instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: polkit_backend_interactive_authority_get_name (PolkitBackendAuthority *authority)
{
return "interactive";
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 14,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RedsStream *red_channel_client_get_stream(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
return rcc->stream;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 2,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
struct thread_info *ti;
int err;
prepare_to_copy(orig);
tsk = alloc_task_struct();
if (!tsk)
return NULL;
ti = alloc_thread_info(tsk);
if (!ti) {
free_task_struct(tsk);
return NULL;
}
err = arch_dup_task_struct(tsk, orig);
if (err)
goto out;
tsk->stack = ti;
err = prop_local_init_single(&tsk->dirties);
if (err)
goto out;
setup_thread_stack(tsk, orig);
#ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int();
#endif
/* One for us, one for whoever does the "release_task()" (usually parent) */
atomic_set(&tsk->usage,2);
atomic_set(&tsk->fs_excl, 0);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_IO_TRACE
tsk->btrace_seq = 0;
#endif
tsk->splice_pipe = NULL;
return tsk;
out:
free_thread_info(ti);
free_task_struct(tsk);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,162 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Framebuffer::HasAlphaMRT() const {
for (uint32 i = 0; i < manager_->max_draw_buffers_; ++i) {
if (draw_buffers_[i] != GL_NONE) {
const Attachment* attachment = GetAttachment(draw_buffers_[i]);
if (!attachment)
continue;
if ((GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
attachment->internal_format()) & 0x0008) != 0)
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_GINIT_FUNCTION(pgsql)
{
#if defined(COMPILE_DL_PGSQL) && defined(ZTS)
ZEND_TSRMLS_CACHE_UPDATE;
#endif
memset(pgsql_globals, 0, sizeof(zend_pgsql_globals));
/* Initilize notice message hash at MINIT only */
zend_hash_init_ex(&pgsql_globals->notices, 0, NULL, PHP_PGSQL_NOTICE_PTR_DTOR, 1, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,204 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lzh_huffman_init(struct huffman *hf, size_t len_size, int tbl_bits)
{
int bits;
if (hf->bitlen == NULL) {
hf->bitlen = malloc(len_size * sizeof(hf->bitlen[0]));
if (hf->bitlen == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (hf->tbl == NULL) {
if (tbl_bits < HTBL_BITS)
bits = tbl_bits;
else
bits = HTBL_BITS;
hf->tbl = malloc(((size_t)1 << bits) * sizeof(hf->tbl[0]));
if (hf->tbl == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (hf->tree == NULL && tbl_bits > HTBL_BITS) {
hf->tree_avail = 1 << (tbl_bits - HTBL_BITS + 4);
hf->tree = malloc(hf->tree_avail * sizeof(hf->tree[0]));
if (hf->tree == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
hf->len_size = (int)len_size;
hf->tbl_bits = tbl_bits;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RunCSSTest(const base::FilePath::CharType* file_path) {
base::FilePath test_path = GetTestFilePath("accessibility", "css");
{
base::ScopedAllowBlockingForTesting allow_blocking;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::PathExists(test_path)) << test_path.LossyDisplayName();
}
base::FilePath css_file = test_path.Append(base::FilePath(file_path));
RunTest(css_file, "accessibility/css");
}
Commit Message: Position info (item n of m) incorrect if hidden focusable items in list
Bug: 836997
Change-Id: I971fa7076f72d51829b36af8e379260d48ca25ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1450235
Commit-Queue: Aaron Leventhal <aleventhal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nektarios Paisios <nektar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628890}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 130,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WindowsGetLastFocusedFunction::RunImpl() {
scoped_ptr<GetLastFocused::Params> params(
GetLastFocused::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params.get());
bool populate_tabs = false;
if (params->get_info.get() && params->get_info->populate.get())
populate_tabs = *params->get_info->populate;
Browser* browser = chrome::FindAnyBrowser(
profile(), include_incognito(), chrome::GetActiveDesktop());
if (!browser || !browser->window()) {
error_ = keys::kNoLastFocusedWindowError;
return false;
}
WindowController* controller =
browser->extension_window_controller();
if (populate_tabs)
SetResult(controller->CreateWindowValueWithTabs(GetExtension()));
else
SetResult(controller->CreateWindowValue());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow extensions to take screenshots of interstitial pages. Branched from
https://codereview.chromium.org/14885004/ which is trying to test it.
BUG=229504
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14954004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@198297 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lookup_fast(struct nameidata *nd,
struct path *path, struct inode **inode)
{
struct vfsmount *mnt = nd->path.mnt;
struct dentry *dentry, *parent = nd->path.dentry;
int need_reval = 1;
int status = 1;
int err;
/*
* Rename seqlock is not required here because in the off chance
* of a false negative due to a concurrent rename, we're going to
* do the non-racy lookup, below.
*/
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
unsigned seq;
bool negative;
dentry = __d_lookup_rcu(parent, &nd->last, &seq);
if (!dentry)
goto unlazy;
/*
* This sequence count validates that the inode matches
* the dentry name information from lookup.
*/
*inode = dentry->d_inode;
negative = d_is_negative(dentry);
if (read_seqcount_retry(&dentry->d_seq, seq))
return -ECHILD;
if (negative)
return -ENOENT;
/*
* This sequence count validates that the parent had no
* changes while we did the lookup of the dentry above.
*
* The memory barrier in read_seqcount_begin of child is
* enough, we can use __read_seqcount_retry here.
*/
if (__read_seqcount_retry(&parent->d_seq, nd->seq))
return -ECHILD;
nd->seq = seq;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE)) {
status = d_revalidate(dentry, nd->flags);
if (unlikely(status <= 0)) {
if (status != -ECHILD)
need_reval = 0;
goto unlazy;
}
}
path->mnt = mnt;
path->dentry = dentry;
if (likely(__follow_mount_rcu(nd, path, inode)))
return 0;
unlazy:
if (unlazy_walk(nd, dentry))
return -ECHILD;
} else {
dentry = __d_lookup(parent, &nd->last);
}
if (unlikely(!dentry))
goto need_lookup;
if (unlikely(dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE) && need_reval)
status = d_revalidate(dentry, nd->flags);
if (unlikely(status <= 0)) {
if (status < 0) {
dput(dentry);
return status;
}
d_invalidate(dentry);
dput(dentry);
goto need_lookup;
}
if (unlikely(d_is_negative(dentry))) {
dput(dentry);
return -ENOENT;
}
path->mnt = mnt;
path->dentry = dentry;
err = follow_managed(path, nd->flags);
if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
path_put_conditional(path, nd);
return err;
}
if (err)
nd->flags |= LOOKUP_JUMPED;
*inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
return 0;
need_lookup:
return 1;
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | 0 | 42,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 sched_vslice(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se)
{
return calc_delta_fair(sched_slice(cfs_rq, se), se);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void zend_clear_exception(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
if (EG(prev_exception)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&EG(prev_exception));
EG(prev_exception) = NULL;
}
if (!EG(exception)) {
return;
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&EG(exception));
EG(exception) = NULL;
EG(current_execute_data)->opline = EG(opline_before_exception);
#if ZEND_DEBUG
EG(opline_before_exception) = NULL;
#endif
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool generic_invert_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *orig)
{
tuple->src.u.all = 0;
tuple->dst.u.all = 0;
return true;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: conntrack: disable generic tracking for known protocols
Given following iptables ruleset:
-P FORWARD DROP
-A FORWARD -m sctp --dport 9 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m conntrack -m state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT
One would assume that this allows SCTP on port 9 and TCP on port 80.
