instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ceph_aes_decrypt(const void *key, int key_len,
void *dst, size_t *dst_len,
const void *src, size_t src_len)
{
struct scatterlist sg_in[1], sg_out[2];
struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm = ceph_crypto_alloc_cipher();
struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = tfm };
char pad[16];
void *iv;
int ivsize;
int ret;
int last_byte;
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
crypto_blkcipher_setkey((void *)tfm, key, key_len);
sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
sg_init_table(sg_out, 2);
sg_set_buf(sg_in, src, src_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[0], dst, *dst_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg_out[1], pad, sizeof(pad));
iv = crypto_blkcipher_crt(tfm)->iv;
ivsize = crypto_blkcipher_ivsize(tfm);
memcpy(iv, aes_iv, ivsize);
/*
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "dec key: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
key, key_len, 1);
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "dec in: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
src, src_len, 1);
*/
ret = crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, src_len);
crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("ceph_aes_decrypt failed %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
if (src_len <= *dst_len)
last_byte = ((char *)dst)[src_len - 1];
else
last_byte = pad[src_len - *dst_len - 1];
if (last_byte <= 16 && src_len >= last_byte) {
*dst_len = src_len - last_byte;
} else {
pr_err("ceph_aes_decrypt got bad padding %d on src len %d\n",
last_byte, (int)src_len);
return -EPERM; /* bad padding */
}
/*
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "dec out: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
dst, *dst_len, 1);
*/
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(WebContents* contents) {
if (!contents)
return;
UpdateMap::iterator i = scheduled_updates_.find(contents);
if (i != scheduled_updates_.end())
scheduled_updates_.erase(i);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::HandleKeyboardEvent(const NativeWebKeyboardEvent& event) {
if (frame_->HandleKeyboardEvent(event))
return;
unhandled_keyboard_event_handler_.HandleKeyboardEvent(event,
GetFocusManager());
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BaseShadow::mockTerminateJob( MyString exit_reason,
bool exited_by_signal, int exit_code, int exit_signal,
bool core_dumped )
{
if (exit_reason == "") {
exit_reason = "Exited normally";
}
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "Mock terminating job %d.%d: "
"exited_by_signal=%s, exit_code=%d OR exit_signal=%d, "
"core_dumped=%s, exit_reason=\"%s\"\n",
getCluster(),
getProc(),
exited_by_signal ? "TRUE" : "FALSE",
exit_code,
exit_signal,
core_dumped ? "TRUE" : "FALSE",
exit_reason.Value());
if( ! jobAd ) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "BaseShadow::mockTerminateJob(): NULL JobAd! "
"Holding Job!");
DC_Exit( JOB_SHOULD_HOLD );
}
jobAd->Assign( ATTR_JOB_CORE_DUMPED, core_dumped );
jobAd->Assign( ATTR_ON_EXIT_BY_SIGNAL, exited_by_signal );
if (exited_by_signal) {
jobAd->Assign( ATTR_ON_EXIT_SIGNAL, exit_signal );
} else {
jobAd->Assign( ATTR_ON_EXIT_CODE, exit_code );
}
jobAd->Assign( ATTR_EXIT_REASON, exit_reason );
if( !updateJobInQueue(U_TERMINATE) ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "Failed to update job queue!\n" );
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void rpc_task_set_debuginfo(struct rpc_task *task)
{
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void xtables_unlock(int lock)
{
if (lock >= 0)
close(lock);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EphemeralRange Editor::selectedRange() {
return frame()
.selection()
.computeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.toNormalizedEphemeralRange();
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u8* h264bsdAllocateDpbImage(dpbStorage_t *dpb)
{
/* Variables */
/* Code */
ASSERT( !dpb->buffer[dpb->dpbSize].toBeDisplayed &&
!IS_REFERENCE(dpb->buffer[dpb->dpbSize]) );
ASSERT(dpb->fullness <= dpb->dpbSize);
dpb->currentOut = dpb->buffer + dpb->dpbSize;
return(dpb->currentOut->data);
}
Commit Message: Fix potential overflow
Bug: 28533562
Change-Id: I798ab24caa4c81f3ba564cad7c9ee019284fb702
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,581 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateDeviceAssociation(const std::string& input_device_id,
const std::string& output_device_id) {
EXPECT_FALSE(IsValidDeviceId(input_device_id));
EXPECT_FALSE(IsValidDeviceId(output_device_id));
associations_[input_device_id] = output_device_id;
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoDrawElements(GLenum mode,
GLsizei count,
GLenum type,
const void* indices) {
BindPendingImagesForSamplersIfNeeded();
api()->glDrawElementsFn(mode, count, type, indices);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read.
* We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos
* ('type == 3') correctly only when the following
* is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by
* the protocol specification:
* Byte Content
* 0 type \
* 1/2 version > record header
* 3/4 length /
* 5 msg_type \
* 6-8 length > Client Hello message
* 9/10 client_version /
*/
char *buf= &(buf_space[0]);
unsigned char *p,*d,*d_len,*dd;
unsigned int i;
unsigned int csl,sil,cl;
int n=0,j;
int type=0;
int v[2];
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
{
/* read the initial header */
v[0]=v[1]=0;
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) goto err;
n=ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space);
if (n != sizeof buf_space) return(n); /* n == -1 || n == 0 */
p=s->packet;
memcpy(buf,p,n);
if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO))
{
/*
* SSLv2 header
*/
if ((p[3] == 0x00) && (p[4] == 0x02))
{
v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
/* SSLv2 */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
type=1;
}
else if (p[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
{
v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4];
/* SSLv3/TLSv1 */
if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
{
if (p[4] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
{
s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (p[4] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
{
s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
/* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
/* type=2; */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
{
type=1;
}
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
/* type=2; */
s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2))
type=1;
}
}
else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
(p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) &&
(p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */)
|| (p[9] >= p[1])))
{
/*
* SSLv3 or tls1 header
*/
v[0]=p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */
/* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message
* to get the correct minor version.
* However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the
* Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
* to read more records to find out.
* No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
* so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
* attacks. */
if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
{
#if 0
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto err;
#else
v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
#endif
}
/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
* which will use the highest version 3 we support.
* If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
* this....
*/
else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
v[1]=0xff;
else
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
v[1]=0xff;
else
v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR)
{
if (v[1] >= TLS1_2_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2))
{
s->version=TLS1_2_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (v[1] >= TLS1_1_VERSION_MINOR &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1))
{
s->version=TLS1_1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
type=3;
}
}
else
{
/* client requests SSL 3.0 */
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3))
{
s->version=SSL3_VERSION;
type=3;
}
else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1))
{
/* we won't be able to use TLS of course,
* but this will send an appropriate alert */
s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
type=3;
}
}
}
else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p,4) == 0) ||
(strncmp("POST ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
(strncmp("HEAD ",(char *)p,5) == 0) ||
(strncmp("PUT ", (char *)p,4) == 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
else if (strncmp("CONNECT",(char *)p,7) == 0)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST);
goto err;
}
}
if (s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
goto err;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
goto err;
}
#endif
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
goto err;
}
if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B)
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header
v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
v[1] = p[4];
n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
if (n > (1024*4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
if (j <= 0) return(j);
ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
/* record header: msg_type ... */
*(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
/* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */
d_len = d;
d += 3;
/* client_version */
*(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */
*(d++) = v[1];
/* lets populate the random area */
/* get the challenge_length */
i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl;
memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i);
d+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
/* no session-id reuse */
*(d++)=0;
/* ciphers */
j=0;
dd=d;
d+=2;
for (i=0; i<csl; i+=3)
{
if (p[i] != 0) continue;
*(d++)=p[i+1];
*(d++)=p[i+2];
j+=2;
}
s2n(j,dd);
/* COMPRESSION */
*(d++)=1;
*(d++)=0;
#if 0
/* copy any remaining data with may be extensions */
p = p+csl+sil+cl;
while (p < s->packet+s->packet_length)
{
*(d++)=*(p++);
}
#endif
i = (d-(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data) - 4;
l2n3((long)i, d_len);
/* get the data reused from the init_buf */
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
s->s3->tmp.message_type=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
s->s3->tmp.message_size=i;
}
/* imaginary new state (for program structure): */
/* s->state = SSL23_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C */
if (type == 1)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
#else
/* we are talking sslv2 */
/* we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the
* sslv2 stuff. */
if (s->s2 == NULL)
{
if (!ssl2_new(s))
goto err;
}
else
ssl2_clear(s);
if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_free(s);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,
SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER))
{
goto err;
}
s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)
s->s2->ssl2_rollback=0;
else
/* reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0
* (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */
s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1;
/* setup the n bytes we have read so we get them from
* the sslv2 buffer */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
s->packet_length=n;
s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[0]);
memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
