instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ElementsAccessor::InitializeOncePerProcess() {
static ElementsAccessor* accessor_array[] = {
#define ACCESSOR_ARRAY(Class, Kind, Store) new Class(#Kind),
ELEMENTS_LIST(ACCESSOR_ARRAY)
#undef ACCESSOR_ARRAY
};
STATIC_ASSERT((sizeof(accessor_array) / sizeof(*accessor_array)) ==
kElementsKindCount);
elements_accessors_ = accessor_array;
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX::node_id OMX::makeNodeID(OMXNodeInstance *instance) {
node_id node = (node_id)++mNodeCounter;
mNodeIDToInstance.add(node, instance);
return node;
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: recv_and_process_peer_pkt(peer_t *p)
{
int rc;
ssize_t size;
msg_t msg;
double T1, T2, T3, T4;
double offset;
double prev_delay, delay;
unsigned interval;
datapoint_t *datapoint;
peer_t *q;
offset = 0;
/* We can recvfrom here and check from.IP, but some multihomed
* ntp servers reply from their *other IP*.
* TODO: maybe we should check at least what we can: from.port == 123?
*/
recv_again:
size = recv(p->p_fd, &msg, sizeof(msg), MSG_DONTWAIT);
if (size < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
/* Signal caught */
goto recv_again;
if (errno == EAGAIN)
/* There was no packet after all
* (poll() returning POLLIN for a fd
* is not a ironclad guarantee that data is there)
*/
return;
/*
* If you need a different handling for a specific
* errno, always explain it in comment.
*/
bb_perror_msg_and_die("recv(%s) error", p->p_dotted);
}
if (size != NTP_MSGSIZE_NOAUTH && size != NTP_MSGSIZE) {
bb_error_msg("malformed packet received from %s", p->p_dotted);
return;
}
if (msg.m_orgtime.int_partl != p->p_xmt_msg.m_xmttime.int_partl
|| msg.m_orgtime.fractionl != p->p_xmt_msg.m_xmttime.fractionl
) {
/* Somebody else's packet */
return;
}
/* We do not expect any more packets from this peer for now.
* Closing the socket informs kernel about it.
* We open a new socket when we send a new query.
*/
close(p->p_fd);
p->p_fd = -1;
if ((msg.m_status & LI_ALARM) == LI_ALARM
|| msg.m_stratum == 0
|| msg.m_stratum > NTP_MAXSTRATUM
) {
bb_error_msg("reply from %s: peer is unsynced", p->p_dotted);
/*
* Stratum 0 responses may have commands in 32-bit m_refid field:
* "DENY", "RSTR" - peer does not like us at all,
* "RATE" - peer is overloaded, reduce polling freq.
* If poll interval is small, increase it.
*/
if (G.poll_exp < BIGPOLL)
goto increase_interval;
goto pick_normal_interval;
}
/*
* From RFC 2030 (with a correction to the delay math):
*
* Timestamp Name ID When Generated
* ------------------------------------------------------------
* Originate Timestamp T1 time request sent by client
* Receive Timestamp T2 time request received by server
* Transmit Timestamp T3 time reply sent by server
* Destination Timestamp T4 time reply received by client
*
* The roundtrip delay and local clock offset are defined as
*
* delay = (T4 - T1) - (T3 - T2); offset = ((T2 - T1) + (T3 - T4)) / 2
*/
T1 = p->p_xmttime;
T2 = lfp_to_d(msg.m_rectime);
T3 = lfp_to_d(msg.m_xmttime);
T4 = G.cur_time;
/* The delay calculation is a special case. In cases where the
* server and client clocks are running at different rates and
* with very fast networks, the delay can appear negative. In
* order to avoid violating the Principle of Least Astonishment,
* the delay is clamped not less than the system precision.
*/
delay = (T4 - T1) - (T3 - T2);
if (delay < G_precision_sec)
delay = G_precision_sec;
/*
* If this packet's delay is much bigger than the last one,
* it's better to just ignore it than use its much less precise value.
*/
prev_delay = p->p_raw_delay;
p->p_raw_delay = delay;
if (p->reachable_bits && delay > prev_delay * BAD_DELAY_GROWTH) {
bb_error_msg("reply from %s: delay %f is too high, ignoring", p->p_dotted, delay);
goto pick_normal_interval;
}
p->lastpkt_delay = delay;
p->lastpkt_recv_time = T4;
VERB6 bb_error_msg("%s->lastpkt_recv_time=%f", p->p_dotted, p->lastpkt_recv_time);
p->lastpkt_status = msg.m_status;
p->lastpkt_stratum = msg.m_stratum;
p->lastpkt_rootdelay = sfp_to_d(msg.m_rootdelay);
p->lastpkt_rootdisp = sfp_to_d(msg.m_rootdisp);
p->lastpkt_refid = msg.m_refid;
p->datapoint_idx = p->reachable_bits ? (p->datapoint_idx + 1) % NUM_DATAPOINTS : 0;
datapoint = &p->filter_datapoint[p->datapoint_idx];
datapoint->d_recv_time = T4;
datapoint->d_offset = offset = ((T2 - T1) + (T3 - T4)) / 2;
datapoint->d_dispersion = LOG2D(msg.m_precision_exp) + G_precision_sec;
if (!p->reachable_bits) {
/* 1st datapoint ever - replicate offset in every element */
int i;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_DATAPOINTS; i++) {
p->filter_datapoint[i].d_offset = offset;
}
}
p->reachable_bits |= 1;
if ((MAX_VERBOSE && G.verbose) || (option_mask32 & OPT_w)) {
bb_error_msg("reply from %s: offset:%+f delay:%f status:0x%02x strat:%d refid:0x%08x rootdelay:%f reach:0x%02x",
p->p_dotted,
offset,
p->lastpkt_delay,
p->lastpkt_status,
p->lastpkt_stratum,
p->lastpkt_refid,
p->lastpkt_rootdelay,
p->reachable_bits
/* not shown: m_ppoll, m_precision_exp, m_rootdisp,
* m_reftime, m_orgtime, m_rectime, m_xmttime
*/
);
}
/* Muck with statictics and update the clock */
filter_datapoints(p);
q = select_and_cluster();
rc = 0;
if (q) {
if (!(option_mask32 & OPT_w)) {
rc = update_local_clock(q);
#if 0
/* If drift is dangerously large, immediately
* drop poll interval one step down.
*/
if (fabs(q->filter_offset) >= POLLDOWN_OFFSET) {
VERB4 bb_error_msg("offset:%+f > POLLDOWN_OFFSET", q->filter_offset);
adjust_poll(-POLLADJ_LIMIT * 3);
rc = 0;
}
#endif
}
} else {
/* No peer selected.
* If poll interval is small, increase it.
*/
if (G.poll_exp < BIGPOLL)
goto increase_interval;
}
if (rc != 0) {
/* Adjust the poll interval by comparing the current offset
* with the clock jitter. If the offset is less than
* the clock jitter times a constant, then the averaging interval
* is increased, otherwise it is decreased. A bit of hysteresis
* helps calm the dance. Works best using burst mode.
*/
if (rc > 0 && G.offset_to_jitter_ratio <= POLLADJ_GATE) {
/* was += G.poll_exp but it is a bit
* too optimistic for my taste at high poll_exp's */
increase_interval:
adjust_poll(MINPOLL);
} else {
VERB3 if (rc > 0)
bb_error_msg("want smaller interval: offset/jitter = %u",
G.offset_to_jitter_ratio);
adjust_poll(-G.poll_exp * 2);
}
}
/* Decide when to send new query for this peer */
pick_normal_interval:
interval = poll_interval(INT_MAX);
if (fabs(offset) >= BIGOFF && interval > BIGOFF_INTERVAL) {
/* If we are synced, offsets are less than SLEW_THRESHOLD,
* or at the very least not much larger than it.
* Now we see a largish one.
* Either this peer is feeling bad, or packet got corrupted,
* or _our_ clock is wrong now and _all_ peers will show similar
* largish offsets too.
* I observed this with laptop suspend stopping clock.
* In any case, it makes sense to make next request soonish:
* cases 1 and 2: get a better datapoint,
* case 3: allows to resync faster.
