instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ctr_crypt_final(struct bf_ctx *ctx, struct blkcipher_walk *walk)
{
u8 *ctrblk = walk->iv;
u8 keystream[BF_BLOCK_SIZE];
u8 *src = walk->src.virt.addr;
u8 *dst = walk->dst.virt.addr;
unsigned int nbytes = walk->nbytes;
blowfish_enc_blk(ctx, keystream, ctrblk);
crypto_xor(keystream, src, nbytes);
memcpy(dst, keystream, nbytes);
crypto_inc(ctrblk, BF_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncTest::SetUp() {
CommandLine* cl = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (cl->HasSwitch(switches::kPasswordFileForTest)) {
ReadPasswordFile();
} else if (cl->HasSwitch(switches::kSyncUserForTest) &&
cl->HasSwitch(switches::kSyncPasswordForTest)) {
username_ = cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSyncUserForTest);
password_ = cl->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kSyncPasswordForTest);
} else {
SetupMockGaiaResponses();
}
if (!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kSyncServiceURL) &&
!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kSyncServerCommandLine)) {
server_type_ = LOCAL_PYTHON_SERVER;
} else if (cl->HasSwitch(switches::kSyncServiceURL) &&
cl->HasSwitch(switches::kSyncServerCommandLine)) {
server_type_ = LOCAL_LIVE_SERVER;
} else if (cl->HasSwitch(switches::kSyncServiceURL) &&
!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kSyncServerCommandLine)) {
server_type_ = EXTERNAL_LIVE_SERVER;
} else {
LOG(FATAL) << "Can't figure out how to run a server.";
}
if (username_.empty() || password_.empty())
LOG(FATAL) << "Cannot run sync tests without GAIA credentials.";
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
Encryptor::UseMockKeychain(true);
#endif
InProcessBrowserTest::SetUp();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_make_key(WC_RNG* rng, int keysize, ecc_key* key)
{
return wc_ecc_make_key_ex(rng, keysize, key, ECC_CURVE_DEF);
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t arcmsr_iop_reset(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
struct CommandControlBlock *ccb;
uint32_t intmask_org;
uint8_t rtnval = 0x00;
int i = 0;
unsigned long flags;
if (atomic_read(&acb->ccboutstandingcount) != 0) {
/* disable all outbound interrupt */
intmask_org = arcmsr_disable_outbound_ints(acb);
/* talk to iop 331 outstanding command aborted */
rtnval = arcmsr_abort_allcmd(acb);
/* clear all outbound posted Q */
arcmsr_done4abort_postqueue(acb);
for (i = 0; i < ARCMSR_MAX_FREECCB_NUM; i++) {
ccb = acb->pccb_pool[i];
if (ccb->startdone == ARCMSR_CCB_START) {
scsi_dma_unmap(ccb->pcmd);
ccb->startdone = ARCMSR_CCB_DONE;
ccb->ccb_flags = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&acb->ccblist_lock, flags);
list_add_tail(&ccb->list, &acb->ccb_free_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&acb->ccblist_lock, flags);
}
}
atomic_set(&acb->ccboutstandingcount, 0);
/* enable all outbound interrupt */
arcmsr_enable_outbound_ints(acb, intmask_org);
return rtnval;
}
return rtnval;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(char *) cJSON_GetStringValue(cJSON *item) {
if (!cJSON_IsString(item)) {
return NULL;
}
return item->valuestring;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 87,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int delete_keys_call_count() const { return delete_keys_call_count_; }
Commit Message: Don't downcast DownloadManagerDelegate to ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate.
DownloadManager has public SetDelegate method and tests and or other subsystems
can install their own implementations of the delegate.
Bug: 805905
Change-Id: Iecf1e0aceada0e1048bed1e2d2ceb29ca64295b8
TBR: tests updated to follow the API change.
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894702
Reviewed-by: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533515}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 154,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_orphan_del(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct list_head *prev;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
__u32 ino_next;
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
int err = 0;
if (!EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
if (list_empty(&ei->i_orphan))
goto out;
ino_next = NEXT_ORPHAN(inode);
prev = ei->i_orphan.prev;
sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
jbd_debug(4, "remove inode %lu from orphan list\n", inode->i_ino);
list_del_init(&ei->i_orphan);
/* If we're on an error path, we may not have a valid
* transaction handle with which to update the orphan list on
* disk, but we still need to remove the inode from the linked
* list in memory. */
if (!handle)
goto out;
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
goto out_err;
if (prev == &sbi->s_orphan) {
jbd_debug(4, "superblock will point to %u\n", ino_next);
BUFFER_TRACE(sbi->s_sbh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(ino_next);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, inode->i_sb);
} else {
struct ext4_iloc iloc2;
struct inode *i_prev =
&list_entry(prev, struct ext4_inode_info, i_orphan)->vfs_inode;
jbd_debug(4, "orphan inode %lu will point to %u\n",
i_prev->i_ino, ino_next);
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(i_prev) = ino_next;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
}
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) = 0;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
out_err:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
out:
mutex_unlock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
return err;
out_brelse:
brelse(iloc.bh);
goto out_err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init l2cap_init_sockets(void)
{
int err;
err = proto_register(&l2cap_proto, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = bt_sock_register(BTPROTO_L2CAP, &l2cap_sock_family_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto error;
BT_INFO("L2CAP socket layer initialized");
return 0;
error:
BT_ERR("L2CAP socket registration failed");
proto_unregister(&l2cap_proto);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,513 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dput(struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(!dentry))
return;
repeat:
might_sleep();
rcu_read_lock();
if (likely(fast_dput(dentry))) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return;
}
/* Slow case: now with the dentry lock held */
rcu_read_unlock();
WARN_ON(d_in_lookup(dentry));
/* Unreachable? Get rid of it */
if (unlikely(d_unhashed(dentry)))
goto kill_it;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_DISCONNECTED))
goto kill_it;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_DELETE)) {
if (dentry->d_op->d_delete(dentry))
goto kill_it;
}
dentry_lru_add(dentry);
dentry->d_lockref.count--;
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
return;
kill_it:
dentry = dentry_kill(dentry);
if (dentry) {
cond_resched();
goto repeat;
}
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void reply_outbuf(struct smb_request *req, uint8 num_words, uint32 num_bytes)
{
char *outbuf;
if (!create_outbuf(req, req, (char *)req->inbuf, &outbuf, num_words,
num_bytes)) {
smb_panic("could not allocate output buffer\n");
}
req->outbuf = (uint8_t *)outbuf;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetMappedButton(int button) {
return button > 0 && button <= count_ ? map_[button - 1] : button;
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 119,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> SiteInstanceImpl::GetRelatedSiteInstance(
const GURL& url) {
return browsing_instance_->GetSiteInstanceForURL(url);
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void check_irq_off(void)
{
BUG_ON(!irqs_disabled());
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_extreme_restriction_threshold(void)
{
int32_t pct = networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
"guard-extreme-restriction-percent",
DFLT_EXTREME_RESTRICTION_PERCENT,
1, INT32_MAX);
return pct / 100.0;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inline void comps_rtree_pair_destroy_v(void * pair) {
free(((COMPS_RTreePair *)pair)->key);
free(pair);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PasswordInputType::OnAttachWithLayoutObject() {
GetElement().GetDocument().IncrementPasswordCount();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGenPathsCHROMIUM(GLuint path,
GLsizei range) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fill_note_info(struct elfhdr *elf, int phdrs,
struct elf_note_info *info,
long signr, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct list_head *t;
if (!elf_note_info_init(info))
return 0;
if (signr) {
struct core_thread *ct;
struct elf_thread_status *ets;
for (ct = current->mm->core_state->dumper.next;
ct; ct = ct->next) {
ets = kzalloc(sizeof(*ets), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ets)
return 0;
ets->thread = ct->task;
list_add(&ets->list, &info->thread_list);
}
list_for_each(t, &info->thread_list) {
int sz;
ets = list_entry(t, struct elf_thread_status, list);
sz = elf_dump_thread_status(signr, ets);
info->thread_status_size += sz;
}
}
/* now collect the dump for the current */
memset(info->prstatus, 0, sizeof(*info->prstatus));
fill_prstatus(info->prstatus, current, signr);
elf_core_copy_regs(&info->prstatus->pr_reg, regs);
/* Set up header */
fill_elf_header(elf, phdrs, ELF_ARCH, ELF_CORE_EFLAGS, ELF_OSABI);
/*
* Set up the notes in similar form to SVR4 core dumps made
* with info from their /proc.
