instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameSelection::ScheduleVisualUpdateForPaintInvalidationIfNeeded() const {
if (LocalFrameView* frame_view = frame_->View())
frame_view->ScheduleVisualUpdateForPaintInvalidationIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ImeAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_imeAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::ImeAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: netdutils::Status XfrmController::ipSecDeleteSecurityPolicy(int32_t transformId, int32_t direction,
const std::string& localAddress,
const std::string& remoteAddress,
int32_t markValue, int32_t markMask) {
return processSecurityPolicy(transformId, direction, localAddress, remoteAddress, 0, markValue,
markMask, XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY);
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909 | 0 | 162,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void re_yyset_debug (int _bdebug , yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
struct yyguts_t * yyg = (struct yyguts_t*)yyscanner;
yy_flex_debug = _bdebug ;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: partition_table_create_data_unref (CreatePartitionTableData *data)
{
data->refcount--;
if (data->refcount == 0)
{
g_object_unref (data->device);
g_free (data->scheme);
g_free (data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bin_symbols(RCore *r, int mode, ut64 laddr, int va, ut64 at, const char *name, bool exponly, const char *args) {
RBinInfo *info = r_bin_get_info (r->bin);
RList *entries = r_bin_get_entries (r->bin);
RBinSymbol *symbol;
RBinAddr *entry;
RListIter *iter;
bool firstexp = true;
bool printHere = false;
int i = 0, lastfs = 's';
bool bin_demangle = r_config_get_i (r->config, "bin.demangle");
if (!info) {
return 0;
}
if (args && *args == '.') {
printHere = true;
}
bool is_arm = info && info->arch && !strncmp (info->arch, "arm", 3);
const char *lang = bin_demangle ? r_config_get (r->config, "bin.lang") : NULL;
RList *symbols = r_bin_get_symbols (r->bin);
r_spaces_push (&r->anal->meta_spaces, "bin");
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode) && !printHere) {
r_cons_printf ("[");
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
r_flag_space_set (r->flags, R_FLAGS_FS_SYMBOLS);
} else if (!at && exponly) {
if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs exports\n");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf (printHere ? "" : "[Exports]\n");
}
} else if (!at && !exponly) {
if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("fs symbols\n");
} else if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf (printHere ? "" : "[Symbols]\n");
}
}
if (IS_MODE_NORMAL (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("Num Paddr Vaddr Bind Type Size Name\n");
}
size_t count = 0;
r_list_foreach (symbols, iter, symbol) {
if (!symbol->name) {
continue;
}
char *r_symbol_name = r_str_escape_utf8 (symbol->name, false, true);
ut64 addr = compute_addr (r->bin, symbol->paddr, symbol->vaddr, va);
int len = symbol->size ? symbol->size : 32;
SymName sn = {0};
if (exponly && !isAnExport (symbol)) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if (name && strcmp (r_symbol_name, name)) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if (at && (!symbol->size || !is_in_range (at, addr, symbol->size))) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
if ((printHere && !is_in_range (r->offset, symbol->paddr, len))
&& (printHere && !is_in_range (r->offset, addr, len))) {
free (r_symbol_name);
continue;
}
count ++;
snInit (r, &sn, symbol, lang);
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode) && (is_section_symbol (symbol) || is_file_symbol (symbol))) {
/*
* Skip section symbols because they will have their own flag.
* Skip also file symbols because not useful for now.
*/
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode) && is_special_symbol (symbol)) {
if (is_arm) {
handle_arm_special_symbol (r, symbol, va);
}
} else if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
if (is_arm) {
handle_arm_symbol (r, symbol, info, va);
}
select_flag_space (r, symbol);
/* If that's a Classed symbol (method or so) */
if (sn.classname) {
RFlagItem *fi = r_flag_get (r->flags, sn.methflag);
if (r->bin->prefix) {
char *prname = r_str_newf ("%s.%s", r->bin->prefix, sn.methflag);
r_name_filter (sn.methflag, -1);
free (sn.methflag);
sn.methflag = prname;
}
if (fi) {
r_flag_item_set_realname (fi, sn.methname);
if ((fi->offset - r->flags->base) == addr) {
r_flag_unset (r->flags, fi);
}
} else {
fi = r_flag_set (r->flags, sn.methflag, addr, symbol->size);
char *comment = fi->comment ? strdup (fi->comment) : NULL;
if (comment) {
r_flag_item_set_comment (fi, comment);
R_FREE (comment);
}
}
} else {
const char *n = sn.demname ? sn.demname : sn.name;
const char *fn = sn.demflag ? sn.demflag : sn.nameflag;
char *fnp = (r->bin->prefix) ?
r_str_newf ("%s.%s", r->bin->prefix, fn):
strdup (fn);
RFlagItem *fi = r_flag_set (r->flags, fnp, addr, symbol->size);
if (fi) {
r_flag_item_set_realname (fi, n);
fi->demangled = (bool)(size_t)sn.demname;
} else {
if (fn) {
eprintf ("[Warning] Can't find flag (%s)\n", fn);
}
}
free (fnp);
}
if (sn.demname) {
r_meta_add (r->anal, R_META_TYPE_COMMENT,
addr, symbol->size, sn.demname);
}
r_flag_space_pop (r->flags);
} else if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
char *str = r_str_escape_utf8_for_json (r_symbol_name, -1);
r_cons_printf ("%s{\"name\":\"%s\","
"\"demname\":\"%s\","
"\"flagname\":\"%s\","
"\"ordinal\":%d,"
"\"bind\":\"%s\","
"\"size\":%d,"
"\"type\":\"%s\","
"\"vaddr\":%"PFMT64d","
"\"paddr\":%"PFMT64d"}",
((exponly && firstexp) || printHere) ? "" : (iter->p ? "," : ""),
str,
sn.demname? sn.demname: "",
sn.nameflag,
symbol->ordinal,
symbol->bind,
(int)symbol->size,
symbol->type,
(ut64)addr, (ut64)symbol->paddr);
free (str);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLE (mode)) {
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
r_cons_printf ("0x%08"PFMT64x" %d %s\n",
addr, (int)symbol->size, name);
} else if (IS_MODE_SIMPLEST (mode)) {
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
r_cons_printf ("%s\n", name);
} else if (IS_MODE_RAD (mode)) {
/* Skip special symbols because we do not flag them and
* they shouldn't be printed in the rad format either */
if (is_special_symbol (symbol)) {
goto next;
}
RBinFile *binfile;
RBinPlugin *plugin;
const char *name = sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name;
if (!name) {
goto next;
}
if (!strncmp (name, "imp.", 4)) {
if (lastfs != 'i') {
r_cons_printf ("fs imports\n");
}
lastfs = 'i';
} else {
if (lastfs != 's') {
const char *fs = exponly? "exports": "symbols";
r_cons_printf ("fs %s\n", fs);
}
lastfs = 's';
}
if (r->bin->prefix || *name) { // we don't want unnamed symbol flags
char *flagname = construct_symbol_flagname ("sym", name, MAXFLAG_LEN_DEFAULT);
if (!flagname) {
goto next;
}
r_cons_printf ("\"f %s%s%s %u 0x%08" PFMT64x "\"\n",
r->bin->prefix ? r->bin->prefix : "", r->bin->prefix ? "." : "",
flagname, symbol->size, addr);
free (flagname);
}
binfile = r_bin_cur (r->bin);
plugin = r_bin_file_cur_plugin (binfile);
if (plugin && plugin->name) {
if (r_str_startswith (plugin->name, "pe")) {
char *module = strdup (r_symbol_name);
char *p = strstr (module, ".dll_");
if (p && strstr (module, "imp.")) {
char *symname = __filterShell (p + 5);
char *m = __filterShell (module);
*p = 0;
if (r->bin->prefix) {
r_cons_printf ("k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s.%s\n",
module, symbol->ordinal, r->bin->prefix, symname);
} else {
r_cons_printf ("k bin/pe/%s/%d=%s\n",
module, symbol->ordinal, symname);
}
free (symname);
free (m);
}
free (module);
}
}
} else {
const char *bind = symbol->bind? symbol->bind: "NONE";
const char *type = symbol->type? symbol->type: "NONE";
const char *name = r_str_get (sn.demname? sn.demname: r_symbol_name);
r_cons_printf ("%03u", symbol->ordinal);
if (symbol->paddr == UT64_MAX) {
r_cons_printf (" ----------");
} else {
r_cons_printf (" 0x%08"PFMT64x, symbol->paddr);
}
r_cons_printf (" 0x%08"PFMT64x" %6s %6s %4d%s%s\n",
addr, bind, type, symbol->size, *name? " ": "", name);
}
next:
snFini (&sn);
i++;
free (r_symbol_name);