Unfortunately, if the SCTP conntrack module is not loaded, this allows
*all* SCTP communication, to pass though, i.e. -p sctp -j ACCEPT,
which we think is a security issue.
This is because on the first SCTP packet on port 9, we create a dummy
"generic l4" conntrack entry without any port information (since
conntrack doesn't know how to extract this information).
All subsequent packets that are unknown will then be in established
state since they will fallback to proto_generic and will match the
'generic' entry.
Our originally proposed version [1] completely disabled generic protocol
tracking, but Jozsef suggests to not track protocols for which a more
suitable helper is available, hence we now mitigate the issue for in
tree known ct protocol helpers only, so that at least NAT and direction
information will still be preserved for others.
[1] http://www.spinics.net/lists/netfilter-devel/msg33430.html
Joint work with Daniel Borkmann.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 46,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaStreamDispatcherHost::~MediaStreamDispatcherHost() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
bindings_.CloseAllBindings();
CancelAllRequests();
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 173,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataDirectoryService::SerializeToString(
std::string* serialized_proto) const {
GDataRootDirectoryProto proto;
root_->ToProto(proto.mutable_gdata_directory());
proto.set_largest_changestamp(largest_changestamp_);
proto.set_version(kProtoVersion);
const bool ok = proto.SerializeToString(serialized_proto);
DCHECK(ok);
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void copy_samples(short *dest, float *src, int len)
{
int i;
check_endianness();
for (i=0; i < len; ++i) {
FASTDEF(temp);
int v = FAST_SCALED_FLOAT_TO_INT(temp, src[i],15);
if ((unsigned int) (v + 32768) > 65535)
v = v < 0 ? -32768 : 32767;
dest[i] = v;
}
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 75,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mac_init (digest_hd_st* td, gnutls_mac_algorithm_t mac, opaque * secret, int secret_size,
int ver)
{
int ret = 0;
if (mac == GNUTLS_MAC_NULL)
{
gnutls_assert();
return GNUTLS_E_HASH_FAILED;
}
if (ver == GNUTLS_SSL3)
{ /* SSL 3.0 */
ret = _gnutls_mac_init_ssl3 (td, mac, secret, secret_size);
}
else
{ /* TLS 1.x */
ret = _gnutls_hmac_init (td, mac, secret, secret_size);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wait_for_completion_timeout(struct completion *x, unsigned long timeout)
{
return wait_for_common(x, timeout, TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void overloadedActivityLoggedMethod2MethodForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "overloadedActivityLoggedMethod", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 2)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(2, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, strArg, info[0]);
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, longArg, toInt32(info[1], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->overloadedActivityLoggedMethod(strArg, longArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_locku(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_locku_res *res)
{
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_LOCKU);
if (status != -EIO)
nfs_increment_lock_seqid(status, res->seqid);
if (status == 0)
status = decode_stateid(xdr, &res->stateid);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WaitForWriteCommit() {
DCHECK(run_loop_);
run_loop_->Run();
run_loop_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String AXLayoutObject::textAlternative(bool recursive,
bool inAriaLabelledByTraversal,
AXObjectSet& visited,
AXNameFrom& nameFrom,
AXRelatedObjectVector* relatedObjects,
NameSources* nameSources) const {
if (m_layoutObject) {
String textAlternative;
bool foundTextAlternative = false;
if (m_layoutObject->isBR()) {
textAlternative = String("\n");
foundTextAlternative = true;
} else if (m_layoutObject->isText() &&
(!recursive || !m_layoutObject->isCounter())) {
LayoutText* layoutText = toLayoutText(m_layoutObject);
String result = layoutText->plainText();
if (!result.isEmpty() || layoutText->isAllCollapsibleWhitespace())
textAlternative = result;
else
textAlternative = layoutText->text();
foundTextAlternative = true;
} else if (m_layoutObject->isListMarker() && !recursive) {
textAlternative = toLayoutListMarker(m_layoutObject)->text();
foundTextAlternative = true;
}
if (foundTextAlternative) {
nameFrom = AXNameFromContents;
if (nameSources) {
nameSources->push_back(NameSource(false));
nameSources->back().type = nameFrom;
nameSources->back().text = textAlternative;
}
return textAlternative;
}
}
return AXNodeObject::textAlternative(recursive, inAriaLabelledByTraversal,
visited, nameFrom, relatedObjects,
nameSources);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GfxICCBasedColorSpace::~GfxICCBasedColorSpace() {
delete alt;
#ifdef USE_CMS
if (transform != NULL) {
if (transform->unref() == 0) delete transform;
}
if (lineTransform != NULL) {
if (lineTransform->unref() == 0) delete lineTransform;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asepcos_list_files(sc_card_t *card, u8 *buf, size_t blen)
{
int r, rv = 0, dfFID, efFID;
sc_path_t bpath, tpath;
sc_file_t *tfile = NULL;
/* 1. get currently selected DF */
r = asepcos_get_current_df_path(card, &bpath);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
/* 2. re-select DF to get the FID of the child EFs/DFs */
r = sc_select_file(card, &bpath, &tfile);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
if (tfile->prop_attr_len != 6 || tfile->prop_attr == NULL) {
sc_file_free(tfile);
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "unable to parse proprietary FCI attributes");
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
dfFID = (tfile->prop_attr[2] << 8) | tfile->prop_attr[3];
efFID = (tfile->prop_attr[4] << 8) | tfile->prop_attr[5];
sc_file_free(tfile);
/* 3. select every child DF to get the FID of the next child DF */
while (dfFID != 0) {
/* put DF FID on the list */
if (blen < 2)
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
*buf++ = (dfFID >> 8) & 0xff;
*buf++ = dfFID & 0xff;
rv += 2;
blen -= 2;
/* select DF to get next DF FID */
tpath = bpath;
r = sc_append_file_id(&tpath, dfFID);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
r = sc_select_file(card, &tpath, &tfile);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
if (tfile->prop_attr_len != 6 || tfile->prop_attr == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
dfFID = (tfile->prop_attr[0] << 8) | tfile->prop_attr[1];
sc_file_free(tfile);
}
/* 4. select every child EF ... */
while (efFID != 0) {
/* put DF FID on the list */
if (blen < 2)
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
*buf++ = (efFID >> 8) & 0xff;
*buf++ = efFID & 0xff;
rv += 2;
blen -= 2;
/* select EF to get next EF FID */
tpath = bpath;
r = sc_append_file_id(&tpath, efFID);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
r = sc_select_file(card, &tpath, &tfile);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
if (tfile->prop_attr_len < 2 || tfile->prop_attr == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
efFID = (tfile->prop_attr[0] << 8) | tfile->prop_attr[1];
sc_file_free(tfile);
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __snd_seq_driver_register(struct snd_seq_driver *drv, struct module *mod)
{
if (WARN_ON(!drv->driver.name || !drv->id))
return -EINVAL;
drv->driver.bus = &snd_seq_bus_type;
drv->driver.owner = mod;
return driver_register(&drv->driver);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Cancel pending autoload work at unbinding device
ALSA sequencer core has a mechanism to load the enumerated devices
automatically, and it's performed in an off-load work. This seems
causing some race when a sequencer is removed while the pending
autoload work is running. As syzkaller spotted, it may lead to some
use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70
sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88006c611d90 by task kworker/2:1/567
CPU: 2 PID: 567 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 4.13.0+ #29
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: events autoload_drivers
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
dump_stack+0x192/0x22c lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x230/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:435
snd_rawmidi_dev_seq_free+0x69/0x70 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1617
snd_seq_dev_release+0x4f/0x70 sound/core/seq_device.c:192
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:648 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:677 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:70 [inline]
kobject_put+0x145/0x240 lib/kobject.c:694
put_device+0x25/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:1799
klist_devices_put+0x36/0x40 drivers/base/bus.c:827
klist_next+0x264/0x4a0 lib/klist.c:403
next_device drivers/base/bus.c:270 [inline]
bus_for_each_dev+0x17e/0x210 drivers/base/bus.c:312
autoload_drivers+0x3b/0x50 sound/core/seq_device.c:117
process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1570 kernel/workqueue.c:2097
worker_thread+0x1e4/0x1350 kernel/workqueue.c:2231
kthread+0x324/0x3f0 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:425
The fix is simply to assure canceling the autoload work at removing
the device.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *cookie,
unsigned char cookie_len)
{
unsigned int msg_len;
unsigned char *p;
p = buf;
/* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
*(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
*(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
p += cookie_len;
msg_len = p - buf;
return msg_len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_opendevice(gx_device *dev)