s->s2->rbuf_left=n;
s->s2->rbuf_offs=0;
s->method=SSLv2_server_method();
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
#endif
}
if ((type == 2) || (type == 3))
{
/* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err;
/* we are in this state */
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
if (type == 3)
{
/* put the 'n' bytes we have read into the input buffer
* for SSLv3 */
s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
s->packet_length=n;
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL)
if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
goto err;
s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]);
memcpy(s->packet,buf,n);
s->s3->rbuf.left=n;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
else
{
s->packet_length=0;
s->s3->rbuf.left=0;
s->s3->rbuf.offset=0;
}
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION)
s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION)
s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
else
s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
#if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */
s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1];
#endif
s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept;
}
if ((type < 1) || (type > 3))
{
/* bad, very bad */
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
s->init_num=0;
if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(SSL_accept(s));
err:
if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf);
return(-1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static_rules_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
global_data->have_vrrp_config = true;
if (!strvec)
return;
alloc_value_block(alloc_srule, vector_slot(strvec, 0));
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 75,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XRenderExtRemoveDisplay (XRenderExtInfo *extinfo, Display *dpy)
{
XRenderExtDisplayInfo *dpyinfo, *prev;
/*
* locate this display and its back link so that it can be removed
*/
_XLockMutex(_Xglobal_lock);
prev = NULL;
for (dpyinfo = extinfo->head; dpyinfo; dpyinfo = dpyinfo->next) {
if (dpyinfo->display == dpy) break;
prev = dpyinfo;
}
if (!dpyinfo) {
_XUnlockMutex(_Xglobal_lock);
return 0; /* hmm, actually an error */
}
/*
* remove the display from the list; handles going to zero
*/
if (prev)
prev->next = dpyinfo->next;
else
extinfo->head = dpyinfo->next;
extinfo->ndisplays--;
if (dpyinfo == extinfo->cur) extinfo->cur = NULL; /* flush cache */
_XUnlockMutex(_Xglobal_lock);
Xfree ((char *) dpyinfo);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 8,276 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(strspn)
{
php_spn_common_handler(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, STR_STRSPN);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 14,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::CommandLinkClicked(DWORD dwFieldID) {
return E_NOTIMPL;
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 130,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: name_len(netdissect_options *ndo,
const unsigned char *s, const unsigned char *maxbuf)
{
const unsigned char *s0 = s;
unsigned char c;
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
c = *s;
if ((c & 0xC0) == 0xC0)
return(2);
while (*s) {
if (s >= maxbuf)
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
ND_TCHECK2(*s, 1);
s += (*s) + 1;
}
return(PTR_DIFF(s, s0) + 1);
trunc:
return(-1); /* name goes past the end of the buffer */
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int posix_get_boottime(const clockid_t which_clock, struct timespec64 *tp)
{
ktime_get_boottime_ts64(tp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 81,176 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t mptsas_config_sas_io_unit_1(MPTSASState *s, uint8_t **data, int address)
{
size_t size = MPTSAS_CONFIG_PACK_EXT(1, MPI_CONFIG_EXTPAGETYPE_SAS_IO_UNIT, 0x07,
"*w*w*w*wb*b*b*b"
repl(MPTSAS_NUM_PORTS, "*s12"),
MPTSAS_NUM_PORTS);
if (data) {
size_t ofs = size - MPTSAS_NUM_PORTS * MPTSAS_CONFIG_SAS_IO_UNIT_1_SIZE;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MPTSAS_NUM_PORTS; i++) {
SCSIDevice *dev = mptsas_phy_get_device(s, i, NULL, NULL);
fill(*data + ofs, MPTSAS_CONFIG_SAS_IO_UNIT_1_SIZE,
"bbbblww", i, 0, 0,
(MPI_SAS_IOUNIT0_RATE_3_0 << 4) | MPI_SAS_IOUNIT0_RATE_1_5,
(dev
? MPI_SAS_DEVICE_INFO_END_DEVICE | MPI_SAS_DEVICE_INFO_SSP_TARGET
: MPI_SAS_DEVICE_INFO_NO_DEVICE),
0, 0);
ofs += MPTSAS_CONFIG_SAS_IO_UNIT_1_SIZE;
}
assert(ofs == size);
}
return size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
int i, call_panic = 0;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
struct audit_names *n;
/* tsk == current */
context->personality = tsk->personality;
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
return; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
context->arch, context->major);
if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
if (context->return_valid)
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
audit_log_format(ab,
" a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
context->argv[0],
context->argv[1],
context->argv[2],
context->argv[3],
context->name_count);
audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
switch (aux->type) {
case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
break; }
}
audit_log_end(ab);
}
if (context->type)
show_special(context, &call_panic);
if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
if (ab) {
audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
if (context->sockaddr_len) {
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
if (ab) {
audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
context->sockaddr_len);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
axs->target_auid[i],
axs->target_uid[i],
axs->target_sessionid[i],
axs->target_sid[i],
axs->target_comm[i]))
call_panic = 1;
}
if (context->target_pid &&
audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
context->target_sessionid,
context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
call_panic = 1;
if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
if (ab) {
audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
}
i = 0;
list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
if (n->hidden)
continue;
audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
}
audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
if (ab)
audit_log_end(ab);
if (call_panic)
audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
}
Commit Message: audit: fix a double fetch in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
There is a double fetch problem in audit_log_single_execve_arg()
where we first check the execve(2) argumnets for any "bad" characters
which would require hex encoding and then re-fetch the arguments for
logging in the audit record[1]. Of course this leaves a window of
opportunity for an unsavory application to munge with the data.
This patch reworks things by only fetching the argument data once[2]
into a buffer where it is scanned and logged into the audit
records(s). In addition to fixing the double fetch, this patch
improves on the original code in a few other ways: better handling
of large arguments which require encoding, stricter record length
checking, and some performance improvements (completely unverified,
but we got rid of some strlen() calls, that's got to be a good
thing).
As part of the development of this patch, I've also created a basic
regression test for the audit-testsuite, the test can be tracked on
GitHub at the following link:
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/25
[1] If you pay careful attention, there is actually a triple fetch
problem due to a strnlen_user() call at the top of the function.
[2] This is a tiny white lie, we do make a call to strnlen_user()
prior to fetching the argument data. I don't like it, but due to the
way the audit record is structured we really have no choice unless we
copy the entire argument at once (which would require a rather
wasteful allocation). The good news is that with this patch the
kernel no longer relies on this strnlen_user() value for anything
beyond recording it in the log, we also update it with a trustworthy
value whenever possible.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 51,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int reds_has_vdagent(void)
{
return !!vdagent;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void wmv2_mspel8_v_lowpass(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src, int dstStride, int srcStride, int w){
const uint8_t *cm = ff_cropTbl + MAX_NEG_CROP;
int i;
for(i=0; i<w; i++){
const int src_1= src[ -srcStride];
const int src0 = src[0 ];
const int src1 = src[ srcStride];
const int src2 = src[2*srcStride];
const int src3 = src[3*srcStride];
const int src4 = src[4*srcStride];
const int src5 = src[5*srcStride];
const int src6 = src[6*srcStride];
const int src7 = src[7*srcStride];
const int src8 = src[8*srcStride];
const int src9 = src[9*srcStride];
dst[0*dstStride]= cm[(9*(src0 + src1) - (src_1 + src2) + 8)>>4];
dst[1*dstStride]= cm[(9*(src1 + src2) - (src0 + src3) + 8)>>4];
dst[2*dstStride]= cm[(9*(src2 + src3) - (src1 + src4) + 8)>>4];
dst[3*dstStride]= cm[(9*(src3 + src4) - (src2 + src5) + 8)>>4];
dst[4*dstStride]= cm[(9*(src4 + src5) - (src3 + src6) + 8)>>4];
dst[5*dstStride]= cm[(9*(src5 + src6) - (src4 + src7) + 8)>>4];
dst[6*dstStride]= cm[(9*(src6 + src7) - (src5 + src8) + 8)>>4];
dst[7*dstStride]= cm[(9*(src7 + src8) - (src6 + src9) + 8)>>4];
src++;
dst++;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _tiffWriteProc(thandle_t fd, void* buf, tmsize_t size)
{
size_t size_io = (size_t) size;
if ((tmsize_t) size_io != size)
{
errno=EINVAL;
return (tmsize_t) -1;
}
return ((tmsize_t) write((int) fd, buf, size_io));
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 86,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SCTP_STATIC int sctp_do_bind(struct sock *sk, union sctp_addr *addr, int len)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sp->ep;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp = &ep->base.bind_addr;
struct sctp_af *af;
unsigned short snum;
int ret = 0;
/* Common sockaddr verification. */
af = sctp_sockaddr_af(sp, addr, len);
if (!af) {
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("sctp_do_bind(sk: %p, newaddr: %p, len: %d) EINVAL\n",
sk, addr, len);
return -EINVAL;
}
snum = ntohs(addr->v4.sin_port);
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK_IPADDR("sctp_do_bind(sk: %p, new addr: ",
", port: %d, new port: %d, len: %d)\n",
sk,
addr,
bp->port, snum,
len);
/* PF specific bind() address verification. */
if (!sp->pf->bind_verify(sp, addr))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
/* We must either be unbound, or bind to the same port.
* It's OK to allow 0 ports if we are already bound.
* We'll just inhert an already bound port in this case
*/
if (bp->port) {
if (!snum)
snum = bp->port;
else if (snum != bp->port) {
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("sctp_do_bind:"
" New port %d does not match existing port "
"%d.\n", snum, bp->port);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
if (snum && snum < PROT_SOCK &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
/* See if the address matches any of the addresses we may have
* already bound before checking against other endpoints.
*/
if (sctp_bind_addr_match(bp, addr, sp))
return -EINVAL;
/* Make sure we are allowed to bind here.
* The function sctp_get_port_local() does duplicate address
* detection.
*/
addr->v4.sin_port = htons(snum);
if ((ret = sctp_get_port_local(sk, addr))) {
return -EADDRINUSE;
}
/* Refresh ephemeral port. */
if (!bp->port)
bp->port = inet_sk(sk)->inet_num;
/* Add the address to the bind address list.
* Use GFP_ATOMIC since BHs will be disabled.
