instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: infix(INFIX *in, bool first)
{
/* since this function recurses, it could be driven to stack overflow. */
check_stack_depth();
if (in->curpol->type == QI_VAL)
{
QueryOperand *curpol = &in->curpol->qoperand;
char *op = in->op + curpol->distance;
int clen;
RESIZEBUF(in, curpol->length * (pg_database_encoding_max_length() + 1) + 2 + 6);
*(in->cur) = '\'';
in->cur++;
while (*op)
{
if (t_iseq(op, '\''))
{
*(in->cur) = '\'';
in->cur++;
}
else if (t_iseq(op, '\\'))
{
*(in->cur) = '\\';
in->cur++;
}
COPYCHAR(in->cur, op);
clen = pg_mblen(op);
op += clen;
in->cur += clen;
}
*(in->cur) = '\'';
in->cur++;
if (curpol->weight || curpol->prefix)
{
*(in->cur) = ':';
in->cur++;
if (curpol->prefix)
{
*(in->cur) = '*';
in->cur++;
}
if (curpol->weight & (1 << 3))
{
*(in->cur) = 'A';
in->cur++;
}
if (curpol->weight & (1 << 2))
{
*(in->cur) = 'B';
in->cur++;
}
if (curpol->weight & (1 << 1))
{
*(in->cur) = 'C';
in->cur++;
}
if (curpol->weight & 1)
{
*(in->cur) = 'D';
in->cur++;
}
}
*(in->cur) = '\0';
in->curpol++;
}
else if (in->curpol->qoperator.oper == OP_NOT)
{
bool isopr = false;
RESIZEBUF(in, 1);
*(in->cur) = '!';
in->cur++;
*(in->cur) = '\0';
in->curpol++;
if (in->curpol->type == QI_OPR)
{
isopr = true;
RESIZEBUF(in, 2);
sprintf(in->cur, "( ");
in->cur = strchr(in->cur, '\0');
}
infix(in, isopr);
if (isopr)
{
RESIZEBUF(in, 2);
sprintf(in->cur, " )");
in->cur = strchr(in->cur, '\0');
}
}
else
{
int8 op = in->curpol->qoperator.oper;
INFIX nrm;
in->curpol++;
if (op == OP_OR && !first)
{
RESIZEBUF(in, 2);
sprintf(in->cur, "( ");
in->cur = strchr(in->cur, '\0');
}
nrm.curpol = in->curpol;
nrm.op = in->op;
nrm.buflen = 16;
nrm.cur = nrm.buf = (char *) palloc(sizeof(char) * nrm.buflen);
/* get right operand */
infix(&nrm, false);
/* get & print left operand */
in->curpol = nrm.curpol;
infix(in, false);
/* print operator & right operand */
RESIZEBUF(in, 3 + (nrm.cur - nrm.buf));
switch (op)
{
case OP_OR:
sprintf(in->cur, " | %s", nrm.buf);
break;
case OP_AND:
sprintf(in->cur, " & %s", nrm.buf);
break;
default:
/* OP_NOT is handled in above if-branch */
elog(ERROR, "unrecognized operator type: %d", op);
}
in->cur = strchr(in->cur, '\0');
pfree(nrm.buf);
if (op == OP_OR && !first)
{
RESIZEBUF(in, 2);
sprintf(in->cur, " )");
in->cur = strchr(in->cur, '\0');
}
}
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct page *alloc_huge_page_node(struct hstate *h, int nid)
{
gfp_t gfp_mask = htlb_alloc_mask(h);
struct page *page = NULL;
if (nid != NUMA_NO_NODE)
gfp_mask |= __GFP_THISNODE;
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (h->free_huge_pages - h->resv_huge_pages > 0)
page = dequeue_huge_page_nodemask(h, gfp_mask, nid, NULL);
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (!page)
page = alloc_migrate_huge_page(h, gfp_mask, nid, NULL);
return page;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_tables_fill_rule_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net *net,
u32 portid, u32 seq, int event,
u32 flags, int family,
const struct nft_table *table,
const struct nft_chain *chain,
const struct nft_rule *rule)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg;
const struct nft_expr *expr, *next;
struct nlattr *list;
const struct nft_rule *prule;
int type = event | NFNL_SUBSYS_NFTABLES << 8;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, type, sizeof(struct nfgenmsg),
flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
nfmsg->nfgen_family = family;
nfmsg->version = NFNETLINK_V0;
nfmsg->res_id = htons(net->nft.base_seq & 0xffff);
if (nla_put_string(skb, NFTA_RULE_TABLE, table->name))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_string(skb, NFTA_RULE_CHAIN, chain->name))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nla_put_be64(skb, NFTA_RULE_HANDLE, cpu_to_be64(rule->handle)))
goto nla_put_failure;
if ((event != NFT_MSG_DELRULE) && (rule->list.prev != &chain->rules)) {
prule = list_entry(rule->list.prev, struct nft_rule, list);
if (nla_put_be64(skb, NFTA_RULE_POSITION,
cpu_to_be64(prule->handle)))
goto nla_put_failure;
}
list = nla_nest_start(skb, NFTA_RULE_EXPRESSIONS);
if (list == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
nft_rule_for_each_expr(expr, next, rule) {
struct nlattr *elem = nla_nest_start(skb, NFTA_LIST_ELEM);
if (elem == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (nf_tables_fill_expr_info(skb, expr) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, elem);
}
nla_nest_end(skb, list);
if (rule->ulen &&
nla_put(skb, NFTA_RULE_USERDATA, rule->ulen, nft_userdata(rule)))
goto nla_put_failure;
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_trim(skb, nlh);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 57,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t BnOMX::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel &data, Parcel *reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case LIVES_LOCALLY:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
pid_t pid = (pid_t)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(livesLocally(node, pid));
return OK;
}
case LIST_NODES:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
List<ComponentInfo> list;
listNodes(&list);
reply->writeInt32(list.size());
for (List<ComponentInfo>::iterator it = list.begin();
it != list.end(); ++it) {
ComponentInfo &cur = *it;
reply->writeString8(cur.mName);
reply->writeInt32(cur.mRoles.size());
for (List<String8>::iterator role_it = cur.mRoles.begin();
role_it != cur.mRoles.end(); ++role_it) {
reply->writeString8(*role_it);
}
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOCATE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
const char *name = data.readCString();
sp<IOMXObserver> observer =
interface_cast<IOMXObserver>(data.readStrongBinder());
node_id node;
status_t err = allocateNode(name, observer, &node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)node);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_NODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeNode(node));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SEND_COMMAND:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_COMMANDTYPE cmd =
static_cast<OMX_COMMANDTYPE>(data.readInt32());
OMX_S32 param = data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(sendCommand(node, cmd, param));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_PARAMETER:
case SET_PARAMETER:
case GET_CONFIG:
case SET_CONFIG:
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index = static_cast<OMX_INDEXTYPE>(data.readInt32());
size_t size = data.readInt64();
void *params = malloc(size);
data.read(params, size);
status_t err;
switch (code) {
case GET_PARAMETER:
err = getParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_PARAMETER:
err = setParameter(node, index, params, size);
break;
case GET_CONFIG:
err = getConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_CONFIG:
err = setConfig(node, index, params, size);
break;
case SET_INTERNAL_OPTION:
{
InternalOptionType type =
(InternalOptionType)data.readInt32();
err = setInternalOption(node, index, type, params, size);
break;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
}
reply->writeInt32(err);
if ((code == GET_PARAMETER || code == GET_CONFIG) && err == OK) {
reply->write(params, size);
}
free(params);
params = NULL;
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_STATE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_STATETYPE state = OMX_StateInvalid;
status_t err = getState(node, &state);
reply->writeInt32(state);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ENABLE_GRAPHIC_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = enableGraphicBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_USAGE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 usage = 0;
status_t err = getGraphicBufferUsage(node, port_index, &usage);
reply->writeInt32(err);
reply->writeInt32(usage);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useBuffer(node, port_index, params, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case USE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = useGraphicBuffer(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case UPDATE_GRAPHIC_BUFFER_IN_META:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<GraphicBuffer> graphicBuffer = new GraphicBuffer();
data.read(*graphicBuffer);
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = updateGraphicBufferInMeta(
node, port_index, graphicBuffer, buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CREATE_INPUT_SURFACE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> bufferProducer;
status_t err = createInputSurface(node, port_index,
&bufferProducer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeStrongBinder(bufferProducer->asBinder());
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case SIGNAL_END_OF_INPUT_STREAM:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
status_t err = signalEndOfInputStream(node);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case STORE_META_DATA_IN_BUFFERS:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
status_t err = storeMetaDataInBuffers(node, port_index, enable);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case PREPARE_FOR_ADAPTIVE_PLAYBACK:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL enable = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_width = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 max_height = data.readInt32();
status_t err = prepareForAdaptivePlayback(
node, port_index, enable, max_width, max_height);
reply->writeInt32(err);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case CONFIGURE_VIDEO_TUNNEL_MODE:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
OMX_BOOL tunneled = (OMX_BOOL)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 audio_hw_sync = data.readInt32();
native_handle_t *sideband_handle;
status_t err = configureVideoTunnelMode(
node, port_index, tunneled, audio_hw_sync, &sideband_handle);
reply->writeInt32(err);
reply->writeNativeHandle(sideband_handle);
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
if (!isSecure(node) || port_index != 0 /* kPortIndexInput */) {
ALOGE("b/24310423");
reply->writeInt32(INVALID_OPERATION);
return NO_ERROR;
}
size_t size = data.readInt64();
buffer_id buffer;
void *buffer_data;
status_t err = allocateBuffer(
node, port_index, size, &buffer, &buffer_data);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
reply->writeInt64((uintptr_t)buffer_data);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
sp<IMemory> params =
interface_cast<IMemory>(data.readStrongBinder());
buffer_id buffer;
status_t err = allocateBufferWithBackup(
node, port_index, params, &buffer);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FREE_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 port_index = data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(freeBuffer(node, port_index, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case FILL_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
reply->writeInt32(fillBuffer(node, buffer));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case EMPTY_BUFFER:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
buffer_id buffer = (buffer_id)data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_offset = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 range_length = data.readInt32();
OMX_U32 flags = data.readInt32();
OMX_TICKS timestamp = data.readInt64();
reply->writeInt32(
emptyBuffer(
node, buffer, range_offset, range_length,
flags, timestamp));
return NO_ERROR;
}
case GET_EXTENSION_INDEX:
{
CHECK_OMX_INTERFACE(IOMX, data, reply);
node_id node = (node_id)data.readInt32();
const char *parameter_name = data.readCString();
OMX_INDEXTYPE index;
status_t err = getExtensionIndex(node, parameter_name, &index);
reply->writeInt32(err);
if (err == OK) {
reply->writeInt32(index);
}
return OK;
}
default:
return BBinder::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
}
Commit Message: IOMX.cpp uninitialized pointer in BnOMX::onTransact
This can lead to local code execution in media server.