*/
interval = BIGOFF_INTERVAL;
}
set_next(p, interval);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 9,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_run_lazyinit_thread(void)
{
ext4_lazyinit_task = kthread_run(ext4_lazyinit_thread,
ext4_li_info, "ext4lazyinit");
if (IS_ERR(ext4_lazyinit_task)) {
int err = PTR_ERR(ext4_lazyinit_task);
ext4_clear_request_list();
kfree(ext4_li_info);
ext4_li_info = NULL;
printk(KERN_CRIT "EXT4: error %d creating inode table "
"initialization thread\n",
err);
return err;
}
ext4_li_info->li_state |= EXT4_LAZYINIT_RUNNING;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameFetchContext::DispatchDidReceiveResponse(
unsigned long identifier,
const ResourceResponse& response,
network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType frame_type,
WebURLRequest::RequestContext request_context,
Resource* resource,
ResourceResponseType response_type) {
if (IsDetached())
return;
DCHECK(resource);
MaybeRecordCTPolicyComplianceUseCounter(GetFrame(), resource->GetType(),
response.GetCTPolicyCompliance(),
MasterDocumentLoader());
if (response_type == ResourceResponseType::kFromMemoryCache) {
probe::markResourceAsCached(GetFrame(), MasterDocumentLoader(), identifier);
if (response.IsNull())
return;
}
MixedContentChecker::CheckMixedPrivatePublic(GetFrame(),
response.RemoteIPAddress());
LinkLoader::CanLoadResources resource_loading_policy =
response_type == ResourceResponseType::kFromMemoryCache
? LinkLoader::kDoNotLoadResources
: LinkLoader::kLoadResourcesAndPreconnect;
if (document_loader_ &&
document_loader_ == document_loader_->GetFrame()
->Loader()
.GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()) {
resource_loading_policy = LinkLoader::kDoNotLoadResources;
}
KURL frame_url = Url();
if (frame_url == NullURL())
frame_url = document_loader_->Url();
if ((resource->GetType() == Resource::kMainResource) &&
(IsMainFrame() || IsFirstPartyOrigin(response.Url()))) {
ParseAndPersistClientHints(response);
}
LinkLoader::LoadLinksFromHeader(
response.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Link), response.Url(), *GetFrame(),
document_, NetworkHintsInterfaceImpl(), resource_loading_policy,
LinkLoader::kLoadAll, nullptr);
if (response.HasMajorCertificateErrors()) {
MixedContentChecker::HandleCertificateError(GetFrame(), response,
frame_type, request_context);
}
if (response.IsLegacySymantecCert()) {
RecordLegacySymantecCertUseCounter(GetFrame(), resource->GetType());
GetLocalFrameClient()->ReportLegacySymantecCert(response.Url(),
false /* did_fail */);
}
GetFrame()->Loader().Progress().IncrementProgress(identifier, response);
GetLocalFrameClient()->DispatchDidReceiveResponse(response);
DocumentLoader* document_loader = MasterDocumentLoader();
probe::didReceiveResourceResponse(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), identifier,
document_loader, response, resource);
GetFrame()->Console().ReportResourceResponseReceived(document_loader,
identifier, response);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jas_stream_t *jas_stream_fdopen(int fd, const char *mode)
{
jas_stream_t *stream;
jas_stream_fileobj_t *obj;
/* Allocate a stream object. */
if (!(stream = jas_stream_create())) {
return 0;
}
/* Parse the mode string. */
stream->openmode_ = jas_strtoopenmode(mode);
#if defined(WIN32)
/* Argh!!! Someone ought to banish text mode (i.e., O_TEXT) to the
greatest depths of purgatory! */
/* Ensure that the file descriptor is in binary mode, if the caller
has specified the binary mode flag. Arguably, the caller ought to
take care of this, but text mode is a ugly wart anyways, so we save
the caller some grief by handling this within the stream library. */
/* This ugliness is mainly for the benefit of those who run the
JasPer software under Windows from shells that insist on opening
files in text mode. For example, in the Cygwin environment,
shells often open files in text mode when I/O redirection is
used. Grr... */
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_BINARY) {
setmode(fd, O_BINARY);
}
#endif
/* Allocate space for the underlying file stream object. */
if (!(obj = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_stream_fileobj_t)))) {
jas_stream_destroy(stream);
return 0;
}
obj->fd = fd;
obj->flags = 0;
obj->pathname[0] = '\0';
stream->obj_ = (void *) obj;
/* Do not close the underlying file descriptor when the stream is
closed. */
obj->flags |= JAS_STREAM_FILEOBJ_NOCLOSE;
/* By default, use full buffering for this type of stream. */
jas_stream_initbuf(stream, JAS_STREAM_FULLBUF, 0, 0);
/* Select the operations for a file stream object. */
stream->ops_ = &jas_stream_fileops;
return stream;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 73,123 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderMenuList::updateFromElement()
{
if (m_optionsChanged) {
updateOptionsWidth();
m_optionsChanged = false;
}
if (m_popupIsVisible)
m_popup->updateFromElement();
else
setTextFromOption(toHTMLSelectElement(node())->selectedIndex());
}
Commit Message: PopupMenuClient::multiple() should be const
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76771
Patch by Benjamin Poulain <bpoulain@apple.com> on 2012-01-21
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
* platform/PopupMenuClient.h:
(WebCore::PopupMenuClient::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMenuList::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@105570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 98,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionRegistry::TriggerOnUnloaded(
const Extension* extension,
UnloadedExtensionInfo::Reason reason) {
CHECK(extension);
DCHECK(!enabled_extensions_.Contains(extension->id()));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(ExtensionRegistryObserver,
observers_,
OnExtensionUnloaded(browser_context_, extension, reason));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPageSerializerImpl::endTagToString(Element* element,
SerializeDomParam* param)
{
bool needSkip;
StringBuilder result;
result.append(preActionBeforeSerializeEndTag(element, param, &needSkip));
if (needSkip)
return;
if (element->hasChildren() || param->haveAddedContentsBeforeEnd) {
result.appendLiteral("</");
result.append(element->nodeName().lower());
result.append('>');
} else {
if (param->isHTMLDocument) {
result.append('>');
if (!element->isHTMLElement() || !toHTMLElement(element)->ieForbidsInsertHTML()) {
result.appendLiteral("</");
result.append(element->nodeName().lower());
result.append('>');
}
} else {
result.appendLiteral(" />");
}
}
result.append(postActionAfterSerializeEndTag(element, param));
saveHTMLContentToBuffer(result.toString(), param);
}
Commit Message: Make WebPageSerializerImpl to escape URL attribute values in result.
This patch makes |WebPageSerializerImpl| to escape URL attribute values rather
than directly output URL attribute values into result.
BUG=542054
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.URLAttributeValues
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1398453005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353712}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 124,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ScheduleUIUpdate(const TabContents* source,
unsigned changed_flags) {
if (!source)
return;
if (changed_flags & TabContents::INVALIDATE_URL &&
source == GetSelectedTabContents()) {
UpdateToolbar(false);
changed_flags &= ~TabContents::INVALIDATE_URL;
}
if (changed_flags & TabContents::INVALIDATE_LOAD) {
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->UpdateTabContentsStateAt(
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->GetIndexOfController(
&source->controller()),
TabStripModelObserver::LOADING_ONLY);
}
if (changed_flags & TabContents::INVALIDATE_TITLE && !source->IsLoading()) {
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->UpdateTabContentsStateAt(
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->GetIndexOfController(
&source->controller()),
TabStripModelObserver::TITLE_NOT_LOADING);
}
if (changed_flags == 0)
return;
scheduled_updates_[source] |= changed_flags;
if (chrome_updater_factory_.empty()) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
chrome_updater_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(
&Browser::ProcessPendingUIUpdates),
kUIUpdateCoalescingTimeMS);
}
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: monitor_child (int event_fd, pid_t child_pid, int setup_finished_fd)
{
int res;
uint64_t val;
ssize_t s;
int signal_fd;
sigset_t mask;
struct pollfd fds[2];
int num_fds;
struct signalfd_siginfo fdsi;
int dont_close[] = {-1, -1, -1, -1};
int j = 0;
int exitc;
pid_t died_pid;
int died_status;
/* Close all extra fds in the monitoring process.
Any passed in fds have been passed on to the child anyway. */
if (event_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = event_fd;
if (opt_json_status_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = opt_json_status_fd;
if (setup_finished_fd != -1)
dont_close[j++] = setup_finished_fd;
assert (j < sizeof(dont_close)/sizeof(*dont_close));
fdwalk (proc_fd, close_extra_fds, dont_close);
sigemptyset (&mask);
sigaddset (&mask, SIGCHLD);
signal_fd = signalfd (-1, &mask, SFD_CLOEXEC | SFD_NONBLOCK);
if (signal_fd == -1)
die_with_error ("Can't create signalfd");
num_fds = 1;
fds[0].fd = signal_fd;
fds[0].events = POLLIN;
if (event_fd != -1)
{
fds[1].fd = event_fd;
fds[1].events = POLLIN;
num_fds++;
}
while (1)
{
fds[0].revents = fds[1].revents = 0;
res = poll (fds, num_fds, -1);
if (res == -1 && errno != EINTR)
die_with_error ("poll");
/* Always read from the eventfd first, if pid 2 died then pid 1 often
* dies too, and we could race, reporting that first and we'd lose
* the real exit status. */
if (event_fd != -1)
{
s = read (event_fd, &val, 8);
if (s == -1 && errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
die_with_error ("read eventfd");
else if (s == 8)
{
exitc = (int) val - 1;
report_child_exit_status (exitc, setup_finished_fd);
return exitc;
}
}
/* We need to read the signal_fd, or it will keep polling as read,
* however we ignore the details as we get them from waitpid
* below anyway */
s = read (signal_fd, &fdsi, sizeof (struct signalfd_siginfo));
if (s == -1 && errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
die_with_error ("read signalfd");
/* We may actually get several sigchld compressed into one
SIGCHLD, so we have to handle all of them. */
while ((died_pid = waitpid (-1, &died_status, WNOHANG)) > 0)
{
/* We may be getting sigchild from other children too. For instance if
someone created a child process, and then exec:ed bubblewrap. Ignore them */
if (died_pid == child_pid)
{
exitc = propagate_exit_status (died_status);
report_child_exit_status (exitc, setup_finished_fd);
return exitc;
}
}
}
die ("Should not be reached");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't create our own temporary mount point for pivot_root
An attacker could pre-create /tmp/.bubblewrap-$UID and make it a
non-directory, non-symlink (in which case mounting our tmpfs would fail,
causing denial of service), or make it a symlink under their control
(potentially allowing bad things if the protected_symlinks sysctl is
not enabled).
Instead, temporarily mount the tmpfs on a directory that we are sure
exists and is not attacker-controlled. /tmp (the directory itself, not
a subdirectory) will do.
