instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: syncable::Directory* directory() { return share_.directory.get(); }
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintUsage()
{
fprintf(stderr, "Usage MP4Client [options] [filename]\n"
"\t-c fileName: user-defined configuration file. Also works with -cfg\n"
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
"\t-mem-track: enables memory tracker\n"
"\t-mem-track-stack: enables memory tracker with stack dumping\n"
#endif
"\t-rti fileName: logs run-time info (FPS, CPU, Mem usage) to file\n"
"\t-rtix fileName: same as -rti but driven by GPAC logs\n"
"\t-quiet: removes script message, buffering and downloading status\n"
"\t-strict-error: exit when the player reports its first error\n"
"\t-opt option: Overrides an option in the configuration file. String format is section:key=value. \n"
"\t \"section:key=null\" removes the key\n"
"\t \"section:*=null\" removes the section\n"
"\t-conf option: Same as -opt but does not start player.\n"
"\t-log-file file: sets output log file. Also works with -lf\n"
"\t-logs log_args: sets log tools and levels, formatted as a ':'-separated list of toolX[:toolZ]@levelX\n"
"\t levelX can be one of:\n"
"\t \"quiet\" : skip logs\n"
"\t \"error\" : logs only error messages\n"
"\t \"warning\" : logs error+warning messages\n"
"\t \"info\" : logs error+warning+info messages\n"
"\t \"debug\" : logs all messages\n"
"\t toolX can be one of:\n"
"\t \"core\" : libgpac core\n"
"\t \"coding\" : bitstream formats (audio, video, scene)\n"
"\t \"container\" : container formats (ISO File, MPEG-2 TS, AVI, ...)\n"
"\t \"network\" : network data exept RTP trafic\n"
"\t \"rtp\" : rtp trafic\n"
"\t \"author\" : authoring tools (hint, import, export)\n"
"\t \"sync\" : terminal sync layer\n"
"\t \"codec\" : terminal codec messages\n"
"\t \"parser\" : scene parsers (svg, xmt, bt) and other\n"
"\t \"media\" : terminal media object management\n"
"\t \"scene\" : scene graph and scene manager\n"
"\t \"script\" : scripting engine messages\n"
"\t \"interact\" : interaction engine (events, scripts, etc)\n"
"\t \"smil\" : SMIL timing engine\n"
"\t \"compose\" : composition engine (2D, 3D, etc)\n"
"\t \"mmio\" : Audio/Video HW I/O management\n"
"\t \"rti\" : various run-time stats\n"
"\t \"cache\" : HTTP cache subsystem\n"
"\t \"audio\" : Audio renderer and mixers\n"
#ifdef GPAC_MEMORY_TRACKING
"\t \"mem\" : GPAC memory tracker\n"
#endif
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_DASH_CLIENT
"\t \"dash\" : HTTP streaming logs\n"
#endif
"\t \"module\" : GPAC modules debugging\n"
"\t \"mutex\" : mutex\n"
"\t \"all\" : all tools logged - other tools can be specified afterwards.\n"
"\tThe special value \"ncl\" disables color logs.\n"
"\n"
"\t-log-clock or -lc : logs time in micro sec since start time of GPAC before each log line.\n"
"\t-log-utc or -lu : logs UTC time in ms before each log line.\n"
"\t-ifce IPIFCE : Sets default Multicast interface\n"
"\t-size WxH: specifies visual size (default: scene size)\n"
#if defined(__DARWIN__) || defined(__APPLE__)
"\t-thread: enables thread usage for terminal and compositor \n"
#else
"\t-no-thread: disables thread usage (except for audio)\n"
#endif
"\t-no-cthread: disables compositor thread (iOS and Android mode)\n"
"\t-no-audio: disables audio \n"
"\t-no-wnd: uses windowless mode (Win32 only)\n"
"\t-no-back: uses transparent background for output window when no background is specified (Win32 only)\n"
"\t-align vh: specifies v and h alignment for windowless mode\n"
"\t possible v values: t(op), m(iddle), b(ottom)\n"
"\t possible h values: l(eft), m(iddle), r(ight)\n"
"\t default alignment is top-left\n"
"\t default alignment is top-left\n"
"\t-pause: pauses at first frame\n"
"\t-play-from T: starts from T seconds in media\n"
"\t-speed S: starts with speed S\n"
"\t-loop: loops presentation\n"
"\t-no-regulation: disables framerate regulation\n"
"\t-bench: disable a/v output and bench source decoding (as fast as possible)\n"
"\t-vbench: disable audio output, video sync bench source decoding/display (as fast as possible)\n"
"\t-sbench: disable all decoders and bench systems layer (as fast as possible)\n"
"\t-fs: starts in fullscreen mode\n"
"\t-views v1:.:vN: creates an auto-stereo scene of N views. vN can be any type of URL supported by GPAC.\n"
"\t in this mode, URL argument of GPAC is ignored, GUI as well.\n"
"\t this is equivalent as using views://v1:.:N as an URL.\n"
"\t-mosaic v1:.:vN: creates a mosaic of N views. vN can be any type of URL supported by GPAC.\n"
"\t in this mode, URL argument of GPAC is ignored.\n"
"\t this is equivalent as using mosaic://v1:.:N as an URL.\n"
"\n"
"\t-exit: automatically exits when presentation is over\n"
"\t-run-for TIME: runs for TIME seconds and exits\n"
"\t-service ID: auto-tune to given service ID in a multiplex\n"
"\t-noprog: disable progress report\n"
"\t-no-save: disable saving config file on exit\n"
"\t-no-addon: disable automatic loading of media addons declared in source URL\n"
"\t-gui: starts in GUI mode. The GUI is indicated in GPAC config, section General, by the key [StartupFile]\n"
"\t-ntp-shift T: shifts NTP clock of T (signed int) milliseconds\n"
"\n"
"Dumper Options (times is a formated as start-end, with start being sec, h:m:s:f/fps or h:m:s:ms):\n"
"\t-bmp [times]: dumps given frames to bmp\n"
"\t-png [times]: dumps given frames to png\n"
"\t-raw [times]: dumps given frames to raw\n"
"\t-avi [times]: dumps given file to raw avi\n"
"\t-sha [times]: dumps given file to raw SHA-1 (1 hash per frame)\n"
"\r-out filename: name of the output file\n"
"\t-rgbds: dumps the RGBDS pixel format texture\n"
"\t with -avi [times]: dumps an rgbds-format .avi\n"
"\t-rgbd: dumps the RGBD pixel format texture\n"
"\t with -avi [times]: dumps an rgbd-format .avi\n"
"\t-depth: dumps depthmap (z-buffer) frames\n"
"\t with -avi [times]: dumps depthmap in grayscale .avi\n"
"\t with -bmp: dumps depthmap in grayscale .bmp\n"
"\t with -png: dumps depthmap in grayscale .png\n"
"\t-fps FPS: specifies frame rate for AVI dumping (default: %f)\n"
"\t-scale s: scales the visual size (default: 1)\n"
"\t-fill: uses fill aspect ratio for dumping (default: none)\n"
"\t-show: shows window while dumping (default: no)\n"
"\n"
"\t-uncache: Revert all cached items to their original name and location. Does not start player.\n"
"\n"
"\t-help: shows this screen\n"
"\n"
"MP4Client - GPAC command line player and dumper - version "GPAC_FULL_VERSION"\n"
"(c) Telecom ParisTech 2000-2018 - Licence LGPL v2\n"
"GPAC Configuration: " GPAC_CONFIGURATION "\n"
"Features: %s\n",
GF_IMPORT_DEFAULT_FPS,
gpac_features()
);
}
Commit Message: add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 92,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rtadv_make_socket (vrf_id_t vrf_id)
{
int sock;
int ret;
struct icmp6_filter filter;
if ( zserv_privs.change (ZPRIVS_RAISE) )
zlog_err ("rtadv_make_socket: could not raise privs, %s",
safe_strerror (errno) );
sock = vrf_socket (AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMPV6, vrf_id);
if ( zserv_privs.change (ZPRIVS_LOWER) )
zlog_err ("rtadv_make_socket: could not lower privs, %s",
safe_strerror (errno) );
/* When we can't make ICMPV6 socket simply back. Router
advertisement feature will not be supported. */
if (sock < 0)
{
close (sock);
return -1;
}
ret = setsockopt_ipv6_pktinfo (sock, 1);
if (ret < 0)
{
close (sock);
return ret;
}
ret = setsockopt_ipv6_multicast_loop (sock, 0);
if (ret < 0)
{
close (sock);
return ret;
}
ret = setsockopt_ipv6_unicast_hops (sock, 255);
if (ret < 0)
{
close (sock);
return ret;
}
ret = setsockopt_ipv6_multicast_hops (sock, 255);
if (ret < 0)
{
close (sock);
return ret;
}
ret = setsockopt_ipv6_hoplimit (sock, 1);
if (ret < 0)
{
close (sock);
return ret;
}
ICMP6_FILTER_SETBLOCKALL(&filter);
ICMP6_FILTER_SETPASS (ND_ROUTER_SOLICIT, &filter);
ICMP6_FILTER_SETPASS (ND_ROUTER_ADVERT, &filter);
ret = setsockopt (sock, IPPROTO_ICMPV6, ICMP6_FILTER, &filter,
sizeof (struct icmp6_filter));
if (ret < 0)
{
zlog_info ("ICMP6_FILTER set fail: %s", safe_strerror (errno));
return ret;
}
return sock;
}
Commit Message: zebra: stack overrun in IPv6 RA receive code (CVE-2016-1245)
The IPv6 RA code also receives ICMPv6 RS and RA messages.
Unfortunately, by bad coding practice, the buffer size specified on
receiving such messages mixed up 2 constants that in fact have
different values.
The code itself has:
#define RTADV_MSG_SIZE 4096
While BUFSIZ is system-dependent, in my case (x86_64 glibc):
/usr/include/_G_config.h:#define _G_BUFSIZ 8192
/usr/include/libio.h:#define _IO_BUFSIZ _G_BUFSIZ
/usr/include/stdio.h:# define BUFSIZ _IO_BUFSIZ
FreeBSD, OpenBSD, NetBSD and Illumos are not affected, since all of them
have BUFSIZ == 1024.
As the latter is passed to the kernel on recvmsg(), it's possible to
overwrite 4kB of stack -- with ICMPv6 packets that can be globally sent
to any of the system's addresses (using fragmentation to get to 8k).
(The socket has filters installed limiting this to RS and RA packets,
but does not have a filter for source address or TTL.)
Issue discovered by trying to test other stuff, which randomly caused
the stack to be smaller than 8kB in that code location, which then
causes the kernel to report EFAULT (Bad address).
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
Reviewed-by: Donald Sharp <sharpd@cumulusnetworks.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: zend_string* php_openssl_x509_fingerprint(X509 *peer, const char *method, zend_bool raw)
{
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
const EVP_MD *mdtype;
unsigned int n;
zend_string *ret;
if (!(mdtype = EVP_get_digestbyname(method))) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm");
return NULL;
} else if (!X509_digest(peer, mdtype, md, &n)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_ERROR, "Could not generate signature");
return NULL;
}
if (raw) {
ret = zend_string_init((char*)md, n, 0);
} else {
ret = zend_string_alloc(n * 2, 0);
make_digest_ex(ZSTR_VAL(ret), md, n);
ZSTR_VAL(ret)[n * 2] = '\0';
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_motd(void)
{
FILE *f;
char buf[256];
if (options.print_motd) {
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
"/etc/motd"), "r");
#else
f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
#endif
if (f) {
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
fputs(buf, stdout);
fclose(f);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void enl_ipc_send(char *str)
{
static char *last_msg = NULL;
char buff[21];
register unsigned short i;
register unsigned char j;
unsigned short len;
XEvent ev;
if (str == NULL) {
if (last_msg == NULL)
eprintf("eeek");
str = last_msg;
D(("Resending last message \"%s\" to Enlightenment.\n", str));
} else {
if (last_msg != NULL) {
free(last_msg);
}
last_msg = estrdup(str);
D(("Sending \"%s\" to Enlightenment.\n", str));
}
if (ipc_win == None) {
if ((ipc_win = enl_ipc_get_win()) == None) {
D(("Hrm. Enlightenment doesn't seem to be running. No IPC window, no IPC.\n"));
return;
}
}
len = strlen(str);
ipc_atom = XInternAtom(disp, "ENL_MSG", False);
if (ipc_atom == None) {
D(("IPC error: Unable to find/create ENL_MSG atom.\n"));
return;
}
for (; XCheckTypedWindowEvent(disp, my_ipc_win, ClientMessage, &ev);); /* Discard any out-of-sync messages */
ev.xclient.type = ClientMessage;
ev.xclient.serial = 0;
ev.xclient.send_event = True;
ev.xclient.window = ipc_win;
ev.xclient.message_type = ipc_atom;
ev.xclient.format = 8;
for (i = 0; i < len + 1; i += 12) {
sprintf(buff, "%8x", (int) my_ipc_win);
for (j = 0; j < 12; j++) {
buff[8 + j] = str[i + j];
if (!str[i + j]) {
break;
}
}
buff[20] = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 20; j++) {
ev.xclient.data.b[j] = buff[j];
}
XSendEvent(disp, ipc_win, False, 0, (XEvent *) & ev);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free/OOB-write while receiving IPC data
If a malicious client pretends to be the E17 window manager, it is
possible to trigger an out of boundary heap write while receiving an
IPC message.