if (exponly && firstexp) {
firstexp = false;
}
if (printHere) {
break;
}
}
if (count == 0 && IS_MODE_JSON (mode)) {
r_cons_printf ("{}");
}
if (is_arm) {
r_list_foreach (entries, iter, entry) {
if (IS_MODE_SET (mode)) {
handle_arm_entry (r, entry, info, va);
}
}
}
if (IS_MODE_JSON (mode) && !printHere) {
r_cons_printf ("]");
}
r_spaces_pop (&r->anal->meta_spaces);
return true;
}
Commit Message: More fixes for the CVE-2019-14745
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 1 | 170,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: device_partition_create_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
const gchar *action_id,
guint num_user_data,
gpointer *user_data_elements)
{
guint64 offset = *((guint64*) user_data_elements[0]);
guint64 size = *((guint64*) user_data_elements[1]);
;
const char *type = user_data_elements[2];
const char *label = user_data_elements[3];
char **flags = user_data_elements[4];
char **options = user_data_elements[5];
const char *fstype = user_data_elements[6];
char **fsoptions = user_data_elements[7];
int n;
int m;
char *argv[128];
GError *error;
char *offset_as_string;
char *size_as_string;
char *flags_as_string;
offset_as_string = NULL;
size_as_string = NULL;
flags_as_string = NULL;
error = NULL;
if (!device->priv->device_is_partition_table)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Device is not partitioned");
goto out;
}
if (device_local_is_busy (device, FALSE, &error))
{
dbus_g_method_return_error (context, error);
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
/* partutil.c / libparted will check there are no partitions in the requested slice */
offset_as_string = g_strdup_printf ("%" G_GINT64_FORMAT "", offset);
size_as_string = g_strdup_printf ("%" G_GINT64_FORMAT "", size);
/* TODO: check that neither of the flags include ',' */
flags_as_string = g_strjoinv (",", flags);
n = 0;
argv[n++] = "udisks-helper-create-partition";
if (device->priv->device_is_linux_dmmp)
argv[n++] = (gchar *) get_dmmp_device_node (device);
else
argv[n++] = device->priv->device_file;
argv[n++] = offset_as_string;
argv[n++] = size_as_string;
argv[n++] = (char *) type;
argv[n++] = (char *) label;
argv[n++] = (char *) flags_as_string;
for (m = 0; options[m] != NULL; m++)
{
if (n >= (int) sizeof(argv) - 1)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Too many options");
goto out;
}
/* the helper will validate each option */
argv[n++] = (char *) options[m];
}
argv[n++] = NULL;
if (!job_new (context,
"PartitionCreate",
TRUE,
device,
argv,
NULL,
partition_create_completed_cb,
FALSE,
partition_create_data_new (context, device, offset, size, fstype, fsoptions),
(GDestroyNotify) partition_create_data_unref))
{
goto out;
}
out:
g_free (offset_as_string);
g_free (size_as_string);
g_free (flags_as_string);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void my_handler(int s){
EUID_ROOT();
if (!arg_quiet) {
printf("\nParent received signal %d, shutting down the child process...\n", s);
fflush(0);
}
logsignal(s);
kill(child, SIGTERM);
myexit(1);
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: | 0 | 69,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int pix_abs8_c(void *v, uint8_t *pix1, uint8_t *pix2, int line_size, int h)
{
int s, i;
s = 0;
for(i=0;i<h;i++) {
s += abs(pix1[0] - pix2[0]);
s += abs(pix1[1] - pix2[1]);
s += abs(pix1[2] - pix2[2]);
s += abs(pix1[3] - pix2[3]);
s += abs(pix1[4] - pix2[4]);
s += abs(pix1[5] - pix2[5]);
s += abs(pix1[6] - pix2[6]);
s += abs(pix1[7] - pix2[7]);
pix1 += line_size;
pix2 += line_size;
}
return s;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,151 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_send_id_info(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE le_key;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID, false);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_IDENTITY_INFO, p_cb);
smp_send_cmd(SMP_OPCODE_ID_ADDR, p_cb);
if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) &&
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND))
btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_LID, &le_key, true);
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s", __func__);
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _prb_refresh_rx_retire_blk_timer(struct tpacket_kbdq_core *pkc)
{
mod_timer(&pkc->retire_blk_timer,
jiffies + pkc->tov_in_jiffies);
pkc->last_kactive_blk_num = pkc->kactive_blk_num;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dtdCreate(const XML_Memory_Handling_Suite *ms) {
DTD *p = (DTD *)ms->malloc_fcn(sizeof(DTD));
if (p == NULL)
return p;
poolInit(&(p->pool), ms);
poolInit(&(p->entityValuePool), ms);
hashTableInit(&(p->generalEntities), ms);
hashTableInit(&(p->elementTypes), ms);
hashTableInit(&(p->attributeIds), ms);
hashTableInit(&(p->prefixes), ms);
#ifdef XML_DTD
p->paramEntityRead = XML_FALSE;
hashTableInit(&(p->paramEntities), ms);
#endif /* XML_DTD */
p->defaultPrefix.name = NULL;
p->defaultPrefix.binding = NULL;
p->in_eldecl = XML_FALSE;
p->scaffIndex = NULL;
p->scaffold = NULL;
p->scaffLevel = 0;
p->scaffSize = 0;
p->scaffCount = 0;
p->contentStringLen = 0;
p->keepProcessing = XML_TRUE;
p->hasParamEntityRefs = XML_FALSE;
p->standalone = XML_FALSE;
return p;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check_compressible_cell(struct table *t, MAT * minv,
double *newwidth, double *swidth, short *cwidth,
double totalwidth, double *Sxx,
int icol, int icell, double sxx, int corr)
{
struct table_cell *cell = &t->cell;
int i, j, k, m, bcol, ecol, span;
double delta, owidth;
double dmax, dmin, sxy;
int rulewidth = table_rule_width(t);
if (sxx < 10.)
return corr;
if (icol >= 0) {
owidth = newwidth[icol];
delta = newwidth[icol] - (double)t->tabwidth[icol];
bcol = icol;
ecol = bcol + 1;
}
else if (icell >= 0) {
owidth = swidth[icell];
delta = swidth[icell] - (double)cwidth[icell];
bcol = cell->col[icell];
ecol = bcol + cell->colspan[icell];
}
else {
owidth = totalwidth;
delta = totalwidth;
bcol = 0;
ecol = t->maxcol + 1;
}
dmin = delta;
dmax = -1.;
for (k = 0; k <= cell->maxcell; k++) {
int bcol1, ecol1;
int is_inclusive = 0;
if (dmin <= 0.)
goto _end;
j = cell->index[k];
if (j == icell)
continue;
bcol1 = cell->col[j];
ecol1 = bcol1 + cell->colspan[j];
sxy = 0.;
for (m = bcol1; m < ecol1; m++) {
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++)
sxy += m_entry(minv, i, m);
}
if (bcol1 >= bcol && ecol1 <= ecol) {
is_inclusive = 1;
}
if (sxy > 0.)
dmin = recalc_width(dmin, swidth[j], cwidth[j],
sxx, Sxx[j], sxy, is_inclusive);
else
dmax = recalc_width(dmax, swidth[j], cwidth[j],
sxx, Sxx[j], sxy, is_inclusive);
}
for (m = 0; m <= t->maxcol; m++) {
int is_inclusive = 0;
if (dmin <= 0.)
goto _end;
if (m == icol)
continue;
sxy = 0.;
for (i = bcol; i < ecol; i++)
sxy += m_entry(minv, i, m);
if (m >= bcol && m < ecol) {
is_inclusive = 1;
}
if (sxy > 0.)
dmin = recalc_width(dmin, newwidth[m], t->tabwidth[m],
sxx, m_entry(minv, m, m), sxy, is_inclusive);
else
dmax = recalc_width(dmax, newwidth[m], t->tabwidth[m],
sxx, m_entry(minv, m, m), sxy, is_inclusive);
}
_end:
if (dmax > 0. && dmin > dmax)
dmin = dmax;
span = ecol - bcol;
if ((span == t->maxcol + 1 && dmin >= 0.) ||
(span != t->maxcol + 1 && dmin > rulewidth * 0.5)) {
int nwidth = ceil_at_intervals(round(owidth - dmin), rulewidth);
correct_table_matrix(t, bcol, ecol - bcol, nwidth, 1.);
corr++;
}
return corr;
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 84,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip_queue_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
struct flowi4 *fl4;
struct rtable *rt;
struct iphdr *iph;
int res;
/* Skip all of this if the packet is already routed,
* f.e. by something like SCTP.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
fl4 = &fl->u.ip4;
rt = skb_rtable(skb);
if (rt != NULL)
goto packet_routed;
/* Make sure we can route this packet. */
rt = (struct rtable *)__sk_dst_check(sk, 0);
if (rt == NULL) {
__be32 daddr;
/* Use correct destination address if we have options. */
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.srr)
daddr = inet_opt->opt.faddr;
/* If this fails, retransmit mechanism of transport layer will
* keep trying until route appears or the connection times
* itself out.
