instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CCThreadProxy::start()
{
ASSERT(isMainThread());
ASSERT(s_ccThread);
CCCompletionEvent completion;
s_ccThread->postTask(createCCThreadTask(this, &CCThreadProxy::initializeImplOnCCThread, AllowCrossThreadAccess(&completion)));
completion.wait();
m_started = true;
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned int cdrom_check_events(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
unsigned int clearing)
{
unsigned int events;
cdrom_update_events(cdi, clearing);
events = cdi->vfs_events;
cdi->vfs_events = 0;
return events;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmci_transport_packet_init(struct vmci_transport_packet *pkt,
struct sockaddr_vm *src,
struct sockaddr_vm *dst,
u8 type,
u64 size,
u64 mode,
struct vmci_transport_waiting_info *wait,
u16 proto,
struct vmci_handle handle)
{
/* We register the stream control handler as an any cid handle so we
* must always send from a source address of VMADDR_CID_ANY
*/
pkt->dg.src = vmci_make_handle(VMADDR_CID_ANY,
VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_RID);
pkt->dg.dst = vmci_make_handle(dst->svm_cid,
VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_RID);
pkt->dg.payload_size = sizeof(*pkt) - sizeof(pkt->dg);
pkt->version = VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_VERSION;
pkt->type = type;
pkt->src_port = src->svm_port;
pkt->dst_port = dst->svm_port;
memset(&pkt->proto, 0, sizeof(pkt->proto));
memset(&pkt->_reserved2, 0, sizeof(pkt->_reserved2));
switch (pkt->type) {
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_INVALID:
pkt->u.size = 0;
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_REQUEST:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_NEGOTIATE:
pkt->u.size = size;
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_OFFER:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_ATTACH:
pkt->u.handle = handle;
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_WROTE:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_READ:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST:
pkt->u.size = 0;
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_SHUTDOWN:
pkt->u.mode = mode;
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_WAITING_READ:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_WAITING_WRITE:
memcpy(&pkt->u.wait, wait, sizeof(pkt->u.wait));
break;
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_REQUEST2:
case VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_NEGOTIATE2:
pkt->u.size = size;
pkt->proto = proto;
break;
}
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: vmci - fix possible info leak in vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue()
In case we received no data on the call to skb_recv_datagram(), i.e.
skb->data is NULL, vmci_transport_dgram_dequeue() will return with 0
without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the local,
uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of
kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the already existing msg_namelen assignment a few
lines above.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BookmarkEventRouter::BookmarkNodeFaviconChanged(BookmarkModel* model,
const BookmarkNode* node) {
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 115,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void show_next_step_button()
{
gtk_box_set_child_packing(g_box_buttons, g_btn_close, false, false, 5, GTK_PACK_START);
gtk_widget_show(g_btn_next);
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::paintFloats(const PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutPoint& paintOffset, bool preservePhase) const
{
BlockFlowPainter(*this).paintFloats(paintInfo, paintOffset, preservePhase);
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 123,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NormalPageArena::VerifyMarking() {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
SetAllocationPoint(nullptr, 0);
for (NormalPage* page = static_cast<NormalPage*>(first_page_); page;
page = static_cast<NormalPage*>(page->Next()))
page->VerifyMarking();
#endif // DCHECK_IS_ON()
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 153,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kdc_handle_protected_negotiation(krb5_context context,
krb5_data *req_pkt, krb5_kdc_req *request,
const krb5_keyblock *reply_key,
krb5_pa_data ***out_enc_padata)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_checksum checksum;
krb5_data *der_cksum = NULL;
krb5_pa_data *pa, *pa_in;
memset(&checksum, 0, sizeof(checksum));
pa_in = krb5int_find_pa_data(context, request->padata,
KRB5_ENCPADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP);
if (pa_in == NULL)
return 0;
/* Compute and encode a checksum over the AS-REQ. */
retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, 0, reply_key, KRB5_KEYUSAGE_AS_REQ,
req_pkt, &checksum);
if (retval != 0)
goto cleanup;
retval = encode_krb5_checksum(&checksum, &der_cksum);
if (retval != 0)
goto cleanup;
/* Add a pa-data element to the list, stealing memory from der_cksum. */
retval = alloc_pa_data(KRB5_ENCPADATA_REQ_ENC_PA_REP, 0, &pa);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
pa->length = der_cksum->length;
pa->contents = (uint8_t *)der_cksum->data;
der_cksum->data = NULL;
/* add_pa_data_element() claims pa on success or failure. */
retval = add_pa_data_element(out_enc_padata, pa);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* Add a zero-length PA-FX-FAST element to the list. */
retval = alloc_pa_data(KRB5_PADATA_FX_FAST, 0, &pa);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* add_pa_data_element() claims pa on success or failure. */
retval = add_pa_data_element(out_enc_padata, pa);
cleanup:
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &checksum);
krb5_free_data(context, der_cksum);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[ghudson@mit.edu: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 75,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Instance::ConfigurePageIndicator() {
pp::ImageData background =
CreateResourceImage(PP_RESOURCEIMAGE_PDF_PAGE_INDICATOR_BACKGROUND);
page_indicator_.Configure(pp::Point(), background);
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::appendFormData(FormDataList& encoding, bool multipart)
{
return m_inputType->isFormDataAppendable() && m_inputType->appendFormData(encoding, multipart);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __free_event(struct perf_event *event)
{
if (!event->parent) {
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN)
put_callchain_buffers();
}
if (event->destroy)
event->destroy(event);
if (event->ctx)
put_ctx(event->ctx);
if (event->pmu)
module_put(event->pmu->module);
call_rcu(&event->rcu_head, free_event_rcu);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 50,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
return 0;
if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && to_vmx(vcpu)->soft_vnmi_blocked)
return 0;
return !(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
(GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS | GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI
| GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI));
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::WebMediaPlayer::ReadyState WebMediaPlayerMS::GetReadyState() const {
DVLOG(1) << __func__ << ", state:" << ready_state_;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return ready_state_;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateNewRendererCompositorFrameSink() {
viz::mojom::CompositorFrameSinkPtr sink;
viz::mojom::CompositorFrameSinkRequest sink_request =
mojo::MakeRequest(&sink);
viz::mojom::CompositorFrameSinkClientRequest client_request =
mojo::MakeRequest(&renderer_compositor_frame_sink_ptr_);
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_ =
std::make_unique<FakeRendererCompositorFrameSink>(
std::move(sink), std::move(client_request));
DidCreateNewRendererCompositorFrameSink(
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_ptr_.get());
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_bool_reply_for_header (FlatpakProxyClient *client, Header *header, gboolean val)
{
GDBusMessage *reply;
reply = g_dbus_message_new ();
g_dbus_message_set_message_type (reply, G_DBUS_MESSAGE_TYPE_METHOD_RETURN);
g_dbus_message_set_flags (reply, G_DBUS_MESSAGE_FLAGS_NO_REPLY_EXPECTED);
g_dbus_message_set_reply_serial (reply, header->serial - client->serial_offset);
g_dbus_message_set_body (reply, g_variant_new ("(b)", val));
return reply;
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 84,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_blks_to_allocate(Indirect *branch, int k, unsigned int blks,
int blocks_to_boundary)
{
unsigned int count = 0;
/*
* Simple case, [t,d]Indirect block(s) has not allocated yet
* then it's clear blocks on that path have not allocated
*/
if (k > 0) {
/* right now we don't handle cross boundary allocation */
if (blks < blocks_to_boundary + 1)
count += blks;
else
count += blocks_to_boundary + 1;
return count;
}
count++;
while (count < blks && count <= blocks_to_boundary &&
le32_to_cpu(*(branch[0].p + count)) == 0) {
count++;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DataReductionProxyIOData::SetStringPref(const std::string& pref_path,
const std::string& value) {
DCHECK(io_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
ui_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyService::SetStringPref,
service_, pref_path, value));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaymentRequestState::SetSelectedContactProfile(
autofill::AutofillProfile* profile) {
selected_contact_profile_ = profile;
invalid_contact_profile_ = nullptr;
UpdateIsReadyToPayAndNotifyObservers();
if (IsPaymentAppInvoked()) {
delegate_->OnPayerInfoSelected(
response_helper_->GeneratePayerDetail(profile));
}
}
Commit Message: [Payment Handler] Don't wait for response from closed payment app.
Before this patch, tapping the back button on top of the payment handler
window on desktop would not affect the |response_helper_|, which would
continue waiting for a response from the payment app. The service worker
of the closed payment app could timeout after 5 minutes and invoke the
|response_helper_|. Depending on what else the user did afterwards, in
the best case scenario, the payment sheet would display a "Transaction
failed" error message. In the worst case scenario, the
|response_helper_| would be used after free.
This patch clears the |response_helper_| in the PaymentRequestState and
in the ServiceWorkerPaymentInstrument after the payment app is closed.
After this patch, the cancelled payment app does not show "Transaction
failed" and does not use memory after it was freed.
Bug: 956597
Change-Id: I64134b911a4f8c154cb56d537a8243a68a806394
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1588682
Reviewed-by: anthonyvd <anthonyvd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rouslan Solomakhin <rouslan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654995}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_lapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_lapic_state *s)
{
memcpy(s->regs, vcpu->arch.apic->regs, sizeof *s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tcp_try_to_open(struct sock *sk, int flag)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
tcp_verify_left_out(tp);
if (!tcp_any_retrans_done(sk))
tp->retrans_stamp = 0;
if (flag & FLAG_ECE)
tcp_enter_cwr(sk);
if (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_CWR) {
tcp_try_keep_open(sk);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 51,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int network_config_add_listen (const oconfig_item_t *ci) /* {{{ */
{
sockent_t *se;
int status;
int i;
if ((ci->values_num < 1) || (ci->values_num > 2)
|| (ci->values[0].type != OCONFIG_TYPE_STRING)
|| ((ci->values_num > 1) && (ci->values[1].type != OCONFIG_TYPE_STRING)))
{
ERROR ("network plugin: The `%s' config option needs "
"one or two string arguments.", ci->key);
return (-1);
}
se = sockent_create (SOCKENT_TYPE_SERVER);
if (se == NULL)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: sockent_create failed.");
return (-1);
}
se->node = strdup (ci->values[0].value.string);
if (ci->values_num >= 2)
se->service = strdup (ci->values[1].value.string);
for (i = 0; i < ci->children_num; i++)
{
oconfig_item_t *child = ci->children + i;
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
if (strcasecmp ("AuthFile", child->key) == 0)
network_config_set_string (child, &se->data.server.auth_file);
else if (strcasecmp ("SecurityLevel", child->key) == 0)
network_config_set_security_level (child,
&se->data.server.security_level);
else
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
if (strcasecmp ("Interface", child->key) == 0)
network_config_set_interface (child,
&se->interface);
else
{
WARNING ("network plugin: Option `%s' is not allowed here.",
child->key);
}
}
#if HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
if ((se->data.server.security_level > SECURITY_LEVEL_NONE)
&& (se->data.server.auth_file == NULL))
{
ERROR ("network plugin: A security level higher than `none' was "
"requested, but no AuthFile option was given. Cowardly refusing to "
"open this socket!");
sockent_destroy (se);
return (-1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_LIBGCRYPT */
status = sockent_init_crypto (se);
if (status != 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: network_config_add_listen: sockent_init_crypto() failed.");
sockent_destroy (se);
return (-1);
}
status = sockent_server_listen (se);
if (status != 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: network_config_add_server: sockent_server_listen failed.");
sockent_destroy (se);
return (-1);
}
status = sockent_add (se);
if (status != 0)
{
ERROR ("network plugin: network_config_add_listen: sockent_add failed.");
sockent_destroy (se);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
} /* }}} int network_config_add_listen */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: yyparse (void *YYPARSE_PARAM)
#else
int
yyparse (YYPARSE_PARAM)
void *YYPARSE_PARAM;
#endif
#else /* ! YYPARSE_PARAM */
#if (defined __STDC__ || defined __C99__FUNC__ \
|| defined __cplusplus || defined _MSC_VER)
int
yyparse (void)
#else
int
yyparse ()
#endif
#endif
{
int yystate;
/* Number of tokens to shift before error messages enabled. */
int yyerrstatus;
/* The stacks and their tools:
`yyss': related to states.
`yyvs': related to semantic values.
Refer to the stacks thru separate pointers, to allow yyoverflow
to reallocate them elsewhere. */
/* The state stack. */
yytype_int16 yyssa[YYINITDEPTH];
yytype_int16 *yyss;
yytype_int16 *yyssp;
/* The semantic value stack. */
YYSTYPE yyvsa[YYINITDEPTH];
YYSTYPE *yyvs;
YYSTYPE *yyvsp;
YYSIZE_T yystacksize;
int yyn;
int yyresult;
/* Lookahead token as an internal (translated) token number. */
int yytoken;
/* The variables used to return semantic value and location from the
action routines. */
YYSTYPE yyval;
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
/* Buffer for error messages, and its allocated size. */
char yymsgbuf[128];
char *yymsg = yymsgbuf;
YYSIZE_T yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
#endif
#define YYPOPSTACK(N) (yyvsp -= (N), yyssp -= (N))
/* The number of symbols on the RHS of the reduced rule.
Keep to zero when no symbol should be popped. */
int yylen = 0;
yytoken = 0;
yyss = yyssa;
yyvs = yyvsa;
yystacksize = YYINITDEPTH;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Starting parse\n"));
yystate = 0;
yyerrstatus = 0;
yynerrs = 0;
yychar = YYEMPTY; /* Cause a token to be read. */
/* Initialize stack pointers.
Waste one element of value and location stack
so that they stay on the same level as the state stack.