*/
ret = sctp_add_bind_addr(bp, addr, SCTP_ADDR_SRC, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* Copy back into socket for getsockname() use. */
if (!ret) {
inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport = htons(inet_sk(sk)->inet_num);
af->to_sk_saddr(addr, sk);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 32,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(int) gdImageColorReplace (gdImagePtr im, int src, int dst)
{
register int x, y;
int n = 0;
if (src == dst) {
return 0;
}
#define REPLACING_LOOP(pixel) do { \
for (y = im->cy1; y <= im->cy2; y++) { \
for (x = im->cx1; x <= im->cx2; x++) { \
if (pixel(im, x, y) == src) { \
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y, dst); \
n++; \
} \
} \
} \
} while (0)
if (im->trueColor) {
REPLACING_LOOP(gdImageTrueColorPixel);
} else {
REPLACING_LOOP(gdImagePalettePixel);
}
#undef REPLACING_LOOP
return n;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ReportPreconnectAccuracy(
const PreconnectStats& stats,
const std::map<GURL, OriginRequestSummary>& requests) {
if (stats.requests_stats.empty())
return;
int preresolve_hits_count = 0;
int preresolve_misses_count = 0;
int preconnect_hits_count = 0;
int preconnect_misses_count = 0;
for (const auto& request_stats : stats.requests_stats) {
bool hit = requests.find(request_stats.origin) != requests.end();
bool preconnect = request_stats.was_preconnected;
preresolve_hits_count += hit;
preresolve_misses_count += !hit;
preconnect_hits_count += preconnect && hit;
preconnect_misses_count += preconnect && !hit;
}
int total_preresolves = preresolve_hits_count + preresolve_misses_count;
int total_preconnects = preconnect_hits_count + preconnect_misses_count;
DCHECK_EQ(static_cast<int>(stats.requests_stats.size()),
preresolve_hits_count + preresolve_misses_count);
DCHECK_GT(total_preresolves, 0);
size_t preresolve_hits_percentage =
(100 * preresolve_hits_count) / total_preresolves;
if (total_preconnects > 0) {
size_t preconnect_hits_percentage =
(100 * preconnect_hits_count) / total_preconnects;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectHitsPercentage,
preconnect_hits_percentage);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreresolveHitsPercentage,
preresolve_hits_percentage);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreresolveCount,
total_preresolves);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectCount,
total_preconnects);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 172,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void maximize_sndbuf(const int sfd) {
socklen_t intsize = sizeof(int);
int last_good = 0;
int min, max, avg;
int old_size;
/* Start with the default size. */
if (getsockopt(sfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, &old_size, &intsize) != 0) {
if (settings.verbose > 0)
perror("getsockopt(SO_SNDBUF)");
return;
}
/* Binary-search for the real maximum. */
min = old_size;
max = MAX_SENDBUF_SIZE;
while (min <= max) {
avg = ((unsigned int)(min + max)) / 2;
if (setsockopt(sfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, (void *)&avg, intsize) == 0) {
last_good = avg;
min = avg + 1;
} else {
max = avg - 1;
}
}
if (settings.verbose > 1)
fprintf(stderr, "<%d send buffer was %d, now %d\n", sfd, old_size, last_good);
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlock::removePositionedObject(RenderBox* o)
{
removeFromTrackedRendererMaps(o, gPositionedDescendantsMap, gPositionedContainerMap);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct buffer_head * ext4_dx_find_entry(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *d_name,
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 **res_dir, int *err)
{
struct super_block * sb = dir->i_sb;
struct dx_hash_info hinfo;
struct dx_frame frames[2], *frame;
struct buffer_head *bh;
ext4_lblk_t block;
int retval;
if (!(frame = dx_probe(d_name, dir, &hinfo, frames, err)))
return NULL;
do {
block = dx_get_block(frame->at);
if (!(bh = ext4_bread(NULL, dir, block, 0, err))) {
if (!(*err)) {
*err = -EIO;
ext4_error(dir->i_sb,
"Directory hole detected on inode %lu\n",
dir->i_ino);
}
goto errout;
}
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dirent_csum_verify(dir,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir, "checksumming directory "
"block %lu", (unsigned long)block);
brelse(bh);
*err = -EIO;
goto errout;
}
set_buffer_verified(bh);
retval = search_dirblock(bh, dir, d_name,
block << EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb),
res_dir);
if (retval == 1) { /* Success! */
dx_release(frames);
return bh;
}
brelse(bh);
if (retval == -1) {
*err = ERR_BAD_DX_DIR;
goto errout;
}
/* Check to see if we should continue to search */
retval = ext4_htree_next_block(dir, hinfo.hash, frame,
frames, NULL);
if (retval < 0) {
ext4_warning(sb,
"error reading index page in directory #%lu",
dir->i_ino);
*err = retval;
goto errout;
}
} while (retval == 1);
*err = -ENOENT;
errout:
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s not found\n", d_name->name));
dx_release (frames);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MPEG4Source::read(
MediaBuffer **out, const ReadOptions *options) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
CHECK(mStarted);
if (mFirstMoofOffset > 0) {
return fragmentedRead(out, options);
}
*out = NULL;
int64_t targetSampleTimeUs = -1;
int64_t seekTimeUs;
ReadOptions::SeekMode mode;
if (options && options->getSeekTo(&seekTimeUs, &mode)) {
uint32_t findFlags = 0;
switch (mode) {
case ReadOptions::SEEK_PREVIOUS_SYNC:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagBefore;
break;
case ReadOptions::SEEK_NEXT_SYNC:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagAfter;
break;
case ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST_SYNC:
case ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST:
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagClosest;
break;
default:
CHECK(!"Should not be here.");
break;
}
uint32_t sampleIndex;
status_t err = mSampleTable->findSampleAtTime(
seekTimeUs, 1000000, mTimescale,
&sampleIndex, findFlags);
if (mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST) {
findFlags = SampleTable::kFlagBefore;
}
uint32_t syncSampleIndex;
if (err == OK) {
err = mSampleTable->findSyncSampleNear(
sampleIndex, &syncSampleIndex, findFlags);
}
uint32_t sampleTime;
if (err == OK) {
err = mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
sampleIndex, NULL, NULL, &sampleTime);
}
if (err != OK) {
if (err == ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE) {
err = ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
ALOGV("end of stream");
return err;
}
if (mode == ReadOptions::SEEK_CLOSEST) {
targetSampleTimeUs = (sampleTime * 1000000ll) / mTimescale;
}
#if 0
uint32_t syncSampleTime;
CHECK_EQ(OK, mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
syncSampleIndex, NULL, NULL, &syncSampleTime));
ALOGI("seek to time %lld us => sample at time %lld us, "
"sync sample at time %lld us",
seekTimeUs,
sampleTime * 1000000ll / mTimescale,
syncSampleTime * 1000000ll / mTimescale);
#endif
mCurrentSampleIndex = syncSampleIndex;
if (mBuffer != NULL) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
}
off64_t offset;
size_t size;
uint32_t cts, stts;
bool isSyncSample;
bool newBuffer = false;
if (mBuffer == NULL) {
newBuffer = true;
status_t err =
mSampleTable->getMetaDataForSample(
mCurrentSampleIndex, &offset, &size, &cts, &isSyncSample, &stts);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
err = mGroup->acquire_buffer(&mBuffer);
if (err != OK) {
CHECK(mBuffer == NULL);
return err;
}
if (size > mBuffer->size()) {
ALOGE("buffer too small: %zu > %zu", size, mBuffer->size());
return ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
}
if ((!mIsAVC && !mIsHEVC) || mWantsNALFragments) {
if (newBuffer) {
ssize_t num_bytes_read =
mDataSource->readAt(offset, (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data(), size);
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
mBuffer->meta_data()->clear();
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, ((int64_t)stts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
}
if (!mIsAVC && !mIsHEVC) {
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
CHECK(mBuffer->range_length() >= mNALLengthSize);
const uint8_t *src =
(const uint8_t *)mBuffer->data() + mBuffer->range_offset();
size_t nal_size = parseNALSize(src);
if (mNALLengthSize > SIZE_MAX - nal_size) {
ALOGE("b/24441553, b/24445122");
}
if (mBuffer->range_length() - mNALLengthSize < nal_size) {
ALOGE("incomplete NAL unit.");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
MediaBuffer *clone = mBuffer->clone();
CHECK(clone != NULL);
clone->set_range(mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize, nal_size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(
mBuffer->range_offset() + mNALLengthSize + nal_size,
mBuffer->range_length() - mNALLengthSize - nal_size);
if (mBuffer->range_length() == 0) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
}
*out = clone;
return OK;
} else {
ssize_t num_bytes_read = 0;
int32_t drm = 0;
bool usesDRM = (mFormat->findInt32(kKeyIsDRM, &drm) && drm != 0);
if (usesDRM) {
num_bytes_read =
mDataSource->readAt(offset, (uint8_t*)mBuffer->data(), size);
} else {
num_bytes_read = mDataSource->readAt(offset, mSrcBuffer, size);
}
if (num_bytes_read < (ssize_t)size) {
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (usesDRM) {
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, size);
} else {
uint8_t *dstData = (uint8_t *)mBuffer->data();
size_t srcOffset = 0;
size_t dstOffset = 0;
while (srcOffset < size) {
bool isMalFormed = !isInRange((size_t)0u, size, srcOffset, mNALLengthSize);
size_t nalLength = 0;
if (!isMalFormed) {
nalLength = parseNALSize(&mSrcBuffer[srcOffset]);
srcOffset += mNALLengthSize;
isMalFormed = !isInRange((size_t)0u, size, srcOffset, nalLength);
}
if (isMalFormed) {
ALOGE("Video is malformed");
mBuffer->release();
mBuffer = NULL;
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (nalLength == 0) {
continue;
}
CHECK(dstOffset + 4 <= mBuffer->size());
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 0;
dstData[dstOffset++] = 1;
memcpy(&dstData[dstOffset], &mSrcBuffer[srcOffset], nalLength);
srcOffset += nalLength;
dstOffset += nalLength;
}
CHECK_EQ(srcOffset, size);
CHECK(mBuffer != NULL);
mBuffer->set_range(0, dstOffset);
}
mBuffer->meta_data()->clear();
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTime, ((int64_t)cts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyDuration, ((int64_t)stts * 1000000) / mTimescale);
if (targetSampleTimeUs >= 0) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt64(
kKeyTargetTime, targetSampleTimeUs);
}
if (isSyncSample) {
mBuffer->meta_data()->setInt32(kKeyIsSyncFrame, 1);
}
++mCurrentSampleIndex;
*out = mBuffer;
mBuffer = NULL;
return OK;
}
}
Commit Message: Also fix out of bounds access for normal read
Previous fix accidentally only fixed the fragmented read case.
Bug: 27208621
Change-Id: Ie16f1920b84c8aba613842659238fcd5925694ad
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::flat_set<std::string> GetQuicHostWhitelist(
const VariationParameters& quic_trial_params) {
std::string host_whitelist =
GetVariationParam(quic_trial_params, "host_whitelist");
std::vector<std::string> host_vector = base::SplitString(
host_whitelist, ",", base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_ALL);
return base::flat_set<std::string>(std::move(host_vector));
}
Commit Message: Fix a bug in network_session_configurator.cc in which support for HTTPS URLS in QUIC proxies was always set to false.
BUG=914497
Change-Id: I56ad16088168302598bb448553ba32795eee3756
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1417356
Auto-Submit: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623763}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 152,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::HandleEarlyTabActions(const ui::KeyEvent& event) {
if (!views::FocusManager::IsTabTraversalKeyEvent(event))
return false;
if (model()->is_keyword_hint() && !event.IsShiftDown())
return model()->AcceptKeyword(KeywordModeEntryMethod::TAB);
if (!model()->popup_model()->IsOpen())
return false;
if (event.IsShiftDown() &&
(model()->popup_model()->selected_line_state() ==
OmniboxPopupModel::KEYWORD))
model()->ClearKeyword();
else
model()->OnUpOrDownKeyPressed(event.IsShiftDown() ? -1 : 1);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <jdonnelly@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 150,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: trace_get_syscall_nr(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (unlikely(arch_trace_is_compat_syscall(regs)))
return -1;
return syscall_get_nr(task, regs);
}
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SafeBrowsingBlockingPageV2::PopulateMultipleThreatStringDictionary(
DictionaryValue* strings) {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: Check for a negative integer properly.
BUG=169966
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11892002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176879 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 115,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HashTable *date_object_get_gc(zval *object, zval ***table, int *n TSRMLS_DC)
{
*table = NULL;
*n = 0;
return zend_std_get_properties(object TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char to_hex(char code) {
static char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
return hex[code & 15];
}
Commit Message: fixed vulnerabilities identified by red4sec.com (#4521)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 93,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct timespec __user *timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec timeout_sys;
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
if (!timeout)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, mmsg, vlen, flags, NULL);
if (copy_from_user(&timeout_sys, timeout, sizeof(timeout_sys)))
return -EFAULT;
datagrams = __sys_recvmmsg(fd, mmsg, vlen, flags, &timeout_sys);
if (datagrams > 0 &&
copy_to_user(timeout, &timeout_sys, sizeof(timeout_sys)))
datagrams = -EFAULT;
return datagrams;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 82,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: perf_event_output_backward(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
__perf_event_output(event, data, regs, perf_output_begin_backward);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static sds *cliSplitArgs(char *line, int *argc) {
if (config.eval_ldb && (strstr(line,"eval ") == line ||
strstr(line,"e ") == line))
{
sds *argv = sds_malloc(sizeof(sds)*2);
*argc = 2;
int len = strlen(line);
int elen = line[1] == ' ' ? 2 : 5; /* "e " or "eval "? */
argv[0] = sdsnewlen(line,elen-1);
argv[1] = sdsnewlen(line+elen,len-elen);
return argv;
} else {
return sdssplitargs(line,argc);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 81,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnPortalActivated(blink::TransferableMessage data) {
frame_->OnPortalActivated(std::move(data));
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash on FileChooserImpl
If a renderer process is compromised, and it calls both of
FileChooserImpl::OpenFileChooser() and EnumerateChosenDirectory() via
Mojo, the browser process could crash because ResetOwner() for
the first FileChooserImpl::proxy_ instance was not called. We
should check nullness of proxy_ before updating it.