*/
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), fl4, sk,
daddr, inet->inet_saddr,
inet->inet_dport,
inet->inet_sport,
sk->sk_protocol,
RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto no_route;
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
}
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rt->dst);
packet_routed:
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.is_strictroute && rt->rt_uses_gateway)
goto no_route;
/* OK, we know where to send it, allocate and build IP header. */
skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr) + (inet_opt ? inet_opt->opt.optlen : 0));
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
*((__be16 *)iph) = htons((4 << 12) | (5 << 8) | (inet->tos & 0xff));
if (ip_dont_fragment(sk, &rt->dst) && !skb->local_df)
iph->frag_off = htons(IP_DF);
else
iph->frag_off = 0;
iph->ttl = ip_select_ttl(inet, &rt->dst);
iph->protocol = sk->sk_protocol;
ip_copy_addrs(iph, fl4);
/* Transport layer set skb->h.foo itself. */
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.optlen) {
iph->ihl += inet_opt->opt.optlen >> 2;
ip_options_build(skb, &inet_opt->opt, inet->inet_daddr, rt, 0);
}
ip_select_ident_more(skb, &rt->dst, sk,
(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs ?: 1) - 1);
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
skb->mark = sk->sk_mark;
res = ip_local_out(skb);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
no_route:
rcu_read_unlock();
IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EHOSTUNREACH;
}
Commit Message: ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_feature_set_ok(struct super_block *sb, int readonly)
{
if (ext4_has_unknown_ext4_incompat_features(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Couldn't mount because of "
"unsupported optional features (%x)",
(le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_feature_incompat) &
~EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SUPP));
return 0;
}
if (readonly)
return 1;
if (ext4_has_feature_readonly(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_INFO, "filesystem is read-only");
sb->s_flags |= MS_RDONLY;
return 1;
}
/* Check that feature set is OK for a read-write mount */
if (ext4_has_unknown_ext4_ro_compat_features(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "couldn't mount RDWR because of "
"unsupported optional features (%x)",
(le32_to_cpu(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_es->s_feature_ro_compat) &
~EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_SUPP));
return 0;
}
/*
* Large file size enabled file system can only be mounted
* read-write on 32-bit systems if kernel is built with CONFIG_LBDAF
*/
if (ext4_has_feature_huge_file(sb)) {
if (sizeof(blkcnt_t) < sizeof(u64)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "Filesystem with huge files "
"cannot be mounted RDWR without "
"CONFIG_LBDAF");
return 0;
}
}
if (ext4_has_feature_bigalloc(sb) && !ext4_has_feature_extents(sb)) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Can't support bigalloc feature without "
"extents feature\n");
return 0;
}
#ifndef CONFIG_QUOTA
if (ext4_has_feature_quota(sb) && !readonly) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Filesystem with quota feature cannot be mounted RDWR "
"without CONFIG_QUOTA");
return 0;
}
if (ext4_has_feature_project(sb) && !readonly) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
"Filesystem with project quota feature cannot be mounted RDWR "
"without CONFIG_QUOTA");
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_QUOTA */
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@os-t.de>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <guaneryu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,529 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ctx_group_list(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
if (event->attr.pinned)
return &ctx->pinned_groups;
else
return &ctx->flexible_groups;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int64_t mxf_compute_sample_count(MXFContext *mxf, AVStream *st,
int64_t edit_unit)
{
int i, total = 0, size = 0;
MXFTrack *track = st->priv_data;
AVRational time_base = av_inv_q(track->edit_rate);
AVRational sample_rate = av_inv_q(st->time_base);
const MXFSamplesPerFrame *spf = NULL;
int64_t sample_count;
if (st->codecpar->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO)
return edit_unit;
if ((sample_rate.num / sample_rate.den) == 48000)
spf = ff_mxf_get_samples_per_frame(mxf->fc, time_base);
if (!spf) {
int remainder = (sample_rate.num * time_base.num) %
(time_base.den * sample_rate.den);
if (remainder)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"seeking detected on stream #%d with time base (%d/%d) and "
"sample rate (%d/%d), audio pts won't be accurate.\n",
st->index, time_base.num, time_base.den,
sample_rate.num, sample_rate.den);
return av_rescale_q(edit_unit, sample_rate, track->edit_rate);
}
while (spf->samples_per_frame[size]) {
total += spf->samples_per_frame[size];
size++;
}
av_assert2(size);
sample_count = (edit_unit / size) * (uint64_t)total;
for (i = 0; i < edit_unit % size; i++) {
sample_count += spf->samples_per_frame[i];
}
return sample_count;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<Attr> Element::removeAttributeNode(Attr* attr, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (!attr) {
ec = TYPE_MISMATCH_ERR;
return 0;
}
if (attr->ownerElement() != this) {
ec = NOT_FOUND_ERR;
return 0;
}
ASSERT(document() == attr->document());
synchronizeAttribute(attr->qualifiedName());
size_t index = elementData()->getAttrIndex(attr);
if (index == notFound) {
ec = NOT_FOUND_ERR;
return 0;
}
RefPtr<Attr> guard(attr);
detachAttrNodeAtIndex(attr, index);
return guard.release();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssd0323_invalidate_display(void * opaque)
{
ssd0323_state *s = (ssd0323_state *)opaque;
s->redraw = 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ib_xrcd *mlx5_ib_alloc_xrcd(struct ib_device *ibdev,
struct ib_ucontext *context,
struct ib_udata *udata)
{
struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(ibdev);
struct mlx5_ib_xrcd *xrcd;
int err;
if (!MLX5_CAP_GEN(dev->mdev, xrc))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS);
xrcd = kmalloc(sizeof(*xrcd), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!xrcd)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
err = mlx5_core_xrcd_alloc(dev->mdev, &xrcd->xrcdn);
if (err) {
kfree(xrcd);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
return &xrcd->ibxrcd;
}
Commit Message: IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::DragSourceSystemDragEnded() {
Send(new DragMsg_SourceSystemDragEnded(GetRoutingID()));
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jboolean android_net_wifi_set_Country_Code_Hal(JNIEnv *env,jclass cls, jint iface,
jstring country_code) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ScopedUtfChars chars(env, country_code);
const char *country = chars.c_str();
ALOGD("set country code: %s", country);
wifi_error res = hal_fn.wifi_set_country_code(handle, country);
return res == WIFI_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_port_perm(struct snd_seq_client_port *port, unsigned int flags)
{
if ((port->capability & flags) != flags)
return 0;
return flags;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int64_t ATSParser::Program::recoverPTS(uint64_t PTS_33bit) {
if (mLastRecoveredPTS < 0ll) {
mLastRecoveredPTS = static_cast<int64_t>(PTS_33bit);
} else {
mLastRecoveredPTS = static_cast<int64_t>(
((mLastRecoveredPTS - PTS_33bit + 0x100000000ll)
& 0xfffffffe00000000ull) | PTS_33bit);
if (mLastRecoveredPTS < 0ll) {
ALOGI("Clamping negative recovered PTS (%" PRId64 ") to 0", mLastRecoveredPTS);
mLastRecoveredPTS = 0ll;
}
}
return mLastRecoveredPTS;
}
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlockLoop(base::WaitableEvent* completion, base::Callback<bool()> work) {
do {
completion->Wait();
} while (work.Run());
base::MessageLoop::current()->QuitNow();
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 110,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerFetchContext::CountUsage(WebFeature feature) const {
UseCounter::Count(global_scope_, feature);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned append_symbol_coins(Coin* coins, const unsigned* frequencies, unsigned numcodes, size_t sum)
{
unsigned i;
unsigned j = 0; /*index of present symbols*/
for(i = 0; i < numcodes; i++)
{
if(frequencies[i] != 0) /*only include symbols that are present*/
{
coins[j].weight = frequencies[i] / (float)sum;
uivector_push_back(&coins[j].symbols, i);
j++;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exp_build_u32(const struct nf_expect *exp, int a, struct nethdr *n, int b)
{
uint32_t data = nfexp_get_attr_u32(exp, a);
data = htonl(data);
addattr(n, b, &data, sizeof(uint32_t));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 1,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OMXCodec::setComponentRole() {
setComponentRole(mOMX, mNode, mIsEncoder, mMIME);
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sock_queue_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
int skb_len;
unsigned long flags;
struct sk_buff_head *list = &sk->sk_receive_queue;
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) >= sk->sk_rcvbuf) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
trace_sock_rcvqueue_full(sk, skb);
return -ENOMEM;
}
err = sk_filter(sk, skb);
if (err)
return err;
if (!sk_rmem_schedule(sk, skb, skb->truesize)) {
atomic_inc(&sk->sk_drops);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
skb->dev = NULL;
skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
/* Cache the SKB length before we tack it onto the receive
* queue. Once it is added it no longer belongs to us and
* may be freed by other threads of control pulling packets
* from the queue.