The wasted elements are never initialized. */
yyssp = yyss;
yyvsp = yyvs;
goto yysetstate;
/*------------------------------------------------------------.
| yynewstate -- Push a new state, which is found in yystate. |
`------------------------------------------------------------*/
yynewstate:
/* In all cases, when you get here, the value and location stacks
have just been pushed. So pushing a state here evens the stacks. */
yyssp++;
yysetstate:
*yyssp = yystate;
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
{
/* Get the current used size of the three stacks, in elements. */
YYSIZE_T yysize = yyssp - yyss + 1;
#ifdef yyoverflow
{
/* Give user a chance to reallocate the stack. Use copies of
these so that the &'s don't force the real ones into
memory. */
YYSTYPE *yyvs1 = yyvs;
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
/* Each stack pointer address is followed by the size of the
data in use in that stack, in bytes. This used to be a
conditional around just the two extra args, but that might
be undefined if yyoverflow is a macro. */
yyoverflow (YY_("memory exhausted"),
&yyss1, yysize * sizeof (*yyssp),
&yyvs1, yysize * sizeof (*yyvsp),
&yystacksize);
yyss = yyss1;
yyvs = yyvs1;
}
#else /* no yyoverflow */
# ifndef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
goto yyexhaustedlab;
# else
/* Extend the stack our own way. */
if (YYMAXDEPTH <= yystacksize)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
yystacksize *= 2;
if (YYMAXDEPTH < yystacksize)
yystacksize = YYMAXDEPTH;
{
yytype_int16 *yyss1 = yyss;
union yyalloc *yyptr =
(union yyalloc *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (YYSTACK_BYTES (yystacksize));
if (! yyptr)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyss_alloc, yyss);
YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyvs_alloc, yyvs);
# undef YYSTACK_RELOCATE
if (yyss1 != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss1);
}
# endif
#endif /* no yyoverflow */
yyssp = yyss + yysize - 1;
yyvsp = yyvs + yysize - 1;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Stack size increased to %lu\n",
(unsigned long int) yystacksize));
if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp)
YYABORT;
}
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Entering state %d\n", yystate));
if (yystate == YYFINAL)
YYACCEPT;
goto yybackup;
/*-----------.
| yybackup. |
`-----------*/
yybackup:
/* Do appropriate processing given the current state. Read a
lookahead token if we need one and don't already have one. */
/* First try to decide what to do without reference to lookahead token. */
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yyn == YYPACT_NINF)
goto yydefault;
/* Not known => get a lookahead token if don't already have one. */
/* YYCHAR is either YYEMPTY or YYEOF or a valid lookahead symbol. */
if (yychar == YYEMPTY)
{
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Reading a token: "));
yychar = YYLEX;
}
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
yychar = yytoken = YYEOF;
YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Now at end of input.\n"));
}
else
{
yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar);
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Next token is", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
}
/* If the proper action on seeing token YYTOKEN is to reduce or to
detect an error, take that action. */
yyn += yytoken;
if (yyn < 0 || YYLAST < yyn || yycheck[yyn] != yytoken)
goto yydefault;
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (yyn <= 0)
{
if (yyn == 0 || yyn == YYTABLE_NINF)
goto yyerrlab;
yyn = -yyn;
goto yyreduce;
}
/* Count tokens shifted since error; after three, turn off error
status. */
if (yyerrstatus)
yyerrstatus--;
/* Shift the lookahead token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc);
/* Discard the shifted token. */
yychar = YYEMPTY;
yystate = yyn;
*++yyvsp = yylval;
goto yynewstate;
/*-----------------------------------------------------------.
| yydefault -- do the default action for the current state. |
`-----------------------------------------------------------*/
yydefault:
yyn = yydefact[yystate];
if (yyn == 0)
goto yyerrlab;
goto yyreduce;
/*-----------------------------.
| yyreduce -- Do a reduction. |
`-----------------------------*/
yyreduce:
/* yyn is the number of a rule to reduce with. */
yylen = yyr2[yyn];
/* If YYLEN is nonzero, implement the default value of the action:
`$$ = $1'.
Otherwise, the following line sets YYVAL to garbage.
This behavior is undocumented and Bison
users should not rely upon it. Assigning to YYVAL
unconditionally makes the parser a bit smaller, and it avoids a
GCC warning that YYVAL may be used uninitialized. */
yyval = yyvsp[1-yylen];
YY_REDUCE_PRINT (yyn);
switch (yyn)
{
case 5:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 320 "ntp_parser.y"
{
/* I will need to incorporate much more fine grained
* error messages. The following should suffice for
* the time being.
*/
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"syntax error in %s line %d, column %d",
ip_file->fname,
ip_file->err_line_no,
ip_file->err_col_no);
}
break;
case 19:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 354 "ntp_parser.y"
{
struct peer_node *my_node = create_peer_node((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue));
if (my_node)
enqueue(cfgt.peers, my_node);
}
break;
case 20:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 360 "ntp_parser.y"
{
struct peer_node *my_node = create_peer_node((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node), NULL);
if (my_node)
enqueue(cfgt.peers, my_node);
}
break;
case 27:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 377 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = create_address_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String), AF_INET); }
break;
case 28:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 378 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = create_address_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String), AF_INET6); }
break;
case 29:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 382 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = create_address_node((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String), 0); }
break;
case 30:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 386 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 31:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 387 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 32:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 391 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 33:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 392 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 34:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 393 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 35:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 394 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 36:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 395 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 37:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 396 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 38:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 397 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 39:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 398 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 40:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 399 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 41:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 400 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 42:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 401 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 43:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 402 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 44:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 403 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 45:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 404 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 46:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 405 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 47:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 415 "ntp_parser.y"
{
struct unpeer_node *my_node = create_unpeer_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node));
if (my_node)
enqueue(cfgt.unpeers, my_node);
}
break;
case 50:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 434 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.broadcastclient = 1; }
break;
case 51:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 436 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.manycastserver, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 52:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 438 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.multicastclient, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 53:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 449 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 54:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 451 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.control_key = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer); }
break;
case 55:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 453 "ntp_parser.y"
{
cfgt.auth.cryptosw++;
append_queue(cfgt.auth.crypto_cmd_list, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue));
}
break;
case 56:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 458 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.keys = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String); }
break;
case 57:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 460 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.keysdir = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String); }
break;
case 58:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 462 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.request_key = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer); }
break;
case 59:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 464 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.revoke = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer); }
break;
case 60:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 466 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.trusted_key_list = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue); }
break;
case 61:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 468 "ntp_parser.y"
{ cfgt.auth.ntp_signd_socket = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String); }
break;
case 63:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 474 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = create_queue(); }
break;
case 64:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 479 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue);
}
break;
case 65:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 486 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = create_queue();
}
break;
case 66:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 496 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 67:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 498 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 68:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 500 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 69:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 502 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 70:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 504 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 71:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 506 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 72:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 508 "ntp_parser.y"
{
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
cfgt.auth.revoke = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer);
msyslog(LOG_WARNING,
"'crypto revoke %d' is deprecated, "
"please use 'revoke %d' instead.",
cfgt.auth.revoke, cfgt.auth.revoke);
}
break;
case 73:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 525 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.orphan_cmds,(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 74:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 529 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 75:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 530 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 76:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 535 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 77:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 537 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 78:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 539 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 79:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 541 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 80:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 543 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 81:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 545 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 82:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 547 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 83:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 549 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 84:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 551 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 85:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 553 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 86:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 555 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (double)(yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 87:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 565 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.stats_list, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 88:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 567 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
cfgt.stats_dir = (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String);
else {
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("statsdir remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 89:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 576 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.filegen_opts,
create_filegen_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue)));
}
break;
case 90:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 583 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 91:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 584 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue(create_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer))); }
break;
case 100:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 600 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue);
}
break;
case 101:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 607 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = create_queue();
}
break;
case 102:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 617 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("filegen file remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 103:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 627 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("filegen type remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 104:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 636 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("filegen link remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 105:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 645 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("filegen nolink remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 106:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 653 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 107:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 654 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 115:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 674 "ntp_parser.y"
{
append_queue(cfgt.discard_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue));
}
break;
case 116:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 678 "ntp_parser.y"
{
append_queue(cfgt.mru_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue));
}
break;
case 117:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 682 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), NULL, (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue), ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 118:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 687 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node((yyvsp[(2) - (5)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(5) - (5)].Queue), ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 119:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 692 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(NULL, NULL, (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue), ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 120:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 697 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(
create_address_node(
estrdup("0.0.0.0"),
AF_INET),
create_address_node(
estrdup("0.0.0.0"),
AF_INET),
(yyvsp[(4) - (4)].Queue),
ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 121:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 710 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(
create_address_node(
estrdup("::"),
AF_INET6),
create_address_node(
estrdup("::"),
AF_INET6),
(yyvsp[(4) - (4)].Queue),
ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 122:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 723 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.restrict_opts,
create_restrict_node(
NULL, NULL,
enqueue((yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer))),
ip_file->line_no));
}
break;
case 123:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 734 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = create_queue(); }
break;
case 124:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 736 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 139:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 758 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 140:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 760 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 141:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 764 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 142:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 765 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 143:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 766 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 144:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 771 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 145:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 773 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 146:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 777 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 147:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 778 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 148:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 779 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 149:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 780 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 150:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 781 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 151:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 782 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 152:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 783 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 153:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 784 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 154:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 793 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.fudge, create_addr_opts_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue))); }
break;
case 155:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 798 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 156:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 800 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 157:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 804 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 158:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 805 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 159:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 806 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 160:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 807 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)); }
break;
case 161:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 808 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 162:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 809 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 163:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 810 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 164:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 811 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 165:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 820 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.enable_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 166:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 822 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.disable_opts, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 167:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 827 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue);
}
break;
case 168:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 834 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val) != NULL)
(yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val));
else
(yyval.Queue) = create_queue();
}
break;
case 169:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 843 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 170:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 844 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 171:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 845 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 172:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 846 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 173:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 847 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 174:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 848 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 175:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 850 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival(T_Flag, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer));
else {
(yyval.Attr_val) = NULL;
yyerror("enable/disable stats remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 176:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 865 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.tinker, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 177:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 869 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 178:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 870 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 179:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 874 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 180:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 875 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 181:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 876 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 182:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 877 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 183:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 878 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 184:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 879 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 185:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 880 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)); }
break;
case 187:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 891 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (curr_include_level >= MAXINCLUDELEVEL) {
fprintf(stderr, "getconfig: Maximum include file level exceeded.\n");
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "getconfig: Maximum include file level exceeded.");
}
else {
fp[curr_include_level + 1] = F_OPEN(FindConfig((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].String)), "r");
if (fp[curr_include_level + 1] == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "getconfig: Couldn't open <%s>\n", FindConfig((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].String)));
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "getconfig: Couldn't open <%s>", FindConfig((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].String)));
}
else
ip_file = fp[++curr_include_level];
}
}
break;
case 188:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 907 "ntp_parser.y"
{
while (curr_include_level != -1)
FCLOSE(fp[curr_include_level--]);
}
break;
case 189:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 913 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double))); }
break;
case 190:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 915 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 191:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 917 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double))); }
break;
case 192:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 919 "ntp_parser.y"
{ /* Null action, possibly all null parms */ }
break;
case 193:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 921 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 194:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 924 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 195:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 926 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
enqueue(cfgt.vars,
create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)));
else {
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("logfile remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 196:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 937 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.logconfig, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 197:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 939 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.phone, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 198:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 941 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if (input_from_file)
enqueue(cfgt.vars,
create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String)));
else {
free((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String));
yyerror("saveconfigdir remote configuration ignored");
}
}
break;
case 199:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 951 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.setvar, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Set_var)); }
break;
case 200:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 953 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.trap, create_addr_opts_node((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node), NULL)); }
break;
case 201:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 955 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.trap, create_addr_opts_node((yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Queue))); }
break;
case 202:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 957 "ntp_parser.y"
{ append_queue(cfgt.ttl, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Queue)); }
break;
case 203:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 959 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.qos, create_attr_sval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 204:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 964 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval(T_Driftfile, (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String))); }
break;
case 205:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 966 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_dval(T_WanderThreshold, (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Double)));
enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval(T_Driftfile, (yyvsp[(1) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 206:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 969 "ntp_parser.y"
{ enqueue(cfgt.vars, create_attr_sval(T_Driftfile, "\0")); }
break;
case 207:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 974 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Set_var) = create_setvar_node((yyvsp[(1) - (4)].String), (yyvsp[(3) - (4)].String), (yyvsp[(4) - (4)].Integer)); }
break;
case 208:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 976 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Set_var) = create_setvar_node((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].String), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].String), 0); }
break;
case 209:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 981 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 210:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 982 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 211:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 986 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer)); }
break;
case 212:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 987 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_pval((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Integer), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node)); }
break;
case 213:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 991 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 214:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 992 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 215:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 997 "ntp_parser.y"
{
char prefix = (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String)[0];
char *type = (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String) + 1;
if (prefix != '+' && prefix != '-' && prefix != '=') {
yyerror("Logconfig prefix is not '+', '-' or '='\n");
}
else
(yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_sval(prefix, estrdup(type));
YYFREE((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String));
}
break;
case 216:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1012 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.nic_rules,
create_nic_rule_node((yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Integer), NULL, (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer)));
}
break;
case 217:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1017 "ntp_parser.y"
{
enqueue(cfgt.nic_rules,
create_nic_rule_node(0, (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].String), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Integer)));
}
break;
case 227:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1048 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_ival((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Integer))); }
break;
case 228:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1049 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue(create_ival((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer))); }
break;
case 229:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1054 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 230:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1056 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 231:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1061 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_ival('i', (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer)); }
break;
case 233:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1067 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_shorts('-', (yyvsp[(2) - (5)].Integer), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Integer)); }
break;
case 234:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1071 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), create_pval((yyvsp[(2) - (2)].String))); }
break;
case 235:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1072 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue(create_pval((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].String))); }
break;
case 236:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1076 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Address_node)); }
break;
case 237:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1077 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Address_node)); }
break;
case 238:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1082 "ntp_parser.y"
{
if ((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer) != 0 && (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer) != 1) {
yyerror("Integer value is not boolean (0 or 1). Assuming 1");
(yyval.Integer) = 1;
}
else
(yyval.Integer) = (yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer);
}
break;
case 239:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1090 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Integer) = 1; }
break;
case 240:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1091 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Integer) = 0; }
break;
case 241:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1095 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Double) = (double)(yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Integer); }
break;
case 243:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1106 "ntp_parser.y"
{
cfgt.sim_details = create_sim_node((yyvsp[(3) - (5)].Queue), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Queue));
/* Reset the old_config_style variable */
old_config_style = 1;
}
break;
case 244:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1120 "ntp_parser.y"
{ old_config_style = 0; }
break;
case 245:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1124 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 246:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1125 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 247:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1129 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 248:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1130 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 249:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1134 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Sim_server)); }
break;
case 250:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1135 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Sim_server)); }
break;
case 251:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1140 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Sim_server) = create_sim_server((yyvsp[(1) - (5)].Address_node), (yyvsp[(3) - (5)].Double), (yyvsp[(4) - (5)].Queue)); }
break;
case 252:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1144 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Double) = (yyvsp[(3) - (4)].Double); }
break;
case 253:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1148 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Address_node) = (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Address_node); }
break;
case 254:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1152 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (2)].Sim_script)); }
break;
case 255:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1153 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (1)].Sim_script)); }
break;
case 256:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1158 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Sim_script) = create_sim_script_info((yyvsp[(3) - (6)].Double), (yyvsp[(5) - (6)].Queue)); }
break;
case 257:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1162 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Queue), (yyvsp[(2) - (3)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 258:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1163 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Queue) = enqueue_in_new_queue((yyvsp[(1) - (2)].Attr_val)); }
break;
case 259:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1168 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 260:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1170 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 261:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1172 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 262:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1174 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
case 263:
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 1176 "ntp_parser.y"
{ (yyval.Attr_val) = create_attr_dval((yyvsp[(1) - (3)].Integer), (yyvsp[(3) - (3)].Double)); }
break;
/* Line 1455 of yacc.c */
#line 3826 "ntp_parser.c"
default: break;
}
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("-> $$ =", yyr1[yyn], &yyval, &yyloc);
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
*++yyvsp = yyval;
/* Now `shift' the result of the reduction. Determine what state
that goes to, based on the state we popped back to and the rule
number reduced by. */
yyn = yyr1[yyn];
yystate = yypgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS] + *yyssp;
if (0 <= yystate && yystate <= YYLAST && yycheck[yystate] == *yyssp)
yystate = yytable[yystate];
else
yystate = yydefgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS];
goto yynewstate;
/*------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab -- here on detecting error |
`------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab:
/* If not already recovering from an error, report this error. */
if (!yyerrstatus)
{
++yynerrs;
#if ! YYERROR_VERBOSE
yyerror (YY_("syntax error"));
#else
{
YYSIZE_T yysize = yysyntax_error (0, yystate, yychar);
if (yymsg_alloc < yysize && yymsg_alloc < YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM)
{
YYSIZE_T yyalloc = 2 * yysize;
if (! (yysize <= yyalloc && yyalloc <= YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM))
yyalloc = YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM;
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
yymsg = (char *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (yyalloc);
if (yymsg)
yymsg_alloc = yyalloc;
else
{
yymsg = yymsgbuf;
yymsg_alloc = sizeof yymsgbuf;
}
}
if (0 < yysize && yysize <= yymsg_alloc)
{
(void) yysyntax_error (yymsg, yystate, yychar);
yyerror (yymsg);
}
else
{
yyerror (YY_("syntax error"));
if (yysize != 0)
goto yyexhaustedlab;
}
}
#endif
}
if (yyerrstatus == 3)
{
/* If just tried and failed to reuse lookahead token after an
error, discard it. */
if (yychar <= YYEOF)
{
/* Return failure if at end of input. */
if (yychar == YYEOF)
YYABORT;
}
else
{
yydestruct ("Error: discarding",
yytoken, &yylval);
yychar = YYEMPTY;
}
}
/* Else will try to reuse lookahead token after shifting the error
token. */
goto yyerrlab1;
/*---------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrorlab -- error raised explicitly by YYERROR. |
`---------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrorlab:
/* Pacify compilers like GCC when the user code never invokes
YYERROR and the label yyerrorlab therefore never appears in user
code. */
if (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
goto yyerrorlab;
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule which action triggered
this YYERROR. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
yylen = 0;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
yystate = *yyssp;
goto yyerrlab1;
/*-------------------------------------------------------------.