The length of the already received message is stored in an unsigned
short, which overflows after receiving 64 KB of data. It's comparably
small amount of data and therefore achievable for an attacker.
When len overflows, realloc() will either be called with a small value
and therefore chars will be appended out of bounds, or len + 1 will be
exactly 0, in which case realloc() behaves like free(). This could be
abused for a later double-free attack as it's even possible to overwrite
the free information -- but this depends on the malloc implementation.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 66,909 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::AdjustSelectionByCharacterOffset(int start_adjust,
int end_adjust) {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->Send(new InputMsg_AdjustSelectionByCharacterOffset(
focused_frame->GetRoutingID(), start_adjust, end_adjust));
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: notationDeclDebug(void *ctx ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const xmlChar *name,
const xmlChar *publicId, const xmlChar *systemId)
{
callbacks++;
if (quiet)
return;
fprintf(SAXdebug, "SAX.notationDecl(%s, %s, %s)\n",
(char *) name, (char *) publicId, (char *) systemId);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cmp_event_layer(const void *p1, const void *p2)
{
ASS_Event *e1 = ((EventImages *) p1)->event;
ASS_Event *e2 = ((EventImages *) p2)->event;
if (e1->Layer < e2->Layer)
return -1;
if (e1->Layer > e2->Layer)
return 1;
if (e1->ReadOrder < e2->ReadOrder)
return -1;
if (e1->ReadOrder > e2->ReadOrder)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool checkPermission(const char* permissionString) {
if (getpid() == IPCThreadState::self()->getCallingPid()) return true;
bool ok = checkCallingPermission(String16(permissionString));
if (!ok) ALOGE("Request requires %s", permissionString);
return ok;
}
Commit Message: MediaPlayerService: avoid invalid static cast
Bug: 30204103
Change-Id: Ie0dd3568a375f1e9fed8615ad3d85184bcc99028
(cherry picked from commit ee0a0e39acdcf8f97e0d6945c31ff36a06a36e9d)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String WebPageSerializerImpl::postActionAfterSerializeOpenTag(
const Element* element, SerializeDomParam* param)
{
StringBuilder result;
param->haveAddedContentsBeforeEnd = false;
if (!param->isHTMLDocument)
return result.toString();
if (!param->haveAddedCharsetDeclaration
&& isHTMLHeadElement(*element)) {
param->haveAddedCharsetDeclaration = true;
result.append(WebPageSerializer::generateMetaCharsetDeclaration(
String(param->textEncoding.name())));
param->haveAddedContentsBeforeEnd = true;
} else if (isHTMLScriptElement(*element) || isHTMLScriptElement(*element)) {
param->isInScriptOrStyleTag = true;
}
return result.toString();
}
Commit Message: Make WebPageSerializerImpl to escape URL attribute values in result.
This patch makes |WebPageSerializerImpl| to escape URL attribute values rather
than directly output URL attribute values into result.
BUG=542054
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.URLAttributeValues
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1398453005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#353712}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 124,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CompositorImpl::SetBackgroundColor(int color) {
DCHECK(host_);
host_->set_background_color(color);
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoSwapBuffersWithBoundsCHROMIUM(
uint64_t swap_id,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLint* rects,
GLbitfield flags) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::SwapBuffersWithBoundsCHROMIUM");
if (!supports_swap_buffers_with_bounds_) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glSwapBuffersWithBoundsCHROMIUM",
"command not supported by surface");
return;
}
bool is_tracing;
TRACE_EVENT_CATEGORY_GROUP_ENABLED(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("gpu.debug"),
&is_tracing);
if (is_tracing) {
bool is_offscreen = !!offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get();
ScopedFramebufferBinder binder(this, GetBoundDrawFramebufferServiceId());
gpu_state_tracer_->TakeSnapshotWithCurrentFramebuffer(
is_offscreen ? offscreen_size_ : surface_->GetSize());
}
ClearScheduleCALayerState();
std::vector<gfx::Rect> bounds(count);
for (GLsizei i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
bounds[i] = gfx::Rect(rects[i * 4 + 0], rects[i * 4 + 1], rects[i * 4 + 2],
rects[i * 4 + 3]);
}
client()->OnSwapBuffers(swap_id, flags);
FinishSwapBuffers(surface_->SwapBuffersWithBounds(bounds, base::DoNothing()));
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoRequestCleanupDisabledTypes() {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
sync_manager_->RequestCleanupDisabledTypes();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, getArrayCopy)
{
zval *object = getThis(), *tmp;
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
array_init(return_value);
zend_hash_copy(HASH_OF(return_value), spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, &tmp, sizeof(zval*));
} /* }}} */
static HashTable *spl_array_get_properties(zval *object TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QQuickWebViewPrivate::~QQuickWebViewPrivate()
{
webPageProxy->close();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int bt_sock_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
int noblock = flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
int err;
BT_DBG("sock %p sk %p len %zu", sock, sk, len);
if (flags & (MSG_OOB))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb) {
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
return err;
}
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
copied = skb->len;
if (len < copied) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err == 0)
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
return err ? : copied;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: fix possible info leak in bt_sock_recvmsg()
In case the socket is already shutting down, bt_sock_recvmsg() returns
with 0 without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the
local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes
of kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the msg_namelen assignment in front of the shutdown
test.
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 166,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int msix_is_pending(PCIDevice *dev, int vector)
{
return *msix_pending_byte(dev, vector) & msix_pending_mask(vector);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 15,881 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static double ipow( double n, int exp )
{
double r;
if ( exp < 0 )
return 1.0 / ipow( n, -exp );
r = 1;
while ( exp > 0 ) {
if ( exp & 1 )
r *= n;
exp >>= 1;
n *= n;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_string(struct xkb_compose_table *table, const char *string, size_t len,
const char *file_name)
{
struct scanner s;
scanner_init(&s, table->ctx, string, len, file_name, NULL);
if (!parse(table, &s, 0))
return false;
/* Maybe the allocator can use the excess space. */
darray_shrink(table->nodes);
darray_shrink(table->utf8);
return true;
}
Commit Message: compose: fix infinite loop in parser on some inputs
The parser would enter an infinite loop if an unterminated keysym
literal occurs at EOF.
Found with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <ran234@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 79,020 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool r_bin_mdmp_init_directory_entry(struct r_bin_mdmp_obj *obj, struct minidump_directory *entry) {
int i;
struct minidump_handle_operation_list *handle_operation_list;
struct minidump_memory_list *memory_list;
struct minidump_memory64_list *memory64_list;
struct minidump_memory_info_list *memory_info_list;
struct minidump_module_list *module_list;
struct minidump_thread_list *thread_list;
struct minidump_thread_ex_list *thread_ex_list;
struct minidump_thread_info_list *thread_info_list;
struct minidump_unloaded_module_list *unloaded_module_list;
struct avrf_handle_operation *handle_operations;
struct minidump_memory_descriptor *memories;
struct minidump_memory_descriptor64 *memories64;
struct minidump_memory_info *memory_infos;
struct minidump_module *modules;
struct minidump_thread *threads;
struct minidump_thread_ex *ex_threads;
struct minidump_thread_info *thread_infos;
struct minidump_unloaded_module *unloaded_modules;
/* We could confirm data sizes but a malcious MDMP will always get around
** this! But we can ensure that the data is not outside of the file */
if (entry->location.rva + entry->location.data_size > obj->b->length) {
eprintf("[ERROR] Size Mismatch - Stream data is larger than file size!\n");
return false;
}
switch (entry->stream_type) {
case THREAD_LIST_STREAM:
thread_list = (struct minidump_thread_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread.format", "ddddq?? "
"ThreadId SuspendCount PriorityClass Priority "
"Teb (mdmp_memory_descriptor)Stack "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)ThreadContext", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("d[%i]? "
"NumberOfThreads (mdmp_thread)Threads",
thread_list->number_of_threads),
0);
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
for (i = 0; i < thread_list->number_of_threads; i++) {
threads = (struct minidump_thread *)(&(thread_list->threads));
r_list_append (obj->streams.threads, &(threads[i]));
}
break;
case MODULE_LIST_STREAM:
module_list = (struct minidump_module_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_module.format", "qddtd???qq "
"BaseOfImage SizeOfImage CheckSum "
"TimeDateStamp ModuleNameRVA "
"(mdmp_vs_fixedfileinfo)VersionInfo "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)CvRecord "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)MiscRecord "
"Reserved0 Reserved1", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_module_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_module_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("d[%i]? "
"NumberOfModule (mdmp_module)Modules",
module_list->number_of_modules,
0),
0);
for (i = 0; i < module_list->number_of_modules; i++) {
modules = (struct minidump_module *)(&(module_list->modules));
r_list_append(obj->streams.modules, &(modules[i]));
}
break;
case MEMORY_LIST_STREAM:
memory_list = (struct minidump_memory_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("d[%i]? "
"NumberOfMemoryRanges "
"(mdmp_memory_descriptor)MemoryRanges ",
memory_list->number_of_memory_ranges,
0),
0);
for (i = 0; i < memory_list->number_of_memory_ranges; i++) {
memories = (struct minidump_memory_descriptor *)(&(memory_list->memory_ranges));
r_list_append (obj->streams.memories, &(memories[i]));
}
break;
case EXCEPTION_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.exception = (struct minidump_exception_stream *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_exception.format", "[4]E[4]Eqqdd[15]q "
"(mdmp_exception_code)ExceptionCode "
"(mdmp_exception_flags)ExceptionFlags "
"ExceptionRecord ExceptionAddress "
"NumberParameters __UnusedAlignment "
"ExceptionInformation", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_exception_stream.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_exception_stream.format", "dd?? "
"ThreadId __Alignment "
"(mdmp_exception)ExceptionRecord "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)ThreadContext", 0);
break;
case SYSTEM_INFO_STREAM:
obj->streams.system_info = (struct minidump_system_info *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_system_info.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
/* TODO: We need E as a byte! */
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_system_info.format", "[2]EwwbBddd[4]Ed[2]Ew[2]q "
"(mdmp_processor_architecture)ProcessorArchitecture "
"ProcessorLevel ProcessorRevision NumberOfProcessors "
"(mdmp_product_type)ProductType "
"MajorVersion MinorVersion BuildNumber (mdmp_platform_id)PlatformId "
"CsdVersionRva (mdmp_suite_mask)SuiteMask Reserved2 ProcessorFeatures", 0);
break;
case THREAD_EX_LIST_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
thread_ex_list = (struct minidump_thread_ex_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_ex.format", "ddddq??? "
"ThreadId SuspendCount PriorityClass Priority "
"Teb (mdmp_memory_descriptor)Stack "
"(mdmp_location_descriptor)ThreadContext "
"(mdmp_memory_descriptor)BackingStore", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_ex_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_ex_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("d[%i]? NumberOfThreads "
"(mdmp_thread_ex)Threads",
thread_ex_list->number_of_threads, 0),
0);
for (i = 0; i < thread_ex_list->number_of_threads; i++) {
ex_threads = (struct minidump_thread_ex *)(&(thread_ex_list->threads));
r_list_append (obj->streams.ex_threads, &(ex_threads[i]));
}
break;
case MEMORY_64_LIST_STREAM:
memory64_list = (struct minidump_memory64_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory64_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory64_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("qq[%i]? NumberOfMemoryRanges "
"BaseRva "
"(mdmp_memory_descriptor64)MemoryRanges",
memory64_list->number_of_memory_ranges),
0);
obj->streams.memories64.base_rva = memory64_list->base_rva;
for (i = 0; i < memory64_list->number_of_memory_ranges; i++) {
memories64 = (struct minidump_memory_descriptor64 *)(&(memory64_list->memory_ranges));
r_list_append (obj->streams.memories64.memories, &(memories64[i]));
}
break;
case COMMENT_STREAM_A:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.comments_a = obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva;
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_comment_stream_a.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_comment_stream_a.format",
"s CommentA", 0);
break;
case COMMENT_STREAM_W:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.comments_w = obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva;
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_comment_stream_w.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_comment_stream_w.format",
"s CommentW", 0);
break;
case HANDLE_DATA_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.handle_data = (struct minidump_handle_data_stream *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_handle_data_stream.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_handle_data_stream.format", "dddd "
"SizeOfHeader SizeOfDescriptor "
"NumberOfDescriptors Reserved", 0);
break;
case FUNCTION_TABLE_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.function_table = (struct minidump_function_table_stream *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_function_table_stream.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_function_table_stream.format", "dddddd "
"SizeOfHeader SizeOfDescriptor SizeOfNativeDescriptor "
"SizeOfFunctionEntry NumberOfDescriptors SizeOfAlignPad",
0);
break;
case UNLOADED_MODULE_LIST_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
unloaded_module_list = (struct minidump_unloaded_module_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_unloaded_module.format", "qddtd "
"BaseOfImage SizeOfImage CheckSum TimeDateStamp "
