instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void pretty_print_dev(blkid_dev dev)
{
blkid_tag_iterate iter;
const char *type, *value, *devname;
const char *uuid = "", *fs_type = "", *label = "";
int len, mount_flags;
char mtpt[80];
int retval;
if (dev == NULL) {
pretty_print_line("device", "fs_type", "label",
"mount point", "UUID");
for (len=get_terminal_width()-1; len > 0; len--)
fputc('-', stdout);
fputc('\n', stdout);
return;
}
devname = blkid_dev_devname(dev);
if (access(devname, F_OK))
return;
/* Get the uuid, label, type */
iter = blkid_tag_iterate_begin(dev);
while (blkid_tag_next(iter, &type, &value) == 0) {
if (!strcmp(type, "UUID"))
uuid = value;
if (!strcmp(type, "TYPE"))
fs_type = value;
if (!strcmp(type, "LABEL"))
label = value;
}
blkid_tag_iterate_end(iter);
/* Get the mount point */
mtpt[0] = 0;
retval = check_mount_point(devname, &mount_flags, mtpt, sizeof(mtpt));
if (retval == 0) {
if (mount_flags & MF_MOUNTED) {
if (!mtpt[0])
strcpy(mtpt, "(mounted, mtpt unknown)");
} else if (mount_flags & MF_BUSY)
strcpy(mtpt, "(in use)");
else
strcpy(mtpt, "(not mounted)");
}
pretty_print_line(devname, fs_type, label, mtpt, uuid);
}
Commit Message: libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 74,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_get_referral(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *name, struct nfs_fattr *fattr, struct nfs_fh *fhandle)
{
int status = -ENOMEM;
struct page *page = NULL;
struct nfs4_fs_locations *locations = NULL;
page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (page == NULL)
goto out;
locations = kmalloc(sizeof(struct nfs4_fs_locations), GFP_KERNEL);
if (locations == NULL)
goto out;
status = nfs4_proc_fs_locations(dir, name, locations, page);
if (status != 0)
goto out;
/* Make sure server returned a different fsid for the referral */
if (nfs_fsid_equal(&NFS_SERVER(dir)->fsid, &locations->fattr.fsid)) {
dprintk("%s: server did not return a different fsid for a referral at %s\n", __func__, name->name);
status = -EIO;
goto out;
}
memcpy(fattr, &locations->fattr, sizeof(struct nfs_fattr));
fattr->valid |= NFS_ATTR_FATTR_V4_REFERRAL;
if (!fattr->mode)
fattr->mode = S_IFDIR;
memset(fhandle, 0, sizeof(struct nfs_fh));
out:
if (page)
__free_page(page);
if (locations)
kfree(locations);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PluginInfoMessageFilterTest() :
foo_plugin_path_(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/path/to/foo")),
bar_plugin_path_(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("/path/to/bar")),
file_thread_(content::BrowserThread::FILE, &message_loop_) {
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int64_t http_seek(URLContext *h, int64_t off, int whence)
{
return http_seek_internal(h, off, whence, 0);
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,866 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *set_sethandler(cmd_parms *cmd,
void *d_,
const char *arg_)
{
core_dir_config *dirconf = d_;
const char *err;
dirconf->expr_handler = ap_expr_parse_cmd(cmd, arg_,
AP_EXPR_FLAG_STRING_RESULT,
&err, NULL);
if (err) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool,
"Can't parse expression : ", err, NULL);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::InitializeDiscardableTextureCHROMIUM(
GLuint texture_id) {
ClientDiscardableTextureManager* manager =
share_group()->discardable_texture_manager();
if (manager->TextureIsValid(texture_id)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glInitializeDiscardableTextureCHROMIUM",
"Texture ID already initialized");
return;
}
ClientDiscardableHandle handle =
manager->InitializeTexture(helper_->command_buffer(), texture_id);
if (!handle.IsValid())
return;
helper_->InitializeDiscardableTextureCHROMIUM(texture_id, handle.shm_id(),
handle.byte_offset());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ObjectBackedNativeHandler::DeletePrivate(v8::Local<v8::Object> obj,
const char* key) {
DeletePrivate(context_->v8_context(), obj, key);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,612 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShellWindowFrameView::ShellWindowFrameView()
: frame_(NULL),
close_button_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 1 | 170,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::DispatchFocusInEvent(
const AtomicString& event_type,
Element* old_focused_element,
WebFocusType type,
InputDeviceCapabilities* source_capabilities) {
if (event_type == EventTypeNames::DOMFocusIn)
input_type_view_->HandleFocusInEvent(old_focused_element, type);
HTMLFormControlElementWithState::DispatchFocusInEvent(
event_type, old_focused_element, type, source_capabilities);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WaitForIOThreadCompletion() {
ChildProcess::current()->io_message_loop()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&WaitCallback, base::Unretained(event_.get())));
EXPECT_TRUE(event_->TimedWait(
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(TestTimeouts::action_timeout_ms())));
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void SVGComment(void *context,const xmlChar *value)
{
SVGInfo
*svg_info;
/*
A comment has been parsed.
*/
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," SAX.comment(%s)",
value);
svg_info=(SVGInfo *) context;
if (svg_info->comment != (char *) NULL)
(void) ConcatenateString(&svg_info->comment,"\n");
(void) ConcatenateString(&svg_info->comment,(const char *) value);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostImpl::GotResponseToLockMouseRequest(bool allowed) {
if (!allowed) {
RejectMouseLockOrUnlockIfNecessary();
return false;
} else {
if (!pending_mouse_lock_request_) {
return false;
}
pending_mouse_lock_request_ = false;
if (!view_ || !view_->HasFocus()|| !view_->LockMouse()) {
Send(new ViewMsg_LockMouse_ACK(routing_id_, false));
return false;
} else {
Send(new ViewMsg_LockMouse_ACK(routing_id_, true));
return true;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PlatformWheelEvent constructRelativeWheelEvent(const PlatformWheelEvent& e,
FramelessScrollView* parent,
FramelessScrollView* child)
{
IntPoint pos = parent->convertSelfToChild(child, e.position());
PlatformWheelEvent relativeEvent = e;
IntPoint& relativePos = const_cast<IntPoint&>(relativeEvent.position());
relativePos.setX(pos.x());
relativePos.setY(pos.y());
return relativeEvent;
}
Commit Message: [REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 108,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t NumberOfElementsImpl(JSObject* receiver,
FixedArrayBase* backing_store) {
FixedArray* parameter_map = FixedArray::cast(backing_store);
FixedArrayBase* arguments = FixedArrayBase::cast(parameter_map->get(1));
uint32_t nof_elements = 0;
uint32_t length = parameter_map->length() - 2;
for (uint32_t entry = 0; entry < length; entry++) {
if (HasParameterMapArg(parameter_map, entry)) nof_elements++;
}
return nof_elements +
ArgumentsAccessor::NumberOfElementsImpl(receiver, arguments);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RList* symbols(RBinFile *bf) {
struct Elf_(r_bin_elf_obj_t) *bin;
struct r_bin_elf_symbol_t *symbol = NULL;
RBinSymbol *ptr = NULL;
RList *ret = NULL;
int i;
if (!bf|| !bf->o || !bf->o->bin_obj) {
return NULL;
}
bin = bf->o->bin_obj;
ret = r_list_newf (free);
if (!ret) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(symbol = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_symbols) (bin))) {
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; !symbol[i].last; i++) {
ut64 paddr = symbol[i].offset;
ut64 vaddr = Elf_(r_bin_elf_p2v) (bin, paddr);
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinSymbol))) {
break;
}
ptr->name = strdup (symbol[i].name);
ptr->forwarder = r_str_const ("NONE");
ptr->bind = r_str_const (symbol[i].bind);
ptr->type = r_str_const (symbol[i].type);
ptr->paddr = paddr;
ptr->vaddr = vaddr;
ptr->size = symbol[i].size;
ptr->ordinal = symbol[i].ordinal;
setsymord (bin, ptr->ordinal, ptr);
if (bin->ehdr.e_machine == EM_ARM && *ptr->name) {
_set_arm_thumb_bits (bin, &ptr);
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
}
if (!(symbol = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_imports) (bin))) {
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; !symbol[i].last; i++) {
ut64 paddr = symbol[i].offset;
ut64 vaddr = Elf_(r_bin_elf_p2v) (bin, paddr);
if (!symbol[i].size) {
continue;
}
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinSymbol))) {
break;
}
ptr->name = r_str_newf ("imp.%s", symbol[i].name);
ptr->forwarder = r_str_const ("NONE");
ptr->bind = r_str_const (symbol[i].bind);
ptr->type = r_str_const (symbol[i].type);
ptr->paddr = paddr;
ptr->vaddr = vaddr;
if (ptr->vaddr == UT32_MAX) {
ptr->paddr = 0;
ptr->vaddr = 0;
}
ptr->size = symbol[i].size;
ptr->ordinal = symbol[i].ordinal;
setsymord (bin, ptr->ordinal, ptr);
/* detect thumb */
if (bin->ehdr.e_machine == EM_ARM) {
_set_arm_thumb_bits (bin, &ptr);
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void AttachBlob(BlobInfo *blob_info,const void *blob,
const size_t length)
{
assert(blob_info != (BlobInfo *) NULL);
if (blob_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
blob_info->length=length;
blob_info->extent=length;
blob_info->quantum=(size_t) MagickMaxBlobExtent;
blob_info->offset=0;
blob_info->type=BlobStream;
blob_info->file_info.file=(FILE *) NULL;
blob_info->data=(unsigned char *) blob;
blob_info->mapped=MagickFalse;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ssize_t fuse_direct_io(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write)
{
struct fuse_file *ff = file->private_data;
struct fuse_conn *fc = ff->fc;
size_t nmax = write ? fc->max_write : fc->max_read;
loff_t pos = *ppos;
ssize_t res = 0;
struct fuse_req *req;
req = fuse_get_req(fc);
if (IS_ERR(req))
return PTR_ERR(req);
while (count) {
size_t nres;
fl_owner_t owner = current->files;
size_t nbytes = min(count, nmax);
int err = fuse_get_user_pages(req, buf, &nbytes, write);
if (err) {
res = err;
break;
}
if (write)
nres = fuse_send_write(req, file, pos, nbytes, owner);
else
nres = fuse_send_read(req, file, pos, nbytes, owner);
fuse_release_user_pages(req, !write);
if (req->out.h.error) {
if (!res)
res = req->out.h.error;
break;
} else if (nres > nbytes) {
res = -EIO;
break;
}
count -= nres;
res += nres;
pos += nres;
buf += nres;
if (nres != nbytes)
break;
if (count) {
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
req = fuse_get_req(fc);
if (IS_ERR(req))
break;
}
}
if (!IS_ERR(req))
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
if (res > 0)
*ppos = pos;
return res;
}
Commit Message: fuse: verify ioctl retries
Verify that the total length of the iovec returned in FUSE_IOCTL_RETRY
doesn't overflow iov_length().
