instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: render_subrect (GstVMncDec * dec, int x, int y, int width,
int height, guint32 colour)
{
/* Crazy inefficient! */
int i, j;
guint8 *dst;
for (i = 0; i < height; i++) {
dst = dec->imagedata + dec->format.stride * (y + i) +
dec->format.bytes_per_pixel * x;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++) {
memcpy (dst, &colour, dec->format.bytes_per_pixel);
dst += dec->format.bytes_per_pixel;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num,
EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx)
{
size_t i;
if (group->meth->points_make_affine == 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
}
return group->meth->points_make_affine(group, num, points, ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 12,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PermissionsData::CanAccessPage(const Extension* extension,
const GURL& document_url,
int tab_id,
std::string* error) const {
AccessType result = GetPageAccess(extension, document_url, tab_id, error);
return result == ACCESS_ALLOWED || result == ACCESS_WITHHELD;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Restrict tabs.captureVisibleTab()
Modify the permissions for tabs.captureVisibleTab(). Instead of just
checking for <all_urls> and assuming its safe, do the following:
- If the page is a "normal" web page (e.g., http/https), allow the
capture if the extension has activeTab granted or <all_urls>.
- If the page is a file page (file:///), allow the capture if the
extension has file access *and* either of the <all_urls> or
activeTab permissions.
- If the page is a chrome:// page, allow the capture only if the
extension has activeTab granted.
Bug: 810220
Change-Id: I1e2f71281e2f331d641ba0e435df10d66d721304
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/981195
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548891}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_mapping_free (PopplerLinkMapping *mapping)
{
poppler_action_free (mapping->action);
g_free (mapping);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void smb_dump(const char *name, int type, const char *data, ssize_t len)
{
int fd, i;
char *fname = NULL;
if (DEBUGLEVEL < 50) {
return;
}
if (len < 4) len = smb_len(data)+4;
for (i=1;i<100;i++) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "/tmp/%s.%d.%s", name, i,
type ? "req" : "resp") == -1) {
return;
}
fd = open(fname, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644);
if (fd != -1 || errno != EEXIST) break;
}
if (fd != -1) {
ssize_t ret = write(fd, data, len);
if (ret != len)
DEBUG(0,("smb_dump: problem: write returned %d\n", (int)ret ));
close(fd);
DEBUG(0,("created %s len %lu\n", fname, (unsigned long)len));
}
SAFE_FREE(fname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: usage(void)
{
int i;
fprintf(stderr, "\n%s\n", TIFFGetVersion());
for (i = 0; usage_info[i] != NULL; i++)
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", usage_info[i]);
exit(-1);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 48,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageGd2 (gdImagePtr im, FILE * outFile, int cs, int fmt)
{
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewFileCtx (outFile);
if (out == NULL) return;
_gdImageGd2 (im, out, cs, fmt);
out->gd_free (out);
}
Commit Message: gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074)
Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks.
Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <hji@dyntopia.com> for indepth report
and reproducer information. Made for easy test case writing :).
