instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Bitmap_copyPixelsFromBuffer(JNIEnv* env, jobject,
jlong bitmapHandle, jobject jbuffer) {
SkBitmap* bitmap = reinterpret_cast<SkBitmap*>(bitmapHandle);
SkAutoLockPixels alp(*bitmap);
void* dst = bitmap->getPixels();
if (NULL != dst) {
android::AutoBufferPointer abp(env, jbuffer, JNI_FALSE);
memcpy(dst, abp.pointer(), bitmap->getSize());
bitmap->notifyPixelsChanged();
}
}
Commit Message: Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MetricsLog::WriteMetricsEnableDefault(EnableMetricsDefault metrics_default,
SystemProfileProto* system_profile) {
if (client_->IsReportingPolicyManaged()) {
system_profile->set_uma_default_state(
SystemProfileProto_UmaDefaultState_POLICY_FORCED_ENABLED);
return;
}
switch (metrics_default) {
case EnableMetricsDefault::DEFAULT_UNKNOWN:
break;
case EnableMetricsDefault::OPT_IN:
system_profile->set_uma_default_state(
SystemProfileProto_UmaDefaultState_OPT_IN);
break;
case EnableMetricsDefault::OPT_OUT:
system_profile->set_uma_default_state(
SystemProfileProto_UmaDefaultState_OPT_OUT);
}
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,463 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shutdown_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
struct kvm_run *kvm_run = svm->vcpu.run;
/*
* VMCB is undefined after a SHUTDOWN intercept
* so reinitialize it.
*/
clear_page(svm->vmcb);
init_vmcb(svm);
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int open_url(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext **pb, const char *url,
AVDictionary *opts, AVDictionary *opts2, int *is_http)
{
HLSContext *c = s->priv_data;
AVDictionary *tmp = NULL;
const char *proto_name = NULL;
int ret;
av_dict_copy(&tmp, opts, 0);
av_dict_copy(&tmp, opts2, 0);
if (av_strstart(url, "crypto", NULL)) {
if (url[6] == '+' || url[6] == ':')
proto_name = avio_find_protocol_name(url + 7);
}
if (!proto_name)
proto_name = avio_find_protocol_name(url);
if (!proto_name)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (av_strstart(proto_name, "file", NULL)) {
if (strcmp(c->allowed_extensions, "ALL") && !av_match_ext(url, c->allowed_extensions)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Filename extension of \'%s\' is not a common multimedia extension, blocked for security reasons.\n"
"If you wish to override this adjust allowed_extensions, you can set it to \'ALL\' to allow all\n",
url);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
} else if (av_strstart(proto_name, "http", NULL)) {
;
} else
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!strncmp(proto_name, url, strlen(proto_name)) && url[strlen(proto_name)] == ':')
;
else if (av_strstart(url, "crypto", NULL) && !strncmp(proto_name, url + 7, strlen(proto_name)) && url[7 + strlen(proto_name)] == ':')
;
else if (strcmp(proto_name, "file") || !strncmp(url, "file,", 5))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
ret = s->io_open(s, pb, url, AVIO_FLAG_READ, &tmp);
if (ret >= 0) {
char *new_cookies = NULL;
if (!(s->flags & AVFMT_FLAG_CUSTOM_IO))
av_opt_get(*pb, "cookies", AV_OPT_SEARCH_CHILDREN, (uint8_t**)&new_cookies);
if (new_cookies) {
av_free(c->cookies);
c->cookies = new_cookies;
}
av_dict_set(&opts, "cookies", c->cookies, 0);
}
av_dict_free(&tmp);
if (is_http)
*is_http = av_strstart(proto_name, "http", NULL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 61,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
int i;
if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
svm->asid_generation = 0;
mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
rdmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, to_svm(vcpu)->host.gs_base);
#endif
savesegment(fs, svm->host.fs);
savesegment(gs, svm->host.gs);
svm->host.ldt = kvm_read_ldt();
for (i = 0; i < NR_HOST_SAVE_USER_MSRS; i++)
rdmsrl(host_save_user_msrs[i], svm->host_user_msrs[i]);
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSCRATEMSR) &&
svm->tsc_ratio != __this_cpu_read(current_tsc_ratio)) {
__this_cpu_write(current_tsc_ratio, svm->tsc_ratio);
wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO, svm->tsc_ratio);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char_init(GifCtx *ctx)
{
ctx->a_count = 0;
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 91,493 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera3Device::RequestThread::clear(
NotificationListener *listener,
/*out*/int64_t *lastFrameNumber) {
Mutex::Autolock l(mRequestLock);
ALOGV("RequestThread::%s:", __FUNCTION__);
mRepeatingRequests.clear();
if (listener != NULL) {
for (RequestList::iterator it = mRequestQueue.begin();
it != mRequestQueue.end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->mInputStream != NULL) {
camera3_stream_buffer_t inputBuffer;
status_t res = (*it)->mInputStream->getInputBuffer(&inputBuffer);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGW("%s: %d: couldn't get input buffer while clearing the request "
"list: %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, strerror(-res), res);
} else {
res = (*it)->mInputStream->returnInputBuffer(inputBuffer);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: %d: couldn't return input buffer while clearing the request "
"list: %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, strerror(-res), res);
}
}
}
(*it)->mResultExtras.frameNumber = mFrameNumber++;
listener->notifyError(ICameraDeviceCallbacks::ERROR_CAMERA_REQUEST,
(*it)->mResultExtras);
}
}
mRequestQueue.clear();
mTriggerMap.clear();
if (lastFrameNumber != NULL) {
*lastFrameNumber = mRepeatingLastFrameNumber;
}
mRepeatingLastFrameNumber = NO_IN_FLIGHT_REPEATING_FRAMES;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,027 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_genurlauth(char *tag)
{
struct mboxkey *mboxkey_db;
int first = 1;
int c, r;
static struct buf arg1, arg2;
struct imapurl url;
char newkey[MBOX_KEY_LEN];
char *urlauth = NULL;
const char *key;
size_t keylen;
unsigned char token[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE+1]; /* +1 for algorithm */
unsigned int token_len;
mbentry_t *mbentry = NULL;
time_t now = time(NULL);
r = mboxkey_open(imapd_userid, MBOXKEY_CREATE, &mboxkey_db);
if (r) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s NO Cannot open mailbox key db for %s: %s\r\n",
tag, imapd_userid, error_message(r));
return;
}
do {
char *intname = NULL;
c = getastring(imapd_in, imapd_out, &arg1);
if (c != ' ') {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Missing required argument to Genurlauth\r\n",
tag);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
return;
}
c = getword(imapd_in, &arg2);
if (strcasecmp(arg2.s, "INTERNAL")) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Unknown auth mechanism to Genurlauth %s\r\n",
tag, arg2.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
return;
}
r = imapurl_fromURL(&url, arg1.s);
/* validate the URL */
if (r || !url.user || !url.server || !url.mailbox || !url.uid ||
(url.section && !*url.section) || !url.urlauth.access) {
r = IMAP_BADURL;
} else if (strcmp(url.user, imapd_userid)) {
/* not using currently authorized user's namespace */
r = IMAP_BADURL;
} else if (strcmp(url.server, config_servername)) {
/* wrong server */
r = IMAP_BADURL;
} else if (url.urlauth.expire &&
url.urlauth.expire < mktime(gmtime(&now))) {
/* already expired */
r = IMAP_BADURL;
}
if (r) goto err;
intname = mboxname_from_external(url.mailbox, &imapd_namespace, imapd_userid);
r = mlookup(NULL, NULL, intname, &mbentry);
if (r) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Poorly specified URL to Genurlauth %s\r\n",
tag, arg1.s);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
free(url.freeme);
free(intname);
return;
}
if (mbentry->mbtype & MBTYPE_REMOTE) {
/* XXX proxy to backend */
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbentry);
free(url.freeme);
free(intname);
continue;
}
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbentry);
/* lookup key */
r = mboxkey_read(mboxkey_db, intname, &key, &keylen);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "DBERROR: error fetching mboxkey: %s",
cyrusdb_strerror(r));
}
else if (!key) {
/* create a new key */
RAND_bytes((unsigned char *) newkey, MBOX_KEY_LEN);
key = newkey;
keylen = MBOX_KEY_LEN;
r = mboxkey_write(mboxkey_db, intname, key, keylen);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "DBERROR: error writing new mboxkey: %s",
cyrusdb_strerror(r));
}
}
if (r) {
err:
eatline(imapd_in, c);
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s NO Error authorizing %s: %s\r\n",
tag, arg1.s, cyrusdb_strerror(r));
free(url.freeme);
free(intname);
return;
}
/* first byte is the algorithm used to create token */
token[0] = URLAUTH_ALG_HMAC_SHA1;
HMAC(EVP_sha1(), key, keylen, (unsigned char *) arg1.s, strlen(arg1.s),
token+1, &token_len);
token_len++;
urlauth = xrealloc(urlauth, strlen(arg1.s) + 10 +
2 * (EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE+1) + 1);
strcpy(urlauth, arg1.s);
strcat(urlauth, ":internal:");
bin_to_hex(token, token_len, urlauth+strlen(urlauth), BH_LOWER);
if (first) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* GENURLAUTH");
first = 0;
}
(void)prot_putc(' ', imapd_out);
prot_printstring(imapd_out, urlauth);
free(intname);
free(url.freeme);
} while (c == ' ');
if (!first) prot_printf(imapd_out, "\r\n");
if (c == '\r') c = prot_getc(imapd_in);
if (c != '\n') {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Unexpected extra arguments to GENURLAUTH\r\n", tag);
eatline(imapd_in, c);
}
else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
free(urlauth);
mboxkey_close(mboxkey_db);
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void destroy_phar_data_only(zval *zv) /* {{{ */
{
phar_archive_data *phar_data = (phar_archive_data *) Z_PTR_P(zv);
if (EG(exception) || --phar_data->refcount < 0) {
phar_destroy_phar_data(phar_data);
}
}
/* }}}*/
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 11,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_file_permissions_reduced(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, const char *fname, int len,
gx_io_device *iodev, const char *permitgroup)
{
long i;
ref *permitlist = NULL;
/* an empty string (first character == 0) if '\' character is */
/* recognized as a file name separator as on DOS & Windows */
const char *win_sep2 = "\\";
bool use_windows_pathsep = (gs_file_name_check_separator(win_sep2, 1, win_sep2) == 1);
uint plen = gp_file_name_parents(fname, len);
/* we're protecting arbitrary file system accesses, not Postscript device accesses.
* Although, note that %pipe% is explicitly checked for and disallowed elsewhere
*/
if (iodev != iodev_default(imemory)) {
return 0;
}
/* Assuming a reduced file name. */
if (dict_find_string(&(i_ctx_p->userparams), permitgroup, &permitlist) <= 0)
return 0; /* if Permissions not found, just allow access */
for (i=0; i<r_size(permitlist); i++) {
ref permitstring;
const string_match_params win_filename_params = {
'*', '?', '\\', true, true /* ignore case & '/' == '\\' */
};
const byte *permstr;
uint permlen;
int cwd_len = 0;
if (array_get(imemory, permitlist, i, &permitstring) < 0 ||
r_type(&permitstring) != t_string
)
break; /* any problem, just fail */
permstr = permitstring.value.bytes;
permlen = r_size(&permitstring);
/*
* Check if any file name is permitted with "*".
*/
if (permlen == 1 && permstr[0] == '*')
return 0; /* success */
/*
* If the filename starts with parent references,
* the permission element must start with same number of parent references.
