instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proxy_lremovexattr(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *fs_path,
const char *name)
{
int retval;
V9fsString xname;
v9fs_string_init(&xname);
v9fs_string_sprintf(&xname, "%s", name);
retval = v9fs_request(ctx->private, T_LREMOVEXATTR, NULL, fs_path, &xname);
v9fs_string_free(&xname);
if (retval < 0) {
errno = -retval;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContextGetter::~WebContextGetter() {}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document* Document::Create(const Document& document) {
Document* new_document =
new Document(DocumentInit::Create()
.WithContextDocument(const_cast<Document*>(&document))
.WithURL(BlankURL()));
new_document->SetSecurityOrigin(document.GetSecurityOrigin());
new_document->SetContextFeatures(document.GetContextFeatures());
return new_document;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TestLifecycleUnit::CanFreeze(DecisionDetails* decision_details) const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 0 | 132,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cmd_attr_pid(struct genl_info *info)
{
struct taskstats *stats;
struct sk_buff *rep_skb;
size_t size;
u32 pid;
int rc;
size = taskstats_packet_size();
rc = prepare_reply(info, TASKSTATS_CMD_NEW, &rep_skb, size);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
rc = -EINVAL;
pid = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_PID]);
stats = mk_reply(rep_skb, TASKSTATS_TYPE_PID, pid);
if (!stats)
goto err;
rc = fill_stats_for_pid(pid, stats);
if (rc < 0)
goto err;
return send_reply(rep_skb, info);
err:
nlmsg_free(rep_skb);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Make TASKSTATS require root access
Ok, this isn't optimal, since it means that 'iotop' needs admin
capabilities, and we may have to work on this some more. But at the
same time it is very much not acceptable to let anybody just read
anybody elses IO statistics quite at this level.
Use of the GENL_ADMIN_PERM suggested by Johannes Berg as an alternative
to checking the capabilities by hand.
Reported-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
{
unsigned char *p,*pseq;
int i,mac_size,clear=0;
int prefix_len = 0;
int eivlen;
SSL3_RECORD *wr;
SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
* out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
{
OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
}
/* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
{
i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
if (i <= 0)
return(i);
/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
}
if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
return 0;
wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
sess=s->session;
if ( (sess == NULL) ||
(s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
clear=1;
if (clear)
mac_size=0;
else
{
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
if (mac_size < 0)
goto err;
}
/* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
#if 0
/* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
&& SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
{
/* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
* (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
*/
if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
{
/* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
* this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
* (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
* together with the actual payload) */
prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
if (prefix_len <= 0)
goto err;
if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
{
/* insufficient space */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
}
#endif
p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
/* write the header */
*(p++)=type&0xff;
wr->type=type;
/* Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and
* we haven't decided which version to use yet send back using
* version 1.0 header: otherwise some clients will ignore it.
*/
if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)
{
*(p++)=DTLS1_VERSION>>8;
*(p++)=DTLS1_VERSION&0xff;
}
else
{
*(p++)=s->version>>8;
*(p++)=s->version&0xff;
}
/* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
pseq=p;
p+=10;
/* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
if (s->enc_write_ctx)
{
int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
{
eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
if (eivlen <= 1)
eivlen = 0;
}
/* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
else
eivlen = 0;
}
else
eivlen = 0;
/* lets setup the record stuff. */
wr->data=p + eivlen; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
wr->length=(int)len;
wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
/* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
* wr->data */
/* first we compress */
if (s->compress != NULL)
{
if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
else
{
memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
wr->input=wr->data;
}
/* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
* from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
* wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
if (mac_size != 0)
{
if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
goto err;
wr->length+=mac_size;
}
/* this is true regardless of mac size */
wr->input=p;
wr->data=p;
if (eivlen)
wr->length += eivlen;
if(s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1) < 1) goto err;
/* record length after mac and block padding */
/* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
(type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
/* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
/* XDTLS: ?? */
/* else
s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
pseq+=6;
s2n(wr->length,pseq);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, pseq - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* we should now have
* wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
* wr->length long */
wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
#if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
/* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
*((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
#endif
ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
if (create_empty_fragment)
{
/* we are in a recursive call;
* just return the length, don't write out anything here
*/
return wr->length;
}
/* now let's set up wb */
wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
wb->offset = 0;
/* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
s->s3->wpend_type=type;
s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
/* we now just need to write the buffer */
return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
err:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 45,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLenum Framebuffer::GetDrawBuffer(GLenum draw_buffer) const {
GLsizei index = static_cast<GLsizei>(
draw_buffer - GL_DRAW_BUFFER0_ARB);
CHECK(index >= 0 &&
index < static_cast<GLsizei>(manager_->max_draw_buffers_));
return draw_buffers_[index];
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DeletePCPMap(pcp_info_t *pcp_msg_info)
{
uint16_t iport = pcp_msg_info->int_port; /* private port */
uint8_t proto = pcp_msg_info->protocol;
int r=-1;
/* remove the mapping */
/* remove all the mappings for this client */
int index;
unsigned short eport2, iport2;
char iaddr2[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
int proto2;
char desc[64];
unsigned int timestamp;
#ifdef ENABLE_UPNPPINHOLE
int uid = -1;
#endif /* ENABLE_UPNPPINHOLE */
/* iterate through all rules and delete the requested ones */
for (index = 0 ;
(!pcp_msg_info->is_fw &&
get_redirect_rule_by_index(index, 0,
&eport2, iaddr2, sizeof(iaddr2),
&iport2, &proto2,
desc, sizeof(desc),
0, 0, ×tamp, 0, 0) >= 0)
#ifdef ENABLE_UPNPPINHOLE
||
(pcp_msg_info->is_fw &&
(uid=upnp_get_pinhole_uid_by_index(index))>=0 &&
upnp_get_pinhole_info((unsigned short)uid,
NULL, 0, NULL,
iaddr2, sizeof(iaddr2), &iport2,
&proto2, desc, sizeof(desc),
×tamp, NULL) >= 0)
#endif /* ENABLE_UPNPPINHOLE */
;
index++)
if(0 == strcmp(iaddr2, pcp_msg_info->mapped_str)
&& (proto2==proto)
&& ((iport2==iport) || (iport==0))) {
if(0 != strcmp(desc, pcp_msg_info->desc)) {
/* nonce does not match */
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_NOT_AUTHORIZED;
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Unauthorized to remove PCP mapping internal port %hu, protocol %s",
iport, (pcp_msg_info->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP)?"TCP":"UDP");
return;
} else if (!pcp_msg_info->is_fw) {
r = _upnp_delete_redir(eport2, proto2);
} else {
#ifdef ENABLE_UPNPPINHOLE
r = upnp_delete_inboundpinhole(uid);
#endif /* ENABLE_UPNPPINHOLE */
}
break;
}
if (r >= 0) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "PCP: %s port %hu mapping removed",
proto2==IPPROTO_TCP?"TCP":"UDP", eport2);
} else {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to remove PCP mapping internal port %hu, protocol %s",
iport, (pcp_msg_info->protocol == IPPROTO_TCP)?"TCP":"UDP");
pcp_msg_info->result_code = PCP_ERR_NO_RESOURCES;
}
}
Commit Message: pcpserver.c: copyIPv6IfDifferent() check for NULL src argument
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jsR_restorescope(js_State *J)
{
J->E = J->envstack[--J->envtop];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *tty_devnode(struct device *dev, mode_t *mode)
{
if (!mode)
return NULL;
if (dev->devt == MKDEV(TTYAUX_MAJOR, 0) ||
dev->devt == MKDEV(TTYAUX_MAJOR, 2))
*mode = 0666;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TreeCache* AutomationInternalCustomBindings::GetTreeCacheFromTreeID(
int tree_id) {
const auto iter = tree_id_to_tree_cache_map_.find(tree_id);
if (iter == tree_id_to_tree_cache_map_.end())
return nullptr;
return iter->second;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int readlink_malloc(const char *p, char **ret) {
return readlinkat_malloc(AT_FDCWD, p, ret);
}
Commit Message: basic: fix touch() creating files with 07777 mode
mode_t is unsigned, so MODE_INVALID < 0 can never be true.
This fixes a possible DoS where any user could fill /run by writing to
a world-writable /run/systemd/show-status.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 71,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *vfat_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct super_block *sb = dir->i_sb;
struct fat_slot_info sinfo;
struct inode *inode;
struct dentry *alias;
int err;
lock_super(sb);
err = vfat_find(dir, &dentry->d_name, &sinfo);
if (err) {
if (err == -ENOENT) {
inode = NULL;
goto out;
}
goto error;
}
inode = fat_build_inode(sb, sinfo.de, sinfo.i_pos);
brelse(sinfo.bh);
if (IS_ERR(inode)) {
err = PTR_ERR(inode);
goto error;
}
alias = d_find_alias(inode);
if (alias && !vfat_d_anon_disconn(alias)) {
/*
* This inode has non anonymous-DCACHE_DISCONNECTED
* dentry. This means, the user did ->lookup() by an
* another name (longname vs 8.3 alias of it) in past.
*
* Switch to new one for reason of locality if possible.
*/
BUG_ON(d_unhashed(alias));
if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
d_move(alias, dentry);
iput(inode);
unlock_super(sb);
return alias;
} else
dput(alias);
out:
unlock_super(sb);
dentry->d_time = dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_version;
dentry = d_splice_alias(inode, dentry);
if (dentry)
dentry->d_time = dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_version;
return dentry;
error:
unlock_super(sb);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 33,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int writeBufferToContigTiles (TIFF* out, uint8* buf, uint32 imagelength,
uint32 imagewidth, tsample_t spp,
struct dump_opts* dump)
{
uint16 bps;
uint32 tl, tw;
uint32 row, col, nrow, ncol;
uint32 src_rowsize, col_offset;
uint32 tile_rowsize = TIFFTileRowSize(out);
uint8* bufp = (uint8*) buf;
tsize_t tile_buffsize = 0;
tsize_t tilesize = TIFFTileSize(out);
unsigned char *tilebuf = NULL;
if( !TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH, &tl) ||
!TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH, &tw) ||
!TIFFGetField(out, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, &bps) )
return 1;
if (tilesize == 0 || tile_rowsize == 0 || tl == 0 || tw == 0)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles", "Tile size, tile row size, tile width, or tile length is zero");
exit(-1);
}
tile_buffsize = tilesize;
if (tilesize < (tsize_t)(tl * tile_rowsize))
{
#ifdef DEBUG2
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles",
"Tilesize %lu is too small, using alternate calculation %u",
tilesize, tl * tile_rowsize);
#endif
tile_buffsize = tl * tile_rowsize;
if (tl != tile_buffsize / tile_rowsize)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles", "Integer overflow when calculating buffer size");
exit(-1);
}
}
if( imagewidth == 0 ||
(uint32)bps * (uint32)spp > TIFF_UINT32_MAX / imagewidth ||
bps * spp * imagewidth > TIFF_UINT32_MAX - 7U )
{
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(out),
"Error, uint32 overflow when computing (imagewidth * bps * spp) + 7");
return 1;
}
src_rowsize = ((imagewidth * spp * bps) + 7U) / 8;
tilebuf = _TIFFmalloc(tile_buffsize);
if (tilebuf == 0)
return 1;
for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl)
{
nrow = (row + tl > imagelength) ? imagelength - row : tl;
for (col = 0; col < imagewidth; col += tw)
{
/* Calculate visible portion of tile. */
if (col + tw > imagewidth)
ncol = imagewidth - col;
else
ncol = tw;
col_offset = (((col * bps * spp) + 7) / 8);
bufp = buf + (row * src_rowsize) + col_offset;
if (extractContigSamplesToTileBuffer(tilebuf, bufp, nrow, ncol, imagewidth,
tw, 0, spp, spp, bps, dump) > 0)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles",
"Unable to extract data to tile for row %lu, col %lu",
(unsigned long) row, (unsigned long)col);
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return 1;
}
if (TIFFWriteTile(out, tilebuf, col, row, 0, 0) < 0)
{
TIFFError("writeBufferToContigTiles",
"Cannot write tile at %lu %lu",
(unsigned long) col, (unsigned long) row);
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return 1;
}
}
}
_TIFFfree(tilebuf);
return 0;
} /* end writeBufferToContigTiles */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix readContigStripsIntoBuffer() in -i (ignore) mode so
that the output buffer is correctly incremented to avoid write outside bounds.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2620
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ActivityLoggingSetterForAllWorldsLongAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ExceptionState exception_state(isolate, ExceptionState::kSetterContext, "TestObject", "activityLoggingSetterForAllWorldsLongAttribute");
int32_t cpp_value = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), v8_value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->setActivityLoggingSetterForAllWorldsLongAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u8 rds_tcp_get_tos_map(u8 tos)
{
/* all user tos mapped to default 0 for TCP transport */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rds: force to destroy connection if t_sock is NULL in rds_tcp_kill_sock().
When it is to cleanup net namespace, rds_tcp_exit_net() will call
rds_tcp_kill_sock(), if t_sock is NULL, it will not call
rds_conn_destroy(), rds_conn_path_destroy() and rds_tcp_conn_free() to free
connection, and the worker cp_conn_w is not stopped, afterwards the net is freed in
net_drop_ns(); While cp_conn_w rds_connect_worker() will call rds_tcp_conn_path_connect()
and reference 'net' which has already been freed.
