. Second, a subsequent
deletion operation, while collecting trailing UNDEF ranges, would
mark the element as available for reuse (leaving a corrupted HT
state with nNumOfElemnts > nNumUsed).
Fix this by failing early and dropping the deletion code.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 62,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __smb2_reconnect(const struct nls_table *nlsc,
struct cifs_tcon *tcon)
{
int rc;
struct dfs_cache_tgt_list tl;
struct dfs_cache_tgt_iterator *it = NULL;
char *tree;
const char *tcp_host;
size_t tcp_host_len;
const char *dfs_host;
size_t dfs_host_len;
tree = kzalloc(MAX_TREE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tree)
return -ENOMEM;
if (tcon->ipc) {
scnprintf(tree, MAX_TREE_SIZE, "\\\\%s\\IPC$",
tcon->ses->server->hostname);
rc = SMB2_tcon(0, tcon->ses, tree, tcon, nlsc);
goto out;
}
if (!tcon->dfs_path) {
rc = SMB2_tcon(0, tcon->ses, tcon->treeName, tcon, nlsc);
goto out;
}
rc = dfs_cache_noreq_find(tcon->dfs_path + 1, NULL, &tl);
if (rc)
goto out;
extract_unc_hostname(tcon->ses->server->hostname, &tcp_host,
&tcp_host_len);
for (it = dfs_cache_get_tgt_iterator(&tl); it;
it = dfs_cache_get_next_tgt(&tl, it)) {
const char *tgt = dfs_cache_get_tgt_name(it);
extract_unc_hostname(tgt, &dfs_host, &dfs_host_len);
if (dfs_host_len != tcp_host_len
|| strncasecmp(dfs_host, tcp_host, dfs_host_len) != 0) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: skipping %.*s, doesn't match %.*s",
__func__,
(int)dfs_host_len, dfs_host,
(int)tcp_host_len, tcp_host);
continue;
}
scnprintf(tree, MAX_TREE_SIZE, "\\%s", tgt);
rc = SMB2_tcon(0, tcon->ses, tree, tcon, nlsc);
if (!rc)
break;
if (rc == -EREMOTE)
break;
}
if (!rc) {
if (it)
rc = dfs_cache_noreq_update_tgthint(tcon->dfs_path + 1,
it);
else
rc = -ENOENT;
}
dfs_cache_free_tgts(&tl);
out:
kfree(tree);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jswrap_graphics_setColorX(JsVar *parent, JsVar *r, JsVar *g, JsVar *b, bool isForeground) {
JsGraphics gfx; if (!graphicsGetFromVar(&gfx, parent)) return;
unsigned int color = 0;
JsVarFloat rf, gf, bf;
rf = jsvGetFloat(r);
gf = jsvGetFloat(g);
bf = jsvGetFloat(b);
if (!jsvIsUndefined(g) && !jsvIsUndefined(b)) {
int ri = (int)(rf*256);
int gi = (int)(gf*256);
int bi = (int)(bf*256);
if (ri>255) ri=255;
if (gi>255) gi=255;
if (bi>255) bi=255;
if (ri<0) ri=0;
if (gi<0) gi=0;
if (bi<0) bi=0;
int colorMask = gfx.data.flags & JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_MASK;
if (colorMask) {
int tmpr, tmpg, tmpb;
tmpr = ri;
tmpg = gi;
tmpb = bi;
switch (colorMask) {
case JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_BRG:
ri = tmpb;
gi = tmpr;
bi = tmpg;
break;
case JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_BGR:
ri = tmpb;
bi = tmpr;
break;
case JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_GBR:
ri = tmpg;
gi = tmpb;
bi = tmpr;
break;
case JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_GRB:
ri = tmpg;
gi = tmpr;
break;
case JSGRAPHICSFLAGS_COLOR_RBG:
gi = tmpb;
bi = tmpg;
break;
default: break;
}
}
if (gfx.data.bpp==16) {
color = (unsigned int)((bi>>3) | (gi>>2)<<5 | (ri>>3)<<11);
} else if (gfx.data.bpp==32) {
color = 0xFF000000 | (unsigned int)(bi | (gi<<8) | (ri<<16));
} else if (gfx.data.bpp==24) {
color = (unsigned int)(bi | (gi<<8) | (ri<<16));
} else
color = (unsigned int)(((ri+gi+bi)>=384) ? 0xFFFFFFFF : 0);
} else {
color = (unsigned int)jsvGetInteger(r);
}
if (isForeground)
gfx.data.fgColor = color;
else
gfx.data.bgColor = color;
graphicsSetVar(&gfx);
}
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void ensureLineBoxInsideIgnoredSpaces(LineMidpointState& lineMidpointState, RenderObject* renderer)
{
InlineIterator midpoint(0, renderer, 0);
stopIgnoringSpaces(lineMidpointState, midpoint);
startIgnoringSpaces(lineMidpointState, midpoint);
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void l2cap_chan_unlink(struct l2cap_chan_list *l, struct sock *sk)
{
struct sock *next = l2cap_pi(sk)->next_c, *prev = l2cap_pi(sk)->prev_c;
write_lock_bh(&l->lock);
if (sk == l->head)
l->head = next;
if (next)
l2cap_pi(next)->prev_c = prev;
if (prev)
l2cap_pi(prev)->next_c = next;
write_unlock_bh(&l->lock);
__sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 58,922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Part::slotShowProperties()
{
m_model->countEntriesAndSize();
QPointer<Kerfuffle::PropertiesDialog> dialog(new Kerfuffle::PropertiesDialog(0,
m_model->archive(),
m_model->numberOfFiles(),
m_model->numberOfFolders(),
m_model->uncompressedSize()));
dialog.data()->show();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 9,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::ReloadImagesIfNotDeferred() {
for (Resource* resource : document_resources_) {
if (resource->GetType() == Resource::kImage && resource->StillNeedsLoad() &&
!ShouldDeferImageLoad(resource->Url()))
StartLoad(resource);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ETagGet_ConditionalRequest_NoStore_Handler(
const net::HttpRequestInfo* request,
std::string* response_status,
std::string* response_headers,
std::string* response_data) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
request->extra_headers.HasHeader(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kIfNoneMatch));
response_status->assign("HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified");
response_headers->assign("Cache-Control: no-store\n");
response_data->clear();
}
Commit Message: Http cache: Test deleting an entry with a pending_entry when
adding the truncated flag.