*/
if (plen != 0 && plen != gp_file_name_parents((const char *)permstr, permlen))
continue;
cwd_len = gp_file_name_cwds((const char *)permstr, permlen);
/*
* If the permission starts with "./", absolute paths
* are not permitted.
*/
if (cwd_len > 0 && gp_file_name_is_absolute(fname, len))
continue;
/*
* If the permission starts with "./", relative paths
* with no "./" are allowed as well as with "./".
* 'fname' has no "./" because it is reduced.
*/
if (string_match( (const unsigned char*) fname, len,
permstr + cwd_len, permlen - cwd_len,
use_windows_pathsep ? &win_filename_params : NULL))
return 0; /* success */
}
/* not found */
return gs_error_invalidfileaccess;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 16,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cifs_get_tcon(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct smb_vol *volume_info)
{
int rc, xid;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon;
tcon = cifs_find_tcon(ses, volume_info->UNC);
if (tcon) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Found match on UNC path\n");
/* existing tcon already has a reference */
cifs_put_smb_ses(ses);
if (tcon->seal != volume_info->seal)
cifs_dbg(VFS, "transport encryption setting conflicts with existing tid\n");
return tcon;
}
if (!ses->server->ops->tree_connect) {
rc = -ENOSYS;
goto out_fail;
}
tcon = tconInfoAlloc();
if (tcon == NULL) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_fail;
}
tcon->ses = ses;
if (volume_info->password) {
tcon->password = kstrdup(volume_info->password, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcon->password) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_fail;
}
}
/*
* BB Do we need to wrap session_mutex around this TCon call and Unix
* SetFS as we do on SessSetup and reconnect?
*/
xid = get_xid();
rc = ses->server->ops->tree_connect(xid, ses, volume_info->UNC, tcon,
volume_info->local_nls);
free_xid(xid);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Tcon rc = %d\n", rc);
if (rc)
goto out_fail;
if (volume_info->nodfs) {
tcon->Flags &= ~SMB_SHARE_IS_IN_DFS;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "DFS disabled (%d)\n", tcon->Flags);
}
tcon->seal = volume_info->seal;
/*
* We can have only one retry value for a connection to a share so for
* resources mounted more than once to the same server share the last
* value passed in for the retry flag is used.
*/
tcon->retry = volume_info->retry;
tcon->nocase = volume_info->nocase;
tcon->local_lease = volume_info->local_lease;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tcon->pending_opens);
spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_add(&tcon->tcon_list, &ses->tcon_list);
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
cifs_fscache_get_super_cookie(tcon);
return tcon;
out_fail:
tconInfoFree(tcon);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int usb_dev_thaw(struct device *dev)
{
return usb_resume(dev, PMSG_THAW);
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 75,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(request_rec *) ap_sub_req_method_uri(const char *method,
const char *new_uri,
const request_rec *r,
ap_filter_t *next_filter)
{
request_rec *rnew;
/* Initialise res, to avoid a gcc warning */
int res = HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
char *udir;
rnew = make_sub_request(r, next_filter);
/* would be nicer to pass "method" to ap_set_sub_req_protocol */
rnew->method = method;
rnew->method_number = ap_method_number_of(method);
if (new_uri[0] == '/') {
ap_parse_uri(rnew, new_uri);
}
else {
udir = ap_make_dirstr_parent(rnew->pool, r->uri);
udir = ap_escape_uri(rnew->pool, udir); /* re-escape it */
ap_parse_uri(rnew, ap_make_full_path(rnew->pool, udir, new_uri));
}
/* We cannot return NULL without violating the API. So just turn this
* subrequest into a 500 to indicate the failure. */
if (ap_is_recursion_limit_exceeded(r)) {
rnew->status = HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
return rnew;
}
/* lookup_uri
* If the content can be served by the quick_handler, we can
* safely bypass request_internal processing.
*
* If next_filter is NULL we are expecting to be
* internal_fast_redirect'ed to the subrequest, or the subrequest will
* never be invoked. We need to make sure that the quickhandler is not
* invoked by any lookups. Since an internal_fast_redirect will always
* occur too late for the quickhandler to handle the request.
*/
if (next_filter) {
res = ap_run_quick_handler(rnew, 1);
}
if (next_filter == NULL || res != OK) {
if ((res = ap_process_request_internal(rnew))) {
rnew->status = res;
}
}
return rnew;
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2015-3183 (cve.mitre.org)
Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4)
with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook.
Submitted by: breser
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NodeIterator::NodeIterator(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> rootNode, unsigned whatToShow, PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<NodeFilter> filter)
: NodeIteratorBase(rootNode, whatToShow, filter)
, m_referenceNode(root(), true)
{
root()->document().attachNodeIterator(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix detached Attr nodes interaction with NodeIterator
- Don't register NodeIterator to document when attaching to Attr node.
-- NodeIterator is registered to its document to receive updateForNodeRemoval notifications.
-- However it wouldn't make sense on Attr nodes, as they never have children.
BUG=572537
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1577213003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#369687}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hw_roc_done(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct mac80211_hwsim_data *hwsim =
container_of(work, struct mac80211_hwsim_data, roc_done.work);
mutex_lock(&hwsim->mutex);
ieee80211_remain_on_channel_expired(hwsim->hw);
hwsim->tmp_chan = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&hwsim->mutex);
wiphy_dbg(hwsim->hw->wiphy, "hwsim ROC expired\n");
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mt_ioctl_trans(unsigned int fd, unsigned int cmd, void __user *argp)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
struct mtget get;
struct mtget32 __user *umget32;
struct mtpos pos;
struct mtpos32 __user *upos32;
unsigned long kcmd;
void *karg;
int err = 0;
switch(cmd) {
case MTIOCPOS32:
kcmd = MTIOCPOS;
karg = &pos;
break;
default: /* MTIOCGET32 */
kcmd = MTIOCGET;
karg = &get;
break;
}
set_fs (KERNEL_DS);
err = sys_ioctl (fd, kcmd, (unsigned long)karg);
set_fs (old_fs);
if (err)
return err;
switch (cmd) {
case MTIOCPOS32:
upos32 = argp;
err = __put_user(pos.mt_blkno, &upos32->mt_blkno);
break;
case MTIOCGET32:
umget32 = argp;
err = __put_user(get.mt_type, &umget32->mt_type);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_resid, &umget32->mt_resid);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_dsreg, &umget32->mt_dsreg);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_gstat, &umget32->mt_gstat);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_erreg, &umget32->mt_erreg);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_fileno, &umget32->mt_fileno);
err |= __put_user(get.mt_blkno, &umget32->mt_blkno);
break;
}
return err ? -EFAULT: 0;
}
Commit Message: fs/compat_ioctl.c: VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE missing error check
The compat ioctl for VIDEO_SET_SPU_PALETTE was missing an error check
while converting ioctl arguments. This could lead to leaking kernel
stack contents into userspace.
Patch extracted from existing fix in grsecurity.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 32,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RAnalValue *anal_fill_im(RAnal *anal, st32 v) {
RAnalValue *ret = r_anal_value_new ();
ret->imm = v;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9903 - oobread in RAnal.sh
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void default_resize_settings(struct iw_resize_settings *rs)
{
int i;
rs->family = IW_RESIZETYPE_AUTO;
rs->edge_policy = IW_EDGE_POLICY_STANDARD;
rs->blur_factor = 1.0;
rs->translate = 0.0;
for(i=0;i<3;i++) {
rs->channel_offset[i] = 0.0;
}
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 64,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_addr_less_start (RBinJavaField *method, ut64 addr) {
ut64 start = r_bin_java_get_method_code_offset (method);
return (addr < start);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10296 - Heap out of bounds read in java_switch_op()
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type, void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack = arg;
struct sctp_chunk *last_asconf = asoc->addip_last_asconf;
struct sctp_chunk *abort;
struct sctp_paramhdr *err_param = NULL;
sctp_addiphdr_t *addip_hdr;
__u32 sent_serial, rcvd_serial;
if (!sctp_vtag_verify(asconf_ack, asoc)) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPORT_BAD_TAG,
SCTP_NULL());
return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
}
/* ADD-IP, Section 4.1.2:
* This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using
* the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk
* is received unauthenticated it MUST be silently discarded as
* described in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth].
*/
if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth)
return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
/* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */
if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, sizeof(sctp_addip_chunk_t)))
return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
commands);
addip_hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)asconf_ack->skb->data;
rcvd_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial);
/* Verify the ASCONF-ACK chunk before processing it. */
if (!sctp_verify_asconf(asoc, asconf_ack, false, &err_param))
return sctp_sf_violation_paramlen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
(void *)err_param, commands);
if (last_asconf) {
addip_hdr = (sctp_addiphdr_t *)last_asconf->subh.addip_hdr;
sent_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial);
} else {
sent_serial = asoc->addip_serial - 1;
}
/* D0) If an endpoint receives an ASCONF-ACK that is greater than or
* equal to the next serial number to be used but no ASCONF chunk is
* outstanding the endpoint MUST ABORT the association. Note that a
* sequence number is greater than if it is no more than 2^^31-1
* larger than the current sequence number (using serial arithmetic).
*/
if (ADDIP_SERIAL_gte(rcvd_serial, sent_serial + 1) &&
!(asoc->addip_last_asconf)) {
abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, asconf_ack,
sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t));
if (abort) {
sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK, 0);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
}
/* We are going to ABORT, so we might as well stop
* processing the rest of the chunks in the packet.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T4_RTO));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DISCARD_PACKET, SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ECONNABORTED));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
SCTP_DEC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT;
}
if ((rcvd_serial == sent_serial) && asoc->addip_last_asconf) {
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T4_RTO));
if (!sctp_process_asconf_ack((struct sctp_association *)asoc,
asconf_ack)) {
/* Successfully processed ASCONF_ACK. We can
* release the next asconf if we have one.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SEND_NEXT_ASCONF,
SCTP_NULL());
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
abort = sctp_make_abort(asoc, asconf_ack,
sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t));
if (abort) {
sctp_init_cause(abort, SCTP_ERROR_RSRC_LOW, 0);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY,
SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
}
/* We are going to ABORT, so we might as well stop
* processing the rest of the chunks in the packet.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_DISCARD_PACKET, SCTP_NULL());
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ECONNABORTED));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_ASSOC_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_ASCONF_ACK));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
SCTP_DEC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB);
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT;
}
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...
-------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
<----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
[...]
---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.
We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.
One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.
Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
Fixes: 2e3216cd54b1 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~SelectionPin()
{
if (d && (pos || anc))
{
QTextCursor mv(d->textCursor());
mv.setPosition(anc);
mv.setPosition(pos, QTextCursor::KeepAnchor);
d->setTextCursor(mv);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AwContents::HideGeolocationPrompt(const GURL& origin) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
bool removed_current_outstanding_callback = false;
std::list<OriginCallback>::iterator it = pending_geolocation_prompts_.begin();
while (it != pending_geolocation_prompts_.end()) {
if ((*it).first == origin.GetOrigin()) {
if (it == pending_geolocation_prompts_.begin()) {
removed_current_outstanding_callback = true;
}
it = pending_geolocation_prompts_.erase(it);
} else {
++it;
}
}
if (removed_current_outstanding_callback) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jobject> j_ref = java_ref_.get(env);
if (j_ref.obj()) {
devtools_instrumentation::ScopedEmbedderCallbackTask embedder_callback(
"onGeolocationPermissionsHidePrompt");
Java_AwContents_onGeolocationPermissionsHidePrompt(env, j_ref.obj());
}
if (!pending_geolocation_prompts_.empty()) {
ShowGeolocationPromptHelper(java_ref_,
pending_geolocation_prompts_.front().first);
}
}
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wake_affine_idle(int this_cpu, int prev_cpu, int sync)
{
/*
* If this_cpu is idle, it implies the wakeup is from interrupt
* context. Only allow the move if cache is shared. Otherwise an
* interrupt intensive workload could force all tasks onto one
* node depending on the IO topology or IRQ affinity settings.