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 54,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __attribute__((no_instrument_function)) trace_swap_gd(void)
{
volatile void *temp_gd = trace_gd;
trace_gd = gd;
gd = temp_gd;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 89,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Parcel::continueWrite(size_t desired)
{
size_t objectsSize = mObjectsSize;
if (desired < mDataSize) {
if (desired == 0) {
objectsSize = 0;
} else {
while (objectsSize > 0) {
if (mObjects[objectsSize-1] < desired)
break;
objectsSize--;
}
}
}
if (mOwner) {
if (desired == 0) {
freeData();
return NO_ERROR;
}
uint8_t* data = (uint8_t*)malloc(desired);
if (!data) {
mError = NO_MEMORY;
return NO_MEMORY;
}
binder_size_t* objects = NULL;
if (objectsSize) {
objects = (binder_size_t*)malloc(objectsSize*sizeof(binder_size_t));
if (!objects) {
free(data);
mError = NO_MEMORY;
return NO_MEMORY;
}
size_t oldObjectsSize = mObjectsSize;
mObjectsSize = objectsSize;
acquireObjects();
mObjectsSize = oldObjectsSize;
}
if (mData) {
memcpy(data, mData, mDataSize < desired ? mDataSize : desired);
}
if (objects && mObjects) {
memcpy(objects, mObjects, objectsSize*sizeof(binder_size_t));
}
mOwner(this, mData, mDataSize, mObjects, mObjectsSize, mOwnerCookie);
mOwner = NULL;
LOG_ALLOC("Parcel %p: taking ownership of %zu capacity", this, desired);
pthread_mutex_lock(&gParcelGlobalAllocSizeLock);
gParcelGlobalAllocSize += desired;
gParcelGlobalAllocCount++;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&gParcelGlobalAllocSizeLock);
mData = data;
mObjects = objects;
mDataSize = (mDataSize < desired) ? mDataSize : desired;
ALOGV("continueWrite Setting data size of %p to %zu", this, mDataSize);
mDataCapacity = desired;
mObjectsSize = mObjectsCapacity = objectsSize;
mNextObjectHint = 0;
} else if (mData) {
if (objectsSize < mObjectsSize) {
const sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
for (size_t i=objectsSize; i<mObjectsSize; i++) {
const flat_binder_object* flat
= reinterpret_cast<flat_binder_object*>(mData+mObjects[i]);
if (flat->type == BINDER_TYPE_FD) {
mFdsKnown = false;
}
release_object(proc, *flat, this);
}
binder_size_t* objects =
(binder_size_t*)realloc(mObjects, objectsSize*sizeof(binder_size_t));
if (objects) {
mObjects = objects;
}
mObjectsSize = objectsSize;
mNextObjectHint = 0;
}
if (desired > mDataCapacity) {
uint8_t* data = (uint8_t*)realloc(mData, desired);
if (data) {
LOG_ALLOC("Parcel %p: continue from %zu to %zu capacity", this, mDataCapacity,
desired);
pthread_mutex_lock(&gParcelGlobalAllocSizeLock);
gParcelGlobalAllocSize += desired;
gParcelGlobalAllocSize -= mDataCapacity;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&gParcelGlobalAllocSizeLock);
mData = data;
mDataCapacity = desired;
} else if (desired > mDataCapacity) {
mError = NO_MEMORY;
return NO_MEMORY;
}
} else {
if (mDataSize > desired) {
mDataSize = desired;
ALOGV("continueWrite Setting data size of %p to %zu", this, mDataSize);
}
if (mDataPos > desired) {
mDataPos = desired;
ALOGV("continueWrite Setting data pos of %p to %zu", this, mDataPos);
}
}
} else {
uint8_t* data = (uint8_t*)malloc(desired);
if (!data) {
mError = NO_MEMORY;
return NO_MEMORY;
}
if(!(mDataCapacity == 0 && mObjects == NULL
&& mObjectsCapacity == 0)) {
ALOGE("continueWrite: %zu/%p/%zu/%zu", mDataCapacity, mObjects, mObjectsCapacity, desired);
}
LOG_ALLOC("Parcel %p: allocating with %zu capacity", this, desired);
pthread_mutex_lock(&gParcelGlobalAllocSizeLock);
gParcelGlobalAllocSize += desired;
gParcelGlobalAllocCount++;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&gParcelGlobalAllocSizeLock);
mData = data;
mDataSize = mDataPos = 0;
ALOGV("continueWrite Setting data size of %p to %zu", this, mDataSize);
ALOGV("continueWrite Setting data pos of %p to %zu", this, mDataPos);
mDataCapacity = desired;
}
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: debug_print_property (SmProp *prop)
{
GString *tmp;
int i;
switch (prop->type[0]) {
case 'C': /* CARD8 */
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: %s = %d", prop->name, *(unsigned char *)prop->vals[0].value);
break;
case 'A': /* ARRAY8 */
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: %s = '%s'", prop->name, (char *)prop->vals[0].value);
break;
case 'L': /* LISTofARRAY8 */
tmp = g_string_new (NULL);
for (i = 0; i < prop->num_vals; i++) {
g_string_append_printf (tmp, "'%.*s' ", prop->vals[i].length,
(char *)prop->vals[i].value);
}
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: %s = %s", prop->name, tmp->str);
g_string_free (tmp, TRUE);
break;
default:
g_debug ("GsmXSMPClient: %s = ??? (%s)", prop->name, prop->type);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 63,556 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: inject_handler_args(const gchar *actname, const gchar *origargs, const gchar *newargs) {
/*
If actname is one that calls an external command, this function will inject
newargs in front of the user-provided args in that command line. They will
come become after the body of the script (in sh) or after the name of
the command to execute (in spawn).