Fix initializes the pointer and checks the error conditions before
returning
Bug: 26403627
Change-Id: I7fa90682060148448dba01d6acbe3471d1ddb500
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 173,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fuse_put_request(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_req *req)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&req->count)) {
if (req->waiting)
atomic_dec(&fc->num_waiting);
if (req->stolen_file)
put_reserved_req(fc, req);
else
fuse_request_free(req);
}
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsHttpHandler::OnJsonRequest(
int connection_id,
const net::HttpServerRequestInfo& info) {
std::string path = info.path.substr(5);
std::string query;
size_t query_pos = path.find("?");
if (query_pos != std::string::npos) {
query = path.substr(query_pos + 1);
path = path.substr(0, query_pos);
}
size_t fragment_pos = path.find("#");
if (fragment_pos != std::string::npos)
path = path.substr(0, fragment_pos);
std::string command;
std::string target_id;
if (!ParseJsonPath(path, &command, &target_id)) {
SendJson(connection_id, net::HTTP_NOT_FOUND, nullptr,
"Malformed query: " + info.path);
return;
}
if (command == "version") {
base::DictionaryValue version;
version.SetString("Protocol-Version",
DevToolsAgentHost::GetProtocolVersion());
version.SetString("WebKit-Version", GetWebKitVersion());
version.SetString("Browser", GetContentClient()->GetProduct());
version.SetString("User-Agent", GetContentClient()->GetUserAgent());
version.SetString("V8-Version", V8_VERSION_STRING);
std::string host = info.headers["host"];
version.SetString(
kTargetWebSocketDebuggerUrlField,
base::StringPrintf("ws://%s%s", host.c_str(), browser_guid_.c_str()));
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
version.SetString(
"Android-Package",
base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance()->host_package_name());
#endif
SendJson(connection_id, net::HTTP_OK, &version, std::string());
return;
}
if (command == "protocol") {
DecompressAndSendJsonProtocol(connection_id);
return;
}
if (command == "list") {
DevToolsManager* manager = DevToolsManager::GetInstance();
DevToolsAgentHost::List list =
manager->delegate() ? manager->delegate()->RemoteDebuggingTargets()
: DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateAll();
RespondToJsonList(connection_id, info.headers["host"], std::move(list));
return;
}
if (command == "new") {
GURL url(net::UnescapeURLComponent(
query, net::UnescapeRule::URL_SPECIAL_CHARS_EXCEPT_PATH_SEPARATORS |
net::UnescapeRule::PATH_SEPARATORS));
if (!url.is_valid())
url = GURL(url::kAboutBlankURL);
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> agent_host = nullptr;
agent_host = delegate_->CreateNewTarget(url);
if (!agent_host) {
SendJson(connection_id, net::HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, nullptr,
"Could not create new page");
return;
}
std::string host = info.headers["host"];
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> dictionary(
SerializeDescriptor(agent_host, host));
SendJson(connection_id, net::HTTP_OK, dictionary.get(), std::string());
return;
}
if (command == "activate" || command == "close") {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> agent_host =
DevToolsAgentHost::GetForId(target_id);
if (!agent_host) {
SendJson(connection_id, net::HTTP_NOT_FOUND, nullptr,
"No such target id: " + target_id);
return;
}
if (command == "activate") {
if (agent_host->Activate()) {
SendJson(connection_id, net::HTTP_OK, nullptr, "Target activated");
} else {
SendJson(connection_id, net::HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, nullptr,
"Could not activate target id: " + target_id);
}
return;
}
if (command == "close") {
if (agent_host->Close()) {
SendJson(connection_id, net::HTTP_OK, nullptr, "Target is closing");
} else {
SendJson(connection_id, net::HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, nullptr,
"Could not close target id: " + target_id);
}
return;
}
}
SendJson(connection_id, net::HTTP_NOT_FOUND, nullptr,
"Unknown command: " + command);
return;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: check Host header for being IP or localhost when connecting over RDP.
Bug: 813540
Change-Id: I9338aa2475c15090b8a60729be25502eb866efb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/952522
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541547}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _sync_messages_kill(kill_job_msg_t *req)
{
int host_cnt, host_inx;
char *host;
hostset_t hosts;
int epilog_msg_time;
hosts = hostset_create(req->nodes);
host_cnt = hostset_count(hosts);
if (host_cnt <= 64)
goto fini;
if (conf->hostname == NULL)
goto fini; /* should never happen */
for (host_inx=0; host_inx<host_cnt; host_inx++) {
host = hostset_shift(hosts);
if (host == NULL)
break;
if (xstrcmp(host, conf->node_name) == 0) {
free(host);
break;
}
free(host);
}
epilog_msg_time = slurm_get_epilog_msg_time();
_delay_rpc(host_inx, host_cnt, epilog_msg_time);
fini: hostset_destroy(hosts);
}
Commit Message: Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 72,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ext4_ext_init(struct super_block *sb)
{
/*
* possible initialization would be here
*/
if (EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_EXTENTS)) {
#if defined(AGGRESSIVE_TEST) || defined(CHECK_BINSEARCH) || defined(EXTENTS_STATS)
printk(KERN_INFO "EXT4-fs: file extents enabled"
#ifdef AGGRESSIVE_TEST
", aggressive tests"
#endif
#ifdef CHECK_BINSEARCH
", check binsearch"
#endif
#ifdef EXTENTS_STATS
", stats"
#endif
"\n");
#endif
#ifdef EXTENTS_STATS
spin_lock_init(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_ext_stats_lock);
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_ext_min = 1 << 30;
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_ext_max = 0;
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static apr_byte_t oidc_check_cookie_domain(request_rec *r, oidc_cfg *cfg,
oidc_session_t *session) {
const char *c_cookie_domain =
cfg->cookie_domain ?