In rds_tcp_conn_path_connect(), rds_tcp_set_callbacks() will set t_sock = sock before
sock->ops->connect, but if connect() is failed, it will call
rds_tcp_restore_callbacks() and set t_sock = NULL, if connect is always
failed, rds_connect_worker() will try to reconnect all the time, so
rds_tcp_kill_sock() will never to cancel worker cp_conn_w and free the
connections.
Therefore, the condition !tc->t_sock is not needed if it is going to do
cleanup_net->rds_tcp_exit_net->rds_tcp_kill_sock, because tc->t_sock is always
NULL, and there is on other path to cancel cp_conn_w and free
connection. So this patch is to fix this.
rds_tcp_kill_sock():
...
if (net != c_net || !tc->t_sock)
...
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28
net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8003496a4684 by task kworker/u8:4/3721
CPU: 3 PID: 3721 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 5.1.0 #11
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: krdsd rds_connect_worker
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3c0 arch/arm64/kernel/time.c:53
show_stack+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:152
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x120/0x188 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x68/0x278 mm/kasan/report.c:253
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x21c/0x348 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x30/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:429
inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
__sock_create+0x4f8/0x770 net/socket.c:1276
sock_create_kern+0x50/0x68 net/socket.c:1322
rds_tcp_conn_path_connect+0x2b4/0x690 net/rds/tcp_connect.c:114
rds_connect_worker+0x108/0x1d0 net/rds/threads.c:175
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
Allocated by task 687:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0x180 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:444 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2705 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2713 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x14c/0x388 mm/slub.c:2718
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:697 [inline]
net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:384 [inline]
copy_net_ns+0xc4/0x2d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:424
create_new_namespaces+0x300/0x658 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xa0/0x198 kernel/nsproxy.c:206
ksys_unshare+0x340/0x628 kernel/fork.c:2577
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2645 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2643 [inline]
__arm64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x58 kernel/fork.c:2643
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:47 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x168/0x390 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:83
el0_svc_handler+0x60/0xd0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
el0_svc+0x8/0xc arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:960
Freed by task 264:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x220 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1370 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1397 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2952 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xb8/0x3a8 mm/slub.c:2968
net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:400 [inline]
net_drop_ns.part.6+0x78/0x90 net/core/net_namespace.c:407
net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:406 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x53c/0x6d8 net/core/net_namespace.c:569
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8003496a3f80
which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 7872
The buggy address is located 1796 bytes inside of
7872-byte region [ffff8003496a3f80, ffff8003496a5e40)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffff7e000d25a800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff80036ce4b000
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffffe0000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0ffffe0000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff80036ce4b000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8003496a4580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8003496a4680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8003496a4700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 467fa15356ac("RDS-TCP: Support multiple RDS-TCP listen endpoints, one per netns.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,188 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillPopupItemView::AddSpacerWithSize(int spacer_width,
bool resize,
views::BoxLayout* layout) {
auto* spacer = new views::View;
spacer->SetPreferredSize(gfx::Size(spacer_width, 1));
AddChildView(spacer);
layout->SetFlexForView(spacer,
/*flex=*/resize ? 1 : 0,
/*use_min_size=*/true);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::FrameData::AsValueInto(
base::trace_event::TracedValue* value) const {
value->SetBoolean("has_no_damage", has_no_damage);
bool quads_enabled;
TRACE_EVENT_CATEGORY_GROUP_ENABLED(
TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("cc.debug.quads"), &quads_enabled);
if (quads_enabled) {
value->BeginArray("render_passes");
for (size_t i = 0; i < render_passes.size(); ++i) {
value->BeginDictionary();
render_passes[i]->AsValueInto(value);
value->EndDictionary();
}
value->EndArray();
}
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vfio_pci_set_intx_unmask(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev,
unsigned index, unsigned start,
unsigned count, uint32_t flags, void *data)
{
if (!is_intx(vdev) || start != 0 || count != 1)
return -EINVAL;
if (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE) {
vfio_pci_intx_unmask(vdev);
} else if (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_BOOL) {
uint8_t unmask = *(uint8_t *)data;
if (unmask)
vfio_pci_intx_unmask(vdev);
} else if (flags & VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_EVENTFD) {
int32_t fd = *(int32_t *)data;
if (fd >= 0)
return vfio_virqfd_enable((void *) vdev,
vfio_pci_intx_unmask_handler,
vfio_send_intx_eventfd, NULL,
&vdev->ctx[0].unmask, fd);
vfio_virqfd_disable(&vdev->ctx[0].unmask);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfio/pci: Fix integer overflows, bitmask check
The VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS ioctl did not sufficiently sanitize
user-supplied integers, potentially allowing memory corruption. This
patch adds appropriate integer overflow checks, checks the range bounds
for VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_NONE, and also verifies that only single element
in the VFIO_IRQ_SET_DATA_TYPE_MASK bitmask is set.
VFIO_IRQ_SET_ACTION_TYPE_MASK is already correctly checked later in
vfio_pci_set_irqs_ioctl().
Furthermore, a kzalloc is changed to a kcalloc because the use of a
kzalloc with an integer multiplication allowed an integer overflow
condition to be reached without this patch. kcalloc checks for overflow
and should prevent a similar occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Tsyrklevich <vlad@tsyrklevich.net>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 48,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic_entry *me, const char *line,
size_t lineno, int action)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
static uint32_t last_cont_level = 0;
#endif
size_t i;
struct magic *m;
const char *l = line;
char *t;
int op;
uint32_t cont_level;
int32_t diff;
cont_level = 0;
/*
* Parse the offset.
*/
while (*l == '>') {
++l; /* step over */
cont_level++;
}
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
if (cont_level == 0 || cont_level > last_cont_level)
if (file_check_mem(ms, cont_level) == -1)
return -1;
last_cont_level = cont_level;
#endif
if (cont_level != 0) {
if (me->mp == NULL) {
file_magerror(ms, "No current entry for continuation");
return -1;
}
if (me->cont_count == 0) {
file_magerror(ms, "Continuations present with 0 count");
return -1;
}
m = &me->mp[me->cont_count - 1];
diff = (int32_t)cont_level - (int32_t)m->cont_level;
if (diff > 1)
file_magwarn(ms, "New continuation level %u is more "
"than one larger than current level %u", cont_level,
m->cont_level);
if (me->cont_count == me->max_count) {
struct magic *nm;
size_t cnt = me->max_count + ALLOC_CHUNK;
if ((nm = CAST(struct magic *, realloc(me->mp,
sizeof(*nm) * cnt))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, sizeof(*nm) * cnt);
return -1;
}
me->mp = m = nm;
me->max_count = CAST(uint32_t, cnt);
}
m = &me->mp[me->cont_count++];
(void)memset(m, 0, sizeof(*m));
m->cont_level = cont_level;
} else {
static const size_t len = sizeof(*m) * ALLOC_CHUNK;
if (me->mp != NULL)
return 1;
if ((m = CAST(struct magic *, malloc(len))) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, len);
return -1;
}
me->mp = m;
me->max_count = ALLOC_CHUNK;
(void)memset(m, 0, sizeof(*m));
m->factor_op = FILE_FACTOR_OP_NONE;
m->cont_level = 0;
me->cont_count = 1;
}
m->lineno = CAST(uint32_t, lineno);
if (*l == '&') { /* m->cont_level == 0 checked below. */
++l; /* step over */
m->flag |= OFFADD;
}
if (*l == '(') {
++l; /* step over */
m->flag |= INDIR;
if (m->flag & OFFADD)
m->flag = (m->flag & ~OFFADD) | INDIROFFADD;
if (*l == '&') { /* m->cont_level == 0 checked below */
++l; /* step over */
m->flag |= OFFADD;
}
}
/* Indirect offsets are not valid at level 0. */
if (m->cont_level == 0 && (m->flag & (OFFADD | INDIROFFADD)))
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "relative offset at level 0");
/* get offset, then skip over it */
m->offset = (uint32_t)strtoul(l, &t, 0);
if (l == t)
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "offset `%s' invalid", l);
l = t;
if (m->flag & INDIR) {
m->in_type = FILE_LONG;
m->in_offset = 0;
/*
* read [.lbs][+-]nnnnn)
*/
if (*l == '.') {
l++;
switch (*l) {
case 'l':
m->in_type = FILE_LELONG;
break;
case 'L':
m->in_type = FILE_BELONG;
break;
case 'm':
m->in_type = FILE_MELONG;
break;
case 'h':
case 's':
m->in_type = FILE_LESHORT;
break;
case 'H':
case 'S':
m->in_type = FILE_BESHORT;
break;
case 'c':
case 'b':
case 'C':
case 'B':
m->in_type = FILE_BYTE;
break;
case 'e':
case 'f':
case 'g':
m->in_type = FILE_LEDOUBLE;
break;
case 'E':
case 'F':
case 'G':
m->in_type = FILE_BEDOUBLE;
break;
case 'i':
m->in_type = FILE_LEID3;
break;
case 'I':
m->in_type = FILE_BEID3;
break;
default:
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms,
"indirect offset type `%c' invalid",
*l);
break;
}
l++;
}
m->in_op = 0;
if (*l == '~') {
m->in_op |= FILE_OPINVERSE;
l++;
}
if ((op = get_op(*l)) != -1) {
m->in_op |= op;
l++;
}
if (*l == '(') {
m->in_op |= FILE_OPINDIRECT;
l++;
}
if (isdigit((unsigned char)*l) || *l == '-') {
m->in_offset = (int32_t)strtol(l, &t, 0);
if (l == t)
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms,
"in_offset `%s' invalid", l);
l = t;
}
if (*l++ != ')' ||
((m->in_op & FILE_OPINDIRECT) && *l++ != ')'))
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms,
"missing ')' in indirect offset");
}
EATAB;
#ifdef ENABLE_CONDITIONALS
m->cond = get_cond(l, &l);
if (check_cond(ms, m->cond, cont_level) == -1)
return -1;
EATAB;
#endif
/*
* Parse the type.
*/
if (*l == 'u') {
/*
* Try it as a keyword type prefixed by "u"; match what
* follows the "u". If that fails, try it as an SUS
* integer type.
*/
m->type = get_type(type_tbl, l + 1, &l);
if (m->type == FILE_INVALID) {
/*
* Not a keyword type; parse it as an SUS type,
* 'u' possibly followed by a number or C/S/L.
*/
m->type = get_standard_integer_type(l, &l);
}
/* It's unsigned. */
if (m->type != FILE_INVALID)
m->flag |= UNSIGNED;
} else {
/*
* Try it as a keyword type. If that fails, try it as
* an SUS integer type if it begins with "d" or as an
* SUS string type if it begins with "s". In any case,
* it's not unsigned.
*/
m->type = get_type(type_tbl, l, &l);
if (m->type == FILE_INVALID) {
/*
* Not a keyword type; parse it as an SUS type,
* either 'd' possibly followed by a number or
* C/S/L, or just 's'.
*/
if (*l == 'd')
m->type = get_standard_integer_type(l, &l);
else if (*l == 's' && !isalpha((unsigned char)l[1])) {
m->type = FILE_STRING;
++l;
}
}
}
if (m->type == FILE_INVALID) {
/* Not found - try it as a special keyword. */
m->type = get_type(special_tbl, l, &l);
}
if (m->type == FILE_INVALID) {
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "type `%s' invalid", l);
return -1;
}
/* New-style anding: "0 byte&0x80 =0x80 dynamically linked" */
/* New and improved: ~ & | ^ + - * / % -- exciting, isn't it? */
m->mask_op = 0;
if (*l == '~') {
if (!IS_STRING(m->type))
m->mask_op |= FILE_OPINVERSE;
else if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "'~' invalid for string types");
++l;
}
m->str_range = 0;
m->str_flags = m->type == FILE_PSTRING ? PSTRING_1_LE : 0;
if ((op = get_op(*l)) != -1) {
if (!IS_STRING(m->type)) {
uint64_t val;
++l;
m->mask_op |= op;
val = (uint64_t)strtoull(l, &t, 0);
l = t;
m->num_mask = file_signextend(ms, m, val);
eatsize(&l);
}
else if (op == FILE_OPDIVIDE) {
int have_range = 0;
while (!isspace((unsigned char)*++l)) {
switch (*l) {
case '0': case '1': case '2':
case '3': case '4': case '5':
case '6': case '7': case '8':
case '9':
if (have_range &&
(ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK))
file_magwarn(ms,
"multiple ranges");
have_range = 1;
m->str_range = CAST(uint32_t,
strtoul(l, &t, 0));
if (m->str_range == 0)
file_magwarn(ms,
"zero range");
l = t - 1;
break;
case CHAR_COMPACT_WHITESPACE:
m->str_flags |=
STRING_COMPACT_WHITESPACE;
break;
case CHAR_COMPACT_OPTIONAL_WHITESPACE:
m->str_flags |=
STRING_COMPACT_OPTIONAL_WHITESPACE;
break;
case CHAR_IGNORE_LOWERCASE:
m->str_flags |= STRING_IGNORE_LOWERCASE;
break;
case CHAR_IGNORE_UPPERCASE:
m->str_flags |= STRING_IGNORE_UPPERCASE;
break;
case CHAR_REGEX_OFFSET_START:
m->str_flags |= REGEX_OFFSET_START;
break;
case CHAR_BINTEST:
m->str_flags |= STRING_BINTEST;
break;
case CHAR_TEXTTEST:
m->str_flags |= STRING_TEXTTEST;
break;
case CHAR_TRIM:
m->str_flags |= STRING_TRIM;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_1_LE:
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING)
goto bad;
m->str_flags = (m->str_flags & ~PSTRING_LEN) | PSTRING_1_LE;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_2_BE:
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING)
goto bad;
m->str_flags = (m->str_flags & ~PSTRING_LEN) | PSTRING_2_BE;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_2_LE:
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING)
goto bad;
m->str_flags = (m->str_flags & ~PSTRING_LEN) | PSTRING_2_LE;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_4_BE:
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING)
goto bad;
m->str_flags = (m->str_flags & ~PSTRING_LEN) | PSTRING_4_BE;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_4_LE:
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_REGEX:
break;
default:
goto bad;
}
m->str_flags = (m->str_flags & ~PSTRING_LEN) | PSTRING_4_LE;
break;
case CHAR_PSTRING_LENGTH_INCLUDES_ITSELF:
if (m->type != FILE_PSTRING)
goto bad;
m->str_flags |= PSTRING_LENGTH_INCLUDES_ITSELF;
break;
default:
bad:
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms,
"string extension `%c' "
"invalid", *l);
return -1;
}
/* allow multiple '/' for readability */
if (l[1] == '/' &&
!isspace((unsigned char)l[2]))
l++;
}
if (string_modifier_check(ms, m) == -1)
return -1;
}
else {
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "invalid string op: %c", *t);
return -1;
}
}
/*
* We used to set mask to all 1's here, instead let's just not do
* anything if mask = 0 (unless you have a better idea)
*/
EATAB;
switch (*l) {
case '>':
case '<':
m->reln = *l;
++l;
if (*l == '=') {
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK) {
file_magwarn(ms, "%c= not supported",
m->reln);
return -1;
}
++l;
}
break;
/* Old-style anding: "0 byte &0x80 dynamically linked" */
case '&':
case '^':
case '=':
m->reln = *l;
++l;
if (*l == '=') {
/* HP compat: ignore &= etc. */
++l;
}
break;
case '!':
m->reln = *l;
++l;
break;
default:
m->reln = '='; /* the default relation */
if (*l == 'x' && ((isascii((unsigned char)l[1]) &&
isspace((unsigned char)l[1])) || !l[1])) {
m->reln = *l;
++l;
}
break;
}
/*
* Grab the value part, except for an 'x' reln.