i.e. sh <body> <userargs> becomes sh <body> <ARGS> <userargs> and
spawn <command> <userargs> becomes spawn <command> <ARGS> <userargs>.
The return value consist of two strings: the action (sh, ...) and its args.
If act is not one that calls an external command, then the given action merely
gets duplicated.
*/
GArray *rets = g_array_new(TRUE, FALSE, sizeof(gchar*));
/* Arrr! Here be memory leaks */
gchar *actdup = g_strdup(actname);
g_array_append_val(rets, actdup);
if ((g_strcmp0(actname, "spawn") == 0) ||
(g_strcmp0(actname, "sh") == 0) ||
(g_strcmp0(actname, "sync_spawn") == 0) ||
(g_strcmp0(actname, "sync_sh") == 0) ||
(g_strcmp0(actname, "talk_to_socket") == 0)) {
guint i;
GString *a = g_string_new("");
gchar **spawnparts = split_quoted(origargs, FALSE);
g_string_append_printf(a, "%s", spawnparts[0]); /* sh body or script name */
if (newargs) g_string_append_printf(a, " %s", newargs); /* handler args */
for (i = 1; i < g_strv_length(spawnparts); i++) /* user args */
if (spawnparts[i]) g_string_append_printf(a, " %s", spawnparts[i]);
g_array_append_val(rets, a->str);
g_string_free(a, FALSE);
g_strfreev(spawnparts);
} else {
gchar *origdup = g_strdup(origargs);
g_array_append_val(rets, origdup);
}
return (gchar**)g_array_free(rets, FALSE);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bio_reset(struct bio *bio)
{
unsigned long flags = bio->bi_flags & (~0UL << BIO_RESET_BITS);
bio_uninit(bio);
memset(bio, 0, BIO_RESET_BYTES);
bio->bi_flags = flags;
atomic_set(&bio->__bi_remaining, 1);
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 62,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance() {
return Singleton<ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl>::get();
}
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jp2_pclr_putdata(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *out)
{
#if 0
jp2_pclr_t *pclr = &box->data.pclr;
#endif
/* Eliminate warning about unused variable. */
box = 0;
out = 0;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed another problem with incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data upon error.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 70,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btreeInitPage(MemPage *pPage){
int pc; /* Address of a freeblock within pPage->aData[] */
u8 hdr; /* Offset to beginning of page header */
u8 *data; /* Equal to pPage->aData */
BtShared *pBt; /* The main btree structure */
int usableSize; /* Amount of usable space on each page */
u16 cellOffset; /* Offset from start of page to first cell pointer */
int nFree; /* Number of unused bytes on the page */
int top; /* First byte of the cell content area */
int iCellFirst; /* First allowable cell or freeblock offset */
int iCellLast; /* Last possible cell or freeblock offset */
assert( pPage->pBt!=0 );
assert( pPage->pBt->db!=0 );
assert( sqlite3_mutex_held(pPage->pBt->mutex) );
assert( pPage->pgno==sqlite3PagerPagenumber(pPage->pDbPage) );
assert( pPage == sqlite3PagerGetExtra(pPage->pDbPage) );
assert( pPage->aData == sqlite3PagerGetData(pPage->pDbPage) );
assert( pPage->isInit==0 );
pBt = pPage->pBt;
hdr = pPage->hdrOffset;
data = pPage->aData;
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-28594-02890 The one-byte flag at offset 0 indicating
** the b-tree page type. */
if( decodeFlags(pPage, data[hdr]) ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_PAGE(pPage);