*/
fill_note(info->notes + 0, "CORE", NT_PRSTATUS,
sizeof(*info->prstatus), info->prstatus);
fill_psinfo(info->psinfo, current->group_leader, current->mm);
fill_note(info->notes + 1, "CORE", NT_PRPSINFO,
sizeof(*info->psinfo), info->psinfo);
info->numnote = 2;
fill_auxv_note(&info->notes[info->numnote++], current->mm);
/* Try to dump the FPU. */
info->prstatus->pr_fpvalid = elf_core_copy_task_fpregs(current, regs,
info->fpu);
if (info->prstatus->pr_fpvalid)
fill_note(info->notes + info->numnote++,
"CORE", NT_PRFPREG, sizeof(*info->fpu), info->fpu);
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
if (elf_core_copy_task_xfpregs(current, info->xfpu))
fill_note(info->notes + info->numnote++,
"LINUX", ELF_CORE_XFPREG_TYPE,
sizeof(*info->xfpu), info->xfpu);
#endif
return 1;
}
Commit Message: regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltGetHTMLIDs(const xmlChar *version, const xmlChar **publicID,
const xmlChar **systemID) {
unsigned int i;
if (version == NULL)
return(-1);
for (i = 0;i < (sizeof(xsltHTMLVersions)/sizeof(xsltHTMLVersions[1]));
i++) {
if (!xmlStrcasecmp(version,
(const xmlChar *) xsltHTMLVersions[i].version)) {
if (publicID != NULL)
*publicID = (const xmlChar *) xsltHTMLVersions[i].public;
if (systemID != NULL)
*systemID = (const xmlChar *) xsltHTMLVersions[i].system;
return(0);
}
}
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __weak arch_release_thread_stack(unsigned long *stack)
{
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnFrameRemoved(RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.FrameDeleted(render_frame_host);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void allocate_new_segments(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct curseg_info *curseg;
unsigned int old_segno;
int i;
for (i = CURSEG_HOT_DATA; i <= CURSEG_COLD_DATA; i++) {
curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, i);
old_segno = curseg->segno;
SIT_I(sbi)->s_ops->allocate_segment(sbi, i, true);
locate_dirty_segment(sbi, old_segno);
}
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 85,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
trace_kvm_exit(exit_reason, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
/*
* Flush logged GPAs PML buffer, this will make dirty_bitmap more
* updated. Another good is, in kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log, before
* querying dirty_bitmap, we only need to kick all vcpus out of guest
* mode as if vcpus is in root mode, the PML buffer must has been
* flushed already.
*/
if (enable_pml)
vmx_flush_pml_buffer(vcpu);
/* If guest state is invalid, start emulating */
if (vmx->emulation_required)
return handle_invalid_guest_state(vcpu);
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_vmx_exit_reflected(vcpu, exit_reason))
return nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason);
if (exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY) {
dump_vmcs();
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
= exit_reason;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
= vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* Note:
* Do not try to fix EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG if it caused by
* delivery event since it indicates guest is accessing MMIO.
* The vm-exit can be triggered again after return to guest that
* will cause infinite loop.
*/
if ((vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
(exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION &&
exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL &&
exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_DELIVERY_EV;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3;
vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vectoring_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = exit_reason;
vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = vcpu->arch.exit_qualification;
if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
vcpu->run->internal.ndata++;
vcpu->run->internal.data[3] =
vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
}
return 0;
}
if (exit_reason < kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers
&& kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason])
return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason](vcpu);
else {
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmx: unexpected exit reason 0x%x\n",
exit_reason);
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 63,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Com_BeginRedirect (char *buffer, int buffersize, void (*flush)( char *) )
{
if (!buffer || !buffersize || !flush)
return;
rd_buffer = buffer;
rd_buffersize = buffersize;
rd_flush = flush;
*rd_buffer = 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_proc_create_session(struct nfs_client *clp,
struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct nfs4_session *session = clp->cl_session;
struct nfs41_create_session_args args = {
.client = clp,
.clientid = clp->cl_clientid,
.seqid = clp->cl_seqid,
.cb_program = NFS4_CALLBACK,
};
struct nfs41_create_session_res res;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CREATE_SESSION],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
int status;
nfs4_init_channel_attrs(&args);
args.flags = (SESSION4_PERSIST | SESSION4_BACK_CHAN);
status = rpc_call_sync(session->clp->cl_rpcclient, &msg, RPC_TASK_TIMEOUT);
trace_nfs4_create_session(clp, status);
if (!status) {
/* Verify the session's negotiated channel_attrs values */
status = nfs4_verify_channel_attrs(&args, &res);
/* Increment the clientid slot sequence id */
if (clp->cl_seqid == res.seqid)
clp->cl_seqid++;
if (status)
goto out;
nfs4_update_session(session, &res);
}
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: views::View* GetPermissionAnchorView(Browser* browser) {
return bubble_anchor_util::GetPageInfoAnchorView(browser);
}
Commit Message: Elide the permission bubble title from the head of the string.
Long URLs can be used to spoof other origins in the permission bubble
title. This CL customises the title to be elided from the head, which
ensures that the maximal amount of the URL host is displayed in the case
where the URL is too long and causes the string to overflow.
Implementing the ellision means that the title cannot be multiline
(where elision is not well supported). Note that in English, the
window title is a string "$ORIGIN wants to", so the non-origin
component will not be elided. In other languages, the non-origin
component may appear fully or partly before the origin (e.g. in
Filipino, "Gusto ng $ORIGIN na"), so it may be elided there if the
URL is sufficiently long. This is not optimal, but the URLs that are
sufficiently long to trigger the elision are probably malicious, and
displaying the most relevant component of the URL is most important
for security purposes.
BUG=774438
Change-Id: I75c2364b10bf69bf337c7f4970481bf1809f6aae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768312
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Garron <lgarron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516921}
CWE ID: | 0 | 146,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothAdapterChromeOS::DiscoveringChanged(
bool discovering) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(BluetoothAdapter::Observer, observers_,
AdapterDiscoveringChanged(this, discovering));
}
Commit Message: Refactor to support default Bluetooth pairing delegate
In order to support a default pairing delegate we need to move the agent
service provider delegate implementation from BluetoothDevice to
BluetoothAdapter while retaining the existing API.
BUG=338492
TEST=device_unittests, unit_tests, browser_tests
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/148293003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@252216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum test_return test_issue_92(void) {
char buffer[1024];
close(sock);
sock = connect_server("127.0.0.1", port, false);
send_ascii_command("stats cachedump 1 0 0\r\n");
read_ascii_response(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
assert(strncmp(buffer, "END", strlen("END")) == 0);
send_ascii_command("stats cachedump 200 0 0\r\n");
read_ascii_response(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
assert(strncmp(buffer, "CLIENT_ERROR", strlen("CLIENT_ERROR")) == 0);
close(sock);
sock = connect_server("127.0.0.1", port, false);
return TEST_PASS;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 94,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void veth_dellink(struct net_device *dev, struct list_head *head)
{
struct veth_priv *priv;
struct net_device *peer;
priv = netdev_priv(dev);
peer = priv->peer;
unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, head);
unregister_netdevice_queue(peer, head);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ti_vread_sync(struct usb_device *dev, __u8 request,
__u16 value, __u16 index, u8 *data, int size)
{
int status;
status = usb_control_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0), request,
(USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_IN),
value, index, data, size, 1000);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (status != size) {
dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "%s - wanted to write %d, but only wrote %d\n",
__func__, size, status);
return -ECOMM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 33,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: handle_desc_stats_request(struct ofconn *ofconn,
const struct ofp_header *request)
{
static const char *default_mfr_desc = "Nicira, Inc.";
static const char *default_hw_desc = "Open vSwitch";
static const char *default_sw_desc = VERSION;
static const char *default_serial_desc = "None";
static const char *default_dp_desc = "None";
struct ofproto *p = ofconn_get_ofproto(ofconn);
struct ofp_desc_stats *ods;
struct ofpbuf *msg;
msg = ofpraw_alloc_stats_reply(request, 0);
ods = ofpbuf_put_zeros(msg, sizeof *ods);
ovs_strlcpy(ods->mfr_desc, p->mfr_desc ? p->mfr_desc : default_mfr_desc,
sizeof ods->mfr_desc);
ovs_strlcpy(ods->hw_desc, p->hw_desc ? p->hw_desc : default_hw_desc,
sizeof ods->hw_desc);
ovs_strlcpy(ods->sw_desc, p->sw_desc ? p->sw_desc : default_sw_desc,
sizeof ods->sw_desc);
ovs_strlcpy(ods->serial_num,
p->serial_desc ? p->serial_desc : default_serial_desc,
sizeof ods->serial_num);
ovs_strlcpy(ods->dp_desc, p->dp_desc ? p->dp_desc : default_dp_desc,
sizeof ods->dp_desc);
ofconn_send_reply(ofconn, msg);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpServer::Initialize( Proxy *proxy )
{
if ( is_initialized == true ) {
return true;
}
if ( m_gahp_pid == -1 ) {
if ( Startup() == false ) {
return false;
}
}
master_proxy = new GahpProxyInfo;
master_proxy->proxy = proxy->subject->master_proxy;
AcquireProxy( master_proxy->proxy, (TimerHandlercpp)&GahpServer::ProxyCallback,
this );
master_proxy->cached_expiration = 0;
if ( m_commands_supported->contains_anycase( "INITIALIZE_FROM_FILE" ) ) {
if ( command_initialize_from_file( master_proxy->proxy->proxy_filename ) == false ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "GAHP: Failed to initialize from file\n" );
return false;
}
}
current_proxy = master_proxy;
if ( can_cache_proxies ) {
if ( cacheProxyFromFile( master_proxy ) == false ) {
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "GAHP: Failed to cache proxy from file!\n" );
return false;
}
ProxiesByFilename = new HashTable<HashKey,GahpProxyInfo*>( 500,
&hashFunction );
ASSERT(ProxiesByFilename);
}
master_proxy->cached_expiration = master_proxy->proxy->expiration_time;
is_initialized = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int64_t update_size(AVIOContext *pb, int64_t pos)
{
int64_t curpos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_seek(pb, pos, SEEK_SET);
avio_wb32(pb, curpos - pos); /* rewrite size */
avio_seek(pb, curpos, SEEK_SET);
return curpos - pos;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *validate_xmit_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
{
netdev_features_t features;
features = netif_skb_features(skb);
skb = validate_xmit_vlan(skb, features);
if (unlikely(!skb))
goto out_null;
if (netif_needs_gso(skb, features)) {
struct sk_buff *segs;
segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, features);
if (IS_ERR(segs)) {
goto out_kfree_skb;
} else if (segs) {
consume_skb(skb);
skb = segs;
}
} else {
if (skb_needs_linearize(skb, features) &&
__skb_linearize(skb))
goto out_kfree_skb;
if (validate_xmit_xfrm(skb, features))
goto out_kfree_skb;
/* If packet is not checksummed and device does not
* support checksumming for this protocol, complete
* checksumming here.