{
if (dev->is_open)
return 0;
check_device_separable(dev);
gx_device_fill_in_procs(dev);
{
int code = (*dev_proc(dev, open_device))(dev);
if (code < 0)
return_error(code);
dev->is_open = true;
return 1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void usage()
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNG2PNM\n");
fprintf (stderr, " by Willem van Schaik, 1999\n");
#ifdef __TURBOC__
fprintf (stderr, " for Turbo-C and Borland-C compilers\n");
#else
fprintf (stderr, " for Linux (and Unix) compilers\n");
#endif
fprintf (stderr, "Usage: png2pnm [options] <file>.png [<file>.pnm]\n");
fprintf (stderr, " or: ... | png2pnm [options]\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Options:\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -r[aw] write pnm-file in binary format (P4/P5/P6) (default)\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -n[oraw] write pnm-file in ascii format (P1/P2/P3)\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -a[lpha] <file>.pgm write PNG alpha channel as pgm-file\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -h | -? print this help-information\n");
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,724 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::setRangeText(const String& replacement, unsigned start, unsigned end, const String& selectionMode, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!m_inputType->supportsSelectionAPI()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(InvalidStateError, "The input element's type ('" + m_inputType->formControlType() + "') does not support selection.");
return;
}
HTMLTextFormControlElement::setRangeText(replacement, start, end, selectionMode, exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 114,002 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_note_info(struct elf_note_info *info)
{
while (!list_empty(&info->thread_list)) {
struct list_head *tmp = info->thread_list.next;
list_del(tmp);
kfree(list_entry(tmp, struct elf_thread_status, list));
}
/* Free data possibly allocated by fill_files_note(): */
if (info->notes_files)
vfree(info->notes_files->data);
kfree(info->prstatus);
kfree(info->psinfo);
kfree(info->notes);
kfree(info->fpu);
#ifdef ELF_CORE_COPY_XFPREGS
kfree(info->xfpu);
#endif
}
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long shmem_default_max_inodes(void)
{
return min(totalram_pages - totalhigh_pages, totalram_pages / 2);
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
{
if (!ossl_assert(*(unsigned int *)lock == 1))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 12,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void filter_mb_simple(VP8Context *s, uint8_t *dst, VP8FilterStrength *f,
int mb_x, int mb_y)
{
int mbedge_lim, bedge_lim;
int filter_level = f->filter_level;
int inner_limit = f->inner_limit;
int inner_filter = f->inner_filter;
ptrdiff_t linesize = s->linesize;
if (!filter_level)
return;
bedge_lim = 2 * filter_level + inner_limit;
mbedge_lim = bedge_lim + 4;
if (mb_x)
s->vp8dsp.vp8_h_loop_filter_simple(dst, linesize, mbedge_lim);
if (inner_filter) {
s->vp8dsp.vp8_h_loop_filter_simple(dst + 4, linesize, bedge_lim);
s->vp8dsp.vp8_h_loop_filter_simple(dst + 8, linesize, bedge_lim);
s->vp8dsp.vp8_h_loop_filter_simple(dst + 12, linesize, bedge_lim);
}
if (mb_y)
s->vp8dsp.vp8_v_loop_filter_simple(dst, linesize, mbedge_lim);
if (inner_filter) {
s->vp8dsp.vp8_v_loop_filter_simple(dst + 4 * linesize, linesize, bedge_lim);
s->vp8dsp.vp8_v_loop_filter_simple(dst + 8 * linesize, linesize, bedge_lim);
s->vp8dsp.vp8_v_loop_filter_simple(dst + 12 * linesize, linesize, bedge_lim);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 63,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AbortRequestBeforeItStarts(ResourceMessageFilter* filter,
IPC::Message* sync_result,
int request_id) {
if (sync_result) {
SyncLoadResult result;
result.error_code = net::ERR_ABORTED;
ResourceHostMsg_SyncLoad::WriteReplyParams(sync_result, result);
filter->Send(sync_result);
} else {
ResourceMsg_RequestCompleteData request_complete_data;
request_complete_data.error_code = net::ERR_ABORTED;
request_complete_data.was_ignored_by_handler = false;
request_complete_data.exists_in_cache = false;
request_complete_data.completion_time = base::TimeTicks();
request_complete_data.encoded_data_length = 0;
filter->Send(new ResourceMsg_RequestComplete(
request_id, request_complete_data));
}
}
Commit Message: Block a compromised renderer from reusing request ids.
BUG=578882
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1608573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#372547}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 132,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_handle_iTXt(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
png_textp text_ptr;
png_charp key, lang, text, lang_key;
int comp_flag;
int comp_type = 0;
int ret;
png_size_t slength, prefix_len, data_len;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_iTXt");
#ifdef PNG_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->user_chunk_cache_max != 0)
{
if (png_ptr->user_chunk_cache_max == 1)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
if (--png_ptr->user_chunk_cache_max == 1)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "No space in chunk cache for iTXt");
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
}
#endif
if (!(png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR))
png_error(png_ptr, "Missing IHDR before iTXt");
if (png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT)
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_AFTER_IDAT;
#ifdef PNG_MAX_MALLOC_64K
/* We will no doubt have problems with chunks even half this size, but
there is no hard and fast rule to tell us where to stop. */
if (length > (png_uint_32)65535L)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "iTXt chunk too large to fit in memory");
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
#endif
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = (png_charp)png_malloc_warn(png_ptr, length + 1);
if (png_ptr->chunkdata == NULL)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "No memory to process iTXt chunk.");
return;
}
slength = (png_size_t)length;
png_crc_read(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_ptr->chunkdata, slength);
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0))
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
return;
}
png_ptr->chunkdata[slength] = 0x00;
for (lang = png_ptr->chunkdata; *lang; lang++)
/* Empty loop */ ;
lang++; /* Skip NUL separator */
/* iTXt must have a language tag (possibly empty), two compression bytes,
* translated keyword (possibly empty), and possibly some text after the
* keyword
*/
if (lang >= png_ptr->chunkdata + slength - 3)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Truncated iTXt chunk");
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
return;
}
else
{
comp_flag = *lang++;
comp_type = *lang++;
}
for (lang_key = lang; *lang_key; lang_key++)
/* Empty loop */ ;
lang_key++; /* Skip NUL separator */
if (lang_key >= png_ptr->chunkdata + slength)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Truncated iTXt chunk");
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
return;
}
for (text = lang_key; *text; text++)
/* Empty loop */ ;
text++; /* Skip NUL separator */
if (text >= png_ptr->chunkdata + slength)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Malformed iTXt chunk");
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
return;
}
prefix_len = text - png_ptr->chunkdata;
key=png_ptr->chunkdata;
if (comp_flag)
png_decompress_chunk(png_ptr, comp_type,
(size_t)length, prefix_len, &data_len);
else
data_len = png_strlen(png_ptr->chunkdata + prefix_len);
text_ptr = (png_textp)png_malloc_warn(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)png_sizeof(png_text));
if (text_ptr == NULL)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "Not enough memory to process iTXt chunk.");
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
return;
}
text_ptr->compression = (int)comp_flag + 1;
text_ptr->lang_key = png_ptr->chunkdata + (lang_key - key);
text_ptr->lang = png_ptr->chunkdata + (lang - key);
text_ptr->itxt_length = data_len;
text_ptr->text_length = 0;
text_ptr->key = png_ptr->chunkdata;
text_ptr->text = png_ptr->chunkdata + prefix_len;
ret = png_set_text_2(png_ptr, info_ptr, text_ptr, 1);
png_free(png_ptr, text_ptr);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunkdata);
png_ptr->chunkdata = NULL;
if (ret)
png_error(png_ptr, "Insufficient memory to store iTXt chunk.");
}
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 109,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rtnl_link_unregister(struct rtnl_link_ops *ops)
{
rtnl_lock();
__rtnl_link_unregister(ops);
rtnl_unlock();
}
Commit Message: rtnl: fix info leak on RTM_GETLINK request for VF devices
Initialize the mac address buffer with 0 as the driver specific function
will probably not fill the whole buffer. In fact, all in-kernel drivers
fill only ETH_ALEN of the MAX_ADDR_LEN bytes, i.e. 6 of the 32 possible
bytes. Therefore we currently leak 26 bytes of stack memory to userland
via the netlink interface.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateDrawArrays(const char* function_name) {
if (isContextLost())
return false;
if (!ValidateRenderingState(function_name)) {
return false;
}
const char* reason = "framebuffer incomplete";
if (framebuffer_binding_ && framebuffer_binding_->CheckDepthStencilStatus(
&reason) != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, function_name, reason);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::reloadFromCache()
{
d->m_mainFrame->loader()->reload(/* bypassCache */ false);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
{
/*
* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
* preferences.