*/
skb_len = skb->len;
/* we escape from rcu protected region, make sure we dont leak
* a norefcounted dst
*/
skb_dst_force(skb);
spin_lock_irqsave(&list->lock, flags);
skb->dropcount = atomic_read(&sk->sk_drops);
__skb_queue_tail(list, skb);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&list->lock, flags);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
sk->sk_data_ready(sk, skb_len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: guard tcp_set_keepalive() to tcp sockets
Its possible to use RAW sockets to get a crash in
tcp_set_keepalive() / sk_reset_timer()
Fix is to make sure socket is a SOCK_STREAM one.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 41,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::requestRemotePlayback() {
if (webMediaPlayer())
webMediaPlayer()->requestRemotePlayback();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int qcow2_decompress_cluster(BlockDriverState *bs, uint64_t cluster_offset)
{
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
int ret, csize, nb_csectors, sector_offset;
uint64_t coffset;
coffset = cluster_offset & s->cluster_offset_mask;
if (s->cluster_cache_offset != coffset) {
nb_csectors = ((cluster_offset >> s->csize_shift) & s->csize_mask) + 1;
sector_offset = coffset & 511;
csize = nb_csectors * 512 - sector_offset;
BLKDBG_EVENT(bs->file, BLKDBG_READ_COMPRESSED);
ret = bdrv_read(bs->file, coffset >> 9, s->cluster_data, nb_csectors);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
if (decompress_buffer(s->cluster_cache, s->cluster_size,
s->cluster_data + sector_offset, csize) < 0) {
return -EIO;
}
s->cluster_cache_offset = coffset;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tx3g_dump_box(FILE * trace, GF_BoxRecord *rec)
{
fprintf(trace, "<BoxRecord top=\"%d\" left=\"%d\" bottom=\"%d\" right=\"%d\"/>\n", rec->top, rec->left, rec->bottom, rec->right);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,893 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: free_config_tree(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined (_DEBUG)
_CrtCheckMemory();
#endif
if (ptree->source.value.s != NULL)
free(ptree->source.value.s);
free_config_other_modes(ptree);
free_config_auth(ptree);
free_config_tos(ptree);
free_config_monitor(ptree);
free_config_access(ptree);
free_config_tinker(ptree);
free_config_system_opts(ptree);
free_config_logconfig(ptree);
free_config_phone(ptree);
free_config_qos(ptree);
free_config_setvar(ptree);
free_config_ttl(ptree);
free_config_trap(ptree);
free_config_fudge(ptree);
free_config_vars(ptree);
free_config_peers(ptree);
free_config_unpeers(ptree);
free_config_nic_rules(ptree);
#ifdef SIM
free_config_sim(ptree);
#endif
free_auth_node(ptree);
free(ptree);
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined (_DEBUG)
_CrtCheckMemory();
#endif
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(mknodat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, umode_t, mode,
unsigned, dev)
{
struct dentry *dentry;
struct path path;
int error;
unsigned int lookup_flags = 0;
error = may_mknod(mode);
if (error)
return error;
retry:
dentry = user_path_create(dfd, filename, &path, lookup_flags);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
return PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (!IS_POSIXACL(path.dentry->d_inode))
mode &= ~current_umask();
error = security_path_mknod(&path, dentry, mode, dev);
if (error)
goto out;
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
case 0: case S_IFREG:
error = vfs_create(path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,true);
break;
case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK:
error = vfs_mknod(path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,
new_decode_dev(dev));
break;
case S_IFIFO: case S_IFSOCK:
error = vfs_mknod(path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,0);
break;
}
out:
done_path_create(&path, dentry);
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
goto retry;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 36,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: init_as_req (krb5_context context,
KDCOptions opts,
const krb5_creds *creds,
const krb5_addresses *addrs,
const krb5_enctype *etypes,
AS_REQ *a)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
a->pvno = 5;
a->msg_type = krb_as_req;
a->req_body.kdc_options = opts;
a->req_body.cname = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.cname));
if (a->req_body.cname == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto fail;
}
a->req_body.sname = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.sname));
if (a->req_body.sname == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto fail;
}
ret = _krb5_principal2principalname (a->req_body.cname, creds->client);
if (ret)
goto fail;
ret = copy_Realm(&creds->client->realm, &a->req_body.realm);
if (ret)
goto fail;
ret = _krb5_principal2principalname (a->req_body.sname, creds->server);
if (ret)
goto fail;
if(creds->times.starttime) {
a->req_body.from = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.from));
if (a->req_body.from == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto fail;
}
*a->req_body.from = creds->times.starttime;
}
if(creds->times.endtime){
if ((ALLOC(a->req_body.till, 1)) != NULL)
*a->req_body.till = creds->times.endtime;
else {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto fail;
}
}
if(creds->times.renew_till){
a->req_body.rtime = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.rtime));
if (a->req_body.rtime == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto fail;
}
*a->req_body.rtime = creds->times.renew_till;
}
a->req_body.nonce = 0;
ret = _krb5_init_etype(context,
KRB5_PDU_AS_REQUEST,
&a->req_body.etype.len,
&a->req_body.etype.val,
etypes);
if (ret)
goto fail;
/*
* This means no addresses
*/
if (addrs && addrs->len == 0) {
a->req_body.addresses = NULL;
} else {
a->req_body.addresses = malloc(sizeof(*a->req_body.addresses));
if (a->req_body.addresses == NULL) {
ret = krb5_enomem(context);
goto fail;
}
if (addrs)
ret = krb5_copy_addresses(context, addrs, a->req_body.addresses);
else {
ret = krb5_get_all_client_addrs (context, a->req_body.addresses);
if(ret == 0 && a->req_body.addresses->len == 0) {
free(a->req_body.addresses);
a->req_body.addresses = NULL;
}
}
if (ret)
goto fail;
}
a->req_body.enc_authorization_data = NULL;
a->req_body.additional_tickets = NULL;
a->padata = NULL;
return 0;
fail:
free_AS_REQ(a);
memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auristor.com>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@auritor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b)
CWE ID: CWE-320 | 0 | 89,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _client_protocol_timeout (GsmXSMPClient *client)
{
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: client_protocol_timeout for client '%s' in ICE status %d",
client->priv->description,
IceConnectionStatus (client->priv->ice_connection));
gsm_client_set_status (GSM_CLIENT (client), GSM_CLIENT_FAILED);
gsm_client_disconnected (GSM_CLIENT (client));
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 1 | 168,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmxnet3_complete_packet(VMXNET3State *s, int qidx, uint32_t tx_ridx)
{
struct Vmxnet3_TxCompDesc txcq_descr;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
VMXNET3_RING_DUMP(VMW_RIPRN, "TXC", qidx, &s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
txcq_descr.txdIdx = tx_ridx;
txcq_descr.gen = vmxnet3_ring_curr_gen(&s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring);
vmxnet3_ring_write_curr_cell(d, &s->txq_descr[qidx].comp_ring, &txcq_descr);
/* Flush changes in TX descriptor before changing the counter value */
smp_wmb();
vmxnet3_inc_tx_completion_counter(s, qidx);
vmxnet3_trigger_interrupt(s, s->txq_descr[qidx].intr_idx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 9,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::UpdateToolbar(TabContents* contents,
bool should_restore_state) {
toolbar_->Update(contents->web_contents(), should_restore_state);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SelectionController::SelectClosestMisspellingFromHitTestResult(
const HitTestResult& result,
AppendTrailingWhitespace append_trailing_whitespace) {
Node* inner_node = result.InnerNode();
if (!inner_node || !inner_node->GetLayoutObject())
return;
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& pos = VisiblePositionOfHitTestResult(result);
if (pos.IsNull()) {
UpdateSelectionForMouseDownDispatchingSelectStart(
inner_node, SelectionInFlatTree(), TextGranularity::kWord,
HandleVisibility::kNotVisible);
return;
}
const PositionInFlatTree& marker_position =
pos.DeepEquivalent().ParentAnchoredEquivalent();
const DocumentMarker* const marker =
inner_node->GetDocument().Markers().MarkerAtPosition(
ToPositionInDOMTree(marker_position),
DocumentMarker::MisspellingMarkers());
if (!marker) {
UpdateSelectionForMouseDownDispatchingSelectStart(
inner_node, SelectionInFlatTree(), TextGranularity::kWord,
HandleVisibility::kNotVisible);
return;
}
Node* const container_node = marker_position.ComputeContainerNode();
const PositionInFlatTree start(container_node, marker->StartOffset());
const PositionInFlatTree end(container_node, marker->EndOffset());
const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree& new_selection = CreateVisibleSelection(
SelectionInFlatTree::Builder().Collapse(start).Extend(end).Build());
const SelectionInFlatTree& adjusted_selection =
append_trailing_whitespace == AppendTrailingWhitespace::kShouldAppend
? AdjustSelectionWithTrailingWhitespace(new_selection.AsSelection())
: new_selection.AsSelection();
UpdateSelectionForMouseDownDispatchingSelectStart(
inner_node,
ExpandSelectionToRespectUserSelectAll(inner_node, adjusted_selection),
TextGranularity::kWord, HandleVisibility::kNotVisible);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestWCDelegateForDialogsAndFullscreen()
: is_fullscreen_(false), message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Resource::Prune() {
DestroyDecodedDataIfPossible();
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static js_Ast *propname(js_State *J)
{
js_Ast *name;
if (J->lookahead == TK_NUMBER) {
name = jsP_newnumnode(J, EXP_NUMBER, J->number);
jsP_next(J);
} else if (J->lookahead == TK_STRING) {
name = jsP_newstrnode(J, EXP_STRING, J->text);
jsP_next(J);
} else {
name = identifiername(J);
}
return name;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-674 | 0 | 11,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_vmread(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long field;
u64 field_value;
unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
u32 vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
gva_t gva = 0;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu) ||
!nested_vmx_check_vmcs12(vcpu))
return 1;
/* Decode instruction info and find the field to read */
field = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, (((vmx_instruction_info) >> 28) & 0xf));
/* Read the field, zero-extended to a u64 field_value */
if (vmcs12_read_any(vcpu, field, &field_value) < 0) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_UNSUPPORTED_VMCS_COMPONENT);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
/*
* Now copy part of this value to register or memory, as requested.
* Note that the number of bits actually copied is 32 or 64 depending
* on the guest's mode (32 or 64 bit), not on the given field's length.
*/
if (vmx_instruction_info & (1u << 10)) {
kvm_register_writel(vcpu, (((vmx_instruction_info) >> 3) & 0xf),
field_value);
} else {
if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, exit_qualification,
vmx_instruction_info, true, &gva))
return 1;
/* _system ok, as nested_vmx_check_permission verified cpl=0 */
kvm_write_guest_virt_system(&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, gva,
&field_value, (is_long_mode(vcpu) ? 8 : 4), NULL);
}
nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,673 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static blink::WebScreenOrientations stringToOrientations(const AtomicString& orientationString)
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, portrait, ("portrait", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, landscape, ("landscape", AtomicString::ConstructFromLiteral));
if (orientationString == portrait)
return blink::WebScreenOrientationPortraitPrimary | blink::WebScreenOrientationPortraitSecondary;
if (orientationString == landscape)
return blink::WebScreenOrientationLandscapePrimary | blink::WebScreenOrientationLandscapeSecondary;
unsigned length = 0;
ScreenOrientationInfo* orientationMap = orientationsMap(length);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
if (orientationMap[i].name == orientationString)
return orientationMap[i].orientation;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Screen Orientation: use OrientationLockType enum for lockOrientation().