cfg->cookie_domain : oidc_get_current_url_host(r);
const char *s_cookie_domain = oidc_session_get_cookie_domain(r, session);
if ((s_cookie_domain == NULL)
|| (apr_strnatcmp(c_cookie_domain, s_cookie_domain) != 0)) {
oidc_warn(r,
"aborting: detected attempt to play cookie against a different domain/host than issued for! (issued=%s, current=%s)",
s_cookie_domain, c_cookie_domain);
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: release 2.3.10.2: fix XSS vulnerability for poll parameter
in OIDC Session Management RP iframe; CSNC-2019-001; thanks Mischa
Bachmann
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 87,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TEE_Result syscall_cryp_derive_key(unsigned long state,
const struct utee_attribute *usr_params,
unsigned long param_count, unsigned long derived_key)
{
TEE_Result res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
struct tee_ta_session *sess;
struct tee_obj *ko;
struct tee_obj *so;
struct tee_cryp_state *cs;
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *sk;
const struct tee_cryp_obj_type_props *type_props;
TEE_Attribute *params = NULL;
struct user_ta_ctx *utc;
res = tee_ta_get_current_session(&sess);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
utc = to_user_ta_ctx(sess->ctx);
res = tee_svc_cryp_get_state(sess, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(state), &cs);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
return res;
params = malloc(sizeof(TEE_Attribute) * param_count);
if (!params)
return TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
res = copy_in_attrs(utc, usr_params, param_count, params);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Get key set in operation */
res = tee_obj_get(utc, cs->key1, &ko);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
res = tee_obj_get(utc, tee_svc_uref_to_vaddr(derived_key), &so);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Find information needed about the object to initialize */
sk = so->attr;
/* Find description of object */
type_props = tee_svc_find_type_props(so->info.objectType);
if (!type_props) {
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto out;
}
if (cs->algo == TEE_ALG_DH_DERIVE_SHARED_SECRET) {
size_t alloc_size;
struct bignum *pub;
struct bignum *ss;
if (param_count != 1 ||
params[0].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
alloc_size = params[0].content.ref.length * 8;
pub = crypto_bignum_allocate(alloc_size);
ss = crypto_bignum_allocate(alloc_size);
if (pub && ss) {
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[0].content.ref.buffer,
params[0].content.ref.length, pub);
res = crypto_acipher_dh_shared_secret(ko->attr,
pub, ss);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = crypto_bignum_num_bytes(ss);
crypto_bignum_bn2bin(ss, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1));
so->info.handleFlags |=
TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props,
TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
} else {
res = TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
crypto_bignum_free(pub);
crypto_bignum_free(ss);
} else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_ECDH) {
size_t alloc_size;
struct ecc_public_key key_public;
uint8_t *pt_secret;
unsigned long pt_secret_len;
if (param_count != 2 ||
params[0].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_X ||
params[1].attributeID != TEE_ATTR_ECC_PUBLIC_VALUE_Y) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
switch (cs->algo) {
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P192:
alloc_size = 192;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P224:
alloc_size = 224;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P256:
alloc_size = 256;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P384:
alloc_size = 384;
break;
case TEE_ALG_ECDH_P521:
alloc_size = 521;
break;
default:
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
goto out;
}
/* Create the public key */
res = crypto_acipher_alloc_ecc_public_key(&key_public,
alloc_size);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
key_public.curve = ((struct ecc_keypair *)ko->attr)->curve;
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[0].content.ref.buffer,
params[0].content.ref.length,
key_public.x);
crypto_bignum_bin2bn(params[1].content.ref.buffer,
params[1].content.ref.length,
key_public.y);
pt_secret = (uint8_t *)(sk + 1);
pt_secret_len = sk->alloc_size;
res = crypto_acipher_ecc_shared_secret(ko->attr, &key_public,
pt_secret,
&pt_secret_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = pt_secret_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
/* free the public key */
crypto_acipher_free_ecc_public_key(&key_public);
}
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_HKDF)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_HKDF) {
void *salt, *info;
size_t salt_len, info_len, okm_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ik = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *ikm = (const uint8_t *)(ik + 1);
res = get_hkdf_params(params, param_count, &salt, &salt_len,
&info, &info_len, &okm_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (okm_len > ik->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_hkdf(hash_id, ikm, ik->key_size, salt, salt_len,
info, info_len, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1),
okm_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = okm_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_CONCAT_KDF)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_CONCAT_KDF) {
void *info;
size_t info_len, derived_key_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ss = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *shared_secret = (const uint8_t *)(ss + 1);
res = get_concat_kdf_params(params, param_count, &info,
&info_len, &derived_key_len);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (derived_key_len > ss->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_concat_kdf(hash_id, shared_secret, ss->key_size,
info, info_len, (uint8_t *)(sk + 1),
derived_key_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = derived_key_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(CFG_CRYPTO_PBKDF2)
else if (TEE_ALG_GET_MAIN_ALG(cs->algo) == TEE_MAIN_ALGO_PBKDF2) {
void *salt;
size_t salt_len, iteration_count, derived_key_len;
uint32_t hash_id = TEE_ALG_GET_DIGEST_HASH(cs->algo);
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *ss = ko->attr;
const uint8_t *password = (const uint8_t *)(ss + 1);
res = get_pbkdf2_params(params, param_count, &salt, &salt_len,
&derived_key_len, &iteration_count);
if (res != TEE_SUCCESS)
goto out;
/* Requested size must fit into the output object's buffer */
if (derived_key_len > ss->alloc_size) {
res = TEE_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS;
goto out;
}
res = tee_cryp_pbkdf2(hash_id, password, ss->key_size, salt,
salt_len, iteration_count,
(uint8_t *)(sk + 1), derived_key_len);
if (res == TEE_SUCCESS) {
sk->key_size = derived_key_len;
so->info.handleFlags |= TEE_HANDLE_FLAG_INITIALIZED;
set_attribute(so, type_props, TEE_ATTR_SECRET_VALUE);
}
}
#endif
else
res = TEE_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
out:
free(params);
return res;
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in syscall_cryp_obj_populate
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0009: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_statfs(struct fuse* fuse, struct fuse_handler* handler,
const struct fuse_in_header* hdr)
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
struct statfs stat;
struct fuse_statfs_out out;
int res;
pthread_mutex_lock(&fuse->global->lock);
TRACE("[%d] STATFS\n", handler->token);
res = get_node_path_locked(&fuse->global->root, path, sizeof(path));
pthread_mutex_unlock(&fuse->global->lock);
if (res < 0) {
return -ENOENT;
}
if (statfs(fuse->global->root.name, &stat) < 0) {
return -errno;
}
memset(&out, 0, sizeof(out));
out.st.blocks = stat.f_blocks;
out.st.bfree = stat.f_bfree;
out.st.bavail = stat.f_bavail;
out.st.files = stat.f_files;
out.st.ffree = stat.f_ffree;
out.st.bsize = stat.f_bsize;
out.st.namelen = stat.f_namelen;
out.st.frsize = stat.f_frsize;
fuse_reply(fuse, hdr->unique, &out, sizeof(out));
return NO_STATUS;
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasResized(bool scroll_focused_node_into_view) {
if (resize_ack_pending_ || !process_->HasConnection() || !view_ ||
!view_->HasSize() || !renderer_initialized_ || auto_resize_enabled_ ||
!delegate_) {
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<ResizeParams> params(new ResizeParams);
if (!GetResizeParams(params.get()))
return;
params->scroll_focused_node_into_view = scroll_focused_node_into_view;
ScreenInfo screen_info = params->screen_info;
bool width_changed =
!old_resize_params_ ||
old_resize_params_->new_size.width() != params->new_size.width();
if (Send(new ViewMsg_Resize(routing_id_, *params))) {
resize_ack_pending_ = params->needs_resize_ack;
next_resize_needs_resize_ack_ = false;
old_resize_params_.swap(params);
}
if (delegate_)
delegate_->RenderWidgetWasResized(this, screen_info, width_changed);
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetForceDisableOverscrollContent(bool force_disable) {
force_disable_overscroll_content_ = force_disable;
if (view_)
view_->SetOverscrollControllerEnabled(CanOverscrollContent());
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadUYVYImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
u,
v,
y1,
y2;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
image->columns++;
(void) CopyMagickString(image->filename,image_info->filename,MaxTextExtent);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
image->depth=8;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
/*
Accumulate UYVY, then unpack into two pixels.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) (image->columns >> 1); x++)
{
u=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
y1=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
v=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
y2=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(y1));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(u));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(v));
q++;
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(y2));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(u));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(v));
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
SetImageColorspace(image,YCbCrColorspace);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lsi_dma_64bit(LSIState *s)
{
if ((s->ccntl1 & LSI_CCNTL1_EN64DBMV) == LSI_CCNTL1_EN64DBMV)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 3,678 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SettingLevelBubble::OnWidgetClosing(views::Widget* widget) {
if (view_ && view_->GetWidget() == widget) {
view_->GetWidget()->RemoveObserver(this);
view_ = NULL;
}
current_percent_ = target_percent_;
target_time_ = TimeTicks();
last_animation_update_time_ = TimeTicks();
last_target_update_time_ = TimeTicks();
hide_timer_.Stop();
StopAnimation();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void put_uint8(QEMUFile *f, void *pv, size_t size)
{
uint8_t *v = pv;
qemu_put_8s(f, v);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void misaligned_kernel_word_load(__u64 address, int do_sign_extend, __u64 *result)
{
unsigned short x;
unsigned char *p, *q;
p = (unsigned char *) (int) address;
q = (unsigned char *) &x;
q[0] = p[0];
q[1] = p[1];
if (do_sign_extend) {
*result = (__u64)(__s64) *(short *) &x;
} else {
*result = (__u64) x;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Status UpdateKeyGenerator(IndexedDBBackingStore* backing_store,
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction,