| yyerrlab1 -- common code for both syntax error and YYERROR. |
`-------------------------------------------------------------*/
yyerrlab1:
yyerrstatus = 3; /* Each real token shifted decrements this. */
for (;;)
{
yyn = yypact[yystate];
if (yyn != YYPACT_NINF)
{
yyn += YYTERROR;
if (0 <= yyn && yyn <= YYLAST && yycheck[yyn] == YYTERROR)
{
yyn = yytable[yyn];
if (0 < yyn)
break;
}
}
/* Pop the current state because it cannot handle the error token. */
if (yyssp == yyss)
YYABORT;
yydestruct ("Error: popping",
yystos[yystate], yyvsp);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
yystate = *yyssp;
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
}
*++yyvsp = yylval;
/* Shift the error token. */
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yystos[yyn], yyvsp, yylsp);
yystate = yyn;
goto yynewstate;
/*-------------------------------------.
| yyacceptlab -- YYACCEPT comes here. |
`-------------------------------------*/
yyacceptlab:
yyresult = 0;
goto yyreturn;
/*-----------------------------------.
| yyabortlab -- YYABORT comes here. |
`-----------------------------------*/
yyabortlab:
yyresult = 1;
goto yyreturn;
#if !defined(yyoverflow) || YYERROR_VERBOSE
/*-------------------------------------------------.
| yyexhaustedlab -- memory exhaustion comes here. |
`-------------------------------------------------*/
yyexhaustedlab:
yyerror (YY_("memory exhausted"));
yyresult = 2;
/* Fall through. */
#endif
yyreturn:
if (yychar != YYEMPTY)
yydestruct ("Cleanup: discarding lookahead",
yytoken, &yylval);
/* Do not reclaim the symbols of the rule which action triggered
this YYABORT or YYACCEPT. */
YYPOPSTACK (yylen);
YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp);
while (yyssp != yyss)
{
yydestruct ("Cleanup: popping",
yystos[*yyssp], yyvsp);
YYPOPSTACK (1);
}
#ifndef yyoverflow
if (yyss != yyssa)
YYSTACK_FREE (yyss);
#endif
#if YYERROR_VERBOSE
if (yymsg != yymsgbuf)
YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg);
#endif
/* Make sure YYID is used. */
return YYID (yyresult);
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1593] ntpd abort in free() with logconfig syntax error.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 168,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btrfs_unlink_inode(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root,
struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
const char *name, int name_len)
{
int ret;
ret = __btrfs_unlink_inode(trans, root, dir, inode, name, name_len);
if (!ret) {
drop_nlink(inode);
ret = btrfs_update_inode(trans, root, inode);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnPageWasHidden() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
SuspendVideoCaptureDevices(true);
#endif
if (webview()) {
blink::mojom::PageVisibilityState visibilityState =
GetMainRenderFrame() ? GetMainRenderFrame()->VisibilityState()
: blink::mojom::PageVisibilityState::kHidden;
webview()->SetVisibilityState(visibilityState, false);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,141 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cbc_des3_encrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
return cbc_desall_crypt(desc, KMC_TDEA_192_ENCRYPT, &walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool ASCIIHexEncoder::fillBuf() {
static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
int c;
if (eof) {
return gFalse;
}
bufPtr = bufEnd = buf;
if ((c = str->getChar()) == EOF) {
*bufEnd++ = '>';
eof = gTrue;
} else {
if (lineLen >= 64) {
*bufEnd++ = '\n';
lineLen = 0;
}
*bufEnd++ = hex[(c >> 4) & 0x0f];
*bufEnd++ = hex[c & 0x0f];
lineLen += 2;
}
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BlinkTestRunner::DisableAutoResizeMode(const WebSize& new_size) {
content::DisableAutoResizeMode(render_view(), new_size);
if (!new_size.isEmpty())
ForceResizeRenderView(render_view(), new_size);
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *receive_small(struct virtnet_info *vi, void *buf, unsigned int len)
{
struct sk_buff * skb = buf;
len -= vi->hdr_len;
skb_trim(skb, len);
return skb;
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm_exp_state_notify(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_expire_msgsize(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (build_expire(skb, x, c) < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
return nlmsg_multicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::ApplyFeaturePolicy(const ParsedFeaturePolicy& declared_policy) {
const FeaturePolicy::FeatureState* opener_feature_state = nullptr;
if (frame_ && frame_->IsMainFrame() &&
!frame_->Client()->GetOpenerFeatureState().empty()) {
opener_feature_state = &frame_->Client()->GetOpenerFeatureState();
}
InitializeFeaturePolicy(declared_policy, GetOwnerContainerPolicy(),
GetParentFeaturePolicy(), opener_feature_state);
is_vertical_scroll_enforced_ =
frame_ && !frame_->IsMainFrame() &&
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::ExperimentalProductivityFeaturesEnabled() &&
!GetFeaturePolicy()->IsFeatureEnabled(
mojom::FeaturePolicyFeature::kVerticalScroll);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool is_guest_view_hack() { return is_guest_view_hack_; }
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __weak arch_dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *dst,
struct task_struct *src)
{
*dst = *src;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170823211408.31198-1-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE0(vhangup)
{
if (capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG)) {
tty_vhangup_self();
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 46,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BOOL update_send_memblt(rdpContext* context, MEMBLT_ORDER* memblt)
{
wStream* s;
size_t offset;
int headerLength;
ORDER_INFO orderInfo;
rdpUpdate* update = context->update;
headerLength = update_prepare_order_info(context, &orderInfo,
ORDER_TYPE_MEMBLT);
update_check_flush(context,
headerLength + update_approximate_memblt_order(&orderInfo, memblt));
s = update->us;
if (!s)
return FALSE;
offset = Stream_GetPosition(s);
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(s, headerLength))
return FALSE;
Stream_Seek(s, headerLength);
update_write_memblt_order(s, &orderInfo, memblt);
update_write_order_info(context, s, &orderInfo, offset);
update->numberOrders++;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DOMPatchSupport::removeChildAndMoveToNew(Digest* oldDigest, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
RefPtr<Node> oldNode = oldDigest->m_node;
if (!m_domEditor->removeChild(oldNode->parentNode(), oldNode.get(), ec))
return false;
UnusedNodesMap::iterator it = m_unusedNodesMap.find(oldDigest->m_sha1);
if (it != m_unusedNodesMap.end()) {
Digest* newDigest = it->second;
Node* newNode = newDigest->m_node;
if (!m_domEditor->replaceChild(newNode->parentNode(), oldNode, newNode, ec))
return false;
newDigest->m_node = oldNode.get();
markNodeAsUsed(newDigest);
return true;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < oldDigest->m_children.size(); ++i) {
if (!removeChildAndMoveToNew(oldDigest->m_children[i].get(), ec))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,419 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::PostInitialization(
DownloadInitializationDependency dependency) {
if (initialized_)
return;
switch (dependency) {
case DOWNLOAD_INITIALIZATION_DEPENDENCY_HISTORY_DB:
history_db_initialized_ = true;
break;
case DOWNLOAD_INITIALIZATION_DEPENDENCY_IN_PROGRESS_CACHE:
in_progress_cache_initialized_ = true;
break;
case DOWNLOAD_INITIALIZATION_DEPENDENCY_NONE:
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
initialized_ = history_db_initialized_ && in_progress_cache_initialized_;
if (initialized_) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnManagerInitialized();
}
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_wait(struct ofproto *p)
{
p->ofproto_class->wait(p);
if (p->ofproto_class->port_poll_wait) {
p->ofproto_class->port_poll_wait(p);
}
seq_wait(connectivity_seq_get(), p->change_seq);
connmgr_wait(p->connmgr);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: touch_job(conn c, job j)
{
j = find_reserved_job_in_conn(c, j);
if (j) {
j->deadline_at = now_usec() + j->ttr;
c->soonest_job = NULL;
}
return j;
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void f2fs_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
if (!(S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) ||
S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)))
return;
trace_f2fs_truncate(inode);
if (!truncate_blocks(inode, i_size_read(inode))) {
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool kvm_is_mmio_pfn(pfn_t pfn)
{
if (pfn_valid(pfn))
return PageReserved(pfn_to_page(pfn));
return true;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFWriteBufferSetup(TIFF* tif, void* bp, tmsize_t size)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFWriteBufferSetup";
if (tif->tif_rawdata) {
if (tif->tif_flags & TIFF_MYBUFFER) {
_TIFFfree(tif->tif_rawdata);
tif->tif_flags &= ~TIFF_MYBUFFER;
}
tif->tif_rawdata = NULL;
}
if (size == (tmsize_t)(-1)) {
size = (isTiled(tif) ?
tif->tif_tilesize : TIFFStripSize(tif));
/*
* Make raw data buffer at least 8K
*/
if (size < 8*1024)
size = 8*1024;
bp = NULL; /* NB: force malloc */
}
if (bp == NULL) {
bp = _TIFFmalloc(size);
if (bp == NULL) {
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module, "No space for output buffer");
return (0);
}
tif->tif_flags |= TIFF_MYBUFFER;
} else
tif->tif_flags &= ~TIFF_MYBUFFER;
tif->tif_rawdata = (uint8*) bp;
tif->tif_rawdatasize = size;
tif->tif_rawcc = 0;
tif->tif_rawcp = tif->tif_rawdata;
tif->tif_flags |= TIFF_BUFFERSETUP;
return (1);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool virtio_should_notify(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
{
uint16_t old, new;
bool v;
/* We need to expose used array entries before checking used event. */
smp_mb();
/* Always notify when queue is empty (when feature acknowledge) */
if (virtio_vdev_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_NOTIFY_ON_EMPTY) &&
!vq->inuse && virtio_queue_empty(vq)) {
return true;
}
if (!virtio_vdev_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX)) {
return !(vring_avail_flags(vq) & VRING_AVAIL_F_NO_INTERRUPT);
}
v = vq->signalled_used_valid;
vq->signalled_used_valid = true;
old = vq->signalled_used;
new = vq->signalled_used = vq->used_idx;
return !v || vring_need_event(vring_get_used_event(vq), new, old);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,247 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TrayCast::OnCastingSessionStartedOrStopped(bool started) {
is_casting_ = started;
UpdatePrimaryView();
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 119,723 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String HTMLInputElement::ValidationSubMessage() const {
if (!willValidate() || CustomError())
return String();
return input_type_->ValidationMessage(*input_type_view_).second;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FileTransfer::InsertPluginMappings(MyString methods, MyString p)
{
StringList method_list(methods.Value());
char* m;
method_list.rewind();
while((m = method_list.next())) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "FILETRANSFER: protocol \"%s\" handled by \"%s\"\n", m, p.Value());
plugin_table->insert(m, p);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vsad16_c(/*MpegEncContext*/ void *c, uint8_t *s1, uint8_t *s2, int stride, int h){
int score=0;
int x,y;
for(y=1; y<h; y++){
for(x=0; x<16; x++){
score+= FFABS(s1[x ] - s2[x ] - s1[x +stride] + s2[x +stride]);
}
s1+= stride;
s2+= stride;
}
return score;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutRect RenderBox::noOverflowRect() const
{
const int scrollBarWidth = verticalScrollbarWidth();
const int scrollBarHeight = horizontalScrollbarHeight();
LayoutUnit left = borderLeft() + (style()->shouldPlaceBlockDirectionScrollbarOnLogicalLeft() ? scrollBarWidth : 0);
LayoutUnit top = borderTop();
LayoutUnit right = borderRight();
LayoutUnit bottom = borderBottom();
LayoutRect rect(left, top, width() - left - right, height() - top - bottom);
flipForWritingMode(rect);
if (style()->shouldPlaceBlockDirectionScrollbarOnLogicalLeft())
rect.contract(0, scrollBarHeight);
else
rect.contract(scrollBarWidth, scrollBarHeight);
return rect;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourcePrefetchPredictor::OnURLsDeleted(
history::HistoryService* history_service,
const history::DeletionInfo& deletion_info) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(initialization_state_ == INITIALIZED);
if (deletion_info.IsAllHistory())
DeleteAllUrls();
else
DeleteUrls(deletion_info.deleted_rows());
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_send_asconf_del_ip(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *addrs,
int addrcnt)
{
struct sctp_sock *sp;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
union sctp_addr *laddr;
void *addr_buf;
struct sctp_af *af;
struct list_head *pos, *pos1;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *saddr;
int i;
int retval = 0;
if (!sctp_addip_enable)
return retval;
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
ep = sp->ep;
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: (sk: %p, addrs: %p, addrcnt: %d)\n",
__FUNCTION__, sk, addrs, addrcnt);
list_for_each(pos, &ep->asocs) {
asoc = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_association, asocs);
if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable)
continue;
if (asoc->peer.addip_disabled_mask & SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP)
continue;
if (!sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED))
continue;
/* Check if any address in the packed array of addresses is
* not present in the bind address list of the association.
* If so, do not send the asconf chunk to its peer, but
* continue with other associations.
*/
addr_buf = addrs;
for (i = 0; i < addrcnt; i++) {
laddr = (union sctp_addr *)addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(laddr->v4.sin_family);
if (!af) {
retval = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_laddr(asoc, laddr))
break;
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
}
if (i < addrcnt)
continue;
/* Find one address in the association's bind address list
* that is not in the packed array of addresses. This is to
* make sure that we do not delete all the addresses in the
* association.
*/
sctp_read_lock(&asoc->base.addr_lock);
bp = &asoc->base.bind_addr;
laddr = sctp_find_unmatch_addr(bp, (union sctp_addr *)addrs,
addrcnt, sp);
sctp_read_unlock(&asoc->base.addr_lock);
if (!laddr)
continue;
chunk = sctp_make_asconf_update_ip(asoc, laddr, addrs, addrcnt,
SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP);
if (!chunk) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
/* Reset use_as_src flag for the addresses in the bind address
* list that are to be deleted.