*
* If the prev_cpu is idle and cache affine then avoid a migration.
* There is no guarantee that the cache hot data from an interrupt
* is more important than cache hot data on the prev_cpu and from
* a cpufreq perspective, it's better to have higher utilisation
* on one CPU.
*/
if (available_idle_cpu(this_cpu) && cpus_share_cache(this_cpu, prev_cpu))
return available_idle_cpu(prev_cpu) ? prev_cpu : this_cpu;
if (sync && cpu_rq(this_cpu)->nr_running == 1)
return this_cpu;
return nr_cpumask_bits;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void add_pixels_clamped4_c(const int16_t *block, uint8_t *av_restrict pixels,
int line_size)
{
int i;
/* read the pixels */
for(i=0;i<4;i++) {
pixels[0] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[0] + block[0]);
pixels[1] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[1] + block[1]);
pixels[2] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[2] + block[2]);
pixels[3] = av_clip_uint8(pixels[3] + block[3]);
pixels += line_size;
block += 8;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::marginBefore() const
{
switch (style()->writingMode()) {
case TopToBottomWritingMode:
return m_marginTop;
case BottomToTopWritingMode:
return m_marginBottom;
case LeftToRightWritingMode:
return m_marginLeft;
case RightToLeftWritingMode:
return m_marginRight;
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return m_marginTop;
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int load_state_from_tss16(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct tss_segment_16 *tss)
{
int ret;
u8 cpl;
ctxt->_eip = tss->ip;
ctxt->eflags = tss->flag | 2;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->ax;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->cx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = tss->dx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX) = tss->bx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = tss->sp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP) = tss->bp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI) = tss->si;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI) = tss->di;
/*
* SDM says that segment selectors are loaded before segment
* descriptors
*/
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ldt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
cpl = tss->cs & 3;
/*
* Now load segment descriptors. If fault happens at this stage
* it is handled in a context of new task
*/
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ldt, VCPU_SREG_LDTR, cpl,
true, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES, cpl,
true, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl,
true, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS, cpl,
true, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS, cpl,
true, NULL);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int32_t virtio_net_flush_tx(VirtIONetQueue *q)
{
VirtIONet *n = q->n;
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
VirtQueueElement elem;
int32_t num_packets = 0;
int queue_index = vq2q(virtio_get_queue_index(q->tx_vq));
if (!(vdev->status & VIRTIO_CONFIG_S_DRIVER_OK)) {
return num_packets;
}
assert(vdev->vm_running);
if (q->async_tx.elem.out_num) {
virtio_queue_set_notification(q->tx_vq, 0);
return num_packets;
}
while (virtqueue_pop(q->tx_vq, &elem)) {
ssize_t ret, len;
unsigned int out_num = elem.out_num;
struct iovec *out_sg = &elem.out_sg[0];
struct iovec sg[VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE];
if (out_num < 1) {
error_report("virtio-net header not in first element");
exit(1);
}
/*
* If host wants to see the guest header as is, we can
* pass it on unchanged. Otherwise, copy just the parts
* that host is interested in.
*/
assert(n->host_hdr_len <= n->guest_hdr_len);
if (n->host_hdr_len != n->guest_hdr_len) {
unsigned sg_num = iov_copy(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg),
out_sg, out_num,
0, n->host_hdr_len);
sg_num += iov_copy(sg + sg_num, ARRAY_SIZE(sg) - sg_num,
out_sg, out_num,
n->guest_hdr_len, -1);
out_num = sg_num;
out_sg = sg;
}
len = n->guest_hdr_len;
ret = qemu_sendv_packet_async(qemu_get_subqueue(n->nic, queue_index),
out_sg, out_num, virtio_net_tx_complete);
if (ret == 0) {
virtio_queue_set_notification(q->tx_vq, 0);
q->async_tx.elem = elem;
q->async_tx.len = len;
return -EBUSY;
}
len += ret;
virtqueue_push(q->tx_vq, &elem, 0);
virtio_notify(vdev, q->tx_vq);
if (++num_packets >= n->tx_burst) {
break;
}
}
return num_packets;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,830 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: account_type_from_pwent (struct passwd *pwent)
{
struct group *grp;
gint i;
if (pwent->pw_uid == 0) {
g_debug ("user is root so account type is administrator");
return ACCOUNT_TYPE_ADMINISTRATOR;
}
grp = getgrnam (ADMIN_GROUP);
if (grp == NULL) {
g_debug (ADMIN_GROUP " group not found");
return ACCOUNT_TYPE_STANDARD;
}
for (i = 0; grp->gr_mem[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (g_strcmp0 (grp->gr_mem[i], pwent->pw_name) == 0) {
return ACCOUNT_TYPE_ADMINISTRATOR;
}
}
return ACCOUNT_TYPE_STANDARD;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 4,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPagePrivate::zoomToInitialScaleOnLoad()
{
#if DEBUG_WEBPAGE_LOAD
BBLOG(Platform::LogLevelInfo, "WebPagePrivate::zoomToInitialScaleOnLoad");
#endif
bool needsLayout = false;
if (m_shouldUseFixedDesktopMode)
needsLayout = setViewMode(FixedDesktop);
else
needsLayout = setViewMode(Desktop);
if (needsLayout) {
setNeedsLayout();
}
if (contentsSize().isEmpty()) {
#if DEBUG_WEBPAGE_LOAD
BBLOG(Platform::LogLevelInfo, "WebPagePrivate::zoomToInitialScaleOnLoad content is empty!");
#endif
requestLayoutIfNeeded();
notifyTransformedContentsSizeChanged();
return;
}
bool performedZoom = false;
bool shouldZoom = !m_userPerformedManualZoom;
if (m_mainFrame && m_mainFrame->loader() && isBackForwardLoadType(m_mainFrame->loader()->loadType()))
shouldZoom = false;
if (shouldZoom && shouldZoomToInitialScaleOnLoad()) {
FloatPoint anchor = centerOfVisibleContentsRect();
if (!scrollPosition().x())
anchor.setX(0);
if (!scrollPosition().y())
anchor.setY(0);
performedZoom = zoomAboutPoint(initialScale(), anchor);
}
requestLayoutIfNeeded();
if (!performedZoom) {
notifyTransformedContentsSizeChanged();
}
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct rpc_task *rpc_run_bc_task(struct rpc_rqst *req,
const struct rpc_call_ops *tk_ops)
{
struct rpc_task *task;
struct xdr_buf *xbufp = &req->rq_snd_buf;
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.callback_ops = tk_ops,
};
dprintk("RPC: rpc_run_bc_task req= %p\n", req);
/*
* Create an rpc_task to send the data
*/
task = rpc_new_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
xprt_free_bc_request(req);
goto out;
}
task->tk_rqstp = req;
/*
* Set up the xdr_buf length.
* This also indicates that the buffer is XDR encoded already.
*/
xbufp->len = xbufp->head[0].iov_len + xbufp->page_len +
xbufp->tail[0].iov_len;
task->tk_action = call_bc_transmit;
atomic_inc(&task->tk_count);
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&task->tk_count) != 2);
rpc_execute(task);
out:
dprintk("RPC: rpc_run_bc_task: task= %p\n", task);
return task;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: n_shell_variables ()
{
VAR_CONTEXT *vc;
int n;
for (n = 0, vc = shell_variables; vc; vc = vc->down)
n += HASH_ENTRIES (vc->table);
return n;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 17,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntSize UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Size() const {
return IntSize(paint_image_.width(), paint_image_.height());
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int phar_separate_entry_fp(phar_entry_info *entry, char **error TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream *fp;
phar_entry_info *link;
if (FAILURE == phar_open_entry_fp(entry, error, 1 TSRMLS_CC)) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (entry->fp_type == PHAR_MOD) {
return SUCCESS;
}
fp = php_stream_fopen_tmpfile();
if (fp == NULL) {
spprintf(error, 0, "phar error: unable to create temporary file");
return FAILURE;
}
phar_seek_efp(entry, 0, SEEK_SET, 0, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
link = phar_get_link_source(entry TSRMLS_CC);
if (!link) {
link = entry;
}
if (SUCCESS != phar_stream_copy_to_stream(phar_get_efp(link, 0 TSRMLS_CC), fp, link->uncompressed_filesize, NULL)) {
if (error) {
spprintf(error, 4096, "phar error: cannot separate entry file \"%s\" contents in phar archive \"%s\" for write access", entry->filename, entry->phar->fname);
}
return FAILURE;
}
if (entry->link) {
efree(entry->link);
entry->link = NULL;
entry->tar_type = (entry->is_tar ? TAR_FILE : '\0');
}
entry->offset = 0;
entry->fp = fp;
entry->fp_type = PHAR_MOD;
entry->is_modified = 1;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jbig2_decode_generic_region_TPGDON(Jbig2Ctx *ctx,
Jbig2Segment *segment,
const Jbig2GenericRegionParams *params, Jbig2ArithState *as, Jbig2Image *image, Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats)
{
switch (params->GBTEMPLATE) {
case 0:
return jbig2_decode_generic_template0_TPGDON(ctx, segment, params, as, image, GB_stats);
case 1:
return jbig2_decode_generic_template1_TPGDON(ctx, segment, params, as, image, GB_stats);
case 2:
return jbig2_decode_generic_template2_TPGDON(ctx, segment, params, as, image, GB_stats);
case 3:
return jbig2_decode_generic_template3_TPGDON(ctx, segment, params, as, image, GB_stats);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GpuDataManager::RemoveGpuInfoUpdateCallback(Callback0::Type* callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
std::set<Callback0::Type*>::iterator i =
gpu_info_update_callbacks_.find(callback);
if (i != gpu_info_update_callbacks_.end()) {
gpu_info_update_callbacks_.erase(i);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 98,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Render_Text( int num_indices,
int first_index )
{
int start_x, start_y, step_x, step_y, x, y;
int i;
FT_Size size;
const char* p;
const char* pEnd;
num_indices = num_indices; /* pacify compiler */
error = FTDemo_Get_Size( handle, &size );
if ( error )
{
/* probably a non-existent bitmap font size */
return error;
}
INIT_SIZE( size, start_x, start_y, step_x, step_y, x, y );
i = first_index;
p = (const char*)Text;
pEnd = p + strlen( (const char*)Text );
while ( i > 0 )
{
utf8_next( &p, pEnd );
i--;
}
while ( num_indices != 0 )
{
FT_UInt gindex;
int ch;
ch = utf8_next( &p, pEnd );
if ( ch < 0 )
break;
gindex = FTDemo_Get_Index( handle, ch );
error = FTDemo_Draw_Index( handle, display, gindex, &x, &y );
if ( error )
status.Fail++;
else
{
/* Draw_Index adds one pixel space */
x--;
if ( X_TOO_LONG( x, size, display ) )
{
x = start_x;
y += step_y;
if ( Y_TOO_LONG( y, size, display ) )
break;
}
}
if ( num_indices > 0 )
num_indices -= 1;
}
return FT_Err_Ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Dual_Project( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Pos dx,
FT_Pos dy )
{
return TT_DotFix14( dx, dy,
exc->GS.dualVector.x,
exc->GS.dualVector.y );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *FLTGetFeatureIdCommonExpression(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode, layerObj *lp)
{
char *pszExpression = NULL;
int nTokens = 0, i=0, bString=0;
char **tokens = NULL;
const char *pszAttribute=NULL;
#if defined(USE_WMS_SVR) || defined(USE_WFS_SVR) || defined(USE_WCS_SVR) || defined(USE_SOS_SVR)
if (psFilterNode->pszValue) {
pszAttribute = msOWSLookupMetadata(&(lp->metadata), "OFG", "featureid");
if (pszAttribute) {
tokens = msStringSplit(psFilterNode->pszValue,',', &nTokens);
if (tokens && nTokens > 0) {
for (i=0; i<nTokens; i++) {
char *pszTmp = NULL;
int bufferSize = 0;
const char* pszId = tokens[i];
const char* pszDot = strchr(pszId, '.');
if( pszDot )
pszId = pszDot + 1;
if (i == 0) {
if(FLTIsNumeric(pszId) == MS_FALSE)
bString = 1;
}
if (bString) {
bufferSize = 11+strlen(pszId)+strlen(pszAttribute)+1;
pszTmp = (char *)msSmallMalloc(bufferSize);
snprintf(pszTmp, bufferSize, "(\"[%s]\" ==\"%s\")" , pszAttribute, pszId);
} else {
bufferSize = 8+strlen(pszId)+strlen(pszAttribute)+1;
pszTmp = (char *)msSmallMalloc(bufferSize);
snprintf(pszTmp, bufferSize, "([%s] == %s)" , pszAttribute, pszId);
}
if (pszExpression != NULL)
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, " OR ");
else
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, "(");
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, pszTmp);
msFree(pszTmp);
}
msFreeCharArray(tokens, nTokens);
}
}
/* opening and closing brackets are needed for mapserver expressions */
if (pszExpression)
pszExpression = msStringConcatenate(pszExpression, ")");
}
#endif
return pszExpression;
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 69,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
int *valp,
int write, void *data)
{
struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param *param = data;
if (write) {
int val = *negp ? -*lvalp : *lvalp;
if ((param->min && *param->min > val) ||
(param->max && *param->max < val))
return -EINVAL;
*valp = val;
} else {
int val = *valp;
if (val < 0) {
*negp = true;
*lvalp = -(unsigned long)val;
} else {
*negp = false;
*lvalp = (unsigned long)val;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ForwardFourierTransform(FourierInfo *fourier_info,
const Image *image,double *magnitude_pixels,double *phase_pixels,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
const char
*value;
double
*source_pixels;
fftw_complex
*forward_pixels;
fftw_plan
fftw_r2c_plan;
MemoryInfo
*forward_info,
*source_info;
register const IndexPacket
*indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Generate the forward Fourier transform.