*/
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
return 2;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
return 2;
}
# endif
/* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
} else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
*psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
} else {
*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DocumentVisibilityObserver::~DocumentVisibilityObserver()
{
#if !ENABLE(OILPAN)
unregisterObserver();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init init_hw_perf_events(void)
{
pr_info("Performance events: ");
if (!supported_cpu()) {
pr_cont("No support for your CPU.\n");
return 0;
}
pr_cont("Supported CPU type!\n");
/* Override performance counter IRQ vector */
perf_irq = alpha_perf_event_irq_handler;
/* And set up PMU specification */
alpha_pmu = &ev67_pmu;
perf_pmu_register(&pmu, "cpu", PERF_TYPE_RAW);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::ActivateInitiatorTabAndClosePreviewTab() {
TabContents* initiator_tab = GetInitiatorTab();
if (initiator_tab) {
WebContents* web_contents = initiator_tab->web_contents();
web_contents->GetDelegate()->ActivateContents(web_contents);
}
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = static_cast<PrintPreviewUI*>(
web_ui()->GetController());
print_preview_ui->OnClosePrintPreviewTab();
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getpeername, int, fd, struct sockaddr __user *, usockaddr,
int __user *, usockaddr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int len, err, fput_needed;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (sock != NULL) {
err = security_socket_getpeername(sock);
if (err) {
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
return err;
}
err =
sock->ops->getname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&address, &len,
1);
if (!err)
err = move_addr_to_user(&address, len, usockaddr,
usockaddr_len);
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExpectFilledCreditCardFormElvis(int page_id,
const FormData& filled_form,
int expected_page_id,
bool has_address_fields) {
ExpectFilledForm(page_id, filled_form, expected_page_id, "", "", "", "", "",
"", "", "", "", "", "", "Elvis Presley", "4234567890123456",
"04", "2999", has_address_fields, true, false);
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void yy_fatal_error (yyconst char* msg , yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
(void)yyg;
(void) fprintf( stderr, "%s\n", msg );
exit( YY_EXIT_FAILURE );
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FloatRect HarfBuzzShaper::selectionRect(const FloatPoint& point, int height, int from, int to)
{
float currentX = 0;
float fromX = 0;
float toX = 0;
bool foundFromX = false;
bool foundToX = false;
if (m_run.rtl())
currentX = m_totalWidth;
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_harfBuzzRuns.size(); ++i) {
if (m_run.rtl())
currentX -= m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->width();
int numCharacters = m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->numCharacters();
if (!foundFromX && from >= 0 && from < numCharacters) {
fromX = m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->xPositionForOffset(from) + currentX;
foundFromX = true;
} else {
from -= numCharacters;
}
if (!foundToX && to >= 0 && to < numCharacters) {
toX = m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->xPositionForOffset(to) + currentX;
foundToX = true;
} else {
to -= numCharacters;
}
if (foundFromX && foundToX)
break;
if (!m_run.rtl())
currentX += m_harfBuzzRuns[i]->width();
}
if (!foundFromX)
fromX = 0;
if (!foundToX)
toX = m_run.rtl() ? 0 : m_totalWidth;
if (!foundToX && !foundFromX)
fromX = toX = 0;
if (fromX < toX)
return FloatRect(point.x() + fromX, point.y(), toX - fromX, height);
return FloatRect(point.x() + toX, point.y(), fromX - toX, height);
}
Commit Message: Always initialize |m_totalWidth| in HarfBuzzShaper::shape.
R=leviw@chromium.org
BUG=476647
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1108663003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@194541 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnSetHistoryOffsetAndLength(int history_offset,
int history_length) {
DCHECK_LE(-1, history_offset);
DCHECK_LT(history_offset, history_length);
DCHECK_LE(history_length, kMaxSessionHistoryEntries);
history_list_offset_ = history_offset;
history_list_length_ = history_length;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void etm_event_read(struct perf_event *event) {}
Commit Message: coresight: fix kernel panic caused by invalid CPU
Commit d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
caused a kernel panic because of the using of an invalid value: after
'for_each_cpu(cpu, mask)', value of local variable 'cpu' become invalid,
causes following 'cpu_to_node' access invalid memory area.
This patch brings the deleted 'cpu = cpumask_first(mask)' back.
Panic log:
$ perf record -e cs_etm// ls
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffe801804af4f10
pgd = ffff8017ce031600
[fffe801804af4f10] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 33 PID: 1619 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.7.1+ #16
Hardware name: Huawei Taishan 2280 /CH05TEVBA, BIOS 1.10 11/24/2016
task: ffff8017cb0c8400 ti: ffff8017cb154000 task.ti: ffff8017cb154000
PC is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
LR is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x44/0xd4
pc : [<ffff000008633df8>] lr : [<ffff000008633ddc>] pstate: 60000145
sp : ffff8017cb157b40
x29: ffff8017cb157b40 x28: 0000000000000000
...skip...
