instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadItemImpl::RemoveObserver(Observer* observer) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::hasSVGRootNode() const
{
return isSVGSVGElement(documentElement());
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContentsImpl::GetRootBrowserAccessibilityManager() {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh = GetMainFrame();
return rfh ? rfh->browser_accessibility_manager() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::goToBackForwardEntry(BackForwardId id)
{
HistoryItem* item = historyItemFromBackForwardId(id);
ASSERT(item);
d->m_page->goToItem(item, FrameLoadTypeIndexedBackForward);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WandExport MagickBooleanType MogrifyImageList(ImageInfo *image_info,
const int argc,const char **argv,Image **images,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ChannelType
channel;
const char
*option;
ImageInfo
*mogrify_info;
MagickStatusType
status;
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
index;
/*
Apply options to the image list.
*/
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(images != (Image **) NULL);
assert((*images)->previous == (Image *) NULL);
assert((*images)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*images)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
(*images)->filename);
if ((argc <= 0) || (*argv == (char *) NULL))
return(MagickTrue);
mogrify_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
quantize_info=AcquireQuantizeInfo(mogrify_info);
channel=mogrify_info->channel;
status=MagickTrue;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) argc; i++)
{
if (*images == (Image *) NULL)
break;
option=argv[i];
if (IsCommandOption(option) == MagickFalse)
continue;
count=ParseCommandOption(MagickCommandOptions,MagickFalse,option);
count=MagickMax(count,0L);
if ((i+count) >= (ssize_t) argc)
break;
status=MogrifyImageInfo(mogrify_info,(int) count+1,argv+i,exception);
switch (*(option+1))
{
case 'a':
{
if (LocaleCompare("affinity",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("append",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*append_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
append_image=AppendImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,exception);
if (append_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=append_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("average",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*average_image;
/*
Average an image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
average_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MeanEvaluateOperator,
exception);
if (average_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=average_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channel",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
channel=DefaultChannels;
break;
}
channel=(ChannelType) ParseChannelOption(argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*clut_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
clut_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (clut_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) ClutImageChannel(image,channel,clut_image);
clut_image=DestroyImage(clut_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("coalesce",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*coalesce_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
coalesce_image=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (coalesce_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=coalesce_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("combine",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*combine_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
combine_image=CombineImages(*images,channel,exception);
if (combine_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=combine_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("compare",option+1) == 0)
{
const char
*option;
double
distortion;
Image
*difference_image,
*image,
*reconstruct_image;
MetricType
metric;
/*
Mathematically and visually annotate the difference between an
image and its reconstruction.
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
reconstruct_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (reconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
metric=UndefinedMetric;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"metric");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
metric=(MetricType) ParseCommandOption(MagickMetricOptions,
MagickFalse,option);
difference_image=CompareImageChannels(image,reconstruct_image,
channel,metric,&distortion,exception);
if (difference_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
reconstruct_image=DestroyImage(reconstruct_image);
image=DestroyImage(image);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=difference_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("complex",option+1) == 0)
{
ComplexOperator
op;
Image
*complex_images;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
op=(ComplexOperator) ParseCommandOption(MagickComplexOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
complex_images=ComplexImages(*images,op,exception);
if (complex_images == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=complex_images;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("composite",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mask_image,
*composite_image,
*image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
composite_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (composite_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) TransformImage(&composite_image,(char *) NULL,
composite_image->geometry);
SetGeometry(composite_image,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(composite_image->geometry,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(image->columns,image->rows,image->gravity,
&geometry);
mask_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((image->compose == DisplaceCompositeOp) ||
(image->compose == DistortCompositeOp))
{
/*
Merge Y displacement into X displacement image.
*/
(void) CompositeImage(composite_image,CopyGreenCompositeOp,
mask_image,0,0);
mask_image=DestroyImage(mask_image);
}
else
{
/*
Set a blending mask for the composition.
*/
if (image->mask != (Image *) NULL)
image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask);
image->mask=mask_image;
(void) NegateImage(image->mask,MagickFalse);
}
}
(void) CompositeImageChannel(image,channel,image->compose,
composite_image,geometry.x,geometry.y);
if (mask_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
image->mask=DestroyImage(image->mask);
mask_image=image->mask;
}
composite_image=DestroyImage(composite_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("copy",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*source_image;
OffsetInfo
offset;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Copy image pixels.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
(void) ParsePageGeometry(*images,argv[i+2],&geometry,exception);
offset.x=geometry.x;
offset.y=geometry.y;
source_image=(*images);
if (source_image->next != (Image *) NULL)
source_image=source_image->next;
(void) ParsePageGeometry(source_image,argv[i+1],&geometry,
exception);
status=CopyImagePixels(*images,source_image,&geometry,&offset,
exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("deconstruct",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*deconstruct_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
deconstruct_image=DeconstructImages(*images,exception);
if (deconstruct_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=deconstruct_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("delete",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
DeleteImages(images,"-1",exception);
else
DeleteImages(images,argv[i+1],exception);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("dither",option+1) == 0)
{
if (*option == '+')
{
quantize_info->dither=MagickFalse;
break;
}
quantize_info->dither=MagickTrue;
quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("duplicate",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*duplicate_images;
if (*option == '+')
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,1,"-1",exception);
else
{
const char
*p;
size_t
number_duplicates;
number_duplicates=(size_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=strchr(argv[i+1],',');
if (p == (const char *) NULL)
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,
"-1",exception);
else
duplicate_images=DuplicateImages(*images,number_duplicates,p,
exception);
}
AppendImageToList(images, duplicate_images);
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleCompare("evaluate-sequence",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*evaluate_image;
MagickEvaluateOperator
op;
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
op=(MagickEvaluateOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickEvaluateOptions,MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
evaluate_image=EvaluateImages(*images,op,exception);
if (evaluate_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=evaluate_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare("fft",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image;
/*
Implements the discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
fourier_image=ForwardFourierTransformImage(*images,*option == '-' ?
MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("flatten",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*flatten_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
flatten_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,FlattenLayer,exception);
if (flatten_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=flatten_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("fx",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fx_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
fx_image=FxImageChannel(*images,channel,argv[i+1],exception);
if (fx_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fx_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("hald-clut",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*hald_image,
*image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
hald_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (hald_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
(void) HaldClutImageChannel(image,channel,hald_image);
hald_image=DestroyImage(hald_image);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("ift",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*fourier_image,
*magnitude_image,
*phase_image;
/*
Implements the inverse fourier discrete Fourier transform (DFT).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
magnitude_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
phase_image=RemoveFirstImageFromList(images);
if (phase_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
fourier_image=InverseFourierTransformImage(magnitude_image,
phase_image,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse,exception);
if (fourier_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (*images != (Image *) NULL)
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=fourier_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("insert",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q;
index=0;
if (*option != '+')
index=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
p=RemoveLastImageFromList(images);
if (p == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
q=p;
if (index == 0)
PrependImageToList(images,q);
else
if (index == (ssize_t) GetImageListLength(*images))
AppendImageToList(images,q);
else
{
q=GetImageFromList(*images,index-1);
if (q == (Image *) NULL)
{
p=DestroyImage(p);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",argv[i+1]);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InsertImageInList(&q,p);
}
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("layers",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*layers;
ImageLayerMethod
method;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
layers=(Image *) NULL;
method=(ImageLayerMethod) ParseCommandOption(MagickLayerOptions,
MagickFalse,argv[i+1]);
switch (method)
{
case CoalesceLayer:
{
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case CompareAnyLayer:
case CompareClearLayer:
case CompareOverlayLayer:
default:
{
layers=CompareImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case MergeLayer:
case FlattenLayer:
case MosaicLayer:
case TrimBoundsLayer:
{
layers=MergeImageLayers(*images,method,exception);
break;
}
case DisposeLayer:
{
layers=DisposeImages(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeImageLayer:
{
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizePlusLayer:
{
layers=OptimizePlusImageLayers(*images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeTransLayer:
{
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveDupsLayer:
{
RemoveDuplicateLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case RemoveZeroLayer:
{
RemoveZeroDelayLayers(images,exception);
break;
}
case OptimizeLayer:
{
/*
General Purpose, GIF Animation Optimizer.
*/
layers=CoalesceImages(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=OptimizeImageLayers(*images,exception);
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
layers=(Image *) NULL;
OptimizeImageTransparency(*images,exception);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
break;
}
case CompositeLayer:
{
CompositeOperator
compose;
Image
*source;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
/*
Split image sequence at the first 'NULL:' image.
*/
source=(*images);
while (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
source=GetNextImageInList(source);
if ((source != (Image *) NULL) &&
(LocaleCompare(source->magick,"NULL") == 0))
break;
}
if (source != (Image *) NULL)
{
if ((GetPreviousImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetNextImageInList(source) == (Image *) NULL))
source=(Image *) NULL;
else
{
/*
Separate the two lists, junk the null: image.
*/
source=SplitImageList(source->previous);
DeleteImageFromList(&source);
}
}
if (source == (Image *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"MissingNullSeparator","layers Composite");
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
/*
Adjust offset with gravity and virtual canvas.
*/
SetGeometry(*images,&geometry);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry((*images)->geometry,&geometry);
geometry.width=source->page.width != 0 ?
source->page.width : source->columns;
geometry.height=source->page.height != 0 ?
source->page.height : source->rows;
GravityAdjustGeometry((*images)->page.width != 0 ?
(*images)->page.width : (*images)->columns,
(*images)->page.height != 0 ? (*images)->page.height :
(*images)->rows,(*images)->gravity,&geometry);
compose=OverCompositeOp;
option=GetImageOption(mogrify_info,"compose");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
compose=(CompositeOperator) ParseCommandOption(
MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,option);
CompositeLayers(*images,compose,source,geometry.x,geometry.y,
exception);
source=DestroyImageList(source);
break;
}
}
if (layers == (Image *) NULL)
break;
InheritException(exception,&layers->exception);
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=layers;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'm':
{
if (LocaleCompare("map",option+1) == 0)
{
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
if (*option == '+')
{
(void) RemapImages(quantize_info,*images,(Image *) NULL);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
i++;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("maximum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*maximum_image;
/*
Maximum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
maximum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MaxEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (maximum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=maximum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("minimum",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*minimum_image;
/*
Minimum image sequence (deprecated).
*/
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
minimum_image=EvaluateImages(*images,MinEvaluateOperator,exception);
if (minimum_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=minimum_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("morph",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*morph_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
morph_image=MorphImages(*images,StringToUnsignedLong(argv[i+1]),
exception);
if (morph_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=morph_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("mosaic",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*mosaic_image;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
mosaic_image=MergeImageLayers(*images,MosaicLayer,exception);
if (mosaic_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=mosaic_image;
break;
}
break;
}
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("poly",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*args,
token[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*p;
double
*arguments;
Image
*polynomial_image;
register ssize_t
x;
size_t
number_arguments;
/*
Polynomial image.