*/
source_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) fourier_info->width,
fourier_info->height*sizeof(*source_pixels));
if (source_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
source_pixels=(double *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(source_info);
memset(source_pixels,0,fourier_info->width*fourier_info->height*
sizeof(*source_pixels));
i=0L;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
{
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0L,y,fourier_info->width,1UL,
exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetCacheViewVirtualIndexQueue(image_view);
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->width; x++)
{
switch (fourier_info->channel)
{
case RedChannel:
default:
{
source_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelRed(p);
break;
}
case GreenChannel:
{
source_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelGreen(p);
break;
}
case BlueChannel:
{
source_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelBlue(p);
break;
}
case OpacityChannel:
{
source_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelOpacity(p);
break;
}
case IndexChannel:
{
source_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
break;
}
case GrayChannels:
{
source_pixels[i]=QuantumScale*GetPixelGray(p);
break;
}
}
i++;
p++;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
forward_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) fourier_info->width,
(fourier_info->height/2+1)*sizeof(*forward_pixels));
if (forward_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
source_info=(MemoryInfo *) RelinquishVirtualMemory(source_info);
return(MagickFalse);
}
forward_pixels=(fftw_complex *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(forward_info);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_ForwardFourierTransform)
#endif
fftw_r2c_plan=fftw_plan_dft_r2c_2d(fourier_info->width,fourier_info->height,
source_pixels,forward_pixels,FFTW_ESTIMATE);
fftw_execute_dft_r2c(fftw_r2c_plan,source_pixels,forward_pixels);
fftw_destroy_plan(fftw_r2c_plan);
source_info=(MemoryInfo *) RelinquishVirtualMemory(source_info);
value=GetImageArtifact(image,"fourier:normalize");
if ((value == (const char *) NULL) || (LocaleCompare(value,"forward") == 0))
{
double
gamma;
/*
Normalize Fourier transform.
*/
i=0L;
gamma=PerceptibleReciprocal((double) fourier_info->width*
fourier_info->height);
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->center; x++)
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_COMPLEX_H)
forward_pixels[i]*=gamma;
#else
forward_pixels[i][0]*=gamma;
forward_pixels[i][1]*=gamma;
#endif
i++;
}
}
/*
Generate magnitude and phase (or real and imaginary).
*/
i=0L;
if (fourier_info->modulus != MagickFalse)
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->center; x++)
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=cabs(forward_pixels[i]);
phase_pixels[i]=carg(forward_pixels[i]);
i++;
}
else
for (y=0L; y < (ssize_t) fourier_info->height; y++)
for (x=0L; x < (ssize_t) fourier_info->center; x++)
{
magnitude_pixels[i]=creal(forward_pixels[i]);
phase_pixels[i]=cimag(forward_pixels[i]);
i++;
}
forward_info=(MemoryInfo *) RelinquishVirtualMemory(forward_info);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1588
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 88,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputHandler::didNodeOpenPopup(Node* node)
{
if (!node)
return false;
ASSERT(!node->isInShadowTree());
if (node->hasTagName(HTMLNames::selectTag))
return openSelectPopup(static_cast<HTMLSelectElement*>(node));
if (node->hasTagName(HTMLNames::optionTag)) {
HTMLOptionElement* optionElement = static_cast<HTMLOptionElement*>(node);
return openSelectPopup(optionElement->ownerSelectElement());
}
if (HTMLInputElement* element = node->toInputElement()) {
if (DOMSupport::isDateTimeInputField(element))
return openDatePopup(element, elementType(element));
if (DOMSupport::isColorInputField(element))
return openColorPopup(element);
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int orinoco_ioctl_set_encodeext(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu,
char *extra)
{
struct orinoco_private *priv = ndev_priv(dev);
struct iw_point *encoding = &wrqu->encoding;
struct iw_encode_ext *ext = (struct iw_encode_ext *)extra;
int idx, alg = ext->alg, set_key = 1;
unsigned long flags;
int err = -EINVAL;
if (orinoco_lock(priv, &flags) != 0)
return -EBUSY;
/* Determine and validate the key index */
idx = encoding->flags & IW_ENCODE_INDEX;
if (idx) {
if ((idx < 1) || (idx > 4))
goto out;
idx--;
} else
idx = priv->tx_key;
if (encoding->flags & IW_ENCODE_DISABLED)
alg = IW_ENCODE_ALG_NONE;
if (priv->has_wpa && (alg != IW_ENCODE_ALG_TKIP)) {
/* Clear any TKIP TX key we had */
(void) orinoco_clear_tkip_key(priv, priv->tx_key);
}
if (ext->ext_flags & IW_ENCODE_EXT_SET_TX_KEY) {
priv->tx_key = idx;
set_key = ((alg == IW_ENCODE_ALG_TKIP) ||
(ext->key_len > 0)) ? 1 : 0;
}
if (set_key) {
/* Set the requested key first */
switch (alg) {
case IW_ENCODE_ALG_NONE:
priv->encode_alg = ORINOCO_ALG_NONE;
err = orinoco_set_key(priv, idx, ORINOCO_ALG_NONE,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
break;
case IW_ENCODE_ALG_WEP:
if (ext->key_len <= 0)
goto out;
priv->encode_alg = ORINOCO_ALG_WEP;
err = orinoco_set_key(priv, idx, ORINOCO_ALG_WEP,
ext->key, ext->key_len, NULL, 0);
break;
case IW_ENCODE_ALG_TKIP:
{
u8 *tkip_iv = NULL;
if (!priv->has_wpa ||
(ext->key_len > sizeof(struct orinoco_tkip_key)))
goto out;
priv->encode_alg = ORINOCO_ALG_TKIP;
if (ext->ext_flags & IW_ENCODE_EXT_RX_SEQ_VALID)
tkip_iv = &ext->rx_seq[0];
err = orinoco_set_key(priv, idx, ORINOCO_ALG_TKIP,
ext->key, ext->key_len, tkip_iv,
ORINOCO_SEQ_LEN);
err = __orinoco_hw_set_tkip_key(priv, idx,
ext->ext_flags & IW_ENCODE_EXT_SET_TX_KEY,
priv->keys[idx].key,
tkip_iv, ORINOCO_SEQ_LEN, NULL, 0);
if (err)
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Error %d setting TKIP key"
"\n", dev->name, err);
goto out;
}
default:
goto out;
}
}
err = -EINPROGRESS;
out:
orinoco_unlock(priv, &flags);
return err;
}
Commit Message: orinoco: fix TKIP countermeasure behaviour
Enable the port when disabling countermeasures, and disable it on
enabling countermeasures.
This bug causes the response of the system to certain attacks to be
ineffective.
It also prevents wpa_supplicant from getting scan results, as
wpa_supplicant disables countermeasures on startup - preventing the
hardware from scanning.
wpa_supplicant works with ap_mode=2 despite this bug because the commit
handler re-enables the port.
The log tends to look like:
State: DISCONNECTED -> SCANNING
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=0) - scan timeout 5 seconds
EAPOL: disable timer tick
EAPOL: Supplicant port status: Unauthorized
Scan timeout - try to get results
Failed to get scan results
Failed to get scan results - try scanning again
Setting scan request: 1 sec 0 usec
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=-1) - scan timeout 5 seconds
Failed to initiate AP scan.
Reported by: Giacomo Comes <comes@naic.edu>
Signed-off by: David Kilroy <kilroyd@googlemail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(get_include_path)
{
char *str;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "") == FAILURE) {
return;
}
str = zend_ini_string("include_path", sizeof("include_path"), 0);
if (str == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRING(str, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 4,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CameraClient::copyFrameAndPostCopiedFrame(
int32_t msgType, const sp<ICameraClient>& client,
const sp<IMemoryHeap>& heap, size_t offset, size_t size,
camera_frame_metadata_t *metadata) {
LOG2("copyFrameAndPostCopiedFrame");
sp<MemoryHeapBase> previewBuffer;
if (mPreviewBuffer == 0) {
mPreviewBuffer = new MemoryHeapBase(size, 0, NULL);
} else if (size > mPreviewBuffer->virtualSize()) {
mPreviewBuffer.clear();
mPreviewBuffer = new MemoryHeapBase(size, 0, NULL);
}
if (mPreviewBuffer == 0) {
ALOGE("failed to allocate space for preview buffer");
mLock.unlock();
return;
}
previewBuffer = mPreviewBuffer;
memcpy(previewBuffer->base(), (uint8_t *)heap->base() + offset, size);
sp<MemoryBase> frame = new MemoryBase(previewBuffer, 0, size);
if (frame == 0) {
ALOGE("failed to allocate space for frame callback");
mLock.unlock();
return;
}
mLock.unlock();
client->dataCallback(msgType, frame, metadata);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodLongLongArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodLongLongArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
return;
}
int64_t long_long_arg;
long_long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLongLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->voidMethodLongLongArg(long_long_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: match_option(name, opt, dowild)
char *name;
option_t *opt;
int dowild;
{
int (*match) __P((char *, char **, int));
if (dowild != (opt->type == o_wild))
return 0;
if (!dowild)
return strcmp(name, opt->name) == 0;
match = (int (*) __P((char *, char **, int))) opt->addr;
return (*match)(name, NULL, 0);
}
Commit Message: pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing
When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count
of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len
exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the
buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will
wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point
our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing
characters to memory again.