Bug: 941008
Change-Id: Ie0c1895ec46ce78d40594b543e49e43b420af675
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1520509
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640580}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool kvm_irq_has_notifier(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned irqchip, unsigned pin)
{
struct kvm_irq_ack_notifier *kian;
int gsi, idx;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
gsi = kvm_irq_map_chip_pin(kvm, irqchip, pin);
if (gsi != -1)
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(kian, &kvm->irq_ack_notifier_list,
link)
if (kian->gsi == gsi) {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
return true;
}
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
return false;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Don't accept obviously wrong gsi values via KVM_IRQFD
We cannot add routes for gsi values >= KVM_MAX_IRQ_ROUTES -- see
kvm_set_irq_routing(). Hence, there is no sense in accepting them
via KVM_IRQFD. Prevent them from entering the system in the first
place.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htc_request_check_host_hdr(struct http *hp)
{
int u;
int seen_host = 0;
for (u = HTTP_HDR_FIRST; u < hp->nhd; u++) {
if (hp->hd[u].b == NULL)
continue;
AN(hp->hd[u].b);
AN(hp->hd[u].e);
if (http_IsHdr(&hp->hd[u], H_Host)) {
if (seen_host) {
return (400);
}
seen_host = 1;
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Do not consider a CR by itself as a valid line terminator
Varnish (prior to version 4.0) was not following the standard with
regard to line separator.
Spotted and analyzed by: Régis Leroy [regilero] regis.leroy@makina-corpus.com
CWE ID: | 0 | 95,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: field_requires_ct(enum mf_field_id field)
{
return field == MFF_CT_MARK || field == MFF_CT_LABEL;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillDialogViews::SuggestionView::SetTextfield(
const base::string16& placeholder_text,
const gfx::Image& icon) {
textfield_->SetPlaceholderText(placeholder_text);
textfield_->SetIcon(icon);
textfield_->SetVisible(!placeholder_text.empty());
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev)
{
if (oops_in_progress)
return;
printk(KERN_ERR "BUG: scheduling while atomic: %s/%d/0x%08x\n",
prev->comm, prev->pid, preempt_count());
debug_show_held_locks(prev);
print_modules();
if (irqs_disabled())
print_irqtrace_events(prev);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT
if (in_atomic_preempt_off()) {
pr_err("Preemption disabled at:");
print_ip_sym(current->preempt_disable_ip);
pr_cont("\n");
}
#endif
dump_stack();
add_taint(TAINT_WARN, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode smtp_perform_command(struct connectdata *conn)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.protop;
/* Send the command */
if(smtp->rcpt)
result = Curl_pp_sendf(&conn->proto.smtpc.pp, "%s %s",
smtp->custom && smtp->custom[0] != '\0' ?
smtp->custom : "VRFY",
smtp->rcpt->data);
else
result = Curl_pp_sendf(&conn->proto.smtpc.pp, "%s",
smtp->custom && smtp->custom[0] != '\0' ?
smtp->custom : "HELP");
if(!result)
state(conn, SMTP_COMMAND);
return result;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const int http_get_status_idx(unsigned int status)
{
switch (status) {
case 200: return HTTP_ERR_200;
case 400: return HTTP_ERR_400;
case 403: return HTTP_ERR_403;
case 405: return HTTP_ERR_405;
case 408: return HTTP_ERR_408;
case 425: return HTTP_ERR_425;
case 429: return HTTP_ERR_429;
case 500: return HTTP_ERR_500;
case 502: return HTTP_ERR_502;
case 503: return HTTP_ERR_503;
case 504: return HTTP_ERR_504;
default: return HTTP_ERR_500;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::Send(IPC::Message* msg) {
if (IPC_MESSAGE_ID_CLASS(msg->type()) == InputMsgStart)
return input_router_->SendInput(make_scoped_ptr(msg));
return process_->Send(msg);
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t storeMetaDataInBuffers(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index, OMX_BOOL enable, MetadataBufferType *type) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(port_index);
data.writeInt32((uint32_t)enable);
remote()->transact(STORE_META_DATA_IN_BUFFERS, data, &reply);
int negotiatedType = reply.readInt32();
if (type != NULL) {
*type = (MetadataBufferType)negotiatedType;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int inputchk,
int depth) {
xmlElementContentPtr ret = NULL, cur = NULL, last = NULL, op = NULL;
const xmlChar *elem;
xmlChar type = 0;
if (((depth > 128) && ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) ||
(depth > 2048)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_FINISHED,
"xmlParseElementChildrenContentDecl : depth %d too deep, use XML_PARSE_HUGE\n",
depth);
return(NULL);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
if (RAW == '(') {
int inputid = ctxt->input->id;
/* Recurse on first child */
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
cur = ret = xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(ctxt, inputid,
depth + 1);
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
} else {
elem = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (elem == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
cur = ret = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (cur == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
GROW;
if (RAW == '?') {
cur->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT;
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '*') {
cur->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '+') {
cur->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PLUS;
NEXT;
} else {
cur->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
}
GROW;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
SHRINK;
while ((RAW != ')') && (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
/*
* Each loop we parse one separator and one element.
*/
if (RAW == ',') {
if (type == 0) type = CUR;
/*
* Detect "Name | Name , Name" error
*/
else if (type != CUR) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_SEPARATOR_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseElementChildrenContentDecl : '%c' expected\n",
type);
if ((last != NULL) && (last != ret))
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, last);
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
op = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_SEQ);
if (op == NULL) {
if ((last != NULL) && (last != ret))
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, last);
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
if (last == NULL) {
op->c1 = ret;
if (ret != NULL)
ret->parent = op;
ret = cur = op;
} else {
cur->c2 = op;
if (op != NULL)
op->parent = cur;
op->c1 = last;
if (last != NULL)
last->parent = op;
cur =op;
last = NULL;
}
} else if (RAW == '|') {
if (type == 0) type = CUR;
/*
* Detect "Name , Name | Name" error
*/
else if (type != CUR) {
xmlFatalErrMsgInt(ctxt, XML_ERR_SEPARATOR_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseElementChildrenContentDecl : '%c' expected\n",
type);
if ((last != NULL) && (last != ret))
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, last);
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
op = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, NULL, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR);
if (op == NULL) {
if ((last != NULL) && (last != ret))
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, last);
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
if (last == NULL) {
op->c1 = ret;
if (ret != NULL)
ret->parent = op;
ret = cur = op;
} else {
cur->c2 = op;
if (op != NULL)
op->parent = cur;
op->c1 = last;
if (last != NULL)
last->parent = op;
cur =op;
last = NULL;
}
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
if ((last != NULL) && (last != ret))
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, last);
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
GROW;
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
if (RAW == '(') {
int inputid = ctxt->input->id;
/* Recurse on second child */
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
last = xmlParseElementChildrenContentDeclPriv(ctxt, inputid,
depth + 1);
SKIP_BLANKS;
} else {
elem = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (elem == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
last = xmlNewDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, elem, XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ELEMENT);
if (last == NULL) {
if (ret != NULL)
xmlFreeDocElementContent(ctxt->myDoc, ret);
return(NULL);
}
if (RAW == '?') {
last->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT;
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '*') {
last->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '+') {
last->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PLUS;
NEXT;
} else {
last->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
}
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
GROW;
}
if ((cur != NULL) && (last != NULL)) {
cur->c2 = last;
if (last != NULL)
last->parent = cur;
}
if (ctxt->input->id != inputchk) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_BOUNDARY,
"Element content declaration doesn't start and stop in"
" the same entity\n");
}
NEXT;
if (RAW == '?') {
if (ret != NULL) {
if ((ret->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PLUS) ||
(ret->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT))
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
else
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT;
}
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '*') {
if (ret != NULL) {
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
cur = ret;
/*
* Some normalization:
* (a | b* | c?)* == (a | b | c)*
*/
while ((cur != NULL) && (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR)) {
if ((cur->c1 != NULL) &&
((cur->c1->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT) ||
(cur->c1->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT)))
cur->c1->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
if ((cur->c2 != NULL) &&
((cur->c2->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT) ||
(cur->c2->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT)))
cur->c2->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
cur = cur->c2;
}
}
NEXT;
} else if (RAW == '+') {
if (ret != NULL) {
int found = 0;
if ((ret->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT) ||
(ret->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT))
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
else
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_PLUS;
/*
* Some normalization:
* (a | b*)+ == (a | b)*
* (a | b?)+ == (a | b)*
*/
while ((cur != NULL) && (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OR)) {
if ((cur->c1 != NULL) &&
((cur->c1->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT) ||
(cur->c1->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT))) {
cur->c1->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
found = 1;
}
if ((cur->c2 != NULL) &&
((cur->c2->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_OPT) ||
(cur->c2->ocur == XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT))) {
cur->c2->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_ONCE;
found = 1;
}
cur = cur->c2;
}
if (found)
ret->ocur = XML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_MULT;
}
NEXT;
}
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaPlayerService::AudioOutput::~AudioOutput()
{
close();
free(mAttributes);
delete mCallbackData;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rb_check_pages(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer)
{
struct list_head *head = cpu_buffer->pages;
struct buffer_page *bpage, *tmp;
/* Reset the head page if it exists */
if (cpu_buffer->head_page)
rb_set_head_page(cpu_buffer);
rb_head_page_deactivate(cpu_buffer);
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, head->next->prev != head))
return -1;
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, head->prev->next != head))
return -1;
if (rb_check_list(cpu_buffer, head))
return -1;
list_for_each_entry_safe(bpage, tmp, head, list) {
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
bpage->list.next->prev != &bpage->list))
return -1;
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer,
bpage->list.prev->next != &bpage->list))
return -1;
if (rb_check_list(cpu_buffer, &bpage->list))
return -1;
}
rb_head_page_activate(cpu_buffer);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gpk_select_id(sc_card_t *card, int kind, unsigned int fid,
sc_file_t **file)
{
sc_path_t *cp = &card->cache.current_path;
u8 fbuf[2];
int r;
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"gpk_select_id(0x%04X, kind=%u)\n", fid, kind);
fbuf[0] = fid >> 8;
fbuf[1] = fid & 0xff;
r = gpk_select(card, kind, fbuf, 2, file);
/* Fix up the path cache.
