instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::installPerContextEnabledMethods(v8::Handle<v8::Object> prototypeTemplate, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
v8::Local<v8::Signature> defaultSignature = v8::Signature::New(isolate, domTemplate(isolate));
ExecutionContext* context = toExecutionContext(prototypeTemplate->CreationContext());
if (context && context->isDocument() && ContextFeatures::featureNameEnabled(toDocument(context)))
prototypeTemplate->Set(v8AtomicString(isolate, "enabledPerContextMethod"), v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, TestObjectV8Internal::enabledPerContextMethodMethodCallback, v8Undefined(), defaultSignature, 1)->GetFunction());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void addUncommittedWidth(float delta) { m_uncommittedWidth += delta; }
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: STDMETHODIMP UrlmonUrlRequest::OnDataAvailable(DWORD flags, DWORD size,
FORMATETC* formatetc,
STGMEDIUM* storage) {
DCHECK_EQ(thread_, base::PlatformThread::CurrentId());
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << me() << "bytes available: " << size;
if (terminate_requested()) {
DVLOG(1) << " Download requested. INET_E_TERMINATED_BIND returned";
return INET_E_TERMINATED_BIND;
}
if (!storage || (storage->tymed != TYMED_ISTREAM)) {
NOTREACHED();
return E_INVALIDARG;
}
IStream* read_stream = storage->pstm;
if (!read_stream) {
NOTREACHED();
return E_UNEXPECTED;
}
if (size > 0)
pending_data_ = read_stream;
if (pending_read_size_) {
size_t bytes_copied = SendDataToDelegate(pending_read_size_);
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << me() << "size read: " << bytes_copied;
} else {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << me() << "- waiting for remote read";
}
if (BSCF_LASTDATANOTIFICATION & flags) {
if (!is_expecting_download_ || pending()) {
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << me() << "EOF";
return S_OK;
}
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << " EOF: INET_E_TERMINATED_BIND returned";
return INET_E_TERMINATED_BIND;
}
return S_OK;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltCleanupGlobals(void)
{
xsltUnregisterAllExtModules();
xsltUnregisterAllExtModuleFunction();
xsltUnregisterAllExtModuleElement();
xsltUnregisterAllExtModuleTopLevel();
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
/* cleanup dynamic module hash */
if (NULL != xsltModuleHash) {
xmlHashScan(xsltModuleHash, xsltHashScannerModuleFree, 0);
xmlHashFree(xsltModuleHash, NULL);
xsltModuleHash = NULL;
}
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
xmlFreeMutex(xsltExtMutex);
xsltExtMutex = NULL;
xsltFreeLocales();
xsltUninit();
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __build_sched_domains(const struct cpumask *cpu_map,
struct sched_domain_attr *attr)
{
enum s_alloc alloc_state = sa_none;
struct s_data d;
struct sched_domain *sd;
int i;
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
d.sd_allnodes = 0;
#endif
alloc_state = __visit_domain_allocation_hell(&d, cpu_map);
if (alloc_state != sa_rootdomain)
goto error;
alloc_state = sa_sched_groups;
/*
* Set up domains for cpus specified by the cpu_map.
*/
for_each_cpu(i, cpu_map) {
cpumask_and(d.nodemask, cpumask_of_node(cpu_to_node(i)),
cpu_map);
sd = __build_numa_sched_domains(&d, cpu_map, attr, i);
sd = __build_cpu_sched_domain(&d, cpu_map, attr, sd, i);
sd = __build_book_sched_domain(&d, cpu_map, attr, sd, i);
sd = __build_mc_sched_domain(&d, cpu_map, attr, sd, i);
sd = __build_smt_sched_domain(&d, cpu_map, attr, sd, i);
}
for_each_cpu(i, cpu_map) {
build_sched_groups(&d, SD_LV_SIBLING, cpu_map, i);
build_sched_groups(&d, SD_LV_BOOK, cpu_map, i);
build_sched_groups(&d, SD_LV_MC, cpu_map, i);
}
/* Set up physical groups */
for (i = 0; i < nr_node_ids; i++)
build_sched_groups(&d, SD_LV_CPU, cpu_map, i);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
/* Set up node groups */
if (d.sd_allnodes)
build_sched_groups(&d, SD_LV_ALLNODES, cpu_map, 0);
for (i = 0; i < nr_node_ids; i++)
if (build_numa_sched_groups(&d, cpu_map, i))
goto error;
#endif
/* Calculate CPU power for physical packages and nodes */
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
for_each_cpu(i, cpu_map) {
sd = &per_cpu(cpu_domains, i).sd;
init_sched_groups_power(i, sd);
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_MC
for_each_cpu(i, cpu_map) {
sd = &per_cpu(core_domains, i).sd;
init_sched_groups_power(i, sd);
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_BOOK
for_each_cpu(i, cpu_map) {
sd = &per_cpu(book_domains, i).sd;
init_sched_groups_power(i, sd);
}
#endif
for_each_cpu(i, cpu_map) {
sd = &per_cpu(phys_domains, i).sd;
init_sched_groups_power(i, sd);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
for (i = 0; i < nr_node_ids; i++)
init_numa_sched_groups_power(d.sched_group_nodes[i]);
if (d.sd_allnodes) {
struct sched_group *sg;
cpu_to_allnodes_group(cpumask_first(cpu_map), cpu_map, &sg,
d.tmpmask);
init_numa_sched_groups_power(sg);
}
#endif
/* Attach the domains */
for_each_cpu(i, cpu_map) {
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
sd = &per_cpu(cpu_domains, i).sd;
#elif defined(CONFIG_SCHED_MC)
sd = &per_cpu(core_domains, i).sd;
#elif defined(CONFIG_SCHED_BOOK)
sd = &per_cpu(book_domains, i).sd;
#else
sd = &per_cpu(phys_domains, i).sd;
#endif
cpu_attach_domain(sd, d.rd, i);
}
d.sched_group_nodes = NULL; /* don't free this we still need it */
__free_domain_allocs(&d, sa_tmpmask, cpu_map);
return 0;
error:
__free_domain_allocs(&d, alloc_state, cpu_map);
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 Tab::GetTooltipText(const base::string16& title,
TabAlertState alert_state) {
if (alert_state == TabAlertState::NONE)
return title;
base::string16 result = title;
if (!result.empty())
result.append(1, '\n');
switch (alert_state) {
case TabAlertState::AUDIO_PLAYING:
result.append(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TOOLTIP_TAB_ALERT_STATE_AUDIO_PLAYING));
break;
case TabAlertState::AUDIO_MUTING:
result.append(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TOOLTIP_TAB_ALERT_STATE_AUDIO_MUTING));
break;
case TabAlertState::MEDIA_RECORDING:
result.append(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_TOOLTIP_TAB_ALERT_STATE_MEDIA_RECORDING));
break;
case TabAlertState::TAB_CAPTURING:
result.append(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TOOLTIP_TAB_ALERT_STATE_TAB_CAPTURING));
break;
case TabAlertState::BLUETOOTH_CONNECTED:
result.append(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_TOOLTIP_TAB_ALERT_STATE_BLUETOOTH_CONNECTED));
break;
case TabAlertState::USB_CONNECTED:
result.append(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TOOLTIP_TAB_ALERT_STATE_USB_CONNECTED));
break;
case TabAlertState::SERIAL_CONNECTED:
result.append(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_TOOLTIP_TAB_ALERT_STATE_SERIAL_CONNECTED));
break;
case TabAlertState::PIP_PLAYING:
result.append(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TOOLTIP_TAB_ALERT_STATE_PIP_PLAYING));
break;
case TabAlertState::DESKTOP_CAPTURING:
result.append(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_TOOLTIP_TAB_ALERT_STATE_DESKTOP_CAPTURING));
break;
case TabAlertState::VR_PRESENTING_IN_HEADSET:
result.append(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TOOLTIP_TAB_ALERT_STATE_VR_PRESENTING));
break;
case TabAlertState::NONE:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HB_Error GPOS_Do_Glyph_Lookup( GPOS_Instance* gpi,
HB_UShort lookup_index,
HB_Buffer buffer,
HB_UShort context_length,
int nesting_level )
{
HB_Error error = HB_Err_Not_Covered;
HB_UShort i, flags, lookup_count;
HB_GPOSHeader* gpos = gpi->gpos;
HB_Lookup* lo;
int lookup_type;
nesting_level++;
if ( nesting_level > HB_MAX_NESTING_LEVEL )
return ERR(HB_Err_Not_Covered); /* ERR() call intended */
lookup_count = gpos->LookupList.LookupCount;
if (lookup_index >= lookup_count)
return error;
lo = &gpos->LookupList.Lookup[lookup_index];
flags = lo->LookupFlag;
lookup_type = lo->LookupType;
for ( i = 0; i < lo->SubTableCount; i++ )
{
HB_GPOS_SubTable *st = &lo->SubTable[i].st.gpos;
switch (lookup_type) {
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_SINGLE:
error = Lookup_SinglePos ( gpi, st, buffer, flags, context_length, nesting_level ); break;
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_PAIR:
error = Lookup_PairPos ( gpi, st, buffer, flags, context_length, nesting_level ); break;