This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt
security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a
CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158.
This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN.
Reported-by: Lee Campbell <leecam@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xml_track_changes(xmlNode * xml, const char *user, xmlNode *acl_source, bool enforce_acls)
{
xml_accept_changes(xml);
crm_trace("Tracking changes%s to %p", enforce_acls?" with ACLs":"", xml);
set_doc_flag(xml, xpf_tracking);
if(enforce_acls) {
if(acl_source == NULL) {
acl_source = xml;
}
set_doc_flag(xml, xpf_acl_enabled);
__xml_acl_unpack(acl_source, xml, user);
__xml_acl_apply(xml);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( grp != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( r != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( s != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( d != NULL );
ECDSA_VALIDATE_RET( buf != NULL || blen == 0 );
return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, NULL ) );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 169,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl::SetCapabilitiesForTesting(
bool flipped_output_surface) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
DCHECK(impl_on_gpu_);
capabilities_.flipped_output_surface = flipped_output_surface;
auto callback =
base::BindOnce(&SkiaOutputSurfaceImplOnGpu::SetCapabilitiesForTesting,
base::Unretained(impl_on_gpu_.get()), capabilities_);
ScheduleGpuTask(std::move(callback), std::vector<gpu::SyncToken>());
}
Commit Message: SkiaRenderer: Support changing color space
SkiaOutputSurfaceImpl did not handle the color space changing after it
was created previously. The SkSurfaceCharacterization color space was
only set during the first time Reshape() ran when the charactization is
returned from the GPU thread. If the color space was changed later the
SkSurface and SkDDL color spaces no longer matched and draw failed.
Bug: 1009452
Change-Id: Ib6d2083efc7e7eb6f94782342e92a809b69d6fdc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1841811
Reviewed-by: Peng Huang <penghuang@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702946}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 135,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterBGRImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("BGR");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadBGRImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteBGRImage;
entry->raw=MagickTrue;
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Raw blue, green, and red samples");
entry->module=ConstantString("BGR");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("BGRA");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadBGRImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteBGRImage;
entry->raw=MagickTrue;
entry->endian_support=MagickTrue;
entry->description=ConstantString("Raw blue, green, red, and alpha samples");
entry->module=ConstantString("BGR");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserMainLoop::InitializeMainThread() {
TRACE_EVENT0("startup", "BrowserMainLoop::InitializeMainThread");
base::PlatformThread::SetName("CrBrowserMain");
main_thread_.reset(
new BrowserThreadImpl(BrowserThread::UI, base::MessageLoop::current()));
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<ScrollAndScaleSet> LayerTreeHostImpl::ProcessScrollDeltas() {
std::unique_ptr<ScrollAndScaleSet> scroll_info(new ScrollAndScaleSet());
CollectScrollDeltas(scroll_info.get(), active_tree_.get());
CollectScrollbarUpdates(scroll_info.get(), &scrollbar_animation_controllers_);
scroll_info->page_scale_delta =
active_tree_->page_scale_factor()->PullDeltaForMainThread();
scroll_info->top_controls_delta =
active_tree()->top_controls_shown_ratio()->PullDeltaForMainThread();
scroll_info->elastic_overscroll_delta =
active_tree_->elastic_overscroll()->PullDeltaForMainThread();
scroll_info->swap_promises.swap(swap_promises_for_main_thread_scroll_update_);
return scroll_info;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: d_to_lfp(double d)
{
l_fixedpt_t lfp;
lfp.int_partl = (uint32_t)d;
lfp.fractionl = (uint32_t)((d - lfp.int_partl) * UINT_MAX);
lfp.int_partl = htonl(lfp.int_partl);
lfp.fractionl = htonl(lfp.fractionl);
return lfp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,485 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sg_get_version(int __user *p)
{
static const int sg_version_num = 30527;
return put_user(sg_version_num, p);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,368 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbCombineAtopReverseC (CARD32 *dest, CARD32 *src, CARD32 *mask, int width)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 d = READ(dest + i);
CARD32 s = READ(src + i);
CARD32 m = READ(mask + i);
CARD32 ad;
CARD16 as = ~d >> 24;
fbCombineMaskC (&s, &m);
ad = m;
FbByteAddMulC(d, ad, s, as);
WRITE(dest + i, d);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidChangeName(const blink::WebString& name) {
if (current_history_item_.IsNull()) {
unique_name_helper_.UpdateName(name.Utf8());
}
GetFrameHost()->DidChangeName(name.Utf8(), unique_name_helper_.value());
if (!committed_first_load_)
name_changed_before_first_commit_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_targa_y216(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
int ret = mov_read_extradata(c, pb, atom, AV_CODEC_ID_TARGA_Y216);
if (!ret && c->fc->nb_streams >= 1) {
AVCodecParameters *par = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1]->codecpar;
if (par->extradata_size >= 40) {
par->height = AV_RB16(&par->extradata[36]);
par->width = AV_RB16(&par->extradata[38]);
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err chpl_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i, count;
char szDur[20];
GF_ChapterListBox *p = (GF_ChapterListBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "ChapterListBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->size) {
count = gf_list_count(p->list);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_ChapterEntry *ce = (GF_ChapterEntry *)gf_list_get(p->list, i);
fprintf(trace, "<Chapter name=\"");
dump_escape_string(trace, ce->name);
fprintf(trace, "\" startTime=\"%s\" />\n", format_duration(ce->start_time, 1000*10000, szDur));
}
} else {
fprintf(trace, "<Chapter name=\"\" startTime=\"\"/>\n");
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done("ChapterListBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int default_wake_function(wait_queue_t *curr, unsigned mode, int wake_flags,
void *key)
{
return try_to_wake_up(curr->private, mode, wake_flags);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_ENQUEUE(const struct ofpact_enqueue *a, struct ds *s)
{
ds_put_format(s, "%senqueue:%s", colors.param, colors.end);
ofputil_format_port(a->port, s);
ds_put_format(s, ":%"PRIu32, a->queue);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kadm5_purgekeys(void *server_handle,
krb5_principal principal,
int keepkvno)
{
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
kadm5_ret_t ret;
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
krb5_key_data *old_keydata;
int n_old_keydata;
int i, j, k;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
if (principal == NULL)
return EINVAL;
ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, principal, &kdb, &adb);
if (ret)
return(ret);
if (keepkvno <= 0) {
keepkvno = krb5_db_get_key_data_kvno(handle->context, kdb->n_key_data,
kdb->key_data);
}
old_keydata = kdb->key_data;
n_old_keydata = kdb->n_key_data;
kdb->n_key_data = 0;
/* Allocate one extra key_data to avoid allocating 0 bytes. */
kdb->key_data = calloc(n_old_keydata, sizeof(krb5_key_data));
if (kdb->key_data == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
memset(kdb->key_data, 0, n_old_keydata * sizeof(krb5_key_data));
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < n_old_keydata; i++) {
if (old_keydata[i].key_data_kvno < keepkvno)
continue;
/* Alias the key_data_contents pointers; we null them out in the
* source array immediately after. */
kdb->key_data[j] = old_keydata[i];
for (k = 0; k < old_keydata[i].key_data_ver; k++) {
old_keydata[i].key_data_contents[k] = NULL;
}
j++;
}
kdb->n_key_data = j;
cleanup_key_data(handle->context, n_old_keydata, old_keydata);
kdb->mask = KADM5_KEY_DATA;
ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
if (ret)
goto done;
done:
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix flaws in LDAP DN checking
KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data is intended to be internal to the LDAP KDB
module, and not used in disk or wire principal entries. Prevent
kadmin clients from sending KDB_TL_USER_INFO tl-data by giving it a
type number less than 256 and filtering out type numbers less than 256
in kadm5_create_principal_3(). (We already filter out low type
numbers in kadm5_modify_principal()).
In the LDAP KDB module, if containerdn and linkdn are both specified
in a put_principal operation, check both linkdn and the computed
standalone_principal_dn for container membership. To that end, factor
out the checks into helper functions and call them on all applicable
client-influenced DNs.
CVE-2018-5729:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can cause a null
dereference in kadmind, or circumvent a DN container check, by
supplying tagged data intended to be internal to the database module.
Thanks to Sharwan Ram and Pooja Anil for discovering the potential
null dereference.
CVE-2018-5730:
In MIT krb5 1.6 or later, an authenticated kadmin user with permission
to add principals to an LDAP Kerberos database can circumvent a DN
containership check by supplying both a "linkdn" and "containerdn"
database argument, or by supplying a DN string which is a left
extension of a container DN string but is not hierarchically within
the container DN.
ticket: 8643 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.16-next
target_version: 1.15-next
CWE ID: CWE-90 | 0 | 84,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LocalFrameClientImpl::HasWebView() const {
return web_frame_->ViewImpl();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void blk_set_cmd_filter_defaults(struct blk_cmd_filter *filter)
{
/* Basic read-only commands */
__set_bit(TEST_UNIT_READY, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(REQUEST_SENSE, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(READ_6, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(READ_10, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(READ_12, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(READ_16, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(READ_BUFFER, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(READ_DEFECT_DATA, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(READ_CAPACITY, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(READ_LONG, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(INQUIRY, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(MODE_SENSE, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(MODE_SENSE_10, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(LOG_SENSE, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(START_STOP, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_VERIFY_10, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(VERIFY_16, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(REPORT_LUNS, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(SERVICE_ACTION_IN, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(RECEIVE_DIAGNOSTIC, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(MAINTENANCE_IN, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_READ_BUFFER_CAPACITY, filter->read_ok);
/* Audio CD commands */
__set_bit(GPCMD_PLAY_CD, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_PLAY_AUDIO_10, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_PLAY_AUDIO_MSF, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_PLAY_AUDIO_TI, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_PAUSE_RESUME, filter->read_ok);
/* CD/DVD data reading */
__set_bit(GPCMD_READ_CD, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_READ_CD_MSF, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_READ_DISC_INFO, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_READ_CDVD_CAPACITY, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_READ_DVD_STRUCTURE, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_READ_HEADER, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_READ_TRACK_RZONE_INFO, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_READ_SUBCHANNEL, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_READ_TOC_PMA_ATIP, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_REPORT_KEY, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_SCAN, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_GET_CONFIGURATION, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_READ_FORMAT_CAPACITIES, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_GET_EVENT_STATUS_NOTIFICATION, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_GET_PERFORMANCE, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_SEEK, filter->read_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_STOP_PLAY_SCAN, filter->read_ok);
/* Basic writing commands */
__set_bit(WRITE_6, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(WRITE_10, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(WRITE_VERIFY, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(WRITE_12, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(WRITE_VERIFY_12, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(WRITE_16, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(WRITE_LONG, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(WRITE_LONG_2, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(ERASE, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_MODE_SELECT_10, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(MODE_SELECT, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(LOG_SELECT, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_BLANK, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_CLOSE_TRACK, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_FLUSH_CACHE, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_FORMAT_UNIT, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_REPAIR_RZONE_TRACK, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_RESERVE_RZONE_TRACK, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_SEND_DVD_STRUCTURE, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_SEND_EVENT, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_SEND_KEY, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_SEND_OPC, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_SEND_CUE_SHEET, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_SET_SPEED, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_PREVENT_ALLOW_MEDIUM_REMOVAL, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_LOAD_UNLOAD, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_SET_STREAMING, filter->write_ok);
__set_bit(GPCMD_SET_READ_AHEAD, filter->write_ok);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_custom_put_image(gx_device * dev, gs_gstate * pgs, gx_device * target)
{
pdf14_device * pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
pdf14_buf *buf = pdev->ctx->stack;
gs_int_rect rect = buf->rect;
int x0 = rect.p.x, y0 = rect.p.y;
int planestride = buf->planestride;
int rowstride = buf->rowstride;
int num_comp = buf->n_chan - 1;
const byte bg = pdev->ctx->additive ? 0xff : 0;
int x1, y1, width, height;
byte *buf_ptr;
if_debug0m('v', dev->memory, "[v]pdf14_custom_put_image\n");
rect_intersect(rect, buf->dirty);
x1 = min(pdev->width, rect.q.x);
y1 = min(pdev->height, rect.q.y);
width = x1 - rect.p.x;
height = y1 - rect.p.y;
if (width <= 0 || height <= 0 || buf->data == NULL)
return 0;
buf_ptr = buf->data + rect.p.y * buf->rowstride + rect.p.x;
return gx_put_blended_image_custom(target, buf_ptr,
planestride, rowstride,
x0, y0, width, height, num_comp, bg);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 2,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void byteAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::byteAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,578 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mem_cgroup_select_victim_node(struct mem_cgroup *memcg)
{
int node;
mem_cgroup_may_update_nodemask(memcg);
node = memcg->last_scanned_node;
node = next_node(node, memcg->scan_nodes);
if (node == MAX_NUMNODES)
node = first_node(memcg->scan_nodes);
/*
* We call this when we hit limit, not when pages are added to LRU.