*/
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
if (skb->encapsulation)
skb_set_inner_transport_header(skb,
skb_checksum_start_offset(skb));
else
skb_set_transport_header(skb,
skb_checksum_start_offset(skb));
if (skb_csum_hwoffload_help(skb, features))
goto out_kfree_skb;
}
}
return skb;
out_kfree_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
out_null:
atomic_long_inc(&dev->tx_dropped);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<Range> rangeOfContents(Node* node)
{
ASSERT(node);
RefPtr<Range> range = Range::create(node->document());
int exception = 0;
range->selectNodeContents(node, exception);
return range.release();
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestExtensionSystem::~TestExtensionSystem() {
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidSerializeDataForFrame(
const WebVector<char>& data,
WebFrameSerializerClient::FrameSerializationStatus status) {
bool end_of_data =
status == WebFrameSerializerClient::kCurrentFrameIsFinished;
Send(new FrameHostMsg_SerializedHtmlWithLocalLinksResponse(
routing_id_, std::string(data.Data(), data.size()), end_of_data));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int packet_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN)
seq_puts(seq, "sk RefCnt Type Proto Iface R Rmem User Inode\n");
else {
struct sock *s = sk_entry(v);
const struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(s);
seq_printf(seq,
"%pK %-6d %-4d %04x %-5d %1d %-6u %-6u %-6lu\n",
s,
atomic_read(&s->sk_refcnt),
s->sk_type,
ntohs(po->num),
po->ifindex,
po->running,
atomic_read(&s->sk_rmem_alloc),
sock_i_uid(s),
sock_i_ino(s));
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_packet: prevent information leak
In 2.6.27, commit 393e52e33c6c2 (packet: deliver VLAN TCI to userspace)
added a small information leak.
Add padding field and make sure its zeroed before copy to user.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 26,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_sched_cfs_period_timer(struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b, int overrun)
{
u64 runtime, runtime_expires;
int throttled;
/* no need to continue the timer with no bandwidth constraint */
if (cfs_b->quota == RUNTIME_INF)
goto out_deactivate;
throttled = !list_empty(&cfs_b->throttled_cfs_rq);
cfs_b->nr_periods += overrun;
/*
* idle depends on !throttled (for the case of a large deficit), and if
* we're going inactive then everything else can be deferred
*/
if (cfs_b->idle && !throttled)
goto out_deactivate;
__refill_cfs_bandwidth_runtime(cfs_b);
if (!throttled) {
/* mark as potentially idle for the upcoming period */
cfs_b->idle = 1;
return 0;
}
/* account preceding periods in which throttling occurred */
cfs_b->nr_throttled += overrun;
runtime_expires = cfs_b->runtime_expires;
/*
* This check is repeated as we are holding onto the new bandwidth while
* we unthrottle. This can potentially race with an unthrottled group
* trying to acquire new bandwidth from the global pool. This can result
* in us over-using our runtime if it is all used during this loop, but
* only by limited amounts in that extreme case.
*/
while (throttled && cfs_b->runtime > 0 && !cfs_b->distribute_running) {
runtime = cfs_b->runtime;
cfs_b->distribute_running = 1;
raw_spin_unlock(&cfs_b->lock);
/* we can't nest cfs_b->lock while distributing bandwidth */
runtime = distribute_cfs_runtime(cfs_b, runtime,
runtime_expires);
raw_spin_lock(&cfs_b->lock);
cfs_b->distribute_running = 0;
throttled = !list_empty(&cfs_b->throttled_cfs_rq);
lsub_positive(&cfs_b->runtime, runtime);
}
/*
* While we are ensured activity in the period following an
* unthrottle, this also covers the case in which the new bandwidth is
* insufficient to cover the existing bandwidth deficit. (Forcing the
* timer to remain active while there are any throttled entities.)
*/
cfs_b->idle = 0;
return 0;
out_deactivate:
return 1;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd_access(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, u32 *access, u32 *supported)
{
struct accessmap *map;
struct svc_export *export;
struct dentry *dentry;
u32 query, result = 0, sresult = 0;
__be32 error;
error = fh_verify(rqstp, fhp, 0, NFSD_MAY_NOP);
if (error)
goto out;
export = fhp->fh_export;
dentry = fhp->fh_dentry;
if (d_is_reg(dentry))
map = nfs3_regaccess;
else if (d_is_dir(dentry))
map = nfs3_diraccess;
else
map = nfs3_anyaccess;
query = *access;
for (; map->access; map++) {
if (map->access & query) {
__be32 err2;
sresult |= map->access;
err2 = nfsd_permission(rqstp, export, dentry, map->how);
switch (err2) {
case nfs_ok:
result |= map->access;
break;
/* the following error codes just mean the access was not allowed,
* rather than an error occurred */
case nfserr_rofs:
case nfserr_acces:
case nfserr_perm:
/* simply don't "or" in the access bit. */
break;
default:
error = err2;
goto out;
}
}
}
*access = result;
if (supported)
*supported = sresult;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Camera2Client::setPreviewCallbackFlagL(Parameters ¶ms, int flag) {
status_t res = OK;
switch(params.state) {
case Parameters::STOPPED:
case Parameters::WAITING_FOR_PREVIEW_WINDOW:
case Parameters::PREVIEW:
case Parameters::STILL_CAPTURE:
break;
default:
if (flag & CAMERA_FRAME_CALLBACK_FLAG_ENABLE_MASK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't use preview callbacks "
"in state %d", __FUNCTION__, mCameraId, params.state);
return;
}
}
if (flag & CAMERA_FRAME_CALLBACK_FLAG_ONE_SHOT_MASK) {
ALOGV("%s: setting oneshot", __FUNCTION__);
params.previewCallbackOneShot = true;
}
if (params.previewCallbackFlags != (uint32_t)flag) {
if (params.previewCallbackSurface && flag != CAMERA_FRAME_CALLBACK_FLAG_NOOP) {
res = mCallbackProcessor->setCallbackWindow(NULL);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to clear preview callback surface:"
" %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__, mCameraId, strerror(-res), res);
return;
}
params.previewCallbackSurface = false;
}
params.previewCallbackFlags = flag;
if (params.state == Parameters::PREVIEW) {
res = startPreviewL(params, true);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to refresh request in state %s",
__FUNCTION__, mCameraId,
Parameters::getStateName(params.state));
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,743 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void boot_unattempted_labels(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, struct pxe_menu *cfg)
{
struct list_head *pos;
struct pxe_label *label;
list_for_each(pos, &cfg->labels) {
label = list_entry(pos, struct pxe_label, list);
if (!label->attempted)
label_boot(cmdtp, label);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int json_string_equal(json_t *string1, json_t *string2)
{
return strcmp(json_string_value(string1), json_string_value(string2)) == 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 40,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::OnAssociatedInterfaceRequest(
const std::string& interface_name,
mojo::ScopedInterfaceEndpointHandle handle) {
if (interface_name == mojom::RouteProvider::Name_) {
if (route_provider_binding_.is_bound())
return;
mojom::RouteProviderAssociatedRequest request;
request.Bind(std::move(handle));
route_provider_binding_.Bind(std::move(request));
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Request for unknown Channel-associated interface: "
<< interface_name;
}
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline size_t xfrm_migrate_msgsize(int num_migrate, int with_kma)
{
return NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct xfrm_userpolicy_id))
+ (with_kma ? nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_kmaddress)) : 0)
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_user_migrate) * num_migrate)
+ userpolicy_type_attrsize();
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void netif_free_tx_queues(struct net_device *dev)
{
kvfree(dev->_tx);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: content::TtsPlatform* ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetTtsPlatform() {
#ifdef OS_CHROMEOS
return TtsPlatformImplChromeOs::GetInstance();
#else
return nullptr;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: selftests_ecdsa (selftest_report_func_t report)
{
const char *what;
const char *errtxt;
gcry_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t skey = NULL;
gcry_sexp_t pkey = NULL;
what = "convert";
err = sexp_sscan (&skey, NULL, sample_secret_key_secp256,
strlen (sample_secret_key_secp256));
if (!err)
err = sexp_sscan (&pkey, NULL, sample_public_key_secp256,
strlen (sample_public_key_secp256));
if (err)
{
errtxt = _gcry_strerror (err);
goto failed;
}
what = "key consistency";
err = ecc_check_secret_key(skey);
if (err)
{
errtxt = _gcry_strerror (err);
goto failed;
}
what = "sign";
errtxt = selftest_sign (pkey, skey);
if (errtxt)
goto failed;
sexp_release(pkey);
sexp_release(skey);
return 0; /* Succeeded. */
failed:
sexp_release(pkey);
sexp_release(skey);
if (report)
report ("pubkey", GCRY_PK_ECC, what, errtxt);
return GPG_ERR_SELFTEST_FAILED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _XcursorAddPathElt (char *path, const char *elt, int len)
{
size_t pathlen = strlen (path);
/* append / if the path doesn't currently have one */
if (path[0] == '\0' || path[pathlen - 1] != '/')
{
strcat (path, "/");
pathlen++;
}
if (len == -1)
len = strlen (elt);
/* strip leading slashes */
while (len && elt[0] == '/')
{
elt++;
len--;
}
strncpy (path + pathlen, elt, len);
path[pathlen + len] = '\0';
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,087 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const struct arm_pmu *__init xscale1pmu_init(void)