*/
if (m->reln != 'x' && getvalue(ms, m, &l, action))
return -1;
/*
* TODO finish this macro and start using it!
* #define offsetcheck {if (offset > HOWMANY-1)
* magwarn("offset too big"); }
*/
/*
* Now get last part - the description
*/
EATAB;
if (l[0] == '\b') {
++l;
m->flag |= NOSPACE;
} else if ((l[0] == '\\') && (l[1] == 'b')) {
++l;
++l;
m->flag |= NOSPACE;
}
for (i = 0; (m->desc[i++] = *l++) != '\0' && i < sizeof(m->desc); )
continue;
if (i == sizeof(m->desc)) {
m->desc[sizeof(m->desc) - 1] = '\0';
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "description `%s' truncated", m->desc);
}
/*
* We only do this check while compiling, or if any of the magic
* files were not compiled.
*/
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK) {
if (check_format(ms, m) == -1)
return -1;
}
#ifndef COMPILE_ONLY
if (action == FILE_CHECK) {
file_mdump(m);
}
#endif
m->mimetype[0] = '\0'; /* initialise MIME type to none */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 45,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DefragReverseSimpleTest(void)
{
Packet *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *p3 = NULL;
Packet *reassembled = NULL;
int id = 12;
int i;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
p1 = BuildTestPacket(id, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL)
goto end;
p2 = BuildTestPacket(id, 1, 1, 'B', 8);
if (p2 == NULL)
goto end;
p3 = BuildTestPacket(id, 2, 0, 'C', 3);
if (p3 == NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p3, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
reassembled = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL);
if (reassembled == NULL)
goto end;
if (IPV4_GET_HLEN(reassembled) != 20)
goto end;
if (IPV4_GET_IPLEN(reassembled) != 39)
goto end;
/* 20 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of A. */
for (i = 20; i < 20 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'A')
goto end;
}
/* 28 bytes in we should find 8 bytes of B. */
for (i = 28; i < 28 + 8; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'B')
goto end;
}
/* And 36 bytes in we should find 3 bytes of C. */
for (i = 36; i < 36 + 3; i++) {
if (GET_PKT_DATA(reassembled)[i] != 'C')
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL)
SCFree(p1);
if (p2 != NULL)
SCFree(p2);
if (p3 != NULL)
SCFree(p3);
if (reassembled != NULL)
SCFree(reassembled);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 1 | 168,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_end_of_pic(dec_struct_t *ps_dec)
{
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
WORD32 ret;
{
dec_err_status_t * ps_err = ps_dec->ps_dec_err_status;
if(ps_err->u1_err_flag & REJECT_CUR_PIC)
{
ih264d_err_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
return ERROR_NEW_FRAME_EXPECTED;
}
}
H264_MUTEX_LOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_processing(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* ih264d_decode_pic_order_cnt - calculate the Pic Order Cnt */
/* Needed to detect end of picture */
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
H264_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ps_dec->process_disp_mutex);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed initialization of first_slice_in_pic
To handle some errors, first_slice_in_pic was being set to 2.
This is now cleaned up and first_slice_in_pic is set to 1 only once per pic.
This will ensure picture level initializations are done only once even in case
of error clips
Bug: 33717589
Bug: 33551775
Bug: 33716442
Bug: 33677995
Change-Id: If341436b3cbaa724017eedddd88c2e6fac36d8ba
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,626 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t cirrus_mmio_blt_read(CirrusVGAState * s, unsigned address)
{
int value = 0xff;
switch (address) {
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTBGCOLOR + 0):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x00);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTBGCOLOR + 1):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x10);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTBGCOLOR + 2):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x12);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTBGCOLOR + 3):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x14);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTFGCOLOR + 0):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x01);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTFGCOLOR + 1):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x11);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTFGCOLOR + 2):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x13);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTFGCOLOR + 3):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x15);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTWIDTH + 0):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x20);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTWIDTH + 1):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x21);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTHEIGHT + 0):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x22);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTHEIGHT + 1):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x23);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTDESTPITCH + 0):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x24);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTDESTPITCH + 1):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x25);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTSRCPITCH + 0):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x26);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTSRCPITCH + 1):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x27);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTDESTADDR + 0):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x28);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTDESTADDR + 1):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x29);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTDESTADDR + 2):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x2a);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTSRCADDR + 0):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x2c);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTSRCADDR + 1):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x2d);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTSRCADDR + 2):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x2e);
break;
case CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTWRITEMASK:
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x2f);
break;
case CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTMODE:
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x30);
break;
case CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTROP:
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x32);
break;
case CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTMODEEXT:
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x33);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTTRANSPARENTCOLOR + 0):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x34);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTTRANSPARENTCOLOR + 1):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x35);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTTRANSPARENTCOLORMASK + 0):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x38);
break;
case (CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTTRANSPARENTCOLORMASK + 1):
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x39);
break;
case CIRRUS_MMIO_BLTSTATUS:
value = cirrus_vga_read_gr(s, 0x31);
break;
default:
#ifdef DEBUG_CIRRUS
printf("cirrus: mmio read - address 0x%04x\n", address);
#endif
break;
}
return (uint8_t) value;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: arpt_error(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)
{
net_err_ratelimited("arp_tables: error: '%s'\n",
(const char *)par->targinfo);
return NF_DROP;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleCompressedTexImage2D(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::CompressedTexImage2D& c) {
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLenum internal_format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.internalformat);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLint border = static_cast<GLint>(c.border);
GLsizei image_size = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.imageSize);
uint32 data_shm_id = static_cast<uint32>(c.data_shm_id);
uint32 data_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32>(c.data_shm_offset);
const void* data = NULL;
if (data_shm_id != 0 || data_shm_offset != 0) {
data = GetSharedMemoryAs<const void*>(
data_shm_id, data_shm_offset, image_size);
if (!data) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
}
return DoCompressedTexImage2D(
target, level, internal_format, width, height, border, image_size, data);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int equalizer_enable(effect_context_t *context)
{
equalizer_context_t *eq_ctxt = (equalizer_context_t *)context;
ALOGV("%s", __func__);
if (!offload_eq_get_enable_flag(&(eq_ctxt->offload_eq))) {
offload_eq_set_enable_flag(&(eq_ctxt->offload_eq), true);
if (eq_ctxt->ctl)
offload_eq_send_params(eq_ctxt->ctl, &eq_ctxt->offload_eq,
OFFLOAD_SEND_EQ_ENABLE_FLAG |
OFFLOAD_SEND_EQ_BANDS_LEVEL);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix security vulnerability: Equalizer command might allow negative indexes
Bug: 32247948
Bug: 32438598
Bug: 32436341
Test: use POC on bug or cts security test
Change-Id: I56a92582687599b5b313dea1abcb8bcb19c7fc0e
(cherry picked from commit 3f37d4ef89f4f0eef9e201c5a91b7b2c77ed1071)
(cherry picked from commit ceb7b2d7a4c4cb8d03f166c61f5c7551c6c760aa)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 164,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a)
{
int i, j, v, z = 0;
char *buf;
char *p;
if (a->neg && BN_is_zero(a)) {
/* "-0" == 3 bytes including NULL terminator */
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(3);
} else {
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
}
if (buf == NULL) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p = buf;
if (a->neg)
*(p++) = '-';
if (BN_is_zero(a))
*(p++) = '0';
for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
for (j = BN_BITS2 - 8; j >= 0; j -= 8) {
/* strip leading zeros */
v = ((int)(a->d[i] >> (long)j)) & 0xff;
if (z || (v != 0)) {
*(p++) = Hex[v >> 4];
*(p++) = Hex[v & 0x0f];
z = 1;
}
}
}
*p = '\0';
err:
return (buf);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 13,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoVertexAttrib4f(
GLuint index, GLfloat v0, GLfloat v1, GLfloat v2, GLfloat v3) {
GLfloat v[4] = { v0, v1, v2, v3, };
if (SetVertexAttribValue("glVertexAttrib4f", index, v)) {
glVertexAttrib4f(index, v0, v1, v2, v3);
}
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::HandleDocumentLoad(const pp::URLLoader& loader) {
password_tries_remaining_ = kMaxPasswordTries;
process_when_pending_request_complete_ = true;
auto loader_wrapper =
std::make_unique<URLLoaderWrapperImpl>(GetPluginInstance(), loader);
loader_wrapper->SetResponseHeaders(headers_);
doc_loader_ = std::make_unique<DocumentLoader>(this);
if (doc_loader_->Init(std::move(loader_wrapper), url_)) {
doc_loader_->RequestData(0, 1);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::LockBackingStore() {
if (view_)
view_->LockCompositingSurface();
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int numa_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
const struct seq_operations *ops)
{
return proc_maps_open(inode, file, ops,
sizeof(struct numa_maps_private));
}
Commit Message: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err trpy_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_TRPYBox *ptr = (GF_TRPYBox *)s;
ptr->nbBytes = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init early_platform_driver_probe_id(char *class_str,
int id,
int nr_probe)
{
struct early_platform_driver *epdrv;
struct platform_device *match;
int match_id;
int n = 0;
int left = 0;
list_for_each_entry(epdrv, &early_platform_driver_list, list) {
/* only use drivers matching our class_str */
if (strcmp(class_str, epdrv->class_str))
continue;
if (id == -2) {
match_id = epdrv->requested_id;
left = 1;
} else {
match_id = id;
left += early_platform_left(epdrv, id);
/* skip requested id */
switch (epdrv->requested_id) {
case EARLY_PLATFORM_ID_ERROR:
case EARLY_PLATFORM_ID_UNSET:
break;
default:
if (epdrv->requested_id == id)
match_id = EARLY_PLATFORM_ID_UNSET;
}
}
switch (match_id) {
case EARLY_PLATFORM_ID_ERROR:
pr_warn("%s: unable to parse %s parameter\n",
class_str, epdrv->pdrv->driver.name);
/* fall-through */
case EARLY_PLATFORM_ID_UNSET:
match = NULL;
break;
default:
match = early_platform_match(epdrv, match_id);
}
if (match) {
/*
* Set up a sensible init_name to enable
* dev_name() and others to be used before the
* rest of the driver core is initialized.
*/
if (!match->dev.init_name && slab_is_available()) {
if (match->id != -1)
match->dev.init_name =
kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s.%d",
match->name,
match->id);
else
match->dev.init_name =
kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s",
match->name);
if (!match->dev.init_name)
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (epdrv->pdrv->probe(match))
pr_warn("%s: unable to probe %s early.\n",
class_str, match->name);
else
n++;
}
if (n >= nr_probe)
break;
}
if (left)
return n;
else
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 63,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlDocPtr XSLStyleSheet::document()
{
if (m_embedded && ownerDocument() && ownerDocument()->transformSource())
return (xmlDocPtr)ownerDocument()->transformSource()->platformSource();
return m_stylesheetDoc;
}
Commit Message: Avoid reparsing an XSLT stylesheet after the first failure.
Certain libxslt versions appear to leave the doc in an invalid state when parsing fails. We should cache this result and avoid re-parsing.
(The test cannot be converted to text-only due to its invalid stylesheet).