* No LRU may hold pages because all pages are UNEVICTABLE or
* memcg is too small and all pages are not on LRU. In that case,
* we use curret node.
*/
if (unlikely(node == MAX_NUMNODES))
node = numa_node_id();
memcg->last_scanned_node = node;
return node;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AP_DECLARE(void) ap_hook_check_access(ap_HOOK_access_checker_t *pf,
const char * const *aszPre,
const char * const *aszSucc,
int nOrder, int type)
{
if ((type & AP_AUTH_INTERNAL_MASK) == AP_AUTH_INTERNAL_PER_CONF) {
++auth_internal_per_conf_hooks;
}
ap_hook_access_checker(pf, aszPre, aszSucc, nOrder);
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: CVE-2015-3183 (cve.mitre.org)
Replacement of ap_some_auth_required (unusable in Apache httpd 2.4)
with new ap_some_authn_required and ap_force_authn hook.
Submitted by: breser
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684524 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long aac_compat_cfg_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
return -EPERM;
return aac_compat_do_ioctl(file->private_data, cmd, arg);
}
Commit Message: aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, count)
{
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(zend_hash_num_elements(&phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 165,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::ExecuteJavaScript(const base::string16& javascript,
JavaScriptResultCallback callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
CHECK(CanExecuteJavaScript());
GetNavigationControl()->JavaScriptExecuteRequest(javascript,
std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int write_bytes(int fd, char *buff, int bytes)
{
int res, count;
for(count = 0; count < bytes; count += res) {
res = write(fd, buff + count, bytes - count);
if(res == -1) {
if(errno != EINTR) {
ERROR("Write on output file failed because "
"%s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
res = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: unsquashfs-4: Add more sanity checks + fix CVE-2015-4645/6
Add more filesystem table sanity checks to Unsquashfs-4 and
also properly fix CVE-2015-4645 and CVE-2015-4646.
The CVEs were raised due to Unsquashfs having variable
oveflow and stack overflow in a number of vulnerable
functions.
The suggested patch only "fixed" one such function and fixed
it badly, and so it was buggy and introduced extra bugs!
The suggested patch was not only buggy, but, it used the
essentially wrong approach too. It was "fixing" the
symptom but not the cause. The symptom is wrong values
causing overflow, the cause is filesystem corruption.
This corruption should be detected and the filesystem
rejected *before* trying to allocate memory.
This patch applies the following fixes:
1. The filesystem super-block tables are checked, and the values
must match across the filesystem.
This will trap corrupted filesystems created by Mksquashfs.
2. The maximum (theorectical) size the filesystem tables could grow
to, were analysed, and some variables were increased from int to
long long.
This analysis has been added as comments.
3. Stack allocation was removed, and a shared buffer (which is
checked and increased as necessary) is used to read the
table indexes.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 74,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int snd_seq_queue_check_access(int queueid, int client)
{
struct snd_seq_queue *q = queueptr(queueid);
int access_ok;
unsigned long flags;
if (! q)
return 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&q->owner_lock, flags);
access_ok = check_access(q, client);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->owner_lock, flags);
queuefree(q);
return access_ok;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix race at timer setup and close
ALSA sequencer code has an open race between the timer setup ioctl and
the close of the client. This was triggered by syzkaller fuzzer, and
a use-after-free was caught there as a result.
This patch papers over it by adding a proper queue->timer_mutex lock
around the timer-related calls in the relevant code path.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 54,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t portio_size_show(struct uio_port *port, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "0x%lx\n", port->size);
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::OnLoginPromptVisible() {
if (!login_prompt_visible_time_.is_null())
return;
login_prompt_visible_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
TryToPlayOobeStartupSound();
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,640 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_lock(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_lock_res *res)
{
__be32 *p;
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_LOCK);
if (status == -EIO)
goto out;
if (status == 0) {
READ_BUF(NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
COPYMEM(res->stateid.data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
} else if (status == -NFS4ERR_DENIED)
status = decode_lock_denied(xdr, NULL);
if (res->open_seqid != NULL)
nfs_increment_open_seqid(status, res->open_seqid);
nfs_increment_lock_seqid(status, res->lock_seqid);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: print_ucode_info(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, unsigned int date)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
pr_info("CPU%d microcode updated early to revision 0x%x, date = %04x-%02x-%02x\n",
cpu,
uci->cpu_sig.rev,
date & 0xffff,
date >> 24,
(date >> 16) & 0xff);
}
Commit Message: x86/microcode/intel: Guard against stack overflow in the loader
mc_saved_tmp is a static array allocated on the stack, we need to make
sure mc_saved_count stays within its bounds, otherwise we're overflowing
the stack in _save_mc(). A specially crafted microcode header could lead
to a kernel crash or potentially kernel execution.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1422964824-22056-1-git-send-email-quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void destroy_inodecache(void)
{
/*
* Make sure all delayed rcu free inodes are flushed before we
* destroy cache.
*/
rcu_barrier();
kmem_cache_destroy(f2fs_inode_cachep);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: sanity check checkpoint segno and blkoff
Make sure segno and blkoff read from raw image are valid.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
[Jaegeuk Kim: adjust minor coding style]
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-129 | 0 | 63,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_nvram_get_pagesize(struct tg3 *tp, u32 nvmcfg1)
{
switch (nvmcfg1 & NVRAM_CFG1_5752PAGE_SIZE_MASK) {
case FLASH_5752PAGE_SIZE_256:
tp->nvram_pagesize = 256;
break;
case FLASH_5752PAGE_SIZE_512:
tp->nvram_pagesize = 512;
break;
case FLASH_5752PAGE_SIZE_1K:
tp->nvram_pagesize = 1024;
break;
case FLASH_5752PAGE_SIZE_2K:
tp->nvram_pagesize = 2048;
break;
case FLASH_5752PAGE_SIZE_4K:
tp->nvram_pagesize = 4096;
break;
case FLASH_5752PAGE_SIZE_264:
tp->nvram_pagesize = 264;
break;
case FLASH_5752PAGE_SIZE_528:
tp->nvram_pagesize = 528;
break;
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_fd_set (fd_set *read_fds, fd_set *write_fds, fd_set *exception_fds)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook;
int max_fd;
max_fd = 0;
for (ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_FD]; ptr_hook;
ptr_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook)
{
if (!ptr_hook->deleted)
{
/* skip invalid file descriptors */
if ((fcntl (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook,fd), F_GETFD) == -1)
&& (errno == EBADF))
{
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, error) == 0)
{
HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, error) = errno;
gui_chat_printf (NULL,
_("%sError: bad file descriptor (%d) "
"used in hook_fd"),
gui_chat_prefix[GUI_CHAT_PREFIX_ERROR],
HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd));
}
}
else
{
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_READ)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), read_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_WRITE)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), write_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, flags) & HOOK_FD_FLAG_EXCEPTION)
{
FD_SET (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd), exception_fds);
if (HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd) > max_fd)
max_fd = HOOK_FD(ptr_hook, fd);
}
}
}
}
return max_fd;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jswrap_graphics_init() {
#ifdef USE_LCD_FSMC
JsVar *parent = jspNewObject("LCD", "Graphics");
if (parent) {
JsVar *parentObj = jsvSkipName(parent);
JsGraphics gfx;
graphicsStructInit(&gfx);
gfx.data.type = JSGRAPHICSTYPE_FSMC;
gfx.graphicsVar = parentObj;
gfx.data.width = 320;
gfx.data.height = 240;
gfx.data.bpp = 16;
lcdInit_FSMC(&gfx);
lcdSetCallbacks_FSMC(&gfx);
graphicsSplash(&gfx);
graphicsSetVar(&gfx);
jsvUnLock2(parentObj, parent);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add height check for Graphics.createArrayBuffer(...vertical_byte:true) (fix #1421)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void des_decrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *out, const u8 *in)
{
struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
crypt_s390_km(KM_DEA_DECRYPT, ctx->key, out, in, DES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BackFramebuffer::BackFramebuffer(GLES2DecoderImpl* decoder)
: decoder_(decoder),
id_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptPromise ImageBitmapFactories::createImageBitmap(EventTarget& eventTarget, HTMLCanvasElement* canvas, int sx, int sy, int sw, int sh, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
ASSERT(eventTarget.toDOMWindow());
if (!canvas) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError("The canvas element provided is invalid.");
return ScriptPromise();
}
if (!canvas->originClean()) {
exceptionState.throwSecurityError("The canvas element provided is tainted with cross-origin data.");
return ScriptPromise();
}
if (!sw || !sh) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(IndexSizeError, String::format("The source %s provided is 0.", sw ? "height" : "width"));
return ScriptPromise();
}
return fulfillImageBitmap(eventTarget.executionContext(), ImageBitmap::create(canvas, IntRect(sx, sy, sw, sh)));
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int json_array_clear(json_t *json)
{
json_array_t *array;
size_t i;
if(!json_is_array(json))
return -1;
array = json_to_array(json);
for(i = 0; i < array->entries; i++)
json_decref(array->table[i]);
array->entries = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AXObject::accessibilityIsIgnored() const {
updateCachedAttributeValuesIfNeeded();
return m_cachedIsIgnored;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int phar_analyze_path(const char *fname, const char *ext, int ext_len, int for_create TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_statbuf ssb;
char *realpath;
char *filename = estrndup(fname, (ext - fname) + ext_len);
if ((realpath = expand_filepath(filename, NULL TSRMLS_CC))) {
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(realpath, strlen(realpath));
#endif
if (zend_hash_exists(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), realpath, strlen(realpath))) {
efree(realpath);
efree(filename);
return SUCCESS;
}
if (PHAR_G(manifest_cached) && zend_hash_exists(&cached_phars, realpath, strlen(realpath))) {
efree(realpath);
efree(filename);
return SUCCESS;
}
efree(realpath);
}
if (SUCCESS == php_stream_stat_path((char *) filename, &ssb)) {
efree(filename);
if (ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR) {
return FAILURE;
}
if (for_create == 1) {
return FAILURE;
}
return SUCCESS;
} else {
char *slash;
if (!for_create) {
efree(filename);
return FAILURE;
}
slash = (char *) strrchr(filename, '/');
if (slash) {
*slash = '\0';
}
if (SUCCESS != php_stream_stat_path((char *) filename, &ssb)) {
if (!slash) {
if (!(realpath = expand_filepath(filename, NULL TSRMLS_CC))) {
efree(filename);
return FAILURE;
}
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
phar_unixify_path_separators(realpath, strlen(realpath));
#endif
slash = strstr(realpath, filename);
if (slash) {
slash += ((ext - fname) + ext_len);
*slash = '\0';
}
slash = strrchr(realpath, '/');
if (slash) {
*slash = '\0';
} else {
efree(realpath);
efree(filename);
return FAILURE;
}
if (SUCCESS != php_stream_stat_path(realpath, &ssb)) {
efree(realpath);
efree(filename);
return FAILURE;
}
efree(realpath);
if (ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR) {
efree(filename);
return SUCCESS;
}
}
efree(filename);
return FAILURE;
}
efree(filename);
if (ssb.sb.st_mode & S_IFDIR) {
return SUCCESS;
}
return FAILURE;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 4,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int irda_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct irda_sock *self = irda_sk(sk);
struct irda_device_list list;
struct irda_device_info *discoveries;
struct irda_ias_set * ias_opt; /* IAS get/query params */
struct ias_object * ias_obj; /* Object in IAS */
struct ias_attrib * ias_attr; /* Attribute in IAS object */
int daddr = DEV_ADDR_ANY; /* Dest address for IAS queries */
int val = 0;
int len = 0;
int err = 0;
int offset, total;
pr_debug("%s(%p)\n", __func__, self);
if (level != SOL_IRLMP)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if(len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES:
/* Offset to first device entry */
offset = sizeof(struct irda_device_list) -
sizeof(struct irda_device_info);
if (len < offset) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Ask lmp for the current discovery log */
discoveries = irlmp_get_discoveries(&list.len, self->mask.word,
self->nslots);
/* Check if the we got some results */
if (discoveries == NULL) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out; /* Didn't find any devices */
}
/* Write total list length back to client */
if (copy_to_user(optval, &list, offset))
err = -EFAULT;
/* Copy the list itself - watch for overflow */
if (list.len > 2048) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto bed;
}
total = offset + (list.len * sizeof(struct irda_device_info));
if (total > len)
total = len;
if (copy_to_user(optval+offset, discoveries, total - offset))
err = -EFAULT;
/* Write total number of bytes used back to client */
if (put_user(total, optlen))
err = -EFAULT;
bed:
/* Free up our buffer */
kfree(discoveries);
break;
case IRLMP_MAX_SDU_SIZE:
val = self->max_data_size;
len = sizeof(int);
if (put_user(len, optlen)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (copy_to_user(optval, &val, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
break;
case IRLMP_IAS_GET:
/* The user want an object from our local IAS database.