Fixes: #304
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=923557
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
Closes: #305
Approved by: cgwalters
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 89,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool IsArchiveMIMEType(const String& mime_type) {
return DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase("multipart/related", mime_type) ||
DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase("message/rfc822", mime_type);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void registerStreamURLTask(void* context)
{
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> blobRegistryContext = adoptPtr(static_cast<BlobRegistryContext*>(context));
blobRegistry().registerStreamURL(blobRegistryContext->url, blobRegistryContext->type);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SelectionController::SendContextMenuEvent(
const MouseEventWithHitTestResults& mev,
const LayoutPoint& position) {
if (!Selection().IsAvailable())
return;
if (Selection().Contains(position) || mev.GetScrollbar() ||
!(Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.IsContentEditable() ||
(mev.InnerNode() && mev.InnerNode()->IsTextNode())))
return;
AutoReset<bool> mouse_down_may_start_select_change(
&mouse_down_may_start_select_, true);
if (mev.Event().menu_source_type != kMenuSourceTouchHandle &&
HitTestResultIsMisspelled(mev.GetHitTestResult()))
return SelectClosestMisspellingFromMouseEvent(mev);
if (!frame_->GetEditor().Behavior().ShouldSelectOnContextualMenuClick())
return;
SelectClosestWordOrLinkFromMouseEvent(mev);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GetPageChanged() const { return page_changed_; }
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: reassemble_files_name(const char *certfile, const char *keyfile)
{
char *ret;
if (keyfile != NULL) {
if (asprintf(&ret, "FILE:%s,%s", certfile, keyfile) < 0)
return NULL;
} else {
if (asprintf(&ret, "FILE:%s", certfile) < 0)
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL gdi_Bitmap_New(rdpContext* context, rdpBitmap* bitmap)
{
gdiBitmap* gdi_bitmap;
rdpGdi* gdi = context->gdi;
gdi_bitmap = (gdiBitmap*) bitmap;
gdi_bitmap->hdc = gdi_CreateCompatibleDC(gdi->hdc);
if (!gdi_bitmap->hdc)
return FALSE;
if (!bitmap->data)
gdi_bitmap->bitmap = gdi_CreateCompatibleBitmap(
gdi->hdc, bitmap->width,
bitmap->height);
else
{
UINT32 format = bitmap->format;
gdi_bitmap->bitmap = gdi_create_bitmap(gdi, bitmap->width,
bitmap->height,
format, bitmap->data);
}
if (!gdi_bitmap->bitmap)
{
gdi_DeleteDC(gdi_bitmap->hdc);
return FALSE;
}
gdi_bitmap->hdc->format = gdi_bitmap->bitmap->format;
gdi_SelectObject(gdi_bitmap->hdc, (HGDIOBJECT) gdi_bitmap->bitmap);
gdi_bitmap->org_bitmap = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8787
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 83,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ETagGet_UnconditionalRequest_Handler(
const net::HttpRequestInfo* request,
std::string* response_status,
std::string* response_headers,
std::string* response_data) {
EXPECT_FALSE(
request->extra_headers.HasHeader(net::HttpRequestHeaders::kIfNoneMatch));
}
Commit Message: Http cache: Test deleting an entry with a pending_entry when
adding the truncated flag.
BUG=125159
TEST=net_unittests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10356113
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139331 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftAAC2::onPortFlushCompleted(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
if (portIndex == 0) {
drainDecoder();
mBufferTimestamps.clear();
mBufferSizes.clear();
mDecodedSizes.clear();
mLastInHeader = NULL;
mEndOfInput = false;
} else {
int avail;
while ((avail = outputDelayRingBufferSamplesAvailable()) > 0) {
if (avail > mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels) {
avail = mStreamInfo->frameSize * mStreamInfo->numChannels;
}
int32_t ns = outputDelayRingBufferGetSamples(0, avail);
if (ns != avail) {
ALOGW("not a complete frame of samples available");
break;
}
mOutputBufferCount++;
}
mOutputDelayRingBufferReadPos = mOutputDelayRingBufferWritePos;
mEndOfOutput = false;
}
}
Commit Message: SoftAAC2: fix crash on all-zero adts buffer
Bug: 29153599
Change-Id: I1cb81c054098b86cf24f024f8479909ca7bc85a6
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bond_open(struct net_device *bond_dev)
{
struct bonding *bond = netdev_priv(bond_dev);
bond->kill_timers = 0;
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&bond->mcast_work, bond_resend_igmp_join_requests_delayed);
if (bond_is_lb(bond)) {
/* bond_alb_initialize must be called before the timer
* is started.
*/
if (bond_alb_initialize(bond, (bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_ALB))) {
/* something went wrong - fail the open operation */
return -ENOMEM;
}
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&bond->alb_work, bond_alb_monitor);
queue_delayed_work(bond->wq, &bond->alb_work, 0);
}
if (bond->params.miimon) { /* link check interval, in milliseconds. */
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&bond->mii_work, bond_mii_monitor);
queue_delayed_work(bond->wq, &bond->mii_work, 0);
}
if (bond->params.arp_interval) { /* arp interval, in milliseconds. */
if (bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP)
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&bond->arp_work,
bond_activebackup_arp_mon);
else
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&bond->arp_work,
bond_loadbalance_arp_mon);
queue_delayed_work(bond->wq, &bond->arp_work, 0);
if (bond->params.arp_validate)
bond->recv_probe = bond_arp_rcv;
}
if (bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_8023AD) {
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&bond->ad_work, bond_3ad_state_machine_handler);
queue_delayed_work(bond->wq, &bond->ad_work, 0);
/* register to receive LACPDUs */
bond->recv_probe = bond_3ad_lacpdu_recv;
bond_3ad_initiate_agg_selection(bond, 1);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Automation::WaitForAllTabsToStopLoading(Error** error) {
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendWaitForAllTabsToStopLoadingJSONRequest(automation(), &error_msg))
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ~FrameProgressTracker()
{
ASSERT(!m_inProgress || m_frame->page());
if (m_inProgress)
m_frame->page()->progress().progressCompleted(m_frame);
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_da3_blk_link(
struct xfs_da_state *state,
struct xfs_da_state_blk *old_blk,
struct xfs_da_state_blk *new_blk)
{
struct xfs_da_blkinfo *old_info;
struct xfs_da_blkinfo *new_info;
struct xfs_da_blkinfo *tmp_info;
struct xfs_da_args *args;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
int before = 0;
int error;
struct xfs_inode *dp = state->args->dp;
/*
* Set up environment.
*/
args = state->args;
ASSERT(args != NULL);
old_info = old_blk->bp->b_addr;
new_info = new_blk->bp->b_addr;
ASSERT(old_blk->magic == XFS_DA_NODE_MAGIC ||
old_blk->magic == XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC ||
old_blk->magic == XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAGIC);
switch (old_blk->magic) {
case XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAGIC:
before = xfs_attr_leaf_order(old_blk->bp, new_blk->bp);
break;
case XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC:
before = xfs_dir2_leafn_order(dp, old_blk->bp, new_blk->bp);
break;
case XFS_DA_NODE_MAGIC:
before = xfs_da3_node_order(dp, old_blk->bp, new_blk->bp);
break;
}
/*
* Link blocks in appropriate order.
*/
if (before) {
/*
* Link new block in before existing block.
*/
trace_xfs_da_link_before(args);
new_info->forw = cpu_to_be32(old_blk->blkno);
new_info->back = old_info->back;
if (old_info->back) {
error = xfs_da3_node_read(args->trans, dp,
be32_to_cpu(old_info->back),
-1, &bp, args->whichfork);
if (error)
return(error);
ASSERT(bp != NULL);
tmp_info = bp->b_addr;
ASSERT(tmp_info->magic == old_info->magic);
ASSERT(be32_to_cpu(tmp_info->forw) == old_blk->blkno);
tmp_info->forw = cpu_to_be32(new_blk->blkno);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp, 0, sizeof(*tmp_info)-1);
}
old_info->back = cpu_to_be32(new_blk->blkno);
} else {
/*
* Link new block in after existing block.
*/
trace_xfs_da_link_after(args);
new_info->forw = old_info->forw;
new_info->back = cpu_to_be32(old_blk->blkno);
if (old_info->forw) {
error = xfs_da3_node_read(args->trans, dp,
be32_to_cpu(old_info->forw),
-1, &bp, args->whichfork);
if (error)
return(error);
ASSERT(bp != NULL);
tmp_info = bp->b_addr;
ASSERT(tmp_info->magic == old_info->magic);
ASSERT(be32_to_cpu(tmp_info->back) == old_blk->blkno);
tmp_info->back = cpu_to_be32(new_blk->blkno);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp, 0, sizeof(*tmp_info)-1);
}
old_info->forw = cpu_to_be32(new_blk->blkno);
}
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, old_blk->bp, 0, sizeof(*tmp_info) - 1);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, new_blk->bp, 0, sizeof(*tmp_info) - 1);
return(0);
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix directory hash ordering bug
Commit f5ea1100 ("xfs: add CRCs to dir2/da node blocks") introduced
in 3.10 incorrectly converted the btree hash index array pointer in
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(). It resulted in the the current hash always
being compared against the first entry in the btree rather than the
current block index into the btree block's hash entry array. As a
result, it was comparing the wrong hashes, and so could misorder the
entries in the btree.
For most cases, this doesn't cause any problems as it requires hash
collisions to expose the ordering problem. However, when there are
hash collisions within a directory there is a very good probability
that the entries will be ordered incorrectly and that actually
matters when duplicate hashes are placed into or removed from the
btree block hash entry array.
This bug results in an on-disk directory corruption and that results
in directory verifier functions throwing corruption warnings into
the logs. While no data or directory entries are lost, access to
them may be compromised, and attempts to remove entries from a
directory that has suffered from this corruption may result in a
filesystem shutdown. xfs_repair will fix the directory hash
ordering without data loss occuring.
[dchinner: wrote useful a commit message]
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameView::postLayoutTimerFired(Timer<FrameView>*)
{
performPostLayoutTasks();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_ebt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
int ret;
struct ebt_replace tmp;
struct ebt_table *t;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)))
return -EFAULT;
t = find_table_lock(sock_net(sk), tmp.name, &ret, &ebt_mutex);
if (!t)
return ret;
switch(cmd) {
case EBT_SO_GET_INFO:
case EBT_SO_GET_INIT_INFO:
if (*len != sizeof(struct ebt_replace)){
ret = -EINVAL;
mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
break;
}
if (cmd == EBT_SO_GET_INFO) {
tmp.nentries = t->private->nentries;
tmp.entries_size = t->private->entries_size;
tmp.valid_hooks = t->valid_hooks;
} else {
tmp.nentries = t->table->nentries;
tmp.entries_size = t->table->entries_size;
tmp.valid_hooks = t->table->valid_hooks;
}
mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
if (copy_to_user(user, &tmp, *len) != 0){
BUGPRINT("c2u Didn't work\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
ret = 0;
break;
case EBT_SO_GET_ENTRIES:
case EBT_SO_GET_INIT_ENTRIES:
ret = copy_everything_to_user(t, user, len, cmd);
mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
break;
default:
mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
ret = -EINVAL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 27,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fb_set_suspend(struct fb_info *info, int state)
{
struct fb_event event;
event.info = info;
if (state) {
fb_notifier_call_chain(FB_EVENT_SUSPEND, &event);
info->state = FBINFO_STATE_SUSPENDED;
} else {
info->state = FBINFO_STATE_RUNNING;
fb_notifier_call_chain(FB_EVENT_RESUME, &event);
}
}
Commit Message: vm: convert fb_mmap to vm_iomap_memory() helper
This is my example conversion of a few existing mmap users. The
fb_mmap() case is a good example because it is a bit more complicated
than some: fb_mmap() mmaps one of two different memory areas depending
on the page offset of the mmap (but happily there is never any mixing of
the two, so the helper function still works).