*/
(void) SyncImageSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
args=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
if (args == (char *) NULL)
break;
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; *p != '\0'; x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
}
number_arguments=(size_t) x;
arguments=(double *) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_arguments,
sizeof(*arguments));
if (arguments == (double *) NULL)
ThrowWandFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed",(*images)->filename);
(void) memset(arguments,0,number_arguments*
sizeof(*arguments));
p=(char *) args;
for (x=0; (x < (ssize_t) number_arguments) && (*p != '\0'); x++)
{
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
if (*token == ',')
GetNextToken(p,&p,MaxTextExtent,token);
arguments[x]=StringToDouble(token,(char **) NULL);
}
args=DestroyString(args);
polynomial_image=PolynomialImageChannel(*images,channel,
number_arguments >> 1,arguments,exception);
arguments=(double *) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
if (polynomial_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=polynomial_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("print",option+1) == 0)
{
char
*string;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
string=InterpretImageProperties(mogrify_info,*images,argv[i+1]);
if (string == (char *) NULL)
break;
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
(void) FormatLocaleFile(stdout,"%s",string);
string=DestroyString(string);
}
if (LocaleCompare("process",option+1) == 0)
{
char
**arguments;
int
j,
number_arguments;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
arguments=StringToArgv(argv[i+1],&number_arguments);
if (arguments == (char **) NULL)
break;
if ((argc > 1) && (strchr(arguments[1],'=') != (char *) NULL))
{
char
breaker,
quote,
*token;
const char
*arguments;
int
next,
status;
size_t
length;
TokenInfo
*token_info;
/*
Support old style syntax, filter="-option arg".
*/
length=strlen(argv[i+1]);
token=(char *) NULL;
if (~length >= (MaxTextExtent-1))
token=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length+MaxTextExtent,
sizeof(*token));
if (token == (char *) NULL)
break;
next=0;
arguments=argv[i+1];
token_info=AcquireTokenInfo();
status=Tokenizer(token_info,0,token,length,arguments,"","=",
"\"",'\0',&breaker,&next,"e);
token_info=DestroyTokenInfo(token_info);
if (status == 0)
{
const char
*argv;
argv=(&(arguments[next]));
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(token,&(*images),1,&argv,
exception);
}
token=DestroyString(token);
break;
}
(void) SubstituteString(&arguments[1],"-","");
(void) InvokeDynamicImageFilter(arguments[1],&(*images),
number_arguments-2,(const char **) arguments+2,exception);
for (j=0; j < number_arguments; j++)
arguments[j]=DestroyString(arguments[j]);
arguments=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(arguments);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("reverse",option+1) == 0)
{
ReverseImageList(images);
InheritException(exception,&(*images)->exception);
break;
}
break;
}
case 's':
{
if (LocaleCompare("smush",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*smush_image;
ssize_t
offset;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
offset=(ssize_t) StringToLong(argv[i+1]);
smush_image=SmushImages(*images,*option == '-' ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse,offset,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
*images=DestroyImageList(*images);
*images=smush_image;
break;
}
if (LocaleCompare("swap",option+1) == 0)
{
Image
*p,
*q,
*u,
*v;
ssize_t
swap_index;
index=(-1);
swap_index=(-2);
if (*option != '+')
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
swap_index=(-1);
flags=ParseGeometry(argv[i+1],&geometry_info);
index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.rho;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
swap_index=(ssize_t) geometry_info.sigma;
}
p=GetImageFromList(*images,index);
q=GetImageFromList(*images,swap_index);
if ((p == (Image *) NULL) || (q == (Image *) NULL))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
OptionError,"NoSuchImage","`%s'",(*images)->filename);
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (p == q)
break;
u=CloneImage(p,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (u == (Image *) NULL)
break;
v=CloneImage(q,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (v == (Image *) NULL)
{
u=DestroyImage(u);
break;
}
ReplaceImageInList(&p,v);
ReplaceImageInList(&q,u);
*images=GetFirstImageInList(q);
break;
}
break;
}
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("write",option+1) == 0)
{
char
key[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*write_images;
ImageInfo
*write_info;
(void) SyncImagesSettings(mogrify_info,*images);
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"cache:%s",argv[i+1]);
(void) DeleteImageRegistry(key);
write_images=(*images);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=CloneImageList(*images,exception);
write_info=CloneImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=WriteImages(write_info,write_images,argv[i+1],exception);
write_info=DestroyImageInfo(write_info);
if (*option == '+')
write_images=DestroyImageList(write_images);
break;
}
break;
}
default:
break;
}
i+=count;
}
quantize_info=DestroyQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
mogrify_info=DestroyImageInfo(mogrify_info);
status&=MogrifyImageInfo(image_info,argc,argv,exception);
return(status != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1623
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 169,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int cdc_ncm_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb_in)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
int len;
int nframes;
int x;
int offset;
struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *ndp16;
struct usb_cdc_ncm_dpe16 *dpe16;
int ndpoffset;
int loopcount = 50; /* arbitrary max preventing infinite loop */
u32 payload = 0;
ndpoffset = cdc_ncm_rx_verify_nth16(ctx, skb_in);
if (ndpoffset < 0)
goto error;
next_ndp:
nframes = cdc_ncm_rx_verify_ndp16(skb_in, ndpoffset);
if (nframes < 0)
goto error;
ndp16 = (struct usb_cdc_ncm_ndp16 *)(skb_in->data + ndpoffset);
if (ndp16->dwSignature != cpu_to_le32(USB_CDC_NCM_NDP16_NOCRC_SIGN)) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net,
"invalid DPT16 signature <%#010x>\n",
le32_to_cpu(ndp16->dwSignature));
goto err_ndp;
}
dpe16 = ndp16->dpe16;
for (x = 0; x < nframes; x++, dpe16++) {
offset = le16_to_cpu(dpe16->wDatagramIndex);
len = le16_to_cpu(dpe16->wDatagramLength);
/*
* CDC NCM ch. 3.7
* All entries after first NULL entry are to be ignored
*/
if ((offset == 0) || (len == 0)) {
if (!x)
goto err_ndp; /* empty NTB */
break;
}
/* sanity checking */
if (((offset + len) > skb_in->len) ||
(len > ctx->rx_max) || (len < ETH_HLEN)) {
netif_dbg(dev, rx_err, dev->net,
"invalid frame detected (ignored) offset[%u]=%u, length=%u, skb=%p\n",
x, offset, len, skb_in);
if (!x)
goto err_ndp;
break;
} else {
/* create a fresh copy to reduce truesize */
skb = netdev_alloc_skb_ip_align(dev->net, len);
if (!skb)
goto error;
memcpy(skb_put(skb, len), skb_in->data + offset, len);
usbnet_skb_return(dev, skb);
payload += len; /* count payload bytes in this NTB */
}
}
err_ndp:
/* are there more NDPs to process? */
ndpoffset = le16_to_cpu(ndp16->wNextNdpIndex);
if (ndpoffset && loopcount--)
goto next_ndp;
/* update stats */
ctx->rx_overhead += skb_in->len - payload;
ctx->rx_ntbs++;
return 1;
error:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 53,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void methodWithNullableCallbackInterfaceArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::methodWithNullableCallbackInterfaceArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,801
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::SetSessionStorageNamespace(
const std::string& partition_id,
SessionStorageNamespace* session_storage_namespace) {
if (!session_storage_namespace)
return;
bool successful_insert = session_storage_namespace_map_.insert(
make_pair(partition_id,
static_cast<SessionStorageNamespaceImpl*>(
session_storage_namespace)))
.second;
CHECK(successful_insert) << "Cannot replace existing SessionStorageNamespace";
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,570
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rdpsnd_send_waveconfirm(uint16 tick, uint8 packet_index)
{
STREAM s;
s = rdpsnd_init_packet(SNDC_WAVECONFIRM, 4);
out_uint16_le(s, tick);
out_uint8(s, packet_index);
out_uint8(s, 0);
s_mark_end(s);
rdpsnd_send(s);
logger(Sound, Debug, "rdpsnd_send_waveconfirm(), tick=%u, index=%u",
(unsigned) tick, (unsigned) packet_index);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetLastVisibleWebContents(content::WebContents* web_contents) {
g_last_visible_web_contents = web_contents;
}
Commit Message: OomIntervention opt-out should work properly with 'show original'
OomIntervention should not be re-triggered on the same page if the user declines the intervention once.
This CL fixes the bug.
Bug: 889131, 887119
Change-Id: Idb9eebb2bb9f79756b63f0e010fe018ba5c490e8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245019
Commit-Queue: Yuzu Saijo <yuzus@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594574}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 130,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t get_sample_flags(MOVTrack *track, MOVIentry *entry)
{
return entry->flags & MOV_SYNC_SAMPLE ? MOV_FRAG_SAMPLE_FLAG_DEPENDS_NO :
(MOV_FRAG_SAMPLE_FLAG_DEPENDS_YES | MOV_FRAG_SAMPLE_FLAG_IS_NON_SYNC);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,293
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __sco_chan_add(struct sco_conn *conn, struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent)
{
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
sco_pi(sk)->conn = conn;
conn->sk = sk;
if (parent)
bt_accept_enqueue(parent, sk);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspace
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 27,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring,
struct key_type *type,
const char *description)
{
struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
.index_key.type = type,
.index_key.description = description,
.cred = current_cred(),
.match_data.cmp = type->match,
.match_data.raw_data = description,
.match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
.flags = KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK,
};
key_ref_t key;
int ret;
if (!ctx.match_data.cmp)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
if (type->match_preparse) {
ret = type->match_preparse(&ctx.match_data);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
key = keyring_search_aux(keyring, &ctx);
if (type->match_free)
type->match_free(&ctx.match_data);
return key;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 168,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 vmac(unsigned char m[], unsigned int mbytes,
const unsigned char n[16], u64 *tagl,
struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx)
{
u64 *in_n, *out_p;
u64 p, h;
int i;
in_n = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce;
out_p = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_aes;
i = n[15] & 1;
if ((*(u64 *)(n+8) != in_n[1]) || (*(u64 *)(n) != in_n[0])) {
in_n[0] = *(u64 *)(n);
in_n[1] = *(u64 *)(n+8);
((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] &= 0xFE;
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
(unsigned char *)out_p, (unsigned char *)in_n);
((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] |= (unsigned char)(1-i);
}
p = be64_to_cpup(out_p + i);
h = vhash(m, mbytes, (u64 *)0, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
return le64_to_cpu(p + h);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputDispatcher::pokeUserActivityLocked(const EventEntry* eventEntry) {
if (mFocusedWindowHandle != NULL) {
const InputWindowInfo* info = mFocusedWindowHandle->getInfo();
if (info->inputFeatures & InputWindowInfo::INPUT_FEATURE_DISABLE_USER_ACTIVITY) {
#if DEBUG_DISPATCH_CYCLE
ALOGD("Not poking user activity: disabled by window '%s'.", info->name.string());
#endif
return;
}
}
int32_t eventType = USER_ACTIVITY_EVENT_OTHER;
switch (eventEntry->type) {
case EventEntry::TYPE_MOTION: {
const MotionEntry* motionEntry = static_cast<const MotionEntry*>(eventEntry);
if (motionEntry->action == AMOTION_EVENT_ACTION_CANCEL) {
return;
}
if (MotionEvent::isTouchEvent(motionEntry->source, motionEntry->action)) {
eventType = USER_ACTIVITY_EVENT_TOUCH;
}
break;
}
case EventEntry::TYPE_KEY: {
const KeyEntry* keyEntry = static_cast<const KeyEntry*>(eventEntry);
if (keyEntry->flags & AKEY_EVENT_FLAG_CANCELED) {
return;
}
eventType = USER_ACTIVITY_EVENT_BUTTON;
break;
}
}
CommandEntry* commandEntry = postCommandLocked(
& InputDispatcher::doPokeUserActivityLockedInterruptible);
commandEntry->eventTime = eventEntry->eventTime;
commandEntry->userActivityEventType = eventType;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebKit::WebFrame* PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::frame() {
CHECK(state_ != UNINITIALIZED);
return frame_;
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned char mincore_page(struct address_space *mapping, pgoff_t pgoff)
{
unsigned char present = 0;
struct page *page;
/*
* When tmpfs swaps out a page from a file, any process mapping that
* file will not get a swp_entry_t in its pte, but rather it is like
* any other file mapping (ie. marked !present and faulted in with
* tmpfs's .fault). So swapped out tmpfs mappings are tested here.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_SWAP
if (shmem_mapping(mapping)) {
page = find_get_entry(mapping, pgoff);
/*
* shmem/tmpfs may return swap: account for swapcache
* page too.