R=inferno@chromium.org,abarth@chromium.org,pdr@chromium.org
BUG=271939
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23103007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@156248 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::computePositionedLogicalHeightUsing(Length logicalHeightLength, const RenderBoxModelObject* containerBlock,
LayoutUnit containerLogicalHeight, LayoutUnit bordersPlusPadding, LayoutUnit logicalHeight,
Length logicalTop, Length logicalBottom, Length marginBefore, Length marginAfter,
LogicalExtentComputedValues& computedValues) const
{
ASSERT(!(logicalTop.isAuto() && logicalBottom.isAuto()));
LayoutUnit logicalHeightValue;
LayoutUnit contentLogicalHeight = logicalHeight - bordersPlusPadding;
const LayoutUnit containerRelativeLogicalWidth = containingBlockLogicalWidthForPositioned(containerBlock, false);
LayoutUnit logicalTopValue = 0;
bool logicalHeightIsAuto = logicalHeightLength.isAuto();
bool logicalTopIsAuto = logicalTop.isAuto();
bool logicalBottomIsAuto = logicalBottom.isAuto();
LayoutUnit resolvedLogicalHeight;
if (isTable()) {
resolvedLogicalHeight = contentLogicalHeight;
logicalHeightIsAuto = false;
} else {
if (logicalHeightLength.isIntrinsic())
resolvedLogicalHeight = computeIntrinsicLogicalContentHeightUsing(logicalHeightLength, contentLogicalHeight, bordersPlusPadding);
else
resolvedLogicalHeight = adjustContentBoxLogicalHeightForBoxSizing(valueForLength(logicalHeightLength, containerLogicalHeight));
}
if (!logicalTopIsAuto && !logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
/*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*\
* If none of the three are 'auto': If both 'margin-top' and 'margin-
* bottom' are 'auto', solve the equation under the extra constraint that
* the two margins get equal values. If one of 'margin-top' or 'margin-
* bottom' is 'auto', solve the equation for that value. If the values
* are over-constrained, ignore the value for 'bottom' and solve for that
* value.
\*-----------------------------------------------------------------------*/
logicalHeightValue = resolvedLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
const LayoutUnit availableSpace = containerLogicalHeight - (logicalTopValue + logicalHeightValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight) + bordersPlusPadding);
if (marginBefore.isAuto() && marginAfter.isAuto()) {
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = availableSpace / 2; // split the difference
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = availableSpace - computedValues.m_margins.m_before; // account for odd valued differences
} else if (marginBefore.isAuto()) {
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = valueForLength(marginAfter, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = availableSpace - computedValues.m_margins.m_after;
} else if (marginAfter.isAuto()) {
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = valueForLength(marginBefore, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = availableSpace - computedValues.m_margins.m_before;
} else {
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = valueForLength(marginBefore, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = valueForLength(marginAfter, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
}
} else {
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*\
* Otherwise, set 'auto' values for 'margin-top' and 'margin-bottom'
* to 0, and pick the one of the following six rules that applies.
*
* 1. 'top' and 'height' are 'auto' and 'bottom' is not 'auto', then
* the height is based on the content, and solve for 'top'.
*
* OMIT RULE 2 AS IT SHOULD NEVER BE HIT
* ------------------------------------------------------------------
* 2. 'top' and 'bottom' are 'auto' and 'height' is not 'auto', then
* set 'top' to the static position, and solve for 'bottom'.
* ------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* 3. 'height' and 'bottom' are 'auto' and 'top' is not 'auto', then
* the height is based on the content, and solve for 'bottom'.
* 4. 'top' is 'auto', 'height' and 'bottom' are not 'auto', and
* solve for 'top'.
* 5. 'height' is 'auto', 'top' and 'bottom' are not 'auto', and
* solve for 'height'.
* 6. 'bottom' is 'auto', 'top' and 'height' are not 'auto', and
* solve for 'bottom'.
\*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = minimumValueForLength(marginBefore, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = minimumValueForLength(marginAfter, containerRelativeLogicalWidth);
const LayoutUnit availableSpace = containerLogicalHeight - (computedValues.m_margins.m_before + computedValues.m_margins.m_after + bordersPlusPadding);
if (logicalTopIsAuto && logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalHeightValue = contentLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = availableSpace - (logicalHeightValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight));
} else if (!logicalTopIsAuto && logicalHeightIsAuto && logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
logicalHeightValue = contentLogicalHeight;
} else if (logicalTopIsAuto && !logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalHeightValue = resolvedLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = availableSpace - (logicalHeightValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight));
} else if (!logicalTopIsAuto && logicalHeightIsAuto && !logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
logicalHeightValue = max<LayoutUnit>(0, availableSpace - (logicalTopValue + valueForLength(logicalBottom, containerLogicalHeight)));
} else if (!logicalTopIsAuto && !logicalHeightIsAuto && logicalBottomIsAuto) {
logicalHeightValue = resolvedLogicalHeight;
logicalTopValue = valueForLength(logicalTop, containerLogicalHeight);
}
}
computedValues.m_extent = logicalHeightValue;
computedValues.m_position = logicalTopValue + computedValues.m_margins.m_before;
computeLogicalTopPositionedOffset(computedValues.m_position, this, logicalHeightValue, containerBlock, containerLogicalHeight);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Object> V8TestCustomNamedGetter::wrapSlow(PassRefPtr<TestCustomNamedGetter> impl, v8::Isolate* isolate)
{
v8::Handle<v8::Object> wrapper;
V8Proxy* proxy = 0;
wrapper = V8DOMWrapper::instantiateV8Object(proxy, &info, impl.get());
if (UNLIKELY(wrapper.IsEmpty()))
return wrapper;
v8::Persistent<v8::Object> wrapperHandle = v8::Persistent<v8::Object>::New(wrapper);
if (!hasDependentLifetime)
wrapperHandle.MarkIndependent();
V8DOMWrapper::setJSWrapperForDOMObject(impl, wrapperHandle, isolate);
return wrapper;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: set_directory_hook ()
{
if (dircomplete_expand)
{
rl_directory_completion_hook = bash_directory_completion_hook;
rl_directory_rewrite_hook = (rl_icppfunc_t *)0;
}
else
{
rl_directory_rewrite_hook = bash_directory_completion_hook;
rl_directory_completion_hook = (rl_icppfunc_t *)0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool radeon_atom_apply_quirks(struct drm_device *dev,
uint32_t supported_device,
int *connector_type,
struct radeon_i2c_bus_rec *i2c_bus,
uint16_t *line_mux,
struct radeon_hpd *hpd)
{
/* Asus M2A-VM HDMI board lists the DVI port as HDMI */
if ((dev->pdev->device == 0x791e) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == 0x1043) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_device == 0x826d)) {
if ((*connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_HDMIA) &&
(supported_device == ATOM_DEVICE_DFP3_SUPPORT))
*connector_type = DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVID;
}
/* Asrock RS600 board lists the DVI port as HDMI */
if ((dev->pdev->device == 0x7941) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == 0x1849) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_device == 0x7941)) {
if ((*connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_HDMIA) &&
(supported_device == ATOM_DEVICE_DFP3_SUPPORT))
*connector_type = DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVID;
}
/* a-bit f-i90hd - ciaranm on #radeonhd - this board has no DVI */
if ((dev->pdev->device == 0x7941) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == 0x147b) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_device == 0x2412)) {
if (*connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVII)
return false;
}
/* Falcon NW laptop lists vga ddc line for LVDS */
if ((dev->pdev->device == 0x5653) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == 0x1462) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_device == 0x0291)) {
if (*connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_LVDS) {
i2c_bus->valid = false;
*line_mux = 53;
}
}
/* HIS X1300 is DVI+VGA, not DVI+DVI */
if ((dev->pdev->device == 0x7146) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == 0x17af) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_device == 0x2058)) {
if (supported_device == ATOM_DEVICE_DFP1_SUPPORT)
return false;
}
/* Gigabyte X1300 is DVI+VGA, not DVI+DVI */
if ((dev->pdev->device == 0x7142) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == 0x1458) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_device == 0x2134)) {
if (supported_device == ATOM_DEVICE_DFP1_SUPPORT)
return false;
}
/* Funky macbooks */
if ((dev->pdev->device == 0x71C5) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == 0x106b) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_device == 0x0080)) {
if ((supported_device == ATOM_DEVICE_CRT1_SUPPORT) ||
(supported_device == ATOM_DEVICE_DFP2_SUPPORT))
return false;
if (supported_device == ATOM_DEVICE_CRT2_SUPPORT)
*line_mux = 0x90;
}
/* ASUS HD 3600 XT board lists the DVI port as HDMI */
if ((dev->pdev->device == 0x9598) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == 0x1043) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_device == 0x01da)) {
if (*connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_HDMIA) {
*connector_type = DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVII;
}
}
/* ASUS HD 3450 board lists the DVI port as HDMI */
if ((dev->pdev->device == 0x95C5) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == 0x1043) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_device == 0x01e2)) {
if (*connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_HDMIA) {
*connector_type = DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVII;
}
}
/* some BIOSes seem to report DAC on HDMI - usually this is a board with
* HDMI + VGA reporting as HDMI
*/
if (*connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_HDMIA) {
if (supported_device & (ATOM_DEVICE_CRT_SUPPORT)) {
*connector_type = DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_VGA;
*line_mux = 0;
}
}
/* Acer laptop reports DVI-D as DVI-I */
if ((dev->pdev->device == 0x95c4) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == 0x1025) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_device == 0x013c)) {
if ((*connector_type == DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVII) &&
(supported_device == ATOM_DEVICE_DFP1_SUPPORT))
*connector_type = DRM_MODE_CONNECTOR_DVID;
}
/* XFX Pine Group device rv730 reports no VGA DDC lines
* even though they are wired up to record 0x93
*/
if ((dev->pdev->device == 0x9498) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_vendor == 0x1682) &&
(dev->pdev->subsystem_device == 0x2452)) {
struct radeon_device *rdev = dev->dev_private;
*i2c_bus = radeon_lookup_i2c_gpio(rdev, 0x93);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GooString *ASCIIHexStream::getPSFilter(int psLevel, const char *indent) {
GooString *s;
if (psLevel < 2) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(s = str->getPSFilter(psLevel, indent))) {
return NULL;
}
s->append(indent)->append("/ASCIIHexDecode filter\n");
return s;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: check(FILE *fp, int argc, const char **argv, png_uint_32p flags/*out*/,
display *d, int set_callback)
{
int i, npasses, ipass;
png_uint_32 height;
d->keep = PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT;
d->before_IDAT = 0;
d->after_IDAT = 0;
/* Some of these errors are permanently fatal and cause an exit here, others
* are per-test and cause an error return.
*/
d->png_ptr = png_create_read_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, d, error,
warning);
if (d->png_ptr == NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s(%s): could not allocate png struct\n", d->file,
d->test);
/* Terminate here, this error is not test specific. */
exit(1);
}
d->info_ptr = png_create_info_struct(d->png_ptr);
d->end_ptr = png_create_info_struct(d->png_ptr);
if (d->info_ptr == NULL || d->end_ptr == NULL)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s(%s): could not allocate png info\n", d->file,
d->test);
clean_display(d);
exit(1);
}
png_init_io(d->png_ptr, fp);
# ifdef PNG_READ_USER_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED
/* This is only done if requested by the caller; it interferes with the
* standard store/save mechanism.
*/
if (set_callback)
png_set_read_user_chunk_fn(d->png_ptr, d, read_callback);
# else
UNUSED(set_callback)
# endif
/* Handle each argument in turn; multiple settings are possible for the same
* chunk and multiple calls will occur (the last one should override all
* preceding ones).
*/
for (i=0; i<argc; ++i)
{
const char *equals = strchr(argv[i], '=');
if (equals != NULL)
{
int chunk, option;
if (strcmp(equals+1, "default") == 0)
option = PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT;
else if (strcmp(equals+1, "discard") == 0)
option = PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_NEVER;
else if (strcmp(equals+1, "if-safe") == 0)
option = PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_IF_SAFE;
else if (strcmp(equals+1, "save") == 0)
option = PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_ALWAYS;
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s(%s): %s: unrecognized chunk option\n", d->file,
d->test, argv[i]);
display_exit(d);
}
switch (equals - argv[i])
{
case 4: /* chunk name */
chunk = find(argv[i]);
if (chunk >= 0)
{
/* These #if tests have the effect of skipping the arguments
* if SAVE support is unavailable - we can't do a useful test
* in this case, so we just check the arguments! This could
* be improved in the future by using the read callback.
*/
png_byte name[5];
memcpy(name, chunk_info[chunk].name, 5);
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(d->png_ptr, option, name, 1);
chunk_info[chunk].keep = option;
continue;
}
break;
case 7: /* default */
if (memcmp(argv[i], "default", 7) == 0)
{
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(d->png_ptr, option, NULL, 0);
d->keep = option;
continue;
}
break;
case 3: /* all */
if (memcmp(argv[i], "all", 3) == 0)
{
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(d->png_ptr, option, NULL, -1);
d->keep = option;
for (chunk = 0; chunk < NINFO; ++chunk)
if (chunk_info[chunk].all)
chunk_info[chunk].keep = option;
continue;
}
break;
default: /* some misplaced = */
break;
}
}
fprintf(stderr, "%s(%s): %s: unrecognized chunk argument\n", d->file,
d->test, argv[i]);
display_exit(d);
}
png_read_info(d->png_ptr, d->info_ptr);
switch (png_get_interlace_type(d->png_ptr, d->info_ptr))
{
case PNG_INTERLACE_NONE:
npasses = 1;
break;
case PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7:
npasses = PNG_INTERLACE_ADAM7_PASSES;
break;
default:
/* Hard error because it is not test specific */
fprintf(stderr, "%s(%s): invalid interlace type\n", d->file, d->test);
clean_display(d);
exit(1);
}
/* Skip the image data, if IDAT is not being handled then don't do this
* because it will cause a CRC error.