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_CURSIVE:
error = Lookup_CursivePos ( gpi, st, buffer, flags, context_length, nesting_level ); break;
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_MARKBASE:
error = Lookup_MarkBasePos ( gpi, st, buffer, flags, context_length, nesting_level ); break;
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_MARKLIG:
error = Lookup_MarkLigPos ( gpi, st, buffer, flags, context_length, nesting_level ); break;
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_MARKMARK:
error = Lookup_MarkMarkPos ( gpi, st, buffer, flags, context_length, nesting_level ); break;
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_CONTEXT:
error = Lookup_ContextPos ( gpi, st, buffer, flags, context_length, nesting_level ); break;
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_CHAIN:
error = Lookup_ChainContextPos ( gpi, st, buffer, flags, context_length, nesting_level ); break;
/*case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_EXTENSION:
error = Lookup_ExtensionPos ( gpi, st, buffer, flags, context_length, nesting_level ); break;*/
default:
error = HB_Err_Not_Covered;
}
/* Check whether we have a successful positioning or an error other
than HB_Err_Not_Covered */
if ( error != HB_Err_Not_Covered )
return error;
}
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::blitFramebuffer(GLint src_x0,
GLint src_y0,
GLint src_x1,
GLint src_y1,
GLint dst_x0,
GLint dst_y0,
GLint dst_x1,
GLint dst_y1,
GLbitfield mask,
GLenum filter) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
DrawingBuffer::ScopedRGBEmulationForBlitFramebuffer emulation(
GetDrawingBuffer());
ContextGL()->BlitFramebufferCHROMIUM(src_x0, src_y0, src_x1, src_y1, dst_x0,
dst_y0, dst_x1, dst_y1, mask, filter);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ovsinst_bitmap_to_openflow(uint32_t ovsinst_bitmap, enum ofp_version version)
{
uint32_t ofpit_bitmap = 0;
const struct ovsinst_map *x;
for (x = get_ovsinst_map(version); x->ofpit >= 0; x++) {
if (ovsinst_bitmap & (1u << x->ovsinst)) {
ofpit_bitmap |= 1u << x->ofpit;
}
}
return htonl(ofpit_bitmap);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 77,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fc_dma_mapping_error(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t dma_addr)
{
return dev ? dma_mapping_error(dev, dma_addr) : 0;
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren(bool relayoutChildren, LayoutUnit& repaintLogicalTop, LayoutUnit& repaintLogicalBottom)
{
setLogicalHeight(borderBefore() + paddingBefore());
if (view()->layoutState() && view()->layoutState()->lineGrid() == this)
layoutLineGridBox();
RenderFlowThread* flowThread = flowThreadContainingBlock();
bool clearLinesForPagination = firstLineBox() && flowThread && !flowThread->hasRegions();
bool isFullLayout = !firstLineBox() || selfNeedsLayout() || relayoutChildren || clearLinesForPagination;
LineLayoutState layoutState(isFullLayout, repaintLogicalTop, repaintLogicalBottom, flowThread);
if (isFullLayout)
lineBoxes()->deleteLineBoxes();
bool hasTextOverflow = (style()->textOverflow() && hasOverflowClip())
|| (isAnonymousBlock() && parent() && parent()->isRenderBlock() && parent()->style()->textOverflow() && parent()->hasOverflowClip());
if (hasTextOverflow)
deleteEllipsisLineBoxes();
if (firstChild()) {
bool hasInlineChild = false;
Vector<RenderBox*> replacedChildren;
for (InlineWalker walker(this); !walker.atEnd(); walker.advance()) {
RenderObject* o = walker.current();
if (!hasInlineChild && o->isInline())
hasInlineChild = true;
if (o->isReplaced() || o->isFloating() || o->isOutOfFlowPositioned()) {
RenderBox* box = toRenderBox(o);
if (relayoutChildren || box->hasRelativeDimensions())
o->setChildNeedsLayout(MarkOnlyThis);
if (relayoutChildren && box->needsPreferredWidthsRecalculation())
o->setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty(MarkOnlyThis);
if (o->isOutOfFlowPositioned())
o->containingBlock()->insertPositionedObject(box);
else if (o->isFloating())
layoutState.floats().append(FloatWithRect(box));
else if (isFullLayout || o->needsLayout()) {
box->dirtyLineBoxes(isFullLayout);
if (isFullLayout)
replacedChildren.append(box);
else
o->layoutIfNeeded();
}
} else if (o->isText() || (o->isRenderInline() && !walker.atEndOfInline())) {
if (!o->isText())
toRenderInline(o)->updateAlwaysCreateLineBoxes(layoutState.isFullLayout());
if (layoutState.isFullLayout() || o->selfNeedsLayout())
dirtyLineBoxesForRenderer(o, layoutState.isFullLayout());
o->clearNeedsLayout();
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < replacedChildren.size(); i++)
replacedChildren[i]->layoutIfNeeded();
layoutRunsAndFloats(layoutState, hasInlineChild);
}
int lastLineAnnotationsAdjustment = 0;
if (lastRootBox()) {
LayoutUnit lowestAllowedPosition = max(lastRootBox()->lineBottom(), logicalHeight() + paddingAfter());
if (!style()->isFlippedLinesWritingMode())
lastLineAnnotationsAdjustment = lastRootBox()->computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment(lowestAllowedPosition);
else
lastLineAnnotationsAdjustment = lastRootBox()->computeOverAnnotationAdjustment(lowestAllowedPosition);
}
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() + lastLineAnnotationsAdjustment + borderAfter() + paddingAfter() + scrollbarLogicalHeight());
if (!firstLineBox() && hasLineIfEmpty())
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() + lineHeight(true, isHorizontalWritingMode() ? HorizontalLine : VerticalLine, PositionOfInteriorLineBoxes));
if (hasTextOverflow)
checkLinesForTextOverflow();
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline size_t xfrm_polexpire_msgsize(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_polexpire))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr)
+ nla_total_size(xfrm_user_sec_ctx_size(xp->security))
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_mark))
+ userpolicy_type_attrsize();
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fpm_log_open(int reopen) /* {{{ */
{
struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp;
int ret = 1;
int fd;
for (wp = fpm_worker_all_pools; wp; wp = wp->next) {
if (!wp->config->access_log) {
continue;
}
ret = 0;
fd = open(wp->config->access_log, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
if (0 > fd) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "failed to open access log (%s)", wp->config->access_log);
return -1;
} else {
zlog(ZLOG_DEBUG, "open access log (%s)", wp->config->access_log);
}
if (reopen) {
dup2(fd, wp->log_fd);
close(fd);
fd = wp->log_fd;
fpm_pctl_kill_all(SIGQUIT);
} else {
wp->log_fd = fd;
}
if (0 > fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, fcntl(fd, F_GETFD) | FD_CLOEXEC)) {
zlog(ZLOG_WARNING, "failed to change attribute of access_log");
}
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #70755: fpm_log.c memory leak and buffer overflow
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 52,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum rdma_ch_state srpt_get_ch_state(struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch)
{
unsigned long flags;
enum rdma_ch_state state;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ch->spinlock, flags);
state = ch->state;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ch->spinlock, flags);
return state;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputType::ShouldRespectListAttribute() {
return false;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int remote_socket_enqueue(asocket* s, apacket* p) {
D("entered remote_socket_enqueue RS(%d) WRITE fd=%d peer.fd=%d", s->id, s->fd, s->peer->fd);
p->msg.command = A_WRTE;
p->msg.arg0 = s->peer->id;
p->msg.arg1 = s->id;
p->msg.data_length = p->len;
send_packet(p, s->transport);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void jsvKill() {
#ifdef RESIZABLE_JSVARS
unsigned int i;
for (i=0;i<jsVarsSize>>JSVAR_BLOCK_SHIFT;i++)
free(jsVarBlocks[i]);
free(jsVarBlocks);
jsVarBlocks = 0;
jsVarsSize = 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 82,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct hsr_node *hsr_add_node(struct list_head *node_db, unsigned char addr[],
u16 seq_out)
{
struct hsr_node *node;
unsigned long now;
int i;
node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!node)
return NULL;
ether_addr_copy(node->MacAddressA, addr);
/* We are only interested in time diffs here, so use current jiffies
* as initialization. (0 could trigger an spurious ring error warning).