*/
if (xa_is_value(page)) {
swp_entry_t swp = radix_to_swp_entry(page);
page = find_get_page(swap_address_space(swp),
swp_offset(swp));
}
} else
page = find_get_page(mapping, pgoff);
#else
page = find_get_page(mapping, pgoff);
#endif
if (page) {
present = PageUptodate(page);
put_page(page);
}
return present;
}
Commit Message: Change mincore() to count "mapped" pages rather than "cached" pages
The semantics of what "in core" means for the mincore() system call are
somewhat unclear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache" rather than "page is mapped in the mapping".
The problem with that traditional semantic is that it exposes a lot of
system cache state that it really probably shouldn't, and that users
shouldn't really even care about.
So let's try to avoid that information leak by simply changing the
semantics to be that mincore() counts actual mapped pages, not pages
that might be cheaply mapped if they were faulted (note the "might be"
part of the old semantics: being in the cache doesn't actually guarantee
that you can access them without IO anyway, since things like network
filesystems may have to revalidate the cache before use).
In many ways the old semantics were somewhat insane even aside from the
information leak issue. From the very beginning (and that beginning is
a long time ago: 2.3.52 was released in March 2000, I think), the code
had a comment saying
Later we can get more picky about what "in core" means precisely.
and this is that "later". Admittedly it is much later than is really
comfortable.
NOTE! This is a real semantic change, and it is for example known to
change the output of "fincore", since that program literally does a
mmmap without populating it, and then doing "mincore()" on that mapping
that doesn't actually have any pages in it.
I'm hoping that nobody actually has any workflow that cares, and the
info leak is real.
We may have to do something different if it turns out that people have
valid reasons to want the old semantics, and if we can limit the
information leak sanely.
Cc: Kevin Easton <kevin@guarana.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Masatake YAMATO <yamato@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 169,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DrainMessageLoops() {
MessageLoop::current()->RunUntilIdle();
message_loop_.RunUntilIdle();
}
Commit Message: Check for appropriate bindings in process-per-site mode.
BUG=174059
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12188025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181386 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 116,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_reconnect_durable_buf(struct cifs_fid *fid)
{
struct create_durable *buf;
buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct create_durable), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return NULL;
buf->ccontext.DataOffset = cpu_to_le16(offsetof
(struct create_durable, Data));
buf->ccontext.DataLength = cpu_to_le32(16);
buf->ccontext.NameOffset = cpu_to_le16(offsetof
(struct create_durable, Name));
buf->ccontext.NameLength = cpu_to_le16(4);
buf->Data.Fid.PersistentFileId = fid->persistent_fid;
buf->Data.Fid.VolatileFileId = fid->volatile_fid;
/* SMB2_CREATE_DURABLE_HANDLE_RECONNECT is "DHnC" */
buf->Name[0] = 'D';
buf->Name[1] = 'H';
buf->Name[2] = 'n';
buf->Name[3] = 'C';
return buf;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpgsm_set_locale (void *engine, int category, const char *value)
{
engine_gpgsm_t gpgsm = engine;
gpgme_error_t err;
char *optstr;
char *catstr;
/* FIXME: If value is NULL, we need to reset the option to default.
But we can't do this. So we error out here. GPGSM needs support
for this. */
if (0)
;
#ifdef LC_CTYPE
else if (category == LC_CTYPE)
{
catstr = "lc-ctype";
if (!value && gpgsm->lc_ctype_set)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (value)
gpgsm->lc_ctype_set = 1;
}
#endif
#ifdef LC_MESSAGES
else if (category == LC_MESSAGES)
{
catstr = "lc-messages";
if (!value && gpgsm->lc_messages_set)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
if (value)
gpgsm->lc_messages_set = 1;
}
#endif /* LC_MESSAGES */
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
/* FIXME: Reset value to default. */
if (!value)
return 0;
if (asprintf (&optstr, "OPTION %s=%s", catstr, value) < 0)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
err = assuan_transact (gpgsm->assuan_ctx, optstr, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
free (optstr);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init init_misc_binfmt(void)
{
int err = register_filesystem(&bm_fs_type);
if (!err)
insert_binfmt(&misc_format);
return err;
}
Commit Message: exec: do not leave bprm->interp on stack
If a series of scripts are executed, each triggering module loading via
unprintable bytes in the script header, kernel stack contents can leak
into the command line.
Normally execution of binfmt_script and binfmt_misc happens recursively.
However, when modules are enabled, and unprintable bytes exist in the
bprm->buf, execution will restart after attempting to load matching
binfmt modules. Unfortunately, the logic in binfmt_script and
binfmt_misc does not expect to get restarted. They leave bprm->interp
pointing to their local stack. This means on restart bprm->interp is
left pointing into unused stack memory which can then be copied into the
userspace argv areas.
After additional study, it seems that both recursion and restart remains
the desirable way to handle exec with scripts, misc, and modules. As
such, we need to protect the changes to interp.
This changes the logic to require allocation for any changes to the
bprm->interp. To avoid adding a new kmalloc to every exec, the default
value is left as-is. Only when passing through binfmt_script or
binfmt_misc does an allocation take place.
For a proof of concept, see DoTest.sh from:
http://www.halfdog.net/Security/2012/LinuxKernelBinfmtScriptStackDataDisclosure/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: halfdog <me@halfdog.net>
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::use_input_heap_buffers(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 bytes,
OMX_IN OMX_U8* buffer)
{
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Inside %s, %p", __FUNCTION__, buffer);
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (!m_inp_heap_ptr)
m_inp_heap_ptr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE*)
calloc( (sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE)),
drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount);
if (!m_phdr_pmem_ptr)
m_phdr_pmem_ptr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE**)
calloc( (sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE*)),
drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount);
if (!m_inp_heap_ptr || !m_phdr_pmem_ptr) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Insufficent memory");
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
} else if (m_in_alloc_cnt < drv_ctx.ip_buf.actualcount) {
input_use_buffer = true;
memset(&m_inp_heap_ptr[m_in_alloc_cnt], 0, sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE));
m_inp_heap_ptr[m_in_alloc_cnt].pBuffer = buffer;
m_inp_heap_ptr[m_in_alloc_cnt].nAllocLen = bytes;
m_inp_heap_ptr[m_in_alloc_cnt].pAppPrivate = appData;
m_inp_heap_ptr[m_in_alloc_cnt].nInputPortIndex = (OMX_U32) OMX_DirInput;
m_inp_heap_ptr[m_in_alloc_cnt].nOutputPortIndex = (OMX_U32) OMX_DirMax;
*bufferHdr = &m_inp_heap_ptr[m_in_alloc_cnt];
eRet = allocate_input_buffer(hComp, &m_phdr_pmem_ptr[m_in_alloc_cnt], port, appData, bytes);
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("Heap buffer(%p) Pmem buffer(%p)", *bufferHdr, m_phdr_pmem_ptr[m_in_alloc_cnt]);
if (!m_input_free_q.insert_entry((unsigned long)m_phdr_pmem_ptr[m_in_alloc_cnt],
(unsigned)NULL, (unsigned)NULL)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:Free_q is full");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
m_in_alloc_cnt++;
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("All i/p buffers have been set!");
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void udp6_csum_zero_error(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/* RFC 2460 section 8.1 says that we SHOULD log
* this error. Well, it is reasonable.
*/
net_dbg_ratelimited("IPv6: udp checksum is 0 for [%pI6c]:%u->[%pI6c]:%u\n",
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr, ntohs(udp_hdr(skb)->source),
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, ntohs(udp_hdr(skb)->dest));
}
Commit Message: udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::Value* V8ValueConverterImpl::FromV8Value(
v8::Local<v8::Value> val,
v8::Local<v8::Context> context) const {
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(context->GetIsolate());
FromV8ValueState state(avoid_identity_hash_for_testing_);
return FromV8ValueImpl(&state, val, context->GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 156,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void sem_rmid(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct sem_array *s)
{
ipc_rmid(&sem_ids(ns), &s->sem_perm);
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,548
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int TabStrip::FrameGrabWidth() const {
constexpr int kApparentWidth = 50;
return kApparentWidth - new_tab_button_->GetInsets().right();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: moveTab(TabBuffer * t, TabBuffer * t2, int right)
{
if (t2 == NO_TABBUFFER)
t2 = FirstTab;
if (!t || !t2 || t == t2 || t == NO_TABBUFFER)
return;
if (t->prevTab) {
if (t->nextTab)
t->nextTab->prevTab = t->prevTab;
else
LastTab = t->prevTab;
t->prevTab->nextTab = t->nextTab;
}
else {
t->nextTab->prevTab = NULL;
FirstTab = t->nextTab;
}
if (right) {
t->nextTab = t2->nextTab;
t->prevTab = t2;
if (t2->nextTab)
t2->nextTab->prevTab = t;
else
LastTab = t;
t2->nextTab = t;
}
else {
t->prevTab = t2->prevTab;
t->nextTab = t2;
if (t2->prevTab)
t2->prevTab->nextTab = t;
else
FirstTab = t;
t2->prevTab = t;
}
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_FORCE_REDRAW);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int task_scan_min(struct task_struct *p)
{
unsigned int scan_size = READ_ONCE(sysctl_numa_balancing_scan_size);
unsigned int scan, floor;
unsigned int windows = 1;
if (scan_size < MAX_SCAN_WINDOW)
windows = MAX_SCAN_WINDOW / scan_size;
floor = 1000 / windows;
scan = sysctl_numa_balancing_scan_period_min / task_nr_scan_windows(p);
return max_t(unsigned int, floor, scan);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetApplicationLocaleOnIOThread(const std::string& locale) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
GetIOThreadApplicationLocale() = locale;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,749
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<ClientRectList> Element::getClientRects()
{
document()->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
RenderBoxModelObject* renderBoxModelObject = this->renderBoxModelObject();
if (!renderBoxModelObject)
return ClientRectList::create();
Vector<FloatQuad> quads;
renderBoxModelObject->absoluteQuads(quads);
document()->adjustFloatQuadsForScrollAndAbsoluteZoom(quads, renderBoxModelObject);
return ClientRectList::create(quads);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Editor::Command command(Document* document, const String& commandName, bool userInterface = false)
{
Frame* frame = document->frame();
if (!frame || frame->document() != document)
return Editor::Command();
document->updateStyleIfNeeded();
return frame->editor().command(commandName, userInterface ? CommandFromDOMWithUserInterface : CommandFromDOM);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DEFINE_INLINE_TRACE() { visitor->Trace(content_security_policy); }
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnRunBeforeUnloadConfirm(
bool is_reload,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
TRACE_EVENT1("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::OnRunBeforeUnloadConfirm",
"frame_tree_node", frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id());
GetProcess()->SetIgnoreInputEvents(true);
for (RenderFrameHostImpl* frame = this; frame; frame = frame->GetParent()) {
if (frame->beforeunload_timeout_)
frame->beforeunload_timeout_->Stop();
}
delegate_->RunBeforeUnloadConfirm(this, is_reload, reply_msg);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,994
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FLAC_API FLAC__bool FLAC__stream_decoder_get_md5_checking(const FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder)
{
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != decoder->protected_);
return decoder->protected_->md5_checking;
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool isObservable(JSTestObj* jsTestObj)
{
if (jsTestObj->hasCustomProperties())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int seof = 0, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, decoded_len;
unsigned char *d;
n = ctx->num;
d = ctx->enc_data;
if (n > 0 && d[n - 1] == '=') {
eof++;
if (n > 1 && d[n - 2] == '=')
eof++;
}
/* Legacy behaviour: an empty input chunk signals end of input. */
if (inl == 0) {
rv = 0;
goto end;
}
for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) {
tmp = *(in++);
v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp);
if (v == B64_ERROR) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
if (tmp == '=') {
eof++;
} else if (eof > 0 && B64_BASE64(v)) {
/* More data after padding. */
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
if (eof > 2) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
if (v == B64_EOF) {
seof = 1;
goto tail;
}
/* Only save valid base64 characters. */
if (B64_BASE64(v)) {
if (n >= 64) {
/*
* We increment n once per loop, and empty the buffer as soon as
* we reach 64 characters, so this can only happen if someone's
* manually messed with the ctx. Refuse to write any more data.