BUG=162827
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/204653002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169972 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int brcmf_vif_add_validate(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg,
enum nl80211_iftype new_type)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif *pos;
struct iface_combination_params params = {
.num_different_channels = 1,
};
list_for_each_entry(pos, &cfg->vif_list, list)
params.iftype_num[pos->wdev.iftype]++;
params.iftype_num[new_type]++;
return cfg80211_check_combinations(cfg->wiphy, ¶ms);
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <freenerguo@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 67,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CWebServer::Cmd_RenameDevice(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
if (session.rights != 2)
{
session.reply_status = reply::forbidden;
return; //Only admin user allowed
}
std::string sidx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
std::string sname = request::findValue(&req, "name");
if (
(sidx.empty()) ||
(sname.empty())
)
return;
int idx = atoi(sidx.c_str());
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "RenameDevice";
m_sql.safe_query("UPDATE DeviceStatus SET Name='%q' WHERE (ID == %d)", sname.c_str(), idx);
uint64_t ullidx = std::strtoull(sidx.c_str(), nullptr, 10);
m_mainworker.m_eventsystem.WWWUpdateSingleState(ullidx, sname, m_mainworker.m_eventsystem.REASON_DEVICE);
#ifdef ENABLE_PYTHON
m_mainworker.m_pluginsystem.DeviceModified(idx);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 91,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ElementIdToScrollNodeIndex(CompositorElementId element_id) {
return web_layer_tree_view_->GetLayerTreeHost()
->property_trees()
->element_id_to_scroll_node_index[element_id];
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mp_state *mp_state)
{
mp_state->mp_state = vcpu->arch.mp_state;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ath_tid_drain(struct ath_softc *sc, struct ath_txq *txq,
struct ath_atx_tid *tid)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ath_buf *bf;
struct list_head bf_head;
struct ath_tx_status ts;
struct ath_frame_info *fi;
memset(&ts, 0, sizeof(ts));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bf_head);
while ((skb = ath_tid_dequeue(tid))) {
fi = get_frame_info(skb);
bf = fi->bf;
if (!bf) {
ath_tx_complete(sc, skb, ATH_TX_ERROR, txq);
continue;
}
list_add_tail(&bf->list, &bf_head);
ath_tx_complete_buf(sc, bf, txq, &bf_head, &ts, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: enum ImapAuthRes imap_auth_login(struct ImapData *idata, const char *method)
{
char q_user[SHORT_STRING], q_pass[SHORT_STRING];
char buf[STRING];
int rc;
if (mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, LOGINDISABLED))
{
mutt_message(_("LOGIN disabled on this server."));
return IMAP_AUTH_UNAVAIL;
}
if (mutt_account_getuser(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
if (mutt_account_getpass(&idata->conn->account) < 0)
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
mutt_message(_("Logging in..."));
imap_quote_string(q_user, sizeof(q_user), idata->conn->account.user);
imap_quote_string(q_pass, sizeof(q_pass), idata->conn->account.pass);
/* don't print the password unless we're at the ungodly debugging level
* of 5 or higher */
if (DebugLevel < IMAP_LOG_PASS)
mutt_debug(2, "Sending LOGIN command for %s...\n", idata->conn->account.user);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "LOGIN %s %s", q_user, q_pass);
rc = imap_exec(idata, buf, IMAP_CMD_FAIL_OK | IMAP_CMD_PASS);
if (!rc)
{
mutt_clear_error(); /* clear "Logging in...". fixes #3524 */
return IMAP_AUTH_SUCCESS;
}
mutt_error(_("Login failed."));
return IMAP_AUTH_FAILURE;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 1 | 169,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline char *parse_ip_address(php_stream_xport_param *xparam, int *portno)
{
return parse_ip_address_ex(xparam->inputs.name, xparam->inputs.namelen, portno, xparam->want_errortext, &xparam->outputs.error_text);
}
Commit Message: Detect invalid port in xp_socket parse ip address
For historical reasons, fsockopen() accepts the port and hostname
separately: fsockopen('127.0.0.1', 80)
However, with the introdcution of stream transports in PHP 4.3,
it became possible to include the port in the hostname specifier:
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80')
Or more formally: fsockopen('tcp://127.0.0.1:80')
Confusing results when these two forms are combined, however.
fsockopen('127.0.0.1:80', 443) results in fsockopen() attempting
to connect to '127.0.0.1:80:443' which any reasonable stack would
consider invalid.
Unfortunately, PHP parses the address looking for the first colon
(with special handling for IPv6, don't worry) and calls atoi()
from there. atoi() in turn, simply stops parsing at the first
non-numeric character and returns the value so far.
The end result is that the explicitly supplied port is treated
as ignored garbage, rather than producing an error.
This diff replaces atoi() with strtol() and inspects the
stop character. If additional "garbage" of any kind is found,
it fails and returns an error.
CWE ID: CWE-918 | 0 | 67,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetLockedFullscreenState(Browser* browser, bool locked) {
aura::Window* window = browser->window()->GetNativeWindow();
window->SetProperty(ash::kWindowPinTypeKey,
locked ? ash::mojom::WindowPinType::TRUSTED_PINNED
: ash::mojom::WindowPinType::NONE);
browser->command_controller()->LockedFullscreenStateChanged();
if (chromeos::GetAshConfig() != ash::Config::MASH)
ChromeScreenshotGrabber::Get()->set_screenshots_allowed(!locked);
ui::Clipboard::GetForCurrentThread()->Clear(ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_COPY_PASTE);
content::DevToolsAgentHost::DetachAllClients();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::SetBackground(const SkBitmap& background) {
RenderWidgetHostViewBase::SetBackground(background);
host_->Send(new ViewMsg_SetBackground(host_->GetRoutingID(), background));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstance::FinalizeJpegImage(
uint8_t* dst_ptr,
const JpegBufferRecord& output_buffer,
size_t buffer_size,
std::unique_ptr<UnalignedSharedMemory> exif_shm) {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
size_t idx;
dst_ptr[0] = 0xFF;
dst_ptr[1] = JPEG_SOI;
idx = 2;
if (exif_shm) {
uint8_t* exif_buffer = static_cast<uint8_t*>(exif_shm->memory());
size_t exif_buffer_size = exif_shm->size();
uint16_t exif_segment_size = static_cast<uint16_t>(exif_buffer_size + 2);
const uint8_t kAppSegment[] = {
0xFF, JPEG_APP1, static_cast<uint8_t>(exif_segment_size / 256),
static_cast<uint8_t>(exif_segment_size % 256)};
memcpy(dst_ptr + idx, kAppSegment, sizeof(kAppSegment));
idx += sizeof(kAppSegment);
memcpy(dst_ptr + idx, exif_buffer, exif_buffer_size);
idx += exif_buffer_size;
} else {
static const uint8_t kAppSegment[] = {
0xFF, JPEG_APP0, 0x00,
0x10, // Segment length:16 (2-byte).
0x4A, // J
0x46, // F
0x49, // I
0x46, // F
0x00, // 0
0x01, // Major version.
0x01, // Minor version.
0x01, // Density units 0:no units, 1:pixels per inch,
0x00,
0x48, // X density (2-byte).
0x00,
0x48, // Y density (2-byte).
0x00, // Thumbnail width.
0x00 // Thumbnail height.