*/
sctp_local_bh_disable();
sctp_write_lock(&asoc->base.addr_lock);
addr_buf = addrs;
for (i = 0; i < addrcnt; i++) {
laddr = (union sctp_addr *)addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(laddr->v4.sin_family);
list_for_each(pos1, &bp->address_list) {
saddr = list_entry(pos1,
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry,
list);
if (sctp_cmp_addr_exact(&saddr->a, laddr))
saddr->use_as_src = 0;
}
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
}
sctp_write_unlock(&asoc->base.addr_lock);
sctp_local_bh_enable();
/* Update the route and saddr entries for all the transports
* as some of the addresses in the bind address list are
* about to be deleted and cannot be used as source addresses.
*/
list_for_each(pos1, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
transport = list_entry(pos1, struct sctp_transport,
transports);
dst_release(transport->dst);
sctp_transport_route(transport, NULL,
sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk));
}
retval = sctp_send_asconf(asoc, chunk);
}
out:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int irda_discover_daddr_and_lsap_sel(struct irda_sock *self, char *name)
{
discinfo_t *discoveries; /* Copy of the discovery log */
int number; /* Number of nodes in the log */
int i;
int err = -ENETUNREACH;
__u32 daddr = DEV_ADDR_ANY; /* Address we found the service on */
__u8 dtsap_sel = 0x0; /* TSAP associated with it */
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(), name=%s\n", __func__, name);
/* Ask lmp for the current discovery log
* Note : we have to use irlmp_get_discoveries(), as opposed
* to play with the cachelog directly, because while we are
* making our ias query, le log might change... */
discoveries = irlmp_get_discoveries(&number, self->mask.word,
self->nslots);
/* Check if the we got some results */
if (discoveries == NULL)
return -ENETUNREACH; /* No nodes discovered */
/*
* Now, check all discovered devices (if any), and connect
* client only about the services that the client is
* interested in...
*/
for(i = 0; i < number; i++) {
/* Try the address in the log */
self->daddr = discoveries[i].daddr;
self->saddr = 0x0;
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), trying daddr = %08x\n",
__func__, self->daddr);
/* Query remote LM-IAS for this service */
err = irda_find_lsap_sel(self, name);
switch (err) {
case 0:
/* We found the requested service */
if(daddr != DEV_ADDR_ANY) {
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), discovered service ''%s'' in two different devices !!!\n",
__func__, name);
self->daddr = DEV_ADDR_ANY;
kfree(discoveries);
return -ENOTUNIQ;
}
/* First time we found that one, save it ! */
daddr = self->daddr;
dtsap_sel = self->dtsap_sel;
break;
case -EADDRNOTAVAIL:
/* Requested service simply doesn't exist on this node */
break;
default:
/* Something bad did happen :-( */
IRDA_DEBUG(0, "%s(), unexpected IAS query failure\n", __func__);
self->daddr = DEV_ADDR_ANY;
kfree(discoveries);
return -EHOSTUNREACH;
break;
}
}
/* Cleanup our copy of the discovery log */
kfree(discoveries);
/* Check out what we found */
if(daddr == DEV_ADDR_ANY) {
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), cannot discover service ''%s'' in any device !!!\n",
__func__, name);
self->daddr = DEV_ADDR_ANY;
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
/* Revert back to discovered device & service */
self->daddr = daddr;
self->saddr = 0x0;
self->dtsap_sel = dtsap_sel;
IRDA_DEBUG(1, "%s(), discovered requested service ''%s'' at address %08x\n",
__func__, name, self->daddr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetResponseHook(ResponseHook response_hook) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
response_hook_ = response_hook;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: qboolean FS_ComparePaks( char *neededpaks, int len, qboolean dlstring ) {
searchpath_t *sp;
qboolean havepak;
char *origpos = neededpaks;
int i;
if (!fs_numServerReferencedPaks)
return qfalse; // Server didn't send any pack information along
*neededpaks = 0;
for ( i = 0 ; i < fs_numServerReferencedPaks ; i++ )
{
havepak = qfalse;
if(FS_idPak(fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i], BASEGAME, NUM_ID_PAKS)
#ifndef STANDALONE
|| FS_idPak(fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i], BASETA, NUM_TA_PAKS)
#endif
)
{
continue;
}
if(FS_CheckDirTraversal(fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i]))
{
Com_Printf("WARNING: Invalid download name %s\n", fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i]);
continue;
}
for ( sp = fs_searchpaths ; sp ; sp = sp->next ) {
if ( sp->pack && sp->pack->checksum == fs_serverReferencedPaks[i] ) {
havepak = qtrue; // This is it!
break;
}
}
if ( !havepak && fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i] && *fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i] ) {
if (dlstring)
{
origpos += strlen(origpos);
Q_strcat( neededpaks, len, "@");
Q_strcat( neededpaks, len, fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i] );
Q_strcat( neededpaks, len, ".pk3" );
Q_strcat( neededpaks, len, "@");
if ( FS_SV_FileExists( va( "%s.pk3", fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i] ) ) )
{
char st[MAX_ZPATH];
Com_sprintf( st, sizeof( st ), "%s.%08x.pk3", fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i], fs_serverReferencedPaks[i] );
Q_strcat( neededpaks, len, st );
}
else
{
Q_strcat( neededpaks, len, fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i] );
Q_strcat( neededpaks, len, ".pk3" );
}
if(strlen(origpos) + (origpos - neededpaks) >= len - 1)
{
*origpos = '\0';
break;
}
}
else
{
Q_strcat( neededpaks, len, fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i] );
Q_strcat( neededpaks, len, ".pk3" );
if ( FS_SV_FileExists( va( "%s.pk3", fs_serverReferencedPakNames[i] ) ) )
{
Q_strcat( neededpaks, len, " (local file exists with wrong checksum)");
}
Q_strcat( neededpaks, len, "\n");
}
}
}
if ( *neededpaks ) {
return qtrue;
}
return qfalse; // We have them all
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 96,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableMediaEngagementBypassAutoplayPolicies(
bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetMediaEngagementBypassAutoplayPoliciesEnabled(
enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __bnep_copy_ci(struct bnep_conninfo *ci, struct bnep_session *s)
{
memset(ci, 0, sizeof(*ci));
memcpy(ci->dst, s->eh.h_source, ETH_ALEN);
strcpy(ci->device, s->dev->name);
ci->flags = s->flags;
ci->state = s->state;
ci->role = s->role;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: bnep: bnep_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,387 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
OM_uint32 ret;
u_int len;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
gssbuf.length = len;
mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
mic.length = len;
ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
free(gssbuf.value);
free(mic.value);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, ret);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 72,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fib6_dump_done(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
fib6_dump_end(cb);
return cb->done ? cb->done(cb) : 0;
}
Commit Message: net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <matti.vaittinen@nsn.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 28,405 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: header_put_be_8byte (SF_PRIVATE *psf, sf_count_t x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 8)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 56) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 48) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 40) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 32) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 24) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 16) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} ;
} /* header_put_be_8byte */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GetNATRSIPStatus(struct upnphttp * h, const char * action, const char * ns)
{
#if 0
static const char resp[] =
"<u:GetNATRSIPStatusResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"" SERVICE_TYPE_WANIPC "\">"
"<NewRSIPAvailable>0</NewRSIPAvailable>"
"<NewNATEnabled>1</NewNATEnabled>"
"</u:GetNATRSIPStatusResponse>";
UNUSED(action);
#endif
static const char resp[] =
"<u:%sResponse "
"xmlns:u=\"%s\">"
"<NewRSIPAvailable>0</NewRSIPAvailable>"
"<NewNATEnabled>1</NewNATEnabled>"
"</u:%sResponse>";
char body[512];
int bodylen;
/* 2.2.9. RSIPAvailable
* This variable indicates if Realm-specific IP (RSIP) is available
* as a feature on the InternetGatewayDevice. RSIP is being defined
* in the NAT working group in the IETF to allow host-NATing using
* a standard set of message exchanges. It also allows end-to-end
* applications that otherwise break if NAT is introduced
* (e.g. IPsec-based VPNs).
* A gateway that does not support RSIP should set this variable to 0. */
bodylen = snprintf(body, sizeof(body), resp,
action, ns, /*SERVICE_TYPE_WANIPC,*/
action);
BuildSendAndCloseSoapResp(h, body, bodylen);
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vpx_codec_err_t vp8dx_get_reference(VP8D_COMP *pbi, enum vpx_ref_frame_type ref_frame_flag, YV12_BUFFER_CONFIG *sd)
{
VP8_COMMON *cm = &pbi->common;
int ref_fb_idx;
if (ref_frame_flag == VP8_LAST_FRAME)
ref_fb_idx = cm->lst_fb_idx;
else if (ref_frame_flag == VP8_GOLD_FRAME)
ref_fb_idx = cm->gld_fb_idx;
else if (ref_frame_flag == VP8_ALTR_FRAME)
ref_fb_idx = cm->alt_fb_idx;
else{
vpx_internal_error(&pbi->common.error, VPX_CODEC_ERROR,
"Invalid reference frame");
return pbi->common.error.error_code;
}
if(cm->yv12_fb[ref_fb_idx].y_height != sd->y_height ||
cm->yv12_fb[ref_fb_idx].y_width != sd->y_width ||
cm->yv12_fb[ref_fb_idx].uv_height != sd->uv_height ||
cm->yv12_fb[ref_fb_idx].uv_width != sd->uv_width){
vpx_internal_error(&pbi->common.error, VPX_CODEC_ERROR,
"Incorrect buffer dimensions");
}
else
vp8_yv12_copy_frame(&cm->yv12_fb[ref_fb_idx], sd);
return pbi->common.error.error_code;
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,661 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: drain_pending_changes (Device *device,
gboolean force_update)
{
gboolean emit_changed;
emit_changed = FALSE;
/* the update-in-idle is set up if, and only if, there are pending changes - so
* we should emit a 'change' event only if it is set up
*/
if (device->priv->emit_changed_idle_id != 0)
{
g_source_remove (device->priv->emit_changed_idle_id);
device->priv->emit_changed_idle_id = 0;
emit_changed = TRUE;
}
if ((!device->priv->removed) && (emit_changed || force_update))
{
if (device->priv->object_path != NULL)
{
g_print ("**** EMITTING CHANGED for %s\n", device->priv->native_path);
g_signal_emit_by_name (device, "changed");
g_signal_emit_by_name (device->priv->daemon, "device-changed", device->priv->object_path);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void user_disable_single_step(struct task_struct *task)
{
struct pt_regs *regs = task->thread.regs;
if (regs != NULL) {
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_REGS
/*
* The logic to disable single stepping should be as
* simple as turning off the Instruction Complete flag.
* And, after doing so, if all debug flags are off, turn
* off DBCR0(IDM) and MSR(DE) .... Torez
*/
task->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~(DBCR0_IC|DBCR0_BT);
/*
* Test to see if any of the DBCR_ACTIVE_EVENTS bits are set.
*/
if (!DBCR_ACTIVE_EVENTS(task->thread.debug.dbcr0,
task->thread.debug.dbcr1)) {
/*
* All debug events were off.....
*/
task->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IDM;
regs->msr &= ~MSR_DE;
}
#else
regs->msr &= ~(MSR_SE | MSR_BE);
#endif
}
clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SINGLESTEP);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hfs_file_read_zlib_rsrc(const TSK_FS_ATTR * a_fs_attr,
TSK_OFF_T a_offset, char *a_buf, size_t a_len)
{
return hfs_file_read_compressed_rsrc(
a_fs_attr, a_offset, a_buf, a_len,
hfs_read_zlib_block_table,
hfs_decompress_zlib_block
);
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadMTVImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
buffer[MaxTextExtent];
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register unsigned char
*p;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
unsigned long
columns,
rows;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read MTV image.
*/
(void) ReadBlobString(image,buffer);
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(buffer,"%lu %lu\n",&columns,&rows);
if (count <= 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
do
{
/*
Initialize image structure.
*/
image->columns=columns;
image->rows=rows;
image->depth=8;
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
/*
Convert MTV raster image to pixel packets.