{
return &xscale1pmu;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_notify)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
long result_type = PGSQL_ASSOC;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGnotify *pgsql_notify;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r|l",
&pgsql_link, &result_type) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (!(result_type & PGSQL_BOTH)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid result type");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PQconsumeInput(pgsql);
pgsql_notify = PQnotifies(pgsql);
if (!pgsql_notify) {
/* no notify message */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
if (result_type & PGSQL_NUM) {
add_index_string(return_value, 0, pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_index_long(return_value, 1, pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_index_string(return_value, 2, pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
if (result_type & PGSQL_ASSOC) {
add_assoc_string(return_value, "message", pgsql_notify->relname, 1);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "pid", pgsql_notify->be_pid);
#if HAVE_PQPROTOCOLVERSION && HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
if (PQprotocolVersion(pgsql) >= 3 && atof(PQparameterStatus(pgsql, "server_version")) >= 9.0) {
#else
if (atof(PG_VERSION) >= 9.0) {
#endif
#if HAVE_PQPARAMETERSTATUS
add_assoc_string(return_value, "payload", pgsql_notify->extra, 1);
#endif
}
}
PQfreemem(pgsql_notify);
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto int pg_get_pid([resource connection)
Get backend(server) pid */
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_get_pid)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
int id = -1;
PGconn *pgsql;
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r",
&pgsql_link) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
RETURN_LONG(PQbackendPID(pgsql));
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_pgsql_meta_data
* TODO: Add meta_data cache for better performance
*/
PHP_PGSQL_API int php_pgsql_meta_data(PGconn *pg_link, const char *table_name, zval *meta TSRMLS_DC)
{
PGresult *pg_result;
char *src, *tmp_name, *tmp_name2 = NULL;
char *escaped;
smart_str querystr = {0};
size_t new_len;
int i, num_rows;
zval *elem;
if (!*table_name) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The table name must be specified");
return FAILURE;
}
src = estrdup(table_name);
tmp_name = php_strtok_r(src, ".", &tmp_name2);
if (!tmp_name2 || !*tmp_name2) {
/* Default schema */
tmp_name2 = tmp_name;
tmp_name = "public";
}
smart_str_appends(&querystr,
"SELECT a.attname, a.attnum, t.typname, a.attlen, a.attnotnull, a.atthasdef, a.attndims, t.typtype = 'e' "
"FROM pg_class as c, pg_attribute a, pg_type t, pg_namespace n "
"WHERE a.attnum > 0 AND a.attrelid = c.oid AND c.relname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name2), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name2, strlen(tmp_name2), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND c.relnamespace = n.oid AND n.nspname = '");
escaped = (char *)safe_emalloc(strlen(tmp_name), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, escaped, tmp_name, strlen(tmp_name), NULL);
if (new_len) {
smart_str_appendl(&querystr, escaped, new_len);
}
efree(escaped);
smart_str_appends(&querystr, "' AND a.atttypid = t.oid ORDER BY a.attnum;");
smart_str_0(&querystr);
efree(src);
pg_result = PQexec(pg_link, querystr.c);
if (PQresultStatus(pg_result) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK || (num_rows = PQntuples(pg_result)) == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Table '%s' doesn't exists", table_name);
smart_str_free(&querystr);
PQclear(pg_result);
return FAILURE;
}
smart_str_free(&querystr);
for (i = 0; i < num_rows; i++) {
char *name;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(elem);
array_init(elem);
add_assoc_long(elem, "num", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,1)));
add_assoc_string(elem, "type", PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,2), 1);
add_assoc_long(elem, "len", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,3)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,4), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "not null", 0);
}
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,5), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "has default", 0);
}
add_assoc_long(elem, "array dims", atoi(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,6)));
if (!strcmp(PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,7), "t")) {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 1);
}
else {
add_assoc_bool(elem, "is enum", 0);
}
name = PQgetvalue(pg_result,i,0);
add_assoc_zval(meta, name, elem);
}
PQclear(pg_result);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ proto array pg_meta_data(resource db, string table)
Get meta_data */
PHP_FUNCTION(pg_meta_data)
{
zval *pgsql_link;
char *table_name;
uint table_name_len;
PGconn *pgsql;
int id = -1;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rs",
&pgsql_link, &table_name, &table_name_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
array_init(return_value);
if (php_pgsql_meta_data(pgsql, table_name, return_value TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
zval_dtor(return_value); /* destroy array */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
else {
HashPosition pos;
zval **val;
for (zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(return_value), &pos);
zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(return_value), (void **)&val, &pos) == SUCCESS;
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(Z_ARRVAL_P(return_value), &pos)) {
/* delete newly added entry, in order to keep BC */
zend_hash_del_key_or_index(Z_ARRVAL_PP(val), "is enum", sizeof("is enum"), 0, HASH_DEL_KEY);
}
}
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_pgsql_get_data_type
*/
static php_pgsql_data_type php_pgsql_get_data_type(const char *type_name, size_t len)
{
/* This is stupid way to do. I'll fix it when I decied how to support
user defined types. (Yasuo) */
/* boolean */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "bool")|| !strcmp(type_name, "boolean"))
return PG_BOOL;
/* object id */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "oid"))
return PG_OID;
/* integer */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "int2") || !strcmp(type_name, "smallint"))
return PG_INT2;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "int4") || !strcmp(type_name, "integer"))
return PG_INT4;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "int8") || !strcmp(type_name, "bigint"))
return PG_INT8;
/* real and other */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "float4") || !strcmp(type_name, "real"))
return PG_FLOAT4;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "float8") || !strcmp(type_name, "double precision"))
return PG_FLOAT8;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "numeric"))
return PG_NUMERIC;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "money"))
return PG_MONEY;
/* character */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "text"))
return PG_TEXT;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "bpchar") || !strcmp(type_name, "character"))
return PG_CHAR;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "varchar") || !strcmp(type_name, "character varying"))
return PG_VARCHAR;
/* time and interval */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "abstime"))
return PG_UNIX_TIME;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "reltime"))
return PG_UNIX_TIME_INTERVAL;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "tinterval"))
return PG_UNIX_TIME_INTERVAL;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "date"))
return PG_DATE;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "time"))
return PG_TIME;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "time with time zone") || !strcmp(type_name, "timetz"))
return PG_TIME_WITH_TIMEZONE;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "timestamp without time zone") || !strcmp(type_name, "timestamp"))
return PG_TIMESTAMP;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "timestamp with time zone") || !strcmp(type_name, "timestamptz"))
return PG_TIMESTAMP_WITH_TIMEZONE;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "interval"))
return PG_INTERVAL;
/* binary */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "bytea"))
return PG_BYTEA;
/* network */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "cidr"))
return PG_CIDR;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "inet"))
return PG_INET;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "macaddr"))
return PG_MACADDR;
/* bit */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "bit"))
return PG_BIT;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "bit varying"))
return PG_VARBIT;
/* geometric */
if (!strcmp(type_name, "line"))
return PG_LINE;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "lseg"))
return PG_LSEG;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "box"))
return PG_BOX;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "path"))
return PG_PATH;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "point"))
return PG_POINT;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "polygon"))
return PG_POLYGON;
if (!strcmp(type_name, "circle"))
return PG_CIRCLE;
return PG_UNKNOWN;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_pgsql_convert_match
* test field value with regular expression specified.