*/
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
d[n++] = tmp;
}
if (n == 64) {
decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
n = 0;
if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
ret += decoded_len - eof;
out += decoded_len - eof;
}
}
/*
* Legacy behaviour: if the current line is a full base64-block (i.e., has
* 0 mod 4 base64 characters), it is processed immediately. We keep this
* behaviour as applications may not be calling EVP_DecodeFinal properly.
*/
tail:
if (n > 0) {
if ((n & 3) == 0) {
decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
n = 0;
if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
ret += (decoded_len - eof);
} else if (seof) {
/* EOF in the middle of a base64 block. */
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
}
rv = seof || (n == 0 && eof) ? 0 : 1;
end:
/* Legacy behaviour. This should probably rather be zeroed on error. */
*outl = ret;
ctx->num = n;
return (rv);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Tar::Create(const wxString& dmod_folder, double *compression_ratio, wxProgressDialog* aProgressDialog)
{
if (!bCanCompress)
return wxEmptyString;
wxString strCwd = ::wxGetCwd();
::wxSetWorkingDirectory(strCompressDir);
bool result = CreateReal(dmod_folder, compression_ratio, aProgressDialog);
::wxSetWorkingDirectory(strCwd);
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 15,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ok_to_move_to_unc(struct rle_context *rlectx)
{
if(rlectx->unc_len==0) {
return (rlectx->run_len<4);
}
else if(rlectx->unc_len<=2) {
return (rlectx->run_len<6);
}
else {
return (rlectx->run_len<8);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 64,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *tssy_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TimeStampSynchronyBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TSSY);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: StyleSheetList* Document::styleSheets()
{
if (!m_styleSheetList)
m_styleSheetList = StyleSheetList::create(this);
return m_styleSheetList.get();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: float velocity_y() const { return velocity_y_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,143
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void json_delete_integer(json_integer_t *integer)
{
jsonp_free(integer);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 40,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PluginSelectionPolicy::PluginSelectionPolicy()
: init_from_file_finished_(false) {
}
Commit Message: cros: The next 100 clang plugin errors.
BUG=none
TEST=none
TBR=dpolukhin
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7022008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85418 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setPID(unsigned pid) { mElementaryPID = pid; }
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pathbias_check_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *node)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
const double EPSILON = 1.0e-9;
/* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0
* rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't
* change to <= */
if (node->pb.circ_attempts > EPSILON &&
pathbias_get_close_success_count(node)/node->pb.circ_attempts
< pathbias_get_extreme_rate(options) &&
pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) {
node->pb.path_bias_disabled = 1;
log_info(LD_GENERAL,
"Path bias is too high (%f/%f); disabling node %s",
node->pb.circ_successes, node->pb.circ_attempts,
node->nickname);
}
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestWebKitPlatformSupport::createMessagePortChannel() {
return new TestWebMessagePortChannel();
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ff_rtmp_packet_write(URLContext *h, RTMPPacket *pkt,
int chunk_size, RTMPPacket **prev_pkt_ptr,
int *nb_prev_pkt)
{
uint8_t pkt_hdr[16], *p = pkt_hdr;
int mode = RTMP_PS_TWELVEBYTES;
int off = 0;
int written = 0;
int ret;
RTMPPacket *prev_pkt;
int use_delta; // flag if using timestamp delta, not RTMP_PS_TWELVEBYTES
uint32_t timestamp; // full 32-bit timestamp or delta value
if ((ret = ff_rtmp_check_alloc_array(prev_pkt_ptr, nb_prev_pkt,
pkt->channel_id)) < 0)
return ret;
prev_pkt = *prev_pkt_ptr;
use_delta = prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].channel_id &&
pkt->extra == prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].extra &&
pkt->timestamp >= prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].timestamp;
timestamp = pkt->timestamp;
if (use_delta) {
timestamp -= prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].timestamp;
}
if (timestamp >= 0xFFFFFF) {
pkt->ts_field = 0xFFFFFF;
} else {
pkt->ts_field = timestamp;
}
if (use_delta) {
if (pkt->type == prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].type &&
pkt->size == prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].size) {
mode = RTMP_PS_FOURBYTES;
if (pkt->ts_field == prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].ts_field)
mode = RTMP_PS_ONEBYTE;
} else {
mode = RTMP_PS_EIGHTBYTES;
}
}
if (pkt->channel_id < 64) {
bytestream_put_byte(&p, pkt->channel_id | (mode << 6));
} else if (pkt->channel_id < 64 + 256) {
bytestream_put_byte(&p, 0 | (mode << 6));
bytestream_put_byte(&p, pkt->channel_id - 64);
} else {
bytestream_put_byte(&p, 1 | (mode << 6));
bytestream_put_le16(&p, pkt->channel_id - 64);
}
if (mode != RTMP_PS_ONEBYTE) {
bytestream_put_be24(&p, pkt->ts_field);
if (mode != RTMP_PS_FOURBYTES) {
bytestream_put_be24(&p, pkt->size);
bytestream_put_byte(&p, pkt->type);
if (mode == RTMP_PS_TWELVEBYTES)
bytestream_put_le32(&p, pkt->extra);
}
}
if (pkt->ts_field == 0xFFFFFF)
bytestream_put_be32(&p, timestamp);
prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].channel_id = pkt->channel_id;
prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].type = pkt->type;
prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].size = pkt->size;
prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].timestamp = pkt->timestamp;
prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].ts_field = pkt->ts_field;
prev_pkt[pkt->channel_id].extra = pkt->extra;
if ((ret = ffurl_write(h, pkt_hdr, p - pkt_hdr)) < 0)
return ret;
written = p - pkt_hdr + pkt->size;
while (off < pkt->size) {
int towrite = FFMIN(chunk_size, pkt->size - off);
if ((ret = ffurl_write(h, pkt->data + off, towrite)) < 0)
return ret;
off += towrite;
if (off < pkt->size) {
uint8_t marker = 0xC0 | pkt->channel_id;
if ((ret = ffurl_write(h, &marker, 1)) < 0)
return ret;
written++;
if (pkt->ts_field == 0xFFFFFF) {
uint8_t ts_header[4];
AV_WB32(ts_header, timestamp);
if ((ret = ffurl_write(h, ts_header, 4)) < 0)
return ret;
written += 4;
}
}
}
return written;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Convert ff_amf_get_field_value() to bytestream2
Fixes: out of array accesses
Found-by: JunDong Xie of Ant-financial Light-Year Security Lab
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 63,213
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsAndroid::ShowInterstitialPage(
JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj,
jstring jurl,
jlong delegate_ptr) {
GURL url(base::android::ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, jurl));
InterstitialPageDelegateAndroid* delegate =
reinterpret_cast<InterstitialPageDelegateAndroid*>(delegate_ptr);
InterstitialPage* interstitial = InterstitialPage::Create(
web_contents_, false, url, delegate);
delegate->set_interstitial_page(interstitial);
interstitial->Show();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 109,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void handle_s_without_atn(ESPState *s)
{
uint8_t buf[32];
int len;
if (s->dma && !s->dma_enabled) {
s->dma_cb = handle_s_without_atn;
return;
}
len = get_cmd(s, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len) {
do_busid_cmd(s, buf, 0);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 9,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xhci_kick_ep(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
unsigned int epid, unsigned int streamid)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx;
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
assert(epid >= 1 && epid <= 31);
if (!xhci->slots[slotid-1].enabled) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled slot %d\n", slotid);
return;
}
epctx = xhci->slots[slotid-1].eps[epid-1];
if (!epctx) {
DPRINTF("xhci: xhci_kick_ep for disabled endpoint %d,%d\n",
epid, slotid);
return;
return;
}
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, streamid);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 1
| 164,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SimulateMemoryPressure(
base::MemoryPressureListener::MemoryPressureLevel level) {
FrameEvictionManager::GetInstance()->OnMemoryPressure(level);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 145,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String HTMLFormElement::GetName() const {
return GetNameAttribute();
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::ComputePageLayoutInPointsForCss(
WebKit::WebFrame* frame,
int page_index,
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& page_params,
bool ignore_css_margins,
double* scale_factor,
printing::PageSizeMargins* page_layout_in_points) {
PrintMsg_Print_Params params = CalculatePrintParamsForCss(
frame, page_index, page_params, ignore_css_margins,
page_params.print_scaling_option ==
WebKit::WebPrintScalingOptionFitToPrintableArea,
scale_factor);
CalculatePageLayoutFromPrintParams(params, page_layout_in_points);
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataCache::PinOnUIThread(const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
const CacheOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
base::PlatformFileError* error =
new base::PlatformFileError(base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK);
pool_->GetSequencedTaskRunner(sequence_token_)->PostTaskAndReply(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&GDataCache::Pin,
base::Unretained(this),
resource_id,
md5,
GDataCache::FILE_OPERATION_MOVE,
error),
base::Bind(&GDataCache::OnPinned,
ui_weak_ptr_,
base::Owned(error),
resource_id,
md5,
callback));
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 105,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UnloadController::ClearUnloadState(content::WebContents* web_contents,
bool process_now) {
if (is_attempting_to_close_browser_) {
RemoveFromSet(&tabs_needing_before_unload_fired_, web_contents);
RemoveFromSet(&tabs_needing_unload_fired_, web_contents);
if (process_now) {
ProcessPendingTabs();
} else {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&UnloadController::ProcessPendingTabs,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,285
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ash::NetworkIconInfo CreateNetworkIconInfo(const Network* network,
NetworkMenuIcon* network_icon,
NetworkMenu* network_menu) {
ash::NetworkIconInfo info;
info.name = UTF8ToUTF16(network->name());
info.image = network_icon->GetBitmap(network, NetworkMenuIcon::COLOR_DARK);
info.service_path = network->service_path();
info.highlight = network_menu->ShouldHighlightNetwork(network);
info.tray_icon_visible = ShouldShowNetworkIconInTray(network);
return info;
}
Commit Message: Use display_email() for Uber Tray messages.