*/
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) image->columns,
3UL*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) (3*image->columns),pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) (3*image->columns))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
p=pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
*buffer='\0';
(void) ReadBlobString(image,buffer);
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(buffer,"%lu %lu\n",&columns,&rows);
if (count > 0)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (count > 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aspath_count_confeds (struct aspath *aspath)
{
int count = 0;
struct assegment *seg = aspath->segments;
while (seg)
{
if (seg->type == AS_CONFED_SEQUENCE)
count += seg->length;
else if (seg->type == AS_CONFED_SET)
count++;
seg = seg->next;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VOID ixheaacd_hbe_post_anal_prod3(ia_esbr_hbe_txposer_struct *ptr_hbe_txposer,
WORD32 qmf_voc_columns, WORD32 qmf_band_idx) {
WORD32 i, inp_band_idx, rem;
FLOAT32 *out_buf = &ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_out_buf[2][2 * qmf_band_idx];
for (; qmf_band_idx < ptr_hbe_txposer->x_over_qmf[2]; qmf_band_idx++) {
FLOAT32 temp_r, temp_i;
FLOAT32 temp_r1, temp_i1;
const FLOAT32 *ptr_sel, *ptr_sel1;
inp_band_idx = (2 * qmf_band_idx) / 3;
ptr_sel = &ixheaacd_sel_case[(inp_band_idx + 1) & 3][0];
ptr_sel1 = &ixheaacd_sel_case[((inp_band_idx + 1) & 3) + 1][0];
rem = 2 * qmf_band_idx - 3 * inp_band_idx;
if (rem == 0 || rem == 1) {
FLOAT32 *in_buf = &ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[0][2 * inp_band_idx];
for (i = 0; i < qmf_voc_columns; i += 1) {
WORD32 k;
FLOAT32 vec_x[2 * HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN];
FLOAT32 *ptr_vec_x = &vec_x[0];
FLOAT32 x_zero_band_r, x_zero_band_i;
FLOAT32 mag_scaling_fac;
for (k = 0; k < (HBE_OPER_BLK_LEN_3); k += 2) {
FLOAT64 base1;
FLOAT64 base = 1e-17;
temp_r = in_buf[0];
temp_i = in_buf[1];
in_buf += 256;
base1 = base + temp_r * temp_r;
base1 = base1 + temp_i * temp_i;
mag_scaling_fac = (FLOAT32)(ixheaacd_cbrt_calc((FLOAT32)base1));
ptr_vec_x[0] = temp_r * mag_scaling_fac;
ptr_vec_x[1] = temp_i * mag_scaling_fac;
temp_r = in_buf[0];
temp_i = in_buf[1];
in_buf -= 128;
temp_r1 = ptr_sel[0] * temp_r + ptr_sel[1] * temp_i;
temp_i1 = ptr_sel[2] * temp_r + ptr_sel[3] * temp_i;
temp_r = in_buf[0];
temp_i = in_buf[1];
temp_r1 += ptr_sel[4] * temp_r + ptr_sel[5] * temp_i;
temp_i1 += ptr_sel[6] * temp_r + ptr_sel[7] * temp_i;
temp_r1 *= 0.3984033437f;
temp_i1 *= 0.3984033437f;
base1 = base + temp_r1 * temp_r1;
base1 = base1 + temp_i1 * temp_i1;
mag_scaling_fac = (FLOAT32)(ixheaacd_cbrt_calc((FLOAT32)base1));
ptr_vec_x[2] = temp_r1 * mag_scaling_fac;
ptr_vec_x[3] = temp_i1 * mag_scaling_fac;
ptr_vec_x += 4;
in_buf += 256;
}
ptr_vec_x = &vec_x[0];
temp_r = vec_x[2 * (HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX - 2)];
temp_i = vec_x[(2 * (HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX - 2)) + 1];
x_zero_band_r = temp_r * temp_r - temp_i * temp_i;
x_zero_band_i = temp_r * temp_i + temp_i * temp_r;
for (k = 0; k < (HBE_OPER_BLK_LEN_3); k++) {
temp_r = ptr_vec_x[0] * x_zero_band_r - ptr_vec_x[1] * x_zero_band_i;
temp_i = ptr_vec_x[0] * x_zero_band_i + ptr_vec_x[1] * x_zero_band_r;
out_buf[0] += (temp_r * 0.4714045f);
out_buf[1] += (temp_i * 0.4714045f);
ptr_vec_x += 2;
out_buf += 128;
}
in_buf -= 128 * 11;
out_buf -= 128 * 6;
}
} else {
FLOAT32 *in_buf = &ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[0][2 * inp_band_idx];
FLOAT32 *in_buf1 =
&ptr_hbe_txposer->qmf_in_buf[0][2 * (inp_band_idx + 1)];
for (i = 0; i < qmf_voc_columns; i++) {
WORD32 k;
FLOAT32 vec_x[2 * HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN];
FLOAT32 vec_x_cap[2 * HBE_OPER_WIN_LEN];
FLOAT32 x_zero_band_r, x_zero_band_i;
FLOAT32 *ptr_vec_x = &vec_x[0];
FLOAT32 *ptr_vec_x_cap = &vec_x_cap[0];
FLOAT32 mag_scaling_fac;
for (k = 0; k < (HBE_OPER_BLK_LEN_3); k += 2) {
FLOAT32 tmp_vr, tmp_vi;
FLOAT32 tmp_cr, tmp_ci;
FLOAT64 base1;
FLOAT64 base = 1e-17;
temp_r1 = in_buf[0];
temp_i1 = in_buf[1];
temp_r = in_buf1[0];
temp_i = in_buf1[1];
base1 = base + temp_r * temp_r;
base1 = base1 + temp_i * temp_i;
mag_scaling_fac = (FLOAT32)(ixheaacd_cbrt_calc((FLOAT32)base1));
ptr_vec_x[0] = temp_r * mag_scaling_fac;
ptr_vec_x[1] = temp_i * mag_scaling_fac;
base1 = base + temp_r1 * temp_r1;
base1 = base1 + temp_i1 * temp_i1;
mag_scaling_fac = (FLOAT32)(ixheaacd_cbrt_calc((FLOAT32)base1));
ptr_vec_x_cap[0] = temp_r1 * mag_scaling_fac;
ptr_vec_x_cap[1] = temp_i1 * mag_scaling_fac;
in_buf += 256;
temp_r = in_buf[0];
temp_i = in_buf[1];
temp_r1 = ptr_sel[0] * temp_r + ptr_sel[1] * temp_i;
temp_i1 = ptr_sel[2] * temp_r + ptr_sel[3] * temp_i;
in_buf -= 128;
temp_r = in_buf[0];
temp_i = in_buf[1];
tmp_cr = temp_r1 + ptr_sel[4] * temp_r + ptr_sel[5] * temp_i;
tmp_ci = temp_i1 + ptr_sel[6] * temp_r + ptr_sel[7] * temp_i;
in_buf1 += 256;
temp_r = in_buf1[0];
temp_i = in_buf1[1];
temp_r1 = ptr_sel1[0] * temp_r + ptr_sel1[1] * temp_i;
temp_i1 = ptr_sel1[2] * temp_r + ptr_sel1[3] * temp_i;
in_buf1 -= 128;
temp_r = in_buf1[0];
temp_i = in_buf1[1];
tmp_vr = temp_r1 + ptr_sel1[4] * temp_r + ptr_sel1[5] * temp_i;
tmp_vi = temp_i1 + ptr_sel1[6] * temp_r + ptr_sel1[7] * temp_i;
tmp_cr *= 0.3984033437f;
tmp_ci *= 0.3984033437f;
tmp_vr *= 0.3984033437f;
tmp_vi *= 0.3984033437f;
base1 = base + tmp_vr * tmp_vr;
base1 = base1 + tmp_vi * tmp_vi;
mag_scaling_fac = (FLOAT32)(ixheaacd_cbrt_calc((FLOAT32)base1));
ptr_vec_x[2] = tmp_vr * mag_scaling_fac;
ptr_vec_x[3] = tmp_vi * mag_scaling_fac;
base1 = base + tmp_cr * tmp_cr;
base1 = base1 + tmp_ci * tmp_ci;
mag_scaling_fac = (FLOAT32)(ixheaacd_cbrt_calc((FLOAT32)base1));
ptr_vec_x_cap[2] = tmp_cr * mag_scaling_fac;
ptr_vec_x_cap[3] = tmp_ci * mag_scaling_fac;
in_buf += 256;
in_buf1 += 256;
ptr_vec_x += 4;
ptr_vec_x_cap += 4;
}
ptr_vec_x = &vec_x[0];
ptr_vec_x_cap = &vec_x_cap[0];
temp_r = vec_x_cap[2 * (HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX - 2)];
temp_i = vec_x_cap[2 * (HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX - 2) + 1];
temp_r1 = vec_x[2 * (HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX - 2)];
temp_i1 = vec_x[2 * (HBE_ZERO_BAND_IDX - 2) + 1];
x_zero_band_r = temp_r * temp_r - temp_i * temp_i;
x_zero_band_i = temp_r * temp_i + temp_i * temp_r;
temp_r = temp_r1 * temp_r1 - temp_i1 * temp_i1;
temp_i = temp_r1 * temp_i1 + temp_i1 * temp_r1;
for (k = 0; k < (HBE_OPER_BLK_LEN_3); k++) {
temp_r1 = ptr_vec_x[0] * x_zero_band_r - ptr_vec_x[1] * x_zero_band_i;
temp_i1 = ptr_vec_x[0] * x_zero_band_i + ptr_vec_x[1] * x_zero_band_r;
temp_r1 += ptr_vec_x_cap[0] * temp_r - ptr_vec_x_cap[1] * temp_i;
temp_i1 += ptr_vec_x_cap[0] * temp_i + ptr_vec_x_cap[1] * temp_r;
out_buf[0] += (temp_r1 * 0.23570225f);
out_buf[1] += (temp_i1 * 0.23570225f);
out_buf += 128;
ptr_vec_x += 2;
ptr_vec_x_cap += 2;
}
in_buf -= 128 * 11;
in_buf1 -= 128 * 11;
out_buf -= 128 * 6;
}
}
out_buf -= (256 * qmf_voc_columns) - 2;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for stack corruption in esbr
Bug: 110769924
Test: poc from bug before/after
Change-Id: I99c6e89902064849ea1310c271064bdeccf7f20e
(cherry picked from commit 7e90d745c22695236437297cd8167a9312427a4a)
(cherry picked from commit 5464927f0c1fc721fa03d1c5be77b0b43dfffc50)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 162,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MHTMLBodyLoaderClient(
std::unique_ptr<blink::WebNavigationParams> navigation_params,
base::OnceCallback<void(std::unique_ptr<blink::WebNavigationParams>)>
done_callback)
: navigation_params_(std::move(navigation_params)),
done_callback_(std::move(done_callback)) {
body_loader_ = std::move(navigation_params_->body_loader);
body_loader_->StartLoadingBody(this, false /* use_isolated_code_cache */);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_AddGameDirectory( const char *path, const char *dir, qboolean allowUnzippedDLLs ) {
searchpath_t *sp;
int i;
searchpath_t *search;
pack_t *pak;
char curpath[MAX_OSPATH + 1], *pakfile;
int numfiles;
char **pakfiles;
char *sorted[MAX_PAKFILES];
Q_strncpyz(curpath, FS_BuildOSPath(path, dir, ""), sizeof(curpath));
curpath[strlen(curpath) - 1] = '\0'; // strip the trailing slash
for ( sp = fs_searchpaths ; sp ; sp = sp->next ) {
if ( sp->dir && !Q_stricmp( sp->dir->path, path ) && !Q_stricmp( sp->dir->gamedir, dir ) ) {
return; // we've already got this one
}
}
Q_strncpyz( fs_gamedir, dir, sizeof( fs_gamedir ) );
pakfile = FS_BuildOSPath( path, dir, "" );
pakfile[ strlen( pakfile ) - 1 ] = 0; // strip the trailing slash
pakfiles = Sys_ListFiles( pakfile, ".pk3", NULL, &numfiles, qfalse );
if ( numfiles > MAX_PAKFILES ) {
numfiles = MAX_PAKFILES;
}
for ( i = 0 ; i < numfiles ; i++ ) {
sorted[i] = pakfiles[i];
if ( !Q_strncmp( sorted[i],"mp_",3 ) ) {
memcpy( sorted[i],"zz",2 );
}
}
qsort( sorted, numfiles, sizeof(char*), paksort );
for ( i = 0 ; i < numfiles ; i++ ) {
if ( Q_strncmp( sorted[i],"sp_",3 ) ) { // JPW NERVE -- exclude sp_*
if ( !Q_strncmp( sorted[i],"zz_",3 ) ) {
memcpy( sorted[i],"mp",2 );
}
pakfile = FS_BuildOSPath( path, dir, sorted[i] );
if ( ( pak = FS_LoadZipFile( pakfile, sorted[i] ) ) == 0 ) {
continue;
}
Q_strncpyz(pak->pakPathname, curpath, sizeof(pak->pakPathname));
strcpy( pak->pakGamename, dir );
search = Z_Malloc( sizeof( searchpath_t ) );
search->pack = pak;
search->next = fs_searchpaths;
fs_searchpaths = search;
}
}
Sys_FreeFileList( pakfiles );
search = Z_Malloc (sizeof(searchpath_t));
search->dir = Z_Malloc( sizeof( *search->dir ) );
Q_strncpyz(search->dir->path, path, sizeof(search->dir->path));
Q_strncpyz(search->dir->fullpath, curpath, sizeof(search->dir->fullpath));
Q_strncpyz(search->dir->gamedir, dir, sizeof(search->dir->gamedir));
search->dir->allowUnzippedDLLs = allowUnzippedDLLs;
search->next = fs_searchpaths;
fs_searchpaths = search;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,755 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_siz_getparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
unsigned int i;
uint_fast8_t tmp;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->caps) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->width) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->height) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->xoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->yoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilewidth) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileheight) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tilexoff) ||
jpc_getuint32(in, &siz->tileyoff) ||
jpc_getuint16(in, &siz->numcomps)) {
return -1;
}
if (!siz->width || !siz->height || !siz->tilewidth ||
!siz->tileheight || !siz->numcomps || siz->numcomps > 16384) {
return -1;
}
if (siz->tilexoff >= siz->width || siz->tileyoff >= siz->height) {
jas_eprintf("all tiles are outside the image area\n");
return -1;
}
if (!(siz->comps = jas_alloc2(siz->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_sizcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < siz->numcomps; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].hsamp) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &siz->comps[i].vsamp)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].hsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].hsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid XRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].hsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
if (siz->comps[i].vsamp == 0 || siz->comps[i].vsamp > 255) {
jas_eprintf("invalid YRsiz value %d\n", siz->comps[i].vsamp);
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
siz->comps[i].sgnd = (tmp >> 7) & 1;
siz->comps[i].prec = (tmp & 0x7f) + 1;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
jas_free(siz->comps);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Added some missing sanity checks on the data in a SIZ marker segment.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 168,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void task_clock_event_stop(struct perf_event *event, int flags)
{
perf_swevent_cancel_hrtimer(event);
task_clock_event_update(event, event->ctx->time);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ip_printroute(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int ptr;
register u_int len;
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
return (0);
}
if ((length + 1) & 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
ND_TCHECK(cp[2]);
ptr = cp[2] - 1;
if (ptr < 3 || ((ptr + 1) & 3) || ptr > length + 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad ptr %u]", cp[2]));
for (len = 3; len < length; len += 4) {
ND_TCHECK2(cp[len], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &cp[len])));
if (ptr > len)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
}
return (0);
trunc:
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13037/IP: Add bounds checks when printing time stamp options.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int blk_mangle_minor(int minor)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_BLOCK_EXT_DEVT
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MINORBITS / 2; i++) {
int low = minor & (1 << i);
int high = minor & (1 << (MINORBITS - 1 - i));
int distance = MINORBITS - 1 - 2 * i;
minor ^= low | high; /* clear both bits */
low <<= distance; /* swap the positions */
high >>= distance;
minor |= low | high; /* and set */
}
#endif
return minor;
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,660 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t shrink_store(struct kmem_cache *s,
const char *buf, size_t length)
{
if (buf[0] == '1') {
int rc = kmem_cache_shrink(s);
if (rc)
return rc;
} else
return -EINVAL;
return length;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::TaskRunner* RenderThreadImpl::GetWorkerTaskRunner() {
return categorized_worker_pool_.get();
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InlineIterator RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextSegmentBreak(InlineBidiResolver& resolver, LineInfo& lineInfo, RenderTextInfo& renderTextInfo, FloatingObject* lastFloatFromPreviousLine, unsigned consecutiveHyphenatedLines, WordMeasurements& wordMeasurements)