BUG=125159
TEST=net_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10356113
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139331 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int hpel_motion_lowres(MpegEncContext *s,
uint8_t *dest, uint8_t *src,
int field_based, int field_select,
int src_x, int src_y,
int width, int height, ptrdiff_t stride,
int h_edge_pos, int v_edge_pos,
int w, int h, h264_chroma_mc_func *pix_op,
int motion_x, int motion_y)
{
const int lowres = s->avctx->lowres;
const int op_index = FFMIN(lowres, 3);
const int s_mask = (2 << lowres) - 1;
int emu = 0;
int sx, sy;
if (s->quarter_sample) {
motion_x /= 2;
motion_y /= 2;
}
sx = motion_x & s_mask;
sy = motion_y & s_mask;
src_x += motion_x >> lowres + 1;
src_y += motion_y >> lowres + 1;
src += src_y * stride + src_x;
if ((unsigned)src_x > FFMAX( h_edge_pos - (!!sx) - w, 0) ||
(unsigned)src_y > FFMAX((v_edge_pos >> field_based) - (!!sy) - h, 0)) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(s->sc.edge_emu_buffer, src,
s->linesize, s->linesize,
w + 1, (h + 1) << field_based,
src_x, src_y << field_based,
h_edge_pos, v_edge_pos);
src = s->sc.edge_emu_buffer;
emu = 1;
}
sx = (sx << 2) >> lowres;
sy = (sy << 2) >> lowres;
if (field_select)
src += s->linesize;
pix_op[op_index](dest, src, stride, h, sx, sy);
return emu;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 81,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadGROUP4Image(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MaxTextExtent];
FILE
*file;
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
unique_file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
offset,
strip_offset;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Write raw CCITT Group 4 wrapped as a TIFF image file.
*/
file=(FILE *) NULL;
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
ThrowImageException(FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile");
length=fwrite("\111\111\052\000\010\000\000\000\016\000",1,10,file);
length=fwrite("\376\000\003\000\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\000\001\004\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,image->columns);
length=fwrite("\001\001\004\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,image->rows);
length=fwrite("\002\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\001\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\003\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\004\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\006\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\021\001\003\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
strip_offset=10+(12*14)+4+8;
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(size_t) strip_offset);
length=fwrite("\022\001\003\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(size_t) image_info->orientation);
length=fwrite("\025\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\001\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\026\001\004\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,image->rows);
length=fwrite("\027\001\004\000\001\000\000\000\000\000\000\000",1,12,file);
offset=(ssize_t) ftell(file)-4;
length=fwrite("\032\001\005\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(size_t) (strip_offset-8));
length=fwrite("\033\001\005\000\001\000\000\000",1,8,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(size_t) (strip_offset-8));
length=fwrite("\050\001\003\000\001\000\000\000\002\000\000\000",1,12,file);
length=fwrite("\000\000\000\000",1,4,file);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(size_t) (image->x_resolution+0.5));
length=WriteLSBLong(file,1);
status=MagickTrue;
for (length=0; (c=ReadBlobByte(image)) != EOF; length++)
if (fputc(c,file) != c)
status=MagickFalse;
offset=(ssize_t) fseek(file,(ssize_t) offset,SEEK_SET);
length=WriteLSBLong(file,(unsigned int) length);
(void) fclose(file);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
/*
Read TIFF image.