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
CC: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.31+]
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform2iv(
GLint fake_location, GLsizei count, const GLint* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniform2iv",
Program::kUniform2i,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
glUniform2iv(real_location, count, value);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::OnMouseDragged(const ui::MouseEvent& event) {
if (filter_drag_events_for_unelision_ &&
!ExceededDragThreshold(event.root_location() -
GetLastClickRootLocation())) {
return true;
}
if (HasTextBeingDragged())
CloseOmniboxPopup();
bool handled = views::Textfield::OnMouseDragged(event);
if (HasSelection() || ExceededDragThreshold(event.root_location() -
GetLastClickRootLocation())) {
select_all_on_mouse_release_ = false;
}
return handled;
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 142,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::TimeTicks RendererSchedulerImpl::CurrentIdleTaskDeadlineForTesting()
const {
return idle_helper_.CurrentIdleTaskDeadline();
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,391 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_input_parameters(uint32_t sample_rate,
audio_format_t format,
int channel_count)
{
if (format != AUDIO_FORMAT_PCM_16_BIT) return -EINVAL;
if ((channel_count < 1) || (channel_count > 4)) return -EINVAL;
switch (sample_rate) {
case 8000:
case 11025:
case 12000:
case 16000:
case 22050:
case 24000:
case 32000:
case 44100:
case 48000:
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,260 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
char **value)
{
int error = -ENOENT;
/* released below */
const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->profile);
else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && cxt->previous)
profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->previous);
else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && cxt->onexec)
profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
else
error = -EINVAL;
if (profile)
error = aa_getprocattr(profile, value);
aa_put_profile(profile);
put_cred(cred);
return error;
}
Commit Message: apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DeprecatedLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->deprecatedLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fetch_bit_operand(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
long sv = 0, mask;
if (ctxt->dst.type == OP_MEM && ctxt->src.type == OP_REG) {
mask = ~((long)ctxt->dst.bytes * 8 - 1);
if (ctxt->src.bytes == 2)
sv = (s16)ctxt->src.val & (s16)mask;
else if (ctxt->src.bytes == 4)
sv = (s32)ctxt->src.val & (s32)mask;
else
sv = (s64)ctxt->src.val & (s64)mask;
ctxt->dst.addr.mem.ea = address_mask(ctxt,
ctxt->dst.addr.mem.ea + (sv >> 3));
}
/* only subword offset */
ctxt->src.val &= (ctxt->dst.bytes << 3) - 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: SYSENTER emulation is broken
SYSENTER emulation is broken in several ways:
1. It misses the case of 16-bit code segments completely (CVE-2015-0239).
2. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS is checked in 64-bit mode incorrectly (bits 0 and 1 can
still be set without causing #GP).
3. MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP and MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP are not masked in
legacy-mode.
4. There is some unneeded code.
Fix it.
Cc: stable@vger.linux.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DefragVlanTest(void)
{
Packet *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL, *r = NULL;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
p1 = BuildTestPacket(1, 0, 1, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL)
goto end;
p2 = BuildTestPacket(1, 1, 0, 'B', 8);
if (p2 == NULL)
goto end;
/* With no VLAN IDs set, packets should re-assemble. */
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL)) == NULL)
goto end;
SCFree(r);
/* With mismatched VLANs, packets should not re-assemble. */
p1->vlan_id[0] = 1;
p2->vlan_id[0] = 2;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p1, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
if ((r = Defrag(NULL, NULL, p2, NULL)) != NULL)
goto end;
/* Pass. */
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL)
SCFree(p1);
if (p2 != NULL)
SCFree(p2);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 1 | 168,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nvmet_fc_alloc_target_queue(struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc,
u16 qid, u16 sqsize)
{
struct nvmet_fc_tgt_queue *queue;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
if (qid > NVMET_NR_QUEUES)
return NULL;
queue = kzalloc((sizeof(*queue) +
(sizeof(struct nvmet_fc_fcp_iod) * sqsize)),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!queue)
return NULL;
if (!nvmet_fc_tgt_a_get(assoc))
goto out_free_queue;
queue->work_q = alloc_workqueue("ntfc%d.%d.%d", 0, 0,
assoc->tgtport->fc_target_port.port_num,
assoc->a_id, qid);
if (!queue->work_q)
goto out_a_put;
queue->fod = (struct nvmet_fc_fcp_iod *)&queue[1];
queue->qid = qid;
queue->sqsize = sqsize;
queue->assoc = assoc;
queue->port = assoc->tgtport->port;
queue->cpu = nvmet_fc_queue_to_cpu(assoc->tgtport, qid);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&queue->fod_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&queue->avail_defer_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&queue->pending_cmd_list);
atomic_set(&queue->connected, 0);
atomic_set(&queue->sqtail, 0);
atomic_set(&queue->rsn, 1);
atomic_set(&queue->zrspcnt, 0);
spin_lock_init(&queue->qlock);
kref_init(&queue->ref);
nvmet_fc_prep_fcp_iodlist(assoc->tgtport, queue);
ret = nvmet_sq_init(&queue->nvme_sq);
if (ret)
goto out_fail_iodlist;
WARN_ON(assoc->queues[qid]);
spin_lock_irqsave(&assoc->tgtport->lock, flags);
assoc->queues[qid] = queue;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&assoc->tgtport->lock, flags);
return queue;
out_fail_iodlist:
nvmet_fc_destroy_fcp_iodlist(assoc->tgtport, queue);
destroy_workqueue(queue->work_q);
out_a_put:
nvmet_fc_tgt_a_put(assoc);
out_free_queue:
kfree(queue);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int phar_zip_changed_apply(zval *zv, void *arg) /* {{{ */
{
return phar_zip_changed_apply_int(Z_PTR_P(zv), arg);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,906 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const views::Widget* ShellSurface::GetWidget() const {
return widget_;
}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnEnded() {
TRACE_EVENT2("media", "WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnEnded", "duration", Duration(),
"id", media_log_->id());
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!pipeline_controller_.IsStable())
return;
ended_ = true;
client_->TimeChanged();
frame_time_report_cb_.Cancel();
UpdatePlayState();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const base::Feature* FindFeatureExposedToJava(const std::string& feature_name) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < base::size(kFeaturesExposedToJava); ++i) {
if (kFeaturesExposedToJava[i]->name == feature_name)
return kFeaturesExposedToJava[i];
}
NOTREACHED() << "Queried feature cannot be found in ChromeFeatureList: "
<< feature_name;
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Add feature and flag to enable incognito Chrome Custom Tabs
kCCTIncognito feature and flag are added to enable/disable incognito
Chrome Custom Tabs. The default is set to disabled.
Bug: 1023759
Change-Id: If32d256e3e9eaa94bcc09f7538c85e2dab53c589
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1911201
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714849}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 137,037 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void emit(JF, int value)
{
emitraw(J, F, F->lastline);
emitraw(J, F, value);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700947: Add missing ENDTRY opcode in try/catch/finally byte code.
In one of the code branches in handling exceptions in the catch block
we forgot to call the ENDTRY opcode to pop the inner hidden try.