BUG=124087
TEST=manually
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10388171
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137721 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 106,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::FilePath ContentBrowserClient::GetDefaultDownloadDirectory() {
return base::FilePath();
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::SetRate(double rate) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__ << "(" << rate << ")";
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (rate != playback_rate_) {
LIMITED_MEDIA_LOG(INFO, media_log_.get(), num_playback_rate_logs_,
kMaxNumPlaybackRateLogs)
<< "Effective playback rate changed from " << playback_rate_ << " to "
<< rate;
}
playback_rate_ = rate;
if (!paused_) {
pipeline_controller_.SetPlaybackRate(rate);
if (data_source_)
data_source_->MediaPlaybackRateChanged(rate);
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Con_Init( void ) {
int i;
con_notifytime = Cvar_Get( "con_notifytime", "7", 0 ); // JPW NERVE increased per id req for obits
con_conspeed = Cvar_Get( "scr_conspeed", "3", 0 );
con_debug = Cvar_Get( "con_debug", "0", CVAR_ARCHIVE ); //----(SA) added
con_restricted = Cvar_Get( "con_restricted", "0", CVAR_INIT ); // DHM - Nerve
Field_Clear( &g_consoleField );
g_consoleField.widthInChars = g_console_field_width;
for ( i = 0 ; i < COMMAND_HISTORY ; i++ ) {
Field_Clear( &historyEditLines[i] );
historyEditLines[i].widthInChars = g_console_field_width;
}
CL_LoadConsoleHistory( );
Cmd_AddCommand( "toggleconsole", Con_ToggleConsole_f );
Cmd_AddCommand ("togglemenu", Con_ToggleMenu_f);
Cmd_AddCommand( "messagemode", Con_MessageMode_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "messagemode2", Con_MessageMode2_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "messagemode3", Con_MessageMode3_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "messagemode4", Con_MessageMode4_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "startLimboMode", Con_StartLimboMode_f ); // NERVE - SMF
Cmd_AddCommand( "stopLimboMode", Con_StopLimboMode_f ); // NERVE - SMF
Cmd_AddCommand( "clear", Con_Clear_f );
Cmd_AddCommand( "condump", Con_Dump_f );
Cmd_SetCommandCompletionFunc( "condump", Cmd_CompleteTxtName );
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltApplyOneTemplate(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt,
xmlNodePtr contextNode,
xmlNodePtr list,
xsltTemplatePtr templ ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
xsltStackElemPtr params)
{
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (list == NULL))
return;
CHECK_STOPPED;
if (params) {
/*
* This code should be obsolete - was previously used
* by libexslt/functions.c, but due to bug 381319 the
* logic there was changed.
*/
int oldVarsNr = ctxt->varsNr;
/*
* Push the given xsl:param(s) onto the variable stack.
*/
while (params != NULL) {
xsltLocalVariablePush(ctxt, params, -1);
params = params->next;
}
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt, contextNode, list, templ);
/*
* Pop the given xsl:param(s) from the stack but don't free them.
*/
xsltLocalVariablePop(ctxt, oldVarsNr, -2);
} else
xsltApplySequenceConstructor(ctxt, contextNode, list, templ);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: image_draw_decide_cb (int image_id, void *data)
{
return (image_id == GPOINTER_TO_INT (data));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::StaticNullableTestDictionaryMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_staticNullableTestDictionaryMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::StaticNullableTestDictionaryMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long setup_trampoline(unsigned int syscall, unsigned int __user *tramp)
{
int i;
long err = 0;
/* addi r1, r1, __SIGNAL_FRAMESIZE # Pop the dummy stackframe */
err |= __put_user(0x38210000UL | (__SIGNAL_FRAMESIZE & 0xffff), &tramp[0]);
/* li r0, __NR_[rt_]sigreturn| */
err |= __put_user(0x38000000UL | (syscall & 0xffff), &tramp[1]);
/* sc */
err |= __put_user(0x44000002UL, &tramp[2]);
/* Minimal traceback info */
for (i=TRAMP_TRACEBACK; i < TRAMP_SIZE ;i++)
err |= __put_user(0, &tramp[i]);
if (!err)
flush_icache_range((unsigned long) &tramp[0],
(unsigned long) &tramp[TRAMP_SIZE]);
return err;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 56,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::HideGaiaDialog() {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AutomationProviderHistoryObserver::~AutomationProviderHistoryObserver() {}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static double FreshnessLifetime(const ResourceResponse& response,
double response_timestamp) {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (response.Url().IsLocalFile())
return 0;
#endif
if (!response.Url().ProtocolIsInHTTPFamily() &&
!response.Url().ProtocolIs("filesystem"))
return std::numeric_limits<double>::max();
double max_age_value = response.CacheControlMaxAge();
if (std::isfinite(max_age_value))
return max_age_value;
double expires_value = response.Expires();
double date_value = response.Date();
double creation_time =
std::isfinite(date_value) ? date_value : response_timestamp;
if (std::isfinite(expires_value))
return expires_value - creation_time;
double last_modified_value = response.LastModified();
if (std::isfinite(last_modified_value))
return (creation_time - last_modified_value) * 0.1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::Form_DisplayCaret(FPDF_FORMFILLINFO* param,
FPDF_PAGE page,
FPDF_BOOL visible,
double left,
double top,
double right,
double bottom) {}
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cursorHoldsMutex(BtCursor *p){
return sqlite3_mutex_held(p->pBt->mutex);
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::setMiterLimit(float)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __xmlParserVersion(void) {
if (IS_MAIN_THREAD)
return (&xmlParserVersion);
else
return (&xmlGetGlobalState()->xmlParserVersion);
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 107,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DelegatedFrameHostClient::ShouldCreateResizeLock() {
#if !defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
return false;
#else
return GetDelegatedFrameHost()->ShouldCreateResizeLock();
#endif
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void age_mic_context(miccntx *cur, miccntx *old, u8 *key, int key_len,
struct crypto_cipher *tfm)
{
/* If the current MIC context is valid and its key is the same as
* the MIC register, there's nothing to do.
*/
if (cur->valid && (memcmp(cur->key, key, key_len) == 0))
return;
/* Age current mic Context */
memcpy(old, cur, sizeof(*cur));
/* Initialize new context */
memcpy(cur->key, key, key_len);
cur->window = 33; /* Window always points to the middle */
cur->rx = 0; /* Rx Sequence numbers */
cur->tx = 0; /* Tx sequence numbers */
cur->valid = 1; /* Key is now valid */
/* Give key to mic seed */
emmh32_setseed(&cur->seed, key, key_len, tfm);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bson_iter_init (bson_iter_t *iter, /* OUT */
const bson_t *bson) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
BSON_ASSERT (bson);
if (BSON_UNLIKELY (bson->len < 5)) {
memset (iter, 0, sizeof *iter);
return false;
}
iter->raw = bson_get_data (bson);
iter->len = bson->len;
iter->off = 0;
iter->type = 0;
iter->key = 0;
iter->d1 = 0;
iter->d2 = 0;
iter->d3 = 0;
iter->d4 = 0;
iter->next_off = 4;
iter->err_off = 0;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,835
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::SetOobeProgressBarVisible(bool visible) {
GetOobeUI()->ShowOobeUI(visible);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FileTransfer::HandleCommands(Service *, int command, Stream *s)
{
FileTransfer *transobject;
char *transkey = NULL;
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"entering FileTransfer::HandleCommands\n");
if ( s->type() != Stream::reli_sock ) {
return 0;
}
ReliSock *sock = (ReliSock *) s;
sock->timeout(0);
if (!sock->get_secret(transkey) ||
!sock->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,
"FileTransfer::HandleCommands failed to read transkey\n");
return 0;
}
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,
"FileTransfer::HandleCommands read transkey=%s\n",transkey);
MyString key(transkey);
free(transkey);
if ( (TranskeyTable == NULL) ||
(TranskeyTable->lookup(key,transobject) < 0) ) {
sock->snd_int(0,1); // sends a "0" then an end_of_record
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"transkey is invalid!\n");
sleep(5);
return FALSE;
}
switch (command) {
case FILETRANS_UPLOAD:
{
const char *currFile;
transobject->CommitFiles();
Directory spool_space( transobject->SpoolSpace,
transobject->getDesiredPrivState() );
while ( (currFile=spool_space.Next()) ) {
if (transobject->UserLogFile &&
!file_strcmp(transobject->UserLogFile,currFile))
{
continue;
} else {
const char *filename = spool_space.GetFullPath();
if ( !transobject->InputFiles->file_contains(filename) &&
!transobject->InputFiles->file_contains(condor_basename(filename)) ) {
transobject->InputFiles->append(filename);
}
}
}
transobject->FilesToSend = transobject->InputFiles;
transobject->EncryptFiles = transobject->EncryptInputFiles;
transobject->DontEncryptFiles = transobject->DontEncryptInputFiles;
transobject->Upload(sock,true); // blocking = true for now...