*/
now = jiffies;
for (i = 0; i < HSR_PT_PORTS; i++)
node->time_in[i] = now;
for (i = 0; i < HSR_PT_PORTS; i++)
node->seq_out[i] = seq_out;
list_add_tail_rcu(&node->mac_list, node_db);
return node;
}
Commit Message: net: hsr: fix memory leak in hsr_dev_finalize()
If hsr_add_port(hsr, hsr_dev, HSR_PT_MASTER) failed to
add port, it directly returns res and forgets to free the node
that allocated in hsr_create_self_node(), and forgets to delete
the node->mac_list linked in hsr->self_node_db.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881cfa0c780 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor.0", pid 2077, jiffies 4294717969 (age 2415.377s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 c7 a0 cf 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de ................
00 e6 49 cd 81 88 ff ff c0 9b 87 d0 81 88 ff ff ..I.............
backtrace:
[<00000000e2ff5070>] hsr_dev_finalize+0x736/0x960 [hsr]
[<000000003ed2e597>] hsr_newlink+0x2b2/0x3e0 [hsr]
[<000000003fa8c6b6>] __rtnl_newlink+0xf1f/0x1600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3182
[<000000001247a7ad>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3240
[<00000000e7d1b61d>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x54e/0xb90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5130
[<000000005556bd3a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x129/0x340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
[<000000009d56f9b7>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg+0xc3/0x100 net/socket.c:631
[<00000000d208adc9>] __sys_sendto+0x33e/0x560 net/socket.c:1786
[<00000000b582837a>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1798 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1794 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1794
[<00000000c866801d>] do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000fea382d9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<00000000e01dacb3>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: c5a759117210 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void bpf_flush_icache(void *start, void *end)
{
mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
smp_wmb();
flush_icache_range((unsigned long)start, (unsigned long)end);
set_fs(old_fs);
}
Commit Message: net: bpf_jit: fix an off-one bug in x86_64 cond jump target
x86 jump instruction size is 2 or 5 bytes (near/long jump), not 2 or 6
bytes.
In case a conditional jump is followed by a long jump, conditional jump
target is one byte past the start of target instruction.
Signed-off-by: Markus Kötter <nepenthesdev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip_reply_glue_bits(void *dptr, char *to, int offset,
int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__wsum csum;
csum = csum_partial_copy_nocheck(dptr+offset, to, len, 0);
skb->csum = csum_block_add(skb->csum, csum, odd);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit LayoutBlockFlow::estimateLogicalTopPosition(LayoutBox& child, const MarginInfo& marginInfo, LayoutUnit& estimateWithoutPagination)
{
LayoutUnit logicalTopEstimate = logicalHeight();
if (!marginInfo.canCollapseWithMarginBefore()) {
LayoutUnit positiveMarginBefore = 0;
LayoutUnit negativeMarginBefore = 0;
bool discardMarginBefore = false;
if (child.selfNeedsLayout()) {
marginBeforeEstimateForChild(child, positiveMarginBefore, negativeMarginBefore, discardMarginBefore);
} else {
LayoutBlockFlow::MarginValues marginValues = marginValuesForChild(child);
positiveMarginBefore = std::max(positiveMarginBefore, marginValues.positiveMarginBefore());
negativeMarginBefore = std::max(negativeMarginBefore, marginValues.negativeMarginBefore());
discardMarginBefore = mustDiscardMarginBeforeForChild(child);
}
if (!discardMarginBefore)
logicalTopEstimate += std::max(marginInfo.positiveMargin(), positiveMarginBefore) - std::max(marginInfo.negativeMargin(), negativeMarginBefore);
}
LayoutState* layoutState = view()->layoutState();
if (layoutState->isPaginated() && isPageLogicalHeightKnown(logicalHeight()) && logicalTopEstimate > logicalHeight())
logicalTopEstimate = std::min(logicalTopEstimate, nextPageLogicalTop(logicalHeight(), AssociateWithLatterPage));
logicalTopEstimate += getClearDelta(&child, logicalTopEstimate);
estimateWithoutPagination = logicalTopEstimate;
if (layoutState->isPaginated()) {
logicalTopEstimate = applyBeforeBreak(child, logicalTopEstimate);
logicalTopEstimate = adjustForUnsplittableChild(child, logicalTopEstimate);
if (!child.selfNeedsLayout() && child.isLayoutBlockFlow())
logicalTopEstimate += toLayoutBlockFlow(&child)->paginationStrut();
}
return logicalTopEstimate;
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 122,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderMenuList::multiple()
{
return toHTMLSelectElement(node())->multiple();
}
Commit Message: PopupMenuClient::multiple() should be const
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76771
Patch by Benjamin Poulain <bpoulain@apple.com> on 2012-01-21
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
* platform/PopupMenuClient.h:
(WebCore::PopupMenuClient::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMenuList::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@105570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 170,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidDisownOpener(RenderViewHost* rvh) {
if (opener_) {
RemoveDestructionObserver(opener_);
opener_ = NULL;
}
render_manager_.DidDisownOpener(rvh);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserWindow* BrowserCommandController::window() {
return browser_->window();
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_once(void *foo)
{
struct inode *inode = (struct inode *) foo;
inode_init_once(inode);
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_futex_value_locked(u32 *dest, u32 __user *from)
{
int ret;
pagefault_disable();
ret = __get_user(*dest, from);
pagefault_enable();
return ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 84,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int wp256_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
u8 D[64];
wp512_final(desc, D);
memcpy(out, D, WP256_DIGEST_SIZE);
memzero_explicit(D, WP512_DIGEST_SIZE);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::SetNavigationRequest(
std::unique_ptr<NavigationRequest> navigation_request) {
DCHECK(navigation_request);
if (FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::IsSameDocument(
navigation_request->common_params().navigation_type)) {
same_document_navigation_request_ = std::move(navigation_request);
return;
}
navigation_requests_[navigation_request.get()] =
std::move(navigation_request);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,411 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static QEMUSGList *megasas_get_sg_list(SCSIRequest *req)
{
MegasasCmd *cmd = req->hba_private;
if (cmd->frame->header.frame_cmd == MFI_CMD_DCMD) {
return NULL;
} else {
return &cmd->qsg;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::Blur() {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* focused_widget =
delegate_ ? delegate_->GetRenderWidgetHostWithPageFocus() : nullptr;
if (!focused_widget)
focused_widget = this;
focused_widget->SetPageFocus(false);
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ppp_get_stats64(struct net_device *dev, struct rtnl_link_stats64 *stats64)
{
struct ppp *ppp = netdev_priv(dev);
ppp_recv_lock(ppp);
stats64->rx_packets = ppp->stats64.rx_packets;
stats64->rx_bytes = ppp->stats64.rx_bytes;
ppp_recv_unlock(ppp);
ppp_xmit_lock(ppp);
stats64->tx_packets = ppp->stats64.tx_packets;
stats64->tx_bytes = ppp->stats64.tx_bytes;
ppp_xmit_unlock(ppp);
stats64->rx_errors = dev->stats.rx_errors;
stats64->tx_errors = dev->stats.tx_errors;
stats64->rx_dropped = dev->stats.rx_dropped;
stats64->tx_dropped = dev->stats.tx_dropped;
stats64->rx_length_errors = dev->stats.rx_length_errors;
return stats64;
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 52,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport const ModuleInfo **GetModuleInfoList(const char *pattern,
size_t *number_modules,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const ModuleInfo
**modules;
register const ModuleInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Allocate module list.
*/
assert(pattern != (char *) NULL);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",pattern);
assert(number_modules != (size_t *) NULL);
*number_modules=0;
p=GetModuleInfo("*",exception);
if (p == (const ModuleInfo *) NULL)
return((const ModuleInfo **) NULL);
modules=(const ModuleInfo **) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
GetNumberOfNodesInSplayTree(module_list)+1UL,sizeof(*modules));
if (modules == (const ModuleInfo **) NULL)
return((const ModuleInfo **) NULL);
/*
Generate module list.