This leads to an unbalanced exception stack which can cause a crash
due to us jumping to a stack frame that has already been exited.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 90,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: markSyllables(const TranslationTableHeader *table, const InString *input,
formtype *typebuf, int *transOpcode, const TranslationTableRule **transRule,
int *transCharslen) {
int pos;
int k;
int currentMark = 0;
int const syllable_marks[] = { SYLLABLE_MARKER_1, SYLLABLE_MARKER_2 };
int syllable_mark_selector = 0;
if (typebuf == NULL || !table->syllables) return 1;
pos = 0;
while (pos < input->length) { /* the main multipass translation loop */
int length = input->length - pos;
const TranslationTableCharacter *character =
findCharOrDots(input->chars[pos], 0, table);
const TranslationTableCharacter *character2;
int tryThis = 0;
while (tryThis < 3) {
TranslationTableOffset ruleOffset = 0;
unsigned long int makeHash = 0;
switch (tryThis) {
case 0:
if (!(length >= 2)) break;
makeHash = (unsigned long int)character->lowercase << 8;
character2 = findCharOrDots(input->chars[pos + 1], 0, table);
makeHash += (unsigned long int)character2->lowercase;
makeHash %= HASHNUM;
ruleOffset = table->forRules[makeHash];
break;
case 1:
if (!(length >= 1)) break;
length = 1;
ruleOffset = character->otherRules;
break;
case 2: /* No rule found */
*transOpcode = CTO_Always;
ruleOffset = 0;
break;
}
while (ruleOffset) {
*transRule = (TranslationTableRule *)&table->ruleArea[ruleOffset];
*transOpcode = (*transRule)->opcode;
*transCharslen = (*transRule)->charslen;
if (tryThis == 1 ||
(*transCharslen <= length &&
compareChars(&(*transRule)->charsdots[0],
&input->chars[pos], *transCharslen, 0, table))) {
if (*transOpcode == CTO_Syllable) {
tryThis = 4;
break;
}
}
ruleOffset = (*transRule)->charsnext;
}
tryThis++;
}
switch (*transOpcode) {
case CTO_Always:
if (pos >= input->length) return 0;
typebuf[pos++] |= currentMark;
break;
case CTO_Syllable:
/* cycle between SYLLABLE_MARKER_1 and SYLLABLE_MARKER_2 so
* we can distinguinsh two consequtive syllables */
currentMark = syllable_marks[syllable_mark_selector];
syllable_mark_selector = (syllable_mark_selector + 1) % 2;
if ((pos + *transCharslen) > input->length) return 0;
for (k = 0; k < *transCharslen; k++) typebuf[pos++] |= currentMark;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 76,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderViewImpl::CanHandleGestureEvent() {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::CloseWindow() {
DCHECK(IsDocked());
web_contents_->GetRenderViewHost()->FirePageBeforeUnload(false);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dev_cpu_callback(struct notifier_block *nfb,
unsigned long action,
void *ocpu)
{
struct sk_buff **list_skb;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int cpu, oldcpu = (unsigned long)ocpu;
struct softnet_data *sd, *oldsd;
if (action != CPU_DEAD && action != CPU_DEAD_FROZEN)
return NOTIFY_OK;
local_irq_disable();
cpu = smp_processor_id();
sd = &per_cpu(softnet_data, cpu);
oldsd = &per_cpu(softnet_data, oldcpu);
/* Find end of our completion_queue. */
list_skb = &sd->completion_queue;
while (*list_skb)
list_skb = &(*list_skb)->next;
/* Append completion queue from offline CPU. */
*list_skb = oldsd->completion_queue;
oldsd->completion_queue = NULL;
/* Append output queue from offline CPU. */
if (oldsd->output_queue) {
*sd->output_queue_tailp = oldsd->output_queue;
sd->output_queue_tailp = oldsd->output_queue_tailp;
oldsd->output_queue = NULL;
oldsd->output_queue_tailp = &oldsd->output_queue;
}
raise_softirq_irqoff(NET_TX_SOFTIRQ);
local_irq_enable();
/* Process offline CPU's input_pkt_queue */
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&oldsd->process_queue))) {
netif_rx(skb);
input_queue_head_incr(oldsd);
}
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&oldsd->input_pkt_queue))) {
netif_rx(skb);
input_queue_head_incr(oldsd);
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct nlmsghdr *nlmsg_put(struct nl_msg *n, uint32_t pid, uint32_t seq,
int type, int payload, int flags)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
if (n->nm_nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN)
BUG();
nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *) n->nm_nlh;
nlh->nlmsg_type = type;
nlh->nlmsg_flags = flags;
nlh->nlmsg_pid = pid;
nlh->nlmsg_seq = seq;
NL_DBG(2, "msg %p: Added netlink header type=%d, flags=%d, pid=%d, "
"seq=%d\n", n, type, flags, pid, seq);
if (payload > 0 &&
nlmsg_reserve(n, payload, NLMSG_ALIGNTO) == NULL)
return NULL;
return nlh;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 12,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void* sspi_SecureHandleGetLowerPointer(SecHandle* handle)
{
void* pointer;
if (!handle)
return NULL;
pointer = (void*) ~((size_t) handle->dwLower);
return pointer;
}
Commit Message: nla: invalidate sec handle after creation
If sec pointer isn't invalidated after creation it is not possible
to check if the upper and lower pointers are valid.
This fixes a segfault in the server part if the client disconnects before
the authentication was finished.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 167,604 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputDispatcher::shouldSendKeyToInputFilterLocked(const NotifyKeyArgs* args) {
return mInputFilterEnabled;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 163,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
old->cap_permitted)))
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
return -EPERM;
if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
old->cap_bset)))
/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
return -EPERM;
/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted))
return -EPERM;
/* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted))
return -EPERM;
new->cap_effective = *effective;
new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
new->cap_permitted = *permitted;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fcaps: clear the same personality flags as suid when fcaps are used
If a process increases permissions using fcaps all of the dangerous
personality flags which are cleared for suid apps should also be cleared.
Thus programs given priviledge with fcaps will continue to have address space
randomization enabled even if the parent tried to disable it to make it
easier to attack.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ppp_push(struct ppp *ppp)
{
struct list_head *list;
struct channel *pch;
struct sk_buff *skb = ppp->xmit_pending;
if (!skb)
return;
list = &ppp->channels;
if (list_empty(list)) {
/* nowhere to send the packet, just drop it */
ppp->xmit_pending = NULL;
kfree_skb(skb);
return;
}
if ((ppp->flags & SC_MULTILINK) == 0) {
/* not doing multilink: send it down the first channel */
list = list->next;
pch = list_entry(list, struct channel, clist);
spin_lock_bh(&pch->downl);
if (pch->chan) {
if (pch->chan->ops->start_xmit(pch->chan, skb))
ppp->xmit_pending = NULL;
} else {
/* channel got unregistered */
kfree_skb(skb);
ppp->xmit_pending = NULL;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&pch->downl);
return;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK
/* Multilink: fragment the packet over as many links
as can take the packet at the moment. */
if (!ppp_mp_explode(ppp, skb))
return;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK */
ppp->xmit_pending = NULL;
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: ppp: take reference on channels netns
Let channels hold a reference on their network namespace.
Some channel types, like ppp_async and ppp_synctty, can have their
userspace controller running in a different namespace. Therefore they
can't rely on them to preclude their netns from being removed from
under them.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 at
addr ffff880064e217e0
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor/11581
=============================================================================
BUG net_namespace (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 age=92569 cpu=3 pid=6906
[< none >] ___slab_alloc+0x4c7/0x500 kernel/mm/slub.c:2440
[< none >] __slab_alloc+0x4c/0x90 kernel/mm/slub.c:2469
[< inline >] slab_alloc_node kernel/mm/slub.c:2532
[< inline >] slab_alloc kernel/mm/slub.c:2574
[< none >] kmem_cache_alloc+0x23a/0x2b0 kernel/mm/slub.c:2579
[< inline >] kmem_cache_zalloc kernel/include/linux/slab.h:597
[< inline >] net_alloc kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:325
[< none >] copy_net_ns+0x6b/0x1a0 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:360
[< none >] create_new_namespaces+0x2f6/0x610 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:95
[< none >] copy_namespaces+0x297/0x320 kernel/kernel/nsproxy.c:150
[< none >] copy_process.part.35+0x1bf4/0x5760 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1451
[< inline >] copy_process kernel/kernel/fork.c:1274
[< none >] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xcb0 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1723
[< inline >] SYSC_clone kernel/kernel/fork.c:1832
[< none >] SyS_clone+0x37/0x50 kernel/kernel/fork.c:1826
[< none >] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
INFO: Freed in net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 age=575 cpu=2 pid=2631
[< none >] __slab_free+0x1fc/0x320 kernel/mm/slub.c:2650
[< inline >] slab_free kernel/mm/slub.c:2805
[< none >] kmem_cache_free+0x2a0/0x330 kernel/mm/slub.c:2814
[< inline >] net_free kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:341
[< none >] net_drop_ns+0x67/0x80 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:348
[< none >] cleanup_net+0x4e5/0x600 kernel/net/core/net_namespace.c:448
[< none >] process_one_work+0x794/0x1440 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2036
[< none >] worker_thread+0xdb/0xfc0 kernel/kernel/workqueue.c:2170
[< none >] kthread+0x23f/0x2d0 kernel/drivers/block/aoe/aoecmd.c:1303
[< none >] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70 kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:468
INFO: Slab 0xffffea0001938800 objects=3 used=0 fp=0xffff880064e20000
flags=0x5fffc0000004080
INFO: Object 0xffff880064e20000 @offset=0 fp=0xffff880064e24200
CPU: 1 PID: 11581 Comm: syz-executor Tainted: G B 4.4.0+