}
assert( pBt->pageSize>=512 && pBt->pageSize<=65536 );
pPage->maskPage = (u16)(pBt->pageSize - 1);
pPage->nOverflow = 0;
usableSize = pBt->usableSize;
pPage->cellOffset = cellOffset = hdr + 8 + pPage->childPtrSize;
pPage->aDataEnd = &data[usableSize];
pPage->aCellIdx = &data[cellOffset];
pPage->aDataOfst = &data[pPage->childPtrSize];
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-58015-48175 The two-byte integer at offset 5 designates
** the start of the cell content area. A zero value for this integer is
** interpreted as 65536. */
top = get2byteNotZero(&data[hdr+5]);
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-37002-32774 The two-byte integer at offset 3 gives the
** number of cells on the page. */
pPage->nCell = get2byte(&data[hdr+3]);
if( pPage->nCell>MX_CELL(pBt) ){
/* To many cells for a single page. The page must be corrupt */
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_PAGE(pPage);
}
testcase( pPage->nCell==MX_CELL(pBt) );
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-24089-57979 If a page contains no cells (which is only
** possible for a root page of a table that contains no rows) then the
** offset to the cell content area will equal the page size minus the
** bytes of reserved space. */
assert( pPage->nCell>0 || top==usableSize || CORRUPT_DB );
/* A malformed database page might cause us to read past the end
** of page when parsing a cell.
**
** The following block of code checks early to see if a cell extends
** past the end of a page boundary and causes SQLITE_CORRUPT to be
** returned if it does.
*/
iCellFirst = cellOffset + 2*pPage->nCell;
iCellLast = usableSize - 4;
if( pBt->db->flags & SQLITE_CellSizeCk ){
int i; /* Index into the cell pointer array */
int sz; /* Size of a cell */
if( !pPage->leaf ) iCellLast--;
for(i=0; i<pPage->nCell; i++){
pc = get2byteAligned(&data[cellOffset+i*2]);
testcase( pc==iCellFirst );
testcase( pc==iCellLast );
if( pc<iCellFirst || pc>iCellLast ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_PAGE(pPage);
}
sz = pPage->xCellSize(pPage, &data[pc]);
testcase( pc+sz==usableSize );
if( pc+sz>usableSize ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_PAGE(pPage);
}
}
if( !pPage->leaf ) iCellLast++;
}
/* Compute the total free space on the page
** EVIDENCE-OF: R-23588-34450 The two-byte integer at offset 1 gives the
** start of the first freeblock on the page, or is zero if there are no
** freeblocks. */
pc = get2byte(&data[hdr+1]);
nFree = data[hdr+7] + top; /* Init nFree to non-freeblock free space */
if( pc>0 ){
u32 next, size;
if( pc<iCellFirst ){
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-55530-52930 In a well-formed b-tree page, there will
** always be at least one cell before the first freeblock.
*/
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_PAGE(pPage);
}
while( 1 ){
if( pc>iCellLast ){
/* Freeblock off the end of the page */
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_PAGE(pPage);
}
next = get2byte(&data[pc]);
size = get2byte(&data[pc+2]);
nFree = nFree + size;
if( next<=pc+size+3 ) break;
pc = next;
}
if( next>0 ){
/* Freeblock not in ascending order */
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_PAGE(pPage);
}
if( pc+size>(unsigned int)usableSize ){
/* Last freeblock extends past page end */
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_PAGE(pPage);