*/
read_info=CloneImageInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",filename);
image=ReadTIFFImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick_filename,image_info->filename,
MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image->magick,"GROUP4",MaxTextExtent);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
if (status == MagickFalse)
image=DestroyImage(image);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: https://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=31161
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 69,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int exitcode = 0;
int ii = 0, num_cases = 0;
for (num_cases = 0; testcases[num_cases].description; num_cases++) {
/* Just counting */
}
printf("1..%d\n", num_cases);
for (ii = 0; testcases[ii].description != NULL; ++ii) {
fflush(stdout);
#ifndef DEBUG
/* the test program shouldn't run longer than 10 minutes... */
alarm(600);
#endif
enum test_return ret = testcases[ii].function();
if (ret == TEST_SKIP) {
fprintf(stdout, "ok # SKIP %d - %s\n", ii + 1, testcases[ii].description);
} else if (ret == TEST_PASS) {
fprintf(stdout, "ok %d - %s\n", ii + 1, testcases[ii].description);
} else {
fprintf(stdout, "not ok %d - %s\n", ii + 1, testcases[ii].description);
exitcode = 1;
}
fflush(stdout);
}
return exitcode;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 94,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_arch_flush_shadow(struct kvm *kvm)
{
kvm_mmu_zap_all(kvm);
kvm_reload_remote_mmus(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnRequestSetBounds(const gfx::Rect& bounds) {
if (view_) {
view_->SetBounds(bounds);
Send(new ViewMsg_SetBounds_ACK(routing_id_));
}
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ovl_remove_and_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
{
struct dentry *workdir = ovl_workdir(dentry);
struct inode *wdir = workdir->d_inode;
struct dentry *upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry->d_parent);
struct inode *udir = upperdir->d_inode;
struct dentry *whiteout;
struct dentry *upper;
struct dentry *opaquedir = NULL;
int err;
if (WARN_ON(!workdir))
return -EROFS;
if (is_dir) {
if (OVL_TYPE_MERGE_OR_LOWER(ovl_path_type(dentry))) {
opaquedir = ovl_check_empty_and_clear(dentry);
err = PTR_ERR(opaquedir);
if (IS_ERR(opaquedir))
goto out;
} else {
LIST_HEAD(list);
/*
* When removing an empty opaque directory, then it
* makes no sense to replace it with an exact replica of
* itself. But emptiness still needs to be checked.
*/
err = ovl_check_empty_dir(dentry, &list);
ovl_cache_free(&list);
if (err)
goto out;
}
}
err = ovl_lock_rename_workdir(workdir, upperdir);
if (err)
goto out_dput;
whiteout = ovl_whiteout(workdir, dentry);
err = PTR_ERR(whiteout);
if (IS_ERR(whiteout))
goto out_unlock;
upper = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
if (!upper) {
upper = lookup_one_len(dentry->d_name.name, upperdir,
dentry->d_name.len);
err = PTR_ERR(upper);
if (IS_ERR(upper))
goto kill_whiteout;
err = ovl_do_rename(wdir, whiteout, udir, upper, 0);
dput(upper);
if (err)
goto kill_whiteout;
} else {
int flags = 0;
if (opaquedir)
upper = opaquedir;
err = -ESTALE;
if (upper->d_parent != upperdir)
goto kill_whiteout;
if (is_dir)
flags |= RENAME_EXCHANGE;
err = ovl_do_rename(wdir, whiteout, udir, upper, flags);
if (err)
goto kill_whiteout;
if (is_dir)
ovl_cleanup(wdir, upper);
}
ovl_dentry_version_inc(dentry->d_parent);
out_d_drop:
d_drop(dentry);
dput(whiteout);
out_unlock:
unlock_rename(workdir, upperdir);
out_dput:
dput(opaquedir);
out:
return err;
kill_whiteout:
ovl_cleanup(wdir, whiteout);
goto out_d_drop;
}
Commit Message: ovl: verify upper dentry before unlink and rename
Unlink and rename in overlayfs checked the upper dentry for staleness by
verifying upper->d_parent against upperdir. However the dentry can go
stale also by being unhashed, for example.