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
00000000ffffffff ffff8800662c7790 ffffffff8292049d ffff88003e36a300
ffff880064e20000 ffff880064e20000 ffff8800662c77c0 ffffffff816f2054
ffff88003e36a300 ffffea0001938800 ffff880064e20000 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8292049d>] dump_stack+0x6f/0xa2 kernel/lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff816f2054>] print_trailer+0xf4/0x150 kernel/mm/slub.c:654
[<ffffffff816f875f>] object_err+0x2f/0x40 kernel/mm/slub.c:661
[< inline >] print_address_description kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:138
[<ffffffff816fb0c5>] kasan_report_error+0x215/0x530 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:236
[< inline >] kasan_report kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:259
[<ffffffff816fb4de>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 kernel/mm/kasan/report.c:280
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ppp_pernet kernel/include/linux/compiler.h:218
[<ffffffff83ad71b2>] ppp_unregister_channel+0x372/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[< inline >] ? ppp_pernet kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:293
[<ffffffff83ad6f26>] ? ppp_unregister_channel+0xe6/0x3a0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2392
[<ffffffff83ae18f3>] ppp_asynctty_close+0xa3/0x130 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:241
[<ffffffff83ae1850>] ? async_lcp_peek+0x5b0/0x5b0 kernel/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:1000
[<ffffffff82c33239>] tty_ldisc_close.isra.1+0x99/0xe0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:478
[<ffffffff82c332c0>] tty_ldisc_kill+0x40/0x170 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:744
[<ffffffff82c34943>] tty_ldisc_release+0x1b3/0x260 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:772
[<ffffffff82c1ef21>] tty_release+0xac1/0x13e0 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1901
[<ffffffff82c1e460>] ? release_tty+0x320/0x320 kernel/drivers/tty/tty_io.c:1688
[<ffffffff8174de36>] __fput+0x236/0x780 kernel/fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff8174e405>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 kernel/fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813595ab>] task_work_run+0x16b/0x200 kernel/kernel/task_work.c:115
[< inline >] exit_task_work kernel/include/linux/task_work.h:21
[<ffffffff81307105>] do_exit+0x8b5/0x2c60 kernel/kernel/exit.c:750
[<ffffffff813fdd20>] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290 kernel/kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4123
[<ffffffff81306850>] ? mm_update_next_owner+0x6f0/0x6f0 kernel/kernel/exit.c:357
[<ffffffff813215e6>] ? __dequeue_signal+0x136/0x470 kernel/kernel/signal.c:550
[<ffffffff8132067b>] ? recalc_sigpending_tsk+0x13b/0x180 kernel/kernel/signal.c:145
[<ffffffff81309628>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330 kernel/kernel/exit.c:880
[<ffffffff8132b9d4>] get_signal+0x5e4/0x14f0 kernel/kernel/signal.c:2307
[< inline >] ? kretprobe_table_lock kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1113
[<ffffffff8151d355>] ? kprobe_flush_task+0xb5/0x450 kernel/kernel/kprobes.c:1158
[<ffffffff8115f7d3>] do_signal+0x83/0x1c90 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:712
[<ffffffff8151d2a0>] ? recycle_rp_inst+0x310/0x310 kernel/include/linux/list.h:655
[<ffffffff8115f750>] ? setup_sigcontext+0x780/0x780 kernel/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:165
[<ffffffff81380864>] ? finish_task_switch+0x424/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2692
[< inline >] ? finish_lock_switch kernel/kernel/sched/sched.h:1099
[<ffffffff81380560>] ? finish_task_switch+0x120/0x5f0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2678
[< inline >] ? context_switch kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:2807
[<ffffffff85d794e9>] ? __schedule+0x919/0x1bd0 kernel/kernel/sched/core.c:3283
[<ffffffff81003901>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xf1/0x1a0 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:247
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:282
[<ffffffff810062ef>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x19f/0x210 kernel/arch/x86/entry/common.c:344
[<ffffffff85d88022>] int_ret_from_sys_call+0x25/0x9f kernel/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:281
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff880064e21680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff880064e21780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff880064e21800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff880064e21880: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 273ec51dd7ce ("net: ppp_generic - introduce net-namespace functionality v2")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 52,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Extension::LoadExtensionFeatures(APIPermissionSet* api_permissions,
string16* error) {
if (manifest_->HasKey(keys::kConvertedFromUserScript))
manifest_->GetBoolean(keys::kConvertedFromUserScript,
&converted_from_user_script_);
if (!LoadContentScripts(error) ||
!LoadPageAction(error) ||
!LoadSystemIndicator(api_permissions, error) ||
!LoadIncognitoMode(error) ||
!LoadContentSecurityPolicy(error))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 114,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::Cleanup() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (state_ == kUninitialized || state_ == kDestroying)
return;
VLOGF(2) << "Destroying VAVDA";
state_ = kDestroying;
client_ptr_factory_.reset();
weak_this_factory_.InvalidateWeakPtrs();
input_ready_.Signal();
surfaces_available_.Signal();
{
base::AutoUnlock auto_unlock(lock_);
decoder_thread_.Stop();
}
state_ = kUninitialized;
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 172,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wep_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p)
{
uint32_t iv;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, IEEE802_11_IV_LEN + IEEE802_11_KID_LEN))
return 0;
iv = EXTRACT_LE_32BITS(p);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " IV:%3x Pad %x KeyID %x", IV_IV(iv), IV_PAD(iv),
IV_KEYID(iv)));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebUILoginView::Layout() {
DCHECK(webui_login_);
webui_login_->SetBoundsRect(bounds());
}
Commit Message: [cros] Allow media streaming for OOBE WebUI.
BUG=122764
TEST=Manual with --enable-html5-camera
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144899 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabletModeWindowManager::OnDisplayRemoved(
const display::Display& display) {
DisplayConfigurationChanged();
}
Commit Message: Fix the crash after clamshell -> tablet transition in overview mode.
This CL just reverted some changes that were made in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1658955. In
that CL, we changed the clamshell <-> tablet transition when clamshell
split view mode is enabled, however, we should keep the old behavior
unchanged if the feature is not enabled, i.e., overview should be ended
if it's active before the transition. Otherwise, it will cause a nullptr
dereference crash since |split_view_drag_indicators_| is not created in
clamshell overview and will be used in tablet overview.
Bug: 982507
Change-Id: I238fe9472648a446cff4ab992150658c228714dd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1705474
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima (Slow - on/off site) <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679306}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,534 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int may_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
int ret = 1;
down_read(&namespace_sem);
lock_mount_hash();
if (propagate_mount_busy(real_mount(mnt), 2))
ret = 0;
unlock_mount_hash();
up_read(&namespace_sem);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ReadUserLogFileState::getUniqId( char *buf, int len ) const
{
if ( NULL == m_ro_state ) {
return false;
}
strncpy( buf, m_ro_state->internal.m_uniq_id, len );
buf[len-1] = '\0';
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> SerializedScriptValue::create(const String& data)
{
return create(data, v8::Isolate::GetCurrent());
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserSideNavigationBrowserTest() {}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 150,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct page *__page_cache_alloc(gfp_t gfp)
{
if (cpuset_do_page_mem_spread()) {
int n = cpuset_mem_spread_node();
return alloc_pages_node(n, gfp, 0);
}
return alloc_pages(gfp, 0);
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct nfs4_ol_stateid * nfs4_alloc_open_stateid(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
struct nfs4_stid *stid;
stid = nfs4_alloc_stid(clp, stateid_slab, nfs4_free_ol_stateid);
if (!stid)
return NULL;
return openlockstateid(stid);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int inet6_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dst_entry *dst;
dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
rcu_read_lock();
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
&final);
rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
sk->sk_err_soft = -PTR_ERR(dst);
return PTR_ERR(dst);
}
ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 41,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DataReductionProxyConfig::GetProxyConnectionToProbe() const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
const std::vector<DataReductionProxyServer>& proxies =
DataReductionProxyConfig::GetProxiesForHttp();
for (const DataReductionProxyServer& proxy_server : proxies) {
bool is_secure_proxy = proxy_server.IsSecureProxy();
bool is_core_proxy = proxy_server.IsCoreProxy();
if (!network_properties_manager_->HasWarmupURLProbeFailed(is_secure_proxy,
is_core_proxy) &&
network_properties_manager_->ShouldFetchWarmupProbeURL(is_secure_proxy,
is_core_proxy)) {
return proxy_server;
}
}
for (const DataReductionProxyServer& proxy_server : proxies) {
bool is_secure_proxy = proxy_server.IsSecureProxy();
bool is_core_proxy = proxy_server.IsCoreProxy();
if (network_properties_manager_->ShouldFetchWarmupProbeURL(is_secure_proxy,
is_core_proxy)) {
return proxy_server;
}
}