*/
if (chunk_info[0/*IDAT*/].keep == PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT)
{
png_start_read_image(d->png_ptr);
height = png_get_image_height(d->png_ptr, d->info_ptr);
if (npasses > 1)
{
png_uint_32 width = png_get_image_width(d->png_ptr, d->info_ptr);
for (ipass=0; ipass<npasses; ++ipass)
{
png_uint_32 wPass = PNG_PASS_COLS(width, ipass);
if (wPass > 0)
{
png_uint_32 y;
for (y=0; y<height; ++y) if (PNG_ROW_IN_INTERLACE_PASS(y, ipass))
png_read_row(d->png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
}
}
} /* interlaced */
else /* not interlaced */
{
png_uint_32 y;
for (y=0; y<height; ++y)
png_read_row(d->png_ptr, NULL, NULL);
}
}
png_read_end(d->png_ptr, d->end_ptr);
flags[0] = get_valid(d, d->info_ptr);
flags[1] = get_unknown(d, d->info_ptr, 0/*before IDAT*/);
/* Only png_read_png sets PNG_INFO_IDAT! */
flags[chunk_info[0/*IDAT*/].keep != PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_AS_DEFAULT] |=
PNG_INFO_IDAT;
flags[2] = get_valid(d, d->end_ptr);
flags[3] = get_unknown(d, d->end_ptr, 1/*after IDAT*/);
clean_display(d);
return d->keep;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0)
{
unsigned int hook;
/* No recursion; use packet counter to save back ptrs (reset
* to 0 as we leave), and comefrom to save source hook bitmask.
*/
for (hook = 0; hook < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; hook++) {
unsigned int pos = newinfo->hook_entry[hook];
struct arpt_entry *e
= (struct arpt_entry *)(entry0 + pos);
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << hook)))
continue;
/* Set initial back pointer. */
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
for (;;) {
const struct xt_standard_target *t
= (void *)arpt_get_target_c(e);
int visited = e->comefrom & (1 << hook);
if (e->comefrom & (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS)) {
pr_notice("arptables: loop hook %u pos %u %08X.\n",
hook, pos, e->comefrom);
return 0;
}
e->comefrom
|= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS));
/* Unconditional return/END. */
if ((unconditional(e) &&
(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
unsigned int oldpos, size;
if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < -NF_MAX_VERDICT - 1) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: bad "
"negative verdict (%i)\n",
t->verdict);
return 0;
}
/* Return: backtrack through the last
* big jump.
*/
do {
e->comefrom ^= (1<<NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS);
oldpos = pos;
pos = e->counters.pcnt;
e->counters.pcnt = 0;
/* We're at the start. */
if (pos == oldpos)
goto next;
e = (struct arpt_entry *)
(entry0 + pos);
} while (oldpos == pos + e->next_offset);
/* Move along one */
size = e->next_offset;
e = (struct arpt_entry *)
(entry0 + pos + size);
if (pos + size >= newinfo->size)
return 0;
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos += size;
} else {
int newpos = t->verdict;
if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
newpos >= 0) {
if (newpos > newinfo->size -
sizeof(struct arpt_entry)) {
duprintf("mark_source_chains: "
"bad verdict (%i)\n",
newpos);
return 0;
}
/* This a jump; chase it. */
duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
pos, newpos);
e = (struct arpt_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, e))
return 0;
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
if (newpos >= newinfo->size)
return 0;
}
e = (struct arpt_entry *)
(entry0 + newpos);
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos = newpos;
}
}
next:
duprintf("Finished chain %u\n", hook);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offset
We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff.
Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry).
Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the
match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta.
We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NotifyForEachFrameFromUI(RenderFrameHost* root_frame_host,
const FrameCallback& frame_callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
FrameTree* frame_tree = static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(root_frame_host)
->frame_tree_node()
->frame_tree();
DCHECK_EQ(root_frame_host, frame_tree->GetMainFrame());
auto routing_ids = std::make_unique<std::set<GlobalFrameRoutingId>>();
for (FrameTreeNode* node : frame_tree->Nodes()) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host = node->current_frame_host();
RenderFrameHostImpl* pending_frame_host =
node->render_manager()->speculative_frame_host();
if (frame_host)
routing_ids->insert(frame_host->GetGlobalFrameRoutingId());
if (pending_frame_host)
routing_ids->insert(pending_frame_host->GetGlobalFrameRoutingId());
}
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&NotifyRouteChangesOnIO, frame_callback,
std::move(routing_ids)));
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main () {
RFlagItem *i;
RFlag *f = r_flag_new ();
r_flag_set (f, "rip", 0xfff333999000LL, 1);
r_flag_set (f, "rip", 0xfff333999002LL, 1);
r_flag_unset (f, "rip", NULL);
r_flag_set (f, "rip", 3, 4);
r_flag_set (f, "rip", 4, 4);
r_flag_set (f, "corwp", 300, 4);
r_flag_set (f, "barp", 300, 4);
r_flag_set (f, "rip", 3, 4);
r_flag_set (f, "rip", 4, 4);
i = r_flag_get (f, "rip");
if (i) printf ("nRIP: %p %llx\n", i, i->offset);
else printf ("nRIP: null\n");
i = r_flag_get_i (f, 0xfff333999000LL);
if (i) printf ("iRIP: %p %llx\n", i, i->offset);
else printf ("iRIP: null\n");
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExprResolveKeyCode(struct xkb_context *ctx, const ExprDef *expr,
xkb_keycode_t *kc)
{
xkb_keycode_t leftRtrn, rightRtrn;
switch (expr->expr.op) {
case EXPR_VALUE:
if (expr->expr.value_type != EXPR_TYPE_INT) {
log_err(ctx,
"Found constant of type %s where an int was expected\n",
expr_value_type_to_string(expr->expr.value_type));
return false;
}
*kc = (xkb_keycode_t) expr->integer.ival;
return true;
case EXPR_ADD:
case EXPR_SUBTRACT:
case EXPR_MULTIPLY:
case EXPR_DIVIDE:
if (!ExprResolveKeyCode(ctx, expr->binary.left, &leftRtrn) ||
!ExprResolveKeyCode(ctx, expr->binary.right, &rightRtrn))
return false;
switch (expr->expr.op) {
case EXPR_ADD:
*kc = leftRtrn + rightRtrn;
break;
case EXPR_SUBTRACT:
*kc = leftRtrn - rightRtrn;
break;
case EXPR_MULTIPLY:
*kc = leftRtrn * rightRtrn;
break;
case EXPR_DIVIDE:
if (rightRtrn == 0) {
log_err(ctx, "Cannot divide by zero: %d / %d\n",
leftRtrn, rightRtrn);
return false;
}
*kc = leftRtrn / rightRtrn;
break;
default:
break;
}
return true;
case EXPR_NEGATE:
if (!ExprResolveKeyCode(ctx, expr->unary.child, &leftRtrn))
return false;
*kc = ~leftRtrn;
return true;
case EXPR_UNARY_PLUS:
return ExprResolveKeyCode(ctx, expr->unary.child, kc);
default:
log_wsgo(ctx, "Unknown operator %d in ResolveKeyCode\n",
expr->expr.op);
break;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't explode on invalid virtual modifiers
testcase: 'virtualModifiers=LevelThreC'
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 78,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DatabaseImpl::DeleteObjectStore(int64_t transaction_id,
int64_t object_store_id) {
idb_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&IDBThreadHelper::DeleteObjectStore, base::Unretained(helper_),
transaction_id, object_store_id));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 136,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: authentic_parse_size(unsigned char *in, size_t *out)
{
if (!in || !out)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
if (*in < 0x80) {
*out = *in;
return 1;
}
else if (*in == 0x81) {
*out = *(in + 1);
return 2;
}
else if (*in == 0x82) {
*out = *(in + 1) * 0x100 + *(in + 2);
return 3;
}
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init set_graph_function(char *str)
{
strlcpy(ftrace_graph_buf, str, FTRACE_FILTER_SIZE);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
unsigned int pipes;
rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
/*
* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
* previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
* that right?
*/
rl->packet = NULL;
rl->packet_length = 0;
rl->wnum = 0;
memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
rl->wpend_tot = 0;
rl->wpend_type = 0;
rl->wpend_ret = 0;
rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
for (pipes = 0; pipes < rl->numwpipes; pipes++)
SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf[pipes]);
rl->numwpipes = 0;
rl->numrpipes = 0;
SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
if (rl->d)
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 13,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SelectionController::HandleTripleClick(
const MouseEventWithHitTestResults& event) {
TRACE_EVENT0("blink",
"SelectionController::handleMousePressEventTripleClick");
if (!Selection().IsAvailable()) {
return false;
}
if (!mouse_down_allows_multi_click_)
return HandleSingleClick(event);
if (event.Event().button != WebPointerProperties::Button::kLeft)
return false;
Node* const inner_node = event.InnerNode();
if (!(inner_node && inner_node->GetLayoutObject() &&
mouse_down_may_start_select_))
return false;
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& pos =
VisiblePositionOfHitTestResult(event.GetHitTestResult());
const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree new_selection =
pos.IsNotNull() ? CreateVisibleSelectionWithGranularity(
SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.Collapse(pos.ToPositionWithAffinity())
.Build(),
TextGranularity::kParagraph)
: VisibleSelectionInFlatTree();
const bool is_handle_visible =
event.Event().FromTouch() && new_selection.IsRange();
const bool did_select = UpdateSelectionForMouseDownDispatchingSelectStart(
inner_node,
ExpandSelectionToRespectUserSelectAll(inner_node,
new_selection.AsSelection()),
TextGranularity::kParagraph,
is_handle_visible ? HandleVisibility::kVisible
: HandleVisibility::kNotVisible);
if (!did_select)
return false;
if (!Selection().IsHandleVisible())
return true;
frame_->GetEventHandler().ShowNonLocatedContextMenu(nullptr,
kMenuSourceTouch);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __init multi_init_ports(void)
{
struct mp_port *mtpt;
static int first = 1;
int i,j,k;
unsigned char osc;
unsigned char b_ret = 0;
static struct mp_device_t *sbdev;
if (!first)
return;
first = 0;
mtpt = multi_ports;
for (k=0;k<NR_BOARD;k++)
{
sbdev = &mp_devs[k];
for (i = 0; i < sbdev->nr_ports; i++, mtpt++)
{
mtpt->device = sbdev;
mtpt->port.iobase = sbdev->uart_access_addr + 8*i;
mtpt->port.irq = sbdev->irq;
if ( ((sbdev->device_id == PCI_DEVICE_ID_MP4)&&(sbdev->revision==0x91)))
mtpt->interface_config_addr = sbdev->option_reg_addr + 0x08 + i;
else if (sbdev->revision == 0xc0)
mtpt->interface_config_addr = sbdev->option_reg_addr + 0x08 + (i & 0x1);
else
mtpt->interface_config_addr = sbdev->option_reg_addr + 0x08 + i/8;
mtpt->option_base_addr = sbdev->option_reg_addr;
mtpt->poll_type = sbdev->poll_type;
mtpt->port.uartclk = BASE_BAUD * 16;
/* get input clock information */
osc = inb(sbdev->option_reg_addr + MP_OPTR_DIR0 + i/8) & 0x0F;
if (osc==0x0f)
osc = 0;
for(j=0;j<osc;j++)
mtpt->port.uartclk *= 2;
mtpt->port.flags |= STD_COM_FLAGS | UPF_SHARE_IRQ ;
mtpt->port.iotype = UPIO_PORT;
mtpt->port.ops = &multi_pops;
if (sbdev->revision == 0xc0)
{
/* for SB16C1053APCI */
b_ret = sb1053a_get_interface(mtpt, i);
}
else
{
b_ret = read_option_register(mtpt,(MP_OPTR_IIR0 + i/8));
printk("IIR_RET = %x\n",b_ret);
}
/* default to RS232 */
mtpt->interface = RS232;
if (IIR_RS422 == (b_ret & IIR_TYPE_MASK))
mtpt->interface = RS422PTP;
if (IIR_RS485 == (b_ret & IIR_TYPE_MASK))
mtpt->interface = RS485NE;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,426 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ReadUserLogState::EventNum( const ReadUserLog::FileState &state ) const
{
const ReadUserLogFileState::FileState *istate;
if ( ( !convertState(state, istate) ) || ( !istate->m_version ) ) {
return -1;
}
return (filesize_t) istate->m_event_num.asint;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,621 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(TabContents* contents, int index,
DetachType type) {
if (type == DETACH_TYPE_DETACH) {
if (contents == chrome::GetActiveTabContents(this)) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->SaveStateToContents(contents->web_contents());
}
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all())
SyncHistoryWithTabs(0);
}
SetAsDelegate(contents->web_contents(), NULL);
RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(contents->web_contents());
if (find_bar_controller_.get() && index == active_index()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(NULL);
}
search_delegate_->OnTabDetached(contents->web_contents());
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 171,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/*
* SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
* some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
* to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
* that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
* TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
* answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
*/
mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
| SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
#endif
;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) {
if ((options & mask) != mask) {
s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
} else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
} else {
s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
}
#else
if ((options & mask) == mask) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
return 0;
}
s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
#endif
mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
#endif
if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
return 0;
}
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
return 0;
}
} else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/* Determine which DTLS version to use */
/* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
return 0;
}
/*
* Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
*/
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
return 0;
}
/*
* Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
*/
s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
} else {
/*
* We only support one version: update method
*/
if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
}
}
s->client_version = s->version;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 44,208 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: av_cold int avcodec_close(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
int i;
if (!avctx)
return 0;
if (avcodec_is_open(avctx)) {
FramePool *pool = avctx->internal->pool;
if (CONFIG_FRAME_THREAD_ENCODER &&
avctx->internal->frame_thread_encoder && avctx->thread_count > 1) {
ff_frame_thread_encoder_free(avctx);
}
if (HAVE_THREADS && avctx->internal->thread_ctx)
ff_thread_free(avctx);
if (avctx->codec && avctx->codec->close)
avctx->codec->close(avctx);
avctx->internal->byte_buffer_size = 0;
av_freep(&avctx->internal->byte_buffer);
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->to_free);
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_frame);
av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_pkt);
for (i = 0; i < FF_ARRAY_ELEMS(pool->pools); i++)
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&pool->pools[i]);
av_freep(&avctx->internal->pool);
if (avctx->hwaccel && avctx->hwaccel->uninit)
avctx->hwaccel->uninit(avctx);
av_freep(&avctx->internal->hwaccel_priv_data);
av_freep(&avctx->internal);
}
for (i = 0; i < avctx->nb_coded_side_data; i++)
av_freep(&avctx->coded_side_data[i].data);
av_freep(&avctx->coded_side_data);
avctx->nb_coded_side_data = 0;
av_buffer_unref(&avctx->hw_frames_ctx);
if (avctx->priv_data && avctx->codec && avctx->codec->priv_class)
av_opt_free(avctx->priv_data);
av_opt_free(avctx);
av_freep(&avctx->priv_data);
if (av_codec_is_encoder(avctx->codec)) {
av_freep(&avctx->extradata);
#if FF_API_CODED_FRAME
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
av_frame_free(&avctx->coded_frame);
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
}
avctx->codec = NULL;
avctx->active_thread_type = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 66,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iucv_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_iucv *sa = (struct sockaddr_iucv *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct iucv_sock *iucv;
int err = 0;
struct net_device *dev;
char uid[9];
/* Verify the input sockaddr */
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_IUCV)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
write_lock_bh(&iucv_sk_list.lock);
iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
if (__iucv_get_sock_by_name(sa->siucv_name)) {
err = -EADDRINUSE;
goto done_unlock;
}
if (iucv->path)
goto done_unlock;
/* Bind the socket */
if (pr_iucv)
if (!memcmp(sa->siucv_user_id, iucv_userid, 8))
goto vm_bind; /* VM IUCV transport */
/* try hiper transport */
memcpy(uid, sa->siucv_user_id, sizeof(uid));
ASCEBC(uid, 8);
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_netdev_rcu(&init_net, dev) {
if (!memcmp(dev->perm_addr, uid, 8)) {
memcpy(iucv->src_name, sa->siucv_name, 8);
memcpy(iucv->src_user_id, sa->siucv_user_id, 8);
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = dev->ifindex;
iucv->hs_dev = dev;
dev_hold(dev);
sk->sk_state = IUCV_BOUND;
iucv->transport = AF_IUCV_TRANS_HIPER;
if (!iucv->msglimit)
iucv->msglimit = IUCV_HIPER_MSGLIM_DEFAULT;
rcu_read_unlock();
goto done_unlock;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
vm_bind:
if (pr_iucv) {
/* use local userid for backward compat */
memcpy(iucv->src_name, sa->siucv_name, 8);
memcpy(iucv->src_user_id, iucv_userid, 8);
sk->sk_state = IUCV_BOUND;
iucv->transport = AF_IUCV_TRANS_IUCV;
if (!iucv->msglimit)
iucv->msglimit = IUCV_QUEUELEN_DEFAULT;
goto done_unlock;
}
/* found no dev to bind */
err = -ENODEV;
done_unlock:
/* Release the socket list lock */
write_unlock_bh(&iucv_sk_list.lock);
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
{
int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2];
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr,
"Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
ssh_program, host,
remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
if (port == -1)
port = sshport;
/*
* Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get
* descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below.