*/
static int php_pgsql_convert_match(const char *str, size_t str_len, const char *regex , int icase TSRMLS_DC)
{
regex_t re;
regmatch_t *subs;
int regopt = REG_EXTENDED;
int regerr, ret = SUCCESS;
int i;
/* Check invalid chars for POSIX regex */
for (i = 0; i < str_len; i++) {
if (str[i] == '\n' ||
str[i] == '\r' ||
str[i] == '\0' ) {
return FAILURE;
}
}
if (icase) {
regopt |= REG_ICASE;
}
regerr = regcomp(&re, regex, regopt);
if (regerr) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot compile regex");
regfree(&re);
return FAILURE;
}
subs = (regmatch_t *)ecalloc(sizeof(regmatch_t), re.re_nsub+1);
regerr = regexec(&re, str, re.re_nsub+1, subs, 0);
if (regerr == REG_NOMATCH) {
#ifdef PHP_DEBUG
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "'%s' does not match with '%s'", str, regex);
#endif
ret = FAILURE;
}
else if (regerr) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Cannot exec regex");
ret = FAILURE;
}
regfree(&re);
efree(subs);
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
/* {{{ php_pgsql_add_quote
* add quotes around string.
*/
static int php_pgsql_add_quotes(zval *src, zend_bool should_free TSRMLS_DC)
{
smart_str str = {0};
assert(Z_TYPE_P(src) == IS_STRING);
assert(should_free == 1 || should_free == 0);
smart_str_appendc(&str, 'E');
smart_str_appendc(&str, '\'');
smart_str_appendl(&str, Z_STRVAL_P(src), Z_STRLEN_P(src));
smart_str_appendc(&str, '\'');
smart_str_0(&str);
if (should_free) {
efree(Z_STRVAL_P(src));
}
Z_STRVAL_P(src) = str.c;
Z_STRLEN_P(src) = str.len;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
#define PGSQL_CONV_CHECK_IGNORE() \
if (!err && Z_TYPE_P(new_val) == IS_STRING && !strcmp(Z_STRVAL_P(new_val), "NULL")) { \
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NaClIPCAdapter::NaClIPCAdapter(const IPC::ChannelHandle& handle,
base::TaskRunner* runner)
: lock_(),
cond_var_(&lock_),
task_runner_(runner),
locked_data_() {
io_thread_data_.channel_.reset(
new IPC::Channel(handle, IPC::Channel::MODE_SERVER, this));
task_runner_->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NaClIPCAdapter::ConnectChannelOnIOThread, this));
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sctp_transport *sctp_addr_id2transport(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr_storage *addr,
sctp_assoc_t id)
{
struct sctp_association *addr_asoc = NULL, *id_asoc = NULL;
struct sctp_af *af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->ss_family);
union sctp_addr *laddr = (union sctp_addr *)addr;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
if (!af || sctp_verify_addr(sk, laddr, af->sockaddr_len))
return NULL;
addr_asoc = sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(sctp_sk(sk)->ep,
laddr,
&transport);
if (!addr_asoc)
return NULL;
id_asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, id);
if (id_asoc && (id_asoc != addr_asoc))
return NULL;
sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)->addr_to_user(sctp_sk(sk),
(union sctp_addr *)addr);
return transport;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void llc_cmsg_rcv(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(skb->sk);
if (llc->cmsg_flags & LLC_CMSG_PKTINFO) {
struct llc_pktinfo info;
info.lpi_ifindex = llc_sk(skb->sk)->dev->ifindex;
llc_pdu_decode_dsap(skb, &info.lpi_sap);
llc_pdu_decode_da(skb, info.lpi_mac);
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_LLC, LLC_OPT_PKTINFO, sizeof(info), &info);
}
}
Commit Message: llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: stream_choice_seed_weak_rng(void)
{
crypto_seed_weak_rng(&stream_choice_rng);
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: device_luks_unlock_internal (Device *device,
const char *secret,
char **options,
UnlockEncryptionHookFunc hook_func,
gpointer hook_user_data,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
int n;
char *argv[10];
char *luks_name;
GError *error;
char *secret_as_stdin;
uid_t uid;
luks_name = NULL;
secret_as_stdin = NULL;
error = NULL;
daemon_local_get_uid (device->priv->daemon, &uid, context);
if (device_local_is_busy (device, FALSE, &error))
{
dbus_g_method_return_error (context, error);
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
if (device->priv->id_usage == NULL || strcmp (device->priv->id_usage, "crypto") != 0)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Not a LUKS device");
goto out;
}
if (find_cleartext_device (device) != NULL)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Cleartext device is already unlocked");
goto out;
}
luks_name = g_strdup_printf ("udisks-luks-uuid-%s-uid%d", device->priv->id_uuid, uid);
secret_as_stdin = g_strdup_printf ("%s\n", secret);
n = 0;
argv[n++] = "cryptsetup";
argv[n++] = "-T";
argv[n++] = "1";
argv[n++] = "luksOpen";
argv[n++] = device->priv->device_file;
argv[n++] = luks_name;
argv[n++] = NULL;
/* yay, so it turns out /sbin/cryptsetup returns way too early; what happens is this
*
* - invoke /sbin/cryptsetup
* - temporary dm node with name temporary-cryptsetup-* appears. We ignore these,
* see above
* - temporary dm node removed
* - /sbin/cryptsetup returns with success (brings us here)
* - proper dm node appears
* - with the name we requested, e.g. udisks-luks-uuid-%s-uid%d
* - proper dm node disappears
* - proper dm node reappears
*
* Obiviously /sbin/cryptsetup shouldn't return before the dm node we are
* looking for is really there or ready to use. But that's not how things
* work.
*
* This bug has been reported here:
*
* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=530721
*
* WORKAROUND: wait for the udev queue to settle before returning. Long
* term fix is device-mapper/udev integration.