{
reset();
ASSERT(resolver.position().root() == m_block);
bool appliedStartWidth = resolver.position().m_pos > 0;
bool includeEndWidth = true;
LineMidpointState& lineMidpointState = resolver.midpointState();
LineWidth width(m_block, lineInfo.isFirstLine(), requiresIndent(lineInfo.isFirstLine(), lineInfo.previousLineBrokeCleanly(), m_block->style()));
skipLeadingWhitespace(resolver, lineInfo, lastFloatFromPreviousLine, width);
if (resolver.position().atEnd())
return resolver.position();
bool ignoringSpaces = false;
InlineIterator ignoreStart;
bool currentCharacterIsSpace = false;
bool currentCharacterShouldCollapseIfPreWap = false;
TrailingObjects trailingObjects;
InlineIterator lBreak = resolver.position();
InlineIterator current = resolver.position();
RenderObject* last = current.m_obj;
bool atStart = true;
bool startingNewParagraph = lineInfo.previousLineBrokeCleanly();
lineInfo.setPreviousLineBrokeCleanly(false);
bool autoWrapWasEverTrueOnLine = false;
bool floatsFitOnLine = true;
RenderStyle* blockStyle = m_block->style();
bool allowImagesToBreak = !m_block->document().inQuirksMode() || !m_block->isTableCell() || !blockStyle->logicalWidth().isIntrinsicOrAuto();
EWhiteSpace currWS = blockStyle->whiteSpace();
EWhiteSpace lastWS = currWS;
while (current.m_obj) {
RenderStyle* currentStyle = current.m_obj->style();
RenderObject* next = bidiNextSkippingEmptyInlines(m_block, current.m_obj);
if (next && next->parent() && !next->parent()->isDescendantOf(current.m_obj->parent()))
includeEndWidth = true;
currWS = current.m_obj->isReplaced() ? current.m_obj->parent()->style()->whiteSpace() : currentStyle->whiteSpace();
lastWS = last->isReplaced() ? last->parent()->style()->whiteSpace() : last->style()->whiteSpace();
bool autoWrap = RenderStyle::autoWrap(currWS);
autoWrapWasEverTrueOnLine = autoWrapWasEverTrueOnLine || autoWrap;
bool preserveNewline = current.m_obj->isSVGInlineText() ? false : RenderStyle::preserveNewline(currWS);
bool collapseWhiteSpace = RenderStyle::collapseWhiteSpace(currWS);
if (current.m_obj->isBR()) {
if (width.fitsOnLine()) {
lBreak.moveToStartOf(current.m_obj);
lBreak.increment();
if (startingNewParagraph)
lineInfo.setEmpty(false, m_block, &width);
trailingObjects.clear();
lineInfo.setPreviousLineBrokeCleanly(true);
if (ignoringSpaces && currentStyle->clear() != CNONE)
ensureLineBoxInsideIgnoredSpaces(lineMidpointState, current.m_obj);
if (!lineInfo.isEmpty())
m_clear = currentStyle->clear();
}
goto end;
}
if (current.m_obj->isOutOfFlowPositioned()) {
RenderBox* box = toRenderBox(current.m_obj);
bool isInlineType = box->style()->isOriginalDisplayInlineType();
if (!isInlineType)
m_block->setStaticInlinePositionForChild(box, m_block->logicalHeight(), m_block->startOffsetForContent(m_block->logicalHeight()));
else {
box->layer()->setStaticBlockPosition(m_block->logicalHeight());
}
if (isInlineType || current.m_obj->container()->isRenderInline()) {
if (ignoringSpaces)
ensureLineBoxInsideIgnoredSpaces(lineMidpointState, current.m_obj);
trailingObjects.appendBoxIfNeeded(box);
} else
m_positionedObjects.append(box);
width.addUncommittedWidth(inlineLogicalWidth(current.m_obj));
renderTextInfo.m_lineBreakIterator.resetPriorContext();
} else if (current.m_obj->isFloating()) {
RenderBox* floatBox = toRenderBox(current.m_obj);
FloatingObject* f = m_block->insertFloatingObject(floatBox);
if (floatsFitOnLine && width.fitsOnLine(f->logicalWidth(m_block->isHorizontalWritingMode()))) {
m_block->positionNewFloatOnLine(f, lastFloatFromPreviousLine, lineInfo, width);
if (lBreak.m_obj == current.m_obj) {
ASSERT(!lBreak.m_pos);
lBreak.increment();
}
} else
floatsFitOnLine = false;
renderTextInfo.m_lineBreakIterator.updatePriorContext(replacementCharacter);
} else if (current.m_obj->isRenderInline()) {
ASSERT(isEmptyInline(current.m_obj));
RenderInline* flowBox = toRenderInline(current.m_obj);
bool requiresLineBox = alwaysRequiresLineBox(current.m_obj);
if (requiresLineBox || requiresLineBoxForContent(flowBox, lineInfo)) {
if (requiresLineBox)
lineInfo.setEmpty(false, m_block, &width);
if (ignoringSpaces) {
trailingObjects.clear();
ensureLineBoxInsideIgnoredSpaces(lineMidpointState, current.m_obj);
} else if (blockStyle->collapseWhiteSpace() && resolver.position().m_obj == current.m_obj
&& shouldSkipWhitespaceAfterStartObject(m_block, current.m_obj, lineMidpointState)) {
currentCharacterShouldCollapseIfPreWap = currentCharacterIsSpace = true;
ignoringSpaces = true;
}
}
width.addUncommittedWidth(inlineLogicalWidth(current.m_obj) + borderPaddingMarginStart(flowBox) + borderPaddingMarginEnd(flowBox));
} else if (current.m_obj->isReplaced()) {
RenderBox* replacedBox = toRenderBox(current.m_obj);
if (atStart)
width.updateAvailableWidth(replacedBox->logicalHeight());
if ((autoWrap || RenderStyle::autoWrap(lastWS)) && (!current.m_obj->isImage() || allowImagesToBreak)) {
width.commit();
lBreak.moveToStartOf(current.m_obj);
}
if (ignoringSpaces)
stopIgnoringSpaces(lineMidpointState, InlineIterator(0, current.m_obj, 0));
lineInfo.setEmpty(false, m_block, &width);
ignoringSpaces = false;
currentCharacterShouldCollapseIfPreWap = currentCharacterIsSpace = false;
trailingObjects.clear();
LayoutUnit replacedLogicalWidth = m_block->logicalWidthForChild(replacedBox) + m_block->marginStartForChild(replacedBox) + m_block->marginEndForChild(replacedBox) + inlineLogicalWidth(current.m_obj);
if (current.m_obj->isListMarker()) {
if (blockStyle->collapseWhiteSpace() && shouldSkipWhitespaceAfterStartObject(m_block, current.m_obj, lineMidpointState)) {
currentCharacterShouldCollapseIfPreWap = currentCharacterIsSpace = true;
ignoringSpaces = true;
}
if (toRenderListMarker(current.m_obj)->isInside())
width.addUncommittedWidth(replacedLogicalWidth);
} else
width.addUncommittedWidth(replacedLogicalWidth);
if (current.m_obj->isRubyRun())
width.applyOverhang(toRenderRubyRun(current.m_obj), last, next);
renderTextInfo.m_lineBreakIterator.updatePriorContext(replacementCharacter);
} else if (current.m_obj->isText()) {
if (!current.m_pos)
appliedStartWidth = false;
RenderText* t = toRenderText(current.m_obj);
bool isSVGText = t->isSVGInlineText();
if (t->style()->hasTextCombine() && current.m_obj->isCombineText() && !toRenderCombineText(current.m_obj)->isCombined()) {
RenderCombineText* combineRenderer = toRenderCombineText(current.m_obj);
combineRenderer->combineText();
if (iteratorIsBeyondEndOfRenderCombineText(lBreak, combineRenderer)) {
ASSERT(iteratorIsBeyondEndOfRenderCombineText(resolver.position(), combineRenderer));
lBreak.increment();
resolver.increment();
}
}
RenderStyle* style = t->style(lineInfo.isFirstLine());
const Font& f = style->font();
bool isFixedPitch = f.isFixedPitch();
unsigned lastSpace = current.m_pos;
float wordSpacing = currentStyle->wordSpacing();
float lastSpaceWordSpacing = 0;
float wordSpacingForWordMeasurement = 0;
float wrapW = width.uncommittedWidth() + inlineLogicalWidth(current.m_obj, !appliedStartWidth, true);
float charWidth = 0;
bool breakWords = currentStyle->breakWords() && ((autoWrap && !width.committedWidth()) || currWS == PRE);
bool midWordBreak = false;
bool breakAll = currentStyle->wordBreak() == BreakAllWordBreak && autoWrap;
float hyphenWidth = 0;
if (isSVGText) {
breakWords = false;
breakAll = false;
}
if (t->isWordBreak()) {
width.commit();
lBreak.moveToStartOf(current.m_obj);
ASSERT(current.m_pos == t->textLength());
}
if (renderTextInfo.m_text != t) {
renderTextInfo.m_text = t;
renderTextInfo.m_font = &f;
renderTextInfo.m_layout = f.createLayout(t, width.currentWidth(), collapseWhiteSpace);
renderTextInfo.m_lineBreakIterator.resetStringAndReleaseIterator(t->text(), style->locale());
} else if (renderTextInfo.m_layout && renderTextInfo.m_font != &f) {
renderTextInfo.m_font = &f;
renderTextInfo.m_layout = f.createLayout(t, width.currentWidth(), collapseWhiteSpace);
}
TextLayout* textLayout = renderTextInfo.m_layout.get();
float wordTrailingSpaceWidth = (f.typesettingFeatures() & Kerning) && !textLayout ? f.width(constructTextRun(t, f, &space, 1, style)) + wordSpacing : 0;
UChar lastCharacter = renderTextInfo.m_lineBreakIterator.lastCharacter();
UChar secondToLastCharacter = renderTextInfo.m_lineBreakIterator.secondToLastCharacter();
for (; current.m_pos < t->textLength(); current.fastIncrementInTextNode()) {
bool previousCharacterIsSpace = currentCharacterIsSpace;
bool previousCharacterShouldCollapseIfPreWap = currentCharacterShouldCollapseIfPreWap;
UChar c = current.current();
currentCharacterShouldCollapseIfPreWap = currentCharacterIsSpace = c == ' ' || c == '\t' || (!preserveNewline && (c == '\n'));
if (!collapseWhiteSpace || !currentCharacterIsSpace)
lineInfo.setEmpty(false, m_block, &width);
if (c == softHyphen && autoWrap && !hyphenWidth) {
hyphenWidth = measureHyphenWidth(t, f);
width.addUncommittedWidth(hyphenWidth);
}
bool applyWordSpacing = false;
if ((breakAll || breakWords) && !midWordBreak) {
wrapW += charWidth;
bool midWordBreakIsBeforeSurrogatePair = U16_IS_LEAD(c) && current.m_pos + 1 < t->textLength() && U16_IS_TRAIL((*t)[current.m_pos + 1]);
charWidth = textWidth(t, current.m_pos, midWordBreakIsBeforeSurrogatePair ? 2 : 1, f, width.committedWidth() + wrapW, isFixedPitch, collapseWhiteSpace, 0, textLayout);
midWordBreak = width.committedWidth() + wrapW + charWidth > width.availableWidth();
}
bool betweenWords = c == '\n' || (currWS != PRE && !atStart && isBreakable(renderTextInfo.m_lineBreakIterator, current.m_pos, current.m_nextBreakablePosition));
if (betweenWords || midWordBreak) {
bool stoppedIgnoringSpaces = false;
if (ignoringSpaces) {
lastSpaceWordSpacing = 0;
if (!currentCharacterIsSpace) {
ignoringSpaces = false;
wordSpacingForWordMeasurement = 0;
lastSpace = current.m_pos; // e.g., "Foo goo", don't add in any of the ignored spaces.
stopIgnoringSpaces(lineMidpointState, InlineIterator(0, current.m_obj, current.m_pos));
stoppedIgnoringSpaces = true;
} else {
goto nextCharacter;
}
}
wordMeasurements.grow(wordMeasurements.size() + 1);
WordMeasurement& wordMeasurement = wordMeasurements.last();
wordMeasurement.renderer = t;
wordMeasurement.endOffset = current.m_pos;
wordMeasurement.startOffset = lastSpace;
float additionalTmpW;
if (wordTrailingSpaceWidth && c == ' ')
additionalTmpW = textWidth(t, lastSpace, current.m_pos + 1 - lastSpace, f, width.currentWidth(), isFixedPitch, collapseWhiteSpace, &wordMeasurement.fallbackFonts, textLayout) - wordTrailingSpaceWidth;
else
additionalTmpW = textWidth(t, lastSpace, current.m_pos - lastSpace, f, width.currentWidth(), isFixedPitch, collapseWhiteSpace, &wordMeasurement.fallbackFonts, textLayout);
wordMeasurement.width = additionalTmpW + wordSpacingForWordMeasurement;
additionalTmpW += lastSpaceWordSpacing;
width.addUncommittedWidth(additionalTmpW);
if (!appliedStartWidth) {
width.addUncommittedWidth(inlineLogicalWidth(current.m_obj, true, false));
appliedStartWidth = true;
}
applyWordSpacing = wordSpacing && currentCharacterIsSpace;
if (!width.committedWidth() && autoWrap && !width.fitsOnLine())
width.fitBelowFloats();
if (autoWrap || breakWords) {
bool lineWasTooWide = false;
if (width.fitsOnLine() && currentCharacterIsSpace && currentStyle->breakOnlyAfterWhiteSpace() && !midWordBreak) {
float charWidth = textWidth(t, current.m_pos, 1, f, width.currentWidth(), isFixedPitch, collapseWhiteSpace, &wordMeasurement.fallbackFonts, textLayout) + (applyWordSpacing ? wordSpacing : 0);
if (!width.fitsOnLine(charWidth)) {
lineWasTooWide = true;
lBreak.moveTo(current.m_obj, current.m_pos, current.m_nextBreakablePosition);
skipTrailingWhitespace(lBreak, lineInfo);
}
}
if (lineWasTooWide || !width.fitsOnLine()) {
if (lBreak.atTextParagraphSeparator()) {
if (!stoppedIgnoringSpaces && current.m_pos > 0)
ensureCharacterGetsLineBox(lineMidpointState, current);
lBreak.increment();
lineInfo.setPreviousLineBrokeCleanly(true);
wordMeasurement.endOffset = lBreak.m_pos;
}
if (lBreak.m_obj && lBreak.m_pos && lBreak.m_obj->isText() && toRenderText(lBreak.m_obj)->textLength() && toRenderText(lBreak.m_obj)->characterAt(lBreak.m_pos - 1) == softHyphen)
m_hyphenated = true;
if (lBreak.m_pos && lBreak.m_pos != (unsigned)wordMeasurement.endOffset && !wordMeasurement.width) {
if (charWidth) {
wordMeasurement.endOffset = lBreak.m_pos;
wordMeasurement.width = charWidth;
}
}
if (ignoringSpaces || !collapseWhiteSpace || !currentCharacterIsSpace || !previousCharacterIsSpace)
goto end;
} else {
if (!betweenWords || (midWordBreak && !autoWrap))
width.addUncommittedWidth(-additionalTmpW);
if (hyphenWidth) {
width.addUncommittedWidth(-hyphenWidth);
hyphenWidth = 0;
}
}
}
if (c == '\n' && preserveNewline) {
if (!stoppedIgnoringSpaces && current.m_pos > 0)
ensureCharacterGetsLineBox(lineMidpointState, current);
lBreak.moveTo(current.m_obj, current.m_pos, current.m_nextBreakablePosition);
lBreak.increment();
lineInfo.setPreviousLineBrokeCleanly(true);
return lBreak;
}
if (autoWrap && betweenWords) {
width.commit();
wrapW = 0;
lBreak.moveTo(current.m_obj, current.m_pos, current.m_nextBreakablePosition);
breakWords = false;
}
if (midWordBreak && !U16_IS_TRAIL(c) && !(category(c) & (Mark_NonSpacing | Mark_Enclosing | Mark_SpacingCombining))) {
lBreak.moveTo(current.m_obj, current.m_pos, current.m_nextBreakablePosition);
midWordBreak &= (breakWords || breakAll);
}
if (betweenWords) {
lastSpaceWordSpacing = applyWordSpacing ? wordSpacing : 0;
wordSpacingForWordMeasurement = (applyWordSpacing && wordMeasurement.width) ? wordSpacing : 0;
lastSpace = current.m_pos;
}
if (!ignoringSpaces && currentStyle->collapseWhiteSpace()) {
if (currentCharacterIsSpace && previousCharacterIsSpace) {
ignoringSpaces = true;
startIgnoringSpaces(lineMidpointState, ignoreStart);
trailingObjects.updateMidpointsForTrailingBoxes(lineMidpointState, InlineIterator(), TrailingObjects::DoNotCollapseFirstSpace);
}
}
} else if (ignoringSpaces) {
ignoringSpaces = false;
lastSpaceWordSpacing = applyWordSpacing ? wordSpacing : 0;
wordSpacingForWordMeasurement = (applyWordSpacing && wordMeasurements.last().width) ? wordSpacing : 0;
lastSpace = current.m_pos; // e.g., "Foo goo", don't add in any of the ignored spaces.