return base::nullopt;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_modrm(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct operand *op)
{
u8 sib;
int index_reg, base_reg, scale;
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
ulong modrm_ea = 0;
ctxt->modrm_reg = ((ctxt->rex_prefix << 1) & 8); /* REX.R */
index_reg = (ctxt->rex_prefix << 2) & 8; /* REX.X */
base_reg = (ctxt->rex_prefix << 3) & 8; /* REX.B */
ctxt->modrm_mod = (ctxt->modrm & 0xc0) >> 6;
ctxt->modrm_reg |= (ctxt->modrm & 0x38) >> 3;
ctxt->modrm_rm = base_reg | (ctxt->modrm & 0x07);
ctxt->modrm_seg = VCPU_SREG_DS;
if (ctxt->modrm_mod == 3 || (ctxt->d & NoMod)) {
op->type = OP_REG;
op->bytes = (ctxt->d & ByteOp) ? 1 : ctxt->op_bytes;
op->addr.reg = decode_register(ctxt, ctxt->modrm_rm,
ctxt->d & ByteOp);
if (ctxt->d & Sse) {
op->type = OP_XMM;
op->bytes = 16;
op->addr.xmm = ctxt->modrm_rm;
read_sse_reg(ctxt, &op->vec_val, ctxt->modrm_rm);
return rc;
}
if (ctxt->d & Mmx) {
op->type = OP_MM;
op->bytes = 8;
op->addr.mm = ctxt->modrm_rm & 7;
return rc;
}
fetch_register_operand(op);
return rc;
}
op->type = OP_MEM;
if (ctxt->ad_bytes == 2) {
unsigned bx = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX);
unsigned bp = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP);
unsigned si = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI);
unsigned di = reg_read(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI);
/* 16-bit ModR/M decode. */
switch (ctxt->modrm_mod) {
case 0:
if (ctxt->modrm_rm == 6)
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(u16, ctxt);
break;
case 1:
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s8, ctxt);
break;
case 2:
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(u16, ctxt);
break;
}
switch (ctxt->modrm_rm) {
case 0:
modrm_ea += bx + si;
break;
case 1:
modrm_ea += bx + di;
break;
case 2:
modrm_ea += bp + si;
break;
case 3:
modrm_ea += bp + di;
break;
case 4:
modrm_ea += si;
break;
case 5:
modrm_ea += di;
break;
case 6:
if (ctxt->modrm_mod != 0)
modrm_ea += bp;
break;
case 7:
modrm_ea += bx;
break;
}
if (ctxt->modrm_rm == 2 || ctxt->modrm_rm == 3 ||
(ctxt->modrm_rm == 6 && ctxt->modrm_mod != 0))
ctxt->modrm_seg = VCPU_SREG_SS;
modrm_ea = (u16)modrm_ea;
} else {
/* 32/64-bit ModR/M decode. */
if ((ctxt->modrm_rm & 7) == 4) {
sib = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
index_reg |= (sib >> 3) & 7;
base_reg |= sib & 7;
scale = sib >> 6;
if ((base_reg & 7) == 5 && ctxt->modrm_mod == 0)
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s32, ctxt);
else {
modrm_ea += reg_read(ctxt, base_reg);
adjust_modrm_seg(ctxt, base_reg);
/* Increment ESP on POP [ESP] */
if ((ctxt->d & IncSP) &&
base_reg == VCPU_REGS_RSP)
modrm_ea += ctxt->op_bytes;
}
if (index_reg != 4)
modrm_ea += reg_read(ctxt, index_reg) << scale;
} else if ((ctxt->modrm_rm & 7) == 5 && ctxt->modrm_mod == 0) {
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s32, ctxt);
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ctxt->rip_relative = 1;
} else {
base_reg = ctxt->modrm_rm;
modrm_ea += reg_read(ctxt, base_reg);
adjust_modrm_seg(ctxt, base_reg);
}
switch (ctxt->modrm_mod) {
case 1:
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s8, ctxt);
break;
case 2:
modrm_ea += insn_fetch(s32, ctxt);
break;
}
}
op->addr.mem.ea = modrm_ea;
if (ctxt->ad_bytes != 8)
ctxt->memop.addr.mem.ea = (u32)ctxt->memop.addr.mem.ea;
done:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: drop error recovery in em_jmp_far and em_ret_far
em_jmp_far and em_ret_far assumed that setting IP can only fail in 64
bit mode, but syzkaller proved otherwise (and SDM agrees).
Code segment was restored upon failure, but it was left uninitialized
outside of long mode, which could lead to a leak of host kernel stack.
We could have fixed that by always saving and restoring the CS, but we
take a simpler approach and just break any guest that manages to fail
as the error recovery is error-prone and modern CPUs don't need emulator
for this.
Found by syzkaller:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 3668 at arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217 em_ret_far+0x428/0x480
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 2 PID: 3668 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.9.0-rc4+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[...] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:51
[...] panic+0x1b7/0x3a3 kernel/panic.c:179
[...] __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:542
[...] warn_slowpath_null+0x2c/0x40 kernel/panic.c:585
[...] em_ret_far+0x428/0x480 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2217
[...] em_ret_far_imm+0x17/0x70 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:2227
[...] x86_emulate_insn+0x87a/0x3730 arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:5294
[...] x86_emulate_instruction+0x520/0x1ba0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:5545
[...] emulate_instruction arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1116
[...] complete_emulated_io arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6870
[...] complete_emulated_mmio+0x4e9/0x710 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6934
[...] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3b7a/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:6978
[...] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x61e/0xdd0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:2557
[...] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
[...] do_vfs_ioctl+0x18c/0x1040 fs/ioctl.c:679
[...] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:694
[...] SyS_ioctl+0x8f/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:685
[...] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d1442d85cc30 ("KVM: x86: Handle errors when RIP is set during far jumps")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 47,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecreatefromstring)
{
zval **data;
gdImagePtr im;
int imtype;
char sig[8];
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "Z", &data) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
convert_to_string_ex(data);
if (Z_STRLEN_PP(data) < 8) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty string or invalid image");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
memcpy(sig, Z_STRVAL_PP(data), 8);
imtype = _php_image_type(sig);
switch (imtype) {
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_JPG:
#ifdef HAVE_GD_JPG
im = _php_image_create_from_string(data, "JPEG", gdImageCreateFromJpegCtx TSRMLS_CC);
#else
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "No JPEG support in this PHP build");
RETURN_FALSE;
#endif
break;
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_PNG:
#ifdef HAVE_GD_PNG
im = _php_image_create_from_string(data, "PNG", gdImageCreateFromPngCtx TSRMLS_CC);
#else
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "No PNG support in this PHP build");
RETURN_FALSE;
#endif
break;
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GIF:
#ifdef HAVE_GD_GIF_READ
im = _php_image_create_from_string(data, "GIF", gdImageCreateFromGifCtx TSRMLS_CC);
#else
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "No GIF support in this PHP build");
RETURN_FALSE;
#endif
break;
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_WBM:
#ifdef HAVE_GD_WBMP
im = _php_image_create_from_string(data, "WBMP", gdImageCreateFromWBMPCtx TSRMLS_CC);
#else
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "No WBMP support in this PHP build");
RETURN_FALSE;
#endif
break;
case PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2:
#ifdef HAVE_GD_GD2
im = _php_image_create_from_string(data, "GD2", gdImageCreateFromGd2Ctx TSRMLS_CC);
#else
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "No GD2 support in this PHP build");
RETURN_FALSE;
#endif
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Data is not in a recognized format");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (!im) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Couldn't create GD Image Stream out of Data");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, im, le_gd);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameHostManager::UnsetSpeculativeRenderFrameHost() {
CHECK(IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled());
speculative_render_frame_host_->GetProcess()->RemovePendingView();
return std::move(speculative_render_frame_host_);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __net_exit ipip_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
struct ipip_net *ipn = net_generic(net, ipip_net_id);
LIST_HEAD(list);
rtnl_lock();
ipip_destroy_tunnels(ipn, &list);
unregister_netdevice_queue(ipn->fb_tunnel_dev, &list);
unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
rtnl_unlock();
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 27,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sg_table *ion_sg_table(struct ion_client *client,
struct ion_handle *handle)
{
struct ion_buffer *buffer;
struct sg_table *table;
mutex_lock(&client->lock);
if (!ion_handle_validate(client, handle)) {
pr_err("%s: invalid handle passed to map_dma.\n",
__func__);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
buffer = handle->buffer;
table = buffer->sg_table;
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
return table;
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 48,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void vrend_set_num_sampler_views(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t shader_type,
uint32_t start_slot,
int num_sampler_views)
{
if (start_slot + num_sampler_views < ctx->sub->views[shader_type].num_views) {
int i;
for (i = start_slot + num_sampler_views; i < ctx->sub->views[shader_type].num_views; i++)
vrend_sampler_view_reference(&ctx->sub->views[shader_type].views[i], NULL);
}
ctx->sub->views[shader_type].num_views = start_slot + num_sampler_views;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,936 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void HandleCrash(int signo, siginfo_t* siginfo, void* context) {
SandboxedHandler* state = Get();
state->HandleCrashNonFatal(signo, siginfo, context);
Signals::RestoreHandlerAndReraiseSignalOnReturn(
siginfo, state->old_actions_.ActionForSignal(signo));
}
Commit Message: Add Android SDK version to crash reports.