*/
LockSemaphoreInfo(module_semaphore);
ResetSplayTreeIterator(module_list);
p=(const ModuleInfo *) GetNextValueInSplayTree(module_list);
for (i=0; p != (const ModuleInfo *) NULL; )
{
if ((p->stealth == MagickFalse) &&
(GlobExpression(p->tag,pattern,MagickFalse) != MagickFalse))
modules[i++]=p;
p=(const ModuleInfo *) GetNextValueInSplayTree(module_list);
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(module_semaphore);
qsort((void *) modules,(size_t) i,sizeof(*modules),ModuleInfoCompare);
modules[i]=(ModuleInfo *) NULL;
*number_modules=(size_t) i;
return(modules);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 71,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::readUtf8VectorFromUtf16Vector(std::vector<std::string>* val) const {
return readTypedVector(val, &Parcel::readUtf8FromUtf16);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline BOOLEAN send_app_psm_or_chan_l(l2cap_socket *sock)
{
return sock_send_all(sock->our_fd, (const uint8_t*)&sock->channel, sizeof(sock->channel))
== sizeof(sock->channel);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,870 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool TabVisualIndexSortFunction(const SessionTab* t1,
const SessionTab* t2) {
const int delta = t1->tab_visual_index - t2->tab_visual_index;
return delta == 0 ? (t1->tab_id.id() < t2->tab_id.id()) : (delta < 0);
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_read_support_format_lha(struct archive *_a)
{
struct archive_read *a = (struct archive_read *)_a;
struct lha *lha;
int r;
archive_check_magic(_a, ARCHIVE_READ_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_NEW, "archive_read_support_format_lha");
lha = (struct lha *)calloc(1, sizeof(*lha));
if (lha == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate lha data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
archive_string_init(&lha->ws);
r = __archive_read_register_format(a,
lha,
"lha",
archive_read_format_lha_bid,
archive_read_format_lha_options,
archive_read_format_lha_read_header,
archive_read_format_lha_read_data,
archive_read_format_lha_read_data_skip,
NULL,
archive_read_format_lha_cleanup,
NULL,
NULL);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
free(lha);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: circle_left(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle1 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
CIRCLE *circle2 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPlt((circle1->center.x + circle1->radius),
(circle2->center.x - circle2->radius)));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutomationProvider::AutomationProvider(Profile* profile)
: profile_(profile),
reply_message_(NULL),
is_connected_(false),
initial_loads_complete_(false) {
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN("AutomationProvider::AutomationProvider", 0, "");
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
browser_tracker_.reset(new AutomationBrowserTracker(this));
extension_tracker_.reset(new AutomationExtensionTracker(this));
tab_tracker_.reset(new AutomationTabTracker(this));
window_tracker_.reset(new AutomationWindowTracker(this));
autocomplete_edit_tracker_.reset(
new AutomationAutocompleteEditTracker(this));
new_tab_ui_load_observer_.reset(new NewTabUILoadObserver(this));
dom_operation_observer_.reset(new DomOperationMessageSender(this));
metric_event_duration_observer_.reset(new MetricEventDurationObserver());
extension_test_result_observer_.reset(
new ExtensionTestResultNotificationObserver(this));
g_browser_process->AddRefModule();
TRACE_EVENT_END("AutomationProvider::AutomationProvider", 0, "");
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ColorChooserWin::~ColorChooserWin() {
DCHECK(!color_chooser_dialog_);
}
Commit Message: ColorChooserWin::End should act like the dialog has closed
This is only a problem on Windows.
When the page closes itself while the color chooser dialog is open,
ColorChooserDialog::DidCloseDialog was called after the listener has been destroyed.
ColorChooserWin::End() will not actually close the color chooser dialog (because we can't) but act like it did so we can do the necessary cleanup.
BUG=279263
R=jschuh@chromium.org, pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/23785003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@220639 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EGLNativeWindowType RenderingHelper::PlatformCreateWindow(int top_left_x,
int top_left_y) {
int depth = DefaultDepth(x_display_, DefaultScreen(x_display_));
XSetWindowAttributes window_attributes;
window_attributes.background_pixel =
BlackPixel(x_display_, DefaultScreen(x_display_));
window_attributes.override_redirect = true;
Window x_window = XCreateWindow(
x_display_, DefaultRootWindow(x_display_),
top_left_x, top_left_y, width_, height_,
0 /* border width */,
depth, CopyFromParent /* class */, CopyFromParent /* visual */,
(CWBackPixel | CWOverrideRedirect), &window_attributes);
x_windows_.push_back(x_window);
XStoreName(x_display_, x_window, "VideoDecodeAcceleratorTest");
XSelectInput(x_display_, x_window, ExposureMask);
XMapWindow(x_display_, x_window);
return x_window;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar *buf = NULL;
int len = 0;
int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE;
xmlChar cur;
xmlChar stop;
int count = 0;
xmlParserInputState oldstate = ctxt->instate;
SHRINK;
if (RAW == '"') {
NEXT;
stop = '"';
} else if (RAW == '\'') {
NEXT;
stop = '\'';
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
buf = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buf == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PUBLIC_LITERAL;
cur = CUR;
while ((IS_PUBIDCHAR_CH(cur)) && (cur != stop)) { /* checked */
if (len + 1 >= size) {
xmlChar *tmp;
if ((size > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Public ID");
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
size *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
buf = tmp;
}
buf[len++] = cur;
count++;
if (count > 50) {
GROW;
count = 0;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buf);
return(NULL);
}
}
NEXT;
cur = CUR;
if (cur == 0) {
GROW;
SHRINK;
cur = CUR;
}
}
buf[len] = 0;
if (cur != stop) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
} else {
NEXT;
}
ctxt->instate = oldstate;
return(buf);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
int ret;
if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
return( 0 );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
buf, len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( ret );
}
/* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */
ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK;
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 86,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cached_v_advance(hb_font_t *font, void *font_data, hb_codepoint_t glyph,
void *user_data)
{
FT_Face face = font_data;
struct ass_shaper_metrics_data *metrics_priv = user_data;
GlyphMetricsHashValue *metrics = get_cached_metrics(metrics_priv, face, 0, glyph);
if (!metrics)
return 0;
hb_position_t advance = metrics->metrics.vertAdvance;
ass_cache_dec_ref(metrics);
return advance;
}
Commit Message: shaper: fix reallocation
Update the variable that tracks the allocated size. This potentially
improves performance and avoid some side effects, which lead to
undefined behavior in some cases.
Fixes fuzzer test case id:000051,sig:11,sync:fuzzer3,src:004221.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 73,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *mem_devnode(struct device *dev, umode_t *mode)
{
if (mode && devlist[MINOR(dev->devt)].mode)
*mode = devlist[MINOR(dev->devt)].mode;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 66,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ShellMainDelegate::BasicStartupComplete(int* exit_code) {
base::CommandLine& command_line = *base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
int dummy;
if (!exit_code)
exit_code = &dummy;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
logging::LogEventProvider::Initialize(kContentShellProviderName);
v8_breakpad_support::SetUp();
#endif
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
breakpad::SetFirstChanceExceptionHandler(v8::V8::TryHandleSignal);
#endif
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
OverrideFrameworkBundlePath();
OverrideChildProcessPath();
OverrideSourceRootPath();
EnsureCorrectResolutionSettings();
#endif // OS_MACOSX
InitLogging(command_line);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kCheckLayoutTestSysDeps)) {
if (!CheckLayoutSystemDeps()) {
*exit_code = 1;
return true;
}
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch("run-layout-test")) {
std::cerr << std::string(79, '*') << "\n"
<< "* The flag --run-layout-test is obsolete. Please use --"
<< switches::kRunWebTests << " instead. *\n"
<< std::string(79, '*') << "\n";
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kRunWebTests);
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kRunWebTests)) {
EnableBrowserLayoutTestMode();
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
if (!ppapi::RegisterBlinkTestPlugin(&command_line)) {
*exit_code = 1;
return true;
}
#endif
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableResizeLock);
command_line.AppendSwitch(cc::switches::kEnableGpuBenchmarking);
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableLogging);
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kAllowFileAccessFromFiles);
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kUseGpuInTests) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kUseGL)) {
command_line.AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kUseGL,
gl::GetGLImplementationName(gl::GetSoftwareGLImplementation()));
}
command_line.AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kTouchEventFeatureDetection,
switches::kTouchEventFeatureDetectionEnabled);
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kForceDeviceScaleFactor))
command_line.AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kForceDeviceScaleFactor, "1.0");
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAutoplayPolicy)) {
command_line.AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kAutoplayPolicy,
switches::autoplay::kNoUserGestureRequiredPolicy);
}
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kStableReleaseMode)) {
command_line.AppendSwitch(
switches::kEnableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures);
}
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableThreadedCompositing)) {
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableThreadedCompositing);
command_line.AppendSwitch(cc::switches::kDisableThreadedAnimation);
}
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDisplayCompositorPixelDump)) {
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kRunAllCompositorStagesBeforeDraw);
command_line.AppendSwitch(cc::switches::kDisableCheckerImaging);
}
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableInbandTextTracks);
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kMuteAudio);
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kEnablePreciseMemoryInfo);
command_line.AppendSwitchASCII(network::switches::kHostResolverRules,
"MAP *.test 127.0.0.1");
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kEnablePartialRaster);
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableWebAuthTestingAPI);
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kForceGpuRasterization) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableGpuRasterization)) {
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuRasterization);
}
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kForceColorProfile))
command_line.AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kForceColorProfile, "srgb");
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableSkiaRuntimeOpts);
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kDisallowNonExactResourceReuse);
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kUseFakeUIForMediaStream);
command_line.AppendSwitch(switches::kUseFakeDeviceForMediaStream);
if (!BlinkTestPlatformInitialize()) {
*exit_code = 1;
return true;
}
}
content_client_.reset(switches::IsRunWebTestsSwitchPresent()
? new LayoutTestContentClient
: new ShellContentClient);
SetContentClient(content_client_.get());
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix content_shell with network service enabled not loading pages.