Expand the verification to actually look up the name again (under parent
lock) and check if it matches the upper dentry. This matches what the VFS
does before passing the dentry to filesytem's unlink/rename methods, which
excludes any inconsistency caused by overlayfs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,067 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_cpu_hrtimer_restart(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx)
{
struct hrtimer *hr = &cpuctx->hrtimer;
struct pmu *pmu = cpuctx->ctx.pmu;
/* not for SW PMU */
if (pmu->task_ctx_nr == perf_sw_context)
return;
if (hrtimer_active(hr))
return;
if (!hrtimer_callback_running(hr))
__hrtimer_start_range_ns(hr, cpuctx->hrtimer_interval,
0, HRTIMER_MODE_REL_PINNED, 0);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionUninstaller::CleanUp() {
delete this;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool param_get_location(
const char *parameter,
MyString &filename,
int &line_number)
{
bool found_it;
if (parameter != NULL && extra_info != NULL) {
found_it = extra_info->GetParam(parameter, filename, line_number);
} else {
found_it = false;
}
return found_it;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: win32_thread_specific_data(void *private_data)
{
return((DWORD) thread_specific_data(private_data));
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void release_sit_entry_set(struct sit_entry_set *ses)
{
list_del(&ses->set_list);
kmem_cache_free(sit_entry_set_slab, ses);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SavePageResult ArchiverResultToSavePageResult(ArchiverResult archiver_result) {
switch (archiver_result) {
case ArchiverResult::SUCCESSFULLY_CREATED:
return SavePageResult::SUCCESS;
case ArchiverResult::ERROR_DEVICE_FULL:
return SavePageResult::DEVICE_FULL;
case ArchiverResult::ERROR_CONTENT_UNAVAILABLE:
return SavePageResult::CONTENT_UNAVAILABLE;
case ArchiverResult::ERROR_ARCHIVE_CREATION_FAILED:
return SavePageResult::ARCHIVE_CREATION_FAILED;
case ArchiverResult::ERROR_CANCELED:
return SavePageResult::CANCELLED;
case ArchiverResult::ERROR_SECURITY_CERTIFICATE:
return SavePageResult::SECURITY_CERTIFICATE_ERROR;
case ArchiverResult::ERROR_ERROR_PAGE:
return SavePageResult::ERROR_PAGE;
case ArchiverResult::ERROR_INTERSTITIAL_PAGE:
return SavePageResult::INTERSTITIAL_PAGE;
case ArchiverResult::ERROR_SKIPPED:
return SavePageResult::SKIPPED;
case ArchiverResult::ERROR_DIGEST_CALCULATION_FAILED:
return SavePageResult::DIGEST_CALCULATION_FAILED;
}
NOTREACHED();
return SavePageResult::CONTENT_UNAVAILABLE;
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_push_real(gs_main_instance * minst, double value)
{
ref vref;
make_real(&vref, value);
return push_value(minst, &vref);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned char WavpackGetFileFormat (WavpackContext *wpc)
{
return wpc->file_format;
}
Commit Message: fixes for 4 fuzz failures posted to SourceForge mailing list
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void* cast_away_const(const void* string)
{
return (void*)string;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 87,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void treatNullAsNullStringStringAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<WithNullCheck>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setTreatNullAsNullStringStringAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int c;
g_options.log_destination = LOGGING_STDERR;
g_options.only_desired_port = 1;
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "qnhdp:P:s:lv:m:N")) != -1) {
switch (c) {
case '?':
case 'h':
g_options.help_mode = 1;
break;
case 'p':
case 'P':
{
long long port = 0;
port = atoi(optarg);
if (port < 0) {
ERR("Port number must be non-negative");
return 1;
}
if (port > UINT16_MAX) {
ERR("Port number must be %u or less, "
"but not negative", UINT16_MAX);
return 2;
}
g_options.desired_port = (uint16_t)port;
if (c == 'p')
g_options.only_desired_port = 1;
else
g_options.only_desired_port = 0;
break;
}
case 'l':
g_options.log_destination = LOGGING_SYSLOG;
break;
case 'd':
g_options.nofork_mode = 1;
g_options.verbose_mode = 1;
break;
case 'q':
g_options.verbose_mode = 1;
break;
case 'n':
g_options.nofork_mode = 1;
break;
case 'v':
g_options.vendor_id = strto16(optarg);
break;
case 'm':
g_options.product_id = strto16(optarg);
break;
case 's':
g_options.serial_num = (unsigned char *)optarg;
break;
case 'N':
g_options.noprinter_mode = 1;
break;
}
}
if (g_options.help_mode) {
printf(
"Usage: %s -v <vendorid> -m <productid> -p <port>\n"
"Options:\n"
" -h Show this help message\n"
" -v <vid> Vendor ID of desired printer\n"
" -m <pid> Product ID of desired printer\n"
" -s <serial> Serial number of desired printer\n"
" -p <portnum> Port number to bind against, error out if port already taken\n"
" -P <portnum> Port number to bind against, use another port if port already\n"
" taken\n"
" -l Redirect logging to syslog\n"
" -q Enable verbose tracing\n"
" -d Debug mode for verbose output and no fork\n"
" -n No-fork mode\n"
" -N No-printer mode, debug/developer mode which makes ippusbxd\n"
" run without IPP-over-USB printer\n"
, argv[0]);
return 0;
}
start_daemon();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY FIX: Actually restrict the access to the printer to localhost
Before, any machine in any network connected by any of the interfaces (as
listed by "ifconfig") could access to an IPP-over-USB printer on the assigned
port, allowing users on remote machines to print and to access the web
configuration interface of a IPP-over-USB printer in contrary to conventional
USB printers which are only accessible locally.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 42,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bin_main(RCore *r, int mode, int va) {