Bug: 911669
Change-Id: I62a97d76a0b88099a5a42b93463307f03be9b3e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1361104
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Conn <peconn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Michael van Ouwerkerk <mvanouwerkerk@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615851}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 142,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cf2_getStdHW( CFF_Decoder* decoder )
{
FT_ASSERT( decoder && decoder->current_subfont );
return cf2_intToFixed(
decoder->current_subfont->private_dict.standard_width );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 13,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameImpl::GetDocumentInterfaceBroker() {
DCHECK(document_interface_broker_.is_bound());
return document_interface_broker_.get();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::RendererDidNavigateToNewPage(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
bool is_same_document,
bool replace_entry,
NavigationHandleImpl* handle) {
std::unique_ptr<NavigationEntryImpl> new_entry;
bool update_virtual_url = false;
if (is_same_document && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry = new FrameNavigationEntry(
params.frame_unique_name, params.item_sequence_number,
params.document_sequence_number, rfh->GetSiteInstance(), nullptr,
params.url, params.referrer, params.method, params.post_id);
new_entry = GetLastCommittedEntry()->CloneAndReplace(
frame_entry, true, rfh->frame_tree_node(),
delegate_->GetFrameTree()->root());
if (new_entry->GetURL().GetOrigin() != params.url.GetOrigin()) {
new_entry->GetSSL() = SSLStatus();
if (params.url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) && !rfh->GetParent() &&
handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(
"Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus.NewPageInPageOriginMismatch",
!!new_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
}
CHECK(frame_entry->HasOneRef());
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
if (params.url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) && !rfh->GetParent() &&
handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus.NewPageInPage",
!!new_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
}
if (!new_entry &&
PendingEntryMatchesHandle(handle) && pending_entry_index_ == -1 &&
(!pending_entry_->site_instance() ||
pending_entry_->site_instance() == rfh->GetSiteInstance())) {
new_entry = pending_entry_->Clone();
update_virtual_url = new_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url();
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
if (params.url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) && !rfh->GetParent() &&
handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(
"Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus.NewPagePendingEntryMatches",
!!new_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
}
if (!new_entry) {
new_entry = base::WrapUnique(new NavigationEntryImpl);
GURL url = params.url;
bool needs_update = false;
BrowserURLHandlerImpl::GetInstance()->RewriteURLIfNecessary(
&url, browser_context_, &needs_update);
new_entry->set_update_virtual_url_with_url(needs_update);
update_virtual_url = needs_update;
new_entry->GetSSL() = handle->ssl_status();
if (params.url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) && !rfh->GetParent() &&
handle->GetNetErrorCode() == net::OK) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(
"Navigation.SecureSchemeHasSSLStatus.NewPageNoMatchingEntry",
!!new_entry->GetSSL().certificate);
}
}
new_entry->set_page_type(params.url_is_unreachable ? PAGE_TYPE_ERROR
: PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
new_entry->SetURL(params.url);
if (update_virtual_url)
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(new_entry.get(), params.url);
new_entry->SetReferrer(params.referrer);
new_entry->SetTransitionType(params.transition);
new_entry->set_site_instance(
static_cast<SiteInstanceImpl*>(rfh->GetSiteInstance()));
new_entry->SetOriginalRequestURL(params.original_request_url);
new_entry->SetIsOverridingUserAgent(params.is_overriding_user_agent);
FrameNavigationEntry* frame_entry =
new_entry->GetFrameEntry(rfh->frame_tree_node());
frame_entry->set_frame_unique_name(params.frame_unique_name);
frame_entry->set_item_sequence_number(params.item_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_document_sequence_number(params.document_sequence_number);
frame_entry->set_method(params.method);
frame_entry->set_post_id(params.post_id);
if (is_same_document && GetLastCommittedEntry()) {
new_entry->SetTitle(GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetTitle());
new_entry->GetFavicon() = GetLastCommittedEntry()->GetFavicon();
}
DCHECK(!params.history_list_was_cleared || !replace_entry);
if (params.history_list_was_cleared) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal();
entries_.clear();
last_committed_entry_index_ = -1;
}
InsertOrReplaceEntry(std::move(new_entry), replace_entry);
}
Commit Message: Don't update PageState for a SiteInstance mismatch.
BUG=766262
TEST=See bug for repro.
Change-Id: Ifb087b687acd40d8963ef436c9ea82ca2d960117
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/674808
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis (OOO until 9/25) <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503297}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bmpr_strip_alpha(struct iw_image *img)
{
int i,j;
size_t oldbpr;
img->imgtype = IW_IMGTYPE_RGB;
oldbpr = img->bpr;
img->bpr = iw_calc_bytesperrow(img->width,24);
for(j=0;j<img->height;j++) {
for(i=0;i<img->width;i++) {
img->pixels[j*img->bpr + i*3 + 0] = img->pixels[j*oldbpr + i*4 + 0];
img->pixels[j*img->bpr + i*3 + 1] = img->pixels[j*oldbpr + i*4 + 1];
img->pixels[j*img->bpr + i*3 + 2] = img->pixels[j*oldbpr + i*4 + 2];
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::UpdateMemoryCacheStats(Resource* resource,
RevalidationPolicy policy,
const FetchParameters& params,
const ResourceFactory& factory,
bool is_static_data) const {
if (is_static_data)
return;
if (params.IsSpeculativePreload() || params.IsLinkPreload()) {
DEFINE_RESOURCE_HISTOGRAM("Preload.");
} else {
DEFINE_RESOURCE_HISTOGRAM("");
}
if (resource && !resource->IsAlive() && !ContainsAsPreload(resource)) {
DEFINE_RESOURCE_HISTOGRAM("Dead.");
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddHost(AppCacheHost* host) {
std::pair<NotifyHostMap::iterator , bool> ret = hosts_to_notify.insert(
NotifyHostMap::value_type(host->frontend(), HostIds()));
ret.first->second.push_back(host->host_id());
}
Commit Message: AppCache: fix a browser crashing bug that can happen during updates.
BUG=558589
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1463463003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#360967}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx *crypto_ccm_reqctx(
struct aead_request *req)
{
unsigned long align = crypto_aead_alignmask(crypto_aead_reqtfm(req));
return (void *)PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)aead_request_ctx(req), align + 1);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfsaclsvc_release_attrstat(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd_attrstat *resp)
{
fh_put(&resp->fh);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 55,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reset_sys_reg_descs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
const struct sys_reg_desc *table, size_t num)
{
unsigned long i;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
if (table[i].reset)
table[i].reset(vcpu, &table[i]);
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 normalize_cfs_quota(struct task_group *tg,
struct cfs_schedulable_data *d)
{
u64 quota, period;
if (tg == d->tg) {
period = d->period;
quota = d->quota;
} else {
period = tg_get_cfs_period(tg);
quota = tg_get_cfs_quota(tg);
}
/* note: these should typically be equivalent */
if (quota == RUNTIME_INF || quota == -1)
return RUNTIME_INF;
return to_ratio(period, quota);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void clear_leases(const uint8_t *chaddr, uint32_t yiaddr)
{
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < server_config.max_leases; i++) {
if ((chaddr && memcmp(g_leases[i].lease_mac, chaddr, 6) == 0)
|| (yiaddr && g_leases[i].lease_nip == yiaddr)
) {
memset(&g_leases[i], 0, sizeof(g_leases[i]));
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 13,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlXPtrGetLastChar(xmlNodePtr *node, int *indx) {
xmlNodePtr cur;
int pos, len = 0;
if ((node == NULL) || (indx == NULL))
return(-1);
cur = *node;
pos = *indx;
if (cur == NULL)
return(-1);
if ((cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_DOCUMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_HTML_DOCUMENT_NODE)) {
if (pos > 0) {
cur = xmlXPtrGetNthChild(cur, pos);
}
}
while (cur != NULL) {
if (cur->last != NULL)
cur = cur->last;
else if ((cur->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE) &&
(cur->content != NULL)) {
len = xmlStrlen(cur->content);
break;
} else {
return(-1);
}
}
if (cur == NULL)
return(-1);
*node = cur;
*indx = len;
return(0);
}
Commit Message: Fix XPointer bug.
BUG=125462
AUTHOR=asd@ut.ee
R=cevans@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10344022
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@135174 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 109,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::ActivateViewportIntersectionMonitoring(bool activate) {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
client_->ActivateViewportIntersectionMonitoring(activate);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DaemonProcess::OnPermanentError() {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
Stop();
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DefragIPv4NoDataTest(void)
{
DefragContext *dc = NULL;
Packet *p = NULL;
int id = 12;
int ret = 0;
DefragInit();
dc = DefragContextNew();
if (dc == NULL)
goto end;
/* This packet has an offset > 0, more frags set to 0 and no data. */
p = BuildTestPacket(id, 1, 0, 'A', 0);
if (p == NULL)
goto end;
/* We do not expect a packet returned. */
if (Defrag(NULL, NULL, p, NULL) != NULL)
goto end;
/* The fragment should have been ignored so no fragments should
* have been allocated from the pool. */
if (dc->frag_pool->outstanding != 0)
return 0;
ret = 1;
end:
if (dc != NULL)
DefragContextDestroy(dc);
if (p != NULL)
SCFree(p);
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 1 | 168,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetVisibleFalseAndQueueSwapPromise() {
layer_tree_host()->SetVisible(false);
std::unique_ptr<SwapPromise> swap_promise(
new TestSwapPromise(&swap_promise_result_));
layer_tree_host()->GetSwapPromiseManager()->QueueSwapPromise(
std::move(swap_promise));