*/
if (pipe(reserved) < 0)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */
if (pipe(pin) < 0)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
if (pipe(pout) < 0)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Free the reserved descriptors. */
close(reserved[0]);
close(reserved[1]);
signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
do_cmd_pid = fork();
if (do_cmd_pid == 0) {
/* Child. */
close(pin[1]);
close(pout[0]);
dup2(pin[0], 0);
dup2(pout[1], 1);
close(pin[0]);
close(pout[1]);
replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
if (port != -1) {
addargs(&args, "-p");
addargs(&args, "%d", port);
}
if (remuser != NULL) {
addargs(&args, "-l");
addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
}
addargs(&args, "--");
addargs(&args, "%s", host);
addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
perror(ssh_program);
exit(1);
} else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) {
fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */
close(pin[0]);
*fdout = pin[1];
close(pout[1]);
*fdin = pout[0];
signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
signal(SIGINT, killchild);
signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer to the
current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9
CWE ID: CWE-706 | 0 | 92,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ship_v2KE(struct state *st,
struct pluto_crypto_req *r,
chunk_t *g,
pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np)
{
int oakley_group = unpack_v2KE(st, r, g);
return justship_v2KE(st, g, oakley_group, outs, np);
}
Commit Message: SECURITY: Properly handle IKEv2 I1 notification packet without KE payload
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: processCropSelections(struct image_data *image, struct crop_mask *crop,
unsigned char **read_buff_ptr, struct buffinfo seg_buffs[])
{
int i;
uint32 width, length, total_width, total_length;
tsize_t cropsize;
unsigned char *crop_buff = NULL;
unsigned char *read_buff = NULL;
unsigned char *next_buff = NULL;
tsize_t prev_cropsize = 0;
read_buff = *read_buff_ptr;
if (crop->img_mode == COMPOSITE_IMAGES)
{
cropsize = crop->bufftotal;
crop_buff = seg_buffs[0].buffer;
if (!crop_buff)
crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
else
{
prev_cropsize = seg_buffs[0].size;
if (prev_cropsize < cropsize)
{
next_buff = _TIFFrealloc(crop_buff, cropsize);
if (! next_buff)
{
_TIFFfree (crop_buff);
crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
}
else
crop_buff = next_buff;
}
}
if (!crop_buff)
{
TIFFError("processCropSelections", "Unable to allocate/reallocate crop buffer");
return (-1);
}
_TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize);
seg_buffs[0].buffer = crop_buff;
seg_buffs[0].size = cropsize;
/* Checks for matching width or length as required */
if (extractCompositeRegions(image, crop, read_buff, crop_buff) != 0)
return (1);
if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_INVERT)
{
switch (crop->photometric)
{
/* Just change the interpretation */
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
image->photometric = crop->photometric;
break;
case INVERT_DATA_ONLY:
case INVERT_DATA_AND_TAG:
if (invertImage(image->photometric, image->spp, image->bps,
crop->combined_width, crop->combined_length, crop_buff))
{
TIFFError("processCropSelections",
"Failed to invert colorspace for composite regions");
return (-1);
}
if (crop->photometric == INVERT_DATA_AND_TAG)
{
switch (image->photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
image->photometric = PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK;
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
image->photometric = PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
break;
default: break;
}
}
/* Mirror and Rotate will not work with multiple regions unless they are the same width */
if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_MIRROR)
{
if (mirrorImage(image->spp, image->bps, crop->mirror,
crop->combined_width, crop->combined_length, crop_buff))
{
TIFFError("processCropSelections", "Failed to mirror composite regions %s",
(crop->rotation == MIRROR_HORIZ) ? "horizontally" : "vertically");
return (-1);
}
}
if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_ROTATE) /* rotate should be last as it can reallocate the buffer */
{
if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image, &crop->combined_width,
&crop->combined_length, &crop_buff))
{
TIFFError("processCropSelections",
"Failed to rotate composite regions by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
return (-1);
}
seg_buffs[0].buffer = crop_buff;
seg_buffs[0].size = (((crop->combined_width * image->bps + 7 ) / 8)
* image->spp) * crop->combined_length;
}
}
else /* Separated Images */
{
total_width = total_length = 0;
for (i = 0; i < crop->selections; i++)
{
cropsize = crop->bufftotal;
crop_buff = seg_buffs[i].buffer;
if (!crop_buff)
crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
else
{
prev_cropsize = seg_buffs[0].size;
if (prev_cropsize < cropsize)
{
next_buff = _TIFFrealloc(crop_buff, cropsize);
if (! next_buff)
{
_TIFFfree (crop_buff);
crop_buff = (unsigned char *)_TIFFmalloc(cropsize);
}
else
crop_buff = next_buff;
}
}
if (!crop_buff)
{
TIFFError("processCropSelections", "Unable to allocate/reallocate crop buffer");
return (-1);
}
_TIFFmemset(crop_buff, 0, cropsize);
seg_buffs[i].buffer = crop_buff;
seg_buffs[i].size = cropsize;
if (extractSeparateRegion(image, crop, read_buff, crop_buff, i))
{
TIFFError("processCropSelections", "Unable to extract cropped region %d from image", i);
return (-1);
}
width = crop->regionlist[i].width;
length = crop->regionlist[i].length;
if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_INVERT)
{
switch (crop->photometric)
{
/* Just change the interpretation */
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
image->photometric = crop->photometric;
break;
case INVERT_DATA_ONLY:
case INVERT_DATA_AND_TAG:
if (invertImage(image->photometric, image->spp, image->bps,
width, length, crop_buff))
{
TIFFError("processCropSelections",
"Failed to invert colorspace for region");
return (-1);
}
if (crop->photometric == INVERT_DATA_AND_TAG)
{
switch (image->photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
image->photometric = PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK;
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
image->photometric = PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
break;
default: break;
}
}
if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_MIRROR)
{
if (mirrorImage(image->spp, image->bps, crop->mirror,
width, length, crop_buff))
{
TIFFError("processCropSelections", "Failed to mirror crop region %s",
(crop->rotation == MIRROR_HORIZ) ? "horizontally" : "vertically");
return (-1);
}
}
if (crop->crop_mode & CROP_ROTATE) /* rotate should be last as it can reallocate the buffer */
{
if (rotateImage(crop->rotation, image, &crop->regionlist[i].width,
&crop->regionlist[i].length, &crop_buff))
{
TIFFError("processCropSelections",
"Failed to rotate crop region by %d degrees", crop->rotation);
return (-1);
}
total_width += crop->regionlist[i].width;
total_length += crop->regionlist[i].length;
crop->combined_width = total_width;
crop->combined_length = total_length;
seg_buffs[i].buffer = crop_buff;
seg_buffs[i].size = (((crop->regionlist[i].width * image->bps + 7 ) / 8)
* image->spp) * crop->regionlist[i].length;
}
}
}
return (0);
} /* end processCropSelections */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 48,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FrameScheduler* WebLocalFrameImpl::Scheduler() const {
return GetFrame()->GetFrameScheduler();
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Element::rareDataChildrenAffectedByActive() const
{
ASSERT(hasRareData());
return elementRareData()->childrenAffectedByActive();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ImportArrayTIFF ( const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & tagInfo, const bool nativeEndian,
SXMPMeta * xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp )
{
switch ( tagInfo.type ) {
case kTIFF_ShortType :
ImportArrayTIFF_Short ( tagInfo, nativeEndian, xmp, xmpNS, xmpProp );
break;
case kTIFF_LongType :
ImportArrayTIFF_Long ( tagInfo, nativeEndian, xmp, xmpNS, xmpProp );
break;
case kTIFF_RationalType :
ImportArrayTIFF_Rational ( tagInfo, nativeEndian, xmp, xmpNS, xmpProp );
break;
case kTIFF_SRationalType :
ImportArrayTIFF_SRational ( tagInfo, nativeEndian, xmp, xmpNS, xmpProp );
break;
case kTIFF_ASCIIType :
ImportArrayTIFF_ASCII ( tagInfo, xmp, xmpNS, xmpProp );
break;
case kTIFF_ByteType :
ImportArrayTIFF_Byte ( tagInfo, xmp, xmpNS, xmpProp );
break;
case kTIFF_SByteType :
ImportArrayTIFF_SByte ( tagInfo, xmp, xmpNS, xmpProp );
break;
case kTIFF_SShortType :
ImportArrayTIFF_SShort ( tagInfo, nativeEndian, xmp, xmpNS, xmpProp );
break;
case kTIFF_SLongType :
ImportArrayTIFF_SLong ( tagInfo, nativeEndian, xmp, xmpNS, xmpProp );
break;
case kTIFF_FloatType :
ImportArrayTIFF_Float ( tagInfo, nativeEndian, xmp, xmpNS, xmpProp );
break;
case kTIFF_DoubleType :
ImportArrayTIFF_Double ( tagInfo, nativeEndian, xmp, xmpNS, xmpProp );
break;
}
} // ImportArrayTIFF
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IndexedDBDispatcher::RequestIDBObjectStorePut(
const content::SerializedScriptValue& value,
const IndexedDBKey& key,
WebKit::WebIDBObjectStore::PutMode put_mode,
WebIDBCallbacks* callbacks_ptr,
int32 idb_object_store_id,
const WebIDBTransaction& transaction,
WebExceptionCode* ec) {
ResetCursorPrefetchCaches();
scoped_ptr<WebIDBCallbacks> callbacks(callbacks_ptr);
if (!value.is_null() &&
(value.data().length() * sizeof(char16)) > kMaxIDBValueSizeInBytes) {
*ec = WebKit::WebIDBDatabaseExceptionDataError;
return;
}
IndexedDBHostMsg_ObjectStorePut_Params params;
params.thread_id = CurrentWorkerId();
params.idb_object_store_id = idb_object_store_id;
params.response_id = pending_callbacks_.Add(callbacks.release());
params.serialized_value = value;
params.key = key;
params.put_mode = put_mode;
params.transaction_id = TransactionId(transaction);
Send(new IndexedDBHostMsg_ObjectStorePut(params, ec));
if (*ec)
pending_callbacks_.Remove(params.response_id);
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_arg_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int i)
{
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_fl_get_owner(fl_owner_t owner)
{
struct nfs4_lockowner *lo = (struct nfs4_lockowner *)owner;
nfs4_get_stateowner(&lo->lo_owner);
return owner;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppLauncherHandler::OnLearnMore(const base::ListValue* args) {
RecordAppLauncherPromoHistogram(apps::APP_LAUNCHER_PROMO_LEARN_MORE);
}
Commit Message: Remove --disable-app-shims.