"ModuleNameRva", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_unloaded_module_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_unloaded_module_list.format", "ddd "
"SizeOfHeader SizeOfEntry NumberOfEntries", 0);
for (i = 0; i < unloaded_module_list->number_of_entries; i++) {
unloaded_modules = (struct minidump_unloaded_module *)((ut8 *)&unloaded_module_list + sizeof (struct minidump_unloaded_module_list));
r_list_append (obj->streams.unloaded_modules, &(unloaded_modules[i]));
}
break;
case MISC_INFO_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
obj->streams.misc_info.misc_info_1 = (struct minidump_misc_info *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
/* TODO: Handle different sizes */
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_misc_info.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_misc_info.format", "d[4]Bdtttddddd "
"SizeOfInfo (mdmp_misc1_flags)Flags1 ProcessId "
"ProcessCreateTime ProcessUserTime ProcessKernelTime "
"ProcessorMaxMhz ProcessorCurrentMhz "
"ProcessorMhzLimit ProcessorMaxIdleState "
"ProcessorCurrentIdleState", 0);
break;
case MEMORY_INFO_LIST_STREAM:
memory_info_list = (struct minidump_memory_info_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_info.format",
"qq[4]Edq[4]E[4]E[4]Ed BaseAddress AllocationBase "
"(mdmp_page_protect)AllocationProtect __Alignment1 RegionSize "
"(mdmp_mem_state)State (mdmp_page_protect)Protect "
"(mdmp_mem_type)Type __Alignment2", 0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_info_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_memory_info_list.format",
sdb_fmt ("ddq[%i]? SizeOfHeader SizeOfEntry "
"NumberOfEntries (mdmp_memory_info)MemoryInfo",
memory_info_list->number_of_entries),
0);
for (i = 0; i < memory_info_list->number_of_entries; i++) {
memory_infos = (struct minidump_memory_info *)((ut8 *)memory_info_list + sizeof (struct minidump_memory_info_list));
r_list_append (obj->streams.memory_infos, &(memory_infos[i]));
}
break;
case THREAD_INFO_LIST_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
thread_info_list = (struct minidump_thread_info_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_info.format", "ddddttttqq "
"ThreadId DumpFlags DumpError ExitStatus CreateTime "
"ExitTime KernelTime UserTime StartAddress Affinity",
0);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_info_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_thread_info_list.format", "ddd "
"SizeOfHeader SizeOfEntry NumberOfEntries", 0);
for (i = 0; i < thread_info_list->number_of_entries; i++) {
thread_infos = (struct minidump_thread_info *)((ut8 *)thread_info_list + sizeof (struct minidump_thread_info_list));
r_list_append (obj->streams.thread_infos, &(thread_infos[i]));
}
break;
case HANDLE_OPERATION_LIST_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
handle_operation_list = (struct minidump_handle_operation_list *)(obj->b->buf + entry->location.rva);
sdb_num_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_handle_operation_list.offset",
entry->location.rva, 0);
sdb_set (obj->kv, "mdmp_handle_operation_list.format", "dddd "
"SizeOfHeader SizeOfEntry NumberOfEntries Reserved", 0);
for (i = 0; i < handle_operation_list->number_of_entries; i++) {
handle_operations = (struct avrf_handle_operation *)((ut8 *)handle_operation_list + sizeof (struct minidump_handle_operation_list));
r_list_append (obj->streams.operations, &(handle_operations[i]));
}
break;
case LAST_RESERVED_STREAM:
/* TODO: Not yet fully parsed or utilised */
break;
case UNUSED_STREAM:
case RESERVED_STREAM_0:
case RESERVED_STREAM_1:
/* Silently ignore reserved streams */
break;
default:
eprintf ("[WARN] Invalid or unsupported enumeration encountered %i\n", entry->stream_type);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10464 - oobread crash in mdmp
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int blkg_print_stat_bytes_recursive(struct seq_file *sf, void *v)
{
blkcg_print_blkgs(sf, css_to_blkcg(seq_css(sf)),
blkg_prfill_rwstat_field_recursive,
(void *)seq_cft(sf)->private,
offsetof(struct blkcg_gq, stat_bytes), true);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 84,144 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddObserverOnIDBThread() {
DCHECK(context_->TaskRunner()->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
context_->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltRegisterExtModuleElement(const xmlChar * name, const xmlChar * URI,
xsltPreComputeFunction precomp,
xsltTransformFunction transform)
{
int ret;
xsltExtElementPtr ext;
if ((name == NULL) || (URI == NULL) || (transform == NULL))
return (-1);
if (xsltElementsHash == NULL)
xsltElementsHash = xmlHashCreate(10);
if (xsltElementsHash == NULL)
return (-1);
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
ext = xsltNewExtElement(precomp, transform);
if (ext == NULL) {
ret = -1;
goto done;
}
xmlHashUpdateEntry2(xsltElementsHash, name, URI, (void *) ext,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeExtElement);
done:
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::CreateRequestContextForStoragePartition(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const base::FilePath& partition_path,
bool in_memory,
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactory::ProtocolHandler>
blob_protocol_handler,
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactory::ProtocolHandler>
file_system_protocol_handler,
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactory::ProtocolHandler>
developer_protocol_handler,
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactory::ProtocolHandler>
chrome_protocol_handler,
scoped_ptr<net::URLRequestJobFactory::ProtocolHandler>
chrome_devtools_protocol_handler) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
return profile->CreateRequestContextForStoragePartition(
partition_path,
in_memory,
blob_protocol_handler.Pass(),
file_system_protocol_handler.Pass(),
developer_protocol_handler.Pass(),
chrome_protocol_handler.Pass(),
chrome_devtools_protocol_handler.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_usb_mixer_activate(struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer)
{
int err;
if (mixer->urb) {
err = usb_submit_urb(mixer->urb, GFP_NOIO);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int br_nf_dev_queue_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return br_dev_queue_push_xmit(skb);
}
Commit Message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <lkml@scotdoyle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <bandan.das@stratus.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <jluebbe@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,708 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void)
{
encrypted_shash_release();
unregister_key_type(&key_type_encrypted);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix handling of stored error in a negatively instantiated user key
If a user key gets negatively instantiated, an error code is cached in the
payload area. A negatively instantiated key may be then be positively
instantiated by updating it with valid data. However, the ->update key
type method must be aware that the error code may be there.
The following may be used to trigger the bug in the user key type:
keyctl request2 user user "" @u
keyctl add user user "a" @u
which manifests itself as:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff8a
IP: [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
PGD 7cc30067 PUD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 2644 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.3.0+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff88003ddea700 ti: ffff88003dd88000 task.ti: ffff88003dd88000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810a376f>] [<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280
[<ffffffff810a376f>] __call_rcu.constprop.76+0x1f/0x280 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3046
RSP: 0018:ffff88003dd8bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff82 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: ffffffff81e3fe40 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000ffffff82
RBP: ffff88003dd8bde0 R08: ffff88007d2d2da0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff88003e8073c0 R12: 00000000ffffff82
R13: ffff88003dd8be68 R14: ffff88007d027600 R15: ffff88003ddea700
FS: 0000000000b92880(0063) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000ffffff8a CR3: 000000007cc5f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Stack:
ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff81160a8a 0000000000000000 00000000ffffff82
ffff88003dd8be68 ffff88007d027600 ffff88003dd8bdf0 ffffffff810a39e5
ffff88003dd8be20 ffffffff812a31ab ffff88007d027600 ffff88007d027620
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810a39e5>] kfree_call_rcu+0x15/0x20 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3136
[<ffffffff812a31ab>] user_update+0x8b/0xb0 security/keys/user_defined.c:129
[< inline >] __key_update security/keys/key.c:730
[<ffffffff8129e5c1>] key_create_or_update+0x291/0x440 security/keys/key.c:908
[< inline >] SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:125
[<ffffffff8129fc21>] SyS_add_key+0x101/0x1e0 security/keys/keyctl.c:60
[<ffffffff8185f617>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6a arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
Note the error code (-ENOKEY) in EDX.
A similar bug can be tripped by:
keyctl request2 trusted user "" @u
keyctl add trusted user "a" @u
This should also affect encrypted keys - but that has to be correctly
parameterised or it will fail with EINVAL before getting to the bit that
will crashes.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 57,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const String& HTMLInputElement::suggestedValue() const
{
return m_suggestedValue;
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MigrateTaskbarPinsCallback() {
base::FilePath chrome_exe;
if (!base::PathService::Get(base::FILE_EXE, &chrome_exe))
return;
base::FilePath pins_path;
if (!base::PathService::Get(base::DIR_TASKBAR_PINS, &pins_path)) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
win::MigrateShortcutsInPathInternal(chrome_exe, pins_path);
}
Commit Message: Validate external protocols before launching on Windows
Bug: 889459
Change-Id: Id33ca6444bff1e6dd71b6000823cf6fec09746ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1256208
Reviewed-by: Greg Thompson <grt@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597611}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_pass_start_row(int pass)
{
int x, y;
++pass;
for (y=0; y<8; ++y) for (x=0; x<8; ++x) if (adam7[y][x] == pass)
return y;
return 0xf;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SessionService::~SessionService() {
Save();
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_file_info(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *parent,
const unsigned char *isodirrec)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660;
struct file_info *file, *filep;
size_t name_len;
const unsigned char *rr_start, *rr_end;
const unsigned char *p;
size_t dr_len;
uint64_t fsize, offset;
int32_t location;
int flags;
iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)(a->format->data);
dr_len = (size_t)isodirrec[DR_length_offset];
name_len = (size_t)isodirrec[DR_name_len_offset];
location = archive_le32dec(isodirrec + DR_extent_offset);
fsize = toi(isodirrec + DR_size_offset, DR_size_size);
/* Sanity check that dr_len needs at least 34. */
if (dr_len < 34) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid length of directory record");
return (NULL);
}
/* Sanity check that name_len doesn't exceed dr_len. */
if (dr_len - 33 < name_len || name_len == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid length of file identifier");
return (NULL);
}
/* Sanity check that location doesn't exceed volume block.
* Don't check lower limit of location; it's possibility
* the location has negative value when file type is symbolic
* link or file size is zero. As far as I know latest mkisofs
* do that.
*/
if (location > 0 &&
(location + ((fsize + iso9660->logical_block_size -1)
/ iso9660->logical_block_size))
> (uint32_t)iso9660->volume_block) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid location of extent of file");
return (NULL);
}
/* Sanity check that location doesn't have a negative value
* when the file is not empty. it's too large. */
if (fsize != 0 && location < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid location of extent of file");
return (NULL);
}
/* Sanity check that this entry does not create a cycle. */
offset = iso9660->logical_block_size * (uint64_t)location;
for (filep = parent; filep != NULL; filep = filep->parent) {
if (filep->offset == offset) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Directory structure contains loop");
return (NULL);
}
}
/* Create a new file entry and copy data from the ISO dir record. */
file = (struct file_info *)calloc(1, sizeof(*file));
if (file == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"No memory for file entry");
return (NULL);
}
file->parent = parent;
file->offset = offset;
file->size = fsize;
file->mtime = isodate7(isodirrec + DR_date_offset);
file->ctime = file->atime = file->mtime;
file->rede_files.first = NULL;
file->rede_files.last = &(file->rede_files.first);
p = isodirrec + DR_name_offset;
/* Rockridge extensions (if any) follow name. Compute this
* before fidgeting the name_len below. */
rr_start = p + name_len + (name_len & 1 ? 0 : 1);
rr_end = isodirrec + dr_len;
if (iso9660->seenJoliet) {
/* Joliet names are max 64 chars (128 bytes) according to spec,
* but genisoimage/mkisofs allows recording longer Joliet
* names which are 103 UCS2 characters(206 bytes) by their
* option '-joliet-long'.
*/
if (name_len > 206)
name_len = 206;
name_len &= ~1;
/* trim trailing first version and dot from filename.
*
* Remember we were in UTF-16BE land!
* SEPARATOR 1 (.) and SEPARATOR 2 (;) are both
* 16 bits big endian characters on Joliet.
*
* TODO: sanitize filename?
* Joliet allows any UCS-2 char except:
* *, /, :, ;, ? and \.
*/
/* Chop off trailing ';1' from files. */
if (name_len > 4 && p[name_len-4] == 0 && p[name_len-3] == ';'
&& p[name_len-2] == 0 && p[name_len-1] == '1')
name_len -= 4;
#if 0 /* XXX: this somehow manages to strip of single-character file extensions, like '.c'. */
/* Chop off trailing '.' from filenames. */
if (name_len > 2 && p[name_len-2] == 0 && p[name_len-1] == '.')
name_len -= 2;
#endif
if ((file->utf16be_name = malloc(name_len)) == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"No memory for file name");
return (NULL);
}
memcpy(file->utf16be_name, p, name_len);
file->utf16be_bytes = name_len;
} else {
/* Chop off trailing ';1' from files. */
if (name_len > 2 && p[name_len - 2] == ';' &&
p[name_len - 1] == '1')
name_len -= 2;
/* Chop off trailing '.' from filenames. */
if (name_len > 1 && p[name_len - 1] == '.')
--name_len;
archive_strncpy(&file->name, (const char *)p, name_len);
}
flags = isodirrec[DR_flags_offset];
if (flags & 0x02)
file->mode = AE_IFDIR | 0700;
else
file->mode = AE_IFREG | 0400;
if (flags & 0x80)
file->multi_extent = 1;
else
file->multi_extent = 0;
/*
* Use a location for the file number, which is treated as an inode
* number to find out hardlink target. If Rockridge extensions is
* being used, the file number will be overwritten by FILE SERIAL
* NUMBER of RRIP "PX" extension.