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pango_glyph_string_free (PangoGlyphString *string)
{
if (string == NULL)
return;
g_free (string->glyphs);
g_free (string->log_clusters);
g_slice_free (PangoGlyphString, string);
}
Commit Message: [glyphstring] Handle overflow with very long glyphstrings
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 18,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::onPortEnableCompleted(OMX_U32 portIndex, bool enabled) {
if (portIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return;
}
switch (mOutputPortSettingsChange) {
case NONE:
break;
case AWAITING_DISABLED:
{
CHECK(!enabled);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_ENABLED;
break;
}
default:
{
CHECK_EQ((int)mOutputPortSettingsChange, (int)AWAITING_ENABLED);
CHECK(enabled);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = NONE;
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateSingleSampleMetricsProvider(
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner,
service_manager::Connector* connector,
metrics::mojom::SingleSampleMetricsProviderRequest request) {
if (task_runner->BelongsToCurrentThread()) {
connector->BindInterface(mojom::kBrowserServiceName, std::move(request));
return;
}
task_runner->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&CreateSingleSampleMetricsProvider, std::move(task_runner),
connector, base::Passed(&request)));
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,502 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _gcry_aes_ocb_crypt (gcry_cipher_hd_t c, void *outbuf_arg,
const void *inbuf_arg, size_t nblocks, int encrypt)
{
RIJNDAEL_context *ctx = (void *)&c->context.c;
unsigned char *outbuf = outbuf_arg;
const unsigned char *inbuf = inbuf_arg;
unsigned int burn_depth = 0;
if (0)
;
#ifdef USE_AESNI
else if (ctx->use_aesni)
{
return _gcry_aes_aesni_ocb_crypt (c, outbuf, inbuf, nblocks, encrypt);
}
#endif /*USE_AESNI*/
#ifdef USE_SSSE3
else if (ctx->use_ssse3)
{
return _gcry_aes_ssse3_ocb_crypt (c, outbuf, inbuf, nblocks, encrypt);
}
#endif /*USE_SSSE3*/
#ifdef USE_ARM_CE
else if (ctx->use_arm_ce)
{
return _gcry_aes_armv8_ce_ocb_crypt (c, outbuf, inbuf, nblocks, encrypt);
}
#endif /*USE_ARM_CE*/
else if (encrypt)
{
union { unsigned char x1[16] ATTR_ALIGNED_16; u32 x32[4]; } l_tmp;
rijndael_cryptfn_t encrypt_fn = ctx->encrypt_fn;
if (ctx->prefetch_enc_fn)
ctx->prefetch_enc_fn();
for ( ;nblocks; nblocks-- )
{
u64 i = ++c->u_mode.ocb.data_nblocks;
const unsigned char *l = ocb_get_l(c, i);
/* Offset_i = Offset_{i-1} xor L_{ntz(i)} */
cipher_block_xor_1 (c->u_iv.iv, l, BLOCKSIZE);
cipher_block_cpy (l_tmp.x1, inbuf, BLOCKSIZE);
/* Checksum_i = Checksum_{i-1} xor P_i */
cipher_block_xor_1 (c->u_ctr.ctr, l_tmp.x1, BLOCKSIZE);
/* C_i = Offset_i xor ENCIPHER(K, P_i xor Offset_i) */
cipher_block_xor_1 (l_tmp.x1, c->u_iv.iv, BLOCKSIZE);
burn_depth = encrypt_fn (ctx, l_tmp.x1, l_tmp.x1);
cipher_block_xor_1 (l_tmp.x1, c->u_iv.iv, BLOCKSIZE);
cipher_block_cpy (outbuf, l_tmp.x1, BLOCKSIZE);
inbuf += BLOCKSIZE;
outbuf += BLOCKSIZE;
}
}
else
{
union { unsigned char x1[16] ATTR_ALIGNED_16; u32 x32[4]; } l_tmp;
rijndael_cryptfn_t decrypt_fn = ctx->decrypt_fn;
check_decryption_preparation (ctx);
if (ctx->prefetch_dec_fn)
ctx->prefetch_dec_fn();
for ( ;nblocks; nblocks-- )
{
u64 i = ++c->u_mode.ocb.data_nblocks;
const unsigned char *l = ocb_get_l(c, i);
/* Offset_i = Offset_{i-1} xor L_{ntz(i)} */
cipher_block_xor_1 (c->u_iv.iv, l, BLOCKSIZE);
cipher_block_cpy (l_tmp.x1, inbuf, BLOCKSIZE);
/* C_i = Offset_i xor ENCIPHER(K, P_i xor Offset_i) */
cipher_block_xor_1 (l_tmp.x1, c->u_iv.iv, BLOCKSIZE);
burn_depth = decrypt_fn (ctx, l_tmp.x1, l_tmp.x1);
cipher_block_xor_1 (l_tmp.x1, c->u_iv.iv, BLOCKSIZE);
/* Checksum_i = Checksum_{i-1} xor P_i */
cipher_block_xor_1 (c->u_ctr.ctr, l_tmp.x1, BLOCKSIZE);
cipher_block_cpy (outbuf, l_tmp.x1, BLOCKSIZE);
inbuf += BLOCKSIZE;
outbuf += BLOCKSIZE;
}
}
if (burn_depth)
_gcry_burn_stack (burn_depth + 4 * sizeof(void *));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 96,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jboolean Bitmap_hasMipMap(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong bitmapHandle) {
SkBitmap* bitmap = reinterpret_cast<SkBitmap*>(bitmapHandle);
return bitmap->hasHardwareMipMap() ? JNI_TRUE : JNI_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::IsFeatureEnabled(
blink::mojom::FeaturePolicyFeature feature) {
blink::mojom::PolicyValueType feature_type =
feature_policy_->GetFeatureList().at(feature).second;
return feature_policy_ &&
feature_policy_->IsFeatureEnabledForOrigin(
feature, GetLastCommittedOrigin(),
blink::PolicyValue::CreateMaxPolicyValue(feature_type));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_pin_cmd(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *data, int *tries_left)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_pin_cmd() cmd 0x%X, PIN type 0x%X, PIN reference %i, PIN-1 %p:%i, PIN-2 %p:%i",
data->cmd, data->pin_type, data->pin_reference,
data->pin1.data, data->pin1.len, data->pin2.data, data->pin2.len);
switch (data->cmd) {
case SC_PIN_CMD_VERIFY:
rv = iasecc_pin_verify(card, data->pin_type, data->pin_reference, data->pin1.data, data->pin1.len, tries_left);
break;
case SC_PIN_CMD_CHANGE:
if (data->pin_type == SC_AC_AUT)
rv = iasecc_keyset_change(card, data, tries_left);
else
rv = iasecc_pin_change(card, data, tries_left);
break;
case SC_PIN_CMD_UNBLOCK:
rv = iasecc_pin_reset(card, data, tries_left);
break;
case SC_PIN_CMD_GET_INFO:
rv = iasecc_pin_get_policy(card, data);
break;
default:
sc_log(ctx, "Other pin commands not supported yet: 0x%X", data->cmd);
rv = SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo," attrs=("));
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, ep2, map, nmap);
if (cp == NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo," status=("));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
default:
/*
* XXX - fill in more types here; see, for example,
* draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep))
goto trunc;
}
break;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 61,994 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ContentSecurityPolicy::setupSelf(const SecurityOrigin& securityOrigin) {
m_selfProtocol = securityOrigin.protocol();
m_selfSource = new CSPSource(this, m_selfProtocol, securityOrigin.host(),
securityOrigin.port(), String(),
CSPSource::NoWildcard, CSPSource::NoWildcard);
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,802 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void StyleResolver::matchWatchSelectorRules(ElementRuleCollector& collector)
{
if (!m_watchedSelectorsRules)
return;
collector.clearMatchedRules();
collector.matchedResult().ranges.lastUserRule = collector.matchedResult().matchedProperties.size() - 1;
MatchRequest matchRequest(m_watchedSelectorsRules.get());
RuleRange ruleRange = collector.matchedResult().ranges.userRuleRange();
collector.collectMatchingRules(matchRequest, ruleRange);
collector.collectMatchingRulesForRegion(matchRequest, ruleRange);
collector.sortAndTransferMatchedRules();
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t disconnect(int api) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IGraphicBufferProducer::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32(api);
status_t result =remote()->transact(DISCONNECT, data, &reply);
if (result != NO_ERROR) {
return result;
}
result = reply.readInt32();
return result;
}
Commit Message: BQ: fix some uninitialized variables
Bug 27555981
Bug 27556038
Change-Id: I436b6fec589677d7e36c0e980f6e59808415dc0e
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 160,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: token_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, scanner_state * pstate, bool save)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int code;
ref token;
/* Note that gs_scan_token may change osp! */
pop(1); /* remove the file or scanner state */
again:
gs_scanner_error_object(i_ctx_p, pstate, &i_ctx_p->error_object);
break;
case scan_BOS:
code = 0;
case 0: /* read a token */
push(2);
ref_assign(op - 1, &token);
make_true(op);
break;
case scan_EOF: /* no tokens */
push(1);
make_false(op);
code = 0;
break;
case scan_Refill: /* need more data */
code = gs_scan_handle_refill(i_ctx_p, pstate, save,
ztoken_continue);
switch (code) {
case 0: /* state is not copied to the heap */
goto again;
case o_push_estack:
return code;
}
break; /* error */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 164,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void snmp_mib_free(void __percpu *ptr[2])
{
BUG_ON(ptr == NULL);
free_percpu(ptr[0]);
free_percpu(ptr[1]);
ptr[0] = ptr[1] = NULL;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: e1000e_set_ctrl(E1000ECore *core, int index, uint32_t val)
{
trace_e1000e_core_ctrl_write(index, val);
/* RST is self clearing */
core->mac[CTRL] = val & ~E1000_CTRL_RST;
core->mac[CTRL_DUP] = core->mac[CTRL];
trace_e1000e_link_set_params(
!!(val & E1000_CTRL_ASDE),
(val & E1000_CTRL_SPD_SEL) >> E1000_CTRL_SPD_SHIFT,
!!(val & E1000_CTRL_FRCSPD),
!!(val & E1000_CTRL_FRCDPX),
!!(val & E1000_CTRL_RFCE),
!!(val & E1000_CTRL_TFCE));
if (val & E1000_CTRL_RST) {
trace_e1000e_core_ctrl_sw_reset();
e1000x_reset_mac_addr(core->owner_nic, core->mac, core->permanent_mac);
}
if (val & E1000_CTRL_PHY_RST) {
trace_e1000e_core_ctrl_phy_reset();
core->mac[STATUS] |= E1000_STATUS_PHYRA;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 6,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __inline LPWORD lpwAlign(LPWORD addr)
{
return (LPWORD)((((uintptr_t)addr) + 3) & (~3));
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494 | 0 | 62,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioOutputDeviceTest::StopAudioDevice() {
EXPECT_CALL(audio_output_ipc_, CloseStream(kStreamId));
EXPECT_CALL(audio_output_ipc_, RemoveDelegate(kStreamId));
audio_device_->Stop();
io_loop_.RunAllPending();
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 103,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void addPaddingBits(unsigned char* out, const unsigned char* in,
size_t olinebits, size_t ilinebits, unsigned h)
{
/*The opposite of the removePaddingBits function
olinebits must be >= ilinebits*/
unsigned y;
size_t diff = olinebits - ilinebits;
size_t obp = 0, ibp = 0; /*bit pointers*/
for(y = 0; y < h; y++)
{
size_t x;
for(x = 0; x < ilinebits; x++)
{
unsigned char bit = readBitFromReversedStream(&ibp, in);
setBitOfReversedStream(&obp, out, bit);
}
/*obp += diff; --> no, fill in some value in the padding bits too, to avoid
"Use of uninitialised value of size ###" warning from valgrind*/
for(x = 0; x < diff; x++) setBitOfReversedStream(&obp, out, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PermissionsBubbleDialogDelegateView::SizeToContents() {
BubbleDialogDelegateView::SizeToContents();
}
Commit Message: Elide the permission bubble title from the head of the string.