RBinAddr *binmain = r_bin_get_sym (r->bin, R_BIN_SYM_MAIN);
ut64 addr;
if (!binmain) {
return false;
}
addr = va ? r_bin_a2b (r->bin, binmain->vaddr) : binmain->paddr;
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
r_flag_space_set (r->flags, R_FLAGS_FS_SYMBOLS);
r_flag_set (r->flags, "main", addr, r->blocksize);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLE (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("%"PFMT64d, addr);
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs symbols\n");
r_cons_printf ("f main @ 0x%08"PFMT64x"\n", addr);
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("{\"vaddr\":%" PFMT64d
",\"paddr\":%" PFMT64d "}", addr, binmain->paddr);
} else {
r_cons_printf ("[Main]\n");
r_cons_printf ("vaddr=0x%08"PFMT64x" paddr=0x%08"PFMT64x"\n",
addr, binmain->paddr);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 96,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ActivityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NaClIPCAdapter::SendMessageOnIOThread(scoped_ptr<IPC::Message> message) {
io_thread_data_.channel_->Send(message.release());
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MessageLoop::DoDelayedWork(TimeTicks* next_delayed_work_time) {
if (!nestable_tasks_allowed_ ||
!SweepDelayedWorkQueueAndReturnTrueIfStillHasWork()) {
recent_time_ = *next_delayed_work_time = TimeTicks();
return false;
}
TimeTicks next_run_time = delayed_work_queue_.top().delayed_run_time;
if (next_run_time > recent_time_) {
recent_time_ = TimeTicks::Now(); // Get a better view of Now();
if (next_run_time > recent_time_) {
*next_delayed_work_time = next_run_time;
return false;
}
}
PendingTask pending_task =
std::move(const_cast<PendingTask&>(delayed_work_queue_.top()));
delayed_work_queue_.pop();
if (SweepDelayedWorkQueueAndReturnTrueIfStillHasWork())
*next_delayed_work_time = delayed_work_queue_.top().delayed_run_time;
return DeferOrRunPendingTask(std::move(pending_task));
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostView* RenderWidgetHostView::CreateViewForWidget(
RenderWidgetHost* widget) {
return new RenderWidgetHostViewAura(widget);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int inet_csk_listen_start(struct sock *sk, const int nr_table_entries)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
int rc = reqsk_queue_alloc(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue, nr_table_entries);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
sk->sk_max_ack_backlog = 0;
sk->sk_ack_backlog = 0;
inet_csk_delack_init(sk);
/* There is race window here: we announce ourselves listening,
* but this transition is still not validated by get_port().
* It is OK, because this socket enters to hash table only
* after validation is complete.
*/
sk->sk_state = TCP_LISTEN;
if (!sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, inet->inet_num)) {
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
sk_dst_reset(sk);
sk->sk_prot->hash(sk);
return 0;
}
sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
__reqsk_queue_destroy(&icsk->icsk_accept_queue);
return -EADDRINUSE;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HeadlessWebContentsImpl::OnInterfaceRequestFromFrame(
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host,
const std::string& interface_name,
mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle* interface_pipe) {
registry_.TryBindInterface(interface_name, interface_pipe);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VirtualKeyboardControllerAlwaysEnabledTest()
: VirtualKeyboardControllerAutoTest() {}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void region16_uninit(REGION16* region)
{
assert(region);
if (region->data)
{
if ((region->data->size > 0) && (region->data != &empty_region))
free(region->data);
region->data = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void cpu_load_update_nohz(struct rq *this_rq,
unsigned long curr_jiffies,
unsigned long load) { }
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void udpv6_exit(void)
{
inet6_unregister_protosw(&udpv6_protosw);
inet6_del_protocol(&udpv6_protocol, IPPROTO_UDP);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check
At this point, skb->data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.
For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.
This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb->head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 22,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
{
Buffer m;
char *cp;
u_int len;
debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
buffer_init(&m);
if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
if (conf != NULL)
buffer_append(conf, cp, len);
free(cp);
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 72,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_log_throttle(struct perf_event *event, int enable)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
int ret;
struct {
struct perf_event_header header;
u64 time;
u64 id;
u64 stream_id;
} throttle_event = {
.header = {
.type = PERF_RECORD_THROTTLE,
.misc = 0,
.size = sizeof(throttle_event),
},
.time = perf_clock(),
.id = primary_event_id(event),
.stream_id = event->id,
};
if (enable)
throttle_event.header.type = PERF_RECORD_UNTHROTTLE;
perf_event_header__init_id(&throttle_event.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event,
throttle_event.header.size, 1, 0);
if (ret)
return;
perf_output_put(&handle, throttle_event);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 165,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void atl2_set_msglevel(struct net_device *netdev, u32 data)
{
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShelfLayoutManager::AutoHideEventFilter::PreHandleKeyEvent(
aura::Window* target,
aura::KeyEvent* event) {
return false; // Always let the event propagate.