7a60: ffff000008c64dc8 0000000000000006 0000000000000253 ffffffffffffffff
7a80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff0000080872cc 0000000000000001
[<ffff000008633df8>] tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
[<ffff000008632b9c>] etm_setup_aux+0x1dc/0x1e8
[<ffff00000816eed4>] rb_alloc_aux+0x2b0/0x338
[<ffff00000816a5e4>] perf_mmap+0x414/0x568
[<ffff0000081ab694>] mmap_region+0x324/0x544
[<ffff0000081abbe8>] do_mmap+0x334/0x3e0
[<ffff000008191150>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0xa4/0xc8
[<ffff0000081a9a30>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0xb0/0x22c
[<ffff0000080872e4>] sys_mmap+0x18/0x28
[<ffff0000080843f0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
Code: 912040a5 d0001c00 f873d821 911c6000 (b8656822)
---[ end trace 98933da8f92b0c9a ]---
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Xia Kaixu <xiakaixu@huawei.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.10
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 83,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CLASS minolta_z2()
{
int i, nz;
char tail[424];
fseek (ifp, -sizeof tail, SEEK_END);
fread (tail, 1, sizeof tail, ifp);
for (nz=i=0; i < (int) sizeof tail; i++)
if (tail[i]) nz++;
return nz > 20;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AnimationClock& Document::GetAnimationClock() {
DCHECK(GetPage());
return GetPage()->Animator().Clock();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int send_solid_rect(VncState *vs)
{
size_t bytes;
tight_pack24(vs, vs->tight.tight.buffer, 1, &vs->tight.tight.offset);
bytes = 3;
} else {
bytes = vs->clientds.pf.bytes_per_pixel;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 165,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cryptd_blkcipher_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_instance *inst = crypto_tfm_alg_instance(tfm);
struct cryptd_instance_ctx *ictx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
struct crypto_spawn *spawn = &ictx->spawn;
struct cryptd_blkcipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_blkcipher *cipher;
cipher = crypto_spawn_blkcipher(spawn);
if (IS_ERR(cipher))
return PTR_ERR(cipher);
ctx->child = cipher;
tfm->crt_ablkcipher.reqsize =
sizeof(struct cryptd_blkcipher_request_ctx);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t *r_bin_dyldcache_extract(struct r_bin_dyldcache_obj_t* bin, int idx, int *nlib) {
ut64 liboff, linkedit_offset;
ut64 dyld_vmbase;
ut32 addend = 0;
struct r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t *ret = NULL;
struct dyld_cache_image_info* image_infos = NULL;
struct mach_header *mh;
ut8 *data, *cmdptr;
int cmd, libsz = 0;
RBuffer* dbuf;
char *libname;
if (!bin) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->size < 1) {
eprintf ("Empty file? (%s)\n", bin->file? bin->file: "(null)");
return NULL;
}
if (bin->nlibs < 0 || idx < 0 || idx >= bin->nlibs) {
return NULL;
}
*nlib = bin->nlibs;
ret = R_NEW0 (struct r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t);
if (!ret) {
perror ("malloc (ret)");
return NULL;
}
if (bin->hdr.startaddr > bin->size) {
eprintf ("corrupted dyldcache");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
if (bin->hdr.startaddr > bin->size || bin->hdr.baseaddroff > bin->size) {
eprintf ("corrupted dyldcache");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
image_infos = (struct dyld_cache_image_info*) (bin->b->buf + bin->hdr.startaddr);
dyld_vmbase = *(ut64 *)(bin->b->buf + bin->hdr.baseaddroff);
liboff = image_infos[idx].address - dyld_vmbase;
if (liboff > bin->size) {
eprintf ("Corrupted file\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
ret->offset = liboff;
if (image_infos[idx].pathFileOffset > bin->size) {
eprintf ("corrupted file\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
libname = (char *)(bin->b->buf + image_infos[idx].pathFileOffset);
/* Locate lib hdr in cache */
data = bin->b->buf + liboff;
mh = (struct mach_header *)data;
/* Check it is mach-o */
if (mh->magic != MH_MAGIC && mh->magic != MH_MAGIC_64) {
if (mh->magic == 0xbebafeca) { //FAT binary
eprintf ("FAT Binary\n");
}
eprintf ("Not mach-o\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
/* Write mach-o hdr */
if (!(dbuf = r_buf_new ())) {
eprintf ("new (dbuf)\n");
free (ret);
return NULL;
}
addend = mh->magic == MH_MAGIC? sizeof (struct mach_header) : sizeof (struct mach_header_64);
r_buf_set_bytes (dbuf, data, addend);
cmdptr = data + addend;
/* Write load commands */
for (cmd = 0; cmd < mh->ncmds; cmd++) {
struct load_command *lc = (struct load_command *)cmdptr;
r_buf_append_bytes (dbuf, (ut8*)lc, lc->cmdsize);
cmdptr += lc->cmdsize;
}
cmdptr = data + addend;
/* Write segments */
for (cmd = linkedit_offset = 0; cmd < mh->ncmds; cmd++) {
struct load_command *lc = (struct load_command *)cmdptr;
cmdptr += lc->cmdsize;
switch (lc->cmd) {
case LC_SEGMENT:
{
/* Write segment and patch offset */
struct segment_command *seg = (struct segment_command *)lc;
int t = seg->filesize;
if (seg->fileoff + seg->filesize > bin->size || seg->fileoff > bin->size) {
eprintf ("malformed dyldcache\n");
free (ret);
r_buf_free (dbuf);
return NULL;
}
r_buf_append_bytes (dbuf, bin->b->buf+seg->fileoff, t);
r_bin_dyldcache_apply_patch (dbuf, dbuf->length, (ut64)((size_t)&seg->fileoff - (size_t)data));
/* Patch section offsets */
int sect_offset = seg->fileoff - libsz;
libsz = dbuf->length;
if (!strcmp (seg->segname, "__LINKEDIT")) {
linkedit_offset = sect_offset;
}
if (seg->nsects > 0) {
struct section *sects = (struct section *)((ut8 *)seg + sizeof(struct segment_command));
int nsect;
for (nsect = 0; nsect < seg->nsects; nsect++) {
if (sects[nsect].offset > libsz) {
r_bin_dyldcache_apply_patch (dbuf, sects[nsect].offset - sect_offset,
(ut64)((size_t)§s[nsect].offset - (size_t)data));
}
}
}
}
break;
case LC_SYMTAB:
{
struct symtab_command *st = (struct symtab_command *)lc;
NZ_OFFSET (st->symoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->stroff);
}
break;
case LC_DYSYMTAB:
{
struct dysymtab_command *st = (struct dysymtab_command *)lc;
NZ_OFFSET (st->tocoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->modtaboff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->extrefsymoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->indirectsymoff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->extreloff);
NZ_OFFSET (st->locreloff);
}
break;
case LC_DYLD_INFO:
case LC_DYLD_INFO_ONLY:
{
struct dyld_info_command *st = (struct dyld_info_command *)lc;
NZ_OFFSET (st->rebase_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->bind_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->weak_bind_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->lazy_bind_off);
NZ_OFFSET (st->export_off);
}
break;
}
}
/* Fill r_bin_dyldcache_lib_t ret */
ret->b = dbuf;
strncpy (ret->path, libname, sizeof (ret->path) - 1);
ret->size = libsz;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12374 - oobread crash in truncated dyldcache ##bin
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void setterRaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::setterRaisesExceptionLongAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE2(mkdir, const char __user *, pathname, umode_t, mode)
{
return sys_mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, pathname, mode);
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 36,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SerializeNotificationDatabaseData(const NotificationDatabaseData& input,
std::string* output) {
DCHECK(output);
scoped_ptr<NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData> payload(
new NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData());
const PlatformNotificationData& notification_data = input.notification_data;
payload->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.title));
switch (notification_data.direction) {
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::LEFT_TO_RIGHT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::RIGHT_TO_LEFT);
break;
case PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO:
payload->set_direction(
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationData::AUTO);
break;
}
payload->set_lang(notification_data.lang);
payload->set_body(base::UTF16ToUTF8(notification_data.body));
payload->set_tag(notification_data.tag);
payload->set_icon(notification_data.icon.spec());
for (size_t i = 0; i < notification_data.vibration_pattern.size(); ++i)
payload->add_vibration_pattern(notification_data.vibration_pattern[i]);
payload->set_timestamp(notification_data.timestamp.ToInternalValue());
payload->set_silent(notification_data.silent);
payload->set_require_interaction(notification_data.require_interaction);
if (notification_data.data.size()) {
payload->set_data(¬ification_data.data.front(),
notification_data.data.size());
}
for (const PlatformNotificationAction& action : notification_data.actions) {
NotificationDatabaseDataProto::NotificationAction* payload_action =
payload->add_actions();
payload_action->set_action(action.action);
payload_action->set_title(base::UTF16ToUTF8(action.title));
}
NotificationDatabaseDataProto message;
message.set_notification_id(input.notification_id);
message.set_origin(input.origin.spec());
message.set_service_worker_registration_id(
input.service_worker_registration_id);
message.set_allocated_notification_data(payload.release());
return message.SerializeToString(output);
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport Image *ReferenceImage(Image *image)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
LockSemaphoreInfo(image->semaphore);
image->reference_count++;
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(image->semaphore);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: Fixed incorrect call to DestroyImage reported in #491.