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xdr_decode_netobj(__be32 *p, struct xdr_netobj *obj)
{
unsigned int len;
if ((len = be32_to_cpu(*p++)) > XDR_MAX_NETOBJ)
return NULL;
obj->len = len;
obj->data = (u8 *) p;
return p + XDR_QUADLEN(len);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int verify, void *data) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream *stream = (php_stream *)data;
zval **val = NULL;
char *passphrase = NULL;
/* TODO: could expand this to make a callback into PHP user-space */
GET_VER_OPT_STRING("passphrase", passphrase);
if (passphrase) {
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(val) < num - 1) {
memcpy(buf, Z_STRVAL_PP(val), Z_STRLEN_PP(val)+1);
return Z_STRLEN_PP(val);
}
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void taskstats_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int group_dead)
{
int rc;
struct listener_list *listeners;
struct taskstats *stats;
struct sk_buff *rep_skb;
size_t size;
int is_thread_group;
if (!family_registered)
return;
/*
* Size includes space for nested attributes
*/
size = taskstats_packet_size();
is_thread_group = !!taskstats_tgid_alloc(tsk);
if (is_thread_group) {
/* PID + STATS + TGID + STATS */
size = 2 * size;
/* fill the tsk->signal->stats structure */
fill_tgid_exit(tsk);
}
listeners = __this_cpu_ptr(&listener_array);
if (list_empty(&listeners->list))
return;
rc = prepare_reply(NULL, TASKSTATS_CMD_NEW, &rep_skb, size);
if (rc < 0)
return;
stats = mk_reply(rep_skb, TASKSTATS_TYPE_PID, tsk->pid);
if (!stats)
goto err;
fill_stats(tsk, stats);
/*
* Doesn't matter if tsk is the leader or the last group member leaving
*/
if (!is_thread_group || !group_dead)
goto send;
stats = mk_reply(rep_skb, TASKSTATS_TYPE_TGID, tsk->tgid);
if (!stats)
goto err;
memcpy(stats, tsk->signal->stats, sizeof(*stats));
send:
send_cpu_listeners(rep_skb, listeners);
return;
err:
nlmsg_free(rep_skb);
}
Commit Message: Make TASKSTATS require root access
Ok, this isn't optimal, since it means that 'iotop' needs admin
capabilities, and we may have to work on this some more. But at the
same time it is very much not acceptable to let anybody just read
anybody elses IO statistics quite at this level.
Use of the GENL_ADMIN_PERM suggested by Johannes Berg as an alternative
to checking the capabilities by hand.
Reported-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void inet_register_protosw(struct inet_protosw *p)
{
struct list_head *lh;
struct inet_protosw *answer;
int protocol = p->protocol;
struct list_head *last_perm;
spin_lock_bh(&inetsw_lock);
if (p->type >= SOCK_MAX)
goto out_illegal;
/* If we are trying to override a permanent protocol, bail. */
answer = NULL;
last_perm = &inetsw[p->type];
list_for_each(lh, &inetsw[p->type]) {
answer = list_entry(lh, struct inet_protosw, list);
/* Check only the non-wild match. */
if (INET_PROTOSW_PERMANENT & answer->flags) {
if (protocol == answer->protocol)
break;
last_perm = lh;
}
answer = NULL;
}
if (answer)
goto out_permanent;
/* Add the new entry after the last permanent entry if any, so that
* the new entry does not override a permanent entry when matched with
* a wild-card protocol. But it is allowed to override any existing
* non-permanent entry. This means that when we remove this entry, the
* system automatically returns to the old behavior.
*/
list_add_rcu(&p->list, last_perm);
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&inetsw_lock);
return;
out_permanent:
printk(KERN_ERR "Attempt to override permanent protocol %d.\n",
protocol);
goto out;
out_illegal:
printk(KERN_ERR
"Ignoring attempt to register invalid socket type %d.\n",
p->type);
goto out;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfer_init(const char *toserver, struct xfer_header **xferptr)
{
struct xfer_header *xfer = xzmalloc(sizeof(struct xfer_header));
int r;
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XFER: connecting to server '%s'", toserver);
/* Get a connection to the remote backend */
xfer->be = proxy_findserver(toserver, &imap_protocol, "", &backend_cached,
NULL, NULL, imapd_in);
if (!xfer->be) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to connect to server '%s'", toserver);
r = IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE;
goto fail;
}
xfer->remoteversion = backend_version(xfer->be);
if (xfer->be->capability & CAPA_REPLICATION) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XFER: destination supports replication");
xfer->use_replication = 1;
/* attach our IMAP tag buffer to our protstreams as userdata */
xfer->be->in->userdata = xfer->be->out->userdata = &xfer->tagbuf;
}
xfer->toserver = xstrdup(toserver);
xfer->topart = NULL;
xfer->seendb = NULL;
/* connect to mupdate server if configured */
if (config_mupdate_server && !mupdate_h) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XFER: connecting to mupdate '%s'",
config_mupdate_server);
r = mupdate_connect(config_mupdate_server, NULL, &mupdate_h, NULL);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "Failed to connect to mupdate '%s'",
config_mupdate_server);
goto fail;
}
}
*xferptr = xfer;
return 0;
fail:
xfer_done(&xfer);
return r;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserCommandController::RemoveInterstitialObservers(
TabContents* contents) {
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 171,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FilePath WebUIBidiCheckerLibraryJSPath() {
FilePath src_root;
if (!PathService::Get(base::DIR_SOURCE_ROOT, &src_root))
LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't find source root";
return src_root.Append(kWebUIBidiCheckerLibraryJS);
}
Commit Message: Disable WebUIBidiCheckerBrowserTestRTL.TestSettingsFramePasswords for being flaky on all platforms.
TBR=jeremy@chromium.org.
BUG=95425
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10447119
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139814 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 103,222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameSelection::SetCaretVisible(bool caret_is_visible) {
frame_caret_->SetCaretVisibility(caret_is_visible ? CaretVisibility::kVisible
: CaretVisibility::kHidden);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, 1);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ENABLEAUTOALTREF, 1);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_MAXFRAMES, 7);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_STRENGTH, 5);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_ARNR_TYPE, 3);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_tx_flow_on(struct caifsock *cf_sk)
{
set_bit(TX_FLOW_ON_BIT,
(void *) &cf_sk->flow_state);
}
Commit Message: caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Sjur Braendeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __do_proc_dointvec(void *tbl_data, struct ctl_table *table,
int write, void __user *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos,
int (*conv)(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp, int *valp,
int write, void *data),
void *data)
{
int *i, vleft, first = 1, err = 0;
unsigned long page = 0;
size_t left;
char *kbuf;
if (!tbl_data || !table->maxlen || !*lenp || (*ppos && !write)) {
*lenp = 0;
return 0;
}
i = (int *) tbl_data;
vleft = table->maxlen / sizeof(*i);
left = *lenp;
if (!conv)
conv = do_proc_dointvec_conv;
if (write) {
if (left > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
left = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
page = __get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
kbuf = (char *) page;
if (!kbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
if (copy_from_user(kbuf, buffer, left)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto free;
}
kbuf[left] = 0;
}
for (; left && vleft--; i++, first=0) {
unsigned long lval;
bool neg;
if (write) {
left -= proc_skip_spaces(&kbuf);
if (!left)
break;
err = proc_get_long(&kbuf, &left, &lval, &neg,
proc_wspace_sep,
sizeof(proc_wspace_sep), NULL);
if (err)
break;
if (conv(&neg, &lval, i, 1, data)) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
} else {
if (conv(&neg, &lval, i, 0, data)) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (!first)
err = proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\t');
if (err)
break;
err = proc_put_long(&buffer, &left, lval, neg);
if (err)
break;
}
}
if (!write && !first && left && !err)
err = proc_put_char(&buffer, &left, '\n');
if (write && !err && left)
left -= proc_skip_spaces(&kbuf);
free:
if (write) {
free_page(page);
if (first)
return err ? : -EINVAL;
}
*lenp -= left;
*ppos += *lenp;
return err;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void treatNullAsNullStringStringAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::treatNullAsNullStringStringAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentThreadableLoader::dataDownloaded(Resource* resource, int dataLength)
{
ASSERT(m_client);
ASSERT_UNUSED(resource, resource == this->resource());
ASSERT(m_actualRequest.isNull());
ASSERT(m_async);
m_client->didDownloadData(dataLength);
}
Commit Message: DocumentThreadableLoader: Add guards for sync notifyFinished() in setResource()
In loadRequest(), setResource() can call clear() synchronously:
DocumentThreadableLoader::clear()
DocumentThreadableLoader::handleError()
Resource::didAddClient()
RawResource::didAddClient()
and thus |m_client| can be null while resource() isn't null after setResource(),
causing crashes (Issue 595964).
This CL checks whether |*this| is destructed and
whether |m_client| is null after setResource().
BUG=595964
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1902683002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391001}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillPopupViewViews::Show() {
DoShow();
ui::AXPlatformNode::OnInputSuggestionsAvailable();
NotifyAccessibilityEvent(ax::mojom::Event::kMenuStart, true);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int igmpv3_send_report(struct in_device *in_dev, struct ip_mc_list *pmc)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
int type;
if (!pmc) {
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_pmc_rcu(in_dev, pmc) {
if (pmc->multiaddr == IGMP_ALL_HOSTS)
continue;
spin_lock_bh(&pmc->lock);
if (pmc->sfcount[MCAST_EXCLUDE])
type = IGMPV3_MODE_IS_EXCLUDE;
else
type = IGMPV3_MODE_IS_INCLUDE;
skb = add_grec(skb, pmc, type, 0, 0);
spin_unlock_bh(&pmc->lock);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
} else {
spin_lock_bh(&pmc->lock);
if (pmc->sfcount[MCAST_EXCLUDE])
type = IGMPV3_MODE_IS_EXCLUDE;
else
type = IGMPV3_MODE_IS_INCLUDE;
skb = add_grec(skb, pmc, type, 0, 0);
spin_unlock_bh(&pmc->lock);
}
if (!skb)
return 0;
return igmpv3_sendpack(skb);
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void readonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::readonlyTestInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AwMainDelegate::CreateContentBrowserClient() {
content_browser_client_.reset(new AwContentBrowserClient(this));
return content_browser_client_.get();
}
Commit Message: [Android WebView] Fix a couple of typos
Fix a couple of typos in variable names/commentary introduced in:
https://codereview.chromium.org/1315633003/
No functional effect.