stopIgnoringSpaces(lineMidpointState, InlineIterator(0, current.m_obj, current.m_pos));
}
if (isSVGText && current.m_pos > 0) {
if (toRenderSVGInlineText(t)->characterStartsNewTextChunk(current.m_pos))
ensureCharacterGetsLineBox(lineMidpointState, current);
}
if (currentCharacterIsSpace && !previousCharacterIsSpace) {
ignoreStart.m_obj = current.m_obj;
ignoreStart.m_pos = current.m_pos;
}
if (!currentCharacterIsSpace && previousCharacterShouldCollapseIfPreWap) {
if (autoWrap && currentStyle->breakOnlyAfterWhiteSpace())
lBreak.moveTo(current.m_obj, current.m_pos, current.m_nextBreakablePosition);
}
if (collapseWhiteSpace && currentCharacterIsSpace && !ignoringSpaces)
trailingObjects.setTrailingWhitespace(toRenderText(current.m_obj));
else if (!currentStyle->collapseWhiteSpace() || !currentCharacterIsSpace)
trailingObjects.clear();
atStart = false;
nextCharacter:
secondToLastCharacter = lastCharacter;
lastCharacter = c;
}
renderTextInfo.m_lineBreakIterator.setPriorContext(lastCharacter, secondToLastCharacter);
wordMeasurements.grow(wordMeasurements.size() + 1);
WordMeasurement& wordMeasurement = wordMeasurements.last();
wordMeasurement.renderer = t;
float additionalTmpW = ignoringSpaces ? 0 : textWidth(t, lastSpace, current.m_pos - lastSpace, f, width.currentWidth(), isFixedPitch, collapseWhiteSpace, &wordMeasurement.fallbackFonts, textLayout);
wordMeasurement.startOffset = lastSpace;
wordMeasurement.endOffset = current.m_pos;
wordMeasurement.width = ignoringSpaces ? 0 : additionalTmpW + wordSpacingForWordMeasurement;
additionalTmpW += lastSpaceWordSpacing;
width.addUncommittedWidth(additionalTmpW + inlineLogicalWidth(current.m_obj, !appliedStartWidth, includeEndWidth));
includeEndWidth = false;
if (!width.fitsOnLine()) {
if (!m_hyphenated && lBreak.previousInSameNode() == softHyphen)
m_hyphenated = true;
if (m_hyphenated)
goto end;
}
} else
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
bool checkForBreak = autoWrap;
if (width.committedWidth() && !width.fitsOnLine() && lBreak.m_obj && currWS == NOWRAP)
checkForBreak = true;
else if (next && current.m_obj->isText() && next->isText() && !next->isBR() && (autoWrap || next->style()->autoWrap())) {
if (autoWrap && currentCharacterIsSpace)
checkForBreak = true;
else {
RenderText* nextText = toRenderText(next);
if (nextText->textLength()) {
UChar c = nextText->characterAt(0);
checkForBreak = !currentCharacterIsSpace && (c == ' ' || c == '\t' || (c == '\n' && !next->preservesNewline()));
} else if (nextText->isWordBreak())
checkForBreak = true;
if (!width.fitsOnLine() && !width.committedWidth())
width.fitBelowFloats();
bool canPlaceOnLine = width.fitsOnLine() || !autoWrapWasEverTrueOnLine;
if (canPlaceOnLine && checkForBreak) {
width.commit();
lBreak.moveToStartOf(next);
}
}
}
if (checkForBreak && !width.fitsOnLine()) {
if (currentCharacterIsSpace && !ignoringSpaces && currentStyle->collapseWhiteSpace())
trailingObjects.clear();
if (width.committedWidth())
goto end;
width.fitBelowFloats();
if (!width.fitsOnLine())
goto end;
} else if (blockStyle->autoWrap() && !width.fitsOnLine() && !width.committedWidth()) {
width.fitBelowFloats();
}
if (!current.m_obj->isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned()) {
last = current.m_obj;
if (last->isReplaced() && autoWrap && (!last->isImage() || allowImagesToBreak) && (!last->isListMarker() || toRenderListMarker(last)->isInside())) {
width.commit();
lBreak.moveToStartOf(next);
}
}
if (!collapseWhiteSpace)
currentCharacterIsSpace = false;
current.moveToStartOf(next);
atStart = false;
}
if (width.fitsOnLine() || lastWS == NOWRAP)
lBreak.clear();
end:
ShapeInsideInfo* shapeInfo = m_block->layoutShapeInsideInfo();
bool segmentAllowsOverflow = !shapeInfo || !shapeInfo->hasSegments();
if (lBreak == resolver.position() && (!lBreak.m_obj || !lBreak.m_obj->isBR()) && segmentAllowsOverflow) {
if (blockStyle->whiteSpace() == PRE && !current.m_pos) {
lBreak.moveTo(last, last->isText() ? last->length() : 0);
} else if (lBreak.m_obj) {
lBreak.moveTo(current.m_obj, current.m_pos);
}
}
if (lBreak == resolver.position() && segmentAllowsOverflow)
lBreak.increment();
checkMidpoints(lineMidpointState, lBreak);
trailingObjects.updateMidpointsForTrailingBoxes(lineMidpointState, lBreak, TrailingObjects::CollapseFirstSpace);
if (lBreak.m_pos > 0) {
lBreak.m_pos--;
lBreak.increment();
}
return lBreak;
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fwnet_transmit_packet_failed(struct fwnet_packet_task *ptask)
{
struct fwnet_device *dev = ptask->dev;
unsigned long flags;
bool free;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->lock, flags);
/* One fragment failed; don't try to send remaining fragments. */
ptask->outstanding_pkts = 0;
/* Check whether we or the networking TX soft-IRQ is last user. */
free = ptask->enqueued;
if (free)
dec_queued_datagrams(dev);
dev->netdev->stats.tx_dropped++;
dev->netdev->stats.tx_errors++;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
if (free)
fwnet_free_ptask(ptask);
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IHEVCD_ERROR_T ihevcd_parse_time_code_sei(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
parse_ctxt_t *ps_parse = &ps_codec->s_parse;
bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm = &ps_parse->s_bitstrm;
UWORD32 value;
time_code_t *ps_time_code;
WORD32 i;
ps_parse->s_sei_params.i1_time_code_present_flag = 1;
ps_time_code = &ps_parse->s_sei_params.s_time_code;
BITS_PARSE("num_clock_ts", value, ps_bitstrm, 2);
ps_time_code->u1_num_clock_ts = value;
for(i = 0; i < ps_time_code->u1_num_clock_ts; i++)
{
BITS_PARSE("clock_timestamp_flag[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_time_code->au1_clock_timestamp_flag[i] = value;
if(ps_time_code->au1_clock_timestamp_flag[i])
{
BITS_PARSE("units_field_based_flag[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_time_code->au1_units_field_based_flag[i] = value;
BITS_PARSE("counting_type[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 5);
ps_time_code->au1_counting_type[i] = value;
BITS_PARSE("full_timestamp_flag[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_time_code->au1_full_timestamp_flag[i] = value;
BITS_PARSE("discontinuity_flag[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_time_code->au1_discontinuity_flag[i] = value;
BITS_PARSE("cnt_dropped_flag[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_time_code->au1_cnt_dropped_flag[i] = value;
BITS_PARSE("n_frames[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 9);
ps_time_code->au2_n_frames[i] = value;
if(ps_time_code->au1_full_timestamp_flag[i])
{
BITS_PARSE("seconds_value[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 6);
ps_time_code->au1_seconds_value[i] = value;
BITS_PARSE("minutes_value[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 6);
ps_time_code->au1_minutes_value[i] = value;
BITS_PARSE("hours_value[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 5);
ps_time_code->au1_hours_value[i] = value;
}
else
{
BITS_PARSE("seconds_flag[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_time_code->au1_seconds_flag[i] = value;
if(ps_time_code->au1_seconds_flag[i])
{
BITS_PARSE("seconds_value[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 6);
ps_time_code->au1_seconds_value[i] = value;
BITS_PARSE("minutes_flag[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_time_code->au1_minutes_flag[i] = value;
if(ps_time_code->au1_minutes_flag[i])
{
BITS_PARSE("minutes_value[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 6);
ps_time_code->au1_minutes_value[i] = value;
BITS_PARSE("hours_flag[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 1);
ps_time_code->au1_hours_flag[i] = value;
if(ps_time_code->au1_hours_flag[i])
{
BITS_PARSE("hours_value[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 5);
ps_time_code->au1_hours_value[i] = value;
}
}
}
}
BITS_PARSE("time_offset_length[i]", value, ps_bitstrm, 5);
ps_time_code->au1_time_offset_length[i] = value;
if(ps_time_code->au1_time_offset_length[i] > 0)
{
BITS_PARSE("time_offset_value[i]", value, ps_bitstrm,
ps_time_code->au1_time_offset_length[i]);
ps_time_code->au1_time_offset_value[i] = value;
}
else
{
ps_time_code->au1_time_offset_value[i] = 0;
}
}
}
return (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Ensure CTB size > 16 for clips with tiles and width/height >= 4096
For clips with tiles and dimensions >= 4096,
CTB size of 16 can result in tile position > 255.
This is not supported by the decoder
Bug: 37930177
Test: ran poc w/o crashing
Change-Id: I2f223a124c4ea9bfd98343343fd010d80a5dd8bd
(cherry picked from commit 248e72c7a8c7c382ff4397868a6c7453a6453141)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nested_cr4_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
{
u64 fixed0 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed0;
u64 fixed1 = to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1;
return fixed_bits_valid(val, fixed0, fixed1);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 80,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutocompleteEditController::~AutocompleteEditController() {
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutocompleteEditModel::AcceptInput(WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
bool for_drop) {
AutocompleteMatch match;
GURL alternate_nav_url;
GetInfoForCurrentText(&match, &alternate_nav_url);
if (!match.destination_url.is_valid())
return;
if ((match.transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED) &&
(match.destination_url ==
URLFixerUpper::FixupURL(UTF16ToUTF8(permanent_text_), std::string()))) {
match.transition = content::PAGE_TRANSITION_RELOAD;
} else if (for_drop || ((paste_state_ != NONE) &&
match.is_history_what_you_typed_match)) {
match.transition = content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK;
}
const TemplateURL* template_url = match.GetTemplateURL(profile_);
if (template_url && template_url->url_ref().HasGoogleBaseURLs())
GoogleURLTracker::GoogleURLSearchCommitted(profile_);
view_->OpenMatch(match, disposition, alternate_nav_url,
AutocompletePopupModel::kNoMatch);
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __net_init tcp_sk_init(struct net *net)
{
return inet_ctl_sock_create(&net->ipv4.tcp_sock,
PF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_TCP, net);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 19,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String LocalFrame::SelectedText() const {
return Selection().SelectedText();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hugetlb_cow(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte,
struct page *pagecache_page)
{
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
struct page *old_page, *new_page;
int avoidcopy;
int outside_reserve = 0;
old_page = pte_page(pte);
retry_avoidcopy:
/* If no-one else is actually using this page, avoid the copy
* and just make the page writable */
avoidcopy = (page_mapcount(old_page) == 1);
if (avoidcopy) {
if (PageAnon(old_page))
page_move_anon_rmap(old_page, vma, address);
set_huge_ptep_writable(vma, address, ptep);
return 0;
}
/*
* If the process that created a MAP_PRIVATE mapping is about to
* perform a COW due to a shared page count, attempt to satisfy
* the allocation without using the existing reserves. The pagecache
* page is used to determine if the reserve at this address was
* consumed or not. If reserves were used, a partial faulted mapping
* at the time of fork() could consume its reserves on COW instead
* of the full address range.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE) &&
is_vma_resv_set(vma, HPAGE_RESV_OWNER) &&
old_page != pagecache_page)
outside_reserve = 1;
page_cache_get(old_page);
/* Drop page_table_lock as buddy allocator may be called */
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock);
new_page = alloc_huge_page(vma, address, outside_reserve);
if (IS_ERR(new_page)) {
page_cache_release(old_page);
/*
* If a process owning a MAP_PRIVATE mapping fails to COW,
* it is due to references held by a child and an insufficient
* huge page pool. To guarantee the original mappers
* reliability, unmap the page from child processes. The child
* may get SIGKILLed if it later faults.
*/
if (outside_reserve) {
BUG_ON(huge_pte_none(pte));
if (unmap_ref_private(mm, vma, old_page, address)) {
BUG_ON(huge_pte_none(pte));
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
ptep = huge_pte_offset(mm, address & huge_page_mask(h));
if (likely(pte_same(huge_ptep_get(ptep), pte)))
goto retry_avoidcopy;
/*
* race occurs while re-acquiring page_table_lock, and
* our job is done.
*/
return 0;
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
}
/* Caller expects lock to be held */
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
return -PTR_ERR(new_page);
}
/*
* When the original hugepage is shared one, it does not have
* anon_vma prepared.
*/
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(vma))) {
page_cache_release(new_page);
page_cache_release(old_page);
/* Caller expects lock to be held */
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
}
copy_user_huge_page(new_page, old_page, address, vma,
pages_per_huge_page(h));
__SetPageUptodate(new_page);
/*
* Retake the page_table_lock to check for racing updates
* before the page tables are altered
*/
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock);
ptep = huge_pte_offset(mm, address & huge_page_mask(h));
if (likely(pte_same(huge_ptep_get(ptep), pte))) {
/* Break COW */
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(mm,
address & huge_page_mask(h),
(address & huge_page_mask(h)) + huge_page_size(h));
huge_ptep_clear_flush(vma, address, ptep);
set_huge_pte_at(mm, address, ptep,
make_huge_pte(vma, new_page, 1));
page_remove_rmap(old_page);
hugepage_add_new_anon_rmap(new_page, vma, address);
/* Make the old page be freed below */
new_page = old_page;
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(mm,
address & huge_page_mask(h),
(address & huge_page_mask(h)) + huge_page_size(h));
}
page_cache_release(new_page);
page_cache_release(old_page);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: hugetlb: fix resv_map leak in error path
When called for anonymous (non-shared) mappings, hugetlb_reserve_pages()
does a resv_map_alloc(). It depends on code in hugetlbfs's
vm_ops->close() to release that allocation.
However, in the mmap() failure path, we do a plain unmap_region() without
the remove_vma() which actually calls vm_ops->close().
This is a decent fix. This leak could get reintroduced if new code (say,
after hugetlb_reserve_pages() in hugetlbfs_file_mmap()) decides to return
an error. But, I think it would have to unroll the reservation anyway.
Christoph's test case:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=133728900729735
This patch applies to 3.4 and later. A version for earlier kernels is at
https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/5/22/418.