}
}
/* At this point, nFree contains the sum of the offset to the start
** of the cell-content area plus the number of free bytes within
** the cell-content area. If this is greater than the usable-size
** of the page, then the page must be corrupted. This check also
** serves to verify that the offset to the start of the cell-content
** area, according to the page header, lies within the page.
*/
if( nFree>usableSize ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_PAGE(pPage);
}
pPage->nFree = (u16)(nFree - iCellFirst);
pPage->isInit = 1;
return SQLITE_OK;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 151,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool shouldOpenInNewWindow(Frame* targetFrame, const FrameLoadRequest& request, const NavigationAction& action)
{
if (!targetFrame && !request.frameName().isEmpty())
return true;
if (!request.formState())
return false;
NavigationPolicy navigationPolicy = NavigationPolicyCurrentTab;
if (!action.specifiesNavigationPolicy(&navigationPolicy))
return false;
return navigationPolicy != NavigationPolicyCurrentTab;
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsAgentHostImpl::NotifyNavigated() {
for (auto& observer : g_devtools_observers.Get())
observer.DevToolsAgentHostNavigated(this);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MediaRecorder::setPreviewSurface(const sp<IGraphicBufferProducer>& surface)
{
ALOGV("setPreviewSurface(%p)", surface.get());
if (mMediaRecorder == NULL) {
ALOGE("media recorder is not initialized yet");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (!(mCurrentState & MEDIA_RECORDER_DATASOURCE_CONFIGURED)) {
ALOGE("setPreviewSurface called in an invalid state(%d)", mCurrentState);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (!mIsVideoSourceSet) {
ALOGE("try to set preview surface without setting the video source first");
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
status_t ret = mMediaRecorder->setPreviewSurface(surface);
if (OK != ret) {
ALOGV("setPreviewSurface failed: %d", ret);
mCurrentState = MEDIA_RECORDER_ERROR;
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Don't use sp<>&
because they may end up pointing to NULL after a NULL check was performed.
Bug: 28166152
Change-Id: Iab2ea30395b620628cc6f3d067dd4f6fcda824fe
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 159,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_inode_alloc(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
xfs_ino_t ino)
{
struct xfs_inode *ip;
/*
* if this didn't occur in transactions, we could use
* KM_MAYFAIL and return NULL here on ENOMEM. Set the
* code up to do this anyway.
*/
ip = kmem_zone_alloc(xfs_inode_zone, KM_SLEEP);
if (!ip)
return NULL;
if (inode_init_always(mp->m_super, VFS_I(ip))) {
kmem_zone_free(xfs_inode_zone, ip);
return NULL;
}
/* VFS doesn't initialise i_mode! */
VFS_I(ip)->i_mode = 0;
XFS_STATS_INC(mp, vn_active);
ASSERT(atomic_read(&ip->i_pincount) == 0);
ASSERT(!xfs_isiflocked(ip));
ASSERT(ip->i_ino == 0);
/* initialise the xfs inode */
ip->i_ino = ino;
ip->i_mount = mp;
memset(&ip->i_imap, 0, sizeof(struct xfs_imap));
ip->i_afp = NULL;
ip->i_cowfp = NULL;
ip->i_cnextents = 0;
ip->i_cformat = XFS_DINODE_FMT_EXTENTS;
memset(&ip->i_df, 0, sizeof(xfs_ifork_t));
ip->i_flags = 0;
ip->i_delayed_blks = 0;
memset(&ip->i_d, 0, sizeof(ip->i_d));
return ip;
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_write_raw)
{
php_xmlwriter_string_arg(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, xmlTextWriterWriteRaw, NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: buffer_unref (Buffer *buffer)
{
g_assert (buffer->refcount > 0);
buffer->refcount--;
if (buffer->refcount == 0)
{
g_list_free_full (buffer->control_messages, g_object_unref);
g_free (buffer);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 84,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hmac_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_shash *parent = __crypto_shash_cast(tfm);
struct crypto_shash *hash;
struct crypto_instance *inst = (void *)tfm->__crt_alg;
struct crypto_shash_spawn *spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
struct hmac_ctx *ctx = hmac_ctx(parent);
hash = crypto_spawn_shash(spawn);
if (IS_ERR(hash))
return PTR_ERR(hash);
parent->descsize = sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
crypto_shash_descsize(hash);
ctx->hash = hash;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 45,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jas_stream_t *jas_stream_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode)
{
jas_stream_t *stream;
jas_stream_fileobj_t *obj;
int openflags;
/* Allocate a stream object. */
if (!(stream = jas_stream_create())) {
return 0;
}
/* Parse the mode string. */