App shims have been enabled by default for 3 milestones
(since r242711).
BUG=350161
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/298953002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@272786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cifs_copy_sid(struct cifs_sid *dst, const struct cifs_sid *src)
{
int i;
dst->revision = src->revision;
dst->num_subauth = min_t(u8, src->num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES);
for (i = 0; i < NUM_AUTHS; ++i)
dst->authority[i] = src->authority[i];
for (i = 0; i < dst->num_subauth; ++i)
dst->sub_auth[i] = src->sub_auth[i];
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NaClIPCAdapter::LockedData::~LockedData() {
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dn_data_ready(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff_head *q, int flags, int target)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int len = 0;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
return !skb_queue_empty(q) ? 1 : 0;
skb_queue_walk(q, skb) {
struct dn_skb_cb *cb = DN_SKB_CB(skb);
len += skb->len;
if (cb->nsp_flags & 0x40) {
/* SOCK_SEQPACKET reads to EOM */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_SEQPACKET)
return 1;
/* so does SOCK_STREAM unless WAITALL is specified */
if (!(flags & MSG_WAITALL))
return 1;
}
/* minimum data length for read exceeded */
if (len >= target)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t get_xattr_names(const char *fname)
{
ssize_t list_len;
int64 arg;
if (!namebuf) {
namebuf_len = 1024;
namebuf = new_array(char, namebuf_len);
if (!namebuf)
out_of_memory("get_xattr_names");
}
while (1) {
/* The length returned includes all the '\0' terminators. */
list_len = sys_llistxattr(fname, namebuf, namebuf_len);
if (list_len >= 0) {
if ((size_t)list_len <= namebuf_len)
break;
} else if (errno == ENOTSUP)
return 0;
else if (errno != ERANGE) {
arg = namebuf_len;
got_error:
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno,
"get_xattr_names: llistxattr(%s,%s) failed",
full_fname(fname), big_num(arg));
return -1;
}
list_len = sys_llistxattr(fname, NULL, 0);
if (list_len < 0) {
arg = 0;
goto got_error;
}
if (namebuf_len)
free(namebuf);
namebuf_len = list_len + 1024;
namebuf = new_array(char, namebuf_len);
if (!namebuf)
out_of_memory("get_xattr_names");
}
return list_len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 1,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rose_del_node(struct rose_route_struct *rose_route,
struct net_device *dev)
{
struct rose_node *rose_node;
struct rose_neigh *rose_neigh;
int i, err = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&rose_node_list_lock);
spin_lock_bh(&rose_neigh_list_lock);
rose_node = rose_node_list;
while (rose_node != NULL) {
if ((rose_node->mask == rose_route->mask) &&
(rosecmpm(&rose_route->address, &rose_node->address,
rose_route->mask) == 0))
break;
rose_node = rose_node->next;
}
if (rose_node == NULL || rose_node->loopback) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
rose_neigh = rose_neigh_list;
while (rose_neigh != NULL) {
if (ax25cmp(&rose_route->neighbour,
&rose_neigh->callsign) == 0 &&
rose_neigh->dev == dev)
break;
rose_neigh = rose_neigh->next;
}
if (rose_neigh == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < rose_node->count; i++) {
if (rose_node->neighbour[i] == rose_neigh) {
rose_neigh->count--;
if (rose_neigh->count == 0 && rose_neigh->use == 0)
rose_remove_neigh(rose_neigh);
rose_node->count--;
if (rose_node->count == 0) {
rose_remove_node(rose_node);
} else {
switch (i) {
case 0:
rose_node->neighbour[0] =
rose_node->neighbour[1];
case 1:
rose_node->neighbour[1] =
rose_node->neighbour[2];
case 2:
break;
}
}
goto out;
}
}
err = -EINVAL;
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&rose_neigh_list_lock);
spin_unlock_bh(&rose_node_list_lock);
return err;
}
Commit Message: rose: Add length checks to CALL_REQUEST parsing
Define some constant offsets for CALL_REQUEST based on the description
at <http://www.techfest.com/networking/wan/x25plp.htm> and the
definition of ROSE as using 10-digit (5-byte) addresses. Use them
consistently. Validate all implicit and explicit facilities lengths.
Validate the address length byte rather than either trusting or
assuming its value.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 22,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::TransitionToCommittedForNewPage() {
web_frame_->CreateFrameView();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static IntSize sizeFor(HTMLVideoElement* video)
{
if (MediaPlayer* player = video->player())
return player->naturalSize();
return IntSize();
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when creating an ImageBitmap from an invalid canvas
BUG=354356
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/211313003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169973 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 115,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FetchManager::FetchManager(ExecutionContext* execution_context)
: ContextLifecycleObserver(execution_context) {}
Commit Message: [Fetch API] Fix redirect leak on "no-cors" requests
The spec issue is now fixed, and this CL follows the spec change[1].
1: https://github.com/whatwg/fetch/commit/14858d3e9402285a7ff3b5e47a22896ff3adc95d
Bug: 791324
Change-Id: Ic3e3955f43578b38fc44a5a6b2a1b43d56a2becb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1023613
Reviewed-by: Tsuyoshi Horo <horo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#552964}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int checkboard(void)
{
printf("Board: Keymile %s\n", CONFIG_SYS_CONFIG_NAME);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleRequestExtensionCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::RequestExtensionCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::RequestExtensionCHROMIUM*>(
cmd_data);
Bucket* bucket = GetBucket(c.bucket_id);
if (!bucket || bucket->size() == 0) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
std::string feature_str;
if (!bucket->GetAsString(&feature_str)) {
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
feature_str = feature_str + " ";
bool desire_standard_derivatives = false;
bool desire_frag_depth = false;
bool desire_draw_buffers = false;
bool desire_shader_texture_lod = false;
bool desire_multi_draw = false;
bool desire_multi_draw_instanced = false;
if (feature_info_->context_type() == CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL1) {
desire_standard_derivatives =
feature_str.find("GL_OES_standard_derivatives ") != std::string::npos;
desire_frag_depth =
feature_str.find("GL_EXT_frag_depth ") != std::string::npos;
desire_draw_buffers =
feature_str.find("GL_EXT_draw_buffers ") != std::string::npos;
desire_shader_texture_lod =
feature_str.find("GL_EXT_shader_texture_lod ") != std::string::npos;
}
if (feature_info_->IsWebGLContext()) {
desire_multi_draw =
feature_str.find("GL_WEBGL_multi_draw ") != std::string::npos;
desire_multi_draw_instanced =
feature_str.find("GL_WEBGL_multi_draw_instanced ") != std::string::npos;
}
if (desire_standard_derivatives != derivatives_explicitly_enabled_ ||
desire_frag_depth != frag_depth_explicitly_enabled_ ||
desire_draw_buffers != draw_buffers_explicitly_enabled_ ||
desire_shader_texture_lod != shader_texture_lod_explicitly_enabled_ ||
desire_multi_draw != multi_draw_explicitly_enabled_ ||
desire_multi_draw_instanced != multi_draw_instanced_explicitly_enabled_) {
derivatives_explicitly_enabled_ |= desire_standard_derivatives;
frag_depth_explicitly_enabled_ |= desire_frag_depth;
draw_buffers_explicitly_enabled_ |= desire_draw_buffers;
shader_texture_lod_explicitly_enabled_ |= desire_shader_texture_lod;
multi_draw_explicitly_enabled_ |= desire_multi_draw;
multi_draw_instanced_explicitly_enabled_ |= desire_multi_draw_instanced;
DestroyShaderTranslator();
}
if (feature_str.find("GL_CHROMIUM_color_buffer_float_rgba ") !=
std::string::npos) {
feature_info_->EnableCHROMIUMColorBufferFloatRGBA();
}
if (feature_str.find("GL_CHROMIUM_color_buffer_float_rgb ") !=
std::string::npos) {
feature_info_->EnableCHROMIUMColorBufferFloatRGB();
}
if (feature_str.find("GL_EXT_color_buffer_float ") != std::string::npos) {
feature_info_->EnableEXTColorBufferFloat();
}
if (feature_str.find("GL_EXT_color_buffer_half_float ") !=
std::string::npos) {
feature_info_->EnableEXTColorBufferHalfFloat();
}
if (feature_str.find("GL_OES_texture_float_linear ") != std::string::npos) {
feature_info_->EnableOESTextureFloatLinear();
}
if (feature_str.find("GL_OES_texture_half_float_linear ") !=
std::string::npos) {
feature_info_->EnableOESTextureHalfFloatLinear();
}
if (feature_str.find("GL_EXT_float_blend ") != std::string::npos) {
feature_info_->EnableEXTFloatBlend();
}
UpdateCapabilities();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gre_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff)
{
struct gre_base_hdr *greh = (struct gre_base_hdr *)(skb->data + nhoff);
struct packet_offload *ptype;
unsigned int grehlen = sizeof(*greh);
int err = -ENOENT;
__be16 type;
skb->encapsulation = 1;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type = SKB_GSO_GRE;
type = greh->protocol;
if (greh->flags & GRE_KEY)
grehlen += GRE_HEADER_SECTION;
if (greh->flags & GRE_CSUM)
grehlen += GRE_HEADER_SECTION;
rcu_read_lock();
ptype = gro_find_complete_by_type(type);
if (ptype)
err = ptype->callbacks.gro_complete(skb, nhoff + grehlen);
rcu_read_unlock();
skb_set_inner_mac_header(skb, nhoff + grehlen);
return err;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,966 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void jp2_cmap_dumpdata(jp2_box_t *box, FILE *out)
{
jp2_cmap_t *cmap = &box->data.cmap;
unsigned int i;
jp2_cmapent_t *ent;
fprintf(out, "numchans = %d\n", (int) cmap->numchans);
for (i = 0; i < cmap->numchans; ++i) {
ent = &cmap->ents[i];
fprintf(out, "cmptno=%d; map=%d; pcol=%d\n",
(int) ent->cmptno, (int) ent->map, (int) ent->pcol);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed bugs due to uninitialized data in the JP2 decoder.
Also, added some comments marking I/O stream interfaces that probably
need to be changed (in the long term) to fix integer overflow problems.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 67,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool TaskService::IsOnTaskRunner(RunnerId runner_id) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
if (bound_instance_id_ == kInvalidInstanceId)
return false;
if (runner_id == kDefaultRunnerId)
return default_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread();
size_t thread = runner_id - 1;
if (threads_.size() <= thread || !threads_[thread])
return false;
return threads_[thread]->task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread();
}
Commit Message: Change ReadWriteLock to Lock+ConditionVariable in TaskService
There are non-trivial performance implications of using shared
SRWLocking on Windows as more state has to be checked.
Since there are only two uses of the ReadWriteLock in Chromium after
over 1 year, the decision is to remove it.