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 64,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: byteswap(struct magic *magic, uint32_t nmagic)
{
uint32_t i;
for (i = 0; i < nmagic; i++)
bs1(&magic[i]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 7,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int irda_find_lsap_sel(struct irda_sock *self, char *name)
{
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(%p, %s)\n", __func__, self, name);
if (self->iriap) {
IRDA_WARNING("%s(): busy with a previous query\n",
__func__);
return -EBUSY;
}
self->iriap = iriap_open(LSAP_ANY, IAS_CLIENT, self,
irda_getvalue_confirm);
if(self->iriap == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Treat unexpected wakeup as disconnect */
self->errno = -EHOSTUNREACH;
/* Query remote LM-IAS */
iriap_getvaluebyclass_request(self->iriap, self->saddr, self->daddr,
name, "IrDA:TinyTP:LsapSel");
/* Wait for answer, if not yet finished (or failed) */
if (wait_event_interruptible(self->query_wait, (self->iriap==NULL)))
/* Treat signals as disconnect */
return -EHOSTUNREACH;
/* Check what happened */
if (self->errno)
{
/* Requested object/attribute doesn't exist */
if((self->errno == IAS_CLASS_UNKNOWN) ||
(self->errno == IAS_ATTRIB_UNKNOWN))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
else
return -EHOSTUNREACH;
}
/* Get the remote TSAP selector */
switch (self->ias_result->type) {
case IAS_INTEGER:
IRDA_DEBUG(4, "%s() int=%d\n",
__func__, self->ias_result->t.integer);
if (self->ias_result->t.integer != -1)
self->dtsap_sel = self->ias_result->t.integer;
else
self->dtsap_sel = 0;
break;
default:
self->dtsap_sel = 0;
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), bad type!\n", __func__);
break;
}
if (self->ias_result)
irias_delete_value(self->ias_result);
if (self->dtsap_sel)
return 0;
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DOMWindow* HTMLFrameOwnerElement::contentWindow() const {
return content_frame_ ? content_frame_->DomWindow() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 150,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int InternalPageInfoBubbleView::GetDialogButtons() const {
return ui::DIALOG_BUTTON_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <patricialor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 1 | 172,297 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool cgm_enter(void *hdata, pid_t pid)
{
struct cgm_data *d = hdata;
char **slist = subsystems;
bool ret = false;
int i;
if (!d || !d->cgroup_path)
return false;
if (!cgm_dbus_connect()) {
ERROR("Error connecting to cgroup manager");
return false;
}
if (cgm_all_controllers_same)
slist = subsystems_inone;
for (i = 0; slist[i]; i++) {
if (!lxc_cgmanager_enter(pid, slist[i], d->cgroup_path, false))
goto out;
}
ret = true;
out:
cgm_dbus_disconnect();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RecordParallelDownloadRequestCount(int request_count) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_CUSTOM_COUNTS("Download.ParallelDownloadRequestCount",
request_count, 1, 10, 11);
}
Commit Message: Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbCombineMaskU (CARD32 *src, const CARD32 *mask, int width)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 a = READ(mask + i) >> 24;
CARD32 s = READ(src + i);
FbByteMul(s, a);
WRITE(src + i, s);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 md_csum_fold(u32 csum)
{
csum = (csum & 0xffff) + (csum >> 16);
return (csum & 0xffff) + (csum >> 16);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_v4_md5_hash_headers(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr,
const struct tcphdr *th, int nbytes)
{
struct tcp4_pseudohdr *bp;
struct scatterlist sg;
struct tcphdr *_th;
bp = hp->scratch;
bp->saddr = saddr;
bp->daddr = daddr;
bp->pad = 0;
bp->protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
bp->len = cpu_to_be16(nbytes);
_th = (struct tcphdr *)(bp + 1);
memcpy(_th, th, sizeof(*th));
_th->check = 0;
sg_init_one(&sg, bp, sizeof(*bp) + sizeof(*th));
ahash_request_set_crypt(hp->md5_req, &sg, NULL,
sizeof(*bp) + sizeof(*th));
return crypto_ahash_update(hp->md5_req);
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 49,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int einj_get_available_error_type(u32 *type)
{
int rc;
mutex_lock(&einj_mutex);
rc = __einj_get_available_error_type(type);
mutex_unlock(&einj_mutex);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable APEI error injection if securelevel is set
ACPI provides an error injection mechanism, EINJ, for debugging and testing
the ACPI Platform Error Interface (APEI) and other RAS features. If
supported by the firmware, ACPI specification 5.0 and later provide for a
way to specify a physical memory address to which to inject the error.
Injecting errors through EINJ can produce errors which to the platform are
indistinguishable from real hardware errors. This can have undesirable
side-effects, such as causing the platform to mark hardware as needing
replacement.