*/
if (!job_new (context,
"LuksUnlock",
FALSE,
device,
argv,
secret_as_stdin,
luks_unlock_completed_cb,
TRUE, /* see note above */
unlock_encryption_data_new (context, device, hook_func, hook_user_data),
(GDestroyNotify) unlock_encryption_data_unref))
{
goto out;
}
out:
/* scrub the secret */
if (secret_as_stdin != NULL)
{
memset (secret_as_stdin, '\0', strlen (secret_as_stdin));
}
g_free (secret_as_stdin);
g_free (luks_name);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: need_secrets (NMSetting *setting)
{
/* Assume that VPN connections need secrets since they almost always will */
return g_ptr_array_sized_new (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_set_12bit(E1000ECore *core, int index, uint32_t val)
{
core->mac[index] = val & 0xfff;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int ext4_ext_space_root(struct inode *inode, int check)
{
int size;
size = sizeof(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data);
size -= sizeof(struct ext4_extent_header);
size /= sizeof(struct ext4_extent);
if (!check) {
#ifdef AGGRESSIVE_TEST
if (size > 3)
size = 3;
#endif
}
return size;
}
Commit Message: ext4: reimplement convert and split_unwritten
Reimplement ext4_ext_convert_to_initialized() and
ext4_split_unwritten_extents() using ext4_split_extent()
Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Yang <xiaoqiangnk@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Tested-by: Allison Henderson <achender@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 34,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PerformanceEntryVector Performance::getEntries() {
PerformanceEntryVector entries;
entries.AppendVector(resource_timing_buffer_);
if (!navigation_timing_)
navigation_timing_ = CreateNavigationTimingInstance();
if (navigation_timing_)
entries.push_back(navigation_timing_);
entries.AppendVector(frame_timing_buffer_);
if (user_timing_) {
entries.AppendVector(user_timing_->GetMarks());
entries.AppendVector(user_timing_->GetMeasures());
}
if (first_paint_timing_)
entries.push_back(first_paint_timing_);
if (first_contentful_paint_timing_)
entries.push_back(first_contentful_paint_timing_);
std::sort(entries.begin(), entries.end(),
PerformanceEntry::StartTimeCompareLessThan);
return entries;
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 153,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NamedNodeMap* Element::attributes() const
{
ElementRareData* rareData = const_cast<Element*>(this)->ensureElementRareData();
if (NamedNodeMap* attributeMap = rareData->attributeMap())
return attributeMap;
rareData->setAttributeMap(NamedNodeMap::create(const_cast<Element*>(this)));
return rareData->attributeMap();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::RaisesExceptionVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_raisesExceptionVoidMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::RaisesExceptionVoidMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_blob(struct rev_info *revs,
struct blob *blob,
show_object_fn show,
struct strbuf *path,
const char *name,
void *cb_data)
{
struct object *obj = &blob->object;
if (!revs->blob_objects)
return;
if (!obj)
die("bad blob object");
if (obj->flags & (UNINTERESTING | SEEN))
return;
obj->flags |= SEEN;
show(obj, path, name, cb_data);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __group_send_sig_info(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct task_struct *p)
{
return send_signal(sig, info, p, 1);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_send_line_to(rdpContext* context,
const LINE_TO_ORDER* line_to)
{
wStream* s;
int offset;
int headerLength;
ORDER_INFO orderInfo;
int inf;
rdpUpdate* update = context->update;
headerLength = update_prepare_order_info(context, &orderInfo,
ORDER_TYPE_LINE_TO);
inf = update_approximate_line_to_order(&orderInfo, line_to);
update_check_flush(context, headerLength + inf);
s = update->us;
if (!s)
return FALSE;
offset = Stream_GetPosition(s);
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, headerLength))
return FALSE;
Stream_Seek(s, headerLength);
update_write_line_to_order(s, &orderInfo, line_to);
update_write_order_info(context, s, &orderInfo, offset);
update->numberOrders++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cms_signerinfo_verify_cert(CMS_SignerInfo *si,
X509_STORE *store,
STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls,
unsigned int flags)
{
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
X509 *signer;
int i, j, r = 0;
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, &signer, NULL, NULL);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, signer, certs)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT, CMS_R_STORE_INIT_ERROR);
goto err;
}
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, "smime_sign");
if (crls)
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(&ctx, crls);
i = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
if (i <= 0) {
j = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&ctx);
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_SIGNERINFO_VERIFY_CERT,
CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_ERROR);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(j));
goto err;
}
r = 1;
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 11,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: usage(const char *prog)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [OPTION...]\n", prog);
fprintf(stderr, " -f, --use-file=FILE Use the specified configuration file\n");
#if defined _WITH_VRRP_ && defined _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -P, --vrrp Only run with VRRP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -C, --check Only run with Health-checker subsystem\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -B, --no_bfd Don't run BFD subsystem\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " --all Force all child processes to run, even if have no configuration\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -l, --log-console Log messages to local console\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -D, --log-detail Detailed log messages\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -S, --log-facility=[0-7] Set syslog facility to LOG_LOCAL[0-7]\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -g, --log-file=FILE Also log to FILE (default /tmp/keepalived.log)\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --flush-log-file Flush log file on write\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -G, --no-syslog Don't log via syslog\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -X, --release-vips Drop VIP on transition from signal.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -V, --dont-release-vrrp Don't remove VRRP VIPs and VROUTEs on daemon stop\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -I, --dont-release-ipvs Don't remove IPVS topology on daemon stop\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -R, --dont-respawn Don't respawn child processes\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -n, --dont-fork Don't fork the daemon process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -d, --dump-conf Dump the configuration data\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p, --pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for parent process\n");
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
fprintf(stderr, " -r, --vrrp_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for VRRP child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
fprintf(stderr, " -c, --checkers_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for checkers child process\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -a, --address-monitoring Report all address additions/deletions notified via netlink\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
fprintf(stderr, " -b, --bfd_pid=FILE Use specified pidfile for BFD child process\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
fprintf(stderr, " -x, --snmp Enable SNMP subsystem\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -A, --snmp-agent-socket=FILE Use the specified socket for master agent\n");
#endif
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
fprintf(stderr, " -s, --namespace=NAME Run in network namespace NAME (overrides config)\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -m, --core-dump Produce core dump if terminate abnormally\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -M, --core-dump-pattern=PATN Also set /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern to PATN (default 'core')\n");
#ifdef _MEM_CHECK_LOG_
fprintf(stderr, " -L, --mem-check-log Log malloc/frees to syslog\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -i, --config-id id Skip any configuration lines beginning '@' that don't match id\n"
" or any lines beginning @^ that do match.\n"
" The config-id defaults to the node name if option not used\n");
fprintf(stderr, " --signum=SIGFUNC Return signal number for STOP, RELOAD, DATA, STATS"
#ifdef _WITH_JSON_
", JSON"
#endif
"\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -t, --config-test[=LOG_FILE] Check the configuration for obvious errors, output to\n"
" stderr by default\n");
#ifdef _WITH_PERF_
fprintf(stderr, " --perf[=PERF_TYPE] Collect perf data, PERF_TYPE=all, run(default) or end\n");
#endif
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_OPTIONS
fprintf(stderr, " --debug[=...] Enable debug options. p, b, c, v specify parent, bfd, checker and vrrp processes\n");
#ifdef _TIMER_CHECK_
fprintf(stderr, " T - timer debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _SMTP_ALERT_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " M - email alert debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " E - epoll debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _EPOLL_THREAD_DUMP_
fprintf(stderr, " D - epoll thread dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _VRRP_FD_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, " F - vrrp fd dump debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _REGEX_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " R - regex debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_REGEX_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " X - regex timers\n");
#endif
#ifdef _TSM_DEBUG_
fprintf(stderr, " S - TSM debug\n");
#endif
#ifdef _NETLINK_TIMERS_
fprintf(stderr, " N - netlink timer debug\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " Example --debug=TpMEvcp\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr, " -v, --version Display the version number\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -h, --help Display this help message\n");
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 168,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateNewWidget(int route_id,
WebKit::WebPopupType popup_type) {
CreateNewWidget(route_id, false, popup_type);
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::OnScrollFocusedEditableNodeIntoView() {
WebKit::WebNode node = GetFocusedNode();
if (!node.isNull()) {
if (IsEditableNode(node))
webview()->scrollFocusedNodeIntoView();
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __always_inline u64 vmcs_read64(unsigned long field)
{
vmcs_check64(field);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
return __vmcs_readl(field);
#else
return __vmcs_readl(field) | ((u64)__vmcs_readl(field+1) << 32);
#endif
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintRenderFrameHelper::PrintPreviewContext::IsModifiable() const {
DCHECK(state_ != UNINITIALIZED);
return is_modifiable_;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult Core::ArmWatcher(MojoHandle watcher_handle,
uint32_t* num_ready_contexts,
uintptr_t* ready_contexts,
MojoResult* ready_results,
MojoHandleSignalsState* ready_signals_states) {
RequestContext request_context;
scoped_refptr<Dispatcher> watcher = GetDispatcher(watcher_handle);
if (!watcher || watcher->GetType() != Dispatcher::Type::WATCHER)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return watcher->Arm(num_ready_contexts, ready_contexts, ready_results,
ready_signals_states);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_dpxe_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
avio_wb32(pb, 12);
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "DpxE");
if (track->par->extradata_size >= 12 &&
!memcmp(&track->par->extradata[4], "DpxE", 4)) {
avio_wb32(pb, track->par->extradata[11]);
} else {
avio_wb32(pb, 1);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorCSSOMWrappers::collect(ListType* listType)
{
if (!listType)
return;
unsigned size = listType->length();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
CSSRule* cssRule = listType->item(i);
switch (cssRule->type()) {
case CSSRule::IMPORT_RULE:
collect(static_cast<CSSImportRule*>(cssRule)->styleSheet());
break;
case CSSRule::MEDIA_RULE:
collect(static_cast<CSSMediaRule*>(cssRule));
break;
case CSSRule::SUPPORTS_RULE:
collect(static_cast<CSSSupportsRule*>(cssRule));
break;
case CSSRule::WEBKIT_REGION_RULE:
collect(static_cast<CSSRegionRule*>(cssRule));
break;
case CSSRule::HOST_RULE:
collect(static_cast<CSSHostRule*>(cssRule));
break;
case CSSRule::STYLE_RULE:
m_styleRuleToCSSOMWrapperMap.add(static_cast<CSSStyleRule*>(cssRule)->styleRule(), static_cast<CSSStyleRule*>(cssRule));
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
int retval = 0;
int len;
pr_debug("%s: sk:%p, optname:%d\n", __func__, sk, optname);
/* I can hardly begin to describe how wrong this is. This is
* so broken as to be worse than useless. The API draft
* REALLY is NOT helpful here... I am not convinced that the
* semantics of getsockopt() with a level OTHER THAN SOL_SCTP
* are at all well-founded.