* Note: Old mkisofs did not record that FILE SERIAL NUMBER
* in ISO images.
* Note2: xorriso set 0 to the location of a symlink file.
*/
if (file->size == 0 && location >= 0) {
/* If file->size is zero, its location points wrong place,
* and so we should not use it for the file number.
* When the location has negative value, it can be used
* for the file number.
*/
file->number = -1;
/* Do not appear before any directory entries. */
file->offset = -1;
} else
file->number = (int64_t)(uint32_t)location;
/* Rockridge extensions overwrite information from above. */
if (iso9660->opt_support_rockridge) {
if (parent == NULL && rr_end - rr_start >= 7) {
p = rr_start;
if (memcmp(p, "SP\x07\x01\xbe\xef", 6) == 0) {
/*
* SP extension stores the suspOffset
* (Number of bytes to skip between
* filename and SUSP records.)
* It is mandatory by the SUSP standard
* (IEEE 1281).
*
* It allows SUSP to coexist with
* non-SUSP uses of the System
* Use Area by placing non-SUSP data
* before SUSP data.
*
* SP extension must be in the root
* directory entry, disable all SUSP
* processing if not found.
*/
iso9660->suspOffset = p[6];
iso9660->seenSUSP = 1;
rr_start += 7;
}
}
if (iso9660->seenSUSP) {
int r;
file->name_continues = 0;
file->symlink_continues = 0;
rr_start += iso9660->suspOffset;
r = parse_rockridge(a, file, rr_start, rr_end);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
free(file);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* A file size of symbolic link files in ISO images
* made by makefs is not zero and its location is
* the same as those of next regular file. That is
* the same as hard like file and it causes unexpected
* error.
*/
if (file->size > 0 &&
(file->mode & AE_IFMT) == AE_IFLNK) {
file->size = 0;
file->number = -1;
file->offset = -1;
}
} else
/* If there isn't SUSP, disable parsing
* rock ridge extensions. */
iso9660->opt_support_rockridge = 0;
}
file->nlinks = 1;/* Reset nlink. we'll calculate it later. */
/* Tell file's parent how many children that parent has. */
if (parent != NULL && (flags & 0x02))
parent->subdirs++;
if (iso9660->seenRockridge) {
if (parent != NULL && parent->parent == NULL &&
(flags & 0x02) && iso9660->rr_moved == NULL &&
file->name.s &&
(strcmp(file->name.s, "rr_moved") == 0 ||
strcmp(file->name.s, ".rr_moved") == 0)) {
iso9660->rr_moved = file;
file->rr_moved = 1;
file->rr_moved_has_re_only = 1;
file->re = 0;
parent->subdirs--;
} else if (file->re) {
/*
* Sanity check: file's parent is rr_moved.
*/
if (parent == NULL || parent->rr_moved == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge RE");
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Sanity check: file does not have "CL" extension.
*/
if (file->cl_offset) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge RE and CL");
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Sanity check: The file type must be a directory.
*/
if ((flags & 0x02) == 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge RE");
return (NULL);
}
} else if (parent != NULL && parent->rr_moved)
file->rr_moved_has_re_only = 0;
else if (parent != NULL && (flags & 0x02) &&
(parent->re || parent->re_descendant))
file->re_descendant = 1;
if (file->cl_offset) {
struct file_info *r;
if (parent == NULL || parent->parent == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Sanity check: The file type must be a regular file.
*/
if ((flags & 0x02) != 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
return (NULL);
}
parent->subdirs++;
/* Overwrite an offset and a number of this "CL" entry
* to appear before other dirs. "+1" to those is to
* make sure to appear after "RE" entry which this
* "CL" entry should be connected with. */
file->offset = file->number = file->cl_offset + 1;
/*
* Sanity check: cl_offset does not point at its
* the parents or itself.
*/
for (r = parent; r; r = r->parent) {
if (r->offset == file->cl_offset) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
return (NULL);
}
}
if (file->cl_offset == file->offset ||
parent->rr_moved) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Invalid Rockridge CL");
return (NULL);
}
}
}
#if DEBUG
/* DEBUGGING: Warn about attributes I don't yet fully support. */
if ((flags & ~0x02) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unrecognized flag: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (toi(isodirrec + DR_volume_sequence_number_offset, 2) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unrecognized sequence number: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (*(isodirrec + DR_file_unit_size_offset) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unexpected file unit size: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (*(isodirrec + DR_interleave_offset) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unexpected interleave: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
} else if (*(isodirrec + DR_ext_attr_length_offset) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n ** Unexpected extended attribute length: ");
dump_isodirrec(stderr, isodirrec);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
#endif
register_file(iso9660, file);
return (file);
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct zone_reclaim_stat *mem_cgroup_get_reclaim_stat(struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
struct zone *zone)
{
int nid = zone_to_nid(zone);
int zid = zone_idx(zone);
struct mem_cgroup_per_zone *mz = mem_cgroup_zoneinfo(memcg, nid, zid);
return &mz->reclaim_stat;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kwajd_extract(struct mskwaj_decompressor *base,
struct mskwajd_header *hdr, const char *filename)
{
struct mskwaj_decompressor_p *self = (struct mskwaj_decompressor_p *) base;
struct mspack_system *sys;
struct mspack_file *fh, *outfh;
if (!self) return MSPACK_ERR_ARGS;
if (!hdr) return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_ARGS;
sys = self->system;
fh = ((struct mskwajd_header_p *) hdr)->fh;
/* seek to the compressed data */
if (sys->seek(fh, hdr->data_offset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START)) {
return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
/* open file for output */
if (!(outfh = sys->open(sys, filename, MSPACK_SYS_OPEN_WRITE))) {
return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_OPEN;
}
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_OK;
/* decompress based on format */
if (hdr->comp_type == MSKWAJ_COMP_NONE ||
hdr->comp_type == MSKWAJ_COMP_XOR)
{
/* NONE is a straight copy. XOR is a copy xored with 0xFF */
unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char *) sys->alloc(sys, (size_t) KWAJ_INPUT_SIZE);
if (buf) {
int read, i;
while ((read = sys->read(fh, buf, KWAJ_INPUT_SIZE)) > 0) {
if (hdr->comp_type == MSKWAJ_COMP_XOR) {
for (i = 0; i < read; i++) buf[i] ^= 0xFF;
}
if (sys->write(outfh, buf, read) != read) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_WRITE;
break;
}
}
if (read < 0) self->error = MSPACK_ERR_READ;
sys->free(buf);
}
else {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
}
}
else if (hdr->comp_type == MSKWAJ_COMP_SZDD) {
self->error = lzss_decompress(sys, fh, outfh, KWAJ_INPUT_SIZE,
LZSS_MODE_EXPAND);
}
else if (hdr->comp_type == MSKWAJ_COMP_LZH) {
struct kwajd_stream *lzh = lzh_init(sys, fh, outfh);
self->error = (lzh) ? lzh_decompress(lzh) : MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
lzh_free(lzh);
}
else if (hdr->comp_type == MSKWAJ_COMP_MSZIP) {
struct mszipd_stream *zip = mszipd_init(sys,fh,outfh,KWAJ_INPUT_SIZE,0);
self->error = (zip) ? mszipd_decompress_kwaj(zip) : MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
mszipd_free(zip);
}
else {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_DATAFORMAT;
}
/* close output file */
sys->close(outfh);
return self->error;
}
Commit Message: kwaj_read_headers(): fix handling of non-terminated strings
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 79,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bson_iter_as_double (const bson_iter_t *iter) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
switch ((int) ITER_TYPE (iter)) {
case BSON_TYPE_BOOL:
return (double) bson_iter_bool (iter);
case BSON_TYPE_DOUBLE:
return bson_iter_double (iter);
case BSON_TYPE_INT32:
return (double) bson_iter_int32 (iter);
case BSON_TYPE_INT64:
return (double) bson_iter_int64 (iter);
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 77,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int mem_check_range(struct rxe_mem *mem, u64 iova, size_t length)
{
switch (mem->type) {
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_DMA:
return 0;
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_MR:
case RXE_MEM_TYPE_FMR:
return ((iova < mem->iova) ||
((iova + length) > (mem->iova + mem->length))) ?
-EFAULT : 0;
default:
return -EFAULT;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/rxe: Fix mem_check_range integer overflow
Update the range check to avoid integer-overflow in edge case.
Resolves CVE 2016-8636.
Signed-off-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 168,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::DetachLayoutTree(const AttachContext& context) {
if (GetLayoutObject()) {
input_type_->OnDetachWithLayoutObject();
}
TextControlElement::DetachLayoutTree(context);
needs_to_update_view_value_ = true;
input_type_view_->ClosePopupView();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_tx_error(struct airo_info *ai, s32 fid)
{
__le16 status;
if (fid < 0)
status = ((WifiCtlHdr *)ai->txfids[0].virtual_host_addr)->ctlhdr.status;
else {
if (bap_setup(ai, ai->fids[fid] & 0xffff, 4, BAP0) != SUCCESS)
return;
bap_read(ai, &status, 2, BAP0);
}
if (le16_to_cpu(status) & 2) /* Too many retries */
ai->dev->stats.tx_aborted_errors++;
if (le16_to_cpu(status) & 4) /* Transmit lifetime exceeded */
ai->dev->stats.tx_heartbeat_errors++;
if (le16_to_cpu(status) & 8) /* Aid fail */
{ }
if (le16_to_cpu(status) & 0x10) /* MAC disabled */
ai->dev->stats.tx_carrier_errors++;
if (le16_to_cpu(status) & 0x20) /* Association lost */
{ }
/* We produce a TXDROP event only for retry or lifetime
* exceeded, because that's the only status that really mean
* that this particular node went away.
* Other errors means that *we* screwed up. - Jean II */
if ((le16_to_cpu(status) & 2) ||
(le16_to_cpu(status) & 4)) {
union iwreq_data wrqu;
char junk[0x18];
/* Faster to skip over useless data than to do
* another bap_setup(). We are at offset 0x6 and
* need to go to 0x18 and read 6 bytes - Jean II */
bap_read(ai, (__le16 *) junk, 0x18, BAP0);
/* Copy 802.11 dest address.
* We use the 802.11 header because the frame may
* not be 802.3 or may be mangled...
* In Ad-Hoc mode, it will be the node address.
* In managed mode, it will be most likely the AP addr
* User space will figure out how to convert it to
* whatever it needs (IP address or else).