BUG=156062
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1331943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#348175}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ehci_state_horizqh(EHCIQueue *q)
{
int again = 0;
if (ehci_get_fetch_addr(q->ehci, q->async) != q->qh.next) {
ehci_set_fetch_addr(q->ehci, q->async, q->qh.next);
ehci_set_state(q->ehci, q->async, EST_FETCHENTRY);
again = 1;
} else {
ehci_set_state(q->ehci, q->async, EST_ACTIVE);
}
return again;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 5,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxPopupViewGtk::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
DCHECK(type == chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_THEME_CHANGED);
if (theme_service_->UsingNativeTheme()) {
gtk_util::UndoForceFontSize(window_);
border_color_ = theme_service_->GetBorderColor();
gtk_util::GetTextColors(
&background_color_, &selected_background_color_,
&content_text_color_, &selected_content_text_color_);
hovered_background_color_ = gtk_util::AverageColors(
background_color_, selected_background_color_);
url_text_color_ = NormalURLColor(content_text_color_);
url_selected_text_color_ = SelectedURLColor(selected_content_text_color_,
selected_background_color_);
} else {
gtk_util::ForceFontSizePixels(window_, font_.GetFontSize());
border_color_ = kBorderColor;
background_color_ = kBackgroundColor;
selected_background_color_ = kSelectedBackgroundColor;
hovered_background_color_ = kHoveredBackgroundColor;
content_text_color_ = kContentTextColor;
selected_content_text_color_ = kContentTextColor;
url_text_color_ = kURLTextColor;
url_selected_text_color_ = kURLTextColor;
}
content_dim_text_color_ =
gtk_util::AverageColors(content_text_color_,
background_color_);
selected_content_dim_text_color_ =
gtk_util::AverageColors(selected_content_text_color_,
selected_background_color_);
gtk_widget_modify_bg(window_, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &background_color_);
}
Commit Message: GTK: Stop listening to gtk signals in the omnibox before destroying the model.
BUG=123530
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10103012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::CallWithExecutionContextAnyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_callWithExecutionContextAnyAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::CallWithExecutionContextAnyAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GDataEntry::GDataEntry(GDataDirectory* parent,
GDataDirectoryService* directory_service)
: directory_service_(directory_service),
deleted_(false) {
SetParent(parent);
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decode_rd_ip (u_char *pnt, struct rd_ip *rd_ip)
{
memcpy (&rd_ip->ip, pnt, 4);
pnt += 4;
rd_ip->val = ((u_int16_t) *pnt++ << 8);
rd_ip->val |= (u_int16_t) *pnt;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_cmd_ioctl(struct comedi_device *dev,
struct comedi_cmd __user *cmd, void *file)
{
struct comedi_cmd user_cmd;
struct comedi_subdevice *s;
struct comedi_async *async;
int ret = 0;
unsigned int __user *chanlist_saver = NULL;
if (copy_from_user(&user_cmd, cmd, sizeof(struct comedi_cmd))) {
DPRINTK("bad cmd address\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
/* save user's chanlist pointer so it can be restored later */
chanlist_saver = user_cmd.chanlist;
if (user_cmd.subdev >= dev->n_subdevices) {
DPRINTK("%d no such subdevice\n", user_cmd.subdev);
return -ENODEV;
}
s = dev->subdevices + user_cmd.subdev;
async = s->async;
if (s->type == COMEDI_SUBD_UNUSED) {
DPRINTK("%d not valid subdevice\n", user_cmd.subdev);
return -EIO;
}
if (!s->do_cmd || !s->do_cmdtest || !s->async) {
DPRINTK("subdevice %i does not support commands\n",
user_cmd.subdev);
return -EIO;
}
/* are we locked? (ioctl lock) */
if (s->lock && s->lock != file) {
DPRINTK("subdevice locked\n");
return -EACCES;
}
/* are we busy? */
if (s->busy) {
DPRINTK("subdevice busy\n");
return -EBUSY;
}
s->busy = file;
/* make sure channel/gain list isn't too long */
if (user_cmd.chanlist_len > s->len_chanlist) {
DPRINTK("channel/gain list too long %u > %d\n",
user_cmd.chanlist_len, s->len_chanlist);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* make sure channel/gain list isn't too short */
if (user_cmd.chanlist_len < 1) {
DPRINTK("channel/gain list too short %u < 1\n",
user_cmd.chanlist_len);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
kfree(async->cmd.chanlist);
async->cmd = user_cmd;
async->cmd.data = NULL;
/* load channel/gain list */
async->cmd.chanlist =
kmalloc(async->cmd.chanlist_len * sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!async->cmd.chanlist) {
DPRINTK("allocation failed\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto cleanup;
}
if (copy_from_user(async->cmd.chanlist, user_cmd.chanlist,
async->cmd.chanlist_len * sizeof(int))) {
DPRINTK("fault reading chanlist\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
/* make sure each element in channel/gain list is valid */
ret = comedi_check_chanlist(s,
async->cmd.chanlist_len,
async->cmd.chanlist);
if (ret < 0) {
DPRINTK("bad chanlist\n");
goto cleanup;
}
ret = s->do_cmdtest(dev, s, &async->cmd);
if (async->cmd.flags & TRIG_BOGUS || ret) {
DPRINTK("test returned %d\n", ret);
user_cmd = async->cmd;
/* restore chanlist pointer before copying back */
user_cmd.chanlist = chanlist_saver;
user_cmd.data = NULL;
if (copy_to_user(cmd, &user_cmd, sizeof(struct comedi_cmd))) {
DPRINTK("fault writing cmd\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto cleanup;
}
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto cleanup;
}
if (!async->prealloc_bufsz) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
DPRINTK("no buffer (?)\n");
goto cleanup;
}
comedi_reset_async_buf(async);
async->cb_mask =
COMEDI_CB_EOA | COMEDI_CB_BLOCK | COMEDI_CB_ERROR |
COMEDI_CB_OVERFLOW;
if (async->cmd.flags & TRIG_WAKE_EOS)
async->cb_mask |= COMEDI_CB_EOS;
comedi_set_subdevice_runflags(s, ~0, SRF_USER | SRF_RUNNING);
ret = s->do_cmd(dev, s);
if (ret == 0)
return 0;
cleanup:
do_become_nonbusy(dev, s);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::WasHidden() {
if (!IsBeingCaptured()) {
if (auto* view = GetRenderWidgetHostView())
view->Hide();
if (!ShowingInterstitialPage())
SetVisibilityForChildViews(false);
SendPageMessage(new PageMsg_WasHidden(MSG_ROUTING_NONE));
}
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.WasHidden();
should_normally_be_visible_ = false;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SVGElement::tabIndex() const {
if (SupportsFocus())
return Element::tabIndex();
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 152,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void ValidateDataUploadRequest::GetRequestData(DataCallback callback) {
std::move(callback).Run(BinaryUploadService::Result::SUCCESS,
BinaryUploadService::Request::Data());
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int insert_pfn(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long pfn, pgprot_t prot)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
int retval;
pte_t *pte, entry;
spinlock_t *ptl;
retval = -ENOMEM;
pte = get_locked_pte(mm, addr, &ptl);
if (!pte)
goto out;
retval = -EBUSY;
if (!pte_none(*pte))
goto out_unlock;
/* Ok, finally just insert the thing.. */
entry = pte_mkspecial(pfn_pte(pfn, prot));
set_pte_at(mm, addr, pte, entry);
update_mmu_cache(vma, addr, pte); /* XXX: why not for insert_page? */
retval = 0;
out_unlock:
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int send_header(void *data, const char *key, const char *val)
{
ap_fputstrs(((hdr_ptr*)data)->f, ((hdr_ptr*)data)->bb,
key, ": ", val, CRLF, NULL);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: | 0 | 45,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int lvl, int opt, char __user *ov, unsigned int ol)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct caifsock *cf_sk = container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk);
int linksel;
if (cf_sk->sk.sk_socket->state != SS_UNCONNECTED)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
switch (opt) {
case CAIFSO_LINK_SELECT:
if (ol < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
if (lvl != SOL_CAIF)
goto bad_sol;
if (copy_from_user(&linksel, ov, sizeof(int)))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(&(cf_sk->sk));
cf_sk->conn_req.link_selector = linksel;
release_sock(&cf_sk->sk);
return 0;
case CAIFSO_REQ_PARAM:
if (lvl != SOL_CAIF)
goto bad_sol;
if (cf_sk->sk.sk_protocol != CAIFPROTO_UTIL)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
lock_sock(&(cf_sk->sk));
if (ol > sizeof(cf_sk->conn_req.param.data) ||
copy_from_user(&cf_sk->conn_req.param.data, ov, ol)) {
release_sock(&cf_sk->sk);
return -EINVAL;
}
cf_sk->conn_req.param.size = ol;
release_sock(&cf_sk->sk);
return 0;
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
return 0;
bad_sol:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
Commit Message: caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Sjur Braendeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __be32 check_stateid_generation(stateid_t *in, stateid_t *ref, bool has_session)
{
/*
* When sessions are used the stateid generation number is ignored
* when it is zero.