stream->openmode_ = jas_strtoopenmode(mode);
/* Determine the correct flags to use for opening the file. */
if ((stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_READ) &&
(stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_WRITE)) {
openflags = O_RDWR;
} else if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_READ) {
openflags = O_RDONLY;
} else if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_WRITE) {
openflags = O_WRONLY;
} else {
openflags = 0;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_APPEND) {
openflags |= O_APPEND;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_BINARY) {
openflags |= O_BINARY;
}
if (stream->openmode_ & JAS_STREAM_CREATE) {
openflags |= O_CREAT | O_TRUNC;
}
/* Allocate space for the underlying file stream object. */
if (!(obj = jas_malloc(sizeof(jas_stream_fileobj_t)))) {
jas_stream_destroy(stream);
return 0;
}
obj->fd = -1;
obj->flags = 0;
obj->pathname[0] = '\0';
stream->obj_ = (void *) obj;
/* Select the operations for a file stream object. */
stream->ops_ = &jas_stream_fileops;
/* Open the underlying file. */
if ((obj->fd = open(filename, openflags, JAS_STREAM_PERMS)) < 0) {
jas_stream_destroy(stream);
return 0;
}
/* By default, use full buffering for this type of stream. */
jas_stream_initbuf(stream, JAS_STREAM_FULLBUF, 0, 0);
return stream;
}
Commit Message: The memory stream interface allows for a buffer size of zero.
The case of a zero-sized buffer was not handled correctly, as it could
lead to a double free.
This problem has now been fixed (hopefully).
One might ask whether a zero-sized buffer should be allowed at all,
but this is a question for another day.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 73,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LiveSyncTest::TearDown() {
InProcessBrowserTest::TearDown();
TearDownLocalPythonTestServer();
TearDownLocalTestServer();
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ati_remote2_kill_urbs(struct ati_remote2 *ar2)
{
usb_kill_urb(ar2->urb[1]);
usb_kill_urb(ar2->urb[0]);
}
Commit Message: Input: ati_remote2 - fix crashes on detecting device with invalid descriptor
The ati_remote2 driver expects at least two interfaces with one
endpoint each. If given malicious descriptor that specify one
interface or no endpoints, it will crash in the probe function.
Ensure there is at least two interfaces and one endpoint for each
interface before using it.
The full disclosure: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/90
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 55,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: attr_writer(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value obj)
{
mrb_value name = mrb_proc_cfunc_env_get(mrb, 0);
mrb_value val;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &val);
mrb_iv_set(mrb, obj, to_sym(mrb, name), val);
return val;
}
Commit Message: `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Navigate(const char* url, int page_id) {
contents()->TestDidNavigate(
contents()->GetRenderViewHost(), page_id, GURL(url),
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_TYPED);
}
Commit Message: Disable crashing OfflineLoadPageTest
TBR=jam@chromium.org
BUG=113219
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9358027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120977 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 107,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init net_dev_init(void)
{
int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
BUG_ON(!dev_boot_phase);
if (dev_proc_init())
goto out;
if (netdev_kobject_init())
goto out;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ptype_all);
for (i = 0; i < PTYPE_HASH_SIZE; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ptype_base[i]);
if (register_pernet_subsys(&netdev_net_ops))
goto out;
/*
* Initialise the packet receive queues.
*/
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct softnet_data *queue;
queue = &per_cpu(softnet_data, i);
skb_queue_head_init(&queue->input_pkt_queue);
queue->completion_queue = NULL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&queue->poll_list);
queue->backlog.poll = process_backlog;
queue->backlog.weight = weight_p;
queue->backlog.gro_list = NULL;
queue->backlog.gro_count = 0;
}
dev_boot_phase = 0;
/* The loopback device is special if any other network devices
* is present in a network namespace the loopback device must
* be present. Since we now dynamically allocate and free the
* loopback device ensure this invariant is maintained by
* keeping the loopback device as the first device on the
* list of network devices. Ensuring the loopback devices
* is the first device that appears and the last network device
* that disappears.