int64_t database_id,
int64_t object_store_id,
const IndexedDBKey& key,
bool check_current) {
DCHECK_EQ(kWebIDBKeyTypeNumber, key.type());
const double max_generator_value = 9007199254740992.0;
int64_t value = base::saturated_cast<int64_t>(
floor(std::min(key.number(), max_generator_value)));
return backing_store->MaybeUpdateKeyGeneratorCurrentNumber(
transaction->BackingStoreTransaction(), database_id, object_store_id,
value + 1, check_current);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char * getusername(void) {
char *username = NULL;
struct passwd *password = getpwuid(getuid());
if (password) {
username = password->pw_name;
}
return username;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 12,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CycleRunLoops() {
content::RunAllPendingInMessageLoop();
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
chrome::testing::NSRunLoopRunAllPending();
AutoreleasePool()->Recycle();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ContentSettingsClient* LocalFrame::GetContentSettingsClient() {
return Client() ? &Client()->GetContentSettingsClient() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OmniboxAcceptNotificationObserver::~OmniboxAcceptNotificationObserver() {
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gdImageFill(gdImagePtr im, int x, int y, int nc)
{
int l, x1, x2, dy;
int oc; /* old pixel value */
int wx2,wy2;
int alphablending_bak;
/* stack of filled segments */
/* struct seg stack[FILL_MAX],*sp = stack;; */
struct seg *stack = NULL;
struct seg *sp;
if (!im->trueColor && nc > (im->colorsTotal -1)) {
return;
}
alphablending_bak = im->alphaBlendingFlag;
im->alphaBlendingFlag = 0;
if (nc==gdTiled){
_gdImageFillTiled(im,x,y,nc);
im->alphaBlendingFlag = alphablending_bak;
return;
}
wx2=im->sx;wy2=im->sy;
oc = gdImageGetPixel(im, x, y);
if (oc==nc || x<0 || x>wx2 || y<0 || y>wy2) {
im->alphaBlendingFlag = alphablending_bak;
return;
}
/* Do not use the 4 neighbors implementation with
* small images
*/
if (im->sx < 4) {
int ix = x, iy = y, c;
do {
do {
c = gdImageGetPixel(im, ix, iy);
if (c != oc) {
goto done;
}
gdImageSetPixel(im, ix, iy, nc);
} while(ix++ < (im->sx -1));
ix = x;
} while(iy++ < (im->sy -1));
goto done;
}
stack = (struct seg *)safe_emalloc(sizeof(struct seg), ((int)(im->sy*im->sx)/4), 1);
sp = stack;
/* required! */
FILL_PUSH(y,x,x,1);
/* seed segment (popped 1st) */
FILL_PUSH(y+1, x, x, -1);
while (sp>stack) {
FILL_POP(y, x1, x2, dy);
for (x=x1; x>=0 && gdImageGetPixel(im,x, y)==oc; x--) {
gdImageSetPixel(im,x, y, nc);
}
if (x>=x1) {
goto skip;
}
l = x+1;
/* leak on left? */
if (l<x1) {
FILL_PUSH(y, l, x1-1, -dy);
}
x = x1+1;
do {
for (; x<=wx2 && gdImageGetPixel(im,x, y)==oc; x++) {
gdImageSetPixel(im, x, y, nc);
}
FILL_PUSH(y, l, x-1, dy);
/* leak on right? */
if (x>x2+1) {
FILL_PUSH(y, x2+1, x-1, -dy);
}
skip: for (x++; x<=x2 && (gdImageGetPixel(im, x, y)!=oc); x++);
l = x;
} while (x<=x2);
}
efree(stack);
done:
im->alphaBlendingFlag = alphablending_bak;
}
Commit Message: Fix #72696: imagefilltoborder stackoverflow on truecolor images
We must not allow negative color values be passed to
gdImageFillToBorder(), because that can lead to infinite recursion
since the recursion termination condition will not necessarily be met.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 72,471 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct resource *platform_get_resource_byname(struct platform_device *dev,
unsigned int type,
const char *name)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < dev->num_resources; i++) {
struct resource *r = &dev->resource[i];
if (unlikely(!r->name))
continue;
if (type == resource_type(r) && !strcmp(r->name, name))
return r;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: driver core: platform: fix race condition with driver_override
The driver_override implementation is susceptible to race condition when
different threads are reading vs storing a different driver override.
Add locking to avoid race condition.
Fixes: 3d713e0e382e ("driver core: platform: add device binding path 'driver_override'")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Adrian Salido <salidoa@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 63,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nf_ct_frag6_sysctl_register(struct net *net)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: drop mangled skb on ream error
Dmitry Vyukov reported GPF in network stack that Andrey traced down to
negative nh offset in nf_ct_frag6_queue().
Problem is that all network headers before fragment header are pulled.
Normal ipv6 reassembly will drop the skb when errors occur further down
the line.
netfilter doesn't do this, and instead passed the original fragment
along. That was also fine back when netfilter ipv6 defrag worked with
cloned fragments, as the original, pristine fragment was passed on.
So we either have to undo the pull op, or discard such fragments.
Since they're malformed after all (e.g. overlapping fragment) it seems
preferrable to just drop them.
Same for temporary errors -- it doesn't make sense to accept (and
perhaps forward!) only some fragments of same datagram.
Fixes: 029f7f3b8701cc7ac ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free clone operations")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Debugged-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 47,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *vfs_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct delayed_call *done)
{
const char *res = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
if (d_is_symlink(dentry)) {
res = ERR_PTR(security_inode_readlink(dentry));
if (!res)
res = inode->i_op->get_link(dentry, inode, done);
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 67,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int encode_fs_locations(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const u32* bitmask)
{
return encode_getattr_two(xdr,
bitmask[0] & nfs4_fs_locations_bitmap[0],
bitmask[1] & nfs4_fs_locations_bitmap[1]);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __dev_forward_skb(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (skb_orphan_frags(skb, GFP_ATOMIC) ||
unlikely(!is_skb_forwardable(dev, skb))) {
atomic_long_inc(&dev->rx_dropped);
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_RX_DROP;
}
skb_scrub_packet(skb, true);
skb->priority = 0;
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, dev);
skb_postpull_rcsum(skb, eth_hdr(skb), ETH_HLEN);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaControlPanelElement::MediaControlPanelElement(MediaControls& mediaControls)
: MediaControlDivElement(mediaControls, MediaControlsPanel),
m_isDisplayed(false),
m_opaque(true),
m_transitionTimer(this, &MediaControlPanelElement::transitionTimerFired) {
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 126,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shmem_set_policy(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct mempolicy *mpol)
{
struct inode *inode = vma->vm_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
return mpol_set_shared_policy(&SHMEM_I(inode)->policy, vma, mpol);
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderAddGlyphsFromPicture (ClientPtr client)
{
return BadImplementation;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long VideoTrack::GetDisplayUnit() const { return m_display_unit; }
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 164,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void P2PSocketDispatcherHost::OnCreateSocket(
const IPC::Message& msg, P2PSocketType type, int socket_id,
const net::IPEndPoint& local_address,
const net::IPEndPoint& remote_address) {
if (LookupSocket(msg.routing_id(), socket_id)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Received P2PHostMsg_CreateSocket for socket "
"that already exists.";
return;
}
scoped_ptr<P2PSocketHost> socket(
P2PSocketHost::Create(this, msg.routing_id(), socket_id, type));
if (!socket.get()) {
Send(new P2PMsg_OnError(msg.routing_id(), socket_id));
return;
}
if (socket->Init(local_address, remote_address)) {
sockets_.insert(std::pair<ExtendedSocketId, P2PSocketHost*>(
ExtendedSocketId(msg.routing_id(), socket_id), socket.release()));
}
}
Commit Message: Fixing Coverity bugs (DEAD_CODE and PASS_BY_VALUE)
CIDs 16230, 16439, 16610, 16635
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7215029
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@90134 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 98,465 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit RegistrationCallback(ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver)
: m_resolver(resolver) { }
Commit Message: Check CSP before registering ServiceWorkers
Service Worker registrations should be subject to the same CSP checks as
other workers. The spec doesn't say this explicitly
(https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#directive-child-src-workers says "Worker or
SharedWorker constructors"), but it seems to be in the spirit of things,
and it matches Firefox's behavior.
BUG=579801
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1861253004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385775}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 156,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int timer_deserialize_item(Unit *u, const char *key, const char *value, FDSet *fds) {
Timer *t = TIMER(u);
int r;
assert(u);
assert(key);
assert(value);
assert(fds);
if (streq(key, "state")) {
TimerState state;
state = timer_state_from_string(value);
if (state < 0)
log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse state value: %s", value);
else
t->deserialized_state = state;
} else if (streq(key, "result")) {
TimerResult f;
f = timer_result_from_string(value);
if (f < 0)
log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse result value: %s", value);
else if (f != TIMER_SUCCESS)
t->result = f;
} else if (streq(key, "last-trigger-realtime")) {
r = safe_atou64(value, &t->last_trigger.realtime);
if (r < 0)
log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse last-trigger-realtime value: %s", value);
} else if (streq(key, "last-trigger-monotonic")) {
r = safe_atou64(value, &t->last_trigger.monotonic);
if (r < 0)
log_unit_debug(u, "Failed to parse last-trigger-monotonic value: %s", value);
} else
log_unit_debug(u, "Unknown serialization key: %s", key);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: util-lib: use MODE_INVALID as invalid value for mode_t everywhere
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 96,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ImageInputType::hasLegalLinkAttribute(const QualifiedName& name) const
{
return name == srcAttr || BaseButtonInputType::hasLegalLinkAttribute(name);
}
Commit Message: ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
CWE ID: CWE-361 | 0 | 133,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vfat_revalidate_ci(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (nd && nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
return -ECHILD;
/*
* This is not negative dentry. Always valid.
*
* Note, rename() to existing directory entry will have ->d_inode,
* and will use existing name which isn't specified name by user.
*
* We may be able to drop this positive dentry here. But dropping
* positive dentry isn't good idea. So it's unsupported like
* rename("filename", "FILENAME") for now.
*/
if (dentry->d_inode)
return 1;
/*
* This may be nfsd (or something), anyway, we can't see the
* intent of this. So, since this can be for creation, drop it.
*/
if (!nd)
return 0;
/*
* Drop the negative dentry, in order to make sure to use the
* case sensitive name which is specified by user if this is
* for creation.