* - Jean II */
memcpy(wrqu.addr.sa_data, junk + 0x12, ETH_ALEN);
wrqu.addr.sa_family = ARPHRD_ETHER;
/* Send event to user space */
wireless_send_event(ai->dev, IWEVTXDROP, &wrqu, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodDefaultTrueBooleanArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodDefaultTrueBooleanArg");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
bool default_boolean_arg;
if (!info[0]->IsUndefined()) {
default_boolean_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLBoolean>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
} else {
default_boolean_arg = true;
}
impl->voidMethodDefaultTrueBooleanArg(default_boolean_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameObserverNatives::~RenderFrameObserverNatives() {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **crl)
{
return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), fp, crl);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 94,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssl_update_checksum_sha384( ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
sha4_update( &ssl->handshake->fin_sha4, buf, len );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool trap_dbgidr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct sys_reg_params *p,
const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
{
if (p->is_write) {
return ignore_write(vcpu, p);
} else {
u64 dfr = read_system_reg(SYS_ID_AA64DFR0_EL1);
u64 pfr = read_system_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
u32 el3 = !!cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr, ID_AA64PFR0_EL3_SHIFT);
p->regval = ((((dfr >> ID_AA64DFR0_WRPS_SHIFT) & 0xf) << 28) |
(((dfr >> ID_AA64DFR0_BRPS_SHIFT) & 0xf) << 24) |
(((dfr >> ID_AA64DFR0_CTX_CMPS_SHIFT) & 0xf) << 20)
| (6 << 16) | (el3 << 14) | (el3 << 12));
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() {
DCHECK_NE(site_identity_status_, SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_UNKNOWN);
DCHECK_NE(site_connection_status_, SITE_CONNECTION_STATUS_UNKNOWN);
PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo info;
if (site_identity_status_ == SITE_IDENTITY_STATUS_EV_CERT)
info.site_identity = UTF16ToUTF8(organization_name());
else
info.site_identity = UTF16ToUTF8(GetSimpleSiteName(site_url_));
info.connection_status = site_connection_status_;
info.connection_status_description = UTF16ToUTF8(site_connection_details_);
info.identity_status = site_identity_status_;
info.safe_browsing_status = safe_browsing_status_;
info.identity_status_description = UTF16ToUTF8(site_details_message_);
info.certificate = certificate_;
info.show_ssl_decision_revoke_button = show_ssl_decision_revoke_button_;
info.show_change_password_buttons = show_change_password_buttons_;
ui_->SetIdentityInfo(info);
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 1 | 172,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zval* ZEND_FASTCALL _zend_hash_str_update_ind(HashTable *ht, const char *str, size_t len, zval *pData ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
zend_string *key = zend_string_init(str, len, ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT);
zval *ret = _zend_hash_add_or_update_i(ht, key, pData, HASH_UPDATE | HASH_UPDATE_INDIRECT ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
zend_string_release(key);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cypress_earthmate_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct cypress_private *priv;
int ret;
ret = cypress_generic_port_probe(port);
if (ret) {
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - Failed setting up port\n", __func__);
return ret;
}
priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
priv->chiptype = CT_EARTHMATE;
/* All Earthmate devices use the separated-count packet
format! Idiotic. */
priv->pkt_fmt = packet_format_1;
if (serial->dev->descriptor.idProduct !=
cpu_to_le16(PRODUCT_ID_EARTHMATEUSB)) {
/* The old original USB Earthmate seemed able to
handle GET_CONFIG requests; everything they've
produced since that time crashes if this command is
attempted :-( */
dev_dbg(&port->dev,
"%s - Marking this device as unsafe for GET_CONFIG commands\n",
__func__);
priv->get_cfg_unsafe = !0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFOpen(const char* name, const char* mode)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFOpen";
int m, fd;
TIFF* tif;
m = _TIFFgetMode(mode, module);
if (m == -1)
return ((TIFF*)0);
/* for cygwin and mingw */
#ifdef O_BINARY
m |= O_BINARY;
#endif
fd = open(name, m, 0666);
if (fd < 0) {
if (errno > 0 && strerror(errno) != NULL ) {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module, "%s: %s", name, strerror(errno) );
} else {
TIFFErrorExt(0, module, "%s: Cannot open", name);
}
return ((TIFF *)0);
}
tif = TIFFFdOpen((int)fd, name, mode);
if(!tif)
close(fd);
return tif;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 86,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int phar_copy_on_write(phar_archive_data **pphar TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
phar_archive_data **newpphar, *newphar = NULL;
if (SUCCESS != zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), (*pphar)->fname, (*pphar)->fname_len, (void *)&newphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data *), (void **)&newpphar)) {
return FAILURE;
}
*newpphar = *pphar;
phar_copy_cached_phar(newpphar TSRMLS_CC);
/* invalidate phar cache */
PHAR_G(last_phar) = NULL;
PHAR_G(last_phar_name) = PHAR_G(last_alias) = NULL;
if (newpphar[0]->alias_len && FAILURE == zend_hash_add(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_alias_map), newpphar[0]->alias, newpphar[0]->alias_len, (void*)newpphar, sizeof(phar_archive_data*), NULL)) {
zend_hash_del(&(PHAR_GLOBALS->phar_fname_map), (*pphar)->fname, (*pphar)->fname_len);
return FAILURE;
}
*pphar = *newpphar;
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: partition_create_device_not_seen_cb (gpointer user_data)
{
CreatePartitionData *data = user_data;
throw_error (data->context, ERROR_FAILED, "Error creating partition: timeout (10s) waiting for partition to show up");
g_signal_handler_disconnect (data->device->priv->daemon, data->device_added_signal_handler_id);
partition_create_data_unref (data);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_parse_islice(dec_struct_t *ps_dec,
UWORD16 u2_first_mb_in_slice)
{
dec_pic_params_t * ps_pps = ps_dec->ps_cur_pps;
dec_slice_params_t * ps_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UWORD32 u4_temp;
WORD32 i_temp;
WORD32 ret;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Read remaining contents of the slice header */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dec_ref_pic_marking function */
/* G050 */
if(ps_slice->u1_nal_ref_idc != 0)
{
if(!ps_dec->ps_dpb_cmds->u1_dpb_commands_read)
{
i_temp = ih264d_read_mmco_commands(ps_dec);
if (i_temp < 0)
{
return ERROR_DBP_MANAGER_T;
}
ps_dec->u4_bitoffset = i_temp;
}
else
ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst += ps_dec->u4_bitoffset;
}
/* G050 */
/* Read slice_qp_delta */
i_temp = ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp
+ ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if((i_temp < 0) || (i_temp > 51))
return ERROR_INV_RANGE_QP_T;
ps_slice->u1_slice_qp = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_qp_delta",
ps_slice->u1_slice_qp - ps_pps->u1_pic_init_qp);
if(ps_pps->u1_deblocking_filter_parameters_present_flag == 1)
{
u4_temp = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: disable_deblocking_filter_idc", u4_temp);
if(u4_temp > SLICE_BOUNDARY_DBLK_DISABLED)
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = u4_temp;
if(u4_temp != 1)
{
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_alpha_c0_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset >> 1);
i_temp = ih264d_sev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf)
<< 1;
if((MIN_DBLK_FIL_OFF > i_temp) || (i_temp > MAX_DBLK_FIL_OFF))
{
return ERROR_INV_SLICE_HDR_T;
}
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = i_temp;
COPYTHECONTEXT("SH: slice_beta_offset_div2",
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset >> 1);
}
else
{
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
}
else
{
ps_slice->u1_disable_dblk_filter_idc = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_alpha_c0_offset = 0;
ps_slice->i1_slice_beta_offset = 0;
}
/* Initialization to check if number of motion vector per 2 Mbs */
/* are exceeding the range or not */
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[0] = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mv_2mb[1] = 0;
/*set slice header cone to 2 ,to indicate correct header*/
ps_dec->u1_slice_header_done = 2;
if(ps_pps->u1_entropy_coding_mode)
{
SWITCHOFFTRACE; SWITCHONTRACECABAC;
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_mbaff;
}
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cabac_nonmbaff;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice_data_cabac(ps_dec, ps_slice,
u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
SWITCHONTRACE; SWITCHOFFTRACECABAC;
}
else
{
if(ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u1_mbaff_frame_flag)
{
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_mbaff;
}
else
ps_dec->pf_get_mb_info = ih264d_get_mb_info_cavlc_nonmbaff;
ret = ih264d_parse_islice_data_cavlc(ps_dec, ps_slice,
u2_first_mb_in_slice);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix in returning end of bitstream error for MBAFF
In case of MBAFF streams, slices should terminate on
even MB boundary. If bytes are exhausted with odd number
of MBs decoded for MBAff, then treat that as error.
Bug: 33933140
Change-Id: Ifc26b66ff8ebdb3aec5c0d6c512e4cac3f54c5b7
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UINT8 btif_hl_num_dchs_in_use(UINT8 mcl_handle){
btif_hl_app_cb_t * p_acb;
btif_hl_mcl_cb_t *p_mcb;
UINT8 i,j,x;
UINT8 cnt=0;
for (i=0; i<BTA_HL_NUM_APPS; i++)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_num_dchs:i = %d",i);
p_acb =BTIF_HL_GET_APP_CB_PTR(i);
if (p_acb && p_acb->in_use)
{
for (j=0; j < BTA_HL_NUM_MCLS ; j++)
{
if(p_acb->mcb[j].in_use)
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_num_dchs:mcb in use j=%d, mcl_handle=%d,mcb handle=%d",
j,mcl_handle, p_acb->mcb[j].mcl_handle);
if (p_acb->mcb[j].in_use &&
(p_acb->mcb[j].mcl_handle == mcl_handle))
{
p_mcb = &p_acb->mcb[j];
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_num_dchs: mcl handle found j =%d",j);
for (x=0; x < BTA_HL_NUM_MDLS_PER_MCL ; x ++)
{
if (p_mcb->mdl[x].in_use)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("btif_hl_num_dchs_in_use:found x =%d",x);
cnt++;
}
}
}
}
}
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s dch in use count=%d", __FUNCTION__, cnt);
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BlobStorageContext::RegisterPublicBlobURL(const GURL& blob_url,
const std::string& uuid) {
if (!registry_.CreateUrlMapping(blob_url, uuid))
return false;
IncrementBlobRefCount(uuid);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 150,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String8 String8::format(const char* fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
String8 result(formatV(fmt, args));
va_end(args);
return result;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 158,393 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::open() {
DCHECK(!ImportLoader());
DCHECK(!ignore_opens_during_unload_count_);
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser())
DCHECK(!parser->IsParsing() || !parser->IsExecutingScript());
if (frame_ &&
(frame_->Loader().HasProvisionalNavigation() ||
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().IsNavigationScheduledWithin(0))) {
frame_->Loader().StopAllLoaders();
if (frame_ && frame_->Client())
frame_->Client()->AbortClientNavigation();
}
RemoveAllEventListenersRecursively();
ResetTreeScope();
if (frame_)
frame_->Selection().Clear();
ImplicitOpen(kForceSynchronousParsing);
if (ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser())
parser->SetWasCreatedByScript(true);
if (frame_)
frame_->Loader().DidExplicitOpen();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnTimeout() {
MessageLoopForUI::current()->Quit();
}
Commit Message: Disable OutOfProcessPPAPITest.VarDeprecated on Mac due to timeouts.
BUG=121107
TBR=polina@chromium.org,ddorwin@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9950017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@129857 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 107,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_indirect_trans_blocks(struct inode *inode, int nrblocks,
int chunk)
{
int indirects;
/* if nrblocks are contiguous */
if (chunk) {
/*
* With N contiguous data blocks, it need at most
* N/EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(inode->i_sb) indirect blocks
* 2 dindirect blocks
* 1 tindirect block
*/
indirects = nrblocks / EXT4_ADDR_PER_BLOCK(inode->i_sb);
return indirects + 3;
}
/*
* if nrblocks are not contiguous, worse case, each block touch
* a indirect block, and each indirect block touch a double indirect
* block, plus a triple indirect block
*/
indirects = nrblocks * 2 + 1;
return indirects;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,523 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void registerURL(const char* file, const char* mimeType)
{
registerURL(file, file, mimeType);
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TabStrip::GetInactiveTabWidth() const {
return layout_helper_->inactive_tab_width();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::DidGetRegistrationsForDeleteForOrigin(
base::OnceCallback<void(blink::ServiceWorkerStatusCode)> callback,
blink::ServiceWorkerStatusCode status,
const std::vector<scoped_refptr<ServiceWorkerRegistration>>&
registrations) {
if (status != blink::ServiceWorkerStatusCode::kOk) {
std::move(callback).Run(status);
return;
}
if (registrations.empty()) {
std::move(callback).Run(blink::ServiceWorkerStatusCode::kOk);
return;
}
int* expected_calls = new int(2 * registrations.size());
base::RepeatingCallback<void(blink::ServiceWorkerStatusCode)> barrier =
base::BindRepeating(SuccessReportingCallback, base::Owned(expected_calls),
base::AdaptCallbackForRepeating(std::move(callback)));
for (const auto& registration : registrations) {
DCHECK(registration);
if (!registration->is_deleted()) {
RegistrationDeletionListener::WaitForDeletion(
registration,
base::BindOnce(barrier, blink::ServiceWorkerStatusCode::kOk));
} else {
barrier.Run(blink::ServiceWorkerStatusCode::kOk);
}
job_coordinator_->Abort(registration->scope());
UnregisterServiceWorker(registration->scope(), barrier);
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static vpx_codec_err_t decoder_get_si(vpx_codec_alg_priv_t *ctx,
vpx_codec_stream_info_t *si) {
const size_t sz = (si->sz >= sizeof(vp9_stream_info_t))
? sizeof(vp9_stream_info_t)
: sizeof(vpx_codec_stream_info_t);
memcpy(si, &ctx->si, sz);
si->sz = (unsigned int)sz;
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: cherry-pick aa1c813 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9: Fix potential SEGV in decoder_peek_si_internal
decoder_peek_si_internal could potentially read more bytes than
what actually exists in the input buffer. We check for the buffer
size to be at least 8, but we try to read up to 10 bytes in the
worst case. A well crafted file could thus cause a segfault.