* NB we never cache the ID of an EF, just the DF path */
if (r == 0) {
unsigned short int *path;
switch (kind) {
case GPK_SEL_MF:
cp->len = 0;
/* fallthru */
case GPK_SEL_DF:
assert(cp->len + 1 <= SC_MAX_PATH_SIZE / 2);
path = (unsigned short int *) cp->value;
path[cp->len++] = fid;
}
} else {
cp->len = 0;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CallModuleMethod(const std::string& module_name,
const std::string& method_name,
const base::ListValue* args,
ScriptContext* context) {
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(context->isolate());
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context->v8_context());
scoped_ptr<content::V8ValueConverter> converter(
content::V8ValueConverter::create());
std::vector<v8::Local<v8::Value>> arguments;
for (base::ListValue::const_iterator it = args->begin(); it != args->end();
++it) {
arguments.push_back(converter->ToV8Value(*it, context->v8_context()));
}
context->module_system()->CallModuleMethod(
module_name, method_name, &arguments);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameNavigationDisabler::~FrameNavigationDisabler() {
frame_->EnableNavigation();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sysbus_esp_realize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
{
SysBusDevice *sbd = SYS_BUS_DEVICE(dev);
SysBusESPState *sysbus = ESP(dev);
ESPState *s = &sysbus->esp;
Error *err = NULL;
sysbus_init_irq(sbd, &s->irq);
assert(sysbus->it_shift != -1);
s->chip_id = TCHI_FAS100A;
memory_region_init_io(&sysbus->iomem, OBJECT(sysbus), &sysbus_esp_mem_ops,
sysbus, "esp", ESP_REGS << sysbus->it_shift);
sysbus_init_mmio(sbd, &sysbus->iomem);
qdev_init_gpio_in(dev, sysbus_esp_gpio_demux, 2);
scsi_bus_new(&s->bus, sizeof(s->bus), dev, &esp_scsi_info, NULL);
scsi_bus_legacy_handle_cmdline(&s->bus, &err);
if (err != NULL) {
error_propagate(errp, err);
return;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 9,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void del_gendisk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
struct disk_part_iter piter;
struct hd_struct *part;
blk_integrity_del(disk);
disk_del_events(disk);
/* invalidate stuff */
disk_part_iter_init(&piter, disk,
DISK_PITER_INCL_EMPTY | DISK_PITER_REVERSE);
while ((part = disk_part_iter_next(&piter))) {
invalidate_partition(disk, part->partno);
delete_partition(disk, part->partno);
}
disk_part_iter_exit(&piter);
invalidate_partition(disk, 0);
set_capacity(disk, 0);
disk->flags &= ~GENHD_FL_UP;
sysfs_remove_link(&disk_to_dev(disk)->kobj, "bdi");
blk_unregister_queue(disk);
blk_unregister_region(disk_devt(disk), disk->minors);
part_stat_set_all(&disk->part0, 0);
disk->part0.stamp = 0;
kobject_put(disk->part0.holder_dir);
kobject_put(disk->slave_dir);
if (!sysfs_deprecated)
sysfs_remove_link(block_depr, dev_name(disk_to_dev(disk)));
pm_runtime_set_memalloc_noio(disk_to_dev(disk), false);
device_del(disk_to_dev(disk));
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int n_tty_ioctl(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
int retval;
switch (cmd) {
case TIOCOUTQ:
return put_user(tty_chars_in_buffer(tty), (int __user *) arg);
case TIOCINQ:
down_write(&tty->termios_rwsem);
if (L_ICANON(tty))
retval = inq_canon(ldata);
else
retval = read_cnt(ldata);
up_write(&tty->termios_rwsem);
return put_user(retval, (unsigned int __user *) arg);
default:
return n_tty_ioctl_helper(tty, file, cmd, arg);
}
}
Commit Message: n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 1 | 169,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool smb1cli_req_cancel(struct tevent_req *req)
{
struct smbXcli_req_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct smbXcli_req_state);
uint8_t flags;
uint16_t flags2;
uint32_t pid;
uint16_t mid;
struct tevent_req *subreq;
NTSTATUS status;
flags = CVAL(state->smb1.hdr, HDR_FLG);
flags2 = SVAL(state->smb1.hdr, HDR_FLG2);
pid = SVAL(state->smb1.hdr, HDR_PID);
pid |= SVAL(state->smb1.hdr, HDR_PIDHIGH)<<16;
mid = SVAL(state->smb1.hdr, HDR_MID);
subreq = smb1cli_req_create(state, state->ev,
state->conn,
SMBntcancel,
flags, 0,
flags2, 0,
0, /* timeout */
pid,
state->tcon,
state->session,
0, NULL, /* vwv */
0, NULL); /* bytes */
if (subreq == NULL) {
return false;
}
smb1cli_req_set_mid(subreq, mid);
status = smb1cli_req_chain_submit(&subreq, 1);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
TALLOC_FREE(subreq);
return false;
}
smb1cli_req_set_mid(subreq, 0);
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, smb1cli_req_cancel_done, NULL);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 2,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebLocalFrameImpl::IsSelectionAnchorFirst() const {
FrameSelection& selection = frame_->Selection();
if (!selection.IsAvailable()) {
return false;
}
return selection.GetSelectionInDOMTree().IsBaseFirst();
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hci_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = (void __user *) arg;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err;
BT_DBG("cmd %x arg %lx", cmd, arg);
lock_sock(sk);
if (hci_pi(sk)->channel != HCI_CHANNEL_RAW) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
release_sock(sk);
switch (cmd) {
case HCIGETDEVLIST:
return hci_get_dev_list(argp);
case HCIGETDEVINFO:
return hci_get_dev_info(argp);
case HCIGETCONNLIST:
return hci_get_conn_list(argp);
case HCIDEVUP:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_dev_open(arg);
case HCIDEVDOWN:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_dev_close(arg);
case HCIDEVRESET:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_dev_reset(arg);
case HCIDEVRESTAT:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_dev_reset_stat(arg);
case HCISETSCAN:
case HCISETAUTH:
case HCISETENCRYPT:
case HCISETPTYPE:
case HCISETLINKPOL:
case HCISETLINKMODE:
case HCISETACLMTU:
case HCISETSCOMTU:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return hci_dev_cmd(cmd, argp);
case HCIINQUIRY:
return hci_inquiry(argp);
}
lock_sock(sk);
err = hci_sock_bound_ioctl(sk, cmd, arg);
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,365 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: compress_task_thread_func (GTask *task,
gpointer source_object,
gpointer task_data,
GCancellable *cancellable)
{
CompressJob *compress_job = task_data;
SourceInfo source_info;
g_autoptr (AutoarCompressor) compressor = NULL;
g_timer_start (compress_job->common.time);
nautilus_progress_info_start (compress_job->common.progress);
scan_sources (compress_job->source_files,
&source_info,
(CommonJob *) compress_job,
OP_KIND_COMPRESS);
compress_job->total_files = source_info.num_files;
compress_job->total_size = source_info.num_bytes;
compressor = autoar_compressor_new (compress_job->source_files,
compress_job->output_file,
compress_job->format,
compress_job->filter,
FALSE);
autoar_compressor_set_output_is_dest (compressor, TRUE);
autoar_compressor_set_notify_interval (compressor,
PROGRESS_NOTIFY_INTERVAL);
g_signal_connect (compressor, "progress",
G_CALLBACK (compress_job_on_progress), compress_job);
g_signal_connect (compressor, "error",
G_CALLBACK (compress_job_on_error), compress_job);
g_signal_connect (compressor, "completed",
G_CALLBACK (compress_job_on_completed), compress_job);
autoar_compressor_start (compressor,
compress_job->common.cancellable);
compress_job->success = g_file_query_exists (compress_job->output_file,
NULL);
/* There is nothing to undo if the output was not created */
if (compress_job->common.undo_info != NULL && !compress_job->success)
{
g_clear_object (&compress_job->common.undo_info);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static conn_rec *core_create_conn(apr_pool_t *ptrans, server_rec *s,
apr_socket_t *csd, long id, void *sbh,
apr_bucket_alloc_t *alloc)
{
apr_status_t rv;
apr_pool_t *pool;
conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *) apr_pcalloc(ptrans, sizeof(conn_rec));
core_server_config *sconf = ap_get_core_module_config(s->module_config);
c->sbh = sbh;
ap_update_child_status(c->sbh, SERVER_BUSY_READ, NULL);
/* Got a connection structure, so initialize what fields we can
* (the rest are zeroed out by pcalloc).