While it does not provide a method to load unauthenticated privileged code,
the effect of these errors may persist across reboots and affect trust in
the underlying hardware, so disable error injection through EINJ if
securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-74 | 0 | 73,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AutofillExternalDelegate::GetDeletionConfirmationText(
const base::string16& value,
int identifier,
base::string16* title,
base::string16* body) {
return manager_->GetDeletionConfirmationText(value, identifier, title, body);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(ssetmask, int, newmask)
{
int old = current->blocked.sig[0];
sigset_t newset;
siginitset(&newset, newmask);
set_current_blocked(&newset);
return old;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,705 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v)
{
int j, k;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char buf[sizeof(long) + 1];
long d;
a->type = V_ASN1_INTEGER;
if (a->length < (int)(sizeof(long) + 1)) {
if (a->data != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(a->data);
if ((a->data =
(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(long) + 1)) != NULL)
memset((char *)a->data, 0, sizeof(long) + 1);
}
if (a->data == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
d = v;
if (d < 0) {
d = -d;
a->type = V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER;
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(long); i++) {
if (d == 0)
break;
buf[i] = (int)d & 0xff;
d >>= 8;
}
j = 0;
for (k = i - 1; k >= 0; k--)
a->data[j++] = buf[k];
a->length = j;
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _HB_GPOS_Load_SubTable( HB_GPOS_SubTable* st,
HB_Stream stream,
HB_UShort lookup_type )
{
switch ( lookup_type ) {
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_SINGLE: return Load_SinglePos ( st, stream );
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_PAIR: return Load_PairPos ( st, stream );
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_CURSIVE: return Load_CursivePos ( st, stream );
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_MARKBASE: return Load_MarkBasePos ( st, stream );
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_MARKLIG: return Load_MarkLigPos ( st, stream );
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_MARKMARK: return Load_MarkMarkPos ( st, stream );
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_CONTEXT: return Load_ContextPos ( st, stream );
case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_CHAIN: return Load_ChainContextPos ( st, stream );
/*case HB_GPOS_LOOKUP_EXTENSION: return Load_ExtensionPos ( st, stream );*/
default: return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_SubTable_Format);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void customLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
V8TestObjectPython::customLongAttributeAttributeSetterCustom(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AddingToRootWindow() {
host_->ParentChanged(GetNativeViewId());
UpdateScreenInfo(window_);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::TrimMemory(const int level, const bool visible) {
DCHECK(ui_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
enum {
TRIM_MEMORY_RUNNING_LOW = 10,
TRIM_MEMORY_UI_HIDDEN = 20,
TRIM_MEMORY_BACKGROUND = 40,
TRIM_MEMORY_MODERATE = 60,
};
if (level < TRIM_MEMORY_RUNNING_LOW || level == TRIM_MEMORY_UI_HIDDEN)
return;
if (level < TRIM_MEMORY_BACKGROUND && visible)
return;
if (!compositor_ || !hardware_enabled_)
return;
TRACE_EVENT0("android_webview", "BrowserViewRenderer::TrimMemory");
if (level >= TRIM_MEMORY_MODERATE) {
if (offscreen_pre_raster_)
shared_renderer_state_.DeleteHardwareRendererOnUI();
else
shared_renderer_state_.ReleaseHardwareDrawIfNeededOnUI();
return;
}
if (!offscreen_pre_raster_)
compositor_->SetMemoryPolicy(0u);
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vips_gifload( const char *filename, VipsImage **out, ... )
{
va_list ap;
int result;
va_start( ap, out );
result = vips_call_split( "gifload", ap, filename, out );
va_end( ap );
return( result );
}
Commit Message: fetch map after DGifGetImageDesc()
Earlier refactoring broke GIF map fetch.
CWE ID: | 0 | 87,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static pte_t make_huge_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page,
int writable)
{
pte_t entry;
if (writable) {
entry =
pte_mkwrite(pte_mkdirty(mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot)));
} else {
entry = huge_pte_wrprotect(mk_pte(page, vma->vm_page_prot));
}
entry = pte_mkyoung(entry);
entry = pte_mkhuge(entry);
return entry;
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err stts_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TimeToSampleBox *p;
u32 i, nb_samples;
p = (GF_TimeToSampleBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "TimeToSampleBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "EntryCount=\"%d\">\n", p->nb_entries);
nb_samples = 0;
for (i=0; i<p->nb_entries; i++) {
fprintf(trace, "<TimeToSampleEntry SampleDelta=\"%d\" SampleCount=\"%d\"/>\n", p->entries[i].sampleDelta, p->entries[i].sampleCount);
nb_samples += p->entries[i].sampleCount;
}
if (p->size)
fprintf(trace, "<!-- counted %d samples in STTS entries -->\n", nb_samples);
else
fprintf(trace, "<TimeToSampleEntry SampleDelta=\"\" SampleCount=\"\"/>\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("TimeToSampleBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxDeviceRGBColorSpace::getCMYK(GfxColor *color, GfxCMYK *cmyk) {
GfxColorComp c, m, y, k;
c = clip01(gfxColorComp1 - color->c[0]);
m = clip01(gfxColorComp1 - color->c[1]);
y = clip01(gfxColorComp1 - color->c[2]);
k = c;
if (m < k) {
k = m;
}
if (y < k) {
k = y;
}
cmyk->c = c - k;
cmyk->m = m - k;
cmyk->y = y - k;
cmyk->k = k;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,013 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rtnl_net_dumpid_one(int id, void *peer, void *data)
{
struct rtnl_net_dump_cb *net_cb = (struct rtnl_net_dump_cb *)data;
int ret;
if (net_cb->idx < net_cb->s_idx)
goto cont;
ret = rtnl_net_fill(net_cb->skb, NETLINK_CB(net_cb->cb->skb).portid,
net_cb->cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, NLM_F_MULTI,
RTM_NEWNSID, net_cb->net, id);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
cont:
net_cb->idx++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 86,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __skb_get_hash(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct flow_keys keys;
u32 hash;
__flow_hash_secret_init();
hash = ___skb_get_hash(skb, &keys, hashrnd);
if (!hash)
return;
__skb_set_sw_hash(skb, hash,
flow_keys_have_l4(&keys));
}
Commit Message: flow_dissector: Jump to exit code in __skb_flow_dissect
Instead of returning immediately (on a parsing failure for instance) we
jump to cleanup code. This always sets protocol values in key_control
(even on a failure there is still valid information in the key_tags that
was set before the problem was hit).
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmx_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
{
/*
* Patch in the VMCALL instruction:
*/
hypercall[0] = 0x0f;
hypercall[1] = 0x01;
hypercall[2] = 0xc1;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ring_buffer_lock_reserve(struct ring_buffer *buffer, unsigned long length)
{
struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
struct ring_buffer_event *event;
int cpu;
/* If we are tracing schedule, we don't want to recurse */
preempt_disable_notrace();
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&buffer->record_disabled)))
goto out;
cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
if (unlikely(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask)))
goto out;
cpu_buffer = buffer->buffers[cpu];
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&cpu_buffer->record_disabled)))
goto out;
if (unlikely(length > BUF_MAX_DATA_SIZE))
goto out;
if (unlikely(trace_recursive_lock(cpu_buffer)))
goto out;
event = rb_reserve_next_event(buffer, cpu_buffer, length);
if (!event)
goto out_unlock;
return event;
out_unlock:
trace_recursive_unlock(cpu_buffer);
out:
preempt_enable_notrace();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::willComposite()
{
TRACE_EVENT_BEGIN1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"), "CompositeLayers", "mainFrame", mainFrame());
if (InspectorController* ic = inspectorController())
ic->willComposite();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SECURITY_STATUS SEC_ENTRY ImportSecurityContextW(SEC_WCHAR* pszPackage, PSecBuffer pPackedContext, HANDLE pToken, PCtxtHandle phContext)
{
return SEC_E_OK;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 58,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DocumentLoader::MaybeLoadEmpty() {
bool should_load_empty = !substitute_data_.IsValid() &&
(request_.Url().IsEmpty() ||
SchemeRegistry::ShouldLoadURLSchemeAsEmptyDocument(
request_.Url().Protocol()));
if (!should_load_empty)
return false;
if (request_.Url().IsEmpty() &&
!GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CreatingInitialEmptyDocument())
request_.SetURL(BlankURL());
response_ = ResourceResponse(request_.Url());
response_.SetMimeType("text/html");
response_.SetTextEncodingName("utf-8");
FinishedLoading(CurrentTimeTicks());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,095 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
void *object)
{
setup_object_debug(s, page, object);
if (unlikely(s->ctor))
s->ctor(s, object);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct l2tp_ip6_sock *l2tp_ip6_sk(const struct sock *sk)
{
return (struct l2tp_ip6_sock *)sk;
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix info leak in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg()
The L2TP code for IPv6 fails to initialize the l2tp_conn_id member of
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 and therefore leaks four bytes kernel stack
in l2tp_ip6_recvmsg() in case msg_name is set.