*/
if (nd->flags & (LOOKUP_CREATE | LOOKUP_RENAME_TARGET))
return 0;
return vfat_revalidate_shortname(dentry);
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 33,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void user_write_data(png_structp png_ptr, png_bytep data, png_size_t length)
{
struct rwpng_write_state *write_state = (struct rwpng_write_state *)png_get_io_ptr(png_ptr);
if (SUCCESS != write_state->retval) {
return;
}
if (!fwrite(data, length, 1, write_state->outfile)) {
write_state->retval = CANT_WRITE_ERROR;
}
write_state->bytes_written += length;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in rwpng.h (CVE-2016-5735)
Reported by Choi Jaeseung
Found with Sparrow (http://ropas.snu.ac.kr/sparrow)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 73,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_start_time(base::TimeTicks start_time) { start_time_ = start_time; }
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 156,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HTMLInputElement::selectionStartForBinding(ExceptionCode& ec) const
{
if (!canHaveSelection()) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return 0;
}
return HTMLTextFormControlElement::selectionStart();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::CreateRenderWidgetHostViewForRenderManager(
RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* rwh_view =
view_->CreateViewForWidget(render_view_host->GetWidget(), false);
if (rwh_view)
rwh_view->SetSize(GetSizeForNewRenderView());
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,248 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromePaymentRequestDelegate::ShowDialog(PaymentRequest* request) {
DCHECK_EQ(nullptr, dialog_);
dialog_ = chrome::CreatePaymentRequestDialog(request);
dialog_->ShowDialog();
}
Commit Message: [Payments] Prohibit opening payments UI in background tab.
Before this patch, calling PaymentRequest.show() would bring the
background window to the foreground, which allows a page to open a
pop-under.
This patch adds a check for the browser window being active (in
foreground) in PaymentRequest.show(). If the window is not active (in
background), then PaymentRequest.show() promise is rejected with
"AbortError: User cancelled request." No UI is shown in that case.
After this patch, calling PaymentRequest.show() does not bring the
background window to the foreground, thus preventing opening a pop-under.
Bug: 768230
Change-Id: I2b90f9086ceca5ed7b7bdf8045e44d7e99d566d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/681843
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504406}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DRM_ENUM_NAME_FN(drm_get_dirty_info_name,
drm_dirty_info_enum_list)
struct drm_conn_prop_enum_list {
int type;
char *name;
int count;
};
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPluginProxy::ReportExecutableMemory(size_t size) {
PluginThread::current()->Send(
new PluginProcessHostMsg_ReportExecutableMemory(size));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::configureTextTrackDisplay() {
DCHECK(m_textTracks);
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "configureTextTrackDisplay(" << (void*)this << ")";
if (m_processingPreferenceChange)
return;
bool haveVisibleTextTrack = m_textTracks->hasShowingTracks();
m_textTracksVisible = haveVisibleTextTrack;
if (!haveVisibleTextTrack && !mediaControls())
return;
cueTimeline().updateActiveCues(currentTime());
updateTextTrackDisplay();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int BrowserView::GetExtraRenderViewHeight() const {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,352 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: open_patch_file (char const *filename)
{
file_offset file_pos = 0;
file_offset pos;
struct stat st;
if (!filename || !*filename || strEQ (filename, "-"))
pfp = stdin;
else
{
pfp = fopen (filename, binary_transput ? "rb" : "r");
if (!pfp)
pfatal ("Can't open patch file %s", quotearg (filename));
}
#if HAVE_SETMODE_DOS
if (binary_transput)
{
if (isatty (fileno (pfp)))
fatal ("cannot read binary data from tty on this platform");
setmode (fileno (pfp), O_BINARY);
}
#endif
if (fstat (fileno (pfp), &st) != 0)
pfatal ("fstat");
if (S_ISREG (st.st_mode) && (pos = file_tell (pfp)) != -1)
file_pos = pos;
else
{
size_t charsread;
int fd = make_tempfile (&TMPPATNAME, 'p', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
FILE *read_pfp = pfp;
TMPPATNAME_needs_removal = true;
pfp = fdopen (fd, "w+b");
if (! pfp)
pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (TMPPATNAME));
for (st.st_size = 0;
(charsread = fread (buf, 1, bufsize, read_pfp)) != 0;
st.st_size += charsread)
if (fwrite (buf, 1, charsread, pfp) != charsread)
write_fatal ();
if (ferror (read_pfp) || fclose (read_pfp) != 0)
read_fatal ();
if (fflush (pfp) != 0
|| file_seek (pfp, (file_offset) 0, SEEK_SET) != 0)
write_fatal ();
}
p_filesize = st.st_size;
if (p_filesize != (file_offset) p_filesize)
fatal ("patch file is too long");
next_intuit_at (file_pos, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 16,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: chunk_message(struct chunk *chunk, const char *message)
{
type_message(chunk->file, chunk->chunk_type, message);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::DispatchDidFailProvisionalLoad(
const ResourceError& error,
WebHistoryCommitType commit_type) {
web_frame_->DidFail(error, true, commit_type);
virtual_time_pauser_.UnpauseVirtualTime();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __init int seqgen_init(void)
{
rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MojoAudioOutputStream::OnError() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
DCHECK(deleter_callback_);
std::move(deleter_callback_).Run(); // Deletes |this|.
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,542 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnDidStopLoading() {
delegate_->DidStopLoading(this);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnWindowFocused(aura::Window* gained_focus,
aura::Window* lost_focus) {
DCHECK(window_ == gained_focus || window_ == lost_focus);
if (window_ == gained_focus) {
if (host_->ignore_input_events())
return;
host_->GotFocus();
host_->SetActive(true);
ui::InputMethod* input_method = GetInputMethod();
if (input_method) {
input_method->SetFocusedTextInputClient(this);
}
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
host_->GetRootBrowserAccessibilityManager();
if (manager)
manager->OnWindowFocused();
} else if (window_ == lost_focus) {
host_->SetActive(false);
host_->Blur();
DetachFromInputMethod();
selection_controller_->HideAndDisallowShowingAutomatically();
if (overscroll_controller_)
overscroll_controller_->Cancel();
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
host_->GetRootBrowserAccessibilityManager();
if (manager)
manager->OnWindowBlurred();
display::Screen* screen = display::Screen::GetScreen();
bool focusing_other_display =
gained_focus && screen->GetNumDisplays() > 1 &&
(screen->GetDisplayNearestWindow(window_).id() !=
screen->GetDisplayNearestWindow(gained_focus).id());
if (is_fullscreen_ && !in_shutdown_ && !focusing_other_display) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (!gained_focus) {
POINT point = {0};
::GetCursorPos(&point);
if (screen->GetDisplayNearestWindow(window_).id() !=
screen->GetDisplayNearestPoint(gfx::Point(point)).id())
return;
}
#endif
Shutdown();
return;
}
if (popup_child_host_view_)
popup_child_host_view_->Shutdown();
}
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int i;
unsigned char max_level = 0;
int unix_sock_count = 0;
if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
return -ETOOMANYREFS;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]);
if (sk) {
unix_sock_count++;
max_level = max(max_level,
unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level);
}
}
if (unlikely(max_level > MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL))
return -ETOOMANYREFS;
/*
* Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage
* collection. Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a
* candidate for GC while the skb is not yet queued.
*/
UNIXCB(skb).fp = scm_fp_dup(scm->fp);
if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
return max_level;
}
Commit Message: unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.
To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.
Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 167,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<AccessibilityUIElement> AccessibilityUIElement::linkedUIElementAtIndex(unsigned index)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [GTK][WTR] Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=102951
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
Implement AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue in the ATK backend
in the same manner it is implemented in DumpRenderTree.