This regressed in my earlier cl r528763.
This is a reland of r547221.
Bug: 833612
Change-Id: I4c2649414d42773f2530e1abe5912a04fcd0ed9b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1064702
Reviewed-by: Jay Civelli <jcivelli@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560011}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jas_iccgetuint(jas_stream_t *in, int n, ulonglong *val)
{
int i;
int c;
ulonglong v;
v = 0;
for (i = n; i > 0; --i) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF)
return -1;
v = (v << 8) | c;
}
*val = v;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 168,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::Value* V8ValueConverterImpl::FromV8ValueImpl(
FromV8ValueState* state,
v8::Local<v8::Value> val,
v8::Isolate* isolate) const {
CHECK(!val.IsEmpty());
FromV8ValueState::Level state_level(state);
if (state->HasReachedMaxRecursionDepth())
return NULL;
if (val->IsNull())
return base::Value::CreateNullValue().release();
if (val->IsBoolean())
return new base::FundamentalValue(val->ToBoolean(isolate)->Value());
if (val->IsNumber() && strategy_) {
base::Value* out = NULL;
if (strategy_->FromV8Number(val.As<v8::Number>(), &out))
return out;
}
if (val->IsInt32())
return new base::FundamentalValue(val->ToInt32(isolate)->Value());
if (val->IsNumber()) {
double val_as_double = val.As<v8::Number>()->Value();
if (!std::isfinite(val_as_double))
return NULL;
return new base::FundamentalValue(val_as_double);
}
if (val->IsString()) {
v8::String::Utf8Value utf8(val);
return new base::StringValue(std::string(*utf8, utf8.length()));
}
if (val->IsUndefined()) {
if (strategy_) {
base::Value* out = NULL;
if (strategy_->FromV8Undefined(&out))
return out;
}
return NULL;
}
if (val->IsDate()) {
if (!date_allowed_)
return FromV8Object(val->ToObject(isolate), state, isolate);
v8::Date* date = v8::Date::Cast(*val);
return new base::FundamentalValue(date->ValueOf() / 1000.0);
}
if (val->IsRegExp()) {
if (!reg_exp_allowed_)
return FromV8Object(val.As<v8::Object>(), state, isolate);
return new base::StringValue(*v8::String::Utf8Value(val));
}
if (val->IsArray())
return FromV8Array(val.As<v8::Array>(), state, isolate);
if (val->IsFunction()) {
if (!function_allowed_)
return NULL;
return FromV8Object(val.As<v8::Object>(), state, isolate);
}
if (val->IsArrayBuffer() || val->IsArrayBufferView())
return FromV8ArrayBuffer(val.As<v8::Object>(), isolate);
if (val->IsObject())
return FromV8Object(val.As<v8::Object>(), state, isolate);
LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected v8 value type encountered.";
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptPromise ReadableStream::cancel(ScriptState* scriptState, ScriptValue reason)
{
if (m_reader)
return ScriptPromise::reject(scriptState, V8ThrowException::createTypeError(scriptState->isolate(), "this stream is locked to a ReadableStreamReader"));
setIsDisturbed();
if (m_state == Closed)
return ScriptPromise::castUndefined(scriptState);
if (m_state == Errored)
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(scriptState, m_exception);
return cancelInternal(scriptState, reason);
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::readAligned(T *pArg) const {
COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT_FUNCTION_SCOPE(PAD_SIZE(sizeof(T)) == sizeof(T));
if ((mDataPos+sizeof(T)) <= mDataSize) {
const void* data = mData+mDataPos;
mDataPos += sizeof(T);
*pArg = *reinterpret_cast<const T*>(data);
return NO_ERROR;
} else {
return NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
}
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fuse_notify_poll_wakeup(struct fuse_conn *fc,
struct fuse_notify_poll_wakeup_out *outarg)
{
u64 kh = outarg->kh;
struct rb_node **link;
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
link = fuse_find_polled_node(fc, kh, NULL);
if (*link) {
struct fuse_file *ff;
ff = rb_entry(*link, struct fuse_file, polled_node);
wake_up_interruptible_sync(&ff->poll_wait);
}
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_page_get_thumbnail_pixbuf (PopplerPage *page)
{
unsigned char *data;
int width, height, rowstride;
g_return_val_if_fail (POPPLER_IS_PAGE (page), FALSE);
if (!page->page->loadThumb (&data, &width, &height, &rowstride))
return NULL;
return gdk_pixbuf_new_from_data (data, GDK_COLORSPACE_RGB,
FALSE, 8, width, height, rowstride,
(GdkPixbufDestroyNotify)gfree, NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoIsVertexArrayOES(GLuint array,
uint32_t* result) {
*result = api()->glIsVertexArrayOESFn(
GetVertexArrayServiceID(array, &vertex_array_id_map_));
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NormalPageArena::NormalPageArena(ThreadState* state, int index)
: BaseArena(state, index),
m_currentAllocationPoint(nullptr),
m_remainingAllocationSize(0),
m_lastRemainingAllocationSize(0),
m_promptlyFreedSize(0),
m_isLazySweeping(false) {
clearFreeLists();
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 147,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int lh_char_equal(const void *k1, const void *k2)
{
return (strcmp((const char*)k1, (const char*)k2) == 0);
}
Commit Message: Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::DispatchDidReceiveTitle() {
frame_->Client()->DispatchDidReceiveTitle(title_);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int copy_siginfo_to_user32(struct compat_siginfo __user *d, const siginfo_t *s)
{
int err;
if (!access_ok (VERIFY_WRITE, d, sizeof(*d)))
return -EFAULT;
/* If you change siginfo_t structure, please be sure
* this code is fixed accordingly.
* It should never copy any pad contained in the structure
* to avoid security leaks, but must copy the generic
* 3 ints plus the relevant union member.
* This routine must convert siginfo from 64bit to 32bit as well
* at the same time.
*/
err = __put_user(s->si_signo, &d->si_signo);
err |= __put_user(s->si_errno, &d->si_errno);
err |= __put_user((short)s->si_code, &d->si_code);
if (s->si_code < 0)
err |= __copy_to_user(&d->_sifields._pad, &s->_sifields._pad,
SI_PAD_SIZE32);
else switch(s->si_code >> 16) {
case __SI_CHLD >> 16:
err |= __put_user(s->si_pid, &d->si_pid);
err |= __put_user(s->si_uid, &d->si_uid);
err |= __put_user(s->si_utime, &d->si_utime);
err |= __put_user(s->si_stime, &d->si_stime);
err |= __put_user(s->si_status, &d->si_status);
break;
case __SI_FAULT >> 16:
err |= __put_user((unsigned int)(unsigned long)s->si_addr,
&d->si_addr);
break;
case __SI_POLL >> 16:
err |= __put_user(s->si_band, &d->si_band);
err |= __put_user(s->si_fd, &d->si_fd);
break;
case __SI_TIMER >> 16:
err |= __put_user(s->si_tid, &d->si_tid);
err |= __put_user(s->si_overrun, &d->si_overrun);
err |= __put_user(s->si_int, &d->si_int);
break;
case __SI_SYS >> 16:
err |= __put_user(ptr_to_compat(s->si_call_addr), &d->si_call_addr);
err |= __put_user(s->si_syscall, &d->si_syscall);
err |= __put_user(s->si_arch, &d->si_arch);
break;
case __SI_RT >> 16: /* This is not generated by the kernel as of now. */
case __SI_MESGQ >> 16:
err |= __put_user(s->si_int, &d->si_int);
/* fallthrough */
case __SI_KILL >> 16:
default:
err |= __put_user(s->si_pid, &d->si_pid);
err |= __put_user(s->si_uid, &d->si_uid);
break;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 56,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *retrieve_id_from_card_name(const char *name)
{
const char *spos = name;
while (*name) {
if (isspace(*name) && isalnum(name[1]))
spos = name + 1;
name++;
}
return spos;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 36,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterJPEGImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("PJPG");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPS");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPG");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPEG");
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("JPE");
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1641
CWE ID: | 0 | 87,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
const PACKET *session_id,
SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
unsigned int i;
PACKET local_ext = *ext;
int retv = -1;
int have_ticket = 0;
int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
/*
* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
return 0;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
retv = 0;
goto end;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
unsigned int type, size;
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
/* Shouldn't ever happen */
retv = -1;
goto end;
}
if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
retv = 0;
goto end;
}
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
int r;
const unsigned char *etick;
/* Duplicate extension */
if (have_ticket != 0) {
retv = -1;
goto end;
}
have_ticket = 1;
if (size == 0) {
/*
* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
* one.