*/
if (register_pernet_device(&loopback_net_ops))
goto out;
if (register_pernet_device(&default_device_ops))
goto out;
open_softirq(NET_TX_SOFTIRQ, net_tx_action);
open_softirq(NET_RX_SOFTIRQ, net_rx_action);
hotcpu_notifier(dev_cpu_callback, 0);
dst_init();
dev_mcast_init();
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int strcmpn(const char *s1, const char *s2)
{
int digits, predigits = 0;
const char *ss1, *ss2;
while (1) {
if (*s1 == 0 && *s2 == 0)
return 0;
digits = Xisdigit(*s1) && Xisdigit(*s2);
if (digits && !predigits) {
ss1 = s1;
ss2 = s2;
while (Xisdigit(*ss1) && Xisdigit(*ss2))
ss1++, ss2++;
if (!Xisdigit(*ss1) && Xisdigit(*ss2))
return -1;
if (Xisdigit(*ss1) && !Xisdigit(*ss2))
return 1;
}
if ((unsigned char)*s1 < (unsigned char)*s2)
return -1;
if ((unsigned char)*s1 > (unsigned char)*s2)
return 1;
predigits = digits;
s1++, s2++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 2,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LRESULT OmniboxViewWin::OnSetText(const wchar_t* text) {
AutoReset<bool> auto_reset_ignore_ime_messages(&ignore_ime_messages_, true);
return DefWindowProc(WM_SETTEXT, 0, reinterpret_cast<LPARAM>(text));
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::RegisterBrowserPrefs(PrefService* prefs) {
prefs->RegisterDictionaryPref(prefs::kAutofillDialogPlacement);
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,479 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ASF_Support::CreatePaddingObject ( std::string* header, const XMP_Uns64 size )
{
if ( ( ! header) || (size < 24) ) return false;
ASF_ObjectBase newObjectBase;
newObjectBase.guid = ASF_Padding_Object;
newObjectBase.size = MakeUns64LE ( size );
header->append ( (const char*)&newObjectBase, kASF_ObjectBaseLen );
header->append ( XMP_Uns32 ( size - 24 ), '\0' );
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 15,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebFrameWidget* WebLocalFrameImpl::FrameWidget() const {
return frame_widget_;
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: user_new (Daemon *daemon,
uid_t uid)
{
User *user;
user = g_object_new (TYPE_USER, NULL);
user->daemon = daemon;
accounts_user_set_uid (ACCOUNTS_USER (user), uid);
return user;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 4,742 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameFetchContext::DispatchWillSendRequest(
unsigned long identifier,
ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
Resource::Type resource_type,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
if (IsDetached())
return;
if (redirect_response.IsNull()) {
GetFrame()->Loader().Progress().WillStartLoading(identifier,
request.Priority());
}
probe::willSendRequest(GetFrame()->GetDocument(), identifier,
MasterDocumentLoader(), request, redirect_response,
initiator_info, resource_type);
if (IdlenessDetector* idleness_detector = GetFrame()->GetIdlenessDetector())
idleness_detector->OnWillSendRequest(MasterDocumentLoader()->Fetcher());
if (document_) {
InteractiveDetector* interactive_detector(
InteractiveDetector::From(*document_));
if (interactive_detector) {
interactive_detector->OnResourceLoadBegin(base::nullopt);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 145,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *_iov,
unsigned long nr_segs, loff_t ppos)
{
struct file *filp = iocb->ki_filp;
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = filp->private_data;
ssize_t ret;
int do_wakeup;
struct iovec *iov = (struct iovec *)_iov;
size_t total_len;
ssize_t chars;
total_len = iov_length(iov, nr_segs);
/* Null write succeeds. */
if (unlikely(total_len == 0))
return 0;
do_wakeup = 0;
ret = 0;