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/atk/AccessibilityUIElementAtk.cpp:
(WTR::replaceCharactersForResults):
(WTR):
(WTR::AccessibilityUIElement::stringValue):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@135485 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeURLRequestContextGetter::CreateOriginalForIsolatedApp(
Profile* profile,
const ProfileIOData* profile_io_data,
const StoragePartitionDescriptor& partition_descriptor,
scoped_ptr<ProtocolHandlerRegistry::JobInterceptorFactory>
protocol_handler_interceptor,
content::ProtocolHandlerMap* protocol_handlers) {
DCHECK(!profile->IsOffTheRecord());
ChromeURLRequestContextGetter* main_context =
static_cast<ChromeURLRequestContextGetter*>(profile->GetRequestContext());
return new ChromeURLRequestContextGetter(
new FactoryForIsolatedApp(profile_io_data, partition_descriptor,
main_context,
protocol_handler_interceptor.Pass(),
protocol_handlers));
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Node* Document::adoptNode(Node* source, ExceptionState& exception_state) {
EventQueueScope scope;
switch (source->getNodeType()) {
case kDocumentNode:
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"The node provided is of type '" +
source->nodeName() +
"', which may not be adopted.");
return nullptr;
case kAttributeNode: {
Attr* attr = ToAttr(source);
if (Element* owner_element = attr->ownerElement())
owner_element->removeAttributeNode(attr, exception_state);
break;
}
default:
if (source->IsShadowRoot()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kHierarchyRequestError,
"The node provided is a shadow root, which may not be adopted.");
return nullptr;
}
if (auto* frame_owner_element =
DynamicTo<HTMLFrameOwnerElement>(source)) {
if (GetFrame() && GetFrame()->Tree().IsDescendantOf(
frame_owner_element->ContentFrame())) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kHierarchyRequestError,
"The node provided is a frame which contains this document.");
return nullptr;
}
}
if (source->parentNode()) {
source->parentNode()->RemoveChild(source, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return nullptr;
if (source->parentNode()) {
AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kJSMessageSource, mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kWarning,
ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("adoptNode", "Document",
"Unable to remove the "
"specified node from the "
"original parent.")));
return nullptr;
}
}
}
AdoptIfNeeded(*source);
return source;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init crc32_pclmul_mod_init(void)
{
if (!x86_match_cpu(crc32pclmul_cpu_id)) {
pr_info("PCLMULQDQ-NI instructions are not detected.\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
return crypto_register_shash(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostQt::notifyAnimationStarted(const WebCore::GraphicsLayer*, double time)
{
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
size_t i, sig_len;
unsigned char hash[48];
unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
size_t hashlen;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
#endif
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) );
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ||
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
/* Read the message without adding it to the checksum */
do {
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_read_record_layer" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
ret = mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type( ssl );
} while( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL == ret );
if( 0 != ret )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->state++;
/* Process the message contents */
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ||
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
}
i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
/*
* struct {
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only
* opaque signature<0..2^16-1>;
* } DigitallySigned;
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
hashlen = 36;
/* For ECDSA, use SHA-1, not MD-5 + SHA-1 */
if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) )
{
hash_start += 16;
hashlen -= 16;
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 ||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
}
/*
* Hash
*/
md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( ssl->in_msg[i] );
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md( ssl, ssl->in_msg[i] ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
" for verify message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1)
if( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 == md_alg )
hash_start += 16;
#endif
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
hashlen = 0;
i++;
/*
* Signature
*/
if( ( pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( ssl->in_msg[i] ) )
== MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg"
" for verify message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
}
/*
* Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sig_alg doesn't match cert key" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
}
i++;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
}
sig_len = ( ssl->in_msg[i] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[i+1];
i += 2;
if( i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY );
}
/* Calculate hash and verify signature */
ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
return( ret );
}
mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate verify" ) );
return( ret );
}
Commit Message: Prevent bounds check bypass through overflow in PSK identity parsing
The check `if( *p + n > end )` in `ssl_parse_client_psk_identity` is
unsafe because `*p + n` might overflow, thus bypassing the check. As
`n` is a user-specified value up to 65K, this is relevant if the
library happens to be located in the last 65K of virtual memory.
This commit replaces the check by a safe version.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 86,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t getMinTimestampIdx(OMX_S64 *pNTimeStamp, bool *pIsTimeStampValid) {
OMX_S64 minTimeStamp = LLONG_MAX;
int idx = -1;
for (size_t i = 0; i < MAX_TIME_STAMPS; i++) {
if (pIsTimeStampValid[i]) {
if (pNTimeStamp[i] < minTimeStamp) {
minTimeStamp = pNTimeStamp[i];
idx = i;
}
}
}
return idx;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_RINIT_FUNCTION(libxml)
{
if (_php_libxml_per_request_initialization) {
/* report errors via handler rather than stderr */
xmlSetGenericErrorFunc(NULL, php_libxml_error_handler);
xmlParserInputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_input_buffer_create_filename);
xmlOutputBufferCreateFilenameDefault(php_libxml_output_buffer_create_filename);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t nr_overcommit_hugepages_store(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count)
{
int err;
unsigned long input;
struct hstate *h = kobj_to_hstate(kobj, NULL);
if (hstate_is_gigantic(h))
return -EINVAL;
err = kstrtoul(buf, 10, &input);
if (err)
return err;
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
h->nr_overcommit_huge_pages = input;
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
return count;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,408 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vr_get(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
void *kbuf, void __user *ubuf)
{
int ret;
flush_altivec_to_thread(target);
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct thread_struct, vscr) !=
offsetof(struct thread_struct, vr[32]));
ret = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.vr, 0,
33 * sizeof(vector128));
if (!ret) {
/*
* Copy out only the low-order word of vrsave.
*/
union {
elf_vrreg_t reg;
u32 word;
} vrsave;
memset(&vrsave, 0, sizeof(vrsave));
vrsave.word = target->thread.vrsave;
ret = user_regset_copyout(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &vrsave,
33 * sizeof(vector128), -1);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::clipOut(const IntRect& rect)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
SkRect r(rect);
if (!isRectSkiaSafe(getCTM(), r))
return;
platformContext()->canvas()->clipRect(r, SkRegion::kDifference_Op);
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 107,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ApplyPSDOpacityMask(Image *image,const Image *mask,
Quantum background,MagickBooleanType revert,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*complete_mask;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickPixelPacket
color;
ssize_t
y;
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" applying opacity mask");
complete_mask=CloneImage(image,image->columns,image->rows,MagickTrue,
exception);
complete_mask->matte=MagickTrue;
GetMagickPixelPacket(complete_mask,&color);
color.red=background;
SetImageColor(complete_mask,&color);
status=CompositeImage(complete_mask,OverCompositeOp,mask,
mask->page.x-image->page.x,mask->page.y-image->page.y);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
complete_mask=DestroyImage(complete_mask);
return(status);
}
image->matte=MagickTrue;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
p=GetAuthenticPixels(complete_mask,0,y,complete_mask->columns,1,exception);
if ((q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) || (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
MagickRealType
alpha,
intensity;
alpha=GetPixelAlpha(q);
intensity=GetPixelIntensity(complete_mask,p);
if (revert == MagickFalse)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ClampToQuantum(intensity*(QuantumScale*alpha)));
else if (intensity > 0)
SetPixelAlpha(q,ClampToQuantum((alpha/intensity)*QuantumRange));
q++;
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
complete_mask=DestroyImage(complete_mask);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TrailingObjects::updateMidpointsForTrailingBoxes(LineMidpointState& lineMidpointState, const InlineIterator& lBreak, CollapseFirstSpaceOrNot collapseFirstSpace)
{
if (!m_whitespace)
return;
if (lineMidpointState.numMidpoints % 2) {
int trailingSpaceMidpoint = lineMidpointState.numMidpoints - 1;
for ( ; trailingSpaceMidpoint > 0 && lineMidpointState.midpoints[trailingSpaceMidpoint].m_obj != m_whitespace; --trailingSpaceMidpoint) { }
ASSERT(trailingSpaceMidpoint >= 0);
if (collapseFirstSpace == CollapseFirstSpace)
lineMidpointState.midpoints[trailingSpaceMidpoint].m_pos--;
size_t currentMidpoint = trailingSpaceMidpoint + 1;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_boxes.size(); ++i) {
if (currentMidpoint >= lineMidpointState.numMidpoints) {
ensureLineBoxInsideIgnoredSpaces(lineMidpointState, m_boxes[i]);
} else {
ASSERT(lineMidpointState.midpoints[currentMidpoint].m_obj == m_boxes[i]);
ASSERT(lineMidpointState.midpoints[currentMidpoint + 1].m_obj == m_boxes[i]);
}
currentMidpoint += 2;
}
} else if (!lBreak.m_obj) {
ASSERT(m_whitespace->isText());
ASSERT(collapseFirstSpace == CollapseFirstSpace);
unsigned length = m_whitespace->textLength();
unsigned pos = length >= 2 ? length - 2 : INT_MAX;
InlineIterator endMid(0, m_whitespace, pos);
startIgnoringSpaces(lineMidpointState, endMid);
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_boxes.size(); ++i) {
ensureLineBoxInsideIgnoredSpaces(lineMidpointState, m_boxes[i]);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lsi_stop_script(LSIState *s)
{
s->istat1 &= ~LSI_ISTAT1_SRUN;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 3,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_as_if_general_body(tvbuff_t *tvb, gint offset, packet_info *pinfo _U_,
proto_tree *tree, usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info)