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void complete_nread_binary(conn *c) {
assert(c != NULL);
assert(c->cmd >= 0);
switch(c->substate) {
case bin_reading_set_header:
if (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_APPEND ||
c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_PREPEND) {
process_bin_append_prepend(c);
} else {
process_bin_update(c);
}
break;
case bin_read_set_value:
complete_update_bin(c);
break;
case bin_reading_get_key:
process_bin_get(c);
break;
case bin_reading_stat:
process_bin_stat(c);
break;
case bin_reading_del_header:
process_bin_delete(c);
break;
case bin_reading_incr_header:
complete_incr_bin(c);
break;
case bin_read_flush_exptime:
process_bin_flush(c);
break;
case bin_reading_sasl_auth:
process_bin_sasl_auth(c);
break;
case bin_reading_sasl_auth_data:
process_bin_complete_sasl_auth(c);
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Not handling substate %d\n", c->substate);
assert(0);
}
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static irqreturn_t airo_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id)
{
struct net_device *dev = dev_id;
u16 status, savedInterrupts = 0;
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
int handled = 0;
if (!netif_device_present(dev))
return IRQ_NONE;
for (;;) {
status = IN4500(ai, EVSTAT);
if (!(status & STATUS_INTS) || (status == 0xffff))
break;
handled = 1;
if (status & EV_AWAKE) {
OUT4500(ai, EVACK, EV_AWAKE);
OUT4500(ai, EVACK, EV_AWAKE);
}
if (!savedInterrupts) {
savedInterrupts = IN4500(ai, EVINTEN);
OUT4500(ai, EVINTEN, 0);
}
if (status & EV_MIC) {
OUT4500(ai, EVACK, EV_MIC);
airo_handle_cisco_mic(ai);
}
if (status & EV_LINK) {
/* Link status changed */
airo_handle_link(ai);
}
/* Check to see if there is something to receive */
if (status & EV_RX)
airo_handle_rx(ai);
/* Check to see if a packet has been transmitted */
if (status & (EV_TX | EV_TXCPY | EV_TXEXC))
airo_handle_tx(ai, status);
if ( status & ~STATUS_INTS & ~IGNORE_INTS ) {
airo_print_warn(ai->dev->name, "Got weird status %x",
status & ~STATUS_INTS & ~IGNORE_INTS );
}
}
if (savedInterrupts)
OUT4500(ai, EVINTEN, savedInterrupts);
return IRQ_RETVAL(handled);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int digi_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
int ret;
unsigned char buf[32];
struct digi_port *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
struct ktermios not_termios;
/* be sure the device is started up */
if (digi_startup_device(port->serial) != 0)
return -ENXIO;
/* read modem signals automatically whenever they change */
buf[0] = DIGI_CMD_READ_INPUT_SIGNALS;
buf[1] = priv->dp_port_num;
buf[2] = DIGI_ENABLE;
buf[3] = 0;
/* flush fifos */
buf[4] = DIGI_CMD_IFLUSH_FIFO;
buf[5] = priv->dp_port_num;
buf[6] = DIGI_FLUSH_TX | DIGI_FLUSH_RX;
buf[7] = 0;
ret = digi_write_oob_command(port, buf, 8, 1);
if (ret != 0)
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "digi_open: write oob failed, ret=%d\n", ret);
/* set termios settings */
if (tty) {
not_termios.c_cflag = ~tty->termios.c_cflag;
not_termios.c_iflag = ~tty->termios.c_iflag;
digi_set_termios(tty, port, ¬_termios);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
int r;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (compat20) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hugetlb_vm_op_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct resv_map *resv = vma_resv_map(vma);
/*
* This new VMA should share its siblings reservation map if present.
* The VMA will only ever have a valid reservation map pointer where
* it is being copied for another still existing VMA. As that VMA
* has a reference to the reservation map it cannot disappear until
* after this open call completes. It is therefore safe to take a
* new reference here without additional locking.
*/
if (resv && is_vma_resv_set(vma, HPAGE_RESV_OWNER))
kref_get(&resv->refs);
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ModuleSystem::LazyFieldGetterInner(
v8::Local<v8::String> property,
const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info,
RequireFunction require_function) {
CHECK(!info.Data().IsEmpty());
CHECK(info.Data()->IsObject());
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> parameters = v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(info.Data());
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = parameters->CreationContext();
v8::Local<v8::Object> global(context->Global());
v8::Local<v8::Value> module_system_value;
if (!GetPrivate(context, global, kModuleSystem, &module_system_value) ||
!module_system_value->IsExternal()) {
Warn(isolate,
"Module system has been deleted, does extension view exist?");
return;
}
ModuleSystem* module_system = static_cast<ModuleSystem*>(
v8::Local<v8::External>::Cast(module_system_value)->Value());
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_module_name;
if (!GetProperty(context, parameters, kModuleName, &v8_module_name)) {
Warn(isolate, "Cannot find module.");
return;
}
std::string name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(v8_module_name);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
NativesEnabledScope natives_enabled_scope(module_system);
v8::TryCatch try_catch(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Value> module_value;
if (!(module_system->*require_function)(name).ToLocal(&module_value)) {
module_system->HandleException(try_catch);
return;
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> module = v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(module_value);
v8::Local<v8::Value> field_value;
if (!GetProperty(context, parameters, kModuleField, &field_value)) {
module_system->HandleException(try_catch);
return;
}
v8::Local<v8::String> field;
if (!field_value->ToString(context).ToLocal(&field)) {
module_system->HandleException(try_catch);
return;
}
if (!IsTrue(module->Has(context, field))) {
std::string field_str = *v8::String::Utf8Value(field);
Fatal(module_system->context_,
"Lazy require of " + name + "." + field_str + " did not set the " +
field_str + " field");
return;
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> new_field;
if (!GetProperty(context, module, field, &new_field)) {
module_system->HandleException(try_catch);
return;
}
CHECK(!new_field.IsEmpty());
v8::Local<v8::Value> val = info.This();
if (val->IsObject()) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> object = v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(val);
object->Delete(context, property);
SetProperty(context, object, property, new_field);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
info.GetReturnValue().Set(new_field);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Harden against bindings interception
There's more we can do but this is a start.