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
retv = 1;
continue;
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
/*
* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
* calculate the master secret later.
*/
retv = 2;
continue;
}
if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
/* Shouldn't ever happen */
retv = -1;
goto end;
}
r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
switch (r) {
case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
retv = 2;
break;
case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
retv = r;
break;
case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
retv = 3;
break;
default: /* fatal error */
retv = -1;
break;
}
continue;
} else {
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
retv = -1;
goto end;
}
}
}
if (have_ticket == 0)
retv = 0;
end:
return retv;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void copyLine(Color8888* dst, const unsigned char* src, const ColorMapObject* cmap,
int transparent, int width) {
for (; width > 0; width--, src++, dst++) {
if (*src != transparent && *src < cmap->ColorCount) {
*dst = gifColorToColor8888(cmap->Colors[*src]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Skip composition of frames lacking a color map
Bug:68399117
Change-Id: I32f1d6856221b8a60130633edb69da2d2986c27c
(cherry picked from commit 0dc887f70eeea8d707cb426b96c6756edd1c607d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *create_dir_config(apr_pool_t *p, char *dir)
{
ap_lua_dir_cfg *cfg = apr_pcalloc(p, sizeof(ap_lua_dir_cfg));
cfg->package_paths = apr_array_make(p, 2, sizeof(char *));
cfg->package_cpaths = apr_array_make(p, 2, sizeof(char *));
cfg->mapped_handlers =
apr_array_make(p, 1, sizeof(ap_lua_mapped_handler_spec *));
cfg->mapped_filters =
apr_array_make(p, 1, sizeof(ap_lua_filter_handler_spec *));
cfg->pool = p;
cfg->hooks = apr_hash_make(p);
cfg->dir = apr_pstrdup(p, dir);
cfg->vm_scope = AP_LUA_SCOPE_UNSET;
cfg->codecache = AP_LUA_CACHE_UNSET;
cfg->vm_min = 0;
cfg->vm_max = 0;
return cfg;
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *hashtable_iter_at(hashtable_t *hashtable, const char *key)
{
pair_t *pair;
size_t hash;
bucket_t *bucket;
hash = hash_str(key);
bucket = &hashtable->buckets[hash % num_buckets(hashtable)];
pair = hashtable_find_pair(hashtable, bucket, key, hash);
if(!pair)
return NULL;
return &pair->list;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 166,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static LayoutBox* ScrollerLayoutBox(const ScrollableArea* scroller) {
LayoutBox* box = scroller->GetLayoutBox();
DCHECK(box);
return box;
}
Commit Message: Consider scroll-padding when determining scroll anchor node
Scroll anchoring should not anchor to a node that is behind scroll
padding.
Bug: 1010002
Change-Id: Icbd89fb85ea2c97a6de635930a9896f6a87b8f07
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1887745
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nick Burris <nburris@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#711020}
CWE ID: | 0 | 136,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect RenderLayerScrollableArea::scrollCornerAndResizerRect() const
{
IntRect scrollCornerAndResizer = scrollCornerRect();
if (scrollCornerAndResizer.isEmpty())
scrollCornerAndResizer = resizerCornerRect(box().pixelSnappedBorderBoxRect(), ResizerForPointer);
return scrollCornerAndResizer;
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UrlFetcher::Core::Core(const GURL& url, Method method)
: url_(url),
method_(method),
delegate_message_loop_(base::MessageLoopProxy::current()),
buffer_(new net::IOBuffer(kBufferSize)) {
CHECK(url_.is_valid());
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long ring_buffer_overrun_cpu(struct ring_buffer *buffer, int cpu)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
unsigned long ret;
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
return 0;
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
ret = local_read(&cpu_buffer->overrun);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::stepUp()
{
if (hasValue()) {
if (!indexIsInRange(++m_selectedIndex))
m_selectedIndex = m_minimumIndex;
} else
m_selectedIndex = m_minimumIndex;
updateVisibleValue(DispatchEvent);
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 103,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ops_traces_mod(struct ftrace_ops *ops)
{
struct ftrace_hash *hash;
hash = ops->filter_hash;
return ftrace_hash_empty(hash);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ldsem_wake(struct ld_semaphore *sem)
{
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&sem->wait_lock, flags);
__ldsem_wake(sem);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sem->wait_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix hang at ldsem_down_read()
When a controlling tty is being hung up and the hang up is
waiting for a just-signalled tty reader or writer to exit, and a new tty
reader/writer tries to acquire an ldisc reference concurrently with the
ldisc reference release from the signalled reader/writer, the hangup
can hang. The new reader/writer is sleeping in ldsem_down_read() and the
hangup is sleeping in ldsem_down_write() [1].
The new reader/writer fails to wakeup the waiting hangup because the
wrong lock count value is checked (the old lock count rather than the new
lock count) to see if the lock is unowned.
Change helper function to return the new lock count if the cmpxchg was
successful; document this behavior.
[1] edited dmesg log from reporter
SysRq : Show Blocked State
task PC stack pid father
systemd D ffff88040c4f0000 0 1 0 0x00000000
ffff88040c49fbe0 0000000000000046 ffff88040c4a0000 ffff88040c49ffd8
00000000001d3980 00000000001d3980 ffff88040c4a0000 ffff88040593d840
ffff88040c49fb40 ffffffff810a4cc0 0000000000000006 0000000000000023
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817a6649>] schedule+0x24/0x5e
[<ffffffff817a588b>] schedule_timeout+0x15b/0x1ec
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817aa691>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x26
[<ffffffff817aa10c>] down_read_failed+0xe3/0x1b9
[<ffffffff817aa26d>] ldsem_down_read+0x8b/0xa5
[<ffffffff8142b5ca>] ? tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x1b/0x44
[<ffffffff8142b5ca>] tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x1b/0x44
[<ffffffff81423f5b>] tty_write+0x7d/0x28a
[<ffffffff814241f5>] redirected_tty_write+0x8d/0x98
[<ffffffff81424168>] ? tty_write+0x28a/0x28a
[<ffffffff8115d03f>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x56/0x79
[<ffffffff8115e604>] do_readv_writev+0x1b0/0x1ff
[<ffffffff8116ea0b>] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x32a/0x489
[<ffffffff81167d9d>] ? final_putname+0x1d/0x3a
[<ffffffff8115e6c7>] vfs_writev+0x2e/0x49
[<ffffffff8115e7d3>] SyS_writev+0x47/0xaa
[<ffffffff817ab822>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
bash D ffffffff81c104c0 0 5469 5302 0x00000082
ffff8800cf817ac0 0000000000000046 ffff8804086b22a0 ffff8800cf817fd8
00000000001d3980 00000000001d3980 ffff8804086b22a0 ffff8800cf817a48
000000000000b9a0 ffff8800cf817a78 ffffffff81004675 ffff8800cf817a44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81004675>] ? dump_trace+0x165/0x29c
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff8100edda>] ? save_stack_trace+0x26/0x41
[<ffffffff817a6649>] schedule+0x24/0x5e
[<ffffffff817a588b>] schedule_timeout+0x15b/0x1ec
[<ffffffff810a4cc0>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x9f/0xe4
[<ffffffff817a9f03>] ? down_write_failed+0xa3/0x1c9
[<ffffffff817aa691>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x26
[<ffffffff817a9f0b>] down_write_failed+0xab/0x1c9
[<ffffffff817aa300>] ldsem_down_write+0x79/0xb1
[<ffffffff817aada3>] ? tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout+0xa5/0xd9
[<ffffffff817aada3>] tty_ldisc_lock_pair_timeout+0xa5/0xd9
[<ffffffff8142bf33>] tty_ldisc_hangup+0xc4/0x218
[<ffffffff81423ab3>] __tty_hangup+0x2e2/0x3ed
[<ffffffff81424a76>] disassociate_ctty+0x63/0x226
[<ffffffff81078aa7>] do_exit+0x79f/0xa11
[<ffffffff81086bdb>] ? get_signal_to_deliver+0x206/0x62f
[<ffffffff810b4bfb>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.8+0xf/0x16e
[<ffffffff81079b05>] do_group_exit+0x47/0xb5
[<ffffffff81086c16>] get_signal_to_deliver+0x241/0x62f
[<ffffffff810020a7>] do_signal+0x43/0x59d
[<ffffffff810f2af7>] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x21a/0x2a8
[<ffffffff810b4bfb>] ? lock_release_holdtime.part.8+0xf/0x16e
[<ffffffff81002655>] do_notify_resume+0x54/0x6c
[<ffffffff817abaf8>] int_signal+0x12/0x17
Reported-by: Sami Farin <sami.farin@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.12.x
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 57,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t AudioFlinger::EffectModule::removeHandle(EffectHandle *handle)
{
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
size_t size = mHandles.size();
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