Likely change that introduced this bug was:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/70439 (git hash:
7c43fb6)
Bug: 30013856
Change-Id: If556414cb5b82472d5673e045bc185cc57bb9af3
(cherry picked from commit bd57d587c2eb743c61b049add18f9fd72bf78c33)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 158,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ras_getdatastd(jas_stream_t *in, ras_hdr_t *hdr, ras_cmap_t *cmap,
jas_image_t *image)
{
int pad;
int nz;
int z;
int c;
int y;
int x;
int v;
int i;
jas_matrix_t *data[3];
/* Note: This function does not properly handle images with a colormap. */
/* Avoid compiler warnings about unused parameters. */
cmap = 0;
assert(jas_image_numcmpts(image) <= 3);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
data[i] = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
if (!(data[i] = jas_matrix_create(1, jas_image_width(image)))) {
goto error;
}
}
pad = RAS_ROWSIZE(hdr) - (hdr->width * hdr->depth + 7) / 8;
for (y = 0; y < hdr->height; y++) {
nz = 0;
z = 0;
for (x = 0; x < hdr->width; x++) {
while (nz < hdr->depth) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
z = (z << 8) | c;
nz += 8;
}
v = (z >> (nz - hdr->depth)) & RAS_ONES(hdr->depth);
z &= RAS_ONES(nz - hdr->depth);
nz -= hdr->depth;
if (jas_image_numcmpts(image) == 3) {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (RAS_GETRED(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[1], x, (RAS_GETGREEN(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[2], x, (RAS_GETBLUE(v)));
} else {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (v));
}
}
if (pad) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
if (jas_image_writecmpt(image, i, 0, y, hdr->width, 1,
data[i])) {
goto error;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
data[i] = 0;
}
return 0;
error:
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
if (data[i]) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,973 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ffs_ep0_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *ptr)
{
struct ffs_data *ffs = file->private_data;
char *data = NULL;
size_t n;
int ret;
ENTER();
/* Fast check if setup was canceled */
if (ffs_setup_state_clear_cancelled(ffs) == FFS_SETUP_CANCELLED)
return -EIDRM;
/* Acquire mutex */
ret = ffs_mutex_lock(&ffs->mutex, file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return ret;
/* Check state */
if (ffs->state != FFS_ACTIVE) {
ret = -EBADFD;
goto done_mutex;
}
/*
* We're called from user space, we can use _irq rather then
* _irqsave
*/
spin_lock_irq(&ffs->ev.waitq.lock);
switch (ffs_setup_state_clear_cancelled(ffs)) {
case FFS_SETUP_CANCELLED:
ret = -EIDRM;
break;
case FFS_NO_SETUP:
n = len / sizeof(struct usb_functionfs_event);
if (unlikely(!n)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) && !ffs->ev.count) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
if (wait_event_interruptible_exclusive_locked_irq(ffs->ev.waitq,
ffs->ev.count)) {
ret = -EINTR;
break;
}
return __ffs_ep0_read_events(ffs, buf,
min(n, (size_t)ffs->ev.count));
case FFS_SETUP_PENDING:
if (ffs->ev.setup.bRequestType & USB_DIR_IN) {
spin_unlock_irq(&ffs->ev.waitq.lock);
ret = __ffs_ep0_stall(ffs);
goto done_mutex;
}
len = min(len, (size_t)le16_to_cpu(ffs->ev.setup.wLength));
spin_unlock_irq(&ffs->ev.waitq.lock);
if (likely(len)) {
data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!data)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto done_mutex;
}
}
spin_lock_irq(&ffs->ev.waitq.lock);
/* See ffs_ep0_write() */
if (ffs_setup_state_clear_cancelled(ffs) ==
FFS_SETUP_CANCELLED) {
ret = -EIDRM;
break;
}
/* unlocks spinlock */
ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
if (likely(ret > 0) && unlikely(copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
ret = -EFAULT;
goto done_mutex;
default:
ret = -EBADFD;
break;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&ffs->ev.waitq.lock);
done_mutex:
mutex_unlock(&ffs->mutex);
kfree(data);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_level2_header(LHAFileHeader **header, LHAInputStream *stream)
{
unsigned int header_len;
header_len = lha_decode_uint16(&RAW_DATA(header, 0));
if (header_len < LEVEL_2_HEADER_LEN) {
return 0;
}
if (!extend_raw_data(header, stream,
header_len - RAW_DATA_LEN(header))) {
return 0;
}
memcpy((*header)->compress_method, &RAW_DATA(header, 2), 5);
(*header)->compress_method[5] = '\0';
(*header)->compressed_length = lha_decode_uint32(&RAW_DATA(header, 7));
(*header)->length = lha_decode_uint32(&RAW_DATA(header, 11));
(*header)->timestamp = lha_decode_uint32(&RAW_DATA(header, 15));
(*header)->crc = lha_decode_uint16(&RAW_DATA(header, 21));
(*header)->os_type = RAW_DATA(header, 23);
if ((*header)->os_type == LHA_OS_TYPE_OS9_68K) {
if (!extend_raw_data(header, stream, 2)) {
return 0;
}
}
if (!decode_extended_headers(header, 24)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer underflow vulnerability in L3 decode.
Marcin 'Icewall' Noga of Cisco TALOS discovered that the level 3 header
decoding routines were vulnerable to an integer underflow, if the 32-bit
header length was less than the base level 3 header length. This could
lead to an exploitable heap corruption condition.
Thanks go to Marcin Noga and Regina Wilson of Cisco TALOS for reporting
this vulnerability.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 73,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int plug_rq_cmp(void *priv, struct list_head *a, struct list_head *b)
{
struct request *rqa = container_of(a, struct request, queuelist);
struct request *rqb = container_of(b, struct request, queuelist);
return !(rqa->q < rqb->q ||
(rqa->q == rqb->q && blk_rq_pos(rqa) < blk_rq_pos(rqb)));
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 92,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::OnPluginLoadingError(
const base::FilePath& plugin_path) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
plugin_metrics_provider_->LogPluginLoadingError(plugin_path);
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_attr_type(struct xdr_stream *xdr, uint32_t *bitmap, uint32_t *type)
{
__be32 *p;
*type = 0;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_TYPE - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_TYPE)) {
READ_BUF(4);
READ32(*type);
if (*type < NF4REG || *type > NF4NAMEDATTR) {
dprintk("%s: bad type %d\n", __func__, *type);
return -EIO;
}
bitmap[0] &= ~FATTR4_WORD0_TYPE;
}
dprintk("%s: type=0%o\n", __func__, nfs_type2fmt[*type].nfs2type);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,009 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: service_manager::InterfaceProvider* RenderFrameHostImpl::GetRemoteInterfaces() {
return remote_interfaces_.get();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void inverse_mdct_slow(float *buffer, int n, vorb *f, int blocktype)
{
float mcos[16384];
int i,j;
int n2 = n >> 1, nmask = (n << 2) -1;
float *x = (float *) malloc(sizeof(*x) * n2);
memcpy(x, buffer, sizeof(*x) * n2);
for (i=0; i < 4*n; ++i)
mcos[i] = (float) cos(M_PI / 2 * i / n);
for (i=0; i < n; ++i) {
float acc = 0;
for (j=0; j < n2; ++j)
acc += x[j] * mcos[(2 * i + 1 + n2)*(2*j+1) & nmask];
buffer[i] = acc;
}
free(x);
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 75,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltNewCompMatch(void) {
xsltCompMatchPtr cur;
cur = (xsltCompMatchPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xsltCompMatch));
if (cur == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltNewCompMatch : out of memory error\n");
return(NULL);
}
memset(cur, 0, sizeof(xsltCompMatch));
cur->maxStep = 10;
cur->nbStep = 0;
cur-> steps = (xsltStepOpPtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xsltStepOp) *
cur->maxStep);
if (cur->steps == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, NULL, NULL,
"xsltNewCompMatch : out of memory error\n");
xmlFree(cur);
return(NULL);
}
cur->nsNr = 0;
cur->nsList = NULL;
cur->direct = 0;
return(cur);
}
Commit Message: Handle a bad XSLT expression better.
BUG=138672
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10830177
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@150123 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: H264SwDecRet H264SwDecNextPicture(H264SwDecInst decInst,
H264SwDecPicture *pOutput, u32 flushBuffer)
{
decContainer_t *pDecCont;
u32 numErrMbs, isIdrPic, picId;
u32 *pOutPic;
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecNextPicture#");
if (decInst == NULL || pOutput == NULL)
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecNextPicture# ERROR: decInst or pOutput is NULL");
return(H264SWDEC_PARAM_ERR);
}
pDecCont = (decContainer_t*)decInst;
#ifdef H264DEC_TRACE
sprintf(pDecCont->str, "H264SwDecNextPicture# decInst %p pOutput %p %s %d",
decInst, (void*)pOutput, "flushBuffer", flushBuffer);
DEC_API_TRC(pDecCont->str);
#endif
if (flushBuffer)
h264bsdFlushBuffer(&pDecCont->storage);
pOutPic = (u32*)h264bsdNextOutputPicture(&pDecCont->storage, &picId,
&isIdrPic, &numErrMbs);
if (pOutPic == NULL)
{
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecNextPicture# OK: return H264SWDEC_OK");
return(H264SWDEC_OK);
}
else
{
pOutput->pOutputPicture = pOutPic;
pOutput->picId = picId;
pOutput->isIdrPicture = isIdrPic;
pOutput->nbrOfErrMBs = numErrMbs;
DEC_API_TRC("H264SwDecNextPicture# OK: return H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY");
return(H264SWDEC_PIC_RDY);
}
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BluetoothSocketDisconnectFunction::~BluetoothSocketDisconnectFunction() {}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 154,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_writepages(struct address_space *mapping,
struct writeback_control *wbc)
{
pgoff_t writeback_index = 0;
long nr_to_write = wbc->nr_to_write;
int range_whole = 0;
int cycled = 1;
handle_t *handle = NULL;
struct mpage_da_data mpd;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
int needed_blocks, rsv_blocks = 0, ret = 0;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(mapping->host->i_sb);
bool done;
struct blk_plug plug;
bool give_up_on_write = false;
trace_ext4_writepages(inode, wbc);
/*
* No pages to write? This is mainly a kludge to avoid starting
* a transaction for special inodes like journal inode on last iput()
* because that could violate lock ordering on umount
*/
if (!mapping->nrpages || !mapping_tagged(mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY))
goto out_writepages;
if (ext4_should_journal_data(inode)) {
struct blk_plug plug;
blk_start_plug(&plug);
ret = write_cache_pages(mapping, wbc, __writepage, mapping);
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
goto out_writepages;
}
/*
* If the filesystem has aborted, it is read-only, so return
* right away instead of dumping stack traces later on that
* will obscure the real source of the problem. We test
* EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED instead of sb->s_flag's MS_RDONLY because
* the latter could be true if the filesystem is mounted
* read-only, and in that case, ext4_writepages should
* *never* be called, so if that ever happens, we would want
* the stack trace.
*/
if (unlikely(sbi->s_mount_flags & EXT4_MF_FS_ABORTED)) {
ret = -EROFS;
goto out_writepages;
}
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode)) {
/*
* We may need to convert up to one extent per block in
* the page and we may dirty the inode.
*/
rsv_blocks = 1 + (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE >> inode->i_blkbits);
}
/*
* If we have inline data and arrive here, it means that
* we will soon create the block for the 1st page, so
* we'd better clear the inline data here.
*/
if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) {
/* Just inode will be modified... */
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_INODE, 1);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out_writepages;
}
BUG_ON(ext4_test_inode_state(inode,
EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA));
ext4_destroy_inline_data(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
}
if (wbc->range_start == 0 && wbc->range_end == LLONG_MAX)
range_whole = 1;
if (wbc->range_cyclic) {
writeback_index = mapping->writeback_index;
if (writeback_index)
cycled = 0;
mpd.first_page = writeback_index;
mpd.last_page = -1;
} else {
mpd.first_page = wbc->range_start >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
mpd.last_page = wbc->range_end >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
}
mpd.inode = inode;
mpd.wbc = wbc;
ext4_io_submit_init(&mpd.io_submit, wbc);
retry:
if (wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_ALL || wbc->tagged_writepages)
tag_pages_for_writeback(mapping, mpd.first_page, mpd.last_page);
done = false;
blk_start_plug(&plug);
while (!done && mpd.first_page <= mpd.last_page) {
/* For each extent of pages we use new io_end */
mpd.io_submit.io_end = ext4_init_io_end(inode, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mpd.io_submit.io_end) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
/*
* We have two constraints: We find one extent to map and we
* must always write out whole page (makes a difference when
* blocksize < pagesize) so that we don't block on IO when we
* try to write out the rest of the page. Journalled mode is
* not supported by delalloc.
*/
BUG_ON(ext4_should_journal_data(inode));
needed_blocks = ext4_da_writepages_trans_blocks(inode);
/* start a new transaction */
handle = ext4_journal_start_with_reserve(inode,
EXT4_HT_WRITE_PAGE, needed_blocks, rsv_blocks);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
ext4_msg(inode->i_sb, KERN_CRIT, "%s: jbd2_start: "
"%ld pages, ino %lu; err %d", __func__,
wbc->nr_to_write, inode->i_ino, ret);
/* Release allocated io_end */
ext4_put_io_end(mpd.io_submit.io_end);
break;
}
trace_ext4_da_write_pages(inode, mpd.first_page, mpd.wbc);
ret = mpage_prepare_extent_to_map(&mpd);
if (!ret) {
if (mpd.map.m_len)
ret = mpage_map_and_submit_extent(handle, &mpd,
&give_up_on_write);
else {
/*
* We scanned the whole range (or exhausted
* nr_to_write), submitted what was mapped and
* didn't find anything needing mapping. We are
* done.