BUG=590275
BUG=590118
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1748943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378621}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 156,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void authentication_success(void)
{
int r;
struct mboxevent *mboxevent;
/* authstate already created by mysasl_proxy_policy() */
imapd_userisadmin = global_authisa(imapd_authstate, IMAPOPT_ADMINS);
/* Create telemetry log */
imapd_logfd = telemetry_log(imapd_userid, imapd_in, imapd_out, 0);
/* Set namespace */
r = mboxname_init_namespace(&imapd_namespace,
imapd_userisadmin || imapd_userisproxyadmin);
mboxevent_setnamespace(&imapd_namespace);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "%s", error_message(r));
fatal(error_message(r), EC_CONFIG);
}
/* Make a copy of the external userid for use in proxying */
proxy_userid = xstrdup(imapd_userid);
/* send a Login event notification */
if ((mboxevent = mboxevent_new(EVENT_LOGIN))) {
mboxevent_set_access(mboxevent, saslprops.iplocalport,
saslprops.ipremoteport, imapd_userid, NULL, 1);
mboxevent_notify(&mboxevent);
mboxevent_free(&mboxevent);
}
#ifdef USE_AUTOCREATE
autocreate_inbox();
#endif // USE_AUTOCREATE
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReleasePermanentXIDDispatcher(gfx::PluginWindowHandle surface) {
GtkNativeViewManager* manager = GtkNativeViewManager::GetInstance();
manager->ReleasePermanentXID(surface);
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btif_dm_read_energy_info()
{
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
BTA_DmBleGetEnergyInfo(bta_energy_info_cb);
#endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Location::SetLocation(const String& url,
LocalDOMWindow* current_window,
LocalDOMWindow* entered_window,
ExceptionState* exception_state,
SetLocationPolicy set_location_policy) {
if (!IsAttached())
return;
if (!current_window->GetFrame())
return;
Document* entered_document = entered_window->document();
if (!entered_document)
return;
KURL completed_url = entered_document->CompleteURL(url);
if (completed_url.IsNull())
return;
if (!current_window->GetFrame()->CanNavigate(*dom_window_->GetFrame(),
completed_url)) {
if (exception_state) {
exception_state->ThrowSecurityError(
"The current window does not have permission to navigate the target "
"frame to '" +
url + "'.");
}
return;
}
if (exception_state && !completed_url.IsValid()) {
exception_state->ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kSyntaxError,
"'" + url + "' is not a valid URL.");
return;
}
if (dom_window_->IsInsecureScriptAccess(*current_window, completed_url))
return;
V8DOMActivityLogger* activity_logger =
V8DOMActivityLogger::CurrentActivityLoggerIfIsolatedWorld();
if (activity_logger) {
Vector<String> argv;
argv.push_back("LocalDOMWindow");
argv.push_back("url");
argv.push_back(entered_document->Url());
argv.push_back(completed_url);
activity_logger->LogEvent("blinkSetAttribute", argv.size(), argv.data());
}
WebFrameLoadType frame_load_type = WebFrameLoadType::kStandard;
if (set_location_policy == SetLocationPolicy::kReplaceThisFrame)
frame_load_type = WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem;
dom_window_->GetFrame()->ScheduleNavigation(*current_window->document(),
completed_url, frame_load_type,
UserGestureStatus::kNone);
}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void S_AL_CloseMusicFiles(void)
{
if(intro_stream)
{
S_CodecCloseStream(intro_stream);
intro_stream = NULL;
}
if(mus_stream)
{
S_CodecCloseStream(mus_stream);
mus_stream = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsSupportedDownload(const content::DownloadItem& item,
const base::FilePath& target_path,
DownloadCheckResultReason* reason,
ClientDownloadRequest::DownloadType* type) {
if (item.GetUrlChain().empty()) {
*reason = REASON_EMPTY_URL_CHAIN;
return false;
}
const GURL& final_url = item.GetUrlChain().back();
if (!final_url.is_valid() || final_url.is_empty()) {
*reason = REASON_INVALID_URL;
return false;
}
if (!download_protection_util::IsSupportedBinaryFile(target_path)) {
*reason = REASON_NOT_BINARY_FILE;
return false;
}
if ((!final_url.IsStandard() && !final_url.SchemeIsBlob() &&
!final_url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme)) ||
final_url.SchemeIsFile()) {
*reason = REASON_UNSUPPORTED_URL_SCHEME;
return false;
}
*type = download_protection_util::GetDownloadType(target_path);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sg_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
{
Sg_device *sdp;
Sg_fd *sfp;
Sg_request *srp;
int req_pack_id = -1;
sg_io_hdr_t *hp;
struct sg_header *old_hdr = NULL;
int retval = 0;
if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
return -ENXIO;
SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
"sg_read: count=%d\n", (int) count));