if (mHandles[i] == handle) {
break;
}
}
if (i == size) {
return size;
}
ALOGV("removeHandle() %p removed handle %p in position %d", this, handle, i);
mHandles.removeAt(i);
if (i == 0) {
EffectHandle *h = controlHandle_l();
if (h != NULL) {
h->setControl(true /*hasControl*/, true /*signal*/ , handle->enabled() /*enabled*/);
}
}
if (mHandles.size() == 0 && !mPinned) {
mState = DESTROYED;
}
return mHandles.size();
}
Commit Message: Check effect command reply size in AudioFlinger
Bug: 29251553
Change-Id: I1bcc1281f1f0542bb645f6358ce31631f2a8ffbf
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void spl_array_write_dimension_ex(int check_inherited, zval *object, zval *offset, zval *value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
long index;
HashTable *ht;
if (check_inherited && intern->fptr_offset_set) {
if (!offset) {
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(offset);
} else {
SEPARATE_ARG_IF_REF(offset);
}
zend_call_method_with_2_params(&object, Z_OBJCE_P(object), &intern->fptr_offset_set, "offsetSet", NULL, offset, value);
zval_ptr_dtor(&offset);
return;
}
if (!offset) {
ht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (ht->nApplyCount > 0) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Modification of ArrayObject during sorting is prohibited");
return;
}
Z_ADDREF_P(value);
zend_hash_next_index_insert(ht, (void**)&value, sizeof(void*), NULL);
return;
}
switch(Z_TYPE_P(offset)) {
case IS_STRING:
ht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (ht->nApplyCount > 0) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Modification of ArrayObject during sorting is prohibited");
return;
}
Z_ADDREF_P(value);
zend_symtable_update(ht, Z_STRVAL_P(offset), Z_STRLEN_P(offset)+1, (void**)&value, sizeof(void*), NULL);
return;
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_RESOURCE:
case IS_BOOL:
case IS_LONG:
ht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (ht->nApplyCount > 0) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Modification of ArrayObject during sorting is prohibited");
return;
}
if (offset->type == IS_DOUBLE) {
index = (long)Z_DVAL_P(offset);
} else {
index = Z_LVAL_P(offset);
}
Z_ADDREF_P(value);
zend_hash_index_update(ht, index, (void**)&value, sizeof(void*), NULL);
return;
case IS_NULL:
ht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (ht->nApplyCount > 0) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Modification of ArrayObject during sorting is prohibited");
return;
}
Z_ADDREF_P(value);
zend_hash_next_index_insert(ht, (void**)&value, sizeof(void*), NULL);
return;
default:
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Illegal offset type");
return;
}
} /* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalNTPOneGoogleBarSmokeTest() {}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 127,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::errorCheck() const
{
return mError;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::ScheduleAnimation(
const PlatformFrameView* platform_frame_view) {
DCHECK(platform_frame_view->IsLocalFrameView());
LocalFrame& frame =
ToLocalFrameView(platform_frame_view)->GetFrame().LocalFrameRoot();
if (WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(&frame) &&
WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(&frame)->FrameWidget())
WebLocalFrameImpl::FromFrame(&frame)->FrameWidget()->ScheduleAnimation();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::EnqueueVisualViewportResizeEvent() {
VisualViewportResizeEvent* event = VisualViewportResizeEvent::Create();
event->SetTarget(domWindow()->visualViewport());
EnsureScriptedAnimationController().EnqueuePerFrameEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::lockAsync(uint32_t usage, void** vaddr, int fenceFd)
{
const Rect lockBounds(width, height);
status_t res = lockAsync(usage, lockBounds, vaddr, fenceFd);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
{
if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
return true;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
/*
* cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
* security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
*/
if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) {
if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
return true;
if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==
(POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
Commit Message: cred: copy_process() should clear child->replacement_session_keyring
keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().
However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).
change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuChannelHost::MessageFilter::RemoveRoute(int route_id) {
DCHECK(parent_->factory_->IsIOThread());
ListenerMap::iterator it = listeners_.find(route_id);
if (it != listeners_.end())
listeners_.erase(it);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_file_directory_collision(git_index *index,
git_index_entry *entry, size_t pos, int ok_to_replace)
{
int retval = has_file_name(index, entry, pos, ok_to_replace);
retval = retval + has_dir_name(index, entry, ok_to_replace);
if (retval) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INDEX,
"'%s' appears as both a file and a directory", entry->path);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _xfs_buf_get_pages(
xfs_buf_t *bp,
int page_count,
xfs_buf_flags_t flags)
{
/* Make sure that we have a page list */
if (bp->b_pages == NULL) {
bp->b_page_count = page_count;
if (page_count <= XB_PAGES) {
bp->b_pages = bp->b_page_array;
} else {
bp->b_pages = kmem_alloc(sizeof(struct page *) *
page_count, KM_NOFS);
if (bp->b_pages == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
}
memset(bp->b_pages, 0, sizeof(struct page *) * page_count);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ip_mc_clear_src(struct ip_mc_list *pmc)
{
struct ip_sf_list *psf, *nextpsf;
for (psf=pmc->tomb; psf; psf=nextpsf) {
nextpsf = psf->sf_next;
kfree(psf);
}
pmc->tomb = NULL;
for (psf=pmc->sources; psf; psf=nextpsf) {
nextpsf = psf->sf_next;
kfree(psf);
}
pmc->sources = NULL;
pmc->sfmode = MCAST_EXCLUDE;
pmc->sfcount[MCAST_INCLUDE] = 0;
pmc->sfcount[MCAST_EXCLUDE] = 1;
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OnTargetPathDetermined(
int32 download_id,
const content::DownloadTargetCallback& callback,
DownloadItem::TargetDisposition disposition,
content::DownloadDangerType danger_type,
const FilePath& target_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
FilePath intermediate_path;
DownloadItem* download =
download_manager_->GetDownload(download_id);
if (!download || (download->GetState() != DownloadItem::IN_PROGRESS))
return;
if (!target_path.empty()) {
intermediate_path = GetIntermediatePath(target_path, danger_type);
if (disposition == DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_PROMPT &&
!download->IsTemporary())
last_download_path_ = target_path.DirName();
}
callback.Run(target_path, disposition, danger_type, intermediate_path);
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_SaveNewTranslations_f( void ) {
char fileName[512];
if ( Cmd_Argc() != 2 ) {
Com_Printf( "usage: SaveNewTranslations <filename>\n" );
return;
}
strcpy( fileName, va( "translations/%s.cfg", Cmd_Argv( 1 ) ) );
CL_SaveTransTable( fileName, qtrue );
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Con_MessageMode4_f (void) {
chat_playerNum = VM_Call( cgvm, CG_LAST_ATTACKER );
if ( chat_playerNum < 0 || chat_playerNum >= MAX_CLIENTS ) {
chat_playerNum = -1;
return;
}
chat_team = qfalse;
Field_Clear( &chatField );
chatField.widthInChars = 30;
Key_SetCatcher( Key_GetCatcher( ) ^ KEYCATCH_MESSAGE );
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sg_proc_single_open_adio(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return single_open(file, sg_proc_seq_show_int, &sg_allow_dio);
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 42,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_dx_add_entry(handle_t *handle, struct dentry *dentry,
struct inode *inode)
{
struct dx_frame frames[2], *frame;
struct dx_entry *entries, *at;
struct dx_hash_info hinfo;
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
struct ext4_dir_entry_2 *de;
int err;
frame = dx_probe(&dentry->d_name, dir, &hinfo, frames, &err);
if (!frame)
return err;
entries = frame->entries;
at = frame->at;
if (!(bh = ext4_bread(handle, dir, dx_get_block(frame->at), 0, &err))) {
if (!err) {
err = -EIO;
ext4_error(dir->i_sb,
"Directory hole detected on inode %lu\n",
dir->i_ino);
}
goto cleanup;
}
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dirent_csum_verify(dir, (struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data))
goto journal_error;
set_buffer_verified(bh);
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, bh);
if (err)
goto journal_error;
err = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, dentry, inode, NULL, bh);
if (err != -ENOSPC)