{
audio_conv_info_t *audio_conv_info;
gint offset_start;
/* the caller has already checked that usb_conv_info!=NULL */
audio_conv_info = (audio_conv_info_t *)usb_conv_info->class_data;
if (!audio_conv_info)
return 0;
offset_start = offset;
if (audio_conv_info->ver_major==1) {
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_gen_term_id,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset++;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_gen_delay,
tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset++;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_gen_format,
tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
}
return offset-offset_start;
}
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 51,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::FilePath ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetShaderDiskCacheDirectory() {
base::FilePath user_data_dir;
base::PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, &user_data_dir);
DCHECK(!user_data_dir.empty());
return user_data_dir.Append(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("ShaderCache"));
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioRendererHost::OverrideDevicePermissionsForTesting(bool has_access) {
authorization_handler_.OverridePermissionsForTesting(has_access);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,189 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ActiveTabChanged(WebContents* old_contents,
WebContents* new_contents,
int index,
int reason) {
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (old_contents && new_contents) {
RenderWidgetHostView* old_view = old_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetView();
RenderWidgetHostView* new_view = new_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetView();
if (old_view && new_view && old_view->GetBackgroundColor())
new_view->SetBackgroundColor(*old_view->GetBackgroundColor());
}
#endif
base::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ActiveTabChanged"));
UpdateBookmarkBarState(BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_TAB_SWITCH);
window_->OnActiveTabChanged(old_contents, new_contents, index, reason);
exclusive_access_manager_->OnTabDetachedFromView(old_contents);
if (chrome_updater_factory_.HasWeakPtrs() && old_contents)
ProcessPendingUIUpdates();
UpdateToolbar((reason & CHANGE_REASON_REPLACED) == 0);
command_controller_->LoadingStateChanged(new_contents->IsLoading(), true);
command_controller_->TabStateChanged();
StatusBubble* status_bubble = GetStatusBubble();
if (status_bubble) {
status_bubble->Hide();
status_bubble->SetStatus(CoreTabHelper::FromWebContents(
tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents())->GetStatusText());
}
if (HasFindBarController()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(new_contents);
find_bar_controller_->find_bar()->MoveWindowIfNecessary(gfx::Rect());
}
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfileIfExisting(profile_);
if (session_service && !tab_strip_model_->closing_all()) {
session_service->SetSelectedTabInWindow(session_id(),
tab_strip_model_->active_index());
SessionTabHelper* session_tab_helper =
SessionTabHelper::FromWebContents(new_contents);
session_service->SetLastActiveTime(session_id(),
session_tab_helper->session_id(),
base::TimeTicks::Now());
}
SearchTabHelper::FromWebContents(new_contents)->OnTabActivated();
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean webkitWebViewBaseKeyPressEvent(GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventKey* event)
{
WebKitWebViewBase* webViewBase = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(widget);
WebKitWebViewBasePrivate* priv = webViewBase->priv;
#if ENABLE(FULLSCREEN_API)
if (priv->fullScreenModeActive) {
switch (event->keyval) {
case GDK_KEY_Escape:
case GDK_KEY_f:
case GDK_KEY_F:
webkitWebViewBaseExitFullScreen(webViewBase);
return TRUE;
default:
break;
}
}
#endif
if (priv->shouldForwardNextKeyEvent) {
priv->shouldForwardNextKeyEvent = FALSE;
return GTK_WIDGET_CLASS(webkit_web_view_base_parent_class)->key_press_event(widget, event);
}
priv->pageProxy->handleKeyboardEvent(NativeWebKeyboardEvent(reinterpret_cast<GdkEvent*>(event)));
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderViewImpl::openDateTimeChooser(
const WebKit::WebDateTimeChooserParams& params,
WebKit::WebDateTimeChooserCompletion* completion) {
date_time_picker_client_.reset(
new RendererDateTimePicker(this, params, completion));
return date_time_picker_client_->Open();
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType DrawPatternPath(Image *image,
const DrawInfo *draw_info,const char *name,Image **pattern,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
property[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*geometry,
*path,
*type;
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
ImageInfo
*image_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(draw_info != (const DrawInfo *) NULL);
assert(name != (const char *) NULL);
(void) FormatLocaleString(property,MagickPathExtent,"%s",name);
path=GetImageArtifact(image,property);
if (path == (const char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
(void) FormatLocaleString(property,MagickPathExtent,"%s-geometry",name);
geometry=GetImageArtifact(image,property);
if (geometry == (const char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
if ((*pattern) != (Image *) NULL)
*pattern=DestroyImage(*pattern);
image_info=AcquireImageInfo();
image_info->size=AcquireString(geometry);
*pattern=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#000000ff",AllCompliance,
&(*pattern)->background_color,exception);
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(*pattern,exception);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"begin pattern-path %s %s",name,geometry);
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
clone_info->fill_pattern=NewImageList();
clone_info->stroke_pattern=NewImageList();
(void) FormatLocaleString(property,MagickPathExtent,"%s-type",name);
type=GetImageArtifact(image,property);
if (type != (const char *) NULL)
clone_info->gradient.type=(GradientType) ParseCommandOption(
MagickGradientOptions,MagickFalse,type);
(void) CloneString(&clone_info->primitive,path);
status=DrawImage(*pattern,clone_info,exception);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),"end pattern-path");
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostManager::RenderFrameHostManager(
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
RenderFrameHostDelegate* render_frame_delegate,
RenderWidgetHostDelegate* render_widget_delegate,
Delegate* delegate)
: frame_tree_node_(frame_tree_node),
delegate_(delegate),
render_frame_delegate_(render_frame_delegate),
render_widget_delegate_(render_widget_delegate),
interstitial_page_(nullptr),
weak_factory_(this) {
DCHECK(frame_tree_node_);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_SET_TUNNEL(const struct ofpact_tunnel *a, struct ds *s)
{
ds_put_format(s, "%sset_tunnel%s:%s%#"PRIx64, colors.param,
(a->tun_id > UINT32_MAX
|| a->ofpact.raw == NXAST_RAW_SET_TUNNEL64 ? "64" : ""),
colors.end, a->tun_id);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::AutoResumeIfValid() {
DVLOG(20) << __func__ << "() " << DebugString(true);
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
ResumeMode mode = GetResumeMode();
if (mode != RESUME_MODE_IMMEDIATE_RESTART &&
mode != RESUME_MODE_IMMEDIATE_CONTINUE) {
return;
}
auto_resume_count_++;
ResumeInterruptedDownload(ResumptionRequestSource::AUTOMATIC);
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_enable_cap *cap)
{
int r;
if (cap->flags)
return -EINVAL;
switch (cap->cap) {
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_64_HANDLER
case KVM_CAP_PPC_ENABLE_HCALL: {
unsigned long hcall = cap->args[0];
r = -EINVAL;
if (hcall > MAX_HCALL_OPCODE || (hcall & 3) ||
cap->args[1] > 1)
break;
if (!kvmppc_book3s_hcall_implemented(kvm, hcall))
break;
if (cap->args[1])
set_bit(hcall / 4, kvm->arch.enabled_hcalls);
else
clear_bit(hcall / 4, kvm->arch.enabled_hcalls);
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_CAP_PPC_SMT: {
unsigned long mode = cap->args[0];
unsigned long flags = cap->args[1];
r = -EINVAL;
if (kvm->arch.kvm_ops->set_smt_mode)
r = kvm->arch.kvm_ops->set_smt_mode(kvm, mode, flags);
break;
}
#endif
default:
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rds_rdma_free_op(struct rm_rdma_op *ro)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < ro->op_nents; i++) {
struct page *page = sg_page(&ro->op_sg[i]);
/* Mark page dirty if it was possibly modified, which
* is the case for a RDMA_READ which copies from remote
* to local memory */
if (!ro->op_write) {
WARN_ON(!page->mapping && irqs_disabled());
set_page_dirty(page);
}
put_page(page);
}
kfree(ro->op_notifier);
ro->op_notifier = NULL;
ro->op_active = 0;
}
Commit Message: rds: Fix NULL pointer dereference in __rds_rdma_map
This is a fix for syzkaller719569, where memory registration was
attempted without any underlying transport being loaded.
Analysis of the case reveals that it is the setsockopt() RDS_GET_MR
(2) and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST (7) that are vulnerable.
Here is an example stack trace when the bug is hit:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c0
IP: __rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
PGD 2f93d03067 P4D 2f93d03067 PUD 2f93d02067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: bridge stp llc tun rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4
dns_resolver nfs fscache rds binfmt_misc sb_edac intel_powerclamp
coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul c rc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd
iTCO_wdt mei_me sg iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si mei ipmi_devintf nfsd
shpchp pcspkr i2c_i801 ioatd ma ipmi_msghandler wmi lpc_ich mfd_core
auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2
mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ixgbe syscopyarea ahci sysfillrect
sysimgblt libahci mdio fb_sys_fops ttm ptp libata sd_mod mlx4_core drm
crc32c_intel pps_core megaraid_sas i2c_core dca dm_mirror
dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
CPU: 48 PID: 45787 Comm: repro_set2 Not tainted 4.14.2-3.el7uek.x86_64 #2
Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017
task: ffff882f9190db00 task.stack: ffffc9002b994000
RIP: 0010:__rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds]
RSP: 0018:ffffc9002b997df0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff882fa2182580 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9002b997e40 RDI: ffff882fa2182580
RBP: ffffc9002b997e30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002
R10: ffff885fb29e3838 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff882fa2182580
R13: ffff882fa2182580 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000020000ffc
FS: 00007fbffa20b700(0000) GS:ffff882fbfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000002f98a66006 CR4: 00000000001606e0
Call Trace:
rds_get_mr+0x56/0x80 [rds]
rds_setsockopt+0x172/0x340 [rds]
? __fget_light+0x25/0x60
? __fdget+0x13/0x20
SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x67/0x1b0
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
RIP: 0033:0x7fbff9b117f9
RSP: 002b:00007fbffa20aed8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000c84a4 RCX: 00007fbff9b117f9
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000400000000114 RDI: 000000000000109b
RBP: 00007fbffa20af10 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 00007fbff9dd7860
R10: 0000000020000ffc R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fbffa20b9c0 R14: 00007fbffa20b700 R15: 0000000000000021