}
break;
case FILETRANS_DOWNLOAD:
transobject->Download(sock,true); // blocking = true for now...
break;
default:
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,
"FileTransfer::HandleCommands: unrecognized command %d\n",
command);
return 0;
break;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: i915_gem_execbuffer_flush(struct drm_device *dev,
uint32_t invalidate_domains,
uint32_t flush_domains,
uint32_t flush_rings)
{
drm_i915_private_t *dev_priv = dev->dev_private;
int i, ret;
if (flush_domains & I915_GEM_DOMAIN_CPU)
intel_gtt_chipset_flush();
if (flush_domains & I915_GEM_DOMAIN_GTT)
wmb();
if ((flush_domains | invalidate_domains) & I915_GEM_GPU_DOMAINS) {
for (i = 0; i < I915_NUM_RINGS; i++)
if (flush_rings & (1 << i)) {
ret = i915_gem_flush_ring(&dev_priv->ring[i],
invalidate_domains,
flush_domains);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_do_execbuffer()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->num_cliprects from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 432e58ed ("drm/i915: Avoid
allocation for execbuffer object list").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static NICK_REC *nicklist_find_wildcards(CHANNEL_REC *channel,
const char *mask)
{
NICK_REC *nick;
GHashTableIter iter;
g_hash_table_iter_init(&iter, channel->nicks);
while (g_hash_table_iter_next(&iter, NULL, (void*)&nick)) {
for (; nick != NULL; nick = nick->next) {
if (mask_match_address(channel->server, mask,
nick->nick, nick->host))
return nick;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,687
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void skb_tx_error(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_DEV_ZEROCOPY) {
struct ubuf_info *uarg;
uarg = skb_shinfo(skb)->destructor_arg;
if (uarg->callback)
uarg->callback(uarg, false);
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags &= ~SKBTX_DEV_ZEROCOPY;
}
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __revoke_inmem_pages(struct inode *inode,
struct list_head *head, bool drop, bool recover)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct inmem_pages *cur, *tmp;
int err = 0;
list_for_each_entry_safe(cur, tmp, head, list) {
struct page *page = cur->page;
if (drop)
trace_f2fs_commit_inmem_page(page, INMEM_DROP);
lock_page(page);
if (recover) {
struct dnode_of_data dn;
struct node_info ni;
trace_f2fs_commit_inmem_page(page, INMEM_REVOKE);
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (get_dnode_of_data(&dn, page->index, LOOKUP_NODE)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto next;
}
get_node_info(sbi, dn.nid, &ni);
f2fs_replace_block(sbi, &dn, dn.data_blkaddr,
cur->old_addr, ni.version, true, true);
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
}
next:
/* we don't need to invalidate this in the sccessful status */
if (drop || recover)
ClearPageUptodate(page);
set_page_private(page, 0);
ClearPagePrivate(page);
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
list_del(&cur->list);
kmem_cache_free(inmem_entry_slab, cur);
dec_page_count(F2FS_I_SB(inode), F2FS_INMEM_PAGES);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_end_io_nolock(ext4_io_end_t *io)
{
struct inode *inode = io->inode;
loff_t offset = io->offset;
ssize_t size = io->size;
int ret = 0;
ext4_debug("ext4_end_io_nolock: io 0x%p from inode %lu,list->next 0x%p,"
"list->prev 0x%p\n",
io, inode->i_ino, io->list.next, io->list.prev);
if (list_empty(&io->list))
return ret;
if (io->flag != EXT4_IO_UNWRITTEN)
return ret;
if (offset + size <= i_size_read(inode))
ret = ext4_convert_unwritten_extents(inode, offset, size);
if (ret < 0) {
printk(KERN_EMERG "%s: failed to convert unwritten"
"extents to written extents, error is %d"
" io is still on inode %lu aio dio list\n",
__func__, ret, inode->i_ino);
return ret;
}
/* clear the DIO AIO unwritten flag */
io->flag = 0;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 167,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void write_pmc(int idx, unsigned long val)
{
switch (idx) {
case 1:
mtspr(SPRN_PMC1, val);
break;
case 2:
mtspr(SPRN_PMC2, val);
break;
case 3:
mtspr(SPRN_PMC3, val);
break;
case 4:
mtspr(SPRN_PMC4, val);
break;
case 5:
mtspr(SPRN_PMC5, val);
break;
case 6:
mtspr(SPRN_PMC6, val);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
case 7:
mtspr(SPRN_PMC7, val);
break;
case 8:
mtspr(SPRN_PMC8, val);
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "oops trying to write PMC%d\n", idx);
}
}
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 22,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static TEE_Result add_elf_deps(struct user_ta_ctx *utc, char **deps,
size_t num_deps)
{
struct user_ta_elf *libelf;
TEE_Result res = TEE_SUCCESS;
TEE_UUID u;
size_t n;
for (n = 0; n < num_deps; n++) {
res = parse_uuid(deps[n], &u);
if (res) {
EMSG("Invalid dependency (not a UUID): %s", deps[n]);
goto out;
}
DMSG("Library needed: %pUl", (void *)&u);
libelf = ta_elf(&u, utc);
if (!libelf) {
res = TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto out;
}
}
out:
return res;
}
Commit Message: core: clear the entire TA area
Previously we cleared (memset to zero) the size corresponding to code
and data segments, however the allocation for the TA is made on the
granularity of the memory pool, meaning that we did not clear all memory
and because of that we could potentially leak code and data of a
previous loaded TA.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0006: "Potential disclosure of previously loaded TA
code and data"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Suggested-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 86,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: onig_initialize(OnigEncoding encodings[], int n)
{
int i;
int r;
if (onig_inited != 0)
return 0;
onigenc_init();
onig_inited = 1;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
OnigEncoding enc = encodings[i];
r = onig_initialize_encoding(enc);
if (r != 0)
return r;
}
return ONIG_NORMAL;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char* AutofillDialogViews::SuggestedButton::GetClassName() const {
return kSuggestedButtonClassName;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 109,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_in_standby_l(struct stream_in *in)
{
int status = 0;
if (!in->standby) {
in_close_pcm_devices(in);
status = stop_input_stream(in);
if (in->read_buf) {
free(in->read_buf);
in->read_buf = NULL;
}
in->standby = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 162,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t out_get_latency(const struct audio_stream_out *stream)
{
int latency_us;
struct a2dp_stream_out *out = (struct a2dp_stream_out *)stream;
FNLOG();
latency_us = ((out->common.buffer_sz * 1000 ) /
audio_stream_out_frame_size(&out->stream) /
out->common.cfg.rate) * 1000;
return (latency_us / 1000) + 200;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evdns_server_request_drop(struct evdns_server_request *req_)
{
struct server_request *req = TO_SERVER_REQUEST(req_);
server_request_free(req);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoSetDecryptionPassphrase(
const std::string& passphrase) {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
sync_manager_->SetDecryptionPassphrase(passphrase);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool FormHasNonEmptyPasswordField(const FormData& form) {
for (const auto& field : form.fields) {
if (field.IsPasswordInputElement()) {
if (!field.value.empty() || !field.typed_value.empty())
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [Android][TouchToFill] Use FindPasswordInfoForElement for triggering
Use for TouchToFill the same triggering logic that is used for regular
suggestions.
Bug: 1010233
Change-Id: I111d4eac4ce94dd94b86097b6b6c98e08875e11a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1834230
Commit-Queue: Boris Sazonov <bsazonov@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadym Doroshenko <dvadym@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#702058}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 137,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: X11SurfaceFactory::X11SurfaceFactory() {
glx_implementation_.reset(new GLOzoneGLX());
egl_implementation_.reset(new GLOzoneEGLX11());
}
Commit Message: Add ThreadChecker for Ozone X11 GPU.
Ensure Ozone X11 tests the same thread constraints we have in Ozone GBM.
BUG=none
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2366643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421817}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 119,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_VERSION,
DTLSv1_server_method,
dtls1_accept,
ssl_undefined_function,
dtls1_get_server_method,
DTLSv1_enc_data)
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS1_2_VERSION,
DTLSv1_2_server_method,
dtls1_accept,
ssl_undefined_function,
dtls1_get_server_method,
DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLS_ANY_VERSION,
DTLS_server_method,
dtls1_accept,
ssl_undefined_function,
dtls1_get_server_method,
DTLSv1_2_enc_data)
int dtls1_accept(SSL *s)
{
BUF_MEM *buf;
unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
unsigned long alg_k;
int ret= -1;
int new_state,state,skip=0;
int listen;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
#endif
RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
ERR_clear_error();
clear_sys_error();
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
listen = s->d1->listen;
/* init things to blank */
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
s->d1->listen = listen;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake
* mode and prevent stream identifier other
* than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, s->in_handshake, NULL);
#endif
if (s->cert == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
return(-1);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
* already got and don't await it anymore, because
* Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
*/
if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
{
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
}
#endif
for (;;)
{
state=s->state;
switch (s->state)
{
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate=1;
/* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
s->server=1;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
if (s->init_buf == NULL)
{
if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
{
BUF_MEM_free(buf);
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_buf=buf;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
/* Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. */
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
{
/* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
* the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
* ...but not with SCTP :-)
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
#endif
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
}
else
{
/* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
* we will just send a HelloRequest */
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
else
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while listening */
if (listen)
{
memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
}
/* If we're just listening, stop here */
if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
{
ret = 2;
s->d1->listen = 0;
/* Set expected sequence numbers
* to continue the handshake.
*/
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2;
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1;
goto end;
}
break;
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
if ( ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
/* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK:
if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
{
s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
break;
case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK:
ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s));
if (ret < 0) goto end;
if (ret == 0)
{
if (s->d1->next_state != SSL_ST_OK)
{
s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
}
s->state=s->d1->next_state;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
s->renegotiate = 2;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (s->hit)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
snprintf((char*) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
#endif
}
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
/* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
else
{
skip = 1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
#else
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
#endif
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* clear this, it may get reset by
* send_server_key_exchange */
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
&& !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
)
/* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
* even when forbidden by protocol specs
* (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
* be able to handle this) */
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
else
s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
/* only send if a DH key exchange or
* RSA but we have a sign only certificate */
if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
/* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
* hint if provided */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
#endif
|| (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
|| (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
|| ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
&& (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
|| (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
&& EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
)
)
)
)
{
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
else
skip=1;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
/* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
* don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
/* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
* (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
* and in RFC 2246): */
((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
/* ... except when the application insists on verification
* (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
/* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
/* With normal PSK Certificates and
* Certificate Requests are omitted */
|| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
{
/* no cert request */
skip=1;
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
{
s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
}
#endif
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
{
s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
}
#endif
#else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
{
s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
}
#endif
#endif
s->init_num=0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
{
/* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */
if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))
{
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
}
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
{
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
snprintf((char *) labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0);
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (ret == 2)
{
/* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
* the client sends its ECDH pub key in
* a certificate, the CertificateVerify
* message is not sent.
*/
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
}
else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->session->peer)
break;
/* For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
* at this point and digest cached records.
*/
if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
return -1;
}
else
{
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* We need to get hashes here so if there is
* a client cert, it can be verified */
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_md5,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
NID_sha1,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
/*
* This *should* be the first time we enable CCS, but be
* extra careful about surrounding code changes. We need
* to set this here because we don't know if we're
* expecting a CertificateVerify or not.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
s->state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK;
else
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
/*
* Enable CCS for resumed handshakes.
* In a full handshake, we end up here through
* SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, so change_cipher_spec_ok was
* already set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
* sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
* s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
* processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until
* the client's Finished message is read.
*/
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
#endif
else
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num=0;
break;
#endif
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
{ ret= -1; goto end; }
ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (!s->hit)
{
/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
}
#endif
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
{
ret= -1;
goto end;
}
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
break;
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
if (s->hit)
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth,
* will be ignored if no SCTP used.
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL);
#endif
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
{
s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK;
}
#endif
}
s->init_num=0;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
#if 0
BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
s->init_buf=NULL;
#endif
/* remove buffering on output */
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num=0;
if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
{
s->renegotiate=0;
s->new_session=0;
ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
/* s->server=1; */
s->handshake_func=dtls1_accept;
if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
}
ret = 1;
/* done handshaking, next message is client hello */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
/* next message is server hello */
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret= -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
{
if (s->debug)
{
if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
{
new_state=s->state;
s->state=state;
cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
s->state=new_state;
}
}
skip=0;
}
Commit Message: Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites.