* We just need to query the IAS and return the value
* that we found */
/* Check that the user has allocated the right space for us */
if (len != sizeof(struct irda_ias_set)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ias_opt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct irda_ias_set), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ias_opt == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Copy query to the driver. */
if (copy_from_user(ias_opt, optval, len)) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Find the object we target.
* If the user gives us an empty string, we use the object
* associated with this socket. This will workaround
* duplicated class name - Jean II */
if(ias_opt->irda_class_name[0] == '\0')
ias_obj = self->ias_obj;
else
ias_obj = irias_find_object(ias_opt->irda_class_name);
if(ias_obj == (struct ias_object *) NULL) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Find the attribute (in the object) we target */
ias_attr = irias_find_attrib(ias_obj,
ias_opt->irda_attrib_name);
if(ias_attr == (struct ias_attrib *) NULL) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Translate from internal to user structure */
err = irda_extract_ias_value(ias_opt, ias_attr->value);
if(err) {
kfree(ias_opt);
goto out;
}
/* Copy reply to the user */
if (copy_to_user(optval, ias_opt,
sizeof(struct irda_ias_set))) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Note : don't need to put optlen, we checked it */
kfree(ias_opt);
break;
case IRLMP_IAS_QUERY:
/* The user want an object from a remote IAS database.
* We need to use IAP to query the remote database and
* then wait for the answer to come back. */
/* Check that the user has allocated the right space for us */
if (len != sizeof(struct irda_ias_set)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
ias_opt = kmalloc(sizeof(struct irda_ias_set), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ias_opt == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Copy query to the driver. */
if (copy_from_user(ias_opt, optval, len)) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* At this point, there are two cases...
* 1) the socket is connected - that's the easy case, we
* just query the device we are connected to...
* 2) the socket is not connected - the user doesn't want
* to connect and/or may not have a valid service name
* (so can't create a fake connection). In this case,
* we assume that the user pass us a valid destination
* address in the requesting structure...
*/
if(self->daddr != DEV_ADDR_ANY) {
/* We are connected - reuse known daddr */
daddr = self->daddr;
} else {
/* We are not connected, we must specify a valid
* destination address */
daddr = ias_opt->daddr;
if((!daddr) || (daddr == DEV_ADDR_ANY)) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
/* Check that we can proceed with IAP */
if (self->iriap) {
net_warn_ratelimited("%s: busy with a previous query\n",
__func__);
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
self->iriap = iriap_open(LSAP_ANY, IAS_CLIENT, self,
irda_getvalue_confirm);
if (self->iriap == NULL) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Treat unexpected wakeup as disconnect */
self->errno = -EHOSTUNREACH;
/* Query remote LM-IAS */
iriap_getvaluebyclass_request(self->iriap,
self->saddr, daddr,
ias_opt->irda_class_name,
ias_opt->irda_attrib_name);
/* Wait for answer, if not yet finished (or failed) */
if (wait_event_interruptible(self->query_wait,
(self->iriap == NULL))) {
/* pending request uses copy of ias_opt-content
* we can free it regardless! */
kfree(ias_opt);
/* Treat signals as disconnect */
err = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto out;
}
/* Check what happened */
if (self->errno)
{
kfree(ias_opt);
/* Requested object/attribute doesn't exist */
if((self->errno == IAS_CLASS_UNKNOWN) ||
(self->errno == IAS_ATTRIB_UNKNOWN))
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
else
err = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto out;
}
/* Translate from internal to user structure */
err = irda_extract_ias_value(ias_opt, self->ias_result);
if (self->ias_result)
irias_delete_value(self->ias_result);
if (err) {
kfree(ias_opt);
goto out;
}
/* Copy reply to the user */
if (copy_to_user(optval, ias_opt,
sizeof(struct irda_ias_set))) {
kfree(ias_opt);
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Note : don't need to put optlen, we checked it */
kfree(ias_opt);
break;
case IRLMP_WAITDEVICE:
/* This function is just another way of seeing life ;-)
* IRLMP_ENUMDEVICES assumes that you have a static network,
* and that you just want to pick one of the devices present.
* On the other hand, in here we assume that no device is
* present and that at some point in the future a device will
* come into range. When this device arrive, we just wake
* up the caller, so that he has time to connect to it before
* the device goes away...
* Note : once the node has been discovered for more than a
* few second, it won't trigger this function, unless it
* goes away and come back changes its hint bits (so we
* might call it IRLMP_WAITNEWDEVICE).
*/
/* Check that the user is passing us an int */
if (len != sizeof(int)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Get timeout in ms (max time we block the caller) */
if (get_user(val, (int __user *)optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
/* Tell IrLMP we want to be notified */
irlmp_update_client(self->ckey, self->mask.word,
irda_selective_discovery_indication,
NULL, (void *) self);
/* Do some discovery (and also return cached results) */
irlmp_discovery_request(self->nslots);
/* Wait until a node is discovered */
if (!self->cachedaddr) {
pr_debug("%s(), nothing discovered yet, going to sleep...\n",
__func__);
/* Set watchdog timer to expire in <val> ms. */
self->errno = 0;
setup_timer(&self->watchdog, irda_discovery_timeout,
(unsigned long)self);
mod_timer(&self->watchdog,
jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(val));
/* Wait for IR-LMP to call us back */
err = __wait_event_interruptible(self->query_wait,
(self->cachedaddr != 0 || self->errno == -ETIME));
/* If watchdog is still activated, kill it! */
del_timer(&(self->watchdog));
pr_debug("%s(), ...waking up !\n", __func__);
if (err != 0)
goto out;
}
else
pr_debug("%s(), found immediately !\n",
__func__);
/* Tell IrLMP that we have been notified */
irlmp_update_client(self->ckey, self->mask.word,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* Check if the we got some results */
if (!self->cachedaddr) {
err = -EAGAIN; /* Didn't find any devices */
goto out;
}
daddr = self->cachedaddr;
/* Cleanup */
self->cachedaddr = 0;
/* We return the daddr of the device that trigger the
* wakeup. As irlmp pass us only the new devices, we
* are sure that it's not an old device.
* If the user want more details, he should query
* the whole discovery log and pick one device...
*/
if (put_user(daddr, (int __user *)optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GpuChannelHost* RenderThreadImpl::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "RenderThreadImpl::EstablishGpuChannelSync");
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (!gpu_channel_->IsLost())
return gpu_channel_.get();
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
}
int client_id = 0;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
gpu::GPUInfo gpu_info;
if (!Send(new GpuHostMsg_EstablishGpuChannel(cause_for_gpu_launch,
&client_id,
&channel_handle,
&gpu_info)) ||
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
channel_handle.socket.fd == -1 ||
#endif
channel_handle.name.empty()) {
return NULL;
}
GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
io_message_loop_proxy_ = ChildProcess::current()->io_message_loop_proxy();
gpu_channel_ = GpuChannelHost::Create(
this, gpu_info, channel_handle,
ChildProcess::current()->GetShutDownEvent());
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_error_msg(apr_array_header_t *tokens, apr_size_t index)
{
if (index >= tokens->nelts) {
return "end of string";
}
return apr_psprintf(tokens->pool, "\"%s\" at position %" APR_SIZE_T_FMT,
APR_ARRAY_IDX(tokens, index, Token).str,
APR_ARRAY_IDX(tokens, index, Token).offset);
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 91,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::adjustBorderBoxLogicalWidthForBoxSizing(LayoutUnit width) const
{
LayoutUnit bordersPlusPadding = borderAndPaddingLogicalWidth();
if (style()->boxSizing() == CONTENT_BOX)
return width + bordersPlusPadding;
return max(width, bordersPlusPadding);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int getHeight() { return h; }
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_recover_proc_open(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
struct inode *dir = data->dir->d_inode;
struct nfs_openres *o_res = &data->o_res;
int status;
status = nfs4_run_open_task(data, 1);
if (status != 0 || !data->rpc_done)
return status;
nfs_fattr_map_and_free_names(NFS_SERVER(dir), &data->f_attr);
if (o_res->rflags & NFS4_OPEN_RESULT_CONFIRM) {
status = _nfs4_proc_open_confirm(data);
if (status != 0)
return status;
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UserActivityDetector::RemoveObserver(UserActivityObserver* observer) {
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: ash: Make UserActivityDetector ignore synthetic mouse events
This may have been preventing us from suspending (e.g.
mouse event is synthesized in response to lock window being
shown so Chrome tells powerd that the user is active).