*/
apr_pool_create(&pool, ptrans);
apr_pool_tag(pool, "master_conn");
c->pool = pool;
c->conn_config = ap_create_conn_config(c->pool);
c->notes = apr_table_make(c->pool, 5);
c->slaves = apr_array_make(c->pool, 20, sizeof(conn_slave_rec *));
c->requests = apr_array_make(c->pool, 20, sizeof(request_rec *));
if ((rv = apr_socket_addr_get(&c->local_addr, APR_LOCAL, csd))
!= APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, rv, s, APLOGNO(00137)
"apr_socket_addr_get(APR_LOCAL)");
apr_socket_close(csd);
return NULL;
}
apr_sockaddr_ip_get(&c->local_ip, c->local_addr);
if ((rv = apr_socket_addr_get(&c->client_addr, APR_REMOTE, csd))
!= APR_SUCCESS) {
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, rv, s, APLOGNO(00138)
"apr_socket_addr_get(APR_REMOTE)");
apr_socket_close(csd);
return NULL;
}
apr_sockaddr_ip_get(&c->client_ip, c->client_addr);
c->base_server = s;
c->id = id;
c->bucket_alloc = alloc;
c->empty = apr_brigade_create(c->pool, c->bucket_alloc);
c->filters = apr_hash_make(c->pool);
c->async_filter = sconf->async_filter;
c->clogging_input_filters = 0;
if (sconf->conn_log_level) {
int i;
conn_log_config *conf;
const struct ap_logconf *log = NULL;
struct ap_logconf *merged;
for (i = 0; i < sconf->conn_log_level->nelts; i++) {
conf = APR_ARRAY_IDX(sconf->conn_log_level, i, conn_log_config *);
if (apr_ipsubnet_test(conf->subnet, c->client_addr))
log = &conf->log;
}
if (log) {
merged = ap_new_log_config(c->pool, log);
ap_merge_log_config(&s->log, merged);
c->log = merged;
}
}
return c;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,220 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_print_free_blocks(struct inode *inode)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_CRIT, "Total free blocks count %lld",
EXT4_C2B(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb),
ext4_count_free_clusters(sb)));
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_CRIT, "Free/Dirty block details");
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_CRIT, "free_blocks=%lld",
(long long) EXT4_C2B(EXT4_SB(sb),
percpu_counter_sum(&sbi->s_freeclusters_counter)));
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_CRIT, "dirty_blocks=%lld",
(long long) EXT4_C2B(EXT4_SB(sb),
percpu_counter_sum(&sbi->s_dirtyclusters_counter)));
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_CRIT, "Block reservation details");
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_CRIT, "i_reserved_data_blocks=%u",
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks);
return;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void wakeup_handler(void)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
spin_lock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
list_for_each_entry(vcpu, &per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu),
blocked_vcpu_list) {
struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
if (pi_test_on(pi_desc) == 1)
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
}
spin_unlock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebMediaPlayer* RenderFrameImpl::CreateWebMediaPlayerForMediaStream(
const blink::WebURL& url,
WebMediaPlayerClient* client) {
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (!InitializeMediaStreamClient()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initialize MediaStreamClient";
return NULL;
}
if (media_stream_client_->IsMediaStream(url)) {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
bool found_neon =
(android_getCpuFeatures() & ANDROID_CPU_ARM_FEATURE_NEON) != 0;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Platform.WebRtcNEONFound", found_neon);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
return new WebMediaPlayerMS(frame_, client, weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
media_stream_client_, new RenderMediaLog());
}
#endif // defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int network_set_ttl (const sockent_t *se, const struct addrinfo *ai)
{
DEBUG ("network plugin: network_set_ttl: network_config_ttl = %i;",
network_config_ttl);
assert (se->type == SOCKENT_TYPE_CLIENT);
if ((network_config_ttl < 1) || (network_config_ttl > 255))
return (-1);
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET)
{
struct sockaddr_in *addr = (struct sockaddr_in *) ai->ai_addr;
int optname;
if (IN_MULTICAST (ntohl (addr->sin_addr.s_addr)))
optname = IP_MULTICAST_TTL;
else
optname = IP_TTL;
if (setsockopt (se->data.client.fd, IPPROTO_IP, optname,
&network_config_ttl,
sizeof (network_config_ttl)) != 0)
{
char errbuf[1024];
ERROR ("network plugin: setsockopt (ipv4-ttl): %s",
sstrerror (errno, errbuf, sizeof (errbuf)));
return (-1);
}
}
else if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
{
/* Useful example: http://gsyc.escet.urjc.es/~eva/IPv6-web/examples/mcast.html */
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) ai->ai_addr;
int optname;
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST (&addr->sin6_addr))
optname = IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS;
else
optname = IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS;
if (setsockopt (se->data.client.fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, optname,
&network_config_ttl,
sizeof (network_config_ttl)) != 0)
{
char errbuf[1024];
ERROR ("network plugin: setsockopt(ipv6-ttl): %s",
sstrerror (errno, errbuf,
sizeof (errbuf)));
return (-1);
}
}
return (0);
} /* int network_set_ttl */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssh2_pkt_send_noqueue(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
{
int len;
int backlog;
if (ssh->cscipher != NULL && (ssh->cscipher->flags & SSH_CIPHER_IS_CBC)) {
/* We need to send two packets, so use the deferral mechanism. */
ssh2_pkt_defer_noqueue(ssh, pkt, FALSE);
ssh_pkt_defersend(ssh);
return;
}
len = ssh2_pkt_construct(ssh, pkt);
backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->body, len);
if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
ssh->outgoing_data_size += pkt->encrypted_len;
if (!ssh->kex_in_progress &&
!ssh->bare_connection &&
ssh->max_data_size != 0 &&
ssh->outgoing_data_size > ssh->max_data_size)
do_ssh2_transport(ssh, "too much data sent", -1, NULL);
ssh_free_packet(pkt);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UiSceneCreator::CreateSystemIndicators() {
struct Indicator {
UiElementName name;
const gfx::VectorIcon& icon;
int resource_string;
bool PermissionsModel::*signal;
};
const std::vector<Indicator> indicators = {
{kAudioCaptureIndicator, vector_icons::kMicrophoneIcon,
IDS_AUDIO_CALL_NOTIFICATION_TEXT_2,
&PermissionsModel::audio_capture_enabled},
{kVideoCaptureIndicator, vector_icons::kVideocamIcon,
IDS_VIDEO_CALL_NOTIFICATION_TEXT_2,
&PermissionsModel::video_capture_enabled},
{kScreenCaptureIndicator, vector_icons::kScreenShareIcon,
IDS_SCREEN_CAPTURE_NOTIFICATION_TEXT_2,
&PermissionsModel::screen_capture_enabled},
{kBluetoothConnectedIndicator, vector_icons::kBluetoothConnectedIcon, 0,
&PermissionsModel::bluetooth_connected},
{kLocationAccessIndicator, vector_icons::kLocationOnIcon, 0,
&PermissionsModel::location_access},
};
std::unique_ptr<LinearLayout> indicator_layout =
base::MakeUnique<LinearLayout>(LinearLayout::kRight);
indicator_layout->SetName(kIndicatorLayout);
indicator_layout->set_hit_testable(false);
indicator_layout->set_y_anchoring(TOP);
indicator_layout->SetTranslate(0, kIndicatorVerticalOffset,
kIndicatorDistanceOffset);
indicator_layout->set_margin(kIndicatorGap);
indicator_layout->AddBinding(
VR_BIND_FUNC(bool, Model, model_, fullscreen == false, UiElement,
indicator_layout.get(), SetVisible));
scene_->AddUiElement(k2dBrowsingContentGroup, std::move(indicator_layout));
for (const auto& indicator : indicators) {
auto element = base::MakeUnique<SystemIndicator>(512);
element->GetDerivedTexture()->SetIcon(indicator.icon);
element->GetDerivedTexture()->SetMessageId(indicator.resource_string);
element->SetName(indicator.name);
element->SetDrawPhase(kPhaseForeground);
element->set_requires_layout(false);
element->SetSize(0, kIndicatorHeight);
element->SetVisible(false);
BindColor(model_, element.get(), &ColorScheme::system_indicator_background,
&TexturedElement::SetBackgroundColor);
BindColor(model_, element.get(), &ColorScheme::system_indicator_foreground,
&TexturedElement::SetForegroundColor);
element->AddBinding(base::MakeUnique<Binding<bool>>(
base::Bind(
[](Model* m, bool PermissionsModel::*permission) {
return m->permissions.*permission;
},
base::Unretained(model_), indicator.signal),
base::Bind(
[](UiElement* e, const bool& v) {
e->SetVisible(v);
e->set_requires_layout(v);
},
base::Unretained(element.get()))));
scene_->AddUiElement(kIndicatorLayout, std::move(element));
}
}
Commit Message: Fix wrapping behavior of description text in omnibox suggestion
This regression is introduced by
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/827033
The description text should not wrap.
Bug: NONE
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Iaac5e6176e1730853406602835d61fe1e80ec0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/839960
Reviewed-by: Christopher Grant <cjgrant@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525806}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 155,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mmu_sync_roots(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int i;
struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.direct_map)
return;
if (!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa))
return;
vcpu_clear_mmio_info(vcpu, ~0ul);
kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_PRE_SYNC);
if (vcpu->arch.mmu.root_level == PT64_ROOT_LEVEL) {
hpa_t root = vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa;
sp = page_header(root);
mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp);
kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_POST_SYNC);
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
hpa_t root = vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root[i];
if (root && VALID_PAGE(root)) {
root &= PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK;
sp = page_header(root);
mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp);
}
}
kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_POST_SYNC);
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintMsg_Print_Params GetCssPrintParams(
blink::WebFrame* frame,
int page_index,
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& page_params) {
PrintMsg_Print_Params page_css_params = page_params;
int dpi = GetDPI(&page_params);
blink::WebSize page_size_in_pixels(
ConvertUnit(page_params.page_size.width(), dpi, kPixelsPerInch),
ConvertUnit(page_params.page_size.height(), dpi, kPixelsPerInch));
int margin_top_in_pixels =
ConvertUnit(page_params.margin_top, dpi, kPixelsPerInch);
int margin_right_in_pixels = ConvertUnit(
page_params.page_size.width() -
page_params.content_size.width() - page_params.margin_left,
dpi, kPixelsPerInch);
int margin_bottom_in_pixels = ConvertUnit(
page_params.page_size.height() -
page_params.content_size.height() - page_params.margin_top,
dpi, kPixelsPerInch);
int margin_left_in_pixels = ConvertUnit(
page_params.margin_left,
dpi, kPixelsPerInch);
blink::WebSize original_page_size_in_pixels = page_size_in_pixels;
if (frame) {
frame->pageSizeAndMarginsInPixels(page_index,
page_size_in_pixels,
margin_top_in_pixels,
margin_right_in_pixels,
margin_bottom_in_pixels,
margin_left_in_pixels);
}
int new_content_width = page_size_in_pixels.width -
margin_left_in_pixels - margin_right_in_pixels;
int new_content_height = page_size_in_pixels.height -
margin_top_in_pixels - margin_bottom_in_pixels;
if (new_content_width < 1 || new_content_height < 1) {
CHECK(frame != NULL);
page_css_params = GetCssPrintParams(NULL, page_index, page_params);
return page_css_params;
}
page_css_params.content_size =
gfx::Size(ConvertUnit(new_content_width, kPixelsPerInch, dpi),
ConvertUnit(new_content_height, kPixelsPerInch, dpi));
if (original_page_size_in_pixels != page_size_in_pixels) {
page_css_params.page_size =
gfx::Size(ConvertUnit(page_size_in_pixels.width, kPixelsPerInch, dpi),
ConvertUnit(page_size_in_pixels.height, kPixelsPerInch, dpi));
} else {
page_css_params.page_size = page_params.page_size;
}
page_css_params.margin_top =
ConvertUnit(margin_top_in_pixels, kPixelsPerInch, dpi);
page_css_params.margin_left =
ConvertUnit(margin_left_in_pixels, kPixelsPerInch, dpi);
return page_css_params;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: event_change_size( RenderState state,
double delta )
{
double char_size = state->char_size;
char_size += delta;
if ( char_size < 6.0 )
char_size = 6.0;
else if ( char_size > 300.0 )
char_size = 300.0;
render_state_set_size( state, char_size );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 9,992 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static float getMaxWidthListMarker(const RenderBox* renderer)
{
#ifndef NDEBUG
ASSERT(renderer);
Node* parentNode = renderer->generatingNode();
ASSERT(parentNode);
ASSERT(isHTMLOListElement(parentNode) || isHTMLUListElement(parentNode));
ASSERT(renderer->style()->textAutosizingMultiplier() != 1);
#endif
float maxWidth = 0;
for (RenderObject* child = renderer->firstChild(); child; child = child->nextSibling()) {
if (!child->isListItem())
continue;
RenderBox* listItem = toRenderBox(child);
for (RenderObject* itemChild = listItem->firstChild(); itemChild; itemChild = itemChild->nextSibling()) {
if (!itemChild->isListMarker())
continue;
RenderBox* itemMarker = toRenderBox(itemChild);
if (itemMarker->needsLayout())
itemMarker->layout();
maxWidth = max<float>(maxWidth, toRenderListMarker(itemMarker)->logicalWidth().toFloat());
break;
}
}
return maxWidth;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSRetainPtr<JSStringRef> AccessibilityUIElement::rowIndexRange()
{
return indexRangeInTable(m_element, true);
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init atomic_pool_init(void)
{
pgprot_t prot = __pgprot(PROT_NORMAL_NC);
unsigned long nr_pages = atomic_pool_size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
struct page *page;
void *addr;
unsigned int pool_size_order = get_order(atomic_pool_size);
if (dev_get_cma_area(NULL))
page = dma_alloc_from_contiguous(NULL, nr_pages,
pool_size_order);
else
page = alloc_pages(GFP_DMA, pool_size_order);
if (page) {
int ret;
void *page_addr = page_address(page);
memset(page_addr, 0, atomic_pool_size);
__dma_flush_range(page_addr, page_addr + atomic_pool_size);
atomic_pool = gen_pool_create(PAGE_SHIFT, -1);
if (!atomic_pool)
goto free_page;
addr = dma_common_contiguous_remap(page, atomic_pool_size,
VM_USERMAP, prot, atomic_pool_init);
if (!addr)
goto destroy_genpool;
ret = gen_pool_add_virt(atomic_pool, (unsigned long)addr,
page_to_phys(page),
atomic_pool_size, -1);
if (ret)
goto remove_mapping;
gen_pool_set_algo(atomic_pool,
gen_pool_first_fit_order_align,
(void *)PAGE_SHIFT);
pr_info("DMA: preallocated %zu KiB pool for atomic allocations\n",
atomic_pool_size / 1024);
return 0;
}
goto out;
remove_mapping:
dma_common_free_remap(addr, atomic_pool_size, VM_USERMAP);
destroy_genpool:
gen_pool_destroy(atomic_pool);
atomic_pool = NULL;
free_page:
if (!dma_release_from_contiguous(NULL, page, nr_pages))
__free_pages(page, pool_size_order);
out:
pr_err("DMA: failed to allocate %zu KiB pool for atomic coherent allocation\n",
atomic_pool_size / 1024);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: arm64: dma-mapping: always clear allocated buffers
Buffers allocated by dma_alloc_coherent() are always zeroed on Alpha,
ARM (32bit), MIPS, PowerPC, x86/x86_64 and probably other architectures.