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 1
| 166,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __sock_recv_timestamp(struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int need_software_tstamp = sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMP);
struct timespec ts[3];
int empty = 1;
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *shhwtstamps =
skb_hwtstamps(skb);
/* Race occurred between timestamp enabling and packet
receiving. Fill in the current time for now. */
if (need_software_tstamp && skb->tstamp.tv64 == 0)
__net_timestamp(skb);
if (need_software_tstamp) {
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_RCVTSTAMPNS)) {
struct timeval tv;
skb_get_timestamp(skb, &tv);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMP,
sizeof(tv), &tv);
} else {
skb_get_timestampns(skb, &ts[0]);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_TIMESTAMPNS,
sizeof(ts[0]), &ts[0]);
}
}
memset(ts, 0, sizeof(ts));
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_SOFTWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(skb->tstamp, ts + 0))
empty = 0;
if (shhwtstamps) {
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_SYS_HARDWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(shhwtstamps->syststamp, ts + 1))
empty = 0;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMPING_RAW_HARDWARE) &&
ktime_to_timespec_cond(shhwtstamps->hwtstamp, ts + 2))
empty = 0;
}
if (!empty)
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET,
SCM_TIMESTAMPING, sizeof(ts), &ts);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t get_camera_metadata_alignment() {
return METADATA_PACKET_ALIGNMENT;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tst_QQuickWebView::prepareWebViewComponent()
{
static QDeclarativeEngine* engine = new QDeclarativeEngine(this);
engine->addImportPath(QString::fromUtf8(IMPORT_DIR));
m_component.reset(new QDeclarativeComponent(engine, this));
m_component->setData(QByteArrayLiteral("import QtQuick 2.0\n"
"import QtWebKit 3.0\n"
"WebView {}")
, QUrl());
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage long sys_adjtimex(struct timex __user *txc_p)
{
struct timex txc; /* Local copy of parameter */
int ret;
/* Copy the user data space into the kernel copy
* structure. But bear in mind that the structures
* may change
*/
if(copy_from_user(&txc, txc_p, sizeof(struct timex)))
return -EFAULT;
ret = do_adjtimex(&txc);
return copy_to_user(txc_p, &txc, sizeof(struct timex)) ? -EFAULT : ret;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE0(setsid)
{
struct task_struct *group_leader = current->group_leader;
struct pid *sid = task_pid(group_leader);
pid_t session = pid_vnr(sid);
int err = -EPERM;
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* Fail if I am already a session leader */
if (group_leader->signal->leader)
goto out;
/* Fail if a process group id already exists that equals the
* proposed session id.
*/
if (pid_task(sid, PIDTYPE_PGID))
goto out;
group_leader->signal->leader = 1;
__set_special_pids(sid);
proc_clear_tty(group_leader);
err = session;
out:
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
if (err > 0) {
proc_sid_connector(group_leader);
sched_autogroup_create_attach(group_leader);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 162,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void start_thread_ia32(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 new_ip, u32 new_sp)
{
start_thread_common(regs, new_ip, new_sp,
test_thread_flag(TIF_X32)
? __USER_CS : __USER32_CS,
__USER_DS, __USER_DS);
}
Commit Message: x86_64, switch_to(): Load TLS descriptors before switching DS and ES
Otherwise, if buggy user code points DS or ES into the TLS
array, they would be corrupted after a context switch.
This also significantly improves the comments and documents some
gotchas in the code.
Before this patch, the both tests below failed. With this
patch, the es test passes, although the gsbase test still fails.
----- begin es test -----
/*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
* GPL v2
*/
static unsigned short GDT3(int idx)
{
return (idx << 3) | 3;
}
static int create_tls(int idx, unsigned int base)
{
struct user_desc desc = {
.entry_number = idx,
.base_addr = base,
.limit = 0xfffff,
.seg_32bit = 1,
.contents = 0, /* Data, grow-up */
.read_exec_only = 0,
.limit_in_pages = 1,
.seg_not_present = 0,
.useable = 0,
};
if (syscall(SYS_set_thread_area, &desc) != 0)
err(1, "set_thread_area");
return desc.entry_number;
}
int main()
{
int idx = create_tls(-1, 0);
printf("Allocated GDT index %d\n", idx);
unsigned short orig_es;
asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (orig_es));
int errors = 0;
int total = 1000;
for (int i = 0; i < total; i++) {
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (GDT3(idx)));
usleep(100);
unsigned short es;
asm volatile ("mov %%es,%0" : "=rm" (es));
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%es" : : "rm" (orig_es));
if (es != GDT3(idx)) {
if (errors == 0)
printf("[FAIL]\tES changed from 0x%hx to 0x%hx\n",
GDT3(idx), es);
errors++;
}
}
if (errors) {
printf("[FAIL]\tES was corrupted %d/%d times\n", errors, total);
return 1;
} else {
printf("[OK]\tES was preserved\n");
return 0;
}
}
----- end es test -----
----- begin gsbase test -----
/*
* gsbase.c, a gsbase test
* Copyright (c) 2014 Andy Lutomirski
* GPL v2
*/
static unsigned char *testptr, *testptr2;
static unsigned char read_gs_testvals(void)
{
unsigned char ret;
asm volatile ("movb %%gs:%1, %0" : "=r" (ret) : "m" (*testptr));
return ret;
}
int main()
{
int errors = 0;
testptr = mmap((void *)0x200000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (testptr == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap");
testptr2 = mmap((void *)0x300000000UL, 1, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
if (testptr2 == MAP_FAILED)
err(1, "mmap");
*testptr = 0;
*testptr2 = 1;
if (syscall(SYS_arch_prctl, ARCH_SET_GS,
(unsigned long)testptr2 - (unsigned long)testptr) != 0)
err(1, "ARCH_SET_GS");
usleep(100);
if (read_gs_testvals() == 1) {
printf("[OK]\tARCH_SET_GS worked\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tARCH_SET_GS failed\n");
errors++;
}
asm volatile ("mov %0,%%gs" : : "r" (0));
if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
printf("[OK]\tWriting 0 to gs worked\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tWriting 0 to gs failed\n");
errors++;
}
usleep(100);
if (read_gs_testvals() == 0) {
printf("[OK]\tgsbase is still zero\n");
} else {
printf("[FAIL]\tgsbase was corrupted\n");
errors++;
}
return errors == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}
----- end gsbase test -----
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/509d27c9fec78217691c3dad91cec87e1006b34a.1418075657.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 35,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_file(const char *env_name, const char *file_name)
{
char* config_source = NULL;
char* env = NULL;
int fd = 0;
if( env_name && (env = getenv( env_name )) ) {
config_source = strdup( env );
StatInfo si( config_source );
switch( si.Error() ) {
case SIGood:
if( si.IsDirectory() ) {
fprintf( stderr, "File specified in %s environment "
"variable:\n\"%s\" is a directory. "
"Please specify a file.\n", env_name,
config_source );
free( config_source );
config_source = NULL;
exit( 1 );
}
return config_source;
break;
case SINoFile:
if (!is_piped_command(config_source) ||
!is_valid_command(config_source)) {
fprintf( stderr, "File specified in %s environment "
"variable:\n\"%s\" does not exist.\n",
env_name, config_source );
free( config_source );
exit( 1 );
break;
}
return config_source;
case SIFailure:
fprintf( stderr, "Cannot stat file specified in %s "
"environment variable:\n\"%s\", errno: %d\n",
env_name, config_source, si.Errno() );
free( config_source );
exit( 1 );
break;
}
}
# ifdef UNIX
if (!config_source) {
int locations_length = 4;
MyString locations[locations_length];
locations[0].sprintf( "/etc/%s/%s", myDistro->Get(), file_name );
locations[1].sprintf( "/usr/local/etc/%s", file_name );
if (tilde) {
locations[2].sprintf( "%s/%s", tilde, file_name );
}
char *globus_location;
if ((globus_location = getenv("GLOBUS_LOCATION"))) {
locations[3].sprintf( "%s/etc/%s", globus_location, file_name );
}
int ctr;
for (ctr = 0 ; ctr < locations_length; ctr++) {
if (!locations[ctr].IsEmpty()) {
config_source = strdup(locations[ctr].Value());
if ((fd = safe_open_wrapper_follow(config_source, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
free(config_source);
config_source = NULL;
} else {
close(fd);
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Reading condor configuration "
"from '%s'\n", config_source);
break;
}
}
} // FOR
} // IF
# elif defined WIN32 // ifdef UNIX
HKEY handle;
char regKey[256];
snprintf( regKey, 256, "Software\\%s", myDistro->GetCap() );
if ( !config_source && RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, regKey,
0, KEY_READ, &handle) == ERROR_SUCCESS ) {
char the_path[MAX_PATH];
DWORD valType;
DWORD valSize = MAX_PATH - 2;
the_path[0] = '\0';
if ( RegQueryValueEx(handle, env_name, 0,
&valType, (unsigned char *)the_path, &valSize) == ERROR_SUCCESS ) {
if ( valType == REG_SZ && the_path[0] ) {
config_source = strdup(the_path);
if ( strncmp(config_source, "\\\\", 2 ) == 0 ) {
NETRESOURCE nr;
nr.dwType = RESOURCETYPE_DISK;
nr.lpLocalName = NULL;
nr.lpRemoteName = condor_dirname(config_source);
nr.lpProvider = NULL;
if ( NO_ERROR != WNetAddConnection2(
&nr, /* NetResource */
NULL, /* password (default) */
NULL, /* username (default) */
0 /* flags (none) */
) ) {
if ( GetLastError() == ERROR_INVALID_PASSWORD ) {
WNetAddConnection2(
&nr, /* NetResource */
"", /* password (none) */
NULL, /* username (default) */
0 /* flags (none) */
);
}
}
if (nr.lpRemoteName) {
free(nr.lpRemoteName);
}
}
if( !(is_piped_command(config_source) &&
is_valid_command(config_source)) &&
(fd = safe_open_wrapper_follow( config_source, O_RDONLY)) < 0 ) {
free( config_source );
config_source = NULL;
} else {
if (fd != 0) {
close( fd );
}
}
}
}
RegCloseKey(handle);
}
# else
# error "Unknown O/S"
# endif /* ifdef UNIX / Win32 */
return config_source;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_sock *sp;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *new_asoc = NULL, *asoc = NULL;
struct sctp_transport *transport, *chunk_tp;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
union sctp_addr to;
struct sockaddr *msg_name = NULL;
struct sctp_sndrcvinfo default_sinfo;
struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo;
struct sctp_initmsg *sinit;
sctp_assoc_t associd = 0;
struct sctp_cmsgs cmsgs = { NULL };
enum sctp_scope scope;
bool fill_sinfo_ttl = false, wait_connect = false;
struct sctp_datamsg *datamsg;
int msg_flags = msg->msg_flags;
__u16 sinfo_flags = 0;
long timeo;
int err;
err = 0;
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
ep = sp->ep;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, msg:%p, msg_len:%zu ep:%p\n", __func__, sk,
msg, msg_len, ep);
/* We cannot send a message over a TCP-style listening socket. */
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING)) {
err = -EPIPE;
goto out_nounlock;
}
/* Parse out the SCTP CMSGs. */
err = sctp_msghdr_parse(msg, &cmsgs);
if (err) {
pr_debug("%s: msghdr parse err:%x\n", __func__, err);
goto out_nounlock;
}
/* Fetch the destination address for this packet. This
* address only selects the association--it is not necessarily
* the address we will send to.