BUG=133419
TEST=added
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10574044
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143437 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 103,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::AddFindResult(const PDFiumRange& result) {
size_t result_index;
int page_index = result.page_index();
int char_index = result.char_index();
for (result_index = 0; result_index < find_results_.size(); ++result_index) {
if (find_results_[result_index].page_index() > page_index ||
(find_results_[result_index].page_index() == page_index &&
find_results_[result_index].char_index() > char_index)) {
break;
}
}
find_results_.insert(find_results_.begin() + result_index, result);
UpdateTickMarks();
if (current_find_index_.valid()) {
if (result_index <= current_find_index_.GetIndex()) {
size_t find_index = current_find_index_.IncrementIndex();
DCHECK_LT(find_index, find_results_.size());
client_->NotifySelectedFindResultChanged(current_find_index_.GetIndex());
}
} else if (!resume_find_index_.valid()) {
SelectFindResult(true);
}
client_->NotifyNumberOfFindResultsChanged(find_results_.size(), false);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int detect_idkey(
sc_pkcs15_card_t *p15card
){
sc_card_t *card=p15card->card;
sc_path_t p;
/* TCKEY-Applikation ? */
memset(&p, 0, sizeof(sc_path_t));
p.type=SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME;
memcpy(p.value, "\xD2\x76\x00\x00\x03\x0C\x01", p.len=7);
if (sc_select_file(card,&p,NULL)!=SC_SUCCESS) return 1;
p15card->tokeninfo->manufacturer_id = strdup("TeleSec GmbH");
p15card->tokeninfo->label = strdup("IDKey Card");
insert_cert(p15card, "DF074331", 0x45, 1, "Signatur Zertifikat 1");
insert_cert(p15card, "DF074332", 0x45, 1, "Signatur Zertifikat 2");
insert_cert(p15card, "DF074333", 0x45, 1, "Signatur Zertifikat 3");
insert_key(p15card, "DF074E03", 0x45, 0x84, 2048, 1, "IDKey1");
insert_key(p15card, "DF074E04", 0x46, 0x85, 2048, 1, "IDKey2");
insert_key(p15card, "DF074E05", 0x47, 0x86, 2048, 1, "IDKey3");
insert_key(p15card, "DF074E06", 0x48, 0x87, 2048, 1, "IDKey4");
insert_key(p15card, "DF074E07", 0x49, 0x88, 2048, 1, "IDKey5");
insert_key(p15card, "DF074E08", 0x4A, 0x89, 2048, 1, "IDKey6");
insert_pin(p15card, "5000", 1, 2, 0x00, 6, "PIN",
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_CASE_SENSITIVE | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_INITIALIZED
);
insert_pin(p15card, "5001", 2, 0, 0x01, 8, "PUK",
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_CASE_SENSITIVE | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_INITIALIZED |
SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_UNBLOCKING_PIN | SC_PKCS15_PIN_FLAG_SO_PIN
);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __be32 nfsd_splice_read(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct file *file, loff_t offset, unsigned long *count)
{
struct splice_desc sd = {
.len = 0,
.total_len = *count,
.pos = offset,
.u.data = rqstp,
};
int host_err;
rqstp->rq_next_page = rqstp->rq_respages + 1;
host_err = splice_direct_to_actor(file, &sd, nfsd_direct_splice_actor);
return nfsd_finish_read(file, count, host_err);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jpeg_read_scanlines_encap(OJPEGState* sp, jpeg_decompress_struct* cinfo, void* scanlines, uint32 max_lines)
{
if( SETJMP(sp->exit_jmpbuf) )
return 0;
else {
jpeg_read_scanlines(cinfo,scanlines,max_lines);
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 70,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationRequest::OnRequestRedirected(
const net::RedirectInfo& redirect_info,
const scoped_refptr<network::ResourceResponse>& response) {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
base::WeakPtr<NavigationRequest> this_ptr(weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
bool should_override_url_loading = false;
if (!GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldOverrideUrlLoading(
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(), browser_initiated_,
redirect_info.new_url, redirect_info.new_method,
false, true, frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame(),
common_params_.transition, &should_override_url_loading)) {
return;
}
if (!this_ptr)
return;
if (should_override_url_loading) {
bool is_external_protocol =
!GetContentClient()->browser()->IsHandledURL(common_params_.url);
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
navigation_handle_->UpdateStateFollowingRedirect(
redirect_info.new_url, redirect_info.new_method,
GURL(redirect_info.new_referrer), is_external_protocol,
response->head.headers, response->head.connection_info,
base::Bind(&NavigationRequest::OnRedirectChecksComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
#endif
if (!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->CanRedirectToURL(
redirect_info.new_url)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Denied redirect for "
<< redirect_info.new_url.possibly_invalid_spec();
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
if (!browser_initiated_ && source_site_instance() &&
!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->CanRequestURL(
source_site_instance()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
redirect_info.new_url)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Denied unauthorized redirect for "
<< redirect_info.new_url.possibly_invalid_spec();
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
dest_site_instance_ = nullptr;
if (redirect_info.new_method != "POST")
common_params_.post_data = nullptr;
if (request_params_.navigation_timing.redirect_start.is_null()) {
request_params_.navigation_timing.redirect_start =
request_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start;
}
request_params_.navigation_timing.redirect_end = base::TimeTicks::Now();
request_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start = base::TimeTicks::Now();
request_params_.redirect_response.push_back(response->head);
request_params_.redirect_infos.push_back(redirect_info);
request_params_.redirects.push_back(common_params_.url);
common_params_.url = redirect_info.new_url;
common_params_.method = redirect_info.new_method;
common_params_.referrer.url = GURL(redirect_info.new_referrer);
common_params_.referrer =
Referrer::SanitizeForRequest(common_params_.url, common_params_.referrer);
if (CheckContentSecurityPolicyFrameSrc(true /* is redirect */) ==
CONTENT_SECURITY_POLICY_CHECK_FAILED) {
OnRequestFailed(false, net::ERR_BLOCKED_BY_CLIENT, base::nullopt);
return;
}
if (CheckCredentialedSubresource() ==
CredentialedSubresourceCheckResult::BLOCK_REQUEST ||
CheckLegacyProtocolInSubresource() ==
LegacyProtocolInSubresourceCheckResult::BLOCK_REQUEST) {
OnRequestFailed(false, net::ERR_ABORTED, base::nullopt);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> site_instance =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetSiteInstanceForNavigationRequest(
*this);
speculative_site_instance_ =
site_instance->HasProcess() ? site_instance : nullptr;
if (!site_instance->HasProcess()) {
RenderProcessHostImpl::NotifySpareManagerAboutRecentlyUsedBrowserContext(
site_instance->GetBrowserContext());
}
RenderProcessHost* expected_process =
site_instance->HasProcess() ? site_instance->GetProcess() : nullptr;
bool is_external_protocol =
!GetContentClient()->browser()->IsHandledURL(common_params_.url);
navigation_handle_->WillRedirectRequest(
common_params_.url, common_params_.method, common_params_.referrer.url,
is_external_protocol, response->head.headers,
response->head.connection_info, expected_process,
base::Bind(&NavigationRequest::OnRedirectChecksComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Check ancestors when setting an <iframe> navigation's "site for cookies".
Currently, we're setting the "site for cookies" only by looking at the
top-level document. We ought to be verifying that the ancestor frames
are same-site before doing so. We do this correctly in Blink (see
`Document::SiteForCookies`), but didn't do so when navigating in the
browser.
This patch addresses the majority of the problem by walking the ancestor
chain when processing a NavigationRequest. If all the ancestors are
same-site, we set the "site for cookies" to the top-level document's URL.
If they aren't all same-site, we set it to an empty URL to ensure that
we don't send SameSite cookies.
Bug: 833847
Change-Id: Icd77f31fa618fa9f8b59fc3b15e1bed6ee05aabd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1025772
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool OptimizeMatrixShaper(cmsPipeline** Lut, cmsUInt32Number Intent, cmsUInt32Number* InputFormat, cmsUInt32Number* OutputFormat, cmsUInt32Number* dwFlags)
{
cmsStage* Curve1, *Curve2;
cmsStage* Matrix1, *Matrix2;
_cmsStageMatrixData* Data1;
_cmsStageMatrixData* Data2;
cmsMAT3 res;
cmsBool IdentityMat;
cmsPipeline* Dest, *Src;
if (T_CHANNELS(*InputFormat) != 3 || T_CHANNELS(*OutputFormat) != 3) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsFormatterIs8bit(*InputFormat)) return FALSE;
Src = *Lut;
if (!cmsPipelineCheckAndRetreiveStages(Src, 4,
cmsSigCurveSetElemType, cmsSigMatrixElemType, cmsSigMatrixElemType, cmsSigCurveSetElemType,
&Curve1, &Matrix1, &Matrix2, &Curve2)) return FALSE;
Data1 = (_cmsStageMatrixData*) cmsStageData(Matrix1);
Data2 = (_cmsStageMatrixData*) cmsStageData(Matrix2);
if (Data1 ->Offset != NULL) return FALSE;
_cmsMAT3per(&res, (cmsMAT3*) Data2 ->Double, (cmsMAT3*) Data1 ->Double);
IdentityMat = FALSE;
if (_cmsMAT3isIdentity(&res) && Data2 ->Offset == NULL) {
IdentityMat = TRUE;
}
Dest = cmsPipelineAlloc(Src ->ContextID, Src ->InputChannels, Src ->OutputChannels);
if (!Dest) return FALSE;
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Dest, cmsAT_BEGIN, cmsStageDup(Curve1)))
goto Error;
if (!IdentityMat)
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Dest, cmsAT_END, cmsStageAllocMatrix(Dest ->ContextID, 3, 3, (const cmsFloat64Number*) &res, Data2 ->Offset)))
goto Error;
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Dest, cmsAT_END, cmsStageDup(Curve2)))
goto Error;
if (IdentityMat) {
OptimizeByJoiningCurves(&Dest, Intent, InputFormat, OutputFormat, dwFlags);
}
else {
_cmsStageToneCurvesData* mpeC1 = (_cmsStageToneCurvesData*) cmsStageData(Curve1);
_cmsStageToneCurvesData* mpeC2 = (_cmsStageToneCurvesData*) cmsStageData(Curve2);
*dwFlags |= cmsFLAGS_NOCACHE;
SetMatShaper(Dest, mpeC1 ->TheCurves, &res, (cmsVEC3*) Data2 ->Offset, mpeC2->TheCurves, OutputFormat);
}
cmsPipelineFree(Src);
*Lut = Dest;
return TRUE;
Error:
cmsPipelineFree(Dest);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentThreadableLoader::loadActualRequest()
{
ResourceRequest actualRequest = m_actualRequest;
ResourceLoaderOptions actualOptions = m_actualOptions;
m_actualRequest = ResourceRequest();
m_actualOptions = ResourceLoaderOptions();
actualRequest.setHTTPOrigin(getSecurityOrigin());
clearResource();
loadRequest(actualRequest, actualOptions);
}
Commit Message: DocumentThreadableLoader: Add guards for sync notifyFinished() in setResource()
In loadRequest(), setResource() can call clear() synchronously:
DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError()
Resource::didAddClient()
RawResource::didAddClient()
and thus |m_client| can be null while resource() isn't null after setResource(),
causing crashes (Issue 595964).
This CL checks whether |*this| is destructed and
whether |m_client| is null after setResource().
BUG=595964
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1902683002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391001}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,492 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.