*/
if (has_session && in->si_generation == 0)
return nfs_ok;
if (in->si_generation == ref->si_generation)
return nfs_ok;
/* If the client sends us a stateid from the future, it's buggy: */
if (nfsd4_stateid_generation_after(in, ref))
return nfserr_bad_stateid;
/*
* However, we could see a stateid from the past, even from a
* non-buggy client. For example, if the client sends a lock
* while some IO is outstanding, the lock may bump si_generation
* while the IO is still in flight. The client could avoid that
* situation by waiting for responses on all the IO requests,
* but better performance may result in retrying IO that
* receives an old_stateid error if requests are rarely
* reordered in flight:
*/
return nfserr_old_stateid;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit DeferredTaskPopupListSelectSingle(WebPagePrivate* webPagePrivate, int index)
: DeferredTaskType(webPagePrivate)
{
webPagePrivate->m_cachedPopupListSelectedIndex = index;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLES2DecoderImpl::GetAsyncPixelTransferManager() {
return async_pixel_transfer_manager_.get();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_guid_from_buf (GUID* guid, unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
int i;
int idx = 0;
assert (guid);
assert (buf);
CHECKINT32(idx, len); guid->data1 = GETINT32(buf + idx); idx += sizeof (uint32);
CHECKINT16(idx, len); guid->data2 = GETINT16(buf + idx); idx += sizeof (uint16);
CHECKINT16(idx, len); guid->data3 = GETINT16(buf + idx); idx += sizeof (uint16);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++, idx += sizeof (uint8))
guid->data4[i] = (uint8)(buf[idx]);
}
Commit Message: Use asserts on lengths to prevent invalid reads/writes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Dispatcher::Dispatcher(struct mg_context* context, const std::string& root)
: context_(context), root_(root) {
mg_set_uri_callback(context_, "/favicon.ico", &SendNoContentResponse, NULL);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sta_info_destroy_addr(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, const u8 *addr)
{
struct sta_info *sta;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&sdata->local->sta_mtx);
sta = sta_info_get(sdata, addr);
ret = __sta_info_destroy(sta);
mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->sta_mtx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ber_out_integer(STREAM s, int value)
{
ber_out_header(s, BER_TAG_INTEGER, 2);
out_uint16_be(s, value);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u64 vgettsc(cycle_t *cycle_now)
{
long v;
struct pvclock_gtod_data *gtod = &pvclock_gtod_data;
*cycle_now = read_tsc();
v = (*cycle_now - gtod->clock.cycle_last) & gtod->clock.mask;
return v * gtod->clock.mult;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int inet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct inet_protosw *answer;
struct inet_sock *inet;
struct proto *answer_prot;
unsigned char answer_flags;
char answer_no_check;
int try_loading_module = 0;
int err;
if (unlikely(!inet_ehash_secret))
if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW && sock->type != SOCK_DGRAM)
build_ehash_secret();
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
lookup_protocol:
err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(answer, &inetsw[sock->type], list) {
err = 0;
/* Check the non-wild match. */
if (protocol == answer->protocol) {
if (protocol != IPPROTO_IP)
break;
} else {
/* Check for the two wild cases. */
if (IPPROTO_IP == protocol) {
protocol = answer->protocol;
break;
}
if (IPPROTO_IP == answer->protocol)
break;
}
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
}
if (unlikely(err)) {
if (try_loading_module < 2) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* Be more specific, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132-type-1
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP-type-SOCK_STREAM)
*/
if (++try_loading_module == 1)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d",
PF_INET, protocol, sock->type);
/*
* Fall back to generic, e.g. net-pf-2-proto-132
* (net-pf-PF_INET-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP)
*/
else
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d",
PF_INET, protocol);
goto lookup_protocol;
} else
goto out_rcu_unlock;
}
err = -EPERM;
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (!inet_netns_ok(net, protocol))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
sock->ops = answer->ops;
answer_prot = answer->prot;
answer_no_check = answer->no_check;
answer_flags = answer->flags;
rcu_read_unlock();
WARN_ON(answer_prot->slab == NULL);
err = -ENOBUFS;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_INET, GFP_KERNEL, answer_prot);
if (sk == NULL)
goto out;
err = 0;
sk->sk_no_check = answer_no_check;
if (INET_PROTOSW_REUSE & answer_flags)
sk->sk_reuse = 1;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
inet->is_icsk = (INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags) != 0;
inet->nodefrag = 0;
if (SOCK_RAW == sock->type) {
inet->inet_num = protocol;
if (IPPROTO_RAW == protocol)
inet->hdrincl = 1;
}
if (ipv4_config.no_pmtu_disc)
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
else
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
inet->inet_id = 0;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = sk->sk_prot->backlog_rcv;
inet->uc_ttl = -1;
inet->mc_loop = 1;
inet->mc_ttl = 1;
inet->mc_all = 1;
inet->mc_index = 0;
inet->mc_list = NULL;
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
if (inet->inet_num) {
/* It assumes that any protocol which allows
* the user to assign a number at socket
* creation time automatically
* shares.
*/
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
/* Add to protocol hash chains. */
sk->sk_prot->hash(sk);
}
if (sk->sk_prot->init) {
err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk);
if (err)
sk_common_release(sk);
}
out:
return err;
out_rcu_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NotifyForEachFrameFromUI(
RenderFrameHost* root_frame_host,
base::Callback<void(ResourceDispatcherHostImpl*,
const GlobalFrameRoutingId&)> frame_callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
FrameTree* frame_tree = static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(root_frame_host)
->frame_tree_node()
->frame_tree();
DCHECK_EQ(root_frame_host, frame_tree->GetMainFrame());
std::unique_ptr<std::set<GlobalFrameRoutingId>> routing_ids(
new std::set<GlobalFrameRoutingId>());
for (FrameTreeNode* node : frame_tree->Nodes()) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host = node->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHostImpl* pending_frame_host =
IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled()
? node->render_manager()->speculative_frame_host()
: node->render_manager()->pending_frame_host();
if (frame_host)
routing_ids->insert(frame_host->GetGlobalFrameRoutingId());
if (pending_frame_host)
routing_ids->insert(pending_frame_host->GetGlobalFrameRoutingId());
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NotifyRouteChangesOnIO, frame_callback,
base::Passed(std::move(routing_ids))));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static module *find_module(server_rec *s, const char *name)
{
module *found = ap_find_linked_module(name);
/* search prelinked stuff */
if (!found) {
ap_module_symbol_t *current = ap_prelinked_module_symbols;
for (; current->name; ++current) {
if (!strcmp(current->name, name)) {
found = current->modp;
break;
}
}
}
/* search dynamic stuff */
if (!found) {
APR_OPTIONAL_FN_TYPE(ap_find_loaded_module_symbol) *check_symbol =
APR_RETRIEVE_OPTIONAL_FN(ap_find_loaded_module_symbol);
if (check_symbol) {
/*
* There are two phases where calling ap_find_loaded_module_symbol
* is problematic:
*
* During reading of the config, ap_server_conf is invalid but s
* points to the main server config, if passed from cmd->server
* of an EXEC_ON_READ directive.
*
* During config parsing, s may be a virtual host that would cause
* a segfault in mod_so if passed to ap_find_loaded_module_symbol,
* because mod_so's server config for vhosts is initialized later.
* But ap_server_conf is already set at this time.
*
* Therefore we use s if it is not virtual and ap_server_conf if
* s is virtual.
*/
found = check_symbol(s->is_virtual ? ap_server_conf : s, name);
}
}
return found;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int adev_get_master_volume(struct audio_hw_device *dev,
float *volume)
{
(void)dev;
(void)volume;
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void stop_airo_card( struct net_device *dev, int freeres )
{
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
set_bit(FLAG_RADIO_DOWN, &ai->flags);
disable_MAC(ai, 1);
disable_interrupts(ai);
takedown_proc_entry( dev, ai );
if (test_bit(FLAG_REGISTERED, &ai->flags)) {
unregister_netdev( dev );
if (ai->wifidev) {
unregister_netdev(ai->wifidev);
free_netdev(ai->wifidev);
ai->wifidev = NULL;
}
clear_bit(FLAG_REGISTERED, &ai->flags);
}
/*
* Clean out tx queue
*/
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI, &ai->flags) && !skb_queue_empty(&ai->txq)) {
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
for (;(skb = skb_dequeue(&ai->txq));)
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
}
airo_networks_free (ai);
kfree(ai->flash);
kfree(ai->rssi);
kfree(ai->APList);
kfree(ai->SSID);
if (freeres) {
/* PCMCIA frees this stuff, so only for PCI and ISA */
release_region( dev->base_addr, 64 );
if (test_bit(FLAG_MPI, &ai->flags)) {
if (ai->pci)
mpi_unmap_card(ai->pci);
if (ai->pcimem)
iounmap(ai->pcimem);
if (ai->pciaux)
iounmap(ai->pciaux);
pci_free_consistent(ai->pci, PCI_SHARED_LEN,
ai->shared, ai->shared_dma);
}
}
crypto_free_cipher(ai->tfm);
del_airo_dev(ai);
free_netdev( dev );
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int NaClIPCAdapter::RewrittenMessage::Read(char* dest_buffer,
size_t dest_buffer_size) {
CHECK(data_len_ >= data_read_cursor_);
size_t bytes_to_write = std::min(dest_buffer_size,
data_len_ - data_read_cursor_);
if (bytes_to_write == 0)
return 0;
memcpy(dest_buffer, &data_[data_read_cursor_], bytes_to_write);
data_read_cursor_ += bytes_to_write;
return static_cast<int>(bytes_to_write);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const std::vector<std::string> WebviewHandler::Keys() const {
return SingleKey(keys::kWebview);
}
Commit Message: <webview>: Update format for local file access in manifest.json
The new format is:
"webview" : {
"partitions" : [
{
"name" : "foo*",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "b.html"]
},
{
"name" : "bar",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "c.html"]
}
]
}
BUG=340291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/151923005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249640 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 Browser::GetWindowTitleForCurrentTab() const {
WebContents* contents = chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this);
string16 title;
if (contents) {
title = contents->GetTitle();
FormatTitleForDisplay(&title);
}
if (title.empty())
title = CoreTabHelper::GetDefaultTitle();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(USE_ASH)
return title;
#else
return is_app() ?