*/
if (level != SOL_SCTP) {
struct sctp_af *af = sctp_sk(sk)->pf->af;
retval = af->getsockopt(sk, level, optname, optval, optlen);
return retval;
}
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case SCTP_STATUS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_sctp_status(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DISABLE_FRAGMENTS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_disable_fragments(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_EVENTS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_events(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTOCLOSE:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_autoclose(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peeloff(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF_FLAGS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peeloff_flags(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PEER_ADDR_PARAMS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peer_addr_params(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DELAYED_SACK:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_delayed_ack(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_INITMSG:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_initmsg(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDRS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peer_addrs(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_LOCAL_ADDRS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX3:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_connectx3(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DEFAULT_SEND_PARAM:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_default_send_param(sk, len,
optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DEFAULT_SNDINFO:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_default_sndinfo(sk, len,
optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_primary_addr(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_NODELAY:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_nodelay(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_RTOINFO:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_rtoinfo(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_ASSOCINFO:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_associnfo(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_I_WANT_MAPPED_V4_ADDR:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_mappedv4(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_MAXSEG:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_maxseg(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_PEER_ADDR_INFO:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peer_addr_info(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_ADAPTATION_LAYER:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_adaptation_layer(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_CONTEXT:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_context(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_FRAGMENT_INTERLEAVE:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_fragment_interleave(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PARTIAL_DELIVERY_POINT:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_partial_delivery_point(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_MAX_BURST:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_maxburst(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTH_KEY:
case SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK:
case SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY:
retval = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
case SCTP_HMAC_IDENT:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_active_key(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_peer_auth_chunks(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_local_auth_chunks(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_ASSOC_NUMBER:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_assoc_number(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_assoc_ids(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_AUTO_ASCONF:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_auto_asconf(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PEER_ADDR_THLDS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_paddr_thresholds(sk, optval, len, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_RECVRCVINFO:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_recvrcvinfo(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_RECVNXTINFO:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_recvnxtinfo(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PR_SUPPORTED:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_pr_supported(sk, len, optval, optlen);
break;
case SCTP_DEFAULT_PRINFO:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_default_prinfo(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PR_ASSOC_STATUS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_pr_assocstatus(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_PR_STREAM_STATUS:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstatus(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_RECONFIG_SUPPORTED:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_reconfig_supported(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
case SCTP_ENABLE_STREAM_RESET:
retval = sctp_getsockopt_enable_strreset(sk, len, optval,
optlen);
break;
default:
retval = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 60,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: svc_pool_map_get(void)
{
struct svc_pool_map *m = &svc_pool_map;
int npools = -1;
mutex_lock(&svc_pool_map_mutex);
if (m->count++) {
mutex_unlock(&svc_pool_map_mutex);
return m->npools;
}
if (m->mode == SVC_POOL_AUTO)
m->mode = svc_pool_map_choose_mode();
switch (m->mode) {
case SVC_POOL_PERCPU:
npools = svc_pool_map_init_percpu(m);
break;
case SVC_POOL_PERNODE:
npools = svc_pool_map_init_pernode(m);
break;
}
if (npools < 0) {
/* default, or memory allocation failure */
npools = 1;
m->mode = SVC_POOL_GLOBAL;
}
m->npools = npools;
mutex_unlock(&svc_pool_map_mutex);
return m->npools;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType IsPWP(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 5)
return(MagickFalse);
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"SFW95",5) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Prevent memory use after free
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 71,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool __init sparc64_has_sha1_opcode(void)
{
unsigned long cfr;
if (!(sparc64_elf_hwcap & HWCAP_SPARC_CRYPTO))
return false;
__asm__ __volatile__("rd %%asr26, %0" : "=r" (cfr));
if (!(cfr & CFR_SHA1))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE0(sched_yield)
{
struct rq *rq = this_rq_lock();
schedstat_inc(rq, yld_count);
current->sched_class->yield_task(rq);
/*
* Since we are going to call schedule() anyway, there's
* no need to preempt or enable interrupts:
*/
__release(rq->lock);
spin_release(&rq->lock.dep_map, 1, _THIS_IP_);
do_raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
preempt_enable_no_resched();
schedule();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Create(service_manager::mojom::ServiceFactoryRequest request) {
service_factory_bindings_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_ablkcipher_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rb_inc_iter(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer = iter->cpu_buffer;
/*
* The iterator could be on the reader page (it starts there).
* But the head could have moved, since the reader was
* found. Check for this case and assign the iterator
* to the head page instead of next.
*/
if (iter->head_page == cpu_buffer->reader_page)
iter->head_page = rb_set_head_page(cpu_buffer);
else
rb_inc_page(cpu_buffer, &iter->head_page);
iter->read_stamp = iter->head_page->page->time_stamp;
iter->head = 0;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlXPtrRangeFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int i;
xmlXPathObjectPtr set;
xmlLocationSetPtr oldset;
xmlLocationSetPtr newset;
CHECK_ARITY(1);
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) ||
((ctxt->value->type != XPATH_LOCATIONSET) &&
(ctxt->value->type != XPATH_NODESET)))
XP_ERROR(XPATH_INVALID_TYPE)
set = valuePop(ctxt);
if (set->type == XPATH_NODESET) {
xmlXPathObjectPtr tmp;
/*
* First convert to a location set
*/
tmp = xmlXPtrNewLocationSetNodeSet(set->nodesetval);
xmlXPathFreeObject(set);
set = tmp;
}
oldset = (xmlLocationSetPtr) set->user;
/*
* The loop is to compute the covering range for each item and add it
*/
newset = xmlXPtrLocationSetCreate(NULL);
for (i = 0;i < oldset->locNr;i++) {
xmlXPtrLocationSetAdd(newset,
xmlXPtrCoveringRange(ctxt, oldset->locTab[i]));
}
/*
* Save the new value and cleanup
*/
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPtrWrapLocationSet(newset));
xmlXPathFreeObject(set);
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
AUTHOR=asd@ut.ee
R=cevans@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 109,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void ext3_show_quota_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct super_block *sb)
{
#if defined(CONFIG_QUOTA)
struct ext3_sb_info *sbi = EXT3_SB(sb);
if (sbi->s_jquota_fmt) {
char *fmtname = "";
switch (sbi->s_jquota_fmt) {
case QFMT_VFS_OLD:
fmtname = "vfsold";
break;
case QFMT_VFS_V0:
fmtname = "vfsv0";
break;
case QFMT_VFS_V1:
fmtname = "vfsv1";
break;
}
seq_printf(seq, ",jqfmt=%s", fmtname);
}
if (sbi->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA])
seq_printf(seq, ",usrjquota=%s", sbi->s_qf_names[USRQUOTA]);
if (sbi->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA])
seq_printf(seq, ",grpjquota=%s", sbi->s_qf_names[GRPQUOTA]);
if (test_opt(sb, USRQUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",usrquota");
if (test_opt(sb, GRPQUOTA))
seq_puts(seq, ",grpquota");
#endif
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 32,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PacketDefragPktSetupParent(Packet *parent)
{
/* tell parent packet it's part of a tunnel */
SET_TUNNEL_PKT(parent);
/* increment tunnel packet refcnt in the root packet */
TUNNEL_INCR_PKT_TPR(parent);
/* disable payload (not packet) inspection on the parent, as the payload
* is the packet we will now run through the system separately. We do
* check it against the ip/port/other header checks though */
DecodeSetNoPayloadInspectionFlag(parent);
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 87,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: eb_get_object(struct eb_objects *eb, unsigned long handle)
{
struct hlist_head *head;
struct hlist_node *node;
struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj;
head = &eb->buckets[handle & eb->and];
hlist_for_each(node, head) {
obj = hlist_entry(node, struct drm_i915_gem_object, exec_node);
if (obj->exec_handle == handle)
return obj;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_do_execbuffer()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->num_cliprects from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 432e58ed ("drm/i915: Avoid
allocation for execbuffer object list").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_local_auth_chunks(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
struct sctp_authchunks __user *p = (void __user *)optval;
struct sctp_authchunks val;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_chunks_param *ch;
u32 num_chunks = 0;
char __user *to;
if (!ep->auth_enable)
return -EACCES;
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&val, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks)))
return -EFAULT;
to = p->gauth_chunks;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, val.gauth_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && val.gauth_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc)