*/
done = true;
}
}
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
/* Submit prepared bio */
ext4_io_submit(&mpd.io_submit);
/* Unlock pages we didn't use */
mpage_release_unused_pages(&mpd, give_up_on_write);
/* Drop our io_end reference we got from init */
ext4_put_io_end(mpd.io_submit.io_end);
if (ret == -ENOSPC && sbi->s_journal) {
/*
* Commit the transaction which would
* free blocks released in the transaction
* and try again
*/
jbd2_journal_force_commit_nested(sbi->s_journal);
ret = 0;
continue;
}
/* Fatal error - ENOMEM, EIO... */
if (ret)
break;
}
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
if (!ret && !cycled && wbc->nr_to_write > 0) {
cycled = 1;
mpd.last_page = writeback_index - 1;
mpd.first_page = 0;
goto retry;
}
/* Update index */
if (wbc->range_cyclic || (range_whole && wbc->nr_to_write > 0))
/*
* Set the writeback_index so that range_cyclic
* mode will write it back later
*/
mapping->writeback_index = mpd.first_page;
out_writepages:
trace_ext4_writepages_result(inode, wbc, ret,
nr_to_write - wbc->nr_to_write);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool compare_img(const vpx_image_t *img1,
const vpx_image_t *img2) {
bool match = (img1->fmt == img2->fmt) &&
(img1->d_w == img2->d_w) &&
(img1->d_h == img2->d_h);
const unsigned int width_y = img1->d_w;
const unsigned int height_y = img1->d_h;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < height_y; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_Y] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_Y],
width_y) == 0) && match;
const unsigned int width_uv = (img1->d_w + 1) >> 1;
const unsigned int height_uv = (img1->d_h + 1) >> 1;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_U] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_U],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
for (i = 0; i < height_uv; ++i)
match = (memcmp(img1->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img1->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
img2->planes[VPX_PLANE_V] + i * img2->stride[VPX_PLANE_V],
width_uv) == 0) && match;
return match;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::PlatformFileError SystemToPlatformError(int error) {
switch (error) {
case 0:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK;
case EACCES:
case EISDIR:
case EROFS:
case EPERM:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED;
case ETXTBSY:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_IN_USE;
case EEXIST:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_EXISTS;
case ENOENT:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
case EMFILE:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_TOO_MANY_OPENED;
case ENOMEM:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
case ENOSPC:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NO_SPACE;
case ENOTDIR:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_NOT_A_DIRECTORY;
case EINTR:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_ABORT;
default:
return base::PLATFORM_FILE_ERROR_FAILED;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 105,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<Attr> Document::createAttribute(const String& name, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
return createAttributeNS(String(), name, ec, true);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,459 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: decompileActions(int n, SWF_ACTION *actions, int indent)
{
int i, svindent;
svindent = gIndent;
gIndent = indent;
for(i=0;i<n;i++) {
i+=decompileAction(i, actions, n);
}
gIndent = svindent;
}
Commit Message: decompileAction: Prevent heap buffer overflow and underflow with using OpCode
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 89,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int uinput_driver_check()
{
uint32_t i;
for (i=0; i < MAX_UINPUT_PATHS; i++)
{
if (access(uinput_dev_path[i], O_RDWR) == 0) {
return 0;
}
}
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s ERROR: uinput device is not in the system", __FUNCTION__);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::didComposite()
{
TRACE_EVENT_END1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"), "CompositeLayers", "mainFrame", mainFrame());
if (InspectorController* ic = inspectorController())
ic->didComposite();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_DownloadsComplete( void ) {
#ifdef USE_CURL
if(clc.cURLUsed) {
clc.cURLUsed = qfalse;
CL_cURL_Shutdown();
if( clc.cURLDisconnected ) {
if(clc.downloadRestart) {
FS_Restart(clc.checksumFeed);
clc.downloadRestart = qfalse;
}
clc.cURLDisconnected = qfalse;
CL_Reconnect_f();
return;
}
}
#endif
if (clc.downloadRestart) {
clc.downloadRestart = qfalse;
FS_Restart(clc.checksumFeed); // We possibly downloaded a pak, restart the file system to load it
CL_AddReliableCommand("donedl", qfalse);
return;
}
clc.state = CA_LOADING;
Com_EventLoop();
if ( clc.state != CA_LOADING ) {
return;
}
Cvar_Set("r_uiFullScreen", "0");
CL_FlushMemory();
cls.cgameStarted = qtrue;
CL_InitCGame();
CL_SendPureChecksums();
CL_WritePacket();
CL_WritePacket();
CL_WritePacket();
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSObject* JSTestMediaQueryListListener::createPrototype(ExecState* exec, JSGlobalObject* globalObject)
{
return JSTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototype::create(exec->globalData(), globalObject, JSTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototype::createStructure(globalObject->globalData(), globalObject, globalObject->objectPrototype()));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,155 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LargeObjectPage::LargeObjectPage(PageMemory* storage,
BaseArena* arena,
size_t payloadSize)
: BasePage(storage, arena),
m_payloadSize(payloadSize)
#if ENABLE(ASAN_CONTAINER_ANNOTATIONS)
,
m_isVectorBackingPage(false)
#endif
{
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 147,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnWasShown(bool needs_repainting) {
RenderWidget::OnWasShown(needs_repainting);
if (webview()) {
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
webkit_glue::kForegroundTabTimerInterval);
webview()->setVisibilityState(visibilityState(), false);
}
pepper_helper_->PageVisibilityChanged(true);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
std::set<WebPluginDelegateProxy*>::iterator plugin_it;
for (plugin_it = plugin_delegates_.begin();
plugin_it != plugin_delegates_.end(); ++plugin_it) {
(*plugin_it)->SetContainerVisibility(true);
}
#endif // OS_MACOSX
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pcf_interpret_style( PCF_Face pcf )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_Face face = FT_FACE( pcf );
FT_Memory memory = face->memory;
PCF_Property prop;
size_t nn, len;
char* strings[4] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
size_t lengths[4];
face->style_flags = 0;
prop = pcf_find_property( pcf, "SLANT" );
if ( prop && prop->isString &&
( *(prop->value.atom) == 'O' || *(prop->value.atom) == 'o' ||
*(prop->value.atom) == 'I' || *(prop->value.atom) == 'i' ) )
{
face->style_flags |= FT_STYLE_FLAG_ITALIC;
strings[2] = ( *(prop->value.atom) == 'O' ||
*(prop->value.atom) == 'o' ) ? (char *)"Oblique"
: (char *)"Italic";
}
prop = pcf_find_property( pcf, "WEIGHT_NAME" );
if ( prop && prop->isString &&
( *(prop->value.atom) == 'B' || *(prop->value.atom) == 'b' ) )
{
face->style_flags |= FT_STYLE_FLAG_BOLD;
strings[1] = (char*)"Bold";
}
prop = pcf_find_property( pcf, "SETWIDTH_NAME" );
if ( prop && prop->isString &&
*(prop->value.atom) &&
!( *(prop->value.atom) == 'N' || *(prop->value.atom) == 'n' ) )
strings[3] = (char*)( prop->value.atom );
prop = pcf_find_property( pcf, "ADD_STYLE_NAME" );
if ( prop && prop->isString &&
*(prop->value.atom) &&
!( *(prop->value.atom) == 'N' || *(prop->value.atom) == 'n' ) )
strings[0] = (char*)( prop->value.atom );
for ( len = 0, nn = 0; nn < 4; nn++ )
{
lengths[nn] = 0;
if ( strings[nn] )
{
lengths[nn] = ft_strlen( strings[nn] );
len += lengths[nn] + 1;
}
}
if ( len == 0 )
{
strings[0] = (char*)"Regular";
lengths[0] = ft_strlen( strings[0] );
len = lengths[0] + 1;
}
{
char* s;
if ( FT_ALLOC( face->style_name, len ) )
return error;
s = face->style_name;
for ( nn = 0; nn < 4; nn++ )
{
char* src = strings[nn];
len = lengths[nn];
if ( src == NULL )
continue;
/* separate elements with a space */
if ( s != face->style_name )
*s++ = ' ';
ft_memcpy( s, src, len );
/* need to convert spaces to dashes for */
/* add_style_name and setwidth_name */
if ( nn == 0 || nn == 3 )
{
size_t mm;
for ( mm = 0; mm < len; mm++ )
if ( s[mm] == ' ' )
s[mm] = '-';
}
s += len;
}
*s = 0;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 6,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebRtcGetUserMediaBrowserTest() : trace_log_(NULL) {}
Commit Message: Add tests for closing a frame within the scope of a getusermedia callback.
BUG=472617, 474370
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1073783003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#324633}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ArthurOutputDev::clip(GfxState *state)
{
m_painter->setClipPath(convertPath( state, state->getPath(), Qt::WindingFill ) );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: alloc_pages_vma(gfp_t gfp, int order, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr, int node)
{
struct mempolicy *pol = get_vma_policy(current, vma, addr);
struct zonelist *zl;
struct page *page;
get_mems_allowed();
if (unlikely(pol->mode == MPOL_INTERLEAVE)) {
unsigned nid;
nid = interleave_nid(pol, vma, addr, PAGE_SHIFT + order);
mpol_cond_put(pol);
page = alloc_page_interleave(gfp, order, nid);
put_mems_allowed();
return page;
}
zl = policy_zonelist(gfp, pol, node);
if (unlikely(mpol_needs_cond_ref(pol))) {
/*
* slow path: ref counted shared policy
*/
struct page *page = __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp, order,
zl, policy_nodemask(gfp, pol));
__mpol_put(pol);
put_mems_allowed();
return page;
}
/*
* fast path: default or task policy
*/
page = __alloc_pages_nodemask(gfp, order, zl,
policy_nodemask(gfp, pol));
put_mems_allowed();
return page;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,294 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int init_subctxts(struct qib_devdata *dd,
struct qib_ctxtdata *rcd,
const struct qib_user_info *uinfo)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned num_subctxts;
size_t size;
/*
* If the user is requesting zero subctxts,
* skip the subctxt allocation.
*/
if (uinfo->spu_subctxt_cnt <= 0)
goto bail;
num_subctxts = uinfo->spu_subctxt_cnt;
/* Check for subctxt compatibility */
if (!qib_compatible_subctxts(uinfo->spu_userversion >> 16,
uinfo->spu_userversion & 0xffff)) {
qib_devinfo(dd->pcidev,
"Mismatched user version (%d.%d) and driver version (%d.%d) while context sharing. Ensure that driver and library are from the same release.\n",
(int) (uinfo->spu_userversion >> 16),
(int) (uinfo->spu_userversion & 0xffff),
QIB_USER_SWMAJOR, QIB_USER_SWMINOR);
goto bail;
}
if (num_subctxts > QLOGIC_IB_MAX_SUBCTXT) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bail;
}
rcd->subctxt_uregbase = vmalloc_user(PAGE_SIZE * num_subctxts);
if (!rcd->subctxt_uregbase) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto bail;
}
/* Note: rcd->rcvhdrq_size isn't initialized yet. */
size = ALIGN(dd->rcvhdrcnt * dd->rcvhdrentsize *
sizeof(u32), PAGE_SIZE) * num_subctxts;
rcd->subctxt_rcvhdr_base = vmalloc_user(size);
if (!rcd->subctxt_rcvhdr_base) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto bail_ureg;
}
rcd->subctxt_rcvegrbuf = vmalloc_user(rcd->rcvegrbuf_chunks *
rcd->rcvegrbuf_size *
num_subctxts);
if (!rcd->subctxt_rcvegrbuf) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto bail_rhdr;
}
rcd->subctxt_cnt = uinfo->spu_subctxt_cnt;
rcd->subctxt_id = uinfo->spu_subctxt_id;
rcd->active_slaves = 1;
rcd->redirect_seq_cnt = 1;
set_bit(QIB_CTXT_MASTER_UNINIT, &rcd->flag);
goto bail;
bail_rhdr:
vfree(rcd->subctxt_rcvhdr_base);
bail_ureg:
vfree(rcd->subctxt_uregbase);
rcd->subctxt_uregbase = NULL;
bail:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_send_cache_bitmap(rdpContext* context,
const CACHE_BITMAP_ORDER* cache_bitmap)
{
wStream* s;
size_t bm, em;
BYTE orderType;
int headerLength;
int inf;
UINT16 extraFlags;
INT16 orderLength;
rdpUpdate* update = context->update;
extraFlags = 0;
headerLength = 6;
orderType = cache_bitmap->compressed ?
ORDER_TYPE_CACHE_BITMAP_COMPRESSED : ORDER_TYPE_BITMAP_UNCOMPRESSED;
inf = update_approximate_cache_bitmap_order(cache_bitmap,
cache_bitmap->compressed,
&extraFlags);
update_check_flush(context, headerLength + inf);
s = update->us;
if (!s)
return FALSE;
bm = Stream_GetPosition(s);
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, headerLength))
return FALSE;
Stream_Seek(s, headerLength);
if (!update_write_cache_bitmap_order(s, cache_bitmap, cache_bitmap->compressed,
&extraFlags))
return FALSE;
em = Stream_GetPosition(s);
orderLength = (em - bm) - 13;
Stream_SetPosition(s, bm);
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, ORDER_STANDARD |
ORDER_SECONDARY); /* controlFlags (1 byte) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, orderLength); /* orderLength (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, extraFlags); /* extraFlags (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, orderType); /* orderType (1 byte) */
Stream_SetPosition(s, em);
update->numberOrders++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UNCURL_EXPORT int32_t uncurl_set_cacert_file(struct uncurl_tls_ctx *uc_tls, char *cacert_file)
{
return tlss_load_cacert_file(uc_tls->tlss, cacert_file);
}
Commit Message: origin matching must come at str end
CWE ID: CWE-352 | 0 | 84,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AcceleratorManagerTest() {}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 106,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pnm_gethdr(jas_stream_t *in, pnm_hdr_t *hdr)
{
int_fast32_t maxval;
int_fast32_t width;
int_fast32_t height;
int type;
if (pnm_getint16(in, &hdr->magic) || pnm_getsintstr(in, &width) ||
pnm_getsintstr(in, &height)) {
return -1;
}
hdr->width = width;
hdr->height = height;
if ((type = pnm_type(hdr->magic)) == PNM_TYPE_INVALID) {
return -1;
}
if (type != PNM_TYPE_PBM) {
if (pnm_getsintstr(in, &maxval)) {
return -1;
}
} else {
maxval = 1;
}
if (maxval < 0) {
hdr->maxval = -maxval;
hdr->sgnd = true;
} else {
hdr->maxval = maxval;
hdr->sgnd = false;
}
switch (type) {
case PNM_TYPE_PBM:
case PNM_TYPE_PGM:
hdr->numcmpts = 1;
break;
case PNM_TYPE_PPM:
hdr->numcmpts = 3;
break;
default:
abort();
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_mmu_notifier_clear_young(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long start,
unsigned long end)
{
struct kvm *kvm = mmu_notifier_to_kvm(mn);
int young, idx;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
spin_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
/*
* Even though we do not flush TLB, this will still adversely
* affect performance on pre-Haswell Intel EPT, where there is
* no EPT Access Bit to clear so that we have to tear down EPT
* tables instead. If we find this unacceptable, we can always
* add a parameter to kvm_age_hva so that it effectively doesn't
* do anything on clear_young.