BUG=758721
Change-Id: I84d1987d7b624a89e896eb37184ee50845c39d80
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/634423
Commit-Queue: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Toyoshima <toyoshim@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Francois Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#497632}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 132,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PluginModule::GetInterfaceFunc PluginModule::GetLocalGetInterfaceFunc() {
return &GetInterface;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static IW_INLINE iw_tmpsample gamma_to_linear_sample(iw_tmpsample v, double gamma)
{
return pow(v,gamma);
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cff_parse_font_bbox( CFF_Parser parser )
{
CFF_FontRecDict dict = (CFF_FontRecDict)parser->object;
FT_BBox* bbox = &dict->font_bbox;
FT_Byte** data = parser->stack;
FT_Error error;
error = FT_ERR( Stack_Underflow );
if ( parser->top >= parser->stack + 4 )
{
bbox->xMin = FT_RoundFix( cff_parse_fixed( parser, data++ ) );
bbox->yMin = FT_RoundFix( cff_parse_fixed( parser, data++ ) );
bbox->xMax = FT_RoundFix( cff_parse_fixed( parser, data++ ) );
bbox->yMax = FT_RoundFix( cff_parse_fixed( parser, data ) );
error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_TRACE4(( " [%d %d %d %d]\n",
bbox->xMin / 65536,
bbox->yMin / 65536,
bbox->xMax / 65536,
bbox->yMax / 65536 ));
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 13,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: doCdataSection(XML_Parser parser,
const ENCODING *enc,
const char **startPtr,
const char *end,
const char **nextPtr,
XML_Bool haveMore)
{
const char *s = *startPtr;
const char **eventPP;
const char **eventEndPP;
if (enc == parser->m_encoding) {
eventPP = &parser->m_eventPtr;
*eventPP = s;
eventEndPP = &parser->m_eventEndPtr;
}
else {
eventPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventPtr);
eventEndPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventEndPtr);
}
*eventPP = s;
*startPtr = NULL;
for (;;) {
const char *next;
int tok = XmlCdataSectionTok(enc, s, end, &next);
*eventEndPP = next;
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_CDATA_SECT_CLOSE:
if (parser->m_endCdataSectionHandler)
parser->m_endCdataSectionHandler(parser->m_handlerArg);
/* BEGIN disabled code */
/* see comment under XML_TOK_CDATA_SECT_OPEN */
else if (0 && parser->m_characterDataHandler)
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_dataBuf, 0);
/* END disabled code */
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
*startPtr = next;
*nextPtr = next;
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_FINISHED)
return XML_ERROR_ABORTED;
else
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_TOK_DATA_NEWLINE:
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
XML_Char c = 0xA;
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, &c, 1);
}
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
case XML_TOK_DATA_CHARS:
{
XML_CharacterDataHandler charDataHandler = parser->m_characterDataHandler;
if (charDataHandler) {
if (MUST_CONVERT(enc, s)) {
for (;;) {
ICHAR *dataPtr = (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf;
const enum XML_Convert_Result convert_res = XmlConvert(enc, &s, next, &dataPtr, (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBufEnd);
*eventEndPP = next;
charDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_dataBuf,
(int)(dataPtr - (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf));
if ((convert_res == XML_CONVERT_COMPLETED) || (convert_res == XML_CONVERT_INPUT_INCOMPLETE))
break;
*eventPP = s;
}
}
else
charDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg,
(XML_Char *)s,
(int)((XML_Char *)next - (XML_Char *)s));
}
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
}
break;
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
*eventPP = next;
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
case XML_TOK_NONE:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION;
default:
/* Every token returned by XmlCdataSectionTok() has its own
* explicit case, so this default case will never be executed.
* We retain it as a safety net and exclude it from the coverage
* statistics.
*
* LCOV_EXCL_START
*/
*eventPP = next;
return XML_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_STATE;
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
}
*eventPP = s = next;
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
*nextPtr = next;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_FINISHED:
return XML_ERROR_ABORTED;
default: ;
}
}
/* not reached */
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *m_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct proc_maps_private *priv = m->private;
struct vm_area_struct *next;
(*pos)++;
next = m_next_vma(priv, v);
if (!next)
vma_stop(priv);
return next;
}
Commit Message: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.
This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.
[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html
[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
this is the simple model. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,799 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void JNI_WebApkUpdateManager_UpdateWebApkFromFile(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jstring>& java_update_request_path,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& java_callback) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
ScopedJavaGlobalRef<jobject> callback_ref(java_callback);
Profile* profile = ProfileManager::GetLastUsedProfile();
if (profile == nullptr) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&OnUpdated, callback_ref, WebApkInstallResult::FAILURE,
false /* relax_updates */, "" /* webapk_package */));
return;
}
std::string update_request_path =
ConvertJavaStringToUTF8(env, java_update_request_path);
WebApkInstallService::Get(profile)->UpdateAsync(
base::FilePath(update_request_path),
base::Bind(&OnUpdated, callback_ref));
}
Commit Message: [Android WebAPK] Send share target information in WebAPK updates
This CL plumbs through share target information for WebAPK updates.
Chromium detects Web Manifest updates (including Web Manifest share
target updates) and requests an update.
Currently, depending on whether the Web Manifest is for an intranet
site, the updated WebAPK would either:
- no longer be able handle share intents (even if the Web Manifest
share target information was not deleted)
- be created with the same share intent handlers as the current WebAPK
(regardless of whether the Web Manifest share target information has
changed).
This CL plumbs through the share target information from
WebApkUpdateDataFetcher#onDataAvailable() to
WebApkUpdateManager::StoreWebApkUpdateRequestToFile()
BUG=912945
Change-Id: Ie416570533abc848eeb23de8c197b44f2a1fd028
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369709
Commit-Queue: Peter Kotwicz <pkotwicz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616429}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 130,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CCLayerTreeHost::updateCompositorResources(const LayerList& renderSurfaceLayerList, GraphicsContext3D* context, TextureAllocator* allocator)
{
for (int surfaceIndex = renderSurfaceLayerList.size() - 1; surfaceIndex >= 0 ; --surfaceIndex) {
LayerChromium* renderSurfaceLayer = renderSurfaceLayerList[surfaceIndex].get();
RenderSurfaceChromium* renderSurface = renderSurfaceLayer->renderSurface();
ASSERT(renderSurface);
if (!renderSurface->layerList().size() || !renderSurface->drawOpacity())
continue;
const LayerList& layerList = renderSurface->layerList();
ASSERT(layerList.size());
for (unsigned layerIndex = 0; layerIndex < layerList.size(); ++layerIndex) {
LayerChromium* layer = layerList[layerIndex].get();
if (layer->renderSurface() && layer->renderSurface() != renderSurface)
continue;
updateCompositorResources(layer, context, allocator);
}
}
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_ssh2_kex(void)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
struct kex *kex;
int r;
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
options.kex_algorithms);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
} else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
"none,zlib@openssh.com";
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
list_hostkey_types());
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
kex = active_state->kex;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
kex->server = 1;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
session_id2 = kex->session_id;
session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
packet_put_cstring("markus");
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
debug("KEX done");
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static av_cold int vqa_decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
VqaContext *s = avctx->priv_data;
int i, j, codebook_index;
s->avctx = avctx;
avctx->pix_fmt = PIX_FMT_PAL8;
/* make sure the extradata made it */
if (s->avctx->extradata_size != VQA_HEADER_SIZE) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, " VQA video: expected extradata size of %d\n", VQA_HEADER_SIZE);
return -1;
}
/* load up the VQA parameters from the header */
s->vqa_version = s->avctx->extradata[0];
s->width = AV_RL16(&s->avctx->extradata[6]);
s->height = AV_RL16(&s->avctx->extradata[8]);
if(av_image_check_size(s->width, s->height, 0, avctx)){
s->width= s->height= 0;
return -1;
}
s->vector_width = s->avctx->extradata[10];
s->vector_height = s->avctx->extradata[11];
s->partial_count = s->partial_countdown = s->avctx->extradata[13];
/* the vector dimensions have to meet very stringent requirements */
if ((s->vector_width != 4) ||
((s->vector_height != 2) && (s->vector_height != 4))) {
/* return without further initialization */
return -1;
}
/* allocate codebooks */
s->codebook_size = MAX_CODEBOOK_SIZE;
s->codebook = av_malloc(s->codebook_size);
/* allocate decode buffer */
s->decode_buffer_size = (s->width / s->vector_width) *
(s->height / s->vector_height) * 2;
s->decode_buffer = av_malloc(s->decode_buffer_size);
if (!s->decode_buffer)
goto fail;
/* initialize the solid-color vectors */
if (s->vector_height == 4) {
codebook_index = 0xFF00 * 16;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
s->codebook[codebook_index++] = i;
} else {
codebook_index = 0xF00 * 8;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
s->codebook[codebook_index++] = i;
}
s->next_codebook_buffer_index = 0;
s->frame.data[0] = NULL;
return 0;
fail:
av_freep(&s->codebook);
av_freep(&s->next_codebook_buffer);
av_freep(&s->decode_buffer);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 165,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void update_gui_state_from_problem_data(int flags)
{
update_window_title();
remove_tabs_from_notebook(g_notebook);
const char *reason = problem_data_get_content_or_NULL(g_cd, FILENAME_REASON);
const char *not_reportable = problem_data_get_content_or_NULL(g_cd,
FILENAME_NOT_REPORTABLE);
char *t = xasprintf("%s%s%s",
not_reportable ? : "",
not_reportable ? " " : "",
reason ? : _("(no description)"));
gtk_label_set_text(g_lbl_cd_reason, t);
free(t);
gtk_list_store_clear(g_ls_details);
struct cd_stats stats = { 0 };
g_hash_table_foreach(g_cd, append_item_to_ls_details, &stats);
char *msg = xasprintf(_("%llu bytes, %u files"), (long long)stats.filesize, stats.filecount);
gtk_label_set_text(g_lbl_size, msg);
free(msg);
load_text_to_text_view(g_tv_comment, FILENAME_COMMENT);
add_workflow_buttons(g_box_workflows, g_workflow_list,
G_CALLBACK(set_auto_event_chain));
/* Update event radio buttons
* show them only in expert mode
*/
event_gui_data_t *active_button = NULL;
if (g_expert_mode == true)
{
gtk_widget_show(GTK_WIDGET(g_box_events));
active_button = add_event_buttons(
g_box_events,
&g_list_events,
g_events,
G_CALLBACK(event_rb_was_toggled)
);
}
if (flags & UPDATE_SELECTED_EVENT && g_expert_mode)
{
/* Update the value of currently selected event */
free(g_event_selected);
g_event_selected = NULL;
if (active_button)
{
g_event_selected = xstrdup(active_button->event_name);
}
log_info("g_event_selected='%s'", g_event_selected);
}
/* We can't just do gtk_widget_show_all once in main:
* We created new widgets (buttons). Need to make them visible.
*/
gtk_widget_show_all(GTK_WIDGET(g_wnd_assistant));
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,884 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init aes_sparc64_mod_init(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(algs); i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&algs[i].cra_list);
if (sparc64_has_aes_opcode()) {
pr_info("Using sparc64 aes opcodes optimized AES implementation\n");
return crypto_register_algs(algs, ARRAY_SIZE(algs));
}
pr_info("sparc64 aes opcodes not available.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmd_len(conn c)
{
return scan_line_end(c->cmd, c->cmd_read);
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gdImageCharUp (gdImagePtr im, gdFontPtr f, int x, int y, int c, int color)
{
int cx, cy;
int px, py;
int fline;
cx = 0;
cy = 0;
#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
c = ASC (c);
#endif /*CHARSET_EBCDIC */
if ((c < f->offset) || (c >= (f->offset + f->nchars))) {
return;
}
fline = (c - f->offset) * f->h * f->w;
for (py = y; py > (y - f->w); py--) {
for (px = x; px < (x + f->h); px++) {
if (f->data[fline + cy * f->w + cx]) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, px, py, color);
}
cy++;
}
cy = 0;
cx++;
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TabStrip::GetActiveTabWidth() const {
return layout_helper_->active_tab_width();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodLongArgOptionalTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "voidMethodLongArgOptionalTestInterfaceEmptyArg", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, longArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() <= 1)) {
imp->voidMethodLongArgOptionalTestInterfaceEmptyArg(longArg);
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(TestInterfaceEmpty*, optionalTestInterfaceEmpty, V8TestInterfaceEmpty::toNativeWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[1]));
imp->voidMethodLongArgOptionalTestInterfaceEmptyArg(longArg, optionalTestInterfaceEmpty);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,840 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t cdc_ncm_show_rx_max(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(to_net_dev(d));
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
return sprintf(buf, "%u\n", ctx->rx_max);
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned char readBitFromReversedStream(size_t* bitpointer, const unsigned char* bitstream)
{
unsigned char result = (unsigned char)((bitstream[(*bitpointer) >> 3] >> (7 - ((*bitpointer) & 0x7))) & 1);
(*bitpointer)++;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aspath_merge (struct aspath *as1, struct aspath *as2)
{
struct assegment *last, *new;
if (! as1 || ! as2)
return NULL;
last = new = assegment_dup_all (as1->segments);
/* find the last valid segment */
while (last && last->next)
last = last->next;
last->next = as2->segments;
as2->segments = new;
aspath_str_update (as2);
return as2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLSelectElement::appendFormData(FormDataList& list, bool)
{
const AtomicString& name = this->name();
if (name.isEmpty())
return false;
bool successful = false;
const Vector<HTMLElement*>& items = listItems();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < items.size(); ++i) {
HTMLElement* element = items[i];
if (element->hasTagName(optionTag) && toHTMLOptionElement(element)->selected() && !toHTMLOptionElement(element)->isDisabledFormControl()) {
list.appendData(name, toHTMLOptionElement(element)->value());
successful = true;
}
}
return successful;
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 103,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Textfield::DestroyTouchSelection() {
touch_selection_controller_.reset();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pppoe_disc_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct pppoe_hdr *ph;
struct pppox_sock *po;
struct pppoe_net *pn;
skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
goto out;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct pppoe_hdr)))
goto abort;
ph = pppoe_hdr(skb);
if (ph->code != PADT_CODE)
goto abort;
pn = pppoe_pernet(dev_net(dev));
po = get_item(pn, ph->sid, eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, dev->ifindex);
if (po) {
struct sock *sk = sk_pppox(po);
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/* If the user has locked the socket, just ignore
* the packet. With the way two rcv protocols hook into
* one socket family type, we cannot (easily) distinguish
* what kind of SKB it is during backlog rcv.
*/
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk) == 0) {
/* We're no longer connect at the PPPOE layer,
* and must wait for ppp channel to disconnect us.
*/
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_ZOMBIE;
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
abort:
kfree_skb(skb);
out:
return NET_RX_SUCCESS; /* Lies... :-) */
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IncrementSiteProcessCount(const GURL& site_url,
int render_process_host_id) {
std::map<ProcessID, Count>& counts_per_process = map_[site_url];
++counts_per_process[render_process_host_id];
#ifndef NDEBUG
RenderProcessHost* host = RenderProcessHost::FromID(render_process_host_id);
if (!HasProcess(host))
host->AddObserver(this);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,292 |
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