* For a peeled-off socket, msg_name is ignored.
*/
if (!sctp_style(sk, UDP_HIGH_BANDWIDTH) && msg->msg_name) {
int msg_namelen = msg->msg_namelen;
err = sctp_verify_addr(sk, (union sctp_addr *)msg->msg_name,
msg_namelen);
if (err)
return err;
if (msg_namelen > sizeof(to))
msg_namelen = sizeof(to);
memcpy(&to, msg->msg_name, msg_namelen);
msg_name = msg->msg_name;
}
sinit = cmsgs.init;
if (cmsgs.sinfo != NULL) {
memset(&default_sinfo, 0, sizeof(default_sinfo));
default_sinfo.sinfo_stream = cmsgs.sinfo->snd_sid;
default_sinfo.sinfo_flags = cmsgs.sinfo->snd_flags;
default_sinfo.sinfo_ppid = cmsgs.sinfo->snd_ppid;
default_sinfo.sinfo_context = cmsgs.sinfo->snd_context;
default_sinfo.sinfo_assoc_id = cmsgs.sinfo->snd_assoc_id;
sinfo = &default_sinfo;
fill_sinfo_ttl = true;
} else {
sinfo = cmsgs.srinfo;
}
/* Did the user specify SNDINFO/SNDRCVINFO? */
if (sinfo) {
sinfo_flags = sinfo->sinfo_flags;
associd = sinfo->sinfo_assoc_id;
}
pr_debug("%s: msg_len:%zu, sinfo_flags:0x%x\n", __func__,
msg_len, sinfo_flags);
/* SCTP_EOF or SCTP_ABORT cannot be set on a TCP-style socket. */
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP) && (sinfo_flags & (SCTP_EOF | SCTP_ABORT))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nounlock;
}
/* If SCTP_EOF is set, no data can be sent. Disallow sending zero
* length messages when SCTP_EOF|SCTP_ABORT is not set.
* If SCTP_ABORT is set, the message length could be non zero with
* the msg_iov set to the user abort reason.
*/
if (((sinfo_flags & SCTP_EOF) && (msg_len > 0)) ||
(!(sinfo_flags & (SCTP_EOF|SCTP_ABORT)) && (msg_len == 0))) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nounlock;
}
/* If SCTP_ADDR_OVER is set, there must be an address
* specified in msg_name.
*/
if ((sinfo_flags & SCTP_ADDR_OVER) && (!msg->msg_name)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nounlock;
}
transport = NULL;
pr_debug("%s: about to look up association\n", __func__);
lock_sock(sk);
/* If a msg_name has been specified, assume this is to be used. */
if (msg_name) {
/* Look for a matching association on the endpoint. */
asoc = sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(ep, &to, &transport);
/* If we could not find a matching association on the
* endpoint, make sure that it is not a TCP-style
* socket that already has an association or there is
* no peeled-off association on another socket.
*/
if (!asoc &&
((sctp_style(sk, TCP) &&
(sctp_sstate(sk, ESTABLISHED) ||
sctp_sstate(sk, CLOSING))) ||
sctp_endpoint_is_peeled_off(ep, &to))) {
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else {
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, associd);
if (!asoc) {
err = -EPIPE;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (asoc) {
pr_debug("%s: just looked up association:%p\n", __func__, asoc);
/* We cannot send a message on a TCP-style SCTP_SS_ESTABLISHED
* socket that has an association in CLOSED state. This can
* happen when an accepted socket has an association that is
* already CLOSED.
*/
if (sctp_state(asoc, CLOSED) && sctp_style(sk, TCP)) {
err = -EPIPE;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (sinfo_flags & SCTP_EOF) {
pr_debug("%s: shutting down association:%p\n",
__func__, asoc);
sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN(net, asoc, NULL);
err = 0;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (sinfo_flags & SCTP_ABORT) {
chunk = sctp_make_abort_user(asoc, msg, msg_len);
if (!chunk) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_unlock;
}
pr_debug("%s: aborting association:%p\n",
__func__, asoc);
sctp_primitive_ABORT(net, asoc, chunk);
err = 0;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
/* Do we need to create the association? */
if (!asoc) {
pr_debug("%s: there is no association yet\n", __func__);
if (sinfo_flags & (SCTP_EOF | SCTP_ABORT)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Check for invalid stream against the stream counts,
* either the default or the user specified stream counts.
*/
if (sinfo) {
if (!sinit || !sinit->sinit_num_ostreams) {
/* Check against the defaults. */
if (sinfo->sinfo_stream >=
sp->initmsg.sinit_num_ostreams) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else {
/* Check against the requested. */
if (sinfo->sinfo_stream >=
sinit->sinit_num_ostreams) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
}
/*
* API 3.1.2 bind() - UDP Style Syntax
* If a bind() or sctp_bindx() is not called prior to a
* sendmsg() call that initiates a new association, the
* system picks an ephemeral port and will choose an address
* set equivalent to binding with a wildcard address.
*/
if (!ep->base.bind_addr.port) {
if (sctp_autobind(sk)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else {
/*
* If an unprivileged user inherits a one-to-many
* style socket with open associations on a privileged
* port, it MAY be permitted to accept new associations,
* but it SHOULD NOT be permitted to open new
* associations.
*/
if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < inet_prot_sock(net) &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
err = -EACCES;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
scope = sctp_scope(&to);
new_asoc = sctp_association_new(ep, sk, scope, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_asoc) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_unlock;
}
asoc = new_asoc;
err = sctp_assoc_set_bind_addr_from_ep(asoc, scope, GFP_KERNEL);
if (err < 0) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
/* If the SCTP_INIT ancillary data is specified, set all
* the association init values accordingly.
*/
if (sinit) {
if (sinit->sinit_num_ostreams) {
asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams =
sinit->sinit_num_ostreams;
}
if (sinit->sinit_max_instreams) {
asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams =
sinit->sinit_max_instreams;
}
if (sinit->sinit_max_attempts) {
asoc->max_init_attempts
= sinit->sinit_max_attempts;
}
if (sinit->sinit_max_init_timeo) {
asoc->max_init_timeo =
msecs_to_jiffies(sinit->sinit_max_init_timeo);
}
}
/* Prime the peer's transport structures. */
transport = sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &to, GFP_KERNEL, SCTP_UNKNOWN);
if (!transport) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
}
/* ASSERT: we have a valid association at this point. */
pr_debug("%s: we have a valid association\n", __func__);
if (!sinfo) {
/* If the user didn't specify SNDINFO/SNDRCVINFO, make up
* one with some defaults.
*/
memset(&default_sinfo, 0, sizeof(default_sinfo));
default_sinfo.sinfo_stream = asoc->default_stream;
default_sinfo.sinfo_flags = asoc->default_flags;
default_sinfo.sinfo_ppid = asoc->default_ppid;
default_sinfo.sinfo_context = asoc->default_context;
default_sinfo.sinfo_timetolive = asoc->default_timetolive;
default_sinfo.sinfo_assoc_id = sctp_assoc2id(asoc);
sinfo = &default_sinfo;
} else if (fill_sinfo_ttl) {
/* In case SNDINFO was specified, we still need to fill
* it with a default ttl from the assoc here.
*/
sinfo->sinfo_timetolive = asoc->default_timetolive;
}
/* API 7.1.7, the sndbuf size per association bounds the
* maximum size of data that can be sent in a single send call.
*/
if (msg_len > sk->sk_sndbuf) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out_free;
}
if (asoc->pmtu_pending)
sctp_assoc_pending_pmtu(asoc);
/* If fragmentation is disabled and the message length exceeds the
* association fragmentation point, return EMSGSIZE. The I-D
* does not specify what this error is, but this looks like
* a great fit.
*/
if (sctp_sk(sk)->disable_fragments && (msg_len > asoc->frag_point)) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out_free;
}
/* Check for invalid stream. */
if (sinfo->sinfo_stream >= asoc->stream.outcnt) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
if (sctp_wspace(asoc) < msg_len)
sctp_prsctp_prune(asoc, sinfo, msg_len - sctp_wspace(asoc));
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (!sctp_wspace(asoc)) {
err = sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(asoc, &timeo, msg_len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
}
/* If an address is passed with the sendto/sendmsg call, it is used
* to override the primary destination address in the TCP model, or
* when SCTP_ADDR_OVER flag is set in the UDP model.
*/
if ((sctp_style(sk, TCP) && msg_name) ||
(sinfo_flags & SCTP_ADDR_OVER)) {
chunk_tp = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &to);
if (!chunk_tp) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
} else
chunk_tp = NULL;
/* Auto-connect, if we aren't connected already. */
if (sctp_state(asoc, CLOSED)) {
err = sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE(net, asoc, NULL);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
wait_connect = true;
pr_debug("%s: we associated primitively\n", __func__);
}
/* Break the message into multiple chunks of maximum size. */
datamsg = sctp_datamsg_from_user(asoc, sinfo, &msg->msg_iter);
if (IS_ERR(datamsg)) {
err = PTR_ERR(datamsg);
goto out_free;
}
asoc->force_delay = !!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE);
/* Now send the (possibly) fragmented message. */
list_for_each_entry(chunk, &datamsg->chunks, frag_list) {
sctp_chunk_hold(chunk);
/* Do accounting for the write space. */
sctp_set_owner_w(chunk);
chunk->transport = chunk_tp;
}
/* Send it to the lower layers. Note: all chunks
* must either fail or succeed. The lower layer
* works that way today. Keep it that way or this
* breaks.
*/
err = sctp_primitive_SEND(net, asoc, datamsg);
/* Did the lower layer accept the chunk? */
if (err) {
sctp_datamsg_free(datamsg);
goto out_free;
}
pr_debug("%s: we sent primitively\n", __func__);
sctp_datamsg_put(datamsg);
err = msg_len;
if (unlikely(wait_connect)) {
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
sctp_wait_for_connect(asoc, &timeo);
}
/* If we are already past ASSOCIATE, the lower
* layers are responsible for association cleanup.
*/
goto out_unlock;
out_free:
if (new_asoc)
sctp_association_free(asoc);
out_unlock:
release_sock(sk);
out_nounlock:
return sctp_error(sk, msg_flags, err);
#if 0
do_sock_err:
if (msg_len)
err = msg_len;
else
err = sock_error(sk);
goto out;
do_interrupted:
if (msg_len)
err = msg_len;
goto out;
#endif /* 0 */
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_ctl_unregister_ioctl_compat(snd_kctl_ioctl_func_t fcn)
{
return _snd_ctl_unregister_ioctl(fcn, &snd_control_compat_ioctls);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 36,496
|
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