goto cleanup;
/* Block full, should compress but for now just split */
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "using %u of %u node entries\n",
dx_get_count(entries), dx_get_limit(entries)));
/* Need to split index? */
if (dx_get_count(entries) == dx_get_limit(entries)) {
ext4_lblk_t newblock;
unsigned icount = dx_get_count(entries);
int levels = frame - frames;
struct dx_entry *entries2;
struct dx_node *node2;
struct buffer_head *bh2;
if (levels && (dx_get_count(frames->entries) ==
dx_get_limit(frames->entries))) {
ext4_warning(sb, "Directory index full!");
err = -ENOSPC;
goto cleanup;
}
bh2 = ext4_append (handle, dir, &newblock, &err);
if (!(bh2))
goto cleanup;
node2 = (struct dx_node *)(bh2->b_data);
entries2 = node2->entries;
memset(&node2->fake, 0, sizeof(struct fake_dirent));
node2->fake.rec_len = ext4_rec_len_to_disk(sb->s_blocksize,
sb->s_blocksize);
BUFFER_TRACE(frame->bh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, frame->bh);
if (err)
goto journal_error;
if (levels) {
unsigned icount1 = icount/2, icount2 = icount - icount1;
unsigned hash2 = dx_get_hash(entries + icount1);
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG "Split index %i/%i\n",
icount1, icount2));
BUFFER_TRACE(frame->bh, "get_write_access"); /* index root */
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle,
frames[0].bh);
if (err)
goto journal_error;
memcpy((char *) entries2, (char *) (entries + icount1),
icount2 * sizeof(struct dx_entry));
dx_set_count(entries, icount1);
dx_set_count(entries2, icount2);
dx_set_limit(entries2, dx_node_limit(dir));
/* Which index block gets the new entry? */
if (at - entries >= icount1) {
frame->at = at = at - entries - icount1 + entries2;
frame->entries = entries = entries2;
swap(frame->bh, bh2);
}
dx_insert_block(frames + 0, hash2, newblock);
dxtrace(dx_show_index("node", frames[1].entries));
dxtrace(dx_show_index("node",
((struct dx_node *) bh2->b_data)->entries));
err = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, bh2);
if (err)
goto journal_error;
brelse (bh2);
} else {
dxtrace(printk(KERN_DEBUG
"Creating second level index...\n"));
memcpy((char *) entries2, (char *) entries,
icount * sizeof(struct dx_entry));
dx_set_limit(entries2, dx_node_limit(dir));
/* Set up root */
dx_set_count(entries, 1);
dx_set_block(entries + 0, newblock);
((struct dx_root *) frames[0].bh->b_data)->info.indirect_levels = 1;
/* Add new access path frame */
frame = frames + 1;
frame->at = at = at - entries + entries2;
frame->entries = entries = entries2;
frame->bh = bh2;
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle,
frame->bh);
if (err)
goto journal_error;
}
err = ext4_handle_dirty_dx_node(handle, dir, frames[0].bh);
if (err) {
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
goto cleanup;
}
}
de = do_split(handle, dir, &bh, frame, &hinfo, &err);
if (!de)
goto cleanup;
err = add_dirent_to_buf(handle, dentry, inode, de, bh);
goto cleanup;
journal_error:
ext4_std_error(dir->i_sb, err);
cleanup:
if (bh)
brelse(bh);
dx_release(frames);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Layer::InsertChild(scoped_refptr<Layer> child, size_t index) {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
child->RemoveFromParent();
child->SetParent(this);
child->stacking_order_changed_ = true;
index = std::min(index, children_.size());
children_.insert(children_.begin() + index, child);
SetNeedsFullTreeSync();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool bdrv_requests_pending_all(void)
{
BlockDriverState *bs;
QTAILQ_FOREACH(bs, &bdrv_states, device_list) {
if (bdrv_requests_pending(bs)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,896 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BackendImpl::OnWrite(int32_t bytes) {
OnRead(bytes);
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::DetachSession(DevToolsSession* session) {
if (state_ == WORKER_READY && sessions().empty()) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetDevToolsAttachedOnIO,
context_weak_, version_id_, false));
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateDefaultSearchContextAndRequestSearchTerm() {
base::string16 surrounding = base::UTF8ToUTF16("Barack Obama just spoke.");
CreateSearchContextAndRequestSearchTerm("Barack Obama", surrounding, 0, 6);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameFetchContext::IsMainFrame() const {
if (IsDetached())
return frozen_state_->is_main_frame;
return GetFrame()->IsMainFrame();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_reset_slot_table(struct nfs4_slot_table *tbl, u32 max_reqs,
int ivalue)
{
struct nfs4_slot *new = NULL;
int i;
int ret = 0;
dprintk("--> %s: max_reqs=%u, tbl->max_slots %d\n", __func__,
max_reqs, tbl->max_slots);
/* Does the newly negotiated max_reqs match the existing slot table? */
if (max_reqs != tbl->max_slots) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
new = kmalloc(max_reqs * sizeof(struct nfs4_slot),
GFP_NOFS);
if (!new)
goto out;
ret = 0;
kfree(tbl->slots);
}
spin_lock(&tbl->slot_tbl_lock);
if (new) {
tbl->slots = new;
tbl->max_slots = max_reqs;
}
for (i = 0; i < tbl->max_slots; ++i)
tbl->slots[i].seq_nr = ivalue;
spin_unlock(&tbl->slot_tbl_lock);
dprintk("%s: tbl=%p slots=%p max_slots=%d\n", __func__,
tbl, tbl->slots, tbl->max_slots);
out:
dprintk("<-- %s: return %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::open(Document* entered_document,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
if (ImportLoader()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Imported document doesn't support open().");
return;
}
if (!IsHTMLDocument()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Only HTML documents support open().");
return;
}
if (throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"Custom Element constructor should not use open().");
return;
}
if (!AllowedToUseDynamicMarkUpInsertion("open", exception_state))
return;
if (entered_document) {
if (!GetSecurityOrigin()->IsSameSchemeHostPort(
entered_document->GetSecurityOrigin())) {
exception_state.ThrowSecurityError(
"Can only call open() on same-origin documents.");
return;
}
SetSecurityOrigin(entered_document->GetMutableSecurityOrigin());
if (this != entered_document) {
KURL new_url = entered_document->Url();
new_url.SetFragmentIdentifier(String());
SetURL(new_url);
SetReferrerPolicy(entered_document->GetReferrerPolicy());
}
cookie_url_ = entered_document->CookieURL();
}
open();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int uaddr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_tipc *addr = (struct sockaddr_tipc *)uaddr;
u32 portref = tipc_sk_port(sock->sk)->ref;
if (unlikely(!uaddr_len))
return tipc_withdraw(portref, 0, NULL);
if (uaddr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_tipc))
return -EINVAL;
if (addr->family != AF_TIPC)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (addr->addrtype == TIPC_ADDR_NAME)
addr->addr.nameseq.upper = addr->addr.nameseq.lower;
else if (addr->addrtype != TIPC_ADDR_NAMESEQ)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if ((addr->addr.nameseq.type < TIPC_RESERVED_TYPES) &&
(addr->addr.nameseq.type != TIPC_TOP_SRV) &&
(addr->addr.nameseq.type != TIPC_CFG_SRV))
return -EACCES;
return (addr->scope > 0) ?
tipc_publish(portref, addr->scope, &addr->addr.nameseq) :
tipc_withdraw(portref, -addr->scope, &addr->addr.nameseq);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StartVoiceInteractionSetupWizardActivity() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
arc::mojom::VoiceInteractionFrameworkInstance* framework_instance =
ARC_GET_INSTANCE_FOR_METHOD(
arc_bridge_service_->voice_interaction_framework(),
StartVoiceInteractionSetupWizard);
if (!framework_instance)
return;
if (should_start_runtime_flow_) {
should_start_runtime_flow_ = false;
VLOG(1) << "Starting runtime setup flow.";
framework_instance->StartVoiceInteractionSession(IsHomescreenActive());
return;
}
framework_instance->StartVoiceInteractionSetupWizard();
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldInsertNode(Node* node, Range* range, EditorInsertAction insertAction)
{
if (m_webPagePrivate->m_dumpRenderTree)
return m_webPagePrivate->m_dumpRenderTree->shouldInsertNode(node, range, static_cast<int>(insertAction));
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageStringUp16 (gdImagePtr im, gdFontPtr f,
int x, int y, unsigned short *s, int color)
{
int i;
int l;
l = strlen16 (s);
for (i = 0; (i < l); i++) {
gdImageCharUp (im, f, x, y, s[i], color);
y -= f->w;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: name_is_ok(const char *name, size_t max)
{
size_t len = strlen(name);
return len > 0 && len <= max &&
strspn(name, NAME_CHARS) == len && name[0] != '-';
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SecurityHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
host_ = frame_host;
if (enabled_ && host_)
AttachToRenderFrameHost();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,765 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.