title :
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_BROWSER_WINDOW_TITLE_FORMAT, title);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Browser* Restore() {
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_);
DCHECK(session_service);
session_service->GetLastSession(
&request_consumer_,
base::Bind(&SessionRestoreImpl::OnGotSession, base::Unretained(this)));
if (synchronous_) {
bool old_state = MessageLoop::current()->NestableTasksAllowed();
MessageLoop::current()->SetNestableTasksAllowed(true);
MessageLoop::current()->Run();
MessageLoop::current()->SetNestableTasksAllowed(old_state);
Browser* browser = ProcessSessionWindows(&windows_);
delete this;
return browser;
}
if (browser_) {
registrar_.Add(this, chrome::NOTIFICATION_BROWSER_CLOSED,
content::Source<Browser>(browser_));
}
return browser_;
}
Commit Message: Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
TBR=sky@chromium.org
R=marja@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CastStreamingNativeHandler::GetRawEvents(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(3, args.Length());
CHECK(args[0]->IsInt32());
CHECK(args[1]->IsNull() || args[1]->IsString());
CHECK(args[2]->IsFunction());
const int transport_id = args[0]->ToInt32(args.GetIsolate())->Value();
linked_ptr<v8::Global<v8::Function>> callback(new v8::Global<v8::Function>(
args.GetIsolate(), args[2].As<v8::Function>()));
std::string extra_data;
if (!args[1]->IsNull()) {
extra_data = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[1]);
}
CastRtpStream* transport = GetRtpStreamOrThrow(transport_id);
if (!transport)
return;
get_raw_events_callbacks_.insert(std::make_pair(transport_id, callback));
transport->GetRawEvents(
base::Bind(&CastStreamingNativeHandler::CallGetRawEventsCallback,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
transport_id),
extra_data);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaStreamDevices MediaStreamManager::GetDevicesOpenedByRequest(
const std::string& label) const {
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request)
return MediaStreamDevices();
return request->devices;
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline float MaxF(float one, float two)
{
if (one > two)
return one;
return two;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void import_palette(CDXLVideoContext *c, uint32_t *new_palette)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < c->palette_size / 2; i++) {
unsigned rgb = AV_RB16(&c->palette[i * 2]);
unsigned r = ((rgb >> 8) & 0xF) * 0x11;
unsigned g = ((rgb >> 4) & 0xF) * 0x11;
unsigned b = (rgb & 0xF) * 0x11;
AV_WN32(&new_palette[i], (0xFFU << 24) | (r << 16) | (g << 8) | b);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/cdxl: Check format for BGR24
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1427/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5020737339392000
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_ServerStatus_f(void) {
netadr_t to, *toptr = NULL;
char *server;
serverStatus_t *serverStatus;
int argc;
netadrtype_t family = NA_UNSPEC;
argc = Cmd_Argc();
if ( argc != 2 && argc != 3 )
{
if (clc.state != CA_ACTIVE || clc.demoplaying)
{
Com_Printf ("Not connected to a server.\n");
Com_Printf( "usage: serverstatus [-4|-6] server\n");
return;
}
toptr = &clc.serverAddress;
}
if(!toptr)
{
Com_Memset( &to, 0, sizeof(netadr_t) );
if(argc == 2)
server = Cmd_Argv(1);
else
{
if(!strcmp(Cmd_Argv(1), "-4"))
family = NA_IP;
else if(!strcmp(Cmd_Argv(1), "-6"))
family = NA_IP6;
else
Com_Printf( "warning: only -4 or -6 as address type understood.\n");
server = Cmd_Argv(2);
}
toptr = &to;
if ( !NET_StringToAdr( server, toptr, family ) )
return;
}
NET_OutOfBandPrint( NS_CLIENT, *toptr, "getstatus" );
serverStatus = CL_GetServerStatus( *toptr );
serverStatus->address = *toptr;
serverStatus->print = qtrue;
serverStatus->pending = qtrue;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPR_SetMax(struct rx_call *call, afs_int32 aid, afs_int32 gflag)
{
afs_int32 code;
afs_int32 cid = ANONYMOUSID;
code = setMax(call, aid, gflag, &cid);
osi_auditU(call, PTS_SetMaxEvent, code, AUD_ID, aid, AUD_LONG, gflag,
AUD_END);
ViceLog(125, ("PTS_SetMax: code %d cid %d aid %d gflag %d\n", code, cid, aid, gflag));
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 12,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RefCountedMemory* ChromeWebUIControllerFactory::GetFaviconResourceBytes(
const GURL& page_url) const {
if (page_url.host() == extension_misc::kBookmarkManagerId)
return BookmarksUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kExtensionScheme)) {
NOTREACHED();
return NULL;
}
if (!HasWebUIScheme(page_url))
return NULL;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIConflictsHost)
return ConflictsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#endif
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUICrashesHost)
return CrashesUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIHistoryHost)
return HistoryUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFlagsHost)
return FlagsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISessionsHost)
return SessionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIFlashHost)
return FlashUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIDownloadsHost)
return DownloadsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISettingsHost)
return OptionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUISettingsFrameHost)
return options2::OptionsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
#endif
if (page_url.host() == chrome::kChromeUIPluginsHost)
return PluginsUI::GetFaviconResourceBytes();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TypedUrlModelAssociator::IsAssociated(const std::string& typed_url) {
DCHECK(expected_loop_ == MessageLoop::current());
return id_map_.find(typed_url) != id_map_.end();
}
Commit Message: Now ignores obsolete sync nodes without visit transitions.
Also removed assertion that was erroneously triggered by obsolete sync nodes.
BUG=none
TEST=run chrome against a database that contains obsolete typed url sync nodes.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7129069
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88846 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rsa_verify (gcry_sexp_t s_sig, gcry_sexp_t s_data, gcry_sexp_t keyparms)
{
gcry_err_code_t rc;
struct pk_encoding_ctx ctx;
gcry_sexp_t l1 = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t sig = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t data = NULL;
RSA_public_key pk = { NULL, NULL };
gcry_mpi_t result = NULL;
_gcry_pk_util_init_encoding_ctx (&ctx, PUBKEY_OP_VERIFY,
rsa_get_nbits (keyparms));
/* Extract the data. */
rc = _gcry_pk_util_data_to_mpi (s_data, &data, &ctx);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printmpi ("rsa_verify data", data);
if (mpi_is_opaque (data))
{
rc = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
goto leave;
}
/* Extract the signature value. */
rc = _gcry_pk_util_preparse_sigval (s_sig, rsa_names, &l1, NULL);
if (rc)
goto leave;
rc = sexp_extract_param (l1, NULL, "s", &sig, NULL);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printmpi ("rsa_verify sig", sig);
/* Extract the key. */
rc = sexp_extract_param (keyparms, NULL, "ne", &pk.n, &pk.e, NULL);
if (rc)
goto leave;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
{
log_printmpi ("rsa_verify n", pk.n);
log_printmpi ("rsa_verify e", pk.e);
}
/* Do RSA computation and compare. */
result = mpi_new (0);
public (result, sig, &pk);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printmpi ("rsa_verify cmp", result);
if (ctx.verify_cmp)
rc = ctx.verify_cmp (&ctx, result);
else
rc = mpi_cmp (result, data) ? GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE : 0;
leave:
_gcry_mpi_release (result);
_gcry_mpi_release (pk.n);
_gcry_mpi_release (pk.e);
_gcry_mpi_release (data);
_gcry_mpi_release (sig);
sexp_release (l1);
_gcry_pk_util_free_encoding_ctx (&ctx);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("rsa_verify => %s\n", rc?gpg_strerror (rc):"Good");
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 17,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::FunctionTemplate> V8TestObjectPython::domTemplate(v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
V8PerIsolateData* data = V8PerIsolateData::from(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate> result = data->existingDOMTemplate(const_cast<WrapperTypeInfo*>(&wrapperTypeInfo));
if (!result.IsEmpty())
return result;
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPED_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "BuildDOMTemplate");
result = v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, V8ObjectConstructor::isValidConstructorMode);
configureV8TestObjectPythonTemplate(result, isolate);
data->setDOMTemplate(const_cast<WrapperTypeInfo*>(&wrapperTypeInfo), result);
return result;
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_fpu_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc_in,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
int err;
struct crypto_fpu_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc_in->tfm);
struct crypto_blkcipher *child = ctx->child;
struct blkcipher_desc desc = {
.tfm = child,
.info = desc_in->info,
.flags = desc_in->flags & ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
};
kernel_fpu_begin();
err = crypto_blkcipher_crt(desc.tfm)->encrypt(&desc, dst, src, nbytes);
kernel_fpu_end();
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::CreateProgramHelper(GLuint client_id) {
if (GetProgramInfo(client_id)) {
return false;
}
GLuint service_id = glCreateProgram();
if (service_id != 0) {
CreateProgramInfo(client_id, service_id);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int alpha_pmu_add(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
int n0;
int ret;
unsigned long irq_flags;
/*
* The Sparc code has the IRQ disable first followed by the perf
* disable, however this can lead to an overflowed counter with the
* PMI disabled on rare occasions. The alpha_perf_event_update()
* routine should detect this situation by noting a negative delta,
* nevertheless we disable the PMCs first to enable a potential
* final PMI to occur before we disable interrupts.
*/
perf_pmu_disable(event->pmu);
local_irq_save(irq_flags);
/* Default to error to be returned */
ret = -EAGAIN;
/* Insert event on to PMU and if successful modify ret to valid return */
n0 = cpuc->n_events;
if (n0 < alpha_pmu->num_pmcs) {
cpuc->event[n0] = event;
cpuc->evtype[n0] = event->hw.event_base;
cpuc->current_idx[n0] = PMC_NO_INDEX;
if (!alpha_check_constraints(cpuc->event, cpuc->evtype, n0+1)) {
cpuc->n_events++;
cpuc->n_added++;
ret = 0;
}
}
hwc->state = PERF_HES_UPTODATE;
if (!(flags & PERF_EF_START))
hwc->state |= PERF_HES_STOPPED;
local_irq_restore(irq_flags);
perf_pmu_enable(event->pmu);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __u32 ext4_used_dirs_count(struct super_block *sb,
struct ext4_group_desc *bg)
{
return le16_to_cpu(bg->bg_used_dirs_count_lo) |
(EXT4_DESC_SIZE(sb) >= EXT4_MIN_DESC_SIZE_64BIT ?