};
memcpy(dst_ptr + idx, kAppSegment, sizeof(kAppSegment));
idx += sizeof(kAppSegment);
}
switch (output_buffer_pixelformat_) {
case V4L2_PIX_FMT_JPEG_RAW:
memcpy(dst_ptr + idx, jpeg_markers_.data(), jpeg_markers_.size());
idx += jpeg_markers_.size();
memcpy(dst_ptr + idx, output_buffer.address[0], buffer_size);
idx += buffer_size;
if (dst_ptr[idx - 2] != 0xFF && dst_ptr[idx - 1] != JPEG_EOI) {
dst_ptr[idx] = 0xFF;
dst_ptr[idx + 1] = JPEG_EOI;
idx += 2;
}
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Unsupported output pixel format";
}
return idx;
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnSelectionChanged(const base::string16& text,
uint32_t offset,
const gfx::Range& range) {
if (view_)
view_->SelectionChanged(text, static_cast<size_t>(offset), range);
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameImpl::IsHidden() {
return GetLocalRootRenderWidget()->is_hidden();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SelectionDyn(char* title, char* message, char** szChoice, int nChoices)
{
#define ID_RADIO 12345
LPCWSTR lpwszTypeFace = L"MS Shell Dlg";
LPDLGTEMPLATEA lpdt;
LPDLGITEMTEMPLATEA lpdit;
LPCWSTR lpwszCaption;
LPWORD lpw;
LPWSTR lpwsz;
int i, ret, nchar;
lpdt = (LPDLGTEMPLATE)calloc(512 + nChoices * 256, 1);
lpdt->style = WS_POPUP | WS_BORDER | WS_SYSMENU | WS_CAPTION | DS_MODALFRAME | DS_CENTER | DS_SHELLFONT;
lpdt->cdit = 2 + nChoices;
lpdt->x = 10;
lpdt->y = 10;
lpdt->cx = 300;
lpdt->cy = 100;
lpw = (LPWORD)(&lpdt[1]);
*lpw++ = 0; // No menu
*lpw++ = 0; // Default dialog class
lpwsz = (LPWSTR)lpw;
nchar = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, title, -1, lpwsz, 50);
lpw += nchar;
if (lpdt->style & (DS_SETFONT | DS_SHELLFONT)) {
*lpw++ = 8;
for (lpwsz = (LPWSTR)lpw, lpwszCaption = lpwszTypeFace; (*lpwsz++ = *lpwszCaption++) != 0; );
lpw = (LPWORD)lpwsz;
}
lpw = lpwAlign(lpw);
lpdit = (LPDLGITEMTEMPLATE)lpw;
lpdit->style = WS_CHILD | WS_VISIBLE | BS_DEFPUSHBUTTON;
lpdit->x = 10;
lpdit->y = 70;
lpdit->cx = 50;
lpdit->cy = 14;
lpdit->id = IDOK;
lpw = (LPWORD)(&lpdit[1]);
*lpw++ = 0xFFFF;
*lpw++ = 0x0080; // Button class
lpwsz = (LPWSTR)lpw;
nchar = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, "OK", -1, lpwsz, 50);
lpw += nchar;
*lpw++ = 0; // No creation data
lpw = lpwAlign(lpw);
lpdit = (LPDLGITEMTEMPLATE)lpw;
lpdit->x = 90;
lpdit->y = 70;
lpdit->cx = 50;
lpdit->cy = 14;
lpdit->id = IDCANCEL;
lpdit->style = WS_CHILD | WS_VISIBLE | BS_PUSHBUTTON;
lpw = (LPWORD)(&lpdit[1]);
*lpw++ = 0xFFFF;
*lpw++ = 0x0080;
lpwsz = (LPWSTR)lpw;
nchar = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, lmprintf(MSG_007), -1, lpwsz, 50);
lpw += nchar;
*lpw++ = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nChoices; i++) {
lpw = lpwAlign(lpw);
lpdit = (LPDLGITEMTEMPLATE)lpw;
lpdit->x = 10;
lpdit->y = 10 + 15 * i;
lpdit->cx = 40;
lpdit->cy = 20;
lpdit->id = ID_RADIO;
lpdit->style = WS_CHILD | WS_VISIBLE | BS_AUTORADIOBUTTON | (i == 0 ? WS_GROUP : 0);
lpw = (LPWORD)(&lpdit[1]);
*lpw++ = 0xFFFF;
*lpw++ = 0x0080;
lpwsz = (LPWSTR)lpw;
nchar = MultiByteToWideChar(CP_UTF8, 0, szChoice[i], -1, lpwsz, 150);
lpw += nchar;
*lpw++ = 0;
}
ret = (int)DialogBoxIndirect(hMainInstance, (LPDLGTEMPLATE)lpdt, hMainDialog, (DLGPROC)SelectionDynCallback);
free(lpdt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494 | 0 | 62,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct bio *bio_copy_kern(struct request_queue *q, void *data, unsigned int len,
gfp_t gfp_mask, int reading)
{
unsigned long kaddr = (unsigned long)data;
unsigned long end = (kaddr + len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
unsigned long start = kaddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
struct bio *bio;
void *p = data;
int nr_pages = 0;
/*
* Overflow, abort
*/
if (end < start)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
nr_pages = end - start;
bio = bio_kmalloc(gfp_mask, nr_pages);
if (!bio)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
while (len) {
struct page *page;
unsigned int bytes = PAGE_SIZE;
if (bytes > len)
bytes = len;
page = alloc_page(q->bounce_gfp | gfp_mask);
if (!page)
goto cleanup;
if (!reading)
memcpy(page_address(page), p, bytes);
if (bio_add_pc_page(q, bio, page, bytes, 0) < bytes)
break;
len -= bytes;
p += bytes;
}
if (reading) {
bio->bi_end_io = bio_copy_kern_endio_read;
bio->bi_private = data;
} else {
bio->bi_end_io = bio_copy_kern_endio;
}
return bio;
cleanup:
bio_free_pages(bio);
bio_put(bio);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned short ReadDCMShort(DCMStreamInfo *stream_info,Image *image)
{
int
shift;
unsigned short
value;
if (image->compression != RLECompression)
return(ReadBlobLSBShort(image));
shift=image->depth < 16 ? 4 : 8;
value=ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image) | (unsigned short)
(ReadDCMByte(stream_info,image) << shift);
return(value);
}
Commit Message: Add additional checks to DCM reader to prevent data-driven faults (bug report from Hanno Böck
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void limitedWithEmptyMissingInvalidAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::limitedWithEmptyMissingInvalidAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::readInt32(int32_t *pArg) const
{
return readAligned(pArg);
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void check_preempt_curr(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags)
{
const struct sched_class *class;
if (p->sched_class == rq->curr->sched_class) {
rq->curr->sched_class->check_preempt_curr(rq, p, flags);
} else {
for_each_class(class) {
if (class == rq->curr->sched_class)
break;
if (class == p->sched_class) {
resched_task(rq->curr);
break;
}
}
}
/*
* A queue event has occurred, and we're going to schedule. In
* this case, we can save a useless back to back clock update.
*/
if (rq->curr->on_rq && test_tsk_need_resched(rq->curr))
rq->skip_clock_update = 1;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ewk_frame_load_document_finished(Evas_Object* ewkFrame)
{
evas_object_smart_callback_call(ewkFrame, "load,document,finished", 0);
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData);
ewk_view_load_document_finished(smartData->view, ewkFrame);
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFRasterScanlineSize(TIFF* tif)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFRasterScanlineSize";
uint64 m;
tmsize_t n;
m=TIFFRasterScanlineSize64(tif);
n=(tmsize_t)m;
if ((uint64)n!=m)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Integer arithmetic overflow");
n=0;
}
return(n);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_xdr_enc_readdir(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, const struct nfs4_readdir_arg *args)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 2,
};
struct rpc_auth *auth = req->rq_task->tk_msg.rpc_cred->cr_auth;
int replen;
int status;
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
status = encode_putfh(&xdr, args->fh);
if(status)
goto out;
status = encode_readdir(&xdr, args, req);
/* set up reply kvec
* toplevel_status + taglen + rescount + OP_PUTFH + status
* + OP_READDIR + status + verifer(2) = 9
*/
replen = (RPC_REPHDRSIZE + auth->au_rslack + NFS4_dec_readdir_sz) << 2;
xdr_inline_pages(&req->rq_rcv_buf, replen, args->pages,
args->pgbase, args->count);
dprintk("%s: inlined page args = (%u, %p, %u, %u)\n",
__func__, replen, args->pages,
args->pgbase, args->count);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __comps_rtree_set(COMPS_RTree * rt, char * key, size_t len, void * data)
{
COMPS_HSListItem *it, *lesser;
COMPS_HSList *subnodes;
COMPS_RTreeData *rtd;
static COMPS_RTreeData *rtdata;
size_t offset=0, _len;
unsigned x, found = 0;
void *ndata;
char ended;//, tmpch;
if (rt->subnodes == NULL)
return;
if (rt->data_constructor) {
ndata = rt->data_constructor(data);
} else {
ndata = data;
}
subnodes = rt->subnodes;
while (offset != len)
{
found = 0;
lesser = NULL;
for (it = subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key[0] == key[offset]) {
found = 1;
break;
} else if (((COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data)->key[0] < key[offset]) {
lesser = it;
}
}
if (!found) { // not found in subnodes; create new subnode
rtd = comps_rtree_data_create(rt, key+offset, ndata);
if (!lesser) {
comps_hslist_prepend(subnodes, rtd, 0);
} else {
comps_hslist_insert_after(subnodes, lesser, rtd, 0);
}
return;
} else {
rtdata = (COMPS_RTreeData*)it->data;
ended = 0;
for (x=1; ;x++) {
if (rtdata->key[x] == 0) ended += 1;
if (x == len - offset) ended += 2;
if (ended != 0) break;
if (key[offset+x] != rtdata->key[x]) break;
}
if (ended == 3) { //keys equals; data replacement
rt->data_destructor(rtdata->data);
rtdata->data = ndata;
return;
} else if (ended == 2) { //global key ends first; make global leaf
comps_hslist_remove(subnodes, it);
it->next = NULL;
rtd = comps_rtree_data_create_n(rt, key+offset,
len-offset, ndata);
comps_hslist_append(subnodes, rtd, 0);
((COMPS_RTreeData*)subnodes->last->data)->subnodes->last = it;
((COMPS_RTreeData*)subnodes->last->data)->subnodes->first = it;
_len = len - offset;
memmove(rtdata->key,rtdata->key + _len,
strlen(rtdata->key) - _len);
rtdata->key[strlen(rtdata->key) - _len] = 0;
rtdata->key = realloc(rtdata->key,
sizeof(char)* (strlen(rtdata->key)+1));
return;
} else if (ended == 1) { //local key ends first; go deeper
subnodes = rtdata->subnodes;
offset += x;
} else {
void *tmpdata = rtdata->data;
COMPS_HSList *tmpnodes = rtdata->subnodes;
int cmpret = strcmp(key+offset+x, rtdata->key+x);
rtdata->subnodes = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(rtdata->subnodes, NULL, NULL,
&comps_rtree_data_destroy_v);
rtdata->data = NULL;
if (cmpret > 0) {
rtd = comps_rtree_data_create(rt, rtdata->key+x, tmpdata);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtd->subnodes);
rtd->subnodes = tmpnodes;
comps_hslist_append(rtdata->subnodes, rtd, 0);
rtd = comps_rtree_data_create(rt, key+offset+x, ndata);
comps_hslist_append(rtdata->subnodes, rtd, 0);
} else {
rtd = comps_rtree_data_create(rt, key+offset+x, ndata);
comps_hslist_append(rtdata->subnodes, rtd, 0);
rtd = comps_rtree_data_create(rt, rtdata->key+x, tmpdata);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtd->subnodes);
rtd->subnodes = tmpnodes;
comps_hslist_append(rtdata->subnodes, rtd, 0);
}
rtdata->key = realloc(rtdata->key, sizeof(char)*(x+1));
rtdata->key[x] = 0;
return;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,814 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __ip_vs_del_dest(struct ip_vs_dest *dest)
{
ip_vs_kill_estimator(&dest->stats);
/*
* Remove it from the d-linked list with the real services.