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, count))
return -EFAULT;
if (sfp->force_packid && (count >= SZ_SG_HEADER)) {
old_hdr = kmalloc(SZ_SG_HEADER, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!old_hdr)
return -ENOMEM;
if (__copy_from_user(old_hdr, buf, SZ_SG_HEADER)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto free_old_hdr;
}
if (old_hdr->reply_len < 0) {
if (count >= SZ_SG_IO_HDR) {
sg_io_hdr_t *new_hdr;
new_hdr = kmalloc(SZ_SG_IO_HDR, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_hdr) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto free_old_hdr;
}
retval =__copy_from_user
(new_hdr, buf, SZ_SG_IO_HDR);
req_pack_id = new_hdr->pack_id;
kfree(new_hdr);
if (retval) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto free_old_hdr;
}
}
} else
req_pack_id = old_hdr->pack_id;
}
srp = sg_get_rq_mark(sfp, req_pack_id);
if (!srp) { /* now wait on packet to arrive */
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
retval = -ENODEV;
goto free_old_hdr;
}
if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
retval = -EAGAIN;
goto free_old_hdr;
}
retval = wait_event_interruptible(sfp->read_wait,
(atomic_read(&sdp->detaching) ||
(srp = sg_get_rq_mark(sfp, req_pack_id))));
if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching)) {
retval = -ENODEV;
goto free_old_hdr;
}
if (retval) {
/* -ERESTARTSYS as signal hit process */
goto free_old_hdr;
}
}
if (srp->header.interface_id != '\0') {
retval = sg_new_read(sfp, buf, count, srp);
goto free_old_hdr;
}
hp = &srp->header;
if (old_hdr == NULL) {
old_hdr = kmalloc(SZ_SG_HEADER, GFP_KERNEL);
if (! old_hdr) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto free_old_hdr;
}
}
memset(old_hdr, 0, SZ_SG_HEADER);
old_hdr->reply_len = (int) hp->timeout;
old_hdr->pack_len = old_hdr->reply_len; /* old, strange behaviour */
old_hdr->pack_id = hp->pack_id;
old_hdr->twelve_byte =
((srp->data.cmd_opcode >= 0xc0) && (12 == hp->cmd_len)) ? 1 : 0;
old_hdr->target_status = hp->masked_status;
old_hdr->host_status = hp->host_status;
old_hdr->driver_status = hp->driver_status;
if ((CHECK_CONDITION & hp->masked_status) ||
(DRIVER_SENSE & hp->driver_status))
memcpy(old_hdr->sense_buffer, srp->sense_b,
sizeof (old_hdr->sense_buffer));
switch (hp->host_status) {
/* This setup of 'result' is for backward compatibility and is best
ignored by the user who should use target, host + driver status */
case DID_OK:
case DID_PASSTHROUGH:
case DID_SOFT_ERROR:
old_hdr->result = 0;
break;
case DID_NO_CONNECT:
case DID_BUS_BUSY:
case DID_TIME_OUT:
old_hdr->result = EBUSY;
break;
case DID_BAD_TARGET:
case DID_ABORT:
case DID_PARITY:
case DID_RESET:
case DID_BAD_INTR:
old_hdr->result = EIO;
break;
case DID_ERROR:
old_hdr->result = (srp->sense_b[0] == 0 &&
hp->masked_status == GOOD) ? 0 : EIO;
break;
default:
old_hdr->result = EIO;
break;
}
/* Now copy the result back to the user buffer. */
if (count >= SZ_SG_HEADER) {
if (__copy_to_user(buf, old_hdr, SZ_SG_HEADER)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto free_old_hdr;
}
buf += SZ_SG_HEADER;
if (count > old_hdr->reply_len)
count = old_hdr->reply_len;
if (count > SZ_SG_HEADER) {
if (sg_read_oxfer(srp, buf, count - SZ_SG_HEADER)) {
retval = -EFAULT;
goto free_old_hdr;
}
}
} else
count = (old_hdr->result == 0) ? 0 : -EIO;
sg_finish_rem_req(srp);
retval = count;
free_old_hdr:
kfree(old_hdr);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 42,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pdf_run_Tstar(fz_context *ctx, pdf_processor *proc)
{
pdf_run_processor *pr = (pdf_run_processor *)proc;
pdf_gstate *gstate = pr->gstate + pr->gtop;
pdf_tos_newline(&pr->tos, gstate->text.leading);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: validate_exec_list(struct drm_i915_gem_exec_object2 *exec,
int count)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
char __user *ptr = (char __user *)(uintptr_t)exec[i].relocs_ptr;
int length; /* limited by fault_in_pages_readable() */
/* First check for malicious input causing overflow */
if (exec[i].relocation_count >
INT_MAX / sizeof(struct drm_i915_gem_relocation_entry))
return -EINVAL;
length = exec[i].relocation_count *
sizeof(struct drm_i915_gem_relocation_entry);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, ptr, length))
return -EFAULT;
/* we may also need to update the presumed offsets */
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ptr, length))
return -EFAULT;
if (fault_in_pages_readable(ptr, length))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_do_execbuffer()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->num_cliprects from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 432e58ed ("drm/i915: Avoid
allocation for execbuffer object list").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,798 |
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