(__u32)le16_to_cpu(bg->bg_used_dirs_count_hi) << 16 : 0);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UrlFetcherDownloader::UrlFetcherDownloader(
std::unique_ptr<CrxDownloader> successor,
scoped_refptr<NetworkFetcherFactory> network_fetcher_factory)
: CrxDownloader(std::move(successor)),
network_fetcher_factory_(network_fetcher_factory) {}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DragController::DragIsMove(FrameSelection& selection,
DragData* drag_data) {
return document_under_mouse_ == drag_initiator_ &&
selection.SelectionHasFocus() &&
selection.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.IsContentEditable() &&
selection.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated().IsRange() &&
!IsCopyKeyDown(drag_data);
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *netlink_trim(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation)
{
int delta;
skb_orphan(skb);
delta = skb->end - skb->tail;
if (delta * 2 < skb->truesize)
return skb;
if (skb_shared(skb)) {
struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, allocation);
if (!nskb)
return skb;
consume_skb(skb);
skb = nskb;
}
if (!pskb_expand_head(skb, 0, -delta, allocation))
skb->truesize -= delta;
return skb;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int skb_copy_datagram_const_iovec(const struct sk_buff *skb, int offset,
const struct iovec *to, int to_offset,
int len)
{
int start = skb_headlen(skb);
int i, copy = start - offset;
struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
/* Copy header. */
if (copy > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
if (memcpy_toiovecend(to, skb->data + offset, to_offset, copy))
goto fault;
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
to_offset += copy;
}
/* Copy paged appendix. Hmm... why does this look so complicated? */
for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
int end;
const skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + skb_frag_size(frag);
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
int err;
u8 *vaddr;
struct page *page = skb_frag_page(frag);
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
vaddr = kmap(page);
err = memcpy_toiovecend(to, vaddr + frag->page_offset +
offset - start, to_offset, copy);
kunmap(page);
if (err)
goto fault;
if (!(len -= copy))
return 0;
offset += copy;
to_offset += copy;
}
start = end;
}
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
int end;
WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
end = start + frag_iter->len;
if ((copy = end - offset) > 0) {
if (copy > len)
copy = len;
if (skb_copy_datagram_const_iovec(frag_iter,
offset - start,
to, to_offset,
copy))
goto fault;
if ((len -= copy) == 0)
return 0;
offset += copy;
to_offset += copy;
}
start = end;
}
if (!len)
return 0;
fault:
return -EFAULT;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infinite loop in __skb_recv_datagram()
Tommi was fuzzing with trinity and reported the following problem :
commit 3f518bf745 (datagram: Add offset argument to __skb_recv_datagram)
missed that a raw socket receive queue can contain skbs with no payload.
We can loop in __skb_recv_datagram() with MSG_PEEK mode, because
wait_for_packet() is not prepared to skip these skbs.
[ 83.541011] INFO: rcu_sched detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: {}
(detected by 0, t=26002 jiffies, g=27673, c=27672, q=75)
[ 83.541011] INFO: Stall ended before state dump start
[ 108.067010] BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [trinity-child31:2847]
...
[ 108.067010] Call Trace:
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc103>] __skb_recv_datagram+0x1a3/0x3b0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818cc33d>] skb_recv_datagram+0x2d/0x30
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff819ed43d>] rawv6_recvmsg+0xad/0x240
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818c4b04>] sock_common_recvmsg+0x34/0x50
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bc8ec>] sock_recvmsg+0xbc/0xf0
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff818bf31e>] sys_recvfrom+0xde/0x150
[ 108.067010] [<ffffffff81ca4329>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameLoader::UpgradeInsecureRequest(ResourceRequest& resource_request,
ExecutionContext* origin_context) {
if (!origin_context)
return;
if (!(origin_context->GetSecurityContext().GetInsecureRequestPolicy() &
kUpgradeInsecureRequests))
return;
if (resource_request.GetFrameType() ==
network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNested) {
return;
}
resource_request.SetUpgradeIfInsecure(true);
KURL url = resource_request.Url();
if (!url.ProtocolIs("http"))
return;
if (resource_request.GetFrameType() ==
network::mojom::RequestContextFrameType::kNone ||
resource_request.GetRequestContext() ==
WebURLRequest::kRequestContextForm ||
(!url.Host().IsNull() && origin_context->GetSecurityContext()
.InsecureNavigationsToUpgrade()
->Contains(url.Host().Impl()->GetHash()))) {
UseCounter::Count(origin_context,
WebFeature::kUpgradeInsecureRequestsUpgradedRequest);
url.SetProtocol("https");
if (url.Port() == 80)
url.SetPort(443);
resource_request.SetURL(url);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_dbus_method_handler (FlatpakProxyClient *client, Header *header)
{
FlatpakPolicy policy;
const char *method;
if (header->has_reply_serial)
{
ExpectedReplyType expected_reply =
steal_expected_reply (&client->bus_side,
header->reply_serial);
if (expected_reply == EXPECTED_REPLY_NONE)
return HANDLE_DENY;
return HANDLE_PASS;
}
policy = flatpak_proxy_client_get_policy (client, header->destination);
if (policy < FLATPAK_POLICY_SEE)
return HANDLE_HIDE;
if (policy < FLATPAK_POLICY_FILTERED)
return HANDLE_DENY;
if (policy == FLATPAK_POLICY_FILTERED)
{
GList *filters = NULL, *l;
if (header->destination)
filters = g_hash_table_lookup (client->proxy->filters, header->destination);
for (l = filters; l != NULL; l = l->next)
{
Filter *filter = l->data;
if (header->type == G_DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_METHOD_CALL &&
(filter->path == NULL || g_strcmp0 (filter->path, header->path) == 0) &&
(filter->interface == NULL || g_strcmp0 (filter->interface, header->interface) == 0) &&
(filter->member == NULL || g_strcmp0 (filter->member, header->member) == 0))
return HANDLE_PASS;
}
return HANDLE_DENY;
}
if (!is_for_bus (header))
return HANDLE_PASS;
if (is_introspection_call (header))
{
return HANDLE_PASS;
}
else if (is_dbus_method_call (header))
{
method = header->member;
if (method == NULL)
return HANDLE_DENY;
if (strcmp (method, "AddMatch") == 0)
return HANDLE_VALIDATE_MATCH;
if (strcmp (method, "Hello") == 0 ||
strcmp (method, "RemoveMatch") == 0 ||
strcmp (method, "GetId") == 0)
return HANDLE_PASS;
if (strcmp (method, "UpdateActivationEnvironment") == 0 ||
strcmp (method, "BecomeMonitor") == 0)
return HANDLE_DENY;
if (strcmp (method, "RequestName") == 0 ||
strcmp (method, "ReleaseName") == 0 ||
strcmp (method, "ListQueuedOwners") == 0)
return HANDLE_VALIDATE_OWN;
if (strcmp (method, "NameHasOwner") == 0)
return HANDLE_FILTER_HAS_OWNER_REPLY;
if (strcmp (method, "GetNameOwner") == 0)
return HANDLE_FILTER_GET_OWNER_REPLY;
if (strcmp (method, "GetConnectionUnixProcessID") == 0 ||
strcmp (method, "GetConnectionCredentials") == 0 ||
strcmp (method, "GetAdtAuditSessionData") == 0 ||
strcmp (method, "GetConnectionSELinuxSecurityContext") == 0 ||
strcmp (method, "GetConnectionUnixUser") == 0)
return HANDLE_VALIDATE_SEE;
if (strcmp (method, "StartServiceByName") == 0)
return HANDLE_VALIDATE_TALK;
if (strcmp (method, "ListNames") == 0 ||
strcmp (method, "ListActivatableNames") == 0)
return HANDLE_FILTER_NAME_LIST_REPLY;
g_warning ("Unknown bus method %s", method);
return HANDLE_DENY;
}
else
{
return HANDLE_DENY;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 84,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HarfBuzzShaper::HarfBuzzRun::~HarfBuzzRun()
{
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int apic_lvt_enabled(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int lvt_type)
{
return !(kvm_apic_get_reg(apic, lvt_type) & APIC_LVT_MASKED);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int brcmf_dev_pno_config(struct brcmf_if *ifp,
struct cfg80211_sched_scan_request *request)
{
struct brcmf_pno_param_le pfn_param;
struct brcmf_pno_macaddr_le pfn_mac;
s32 err;
u8 *mac_mask;
int i;
memset(&pfn_param, 0, sizeof(pfn_param));
pfn_param.version = cpu_to_le32(BRCMF_PNO_VERSION);
/* set extra pno params */
pfn_param.flags = cpu_to_le16(1 << BRCMF_PNO_ENABLE_ADAPTSCAN_BIT);
pfn_param.repeat = BRCMF_PNO_REPEAT;
pfn_param.exp = BRCMF_PNO_FREQ_EXPO_MAX;
/* set up pno scan fr */
pfn_param.scan_freq = cpu_to_le32(BRCMF_PNO_TIME);
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_data_set(ifp, "pfn_set", &pfn_param,
sizeof(pfn_param));
if (err) {
brcmf_err("pfn_set failed, err=%d\n", err);
return err;
}
/* Find out if mac randomization should be turned on */
if (!(request->flags & NL80211_SCAN_FLAG_RANDOM_ADDR))
return 0;
pfn_mac.version = BRCMF_PFN_MACADDR_CFG_VER;
pfn_mac.flags = BRCMF_PFN_MAC_OUI_ONLY | BRCMF_PFN_SET_MAC_UNASSOC;
memcpy(pfn_mac.mac, request->mac_addr, ETH_ALEN);
mac_mask = request->mac_addr_mask;
for (i = 0; i < ETH_ALEN; i++) {
pfn_mac.mac[i] &= mac_mask[i];
pfn_mac.mac[i] |= get_random_int() & ~(mac_mask[i]);
}
/* Clear multi bit */
pfn_mac.mac[0] &= 0xFE;
/* Set locally administered */
pfn_mac.mac[0] |= 0x02;
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_data_set(ifp, "pfn_macaddr", &pfn_mac,
sizeof(pfn_mac));
if (err)
brcmf_err("pfn_macaddr failed, err=%d\n", err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit TestSafeBrowsingServiceFactory(
const SafeBrowsingTestConfiguration* config)
: test_configuration_(config) {}
Commit Message: Disable setxattr calls from quarantine subsystem on Chrome OS.
BUG=733943
Change-Id: I6e743469a8dc91536e180ecf4ff0df0cf427037c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1380571
Commit-Queue: Will Harris <wfh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thiemo Nagel <tnagel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617961}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 153,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void locationWithPerWorldBindingsAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithPerWorldBindings());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHref(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 171,689 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_scl(int state)
{
I2C_SCL(state);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::WasContextLostByRobustnessExtension() const {
return WasContextLost() && reset_by_robustness_extension_;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mojom::blink::DocumentInterfaceBroker* Document::GetDocumentInterfaceBroker() {
if (!GetFrame())
return nullptr;
return &GetFrame()->GetDocumentInterfaceBroker();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,714 |
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