*
* Also note that currently we never issue secondary TLB flushes
* from clear_young, leaving this job up to the regular system
* cadence. If we find this inaccurate, we might come up with a
* more sophisticated heuristic later.
*/
young = kvm_age_hva(kvm, start, end);
spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
return young;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 71,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vtp_print (netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *pptr, u_int length)
{
int type, len, tlv_len, tlv_value, mgmtd_len;
const u_char *tptr;
const struct vtp_vlan_ *vtp_vlan;
if (length < VTP_HEADER_LEN)
goto trunc;
tptr = pptr;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_HEADER_LEN);
type = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VTPv%u, Message %s (0x%02x), length %u",
*tptr,
tok2str(vtp_message_type_values,"Unknown message type", type),
type,
length));
/* In non-verbose mode, just print version and message type */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
return;
}
/* verbose mode print all fields */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tDomain name: "));
mgmtd_len = *(tptr + 3);
if (mgmtd_len < 1 || mgmtd_len > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [invalid MgmtD Len %d]", mgmtd_len));
return;
}
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + 4, mgmtd_len, NULL);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s: %u",
tok2str(vtp_header_values, "Unknown", type),
*(tptr+2)));
tptr += VTP_HEADER_LEN;
switch (type) {
case VTP_SUMMARY_ADV:
/*
* SUMMARY ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Followers | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Updater Identity IP address |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Update Timestamp (12 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | MD5 digest (16 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Config Rev %x, Updater %s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
tptr += 8;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Timestamp 0x%08x 0x%08x 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8)));
tptr += VTP_UPDATE_TIMESTAMP_LEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", MD5 digest: %08x%08x%08x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 12)));
tptr += VTP_MD5_DIGEST_LEN;
break;
case VTP_SUBSET_ADV:
/*
* SUBSET ADVERTISEMENT
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Seq number | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Configuration revision number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field 1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ................ |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN info field N |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Config Rev %x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
/*
* VLAN INFORMATION
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | V info len | Status | VLAN type | VLAN name len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | ISL vlan id | MTU size |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | 802.10 index (SAID) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | VLAN name |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
tptr += 4;
while (tptr < (pptr+length)) {
len = *tptr;
if (len == 0)
break;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, len);
vtp_vlan = (const struct vtp_vlan_*)tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*vtp_vlan);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tVLAN info status %s, type %s, VLAN-id %u, MTU %u, SAID 0x%08x, Name ",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_status,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->status),
tok2str(vtp_vlan_type_values,"Unknown",vtp_vlan->type),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->vlanid),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&vtp_vlan->mtu),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&vtp_vlan->index)));
fn_printzp(ndo, tptr + VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET, vtp_vlan->name_len, NULL);
/*
* Vlan names are aligned to 32-bit boundaries.
*/
len -= VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
tptr += VTP_VLAN_INFO_OFFSET + 4*((vtp_vlan->name_len + 3)/4);
/* TLV information follows */
while (len > 0) {
/*
* Cisco specs says 2 bytes for type + 2 bytes for length, take only 1
* See: http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/lan/trsrb/frames.htm
*/
type = *tptr;
tlv_len = *(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t%s (0x%04x) TLV",
tok2str(vtp_vlan_tlv_values, "Unknown", type),
type));
/*
* infinite loop check
*/
if (type == 0 || tlv_len == 0) {
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, tlv_len * 2 +2);
tlv_value = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2);
switch (type) {
case VTP_VLAN_STE_HOP_COUNT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %u", tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_PRUNING:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_STP_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tok2str(vtp_stp_type_values, "Unknown", tlv_value),
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BRIDGE_TYPE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "SRB" : "SRT",
tlv_value));
break;
case VTP_VLAN_BACKUP_CRF_MODE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tlv_value == 1 ? "Backup" : "Not backup",
tlv_value));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_RING_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_SOURCE_ROUTING_BRIDGE_NUMBER:
case VTP_VLAN_PARENT_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_TRANS_BRIDGED_VLAN:
case VTP_VLAN_ARP_HOP_COUNT:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t\t ", 2 + tlv_len*2);
break;
}
len -= 2 + tlv_len*2;
tptr += 2 + tlv_len*2;
}
}
break;
case VTP_ADV_REQUEST:
/*
* ADVERTISEMENT REQUEST
*
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Version | Code | Reserved | MgmtD Len |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Management Domain Name (zero-padded to 32 bytes) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Start value |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
*/
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tStart value: %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
break;
case VTP_JOIN_MESSAGE:
/* FIXME - Could not find message format */
break;
default:
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|vtp]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13020/VTP: Add some missing bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ip6mr_cache_unresolved(struct mr6_table *mrt, mifi_t mifi, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
bool found = false;
int err;
struct mfc6_cache *c;
spin_lock_bh(&mfc_unres_lock);
list_for_each_entry(c, &mrt->mfc6_unres_queue, list) {
if (ipv6_addr_equal(&c->mf6c_mcastgrp, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr) &&
ipv6_addr_equal(&c->mf6c_origin, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr)) {
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
/*
* Create a new entry if allowable
*/
if (atomic_read(&mrt->cache_resolve_queue_len) >= 10 ||
(c = ip6mr_cache_alloc_unres()) == NULL) {
spin_unlock_bh(&mfc_unres_lock);
kfree_skb(skb);
return -ENOBUFS;
}
/*
* Fill in the new cache entry
*/
c->mf6c_parent = -1;
c->mf6c_origin = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
c->mf6c_mcastgrp = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
/*
* Reflect first query at pim6sd
*/
err = ip6mr_cache_report(mrt, skb, mifi, MRT6MSG_NOCACHE);
if (err < 0) {
/* If the report failed throw the cache entry
out - Brad Parker
*/
spin_unlock_bh(&mfc_unres_lock);
ip6mr_cache_free(c);
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
atomic_inc(&mrt->cache_resolve_queue_len);
list_add(&c->list, &mrt->mfc6_unres_queue);
mr6_netlink_event(mrt, c, RTM_NEWROUTE);
ipmr_do_expire_process(mrt);
}
/*
* See if we can append the packet
*/
if (c->mfc_un.unres.unresolved.qlen > 3) {
kfree_skb(skb);
err = -ENOBUFS;
} else {
skb_queue_tail(&c->mfc_un.unres.unresolved, skb);
err = 0;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&mfc_unres_lock);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ASessionDescription::ASessionDescription()
: mIsValid(false) {
}
Commit Message: Fix corruption via buffer overflow in mediaserver
change unbound sprintf() to snprintf() so network-provided values
can't overflow the buffers.
Applicable to all K/L/M/N branches.
Bug: 25747670
Change-Id: Id6a5120c2d08a6fbbd47deffb680ecf82015f4f6
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static EAS_I16 ConvertLFOPhaseIncrement (EAS_I32 pitchCents)
{
/* check range */
if (pitchCents > MAX_LFO_FREQUENCY_IN_PITCHCENTS)
pitchCents = MAX_LFO_FREQUENCY_IN_PITCHCENTS;
if (pitchCents < MIN_LFO_FREQUENCY_IN_PITCHCENTS)
pitchCents = MIN_LFO_FREQUENCY_IN_PITCHCENTS;
/* double the rate and divide by frame rate by subtracting in log domain */
pitchCents = pitchCents - dlsLFOFrequencyConvert;
/* convert to phase increment */
return (EAS_I16) EAS_Calculate2toX(pitchCents);
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fill_note_info(struct elfhdr *elf, int phdrs,
struct elf_note_info *info,
const siginfo_t *siginfo, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct task_struct *dump_task = current;
const struct user_regset_view *view = task_user_regset_view(dump_task);
struct elf_thread_core_info *t;
struct elf_prpsinfo *psinfo;
struct core_thread *ct;
unsigned int i;
info->size = 0;
info->thread = NULL;
psinfo = kmalloc(sizeof(*psinfo), GFP_KERNEL);
if (psinfo == NULL) {
info->psinfo.data = NULL; /* So we don't free this wrongly */
return 0;
}
fill_note(&info->psinfo, "CORE", NT_PRPSINFO, sizeof(*psinfo), psinfo);
/*
* Figure out how many notes we're going to need for each thread.
*/
info->thread_notes = 0;
for (i = 0; i < view->n; ++i)
if (view->regsets[i].core_note_type != 0)
++info->thread_notes;
/*
* Sanity check. We rely on regset 0 being in NT_PRSTATUS,
* since it is our one special case.
*/
if (unlikely(info->thread_notes == 0) ||
unlikely(view->regsets[0].core_note_type != NT_PRSTATUS)) {
WARN_ON(1);
return 0;
}
/*
* Initialize the ELF file header.
*/
fill_elf_header(elf, phdrs,
view->e_machine, view->e_flags);
/*
* Allocate a structure for each thread.
*/
for (ct = &dump_task->mm->core_state->dumper; ct; ct = ct->next) {
t = kzalloc(offsetof(struct elf_thread_core_info,
notes[info->thread_notes]),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!t))
return 0;
t->task = ct->task;
if (ct->task == dump_task || !info->thread) {
t->next = info->thread;
info->thread = t;
} else {
/*
* Make sure to keep the original task at
* the head of the list.
*/
t->next = info->thread->next;
info->thread->next = t;
}
}
/*
* Now fill in each thread's information.
*/
for (t = info->thread; t != NULL; t = t->next)
if (!fill_thread_core_info(t, view, siginfo->si_signo, &info->size))
return 0;
/*
* Fill in the two process-wide notes.
*/
fill_psinfo(psinfo, dump_task->group_leader, dump_task->mm);
info->size += notesize(&info->psinfo);
fill_siginfo_note(&info->signote, &info->csigdata, siginfo);
info->size += notesize(&info->signote);
fill_auxv_note(&info->auxv, current->mm);
info->size += notesize(&info->auxv);
if (fill_files_note(&info->files) == 0)
info->size += notesize(&info->files);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickOffsetType GetFITSPixelExtrema(Image *image,
const int bits_per_pixel,double *minima,double *maxima)
{
double
pixel;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register MagickOffsetType
i;
offset=TellBlob(image);
if (offset == -1)
return(-1);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
*minima=GetFITSPixel(image,bits_per_pixel);
*maxima=(*minima);
for (i=1; i < (MagickOffsetType) number_pixels; i++)
{
pixel=GetFITSPixel(image,bits_per_pixel);
if (pixel < *minima)
*minima=pixel;
if (pixel > *maxima)
*maxima=pixel;
}
return(SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum test_return test_binary_pipeline_hickup_chunk(void *buffer, size_t buffersize) {
off_t offset = 0;
char *key[256];
uint64_t value = 0xfeedfacedeadbeef;
while (hickup_thread_running &&
offset + sizeof(protocol_binary_request_no_extras) < buffersize) {
union {
protocol_binary_request_no_extras request;
char bytes[65 * 1024];
} command;
uint8_t cmd = (uint8_t)(rand() & 0xff);
size_t len;
size_t keylen = (rand() % 250) + 1;
switch (cmd) {
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_ADD:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_ADDQ:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_REPLACE:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_REPLACEQ:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SET:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SETQ:
len = storage_command(command.bytes, sizeof(command.bytes), cmd,
key, keylen , &value, sizeof(value),
0, 0);
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_APPEND:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_APPENDQ:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_PREPEND:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_PREPENDQ:
len = raw_command(command.bytes, sizeof(command.bytes), cmd,
key, keylen, &value, sizeof(value));
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_FLUSH:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_FLUSHQ:
len = raw_command(command.bytes, sizeof(command.bytes), cmd,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_NOOP:
len = raw_command(command.bytes, sizeof(command.bytes), cmd,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_DELETE:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_DELETEQ:
len = raw_command(command.bytes, sizeof(command.bytes), cmd,
key, keylen, NULL, 0);
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_DECREMENT:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_DECREMENTQ:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_INCREMENT:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_INCREMENTQ:
len = arithmetic_command(command.bytes, sizeof(command.bytes), cmd,
key, keylen, 1, 0, 0);
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_VERSION:
len = raw_command(command.bytes, sizeof(command.bytes),
PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_VERSION,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GET:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GETK:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GETKQ:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GETQ:
len = raw_command(command.bytes, sizeof(command.bytes), cmd,
key, keylen, NULL, 0);
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_STAT:
len = raw_command(command.bytes, sizeof(command.bytes),
PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_STAT,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SASL_LIST_MECHS:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SASL_AUTH:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SASL_STEP:
/* Ignoring SASL */
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_QUITQ:
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_QUIT:
/* I don't want to pass on the quit commands ;-) */
cmd |= 0xf0;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
len = raw_command(command.bytes, sizeof(command.bytes),
cmd, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
}
if ((len + offset) < buffersize) {
memcpy(((char*)buffer) + offset, command.bytes, len);
offset += len;
} else {
break;
}
}
safe_send(buffer, offset, true);
return TEST_PASS;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 94,268 |
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