It turned out that some drivers rely on this 'feature'. Allocated buffer
might be also exposed to userspace with dma_mmap() call, so clearing it
is desired from security point of view to avoid exposing random memory
to userspace. This patch unifies dma_alloc_coherent() behavior on ARM64
architecture with other implementations by unconditionally zeroing
allocated buffer.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.14+
Signed-off-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 56,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FetchManager::Loader::PerformNetworkError(const String& message) {
Failed(message);
}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::JavaScriptIsolatedWorldRequest::completed(
const blink::WebVector<v8::Local<v8::Value>>& result) {
if (!render_frame_impl_.get()) {
return;
}
if (notify_result_) {
base::ListValue list;
if (!result.isEmpty()) {
v8::Local<v8::Context> context =
render_frame_impl_.get()->frame_->mainWorldScriptContext();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
V8ValueConverterImpl converter;
converter.SetDateAllowed(true);
converter.SetRegExpAllowed(true);
for (const auto& value : result) {
scoped_ptr<base::Value> result_value(
converter.FromV8Value(value, context));
list.Append(result_value ? result_value.Pass()
: base::Value::CreateNullValue());
}
} else {
list.Set(0, base::Value::CreateNullValue());
}
render_frame_impl_.get()->Send(
new FrameHostMsg_JavaScriptExecuteResponse(routing_id_, id_, list));
}
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API void r_config_hold_free(RConfigHold *h) {
if (h) {
r_list_free (h->list_num);
r_list_free (h->list_char);
R_FREE (h);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TABLE* GetTable(cmsIT8* it8)
{
if ((it8 -> nTable >= it8 ->TablesCount)) {
SynError(it8, "Table %d out of sequence", it8 -> nTable);
return it8 -> Tab;
}
return it8 ->Tab + it8 ->nTable;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InitLogOnShutdown() { StatisticsRecorder::InitLogOnShutdown(); }
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ext4_ext_search_left(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_ext_path *path,
ext4_lblk_t *logical, ext4_fsblk_t *phys)
{
struct ext4_extent_idx *ix;
struct ext4_extent *ex;
int depth, ee_len;
BUG_ON(path == NULL);
depth = path->p_depth;
*phys = 0;
if (depth == 0 && path->p_ext == NULL)
return 0;
/* usually extent in the path covers blocks smaller
* then *logical, but it can be that extent is the
* first one in the file */
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
if (*logical < le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block)) {
BUG_ON(EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(path[depth].p_hdr) != ex);
while (--depth >= 0) {
ix = path[depth].p_idx;
BUG_ON(ix != EXT_FIRST_INDEX(path[depth].p_hdr));
}
return 0;
}
BUG_ON(*logical < (le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block) + ee_len));
*logical = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block) + ee_len - 1;
*phys = ext_pblock(ex) + ee_len - 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileReaderLoader::cancel()
{
m_errorCode = FileError::ABORT_ERR;
terminate();
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,488 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int list_readers(void)
{
unsigned int i, rcount = sc_ctx_get_reader_count(ctx);
if (rcount == 0) {
printf("No smart card readers found.\n");
return 0;
}
printf("# Detected readers (%s)\n", ctx->reader_driver->short_name);
printf("Nr. Card Features Name\n");
for (i = 0; i < rcount; i++) {
sc_reader_t *reader = sc_ctx_get_reader(ctx, i);
int state = sc_detect_card_presence(reader);
printf("%-5d%-6s%-10s%s\n", i, state & SC_READER_CARD_PRESENT ? "Yes":"No",
reader->capabilities & SC_READER_CAP_PIN_PAD ? "PIN pad":"",
reader->name);
if (state & SC_READER_CARD_PRESENT && verbose) {
struct sc_card *card;
int r;
char tmp[SC_MAX_ATR_SIZE*3];
sc_bin_to_hex(reader->atr.value, reader->atr.len, tmp, sizeof(tmp) - 1, ':');
if (state & SC_READER_CARD_EXCLUSIVE)
printf(" %s [EXCLUSIVE]\n", tmp);
else {
if ((r = sc_connect_card(reader, &card)) != SC_SUCCESS) {
fprintf(stderr, " failed: %s\n", sc_strerror(r));
} else {
printf(" %s %s %s\n", tmp, card->name ? card->name : "", state & SC_READER_CARD_INUSE ? "[IN USE]" : "");
sc_disconnect_card(card);
}
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_netinfo_config(void)
{
ni_status status;
void *domain;
ni_id config_dir;
struct netinfo_config_state *config;
if (ni_open(NULL, ".", &domain) != NI_OK) return NULL;
while ((status = ni_pathsearch(domain, &config_dir, NETINFO_CONFIG_DIR)) == NI_NODIR) {
void *next_domain;
if (ni_open(domain, "..", &next_domain) != NI_OK) {
ni_free(next_domain);
break;
}
ni_free(domain);
domain = next_domain;
}
if (status != NI_OK) {
ni_free(domain);
return NULL;
}
config = emalloc(sizeof(*config));
config->domain = domain;
config->config_dir = config_dir;
config->prop_index = 0;
config->val_index = 0;
config->val_list = NULL;
return config;
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
/*
* The task is finally done with both the stack and thread_info,
* so free both.
*/
release_task_stack(tsk);
#else
/*
* If the task had a separate stack allocation, it should be gone
* by now.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(&tsk->stack_refcount) != 0);
#endif
rt_mutex_debug_task_free(tsk);
ftrace_graph_exit_task(tsk);
put_seccomp_filter(tsk);
arch_release_task_struct(tsk);
if (tsk->flags & PF_KTHREAD)
free_kthread_struct(tsk);
free_task_struct(tsk);
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int iwch_destroy_listen(struct iw_cm_id *cm_id)
{
int err;
struct iwch_listen_ep *ep = to_listen_ep(cm_id);
PDBG("%s ep %p\n", __func__, ep);
might_sleep();
state_set(&ep->com, DEAD);
ep->com.rpl_done = 0;
ep->com.rpl_err = 0;
err = listen_stop(ep);
if (err)
goto done;
wait_event(ep->com.waitq, ep->com.rpl_done);
cxgb3_free_stid(ep->com.tdev, ep->stid);
done:
err = ep->com.rpl_err;
cm_id->rem_ref(cm_id);
put_ep(&ep->com);
return err;
}
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::UpdateDownloadShelfVisibility(bool visible) {
if (GetStatusBubble())
GetStatusBubble()->UpdateDownloadShelfVisibility(visible);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static off_t handle_telldir(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs)
{
return telldir(fs->dir.stream);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mlx5_ib_qp_event(struct mlx5_core_qp *qp, int type)
{
struct ib_qp *ibqp = &to_mibqp(qp)->ibqp;
struct ib_event event;
if (type == MLX5_EVENT_TYPE_PATH_MIG) {
/* This event is only valid for trans_qps */
to_mibqp(qp)->port = to_mibqp(qp)->trans_qp.alt_port;
}
if (ibqp->event_handler) {
event.device = ibqp->device;
event.element.qp = ibqp;
switch (type) {
case MLX5_EVENT_TYPE_PATH_MIG:
event.event = IB_EVENT_PATH_MIG;
break;
case MLX5_EVENT_TYPE_COMM_EST:
event.event = IB_EVENT_COMM_EST;
break;
case MLX5_EVENT_TYPE_SQ_DRAINED:
event.event = IB_EVENT_SQ_DRAINED;
break;
case MLX5_EVENT_TYPE_SRQ_LAST_WQE:
event.event = IB_EVENT_QP_LAST_WQE_REACHED;
break;
case MLX5_EVENT_TYPE_WQ_CATAS_ERROR:
event.event = IB_EVENT_QP_FATAL;
break;
case MLX5_EVENT_TYPE_PATH_MIG_FAILED:
event.event = IB_EVENT_PATH_MIG_ERR;
break;
case MLX5_EVENT_TYPE_WQ_INVAL_REQ_ERROR:
event.event = IB_EVENT_QP_REQ_ERR;
break;
case MLX5_EVENT_TYPE_WQ_ACCESS_ERROR:
event.event = IB_EVENT_QP_ACCESS_ERR;
break;
default:
pr_warn("mlx5_ib: Unexpected event type %d on QP %06x\n", type, qp->qpn);
return;
}
ibqp->event_handler(&event, ibqp->qp_context);
}
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe];
struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
int err;
/* We may have adjusted the register to this map value, so we
* need to try adding each of min_value and max_value to off
* to make sure our theoretical access will be safe.