*/
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_rs_lock);
ip_vs_rs_unhash(dest);
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_rs_lock);
/*
* Decrease the refcnt of the dest, and free the dest
* if nobody refers to it (refcnt=0). Otherwise, throw
* the destination into the trash.
*/
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&dest->refcnt)) {
ip_vs_dst_reset(dest);
/* simply decrease svc->refcnt here, let the caller check
and release the service if nobody refers to it.
Only user context can release destination and service,
and only one user context can update virtual service at a
time, so the operation here is OK */
atomic_dec(&dest->svc->refcnt);
kfree(dest);
} else {
IP_VS_DBG_BUF(3, "Moving dest %s:%u into trash, "
"dest->refcnt=%d\n",
IP_VS_DBG_ADDR(dest->af, &dest->addr),
ntohs(dest->port),
atomic_read(&dest->refcnt));
list_add(&dest->n_list, &ip_vs_dest_trash);
atomic_inc(&dest->refcnt);
}
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qeth_tx_timeout(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct qeth_card *card;
card = dev->ml_priv;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 4, "txtimeo");
card->stats.tx_errors++;
qeth_schedule_recovery(card);
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::ResetCompositorFrameSinkSupport() {
if (!support_)
return;
if (compositor_)
compositor_->RemoveFrameSink(frame_sink_id_);
support_.reset();
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 150,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
{
key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were
* searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;
* otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if
* none of the keyrings were searchable
*
* in terms of priority: success > -ENOKEY > -EAGAIN > other error
*/
key_ref = NULL;
ret = NULL;
err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
/* search the thread keyring first */
if (ctx->cred->thread_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(ctx->cred->thread_keyring, 1), ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
default:
err = key_ref;
break;
}
}
/* search the process keyring second */
if (ctx->cred->process_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(ctx->cred->process_keyring, 1), ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
default:
err = key_ref;
break;
}
}
/* search the session keyring */
if (ctx->cred->session_keyring) {
rcu_read_lock();
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(ctx->cred->session_keyring), 1),
ctx);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
default:
err = key_ref;
break;
}
}
/* or search the user-session keyring */
else if (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring) {
key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
make_key_ref(ctx->cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
ctx);
if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
goto found;
switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
if (ret)
break;
case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
ret = key_ref;
break;
default:
err = key_ref;
break;
}
}
/* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
key_ref = ret ? ret : err;
found:
return key_ref;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix keyring ref leak in join_session_keyring()
This fixes CVE-2016-0728.
If a thread is asked to join as a session keyring the keyring that's already
set as its session, we leak a keyring reference.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, const char *argv[])
{
int i = 0;
key_serial_t serial;
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
if (keyctl(KEYCTL_SETPERM, serial,
KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL) < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
serial = keyctl(KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING,
"leaked-keyring");
if (serial < 0) {
perror("keyctl");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
If, after the program has run, there something like the following line in
/proc/keys:
3f3d898f I--Q--- 100 perm 3f3f0000 0 0 keyring leaked-keyring: empty
with a usage count of 100 * the number of times the program has been run,
then the kernel is malfunctioning. If leaked-keyring has zero usages or
has been garbage collected, then the problem is fixed.
Reported-by: Yevgeny Pats <yevgeny@perception-point.io>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kernel_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
struct kvec *vec, size_t num, size_t size)
{
struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
if (!sock->ops->sendmsg_locked)
return sock_no_sendmsg_locked(sk, msg, size);
iov_iter_kvec(&msg->msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, vec, num, size);
return sock->ops->sendmsg_locked(sk, msg, msg_data_left(msg));
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 82,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TestInterfaceEmptyFrozenArrayAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "testInterfaceEmptyFrozenArrayAttribute");
HeapVector<Member<TestInterfaceEmpty>> cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLSequence<TestInterfaceEmpty>>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setTestInterfaceEmptyFrozenArrayAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_read_tfhd(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
MOVFragment *frag = &c->fragment;
MOVTrackExt *trex = NULL;
int flags, track_id, i;
avio_r8(pb); /* version */
flags = avio_rb24(pb);
track_id = avio_rb32(pb);
if (!track_id)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
frag->track_id = track_id;
for (i = 0; i < c->trex_count; i++)
if (c->trex_data[i].track_id == frag->track_id) {
trex = &c->trex_data[i];
break;
}
if (!trex) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "could not find corresponding trex\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
frag->base_data_offset = flags & MOV_TFHD_BASE_DATA_OFFSET ?
avio_rb64(pb) : frag->moof_offset;
frag->stsd_id = flags & MOV_TFHD_STSD_ID ? avio_rb32(pb) : trex->stsd_id;
frag->duration = flags & MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_DURATION ?
avio_rb32(pb) : trex->duration;
frag->size = flags & MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_SIZE ?
avio_rb32(pb) : trex->size;
frag->flags = flags & MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_FLAGS ?
avio_rb32(pb) : trex->flags;
av_dlog(c->fc, "frag flags 0x%x\n", frag->flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mov: reset dref_count on realloc to keep values consistent.
This fixes a potential crash.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int megasas_event_wait(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
{
union mfi_evt event;
if (cmd->iov_size < sizeof(struct mfi_evt_detail)) {
trace_megasas_dcmd_invalid_xfer_len(cmd->index, cmd->iov_size,
sizeof(struct mfi_evt_detail));
return MFI_STAT_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
s->event_count = cpu_to_le32(cmd->frame->dcmd.mbox[0]);
event.word = cpu_to_le32(cmd->frame->dcmd.mbox[4]);
s->event_locale = event.members.locale;
s->event_class = event.members.class;
s->event_cmd = cmd;
/* Decrease busy count; event frame doesn't count here */
s->busy--;
cmd->iov_size = sizeof(struct mfi_evt_detail);
return MFI_STAT_INVALID_STATUS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void writeUint32(uint32_t value)
{
append(Uint32Tag);
doWriteUint32(value);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pgx_getbyteorder(jas_stream_t *in, bool *bigendian)
{
int c;
char buf[2];
do {
if ((c = pgx_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
} while (isspace(c));
buf[0] = c;
if ((c = pgx_getc(in)) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
buf[1] = c;
if (buf[0] == 'M' && buf[1] == 'L') {
*bigendian = true;
} else if (buf[0] == 'L' && buf[1] == 'M') {
*bigendian = false;
} else {
goto error;
}
while ((c = pgx_getc(in)) != EOF && !isspace(c)) {
;
}
if (c == EOF) {
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void t1_mark_glyphs(void)
{
int i;
char *charset = extra_charset();
char *g, *s, *r;
cs_entry *ptr;
if (t1_synthetic || embed_all_glyphs(tex_font)) { /* mark everything */
if (cs_tab != NULL)
for (ptr = cs_tab; ptr < cs_ptr; ptr++)
if (ptr->valid)
ptr->used = true;
if (subr_tab != NULL) {
for (ptr = subr_tab; ptr - subr_tab < subr_size; ptr++)
if (ptr->valid)
ptr->used = true;
subr_max = subr_size - 1;
}
return;
}
mark_cs(notdef);
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
if (is_used_char(i)) {
if (t1_glyph_names[i] == notdef)
pdftex_warn("character %i is mapped to %s", i, notdef);
else
mark_cs(t1_glyph_names[i]);
}
if (charset == NULL)
goto set_subr_max;
g = s = charset + 1; /* skip the first '/' */
r = strend(g);
while (g < r) {
while (*s != '/' && s < r)
s++;
*s = 0; /* terminate g by rewriting '/' to 0 */
mark_cs(g);
g = s + 1;
}
set_subr_max:
if (subr_tab != NULL)
for (subr_max = -1, ptr = subr_tab; ptr - subr_tab < subr_size; ptr++)
if (ptr->used && ptr - subr_tab > subr_max)
subr_max = ptr - subr_tab;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 76,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderThreadImpl::HistogramCustomizer::HistogramCustomizer() {
custom_histograms_.insert("V8.MemoryExternalFragmentationTotal");
custom_histograms_.insert("V8.MemoryHeapSampleTotalCommitted");
custom_histograms_.insert("V8.MemoryHeapSampleTotalUsed");
custom_histograms_.insert("V8.MemoryHeapUsed");
custom_histograms_.insert("V8.MemoryHeapCommitted");
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool __init avx_usable(void)
{
u64 xcr0;
if (!cpu_has_avx || !cpu_has_osxsave)
return false;
xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
if ((xcr0 & (XSTATE_SSE | XSTATE_YMM)) != (XSTATE_SSE | XSTATE_YMM)) {
pr_info("AVX detected but unusable.\n");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rfcomm_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock,
int protocol, int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
BT_DBG("sock %p", sock);
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM && sock->type != SOCK_RAW)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
sock->ops = &rfcomm_sock_ops;
sk = rfcomm_sock_alloc(net, sock, protocol, GFP_ATOMIC, kern);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
rfcomm_sock_init(sk, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix potential NULL dereference in RFCOMM bind callback
addr can be NULL and it should not be dereferenced before NULL checking.