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void S_AL_BufferShutdown( void )
{
int i;
if(!alBuffersInitialised)
return;
knownSfx[default_sfx].isLocked = qfalse;
for(i = 0; i < numSfx; i++)
S_AL_BufferUnload(i);
numSfx = 0;
alBuffersInitialised = qfalse;
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,515 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PartiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod4Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "partiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t long_arg;
V8StringResource<> string_arg;
TestInterfaceImplementation* test_interface_arg;
long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
string_arg = info[1];
if (!string_arg.Prepare())
return;
test_interface_arg = V8TestInterface::ToImplWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[2]);
if (!test_interface_arg) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::ArgumentNotOfType(2, "TestInterface"));
return;
}
impl->partiallyRuntimeEnabledOverloadedVoidMethod(long_arg, string_arg, test_interface_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_imul_ex(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u8 ex = 0;
emulate_1op_rax_rdx(ctxt, "imul", ex);
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageloadfont)
{
char *file;
int file_name, hdr_size = sizeof(gdFont) - sizeof(char *);
int ind, body_size, n = 0, b, i, body_size_check;
gdFontPtr font;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &file, &file_name) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
stream = php_stream_open_wrapper(file, "rb", IGNORE_PATH | IGNORE_URL_WIN | REPORT_ERRORS, NULL);
if (stream == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* Only supports a architecture-dependent binary dump format
* at the moment.
* The file format is like this on machines with 32-byte integers:
*
* byte 0-3: (int) number of characters in the font
* byte 4-7: (int) value of first character in the font (often 32, space)
* byte 8-11: (int) pixel width of each character
* byte 12-15: (int) pixel height of each character
* bytes 16-: (char) array with character data, one byte per pixel
* in each character, for a total of
* (nchars*width*height) bytes.
*/
font = (gdFontPtr) emalloc(sizeof(gdFont));
b = 0;
while (b < hdr_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, (char*)&font[b], hdr_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading header");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading header");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
i = php_stream_tell(stream);
php_stream_seek(stream, 0, SEEK_END);
body_size_check = php_stream_tell(stream) - hdr_size;
php_stream_seek(stream, i, SEEK_SET);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
font->w = FLIPWORD(font->w);
font->h = FLIPWORD(font->h);
font->nchars = FLIPWORD(font->nchars);
body_size = font->w * font->h * font->nchars;
}
if (overflow2(font->nchars, font->h)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font, invalid font header");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (overflow2(font->nchars * font->h, font->w )) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font, invalid font header");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (body_size != body_size_check) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error reading font");
efree(font);
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
font->data = emalloc(body_size);
b = 0;
while (b < body_size && (n = php_stream_read(stream, &font->data[b], body_size - b))) {
b += n;
}
if (!n) {
efree(font->data);
efree(font);
if (php_stream_eof(stream)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "End of file while reading body");
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Error while reading body");
}
php_stream_close(stream);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
php_stream_close(stream);
/* Adding 5 to the font index so we will never have font indices
* that overlap with the old fonts (with indices 1-5). The first
* list index given out is always 1.
*/
ind = 5 + zend_list_insert(font, le_gd_font TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(ind);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 165,311 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const Vector<double>& BaseRenderingContext2D::getLineDash() const {
return GetState().LineDash();
}
Commit Message: [PE] Distinguish between tainting due to canvas content and filter.
A filter on a canvas can itself lead to origin tainting, for reasons
other than that the canvas contents are tainted. This CL changes
to distinguish these two causes, so that we recompute filters
on content-tainting change.
Bug: 778506
Change-Id: I3cec8ef3b2772f2af78cdd4b290520113092cca6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811767
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522274}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,923 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_mmu_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva)
{
vcpu->arch.mmu.invlpg(vcpu, gva);
kvm_mmu_flush_tlb(vcpu);
++vcpu->stat.invlpg;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void srpt_queue_response(struct se_cmd *cmd)
{
struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch;
struct srpt_send_ioctx *ioctx;
enum srpt_command_state state;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
enum dma_data_direction dir;
int resp_len;
u8 srp_tm_status;
ioctx = container_of(cmd, struct srpt_send_ioctx, cmd);
ch = ioctx->ch;
BUG_ON(!ch);
spin_lock_irqsave(&ioctx->spinlock, flags);
state = ioctx->state;
switch (state) {
case SRPT_STATE_NEW:
case SRPT_STATE_DATA_IN:
ioctx->state = SRPT_STATE_CMD_RSP_SENT;
break;
case SRPT_STATE_MGMT:
ioctx->state = SRPT_STATE_MGMT_RSP_SENT;
break;
default:
WARN(true, "ch %p; cmd %d: unexpected command state %d\n",
ch, ioctx->ioctx.index, ioctx->state);
break;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ioctx->spinlock, flags);
if (unlikely(transport_check_aborted_status(&ioctx->cmd, false)
|| WARN_ON_ONCE(state == SRPT_STATE_CMD_RSP_SENT))) {
atomic_inc(&ch->req_lim_delta);
srpt_abort_cmd(ioctx);
return;
}
dir = ioctx->cmd.data_direction;
/* For read commands, transfer the data to the initiator. */
if (dir == DMA_FROM_DEVICE && ioctx->cmd.data_length &&
!ioctx->queue_status_only) {
ret = srpt_xfer_data(ch, ioctx);
if (ret) {
pr_err("xfer_data failed for tag %llu\n",
ioctx->cmd.tag);
return;
}
}
if (state != SRPT_STATE_MGMT)
resp_len = srpt_build_cmd_rsp(ch, ioctx, ioctx->cmd.tag,
cmd->scsi_status);
else {
srp_tm_status
= tcm_to_srp_tsk_mgmt_status(cmd->se_tmr_req->response);
resp_len = srpt_build_tskmgmt_rsp(ch, ioctx, srp_tm_status,
ioctx->cmd.tag);
}
ret = srpt_post_send(ch, ioctx, resp_len);
if (ret) {
pr_err("sending cmd response failed for tag %llu\n",
ioctx->cmd.tag);
srpt_unmap_sg_to_ib_sge(ch, ioctx);
srpt_set_cmd_state(ioctx, SRPT_STATE_DONE);
target_put_sess_cmd(&ioctx->cmd);
}
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 50,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void apic_clear_irr(int vec, struct kvm_lapic *apic)
{
apic->irr_pending = false;
apic_clear_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_IRR);
if (apic_search_irr(apic) != -1)
apic->irr_pending = true;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,713 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tg3_setup_fiber_phy(struct tg3 *tp, int force_reset)
{
u32 orig_pause_cfg;
u16 orig_active_speed;
u8 orig_active_duplex;
u32 mac_status;
int current_link_up;
int i;
orig_pause_cfg = tp->link_config.active_flowctrl;
orig_active_speed = tp->link_config.active_speed;
orig_active_duplex = tp->link_config.active_duplex;
if (!tg3_flag(tp, HW_AUTONEG) &&
tp->link_up &&
tg3_flag(tp, INIT_COMPLETE)) {
mac_status = tr32(MAC_STATUS);
mac_status &= (MAC_STATUS_PCS_SYNCED |
MAC_STATUS_SIGNAL_DET |
MAC_STATUS_CFG_CHANGED |
MAC_STATUS_RCVD_CFG);
if (mac_status == (MAC_STATUS_PCS_SYNCED |
MAC_STATUS_SIGNAL_DET)) {
tw32_f(MAC_STATUS, (MAC_STATUS_SYNC_CHANGED |
MAC_STATUS_CFG_CHANGED));
return 0;
}
}
tw32_f(MAC_TX_AUTO_NEG, 0);
tp->mac_mode &= ~(MAC_MODE_PORT_MODE_MASK | MAC_MODE_HALF_DUPLEX);
tp->mac_mode |= MAC_MODE_PORT_MODE_TBI;
tw32_f(MAC_MODE, tp->mac_mode);
udelay(40);
if (tp->phy_id == TG3_PHY_ID_BCM8002)
tg3_init_bcm8002(tp);
/* Enable link change event even when serdes polling. */
tw32_f(MAC_EVENT, MAC_EVENT_LNKSTATE_CHANGED);
udelay(40);
current_link_up = 0;
tp->link_config.rmt_adv = 0;
mac_status = tr32(MAC_STATUS);
if (tg3_flag(tp, HW_AUTONEG))
current_link_up = tg3_setup_fiber_hw_autoneg(tp, mac_status);
else
current_link_up = tg3_setup_fiber_by_hand(tp, mac_status);
tp->napi[0].hw_status->status =
(SD_STATUS_UPDATED |
(tp->napi[0].hw_status->status & ~SD_STATUS_LINK_CHG));
for (i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
tw32_f(MAC_STATUS, (MAC_STATUS_SYNC_CHANGED |
MAC_STATUS_CFG_CHANGED));
udelay(5);
if ((tr32(MAC_STATUS) & (MAC_STATUS_SYNC_CHANGED |
MAC_STATUS_CFG_CHANGED |
MAC_STATUS_LNKSTATE_CHANGED)) == 0)
break;
}
mac_status = tr32(MAC_STATUS);
if ((mac_status & MAC_STATUS_PCS_SYNCED) == 0) {
current_link_up = 0;
if (tp->link_config.autoneg == AUTONEG_ENABLE &&
tp->serdes_counter == 0) {
tw32_f(MAC_MODE, (tp->mac_mode |
MAC_MODE_SEND_CONFIGS));
udelay(1);
tw32_f(MAC_MODE, tp->mac_mode);
}
}
if (current_link_up == 1) {
tp->link_config.active_speed = SPEED_1000;
tp->link_config.active_duplex = DUPLEX_FULL;
tw32(MAC_LED_CTRL, (tp->led_ctrl |
LED_CTRL_LNKLED_OVERRIDE |
LED_CTRL_1000MBPS_ON));
} else {
tp->link_config.active_speed = SPEED_UNKNOWN;
tp->link_config.active_duplex = DUPLEX_UNKNOWN;
tw32(MAC_LED_CTRL, (tp->led_ctrl |
LED_CTRL_LNKLED_OVERRIDE |
LED_CTRL_TRAFFIC_OVERRIDE));
}
if (!tg3_test_and_report_link_chg(tp, current_link_up)) {
u32 now_pause_cfg = tp->link_config.active_flowctrl;
if (orig_pause_cfg != now_pause_cfg ||
orig_active_speed != tp->link_config.active_speed ||
orig_active_duplex != tp->link_config.active_duplex)
tg3_link_report(tp);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void emulator_get_gdt(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, struct desc_ptr *dt)
{
kvm_x86_ops->get_gdt(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), dt);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gpa_t nonpaging_gva_to_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t vaddr,
u32 access, struct x86_exception *exception)
{
if (exception)
exception->error_code = 0;
return vaddr;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
{
int rc = 0;
struct ocontext *c;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
while (c) {
if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
break;
c = c->next;
}
if (c) {
if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
&c->context[0],
&c->sid[0]);
if (rc)
goto out;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
&c->context[1],
&c->sid[1]);
if (rc)
goto out;
}
*if_sid = c->sid[0];
} else
*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
out:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mode_to_access_flags(umode_t mode, umode_t bits_to_use,
__u32 *pace_flags)
{
/* reset access mask */
*pace_flags = 0x0;
/* bits to use are either S_IRWXU or S_IRWXG or S_IRWXO */
mode &= bits_to_use;
/* check for R/W/X UGO since we do not know whose flags
is this but we have cleared all the bits sans RWX for
either user or group or other as per bits_to_use */
if (mode & S_IRUGO)
*pace_flags |= SET_FILE_READ_RIGHTS;
if (mode & S_IWUGO)
*pace_flags |= SET_FILE_WRITE_RIGHTS;
if (mode & S_IXUGO)
*pace_flags |= SET_FILE_EXEC_RIGHTS;
cifs_dbg(NOISY, "mode: 0x%x, access flags now 0x%x\n",
mode, *pace_flags);
return;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::texImage2D(
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
MaybeShared<DOMArrayBufferView> pixels) {
TexImageHelperDOMArrayBufferView(kTexImage2D, target, level, internalformat,
width, height, 1, border, format, type, 0, 0,
0, pixels.View(), kNullAllowed, 0);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,865 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t destroyPlugin() {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IDrm::getInterfaceDescriptor());
status_t status = remote()->transact(DESTROY_PLUGIN, data, &reply);
if (status != OK) {
return status;
}
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Fix info leak vulnerability of IDrm
bug: 26323455
Change-Id: I25bb30d3666ab38d5150496375ed2f55ecb23ba8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_openreq6(struct seq_file *seq,
struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req, int i, int uid)
{
int ttd = req->expires - jiffies;
const struct in6_addr *src = &inet6_rsk(req)->loc_addr;
const struct in6_addr *dest = &inet6_rsk(req)->rmt_addr;
if (ttd < 0)
ttd = 0;
seq_printf(seq,
"%4d: %08X%08X%08X%08X:%04X %08X%08X%08X%08X:%04X "
"%02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %d %d %pK\n",
i,
src->s6_addr32[0], src->s6_addr32[1],
src->s6_addr32[2], src->s6_addr32[3],
ntohs(inet_rsk(req)->loc_port),
dest->s6_addr32[0], dest->s6_addr32[1],
dest->s6_addr32[2], dest->s6_addr32[3],
ntohs(inet_rsk(req)->rmt_port),
TCP_SYN_RECV,
0,0, /* could print option size, but that is af dependent. */
1, /* timers active (only the expire timer) */
jiffies_to_clock_t(ttd),
req->retrans,
uid,
0, /* non standard timer */
0, /* open_requests have no inode */
0, req);
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_decode_requestforward(const struct ofp_header *outer,
struct ofputil_requestforward *rf)
{
struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initializer(outer, ntohs(outer->length));
/* Skip past outer message. */
enum ofpraw outer_raw = ofpraw_pull_assert(&b);
ovs_assert(outer_raw == OFPRAW_OFPT14_REQUESTFORWARD);
/* Validate inner message. */
if (b.size < sizeof(struct ofp_header)) {
return OFPERR_OFPBFC_MSG_BAD_LEN;
}
const struct ofp_header *inner = b.data;
unsigned int inner_len = ntohs(inner->length);
if (inner_len < sizeof(struct ofp_header) || inner_len > b.size) {
return OFPERR_OFPBFC_MSG_BAD_LEN;
}
if (inner->version != outer->version) {
return OFPERR_OFPBRC_BAD_VERSION;
}
/* Parse inner message. */
enum ofptype type;
enum ofperr error = ofptype_decode(&type, inner);
if (error) {
return error;
}
rf->xid = inner->xid;
if (type == OFPTYPE_GROUP_MOD) {
rf->reason = OFPRFR_GROUP_MOD;
rf->group_mod = xmalloc(sizeof *rf->group_mod);
error = ofputil_decode_group_mod(inner, rf->group_mod);
if (error) {
free(rf->group_mod);
return error;
}
} else if (type == OFPTYPE_METER_MOD) {
rf->reason = OFPRFR_METER_MOD;
rf->meter_mod = xmalloc(sizeof *rf->meter_mod);
ofpbuf_init(&rf->bands, 64);
error = ofputil_decode_meter_mod(inner, rf->meter_mod, &rf->bands);
if (error) {
free(rf->meter_mod);
ofpbuf_uninit(&rf->bands);
return error;
}
} else {
return OFPERR_OFPBFC_MSG_UNSUP;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init sclp_ctl_init(void)
{
return misc_register(&sclp_ctl_device);
}
Commit Message: s390/sclp_ctl: fix potential information leak with /dev/sclp
The sclp_ctl_ioctl_sccb function uses two copy_from_user calls to
retrieve the sclp request from user space. The first copy_from_user
fetches the length of the request which is stored in the first two
bytes of the request. The second copy_from_user gets the complete
sclp request, but this copies the length field a second time.
A malicious user may have changed the length in the meantime.
Reported-by: Pengfei Wang <wpengfeinudt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 51,181 |
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