Code: 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 8b 87 f0 02 00 00 48
89 55 d0 48 89 4d c8 85 c0 0f 84 2d 03 00 00 48 8b 87 00 03 00 00 <48>
83 b8 c0 00 00 00 00 0f 84 25 03 00 0 0 48 8b 06 48 8b 56 08
The fix is to check the existence of an underlying transport in
__rds_rdma_map().
Signed-off-by: Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool HandleWebUI(GURL* url, Profile* profile) {
if (!ChromeWebUIFactory::GetInstance()->UseWebUIForURL(profile, *url))
return false;
if (url->SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeInternalScheme)) {
*url = GURL(chrome::kChromeUINewTabURL);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RequestPriority priority() const { return priority_; }
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType ThrowMagickException(ExceptionInfo *exception,
const char *module,const char *function,const size_t line,
const ExceptionType severity,const char *tag,const char *format,...)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
va_list
operands;
va_start(operands,format);
status=ThrowMagickExceptionList(exception,module,function,line,severity,tag,
format,operands);
va_end(operands);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit FastHoleyDoubleElementsAccessor(const char* name)
: FastDoubleElementsAccessor<
FastHoleyDoubleElementsAccessor,
ElementsKindTraits<FAST_HOLEY_DOUBLE_ELEMENTS> >(name) {}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
switch (type) {
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
case PTR_TO_STACK:
case PTR_TO_CTX:
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 91,447 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void sanitize_rfc5988(char *str, size_t len, zval *zv TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval_dtor(zv);
php_trim(str, len, " ><", 3, zv, 3 TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: fix bug #73055
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 94,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_current_time(void)
{
struct timeval tv;
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
return (double) tv.tv_sec + (double) tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 2,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fill_stats(struct task_struct *tsk, struct taskstats *stats)
{
memset(stats, 0, sizeof(*stats));
/*
* Each accounting subsystem adds calls to its functions to
* fill in relevant parts of struct taskstsats as follows
*
* per-task-foo(stats, tsk);
*/
delayacct_add_tsk(stats, tsk);
/* fill in basic acct fields */
stats->version = TASKSTATS_VERSION;
stats->nvcsw = tsk->nvcsw;
stats->nivcsw = tsk->nivcsw;
bacct_add_tsk(stats, tsk);
/* fill in extended acct fields */
xacct_add_tsk(stats, tsk);
}
Commit Message: Make TASKSTATS require root access
Ok, this isn't optimal, since it means that 'iotop' needs admin
capabilities, and we may have to work on this some more. But at the
same time it is very much not acceptable to let anybody just read
anybody elses IO statistics quite at this level.
Use of the GENL_ADMIN_PERM suggested by Johannes Berg as an alternative
to checking the capabilities by hand.
Reported-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 26,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nx842_reset_uselzo(unsigned long data)
{
nx842_uselzo = 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int i2d_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EVP_PKEY,i2d_PUBKEY,bp,pkey);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 94,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_stream_gobble(jas_stream_t *stream, int n)
{
int m;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("jas_stream_gobble(%p, %d)\n", stream, n));
if (n < 0) {
jas_deprecated("negative count for jas_stream_gobble");
}
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_getc(stream) == EOF) {
return n - m;
}
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int unix_stream_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int flags)
{
struct sock_iocb *siocb = kiocb_to_siocb(iocb);
struct scm_cookie tmp_scm;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr = msg->msg_name;
int copied = 0;
int check_creds = 0;
int target;
int err = 0;
long timeo;
int skip;
err = -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags&MSG_OOB)
goto out;
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags&MSG_WAITALL, size);
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags&MSG_DONTWAIT);
msg->msg_namelen = 0;
/* Lock the socket to prevent queue disordering
* while sleeps in memcpy_tomsg
*/
if (!siocb->scm) {
siocb->scm = &tmp_scm;
memset(&tmp_scm, 0, sizeof(tmp_scm));
}
err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock);
if (err) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
goto out;
}
skip = sk_peek_offset(sk, flags);
do {
int chunk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unix_state_lock(sk);
skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
again:
if (skb == NULL) {
unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level = 0;
if (copied >= target)
goto unlock;
/*
* POSIX 1003.1g mandates this order.
*/
err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
goto unlock;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
goto unlock;
unix_state_unlock(sk);
err = -EAGAIN;
if (!timeo)
break;
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
timeo = unix_stream_data_wait(sk, timeo);
if (signal_pending(current)
|| mutex_lock_interruptible(&u->readlock)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
goto out;
}
continue;
unlock:
unix_state_unlock(sk);
break;
}
if (skip >= skb->len) {
skip -= skb->len;
skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
goto again;
}
unix_state_unlock(sk);
if (check_creds) {
/* Never glue messages from different writers */
if ((UNIXCB(skb).pid != siocb->scm->pid) ||
(UNIXCB(skb).cred != siocb->scm->cred))
break;
} else {
/* Copy credentials */
scm_set_cred(siocb->scm, UNIXCB(skb).pid, UNIXCB(skb).cred);
check_creds = 1;
}
/* Copy address just once */
if (sunaddr) {
unix_copy_addr(msg, skb->sk);
sunaddr = NULL;
}
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, skb->len - skip, size);
if (memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, skb->data + skip, chunk)) {
if (copied == 0)
copied = -EFAULT;
break;
}
copied += chunk;
size -= chunk;
/* Mark read part of skb as used */
if (!(flags & MSG_PEEK)) {
skb_pull(skb, chunk);
sk_peek_offset_bwd(sk, chunk);
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
unix_detach_fds(siocb->scm, skb);
if (skb->len)
break;
skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue);
consume_skb(skb);
if (siocb->scm->fp)
break;
} else {
/* It is questionable, see note in unix_dgram_recvmsg.
*/
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
siocb->scm->fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, chunk);
break;
}
} while (size);
mutex_unlock(&u->readlock);
scm_recv(sock, msg, siocb->scm, flags);
out:
return copied ? : err;
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 19,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionService::SetBeingUpgraded(const Extension* extension,
bool value) {
extension_runtime_data_[extension->id()].being_upgraded = value;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZeroSuggestProvider::~ZeroSuggestProvider() {
}
Commit Message: Provide experimental contextual suggestions when current URL comes from a google domain.
The counts for the Omnibox.ZeroSuggestRequests historgram are 35% smaller for groups that are running under the ZeroSuggestRedirectToChrome flag. Note that previous to this CL, a request was not made when the user was visiting an HTTPS page and the domain of the current was different from that of the service providing zero suggestions. This CL addresses this restrictions by making sure that requests are sent to the experimental service when Google is the default search engine AND the same request was validated to be sent to Google.
BUG=692471
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2915163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#476786}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::CommitInstant(TabContentsWrapper* preview_contents) {
TabContentsWrapper* tab_contents = instant_->tab_contents();
int index =
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->GetIndexOfTabContents(tab_contents);
DCHECK_NE(TabStripModel::kNoTab, index);
preview_contents->controller().CopyStateFromAndPrune(
&tab_contents->controller());
TabContentsWrapper* old_contents =
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->ReplaceTabContentsAt(
index, preview_contents);
instant_unload_handler_->RunUnloadListenersOrDestroy(old_contents, index);
GURL url = preview_contents->tab_contents()->GetURL();
if (profile_->GetExtensionService()->IsInstalledApp(url)) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(extension_misc::kAppLaunchHistogram,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_OMNIBOX_INSTANT,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_BUCKET_BOUNDARY);
}
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_nx_flow_format_is_valid(enum nx_flow_format flow_format)
{
return ofputil_nx_flow_format_to_protocol(flow_format) != 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mem_cgroup_count_precharge_pte_range(pmd_t *pmd,
unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,
struct mm_walk *walk)
{
struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->private;
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
split_huge_page_pmd(walk->mm, pmd);
pte = pte_offset_map_lock(vma->vm_mm, pmd, addr, &ptl);
for (; addr != end; pte++, addr += PAGE_SIZE)
if (is_target_pte_for_mc(vma, addr, *pte, NULL))
mc.precharge++; /* increment precharge temporarily */
pte_unmap_unlock(pte - 1, ptl);
cond_resched();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: memcg: Correct unregistring of events attached to the same eventfd
There is an issue when memcg unregisters events that were attached to
the same eventfd:
- On the first call mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() removes all
events attached to a given eventfd, and if there were no events left,
thresholds->primary would become NULL;
- Since there were several events registered, cgroups core will call
mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() again, but now kernel will oops,
as the function doesn't expect that threshold->primary may be NULL.
That's a good question whether mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event()
should actually remove all events in one go, but nowadays it can't
do any better as cftype->unregister_event callback doesn't pass
any private event-associated cookie. So, let's fix the issue by
simply checking for threshold->primary.
FWIW, w/o the patch the following oops may be observed:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
IP: [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
Pid: 574, comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.3.0-rc4+ #9 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810be32c>] [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88001d0b9d60 EFLAGS: 00010246
Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 574, threadinfo ffff88001d0b8000, task ffff88001de91cc0)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8107092b>] cgroup_event_remove+0x2b/0x60
[<ffffffff8103db94>] process_one_work+0x174/0x450
[<ffffffff8103e413>] worker_thread+0x123/0x2d0
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TT_F26Dot6 Read_CVT( EXEC_OPS Int index )
{
return CUR.cvt[index];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void buf_to_pages(const void *buf, size_t buflen,
struct page **pages, unsigned int *pgbase)
{
const void *p = buf;
*pgbase = offset_in_page(buf);
p -= *pgbase;
while (p < buf + buflen) {
*(pages++) = virt_to_page(p);
p += PAGE_CACHE_SIZE;
}
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 165,717 |
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