Long URLs can be used to spoof other origins in the permission bubble
title. This CL customises the title to be elided from the head, which
ensures that the maximal amount of the URL host is displayed in the case
where the URL is too long and causes the string to overflow.
Implementing the ellision means that the title cannot be multiline
(where elision is not well supported). Note that in English, the
window title is a string "$ORIGIN wants to", so the non-origin
component will not be elided. In other languages, the non-origin
component may appear fully or partly before the origin (e.g. in
Filipino, "Gusto ng $ORIGIN na"), so it may be elided there if the
URL is sufficiently long. This is not optimal, but the URLs that are
sufficiently long to trigger the elision are probably malicious, and
displaying the most relevant component of the URL is most important
for security purposes.
BUG=774438
Change-Id: I75c2364b10bf69bf337c7f4970481bf1809f6aae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768312
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Garron <lgarron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516921}
CWE ID: | 0 | 146,970 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: concat_opt_exact_str(OptStr* to, UChar* s, UChar* end, OnigEncoding enc)
{
int i, j, len;
UChar *p;
for (i = to->len, p = s; p < end && i < OPT_EXACT_MAXLEN; ) {
len = enclen(enc, p);
if (i + len > OPT_EXACT_MAXLEN) break;
for (j = 0; j < len && p < end; j++)
to->s[i++] = *p++;
}
to->len = i;
if (p >= end && to->len == (int )(end - s))
to->reach_end = 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_MDRP( INS_ARG )
{
Int point;
TT_F26Dot6 distance,
org_dist;
point = (Int)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.zp1.n_points ) )
{
/* Current version of FreeType silently ignores this out of bounds error
* and drops the instruction, see bug #691121
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference; */
return;
}
/* XXX: Is there some undocumented feature while in the */
/* twilight zone? */
org_dist = CUR_Func_dualproj( CUR.zp1.org_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.org_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.org_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
/* single width cutin test */
if ( ABS(org_dist) < CUR.GS.single_width_cutin )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
org_dist = CUR.GS.single_width_value;
else
org_dist = -CUR.GS.single_width_value;
}
/* round flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 4) != 0 )
distance = CUR_Func_round( org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
else
distance = Round_None( EXEC_ARGS
org_dist,
CUR.metrics.compensations[CUR.opcode & 3] );
/* minimum distance flag */
if ( (CUR.opcode & 8) != 0 )
{
if ( org_dist >= 0 )
{
if ( distance < CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
else
{
if ( distance > -CUR.GS.minimum_distance )
distance = -CUR.GS.minimum_distance;
}
}
/* now move the point */
org_dist = CUR_Func_project( CUR.zp1.cur_x[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_x[CUR.GS.rp0],
CUR.zp1.cur_y[point] -
CUR.zp0.cur_y[CUR.GS.rp0] );
CUR_Func_move( &CUR.zp1, point, distance - org_dist );
CUR.GS.rp1 = CUR.GS.rp0;
CUR.GS.rp2 = point;
if ( (CUR.opcode & 16) != 0 )
CUR.GS.rp0 = point;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_split_extent_at(handle_t *handle,
struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_ext_path **ppath,
ext4_lblk_t split,
int split_flag,
int flags)
{
struct ext4_ext_path *path = *ppath;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block;
struct ext4_extent *ex, newex, orig_ex, zero_ex;
struct ext4_extent *ex2 = NULL;
unsigned int ee_len, depth;
int err = 0;
BUG_ON((split_flag & (EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1 | EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2)) ==
(EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1 | EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2));
ext_debug("ext4_split_extents_at: inode %lu, logical"
"block %llu\n", inode->i_ino, (unsigned long long)split);
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
depth = ext_depth(inode);
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
newblock = split - ee_block + ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
BUG_ON(split < ee_block || split >= (ee_block + ee_len));
BUG_ON(!ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex) &&
split_flag & (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT |
EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1 |
EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2));
err = ext4_ext_get_access(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto out;
if (split == ee_block) {
/*
* case b: block @split is the block that the extent begins with
* then we just change the state of the extent, and splitting
* is not needed.
*/
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_unwritten(ex);
else
ext4_ext_mark_initialized(ex);
if (!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_PRE_IO))
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
goto out;
}
/* case a */
memcpy(&orig_ex, ex, sizeof(orig_ex));
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(split - ee_block);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT1)
ext4_ext_mark_unwritten(ex);
/*
* path may lead to new leaf, not to original leaf any more
* after ext4_ext_insert_extent() returns,
*/
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + depth);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
ex2 = &newex;
ex2->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(split);
ex2->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len - (split - ee_block));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex2, newblock);
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_MARK_UNWRIT2)
ext4_ext_mark_unwritten(ex2);
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, ppath, &newex, flags);
if (err == -ENOSPC && (EXT4_EXT_MAY_ZEROOUT & split_flag)) {
if (split_flag & (EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1|EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID2)) {
if (split_flag & EXT4_EXT_DATA_VALID1) {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex2);
zero_ex.ee_block = ex2->ee_block;
zero_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex2));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&zero_ex,
ext4_ext_pblock(ex2));
} else {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, ex);
zero_ex.ee_block = ex->ee_block;
zero_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&zero_ex,
ext4_ext_pblock(ex));
}
} else {
err = ext4_ext_zeroout(inode, &orig_ex);
zero_ex.ee_block = orig_ex.ee_block;
zero_ex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(
ext4_ext_get_actual_len(&orig_ex));
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&zero_ex,
ext4_ext_pblock(&orig_ex));
}
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update the extent length and mark as initialized */
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ee_len);
ext4_ext_try_to_merge(handle, inode, path, ex);
err = ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
/* update extent status tree */
err = ext4_zeroout_es(inode, &zero_ex);
goto out;
} else if (err)
goto fix_extent_len;
out:
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
return err;
fix_extent_len:
ex->ee_len = orig_ex.ee_len;
ext4_ext_dirty(handle, inode, path + path->p_depth);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: allocate entire range in zero range
Currently there is a bug in zero range code which causes zero range
calls to only allocate block aligned portion of the range, while
ignoring the rest in some cases.
In some cases, namely if the end of the range is past i_size, we do
attempt to preallocate the last nonaligned block. However this might
cause kernel to BUG() in some carefully designed zero range requests
on setups where page size > block size.
Fix this problem by first preallocating the entire range, including
the nonaligned edges and converting the written extents to unwritten
in the next step. This approach will also give us the advantage of
having the range to be as linearly contiguous as possible.
Signed-off-by: Lukas Czerner <lczerner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PasswordAutofillManager::OnAddPasswordFormMapping(
int key,
const autofill::PasswordFormFillData& fill_data) {
if (!autofill::IsValidPasswordFormFillData(fill_data))
return;
login_to_password_info_[key] = fill_data;
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vrend_decode_create_stream_output_target(struct vrend_decode_ctx *ctx, uint32_t handle, uint16_t length)
{
uint32_t res_handle, buffer_size, buffer_offset;
if (length != VIRGL_OBJ_STREAMOUT_SIZE)
return EINVAL;
res_handle = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_STREAMOUT_RES_HANDLE);
buffer_offset = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_STREAMOUT_BUFFER_OFFSET);
buffer_size = get_buf_entry(ctx, VIRGL_OBJ_STREAMOUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
return vrend_create_so_target(ctx->grctx, handle, res_handle, buffer_offset,
buffer_size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 9,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pcf_get_metric( FT_Stream stream,
FT_ULong format,
PCF_Metric metric )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
if ( PCF_FORMAT_MATCH( format, PCF_DEFAULT_FORMAT ) )
{
const FT_Frame_Field* fields;
/* parsing normal metrics */
fields = PCF_BYTE_ORDER( format ) == MSBFirst
? pcf_metric_msb_header
: pcf_metric_header;
/* the following sets `error' but doesn't return in case of failure */
(void)FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS( fields, metric );
}
else
{
PCF_Compressed_MetricRec compr;
/* parsing compressed metrics */
if ( FT_STREAM_READ_FIELDS( pcf_compressed_metric_header, &compr ) )
goto Exit;
metric->leftSideBearing = (FT_Short)( compr.leftSideBearing - 0x80 );
metric->rightSideBearing = (FT_Short)( compr.rightSideBearing - 0x80 );
metric->characterWidth = (FT_Short)( compr.characterWidth - 0x80 );
metric->ascent = (FT_Short)( compr.ascent - 0x80 );
metric->descent = (FT_Short)( compr.descent - 0x80 );
metric->attributes = 0;
}
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 6,963 |
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