Signed-off-by: Jaganath Kanakkassery <jaganath.k@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 56,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResetAllFlags(FlagsStorage* flags_storage) {
FlagsState::GetInstance()->ResetAllFlags(flags_storage);
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vfs_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int buflen, const char *link)
{
int len;
len = PTR_ERR(link);
if (IS_ERR(link))
goto out;
len = strlen(link);
if (len > (unsigned) buflen)
len = buflen;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, link, len))
len = -EFAULT;
out:
return len;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteDeleteWordBackward(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.GetEditor().DeleteWithDirection(DeleteDirection::kBackward,
TextGranularity::kWord, true, false);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GpuProcessHost::GpuProcessHost(int host_id, GpuProcessKind kind)
: host_id_(host_id),
gpu_process_(base::kNullProcessHandle),
in_process_(false),
software_rendering_(false),
kind_(kind),
process_launched_(false) {
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kSingleProcess) ||
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kInProcessGPU))
in_process_ = true;
DCHECK(!in_process_ || g_gpu_process_hosts[kind] == NULL);
g_gpu_process_hosts[kind] = this;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(base::IgnoreResult(&GpuProcessHostUIShim::Create), host_id));
process_.reset(
new BrowserChildProcessHostImpl(content::PROCESS_TYPE_GPU, this));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagegd)
{
_php_image_output(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD, "GD", gdImageGd);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestJavaScriptDialogManager()
: is_fullscreen_(false), message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pdf_add_stream(struct pdf_doc *pdf, struct pdf_object *page,
char *buffer)
{
struct pdf_object *obj;
int len;
char prefix[128];
char suffix[128];
if (!page)
page = pdf_find_last_object(pdf, OBJ_page);
if (!page)
return pdf_set_err(pdf, -EINVAL, "Invalid pdf page");
len = strlen(buffer);
/* We don't want any trailing whitespace in the stream */
while (len >= 1 && (buffer[len - 1] == '\r' ||
buffer[len - 1] == '\n')) {
buffer[len - 1] = '\0';
len--;
}
sprintf(prefix, "<< /Length %d >>stream\r\n", len);
sprintf(suffix, "\r\nendstream\r\n");
len += strlen(prefix) + strlen(suffix);
obj = pdf_add_object(pdf, OBJ_stream);
if (!obj)
return pdf->errval;
obj->stream.text = malloc(len + 1);
if (!obj->stream.text) {
obj->type = OBJ_none;
return pdf_set_err(pdf, -ENOMEM, "Insufficient memory for text (%d bytes)",
len + 1);
}
obj->stream.text[0] = '\0';
strcat(obj->stream.text, prefix);
strcat(obj->stream.text, buffer);
strcat(obj->stream.text, suffix);
obj->stream.len = 0;
return flexarray_append(&page->page.children, obj);
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: flush_log_file(void)
{
if (log_file)
fflush(log_file);
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Parcel::freeData()
{
freeDataNoInit();
initState();
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_channel_offset(struct iw_context *ctx, int channeltype, int dimension, double offs)
{
if(channeltype<0 || channeltype>2) return;
if(dimension<0 || dimension>1) dimension=0;
ctx->resize_settings[dimension].channel_offset[channeltype] = offs;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 64,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_rfc4543_copy_src_to_dst(struct aead_request *req, bool enc)
{
struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct crypto_rfc4543_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(aead);
unsigned int authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(aead);
unsigned int nbytes = req->cryptlen - (enc ? 0 : authsize);
struct blkcipher_desc desc = {
.tfm = ctx->null,
};
return crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, req->dst, req->src, nbytes);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,756 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsMLUsetASCII(cmsMLU* mlu, const char LanguageCode[3], const char CountryCode[3], const char* ASCIIString)
{
cmsUInt32Number i, len = (cmsUInt32Number) strlen(ASCIIString)+1;
wchar_t* WStr;
cmsBool rc;
cmsUInt16Number Lang = _cmsAdjustEndianess16(*(cmsUInt16Number*) LanguageCode);
cmsUInt16Number Cntry = _cmsAdjustEndianess16(*(cmsUInt16Number*) CountryCode);
if (mlu == NULL) return FALSE;
WStr = (wchar_t*) _cmsCalloc(mlu ->ContextID, len, sizeof(wchar_t));
if (WStr == NULL) return FALSE;
for (i=0; i < len; i++)
WStr[i] = (wchar_t) ASCIIString[i];
rc = AddMLUBlock(mlu, len * sizeof(wchar_t), WStr, Lang, Cntry);
_cmsFree(mlu ->ContextID, WStr);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 40,999 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Eina_Bool _ewk_frame_children_iterator_next(Eina_Iterator_Ewk_Frame* iterator, Evas_Object** data)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(iterator->object, smartData, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame, false);
WebCore::FrameTree* tree = smartData->frame->tree(); // check if it's still valid
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(tree, false);
if (iterator->currentIndex < tree->childCount()) {
*data = EWKPrivate::kitFrame(tree->child(iterator->currentIndex++));
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::setRequest(const ResourceRequest& req)
{
bool handlingUnreachableURL = false;
handlingUnreachableURL = m_substituteData.isValid() && !m_substituteData.failingURL().isEmpty();
if (handlingUnreachableURL)
m_committed = false;
ASSERT(!m_committed);
m_request = req;
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,753 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 muldiv64(u64 a, u32 b, u32 c)
{
union {
u64 ll;
struct {
u32 low, high;
} l;
} u, res;
u64 rl, rh;
u.ll = a;
rl = (u64)u.l.low * (u64)b;
rh = (u64)u.l.high * (u64)b;
rh += (rl >> 32);
res.l.high = div64_u64(rh, c);
res.l.low = div64_u64(((mod_64(rh, c) << 32) + (rl & 0xffffffff)), c);
return res.ll;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit
There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM. In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization. If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.
This fixes CVE-2014-3611.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 37,716 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct buffer_head *ext4_getblk(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
ext4_lblk_t block, int create, int *errp)
{
struct buffer_head dummy;
int fatal = 0, err;
int flags = 0;
J_ASSERT(handle != NULL || create == 0);
dummy.b_state = 0;
dummy.b_blocknr = -1000;
buffer_trace_init(&dummy.b_history);
if (create)
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE;
err = ext4_get_blocks(handle, inode, block, 1, &dummy, flags);
/*
* ext4_get_blocks() returns number of blocks mapped. 0 in
* case of a HOLE.
*/
if (err > 0) {
if (err > 1)
WARN_ON(1);
err = 0;
}
*errp = err;
if (!err && buffer_mapped(&dummy)) {
struct buffer_head *bh;
bh = sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, dummy.b_blocknr);
if (!bh) {
*errp = -EIO;
goto err;
}
if (buffer_new(&dummy)) {
J_ASSERT(create != 0);
J_ASSERT(handle != NULL);
/*
* Now that we do not always journal data, we should
* keep in mind whether this should always journal the
* new buffer as metadata. For now, regular file
* writes use ext4_get_block instead, so it's not a
* problem.
*/
lock_buffer(bh);
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "call get_create_access");
fatal = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (!fatal && !buffer_uptodate(bh)) {
memset(bh->b_data, 0, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
}
unlock_buffer(bh);
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata");
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (!fatal)
fatal = err;
} else {
BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "not a new buffer");
}
if (fatal) {
*errp = fatal;
brelse(bh);
bh = NULL;
}
return bh;
}
err:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_win_startup_winsock (void)
{
/* Straight from MSDN, deuglified */
static dbus_bool_t beenhere = FALSE;
WORD wVersionRequested;
WSADATA wsaData;
int err;
if (beenhere)
return;
wVersionRequested = MAKEWORD (2, 0);
err = WSAStartup (wVersionRequested, &wsaData);
if (err != 0)
{
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("Could not initialize WinSock");
_dbus_abort ();
}
/* Confirm that the WinSock DLL supports 2.0. Note that if the DLL
* supports versions greater than 2.0 in addition to 2.0, it will
* still return 2.0 in wVersion since that is the version we
* requested.
*/
if (LOBYTE (wsaData.wVersion) != 2 ||
HIBYTE (wsaData.wVersion) != 0)
{
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("No usable WinSock found");
_dbus_abort ();
}
beenhere = TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CJSON_PUBLIC(cJSON *) cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive(const cJSON * const object, const char * const string)
{
return get_object_item(object, string, true);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash of cJSON_GetObjectItemCaseSensitive when calling it on arrays
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 87,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fuse_writepage_finish(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_req *req)
{
struct inode *inode = req->inode;
struct fuse_inode *fi = get_fuse_inode(inode);
struct backing_dev_info *bdi = inode->i_mapping->backing_dev_info;
list_del(&req->writepages_entry);
dec_bdi_stat(bdi, BDI_WRITEBACK);
dec_zone_page_state(req->pages[0], NR_WRITEBACK_TEMP);
bdi_writeout_inc(bdi);
wake_up(&fi->page_waitq);
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,913 |
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