*/
if (env->log.level)
print_verifier_state(env, state);
/* The minimum value is only important with signed
* comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
* value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
* index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
* will have a set floor within our range.
*/
if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
regno);
return -EACCES;
}
err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size,
zero_size_allowed);
if (err) {
verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the array range\n",
regno);
return err;
}
/* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail since we can't be
* sure we won't do bad things.
* If reg->umax_value + off could overflow, treat that as unbounded too.
*/
if (reg->umax_value >= BPF_MAX_VAR_OFF) {
verbose(env, "R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
regno);
return -EACCES;
}
err = __check_map_access(env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size,
zero_size_allowed);
if (err)
verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the array range\n",
regno);
return err;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dbstmt_compare(zval *object1, zval *object2 TSRMLS_DC)
{
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 72,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CalculatePosition(FPDF_PAGE page,
const PDFiumEngineExports::RenderingSettings& settings,
pp::Rect* dest) {
int dpi = std::max(settings.dpi_x, settings.dpi_y);
int page_width = static_cast<int>(
ConvertUnitDouble(FPDF_GetPageWidth(page), kPointsPerInch, dpi));
int page_height = static_cast<int>(
ConvertUnitDouble(FPDF_GetPageHeight(page), kPointsPerInch, dpi));
*dest = settings.bounds;
int rotate = 0; // normal orientation.
if (settings.autorotate &&
(dest->width() > dest->height()) != (page_width > page_height)) {
rotate = 3; // 90 degrees counter-clockwise.
std::swap(page_width, page_height);
}
bool scale_to_bounds = false;
if (settings.fit_to_bounds &&
((page_width > dest->width()) || (page_height > dest->height()))) {
scale_to_bounds = true;
} else if (settings.stretch_to_bounds &&
((page_width < dest->width()) || (page_height < dest->height()))) {
scale_to_bounds = true;
}
if (scale_to_bounds) {
if (settings.keep_aspect_ratio) {
double scale_factor_x = page_width;
scale_factor_x /= dest->width();
double scale_factor_y = page_height;
scale_factor_y /= dest->height();
if (scale_factor_x > scale_factor_y) {
dest->set_height(page_height / scale_factor_x);
} else {
dest->set_width(page_width / scale_factor_y);
}
}
} else {
dest->set_width(page_width);
dest->set_height(page_height);
}
if (settings.dpi_x != settings.dpi_y) {
dest->set_width(dest->width() * settings.dpi_x / dpi);
dest->set_height(dest->height() * settings.dpi_y / dpi);
}
if (settings.center_in_bounds) {
pp::Point offset(
(settings.bounds.width() * settings.dpi_x / dpi - dest->width()) / 2,
(settings.bounds.height() * settings.dpi_y / dpi - dest->height()) / 2);
dest->Offset(offset);
}
return rotate;
}
Commit Message: Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_trak(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
MOVStreamContext *sc;
int ret;
st = avformat_new_stream(c->fc, NULL);
if (!st) return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
st->id = c->fc->nb_streams;
sc = av_mallocz(sizeof(MOVStreamContext));
if (!sc) return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
st->priv_data = sc;
st->codecpar->codec_type = AVMEDIA_TYPE_DATA;
sc->ffindex = st->index;
c->trak_index = st->index;
if ((ret = mov_read_default(c, pb, atom)) < 0)
return ret;
c->trak_index = -1;
/* sanity checks */
if ((sc->chunk_count && (!sc->stts_count || !sc->stsc_count ||
(!sc->sample_size && !sc->sample_count))) ||
(!sc->chunk_count && sc->sample_count)) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "stream %d, missing mandatory atoms, broken header\n",
st->index);
return 0;
}
fix_timescale(c, sc);
avpriv_set_pts_info(st, 64, 1, sc->time_scale);
mov_build_index(c, st);
if (sc->dref_id-1 < sc->drefs_count && sc->drefs[sc->dref_id-1].path) {
MOVDref *dref = &sc->drefs[sc->dref_id - 1];
if (c->enable_drefs) {
if (mov_open_dref(c, &sc->pb, c->fc->filename, dref) < 0)
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"stream %d, error opening alias: path='%s', dir='%s', "
"filename='%s', volume='%s', nlvl_from=%d, nlvl_to=%d\n",
st->index, dref->path, dref->dir, dref->filename,
dref->volume, dref->nlvl_from, dref->nlvl_to);
} else {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Skipped opening external track: "
"stream %d, alias: path='%s', dir='%s', "
"filename='%s', volume='%s', nlvl_from=%d, nlvl_to=%d."
"Set enable_drefs to allow this.\n",
st->index, dref->path, dref->dir, dref->filename,
dref->volume, dref->nlvl_from, dref->nlvl_to);
}
} else {
sc->pb = c->fc->pb;
sc->pb_is_copied = 1;
}
if (st->codecpar->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) {
if (!st->sample_aspect_ratio.num && st->codecpar->width && st->codecpar->height &&
sc->height && sc->width &&
(st->codecpar->width != sc->width || st->codecpar->height != sc->height)) {
st->sample_aspect_ratio = av_d2q(((double)st->codecpar->height * sc->width) /
((double)st->codecpar->width * sc->height), INT_MAX);
}
#if FF_API_R_FRAME_RATE
if (sc->stts_count == 1 || (sc->stts_count == 2 && sc->stts_data[1].count == 1))
av_reduce(&st->r_frame_rate.num, &st->r_frame_rate.den,
sc->time_scale, sc->stts_data[0].duration, INT_MAX);
#endif
}
if (!st->codecpar->extradata_size && st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 &&
TAG_IS_AVCI(st->codecpar->codec_tag)) {
ret = ff_generate_avci_extradata(st);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
switch (st->codecpar->codec_id) {
#if CONFIG_H261_DECODER
case AV_CODEC_ID_H261:
#endif
#if CONFIG_H263_DECODER
case AV_CODEC_ID_H263:
#endif
#if CONFIG_MPEG4_DECODER
case AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4:
#endif
st->codecpar->width = 0; /* let decoder init width/height */
st->codecpar->height= 0;
break;
}
if (st->codecpar->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MP3
&& sc->stts_count > 3
&& sc->stts_count*10 > st->nb_frames
&& sc->time_scale == st->codecpar->sample_rate) {
st->need_parsing = AVSTREAM_PARSE_FULL;
}
/* Do not need those anymore. */
av_freep(&sc->chunk_offsets);
av_freep(&sc->sample_sizes);
av_freep(&sc->keyframes);
av_freep(&sc->stts_data);
av_freep(&sc->stps_data);
av_freep(&sc->elst_data);
av_freep(&sc->rap_group);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,474 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* Resource::ResourceTypeToString(
Type type,
const AtomicString& fetch_initiator_name) {
switch (type) {
case Resource::kMainResource:
return "Main resource";
case Resource::kImage:
return "Image";
case Resource::kCSSStyleSheet:
return "CSS stylesheet";
case Resource::kScript:
return "Script";
case Resource::kFont:
return "Font";
case Resource::kRaw:
return InitiatorTypeNameToString(fetch_initiator_name);
case Resource::kSVGDocument:
return "SVG document";
case Resource::kXSLStyleSheet:
return "XSL stylesheet";
case Resource::kLinkPrefetch:
return "Link prefetch resource";
case Resource::kTextTrack:
return "Text track";
case Resource::kImportResource:
return "Imported resource";
case Resource::kAudio:
return "Audio";
case Resource::kVideo:
return "Video";
case Resource::kManifest:
return "Manifest";
case Resource::kMock:
return "Mock";
}
NOTREACHED();
return InitiatorTypeNameToString(fetch_initiator_name);
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pfkey_do_dump(struct pfkey_sock *pfk)
{
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
int rc;
rc = pfk->dump.dump(pfk);
if (rc == -ENOBUFS)
return 0;
if (pfk->dump.skb) {
if (!pfkey_can_dump(&pfk->sk))
return 0;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) pfk->dump.skb->data;
hdr->sadb_msg_seq = 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = rc;
pfkey_broadcast(pfk->dump.skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ONE,
&pfk->sk, sock_net(&pfk->sk));
pfk->dump.skb = NULL;
}
pfkey_terminate_dump(pfk);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,412 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLvoid StubGLUniform3iv(GLint location, GLsizei count, const GLint* v) {
glUniform3iv(location, count, v);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 99,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void macvtap_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
}
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 34,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct inode *udf_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct udf_inode_info *ei;
ei = kmem_cache_alloc(udf_inode_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ei)
return NULL;
ei->i_unique = 0;
ei->i_lenExtents = 0;
ei->i_next_alloc_block = 0;
ei->i_next_alloc_goal = 0;
ei->i_strat4096 = 0;
init_rwsem(&ei->i_data_sem);
return &ei->vfs_inode;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
return -2;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
ret = -2;
goto err;
}
if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
ctx, hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
goto err;
if (rv == 0) {
ret = 2;
goto err;
}
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
ret = 2;
goto err;
}
if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
0) {
goto err;
}
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
*/
mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
if (mlen < 0) {
goto err;
}
/* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
if (eticklen <=
TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
ret = 2;
goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
|| HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return 2;
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return -1;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return 2;
}
slen += mlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
p = sdec;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
if (sess) {
/*
* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
* that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
* structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
* standard.
*/
if (sesslen)
memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
*psess = sess;
if (renew_ticket)
return 4;
else
return 3;
}
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
return 2;
err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 69,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
struct kvm_memory_slot old,
struct kvm_userspace_memory_region *mem,
bool user_alloc)
{
int npages = memslot->npages;
/*
* Only private memory slots need to be mapped here since
* KVM_SET_MEMORY_REGION ioctl is no longer supported.
*/
if ((memslot->id >= KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS) && npages && !old.npages) {
unsigned long userspace_addr;
/*
* MAP_SHARED to prevent internal slot pages from being moved
* by fork()/COW.
*/
userspace_addr = vm_mmap(NULL, 0, npages * PAGE_SIZE,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0);
if (IS_ERR((void *)userspace_addr))
return PTR_ERR((void *)userspace_addr);
memslot->userspace_addr = userspace_addr;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 GetProfileIdFromPath(const base::FilePath& profile_path) {
if (profile_path.empty())
return base::string16();
base::FilePath default_user_data_dir;
if (chrome::GetDefaultUserDataDirectory(&default_user_data_dir) &&
profile_path.DirName() == default_user_data_dir &&
profile_path.BaseName().value() ==
base::ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kInitialProfile)) {
return base::string16();
}
base::string16 basenames = profile_path.DirName().BaseName().value() +
L"." + profile_path.BaseName().value();
base::string16 profile_id;
profile_id.reserve(basenames.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < basenames.length(); ++i) {
if (base::IsAsciiAlpha(basenames[i]) ||
base::IsAsciiDigit(basenames[i]) ||
basenames[i] == L'.')
profile_id += basenames[i];
}
return profile_id;
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,666 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.