Initialize l2tp_conn_id with 0 to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *php_gethostbyaddr(char *ip)
{
#if HAVE_IPV6 && HAVE_INET_PTON
struct in6_addr addr6;
#endif
struct in_addr addr;
struct hostent *hp;
#if HAVE_IPV6 && HAVE_INET_PTON
if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, ip, &addr6)) {
hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &addr6, sizeof(addr6), AF_INET6);
} else if (inet_pton(AF_INET, ip, &addr)) {
hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &addr, sizeof(addr), AF_INET);
} else {
return NULL;
}
#else
addr.s_addr = inet_addr(ip);
if (addr.s_addr == -1) {
return NULL;
}
hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &addr, sizeof(addr), AF_INET);
#endif
if (!hp || hp->h_name == NULL || hp->h_name[0] == '\0') {
return estrdup(ip);
}
return estrdup(hp->h_name);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'PHP-5.6'
* PHP-5.6:
Fix potential segfault in dns_get_record()
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 36,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dwc3_resume_gadget(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
if (dwc->gadget_driver && dwc->gadget_driver->resume) {
spin_unlock(&dwc->lock);
dwc->gadget_driver->resume(&dwc->gadget);
spin_lock(&dwc->lock);
}
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 88,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HttpStreamParser::SendRequest(const std::string& request_line,
const HttpRequestHeaders& headers,
HttpResponseInfo* response,
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
DCHECK_EQ(STATE_NONE, io_state_);
DCHECK(callback_.is_null());
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
DCHECK(response);
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_HTTP_TRANSACTION_SEND_REQUEST_HEADERS,
base::Bind(&HttpRequestHeaders::NetLogCallback,
base::Unretained(&headers),
&request_line));
DVLOG(1) << __FUNCTION__ << "()"
<< " request_line = \"" << request_line << "\""
<< " headers = \"" << headers.ToString() << "\"";
response_ = response;
IPEndPoint ip_endpoint;
int result = connection_->socket()->GetPeerAddress(&ip_endpoint);
if (result != OK)
return result;
response_->socket_address = HostPortPair::FromIPEndPoint(ip_endpoint);
std::string request = request_line + headers.ToString();
if (request_->upload_data_stream != NULL) {
request_body_send_buf_ = new SeekableIOBuffer(kRequestBodyBufferSize);
if (request_->upload_data_stream->is_chunked()) {
request_body_read_buf_ =
new SeekableIOBuffer(kRequestBodyBufferSize - kChunkHeaderFooterSize);
} else {
request_body_read_buf_ = request_body_send_buf_;
}
}
io_state_ = STATE_SENDING_HEADERS;
bool did_merge = false;
if (ShouldMergeRequestHeadersAndBody(request, request_->upload_data_stream)) {
size_t merged_size = request.size() + request_->upload_data_stream->size();
scoped_refptr<IOBuffer> merged_request_headers_and_body(
new IOBuffer(merged_size));
request_headers_ = new DrainableIOBuffer(
merged_request_headers_and_body, merged_size);
memcpy(request_headers_->data(), request.data(), request.size());
request_headers_->DidConsume(request.size());
size_t todo = request_->upload_data_stream->size();
while (todo) {
int consumed = request_->upload_data_stream->Read(request_headers_, todo,
CompletionCallback());
DCHECK_GT(consumed, 0); // Read() won't fail if not chunked.
request_headers_->DidConsume(consumed);
todo -= consumed;
}
DCHECK(request_->upload_data_stream->IsEOF());
request_headers_->SetOffset(0);
did_merge = true;
net_log_.AddEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_HTTP_TRANSACTION_SEND_REQUEST_BODY,
base::Bind(&NetLogSendRequestBodyCallback,
request_->upload_data_stream->size(),
false, /* not chunked */
true /* merged */));
}
if (!did_merge) {
scoped_refptr<StringIOBuffer> headers_io_buf(new StringIOBuffer(request));
request_headers_ = new DrainableIOBuffer(headers_io_buf,
headers_io_buf->size());
}
result = DoLoop(OK);
if (result == ERR_IO_PENDING)
callback_ = callback;
return result > 0 ? OK : result;
}
Commit Message: net: don't process truncated headers on HTTPS connections.
This change causes us to not process any headers unless they are correctly
terminated with a \r\n\r\n sequence.
BUG=244260
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15688012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202927 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Range* Editor::FindStringAndScrollToVisible(const String& target,
Range* previous_match,
FindOptions options) {
Range* next_match = FindRangeOfString(
target, EphemeralRangeInFlatTree(previous_match), options);
if (!next_match)
return nullptr;
Node* first_node = next_match->FirstNode();
first_node->GetLayoutObject()->ScrollRectToVisible(
LayoutRect(next_match->BoundingBox()),
ScrollAlignment::kAlignCenterIfNeeded,
ScrollAlignment::kAlignCenterIfNeeded, kUserScroll);
first_node->GetDocument().SetSequentialFocusNavigationStartingPoint(
first_node);
return next_match;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SynchronousCompositorOutputSurface::Invalidate() {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
if (sync_client_)
sync_client_->Invalidate();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_capability(char *tag)
{
imapd_check(NULL, 0);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* CAPABILITY ");
capa_response(CAPA_PREAUTH|CAPA_POSTAUTH);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "\r\n%s OK %s\r\n", tag,
error_message(IMAP_OK_COMPLETED));
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltDateYearFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs)
{
xmlChar *dt = NULL;
double ret;
if ((nargs < 0) || (nargs > 1)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 1) {
dt = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
if (xmlXPathCheckError(ctxt)) {
xmlXPathSetTypeError(ctxt);
return;
}
}
ret = exsltDateYear(dt);
if (dt != NULL)
xmlFree(dt);
xmlXPathReturnNumber(ctxt, ret);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 AuthenticatorBlePinEntrySheetModel::GetAcceptButtonLabel()
const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_BLE_PIN_ENTRY_NEXT);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AccessibilityUIElement::isSelected() const
{
return checkElementState(m_element, ATK_STATE_SELECTED);
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::UpdateCommandsForDevTools() {
bool dev_tools_enabled = !dev_tools_disabled_.GetValue();
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DEV_TOOLS,
dev_tools_enabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DEV_TOOLS_CONSOLE,
dev_tools_enabled);
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_DEV_TOOLS_INSPECT,
dev_tools_enabled);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static UINT8 opcode_from_pdu(UINT8 pdu)
{
UINT8 opcode = 0;
switch (pdu)
{
case AVRC_PDU_NEXT_GROUP:
case AVRC_PDU_PREV_GROUP: /* pass thru */
opcode = AVRC_OP_PASS_THRU;
break;
default: /* vendor */
opcode = AVRC_OP_VENDOR;
break;
}
return opcode;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const security_state::VisibleSecurityState& visible_security_state() {
return visible_security_state_;
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 138,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_data_inl_seg(struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp, const struct ib_send_wr *wr,
void *wqe, int *sz)
{
struct mlx5_wqe_inline_seg *seg;
void *qend = qp->sq.qend;
void *addr;
int inl = 0;
int copy;
int len;
int i;
seg = wqe;
wqe += sizeof(*seg);
for (i = 0; i < wr->num_sge; i++) {
addr = (void *)(unsigned long)(wr->sg_list[i].addr);
len = wr->sg_list[i].length;
inl += len;
if (unlikely(inl > qp->max_inline_data))
return -ENOMEM;
if (unlikely(wqe + len > qend)) {
copy = qend - wqe;
memcpy(wqe, addr, copy);
addr += copy;
len -= copy;
wqe = mlx5_get_send_wqe(qp, 0);
}
memcpy(wqe, addr, len);
wqe += len;
}
seg->byte_count = cpu_to_be32(inl | MLX5_INLINE_SEG);
*sz = ALIGN(inl + sizeof(seg->byte_count), 16) / 16;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,179 |
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