ch = (struct sctp_chunks_param *)asoc->c.auth_chunks;
else
ch = ep->auth_chunk_list;
if (!ch)
goto num;
num_chunks = ntohs(ch->param_hdr.length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) + num_chunks)
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_to_user(to, ch->chunks, num_chunks))
return -EFAULT;
num:
len = sizeof(struct sctp_authchunks) + num_chunks;
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(num_chunks, &p->gauth_number_of_chunks))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 43,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::AddFilter(IPC::ChannelProxy::MessageFilter* filter) {
channel()->AddFilter(filter);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabContents* Browser::GetTabContentsAt(int index) const {
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper = tabstrip_model()->GetTabContentsAt(index);
if (wrapper)
return wrapper->tab_contents();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int donttouch_stat(V9fsStat *stat)
{
if (stat->type == -1 &&
stat->dev == -1 &&
stat->qid.type == -1 &&
stat->qid.version == -1 &&
stat->qid.path == -1 &&
stat->mode == -1 &&
stat->atime == -1 &&
stat->mtime == -1 &&
stat->length == -1 &&
!stat->name.size &&
!stat->uid.size &&
!stat->gid.size &&
!stat->muid.size &&
stat->n_uid == -1 &&
stat->n_gid == -1 &&
stat->n_muid == -1) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 1,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __mark_reg_const_zero(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
__mark_reg_known(reg, 0);
reg->off = 0;
reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_common_dynamic_pusch_assignment(packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset)
{
guint8 pusch_set_id;
guint8 activation_cfn;
guint8 duration;
/* PUSCH Set Id */
pusch_set_id = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_pusch_set_id, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* Activation CFN */
activation_cfn = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_activation_cfn, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* Duration */
duration = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset) * 10;
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_fp_duration, tvb, offset, 1, duration);
offset++;
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
" PUSCH Set Id=%u Activation CFN=%u Duration=%u",
pusch_set_id, activation_cfn, duration);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string MakeMediaAccessRequest(int index) {
const int render_process_id = 1;
const int render_frame_id = 1;
const int page_request_id = 1;
const url::Origin security_origin;
MediaStreamManager::MediaAccessRequestCallback callback =
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManagerTest::ResponseCallback,
base::Unretained(this), index);
StreamControls controls(true, true);
return media_stream_manager_->MakeMediaAccessRequest(
render_process_id, render_frame_id, page_request_id, controls,
security_origin, std::move(callback));
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool Type_DateTime_Write(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number nItems)
{
struct tm * DateTime = (struct tm*) Ptr;
cmsDateTimeNumber timestamp;
_cmsEncodeDateTimeNumber(×tamp, DateTime);
if (!io ->Write(io, sizeof(cmsDateTimeNumber), ×tamp)) return FALSE;
return TRUE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(nItems);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit crypto_ecb_module_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_ecb_tmpl);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TypingCommand::insertTextRunWithoutNewlines(const String& text,
bool selectInsertedText,
EditingState* editingState) {
CompositeEditCommand* command;
if (isIncrementalInsertion()) {
command = InsertIncrementalTextCommand::create(
document(), text, selectInsertedText,
m_compositionType == TextCompositionNone
? InsertIncrementalTextCommand::
RebalanceLeadingAndTrailingWhitespaces
: InsertIncrementalTextCommand::RebalanceAllWhitespaces);
} else {
command = InsertTextCommand::create(
document(), text, selectInsertedText,
m_compositionType == TextCompositionNone
? InsertTextCommand::RebalanceLeadingAndTrailingWhitespaces
: InsertTextCommand::RebalanceAllWhitespaces);
}
applyCommandToComposite(command, endingSelection(), editingState);
if (editingState->isAborted())
return;
typingAddedToOpenCommand(InsertText);
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_valid_clean_head(struct hnae_ring *ring, int h)
{
int u = ring->next_to_use;
int c = ring->next_to_clean;
if (unlikely(h > ring->desc_num))
return 0;
assert(u > 0 && u < ring->desc_num);
assert(c > 0 && c < ring->desc_num);
assert(u != c && h != c); /* must be checked before call this func */
return u > c ? (h > c && h <= u) : (h > c || h <= u);
}
Commit Message: net: hns: Fix a skb used after free bug
skb maybe freed in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw() and return NETDEV_TX_OK,
which cause hns_nic_net_xmit to use a freed skb.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit_hw+0x62c/0x940...
[17659.112635] alloc_debug_processing+0x18c/0x1a0
[17659.117208] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17659.120909] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xac/0x2c0
[17659.125309] __alloc_skb+0x6c/0x260
[17659.128837] tcp_send_ack+0x8c/0x280
[17659.132449] __tcp_ack_snd_check+0x9c/0xf0
[17659.136587] tcp_rcv_established+0x5a4/0xa70
[17659.140899] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x27c/0x620
[17659.144687] tcp_prequeue_process+0x108/0x170
[17659.149085] tcp_recvmsg+0x940/0x1020
[17659.152787] inet_recvmsg+0x124/0x180
[17659.156488] sock_recvmsg+0x64/0x80
[17659.160012] SyS_recvfrom+0xd8/0x180
[17659.163626] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4
[17659.167506] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=23 cpu=1 pid=13
[17659.174000] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17659.178486] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17659.182100] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17659.186062] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17659.189587] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17659.193025] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17659.197074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17659.201038] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17659.205352] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17659.209576] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17659.213363] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17659.217062] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17659.220679] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17659.224821] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17659.228084] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hns_nic_net_xmit+0x8c/0xc0...
[17751.080490] __slab_alloc+0x52c/0x560
[17751.084188] kmem_cache_alloc+0x244/0x280
[17751.088238] __build_skb+0x40/0x150
[17751.091764] build_skb+0x28/0x100
[17751.095115] __alloc_rx_skb+0x94/0x150
[17751.098900] __napi_alloc_skb+0x34/0x90
[17751.102776] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x180/0xbc0
[17751.107097] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.111333] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.115123] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.118823] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.122437] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.126575] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.129838] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
[17751.133454] INFO: Freed in kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0 age=19 cpu=7 pid=43
[17751.139951] free_debug_processing+0x1d4/0x2c0
[17751.144436] __slab_free+0x240/0x390
[17751.148051] kmem_cache_free+0x24c/0x270
[17751.152014] kfree_skbmem+0xa0/0xb0
[17751.155543] __kfree_skb+0x28/0x40
[17751.159022] napi_gro_receive+0x168/0x1c0
[17751.163074] hns_nic_rx_up_pro+0x58/0x90
[17751.167041] hns_nic_rx_poll_one+0x518/0xbc0
[17751.171358] hns_nic_common_poll+0x94/0x140
[17751.175585] net_rx_action+0x458/0x5e0
[17751.179373] __do_softirq+0x1b8/0x480
[17751.183076] run_ksoftirqd+0x64/0x80
[17751.186691] smpboot_thread_fn+0x224/0x310
[17751.190826] kthread+0x150/0x170
[17751.194093] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40
Fixes: 13ac695e7ea1 ("net:hns: Add support of Hip06 SoC to the Hislicon Network Subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lipeng <lipeng321@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Jun He <hjat2005@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 85,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _nfs4_proc_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct iattr *sattr, dev_t rdev)
{
struct nfs4_createdata *data;
int mode = sattr->ia_mode;
int status = -ENOMEM;
BUG_ON(!(sattr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE));
BUG_ON(!S_ISFIFO(mode) && !S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode) && !S_ISSOCK(mode));
data = nfs4_alloc_createdata(dir, &dentry->d_name, sattr, NF4SOCK);
if (data == NULL)
goto out;
if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
data->arg.ftype = NF4FIFO;
else if (S_ISBLK(mode)) {
data->arg.ftype = NF4BLK;
data->arg.u.device.specdata1 = MAJOR(rdev);
data->arg.u.device.specdata2 = MINOR(rdev);
}
else if (S_ISCHR(mode)) {
data->arg.ftype = NF4CHR;
data->arg.u.device.specdata1 = MAJOR(rdev);
data->arg.u.device.specdata2 = MINOR(rdev);
}
status = nfs4_do_create(dir, dentry, data);
nfs4_free_createdata(data);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int readpng2_decode_data(mainprog_info *mainprog_ptr, uch *rawbuf, ulg length)
{
png_structp png_ptr = (png_structp)mainprog_ptr->png_ptr;
png_infop info_ptr = (png_infop)mainprog_ptr->info_ptr;
/* setjmp() must be called in every function that calls a PNG-reading
* libpng function */
if (setjmp(mainprog_ptr->jmpbuf)) {
png_destroy_read_struct(&png_ptr, &info_ptr, NULL);
mainprog_ptr->png_ptr = NULL;
mainprog_ptr->info_ptr = NULL;
return 2;
}
/* hand off the next chunk of input data to libpng for decoding */
png_process_data(png_ptr, info_ptr, rawbuf, length);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ovl_create_upper(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
struct kstat *stat, const char *link,
struct dentry *hardlink)
{
struct dentry *upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry->d_parent);
struct inode *udir = upperdir->d_inode;
struct dentry *newdentry;
int err;
inode_lock_nested(udir, I_MUTEX_PARENT);
newdentry = lookup_one_len(dentry->d_name.name, upperdir,
dentry->d_name.len);
err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
if (IS_ERR(newdentry))
goto out_unlock;
err = ovl_create_real(udir, newdentry, stat, link, hardlink, false);
if (err)
goto out_dput;
ovl_dentry_version_inc(dentry->d_parent);
ovl_dentry_update(dentry, newdentry);
ovl_copyattr(newdentry->d_inode, inode);
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
newdentry = NULL;
out_dput:
dput(newdentry);
out_unlock:
inode_unlock(udir);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ovl: verify upper dentry before unlink and rename
Unlink and rename in overlayfs checked the upper dentry for staleness by
verifying upper->d_parent against upperdir. However the dentry can go
stale also by being unhashed, for example.
Expand the verification to actually look up the name again (under parent
lock) and check if it matches the upper dentry. This matches what the VFS
does before passing the dentry to filesytem's unlink/rename methods, which
excludes any inconsistency caused by overlayfs.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,059 |
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