__pipe_lock(pipe);
if (!pipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
ret = -EPIPE;
goto out;
}
/* We try to merge small writes */
chars = total_len & (PAGE_SIZE-1); /* size of the last buffer */
if (pipe->nrbufs && chars != 0) {
int lastbuf = (pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs - 1) &
(pipe->buffers - 1);
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + lastbuf;
const struct pipe_buf_operations *ops = buf->ops;
int offset = buf->offset + buf->len;
if (ops->can_merge && offset + chars <= PAGE_SIZE) {
int error, atomic = 1;
void *addr;
error = ops->confirm(pipe, buf);
if (error)
goto out;
iov_fault_in_pages_read(iov, chars);
redo1:
if (atomic)
addr = kmap_atomic(buf->page);
else
addr = kmap(buf->page);
error = pipe_iov_copy_from_user(offset + addr, iov,
chars, atomic);
if (atomic)
kunmap_atomic(addr);
else
kunmap(buf->page);
ret = error;
do_wakeup = 1;
if (error) {
if (atomic) {
atomic = 0;
goto redo1;
}
goto out;
}
buf->len += chars;
total_len -= chars;
ret = chars;
if (!total_len)
goto out;
}
}
for (;;) {
int bufs;
if (!pipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
bufs = pipe->nrbufs;
if (bufs < pipe->buffers) {
int newbuf = (pipe->curbuf + bufs) & (pipe->buffers-1);
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + newbuf;
struct page *page = pipe->tmp_page;
char *src;
int error, atomic = 1;
if (!page) {
page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
if (unlikely(!page)) {
ret = ret ? : -ENOMEM;
break;
}
pipe->tmp_page = page;
}
/* Always wake up, even if the copy fails. Otherwise
* we lock up (O_NONBLOCK-)readers that sleep due to
* syscall merging.
* FIXME! Is this really true?
*/
do_wakeup = 1;
chars = PAGE_SIZE;
if (chars > total_len)
chars = total_len;
iov_fault_in_pages_read(iov, chars);
redo2:
if (atomic)
src = kmap_atomic(page);
else
src = kmap(page);
error = pipe_iov_copy_from_user(src, iov, chars,
atomic);
if (atomic)
kunmap_atomic(src);
else
kunmap(page);
if (unlikely(error)) {
if (atomic) {
atomic = 0;
goto redo2;
}
if (!ret)
ret = error;
break;
}
ret += chars;
/* Insert it into the buffer array */
buf->page = page;
buf->ops = &anon_pipe_buf_ops;
buf->offset = 0;
buf->len = chars;
buf->flags = 0;
if (is_packetized(filp)) {
buf->ops = &packet_pipe_buf_ops;
buf->flags = PIPE_BUF_FLAG_PACKET;
}
pipe->nrbufs = ++bufs;
pipe->tmp_page = NULL;
total_len -= chars;
if (!total_len)
break;
}
if (bufs < pipe->buffers)
continue;
if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!ret)
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
if (!ret)
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (do_wakeup) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
do_wakeup = 0;
}
pipe->waiting_writers++;
pipe_wait(pipe);
pipe->waiting_writers--;
}
out:
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
if (do_wakeup) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
if (ret > 0 && sb_start_write_trylock(file_inode(filp)->i_sb)) {
int err = file_update_time(filp);
if (err)
ret = err;
sb_end_write(file_inode(filp)->i_sb);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 1 | 166,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void destruct_tty_driver(struct kref *kref)
{
struct tty_driver *driver = container_of(kref, struct tty_driver, kref);
int i;
struct ktermios *tp;
if (driver->flags & TTY_DRIVER_INSTALLED) {
/*
* Free the termios and termios_locked structures because
* we don't want to get memory leaks when modular tty
* drivers are removed from the kernel.
*/
for (i = 0; i < driver->num; i++) {
tp = driver->termios[i];
if (tp) {
driver->termios[i] = NULL;
kfree(tp);
}
if (!(driver->flags & TTY_DRIVER_DYNAMIC_DEV))
tty_unregister_device(driver, i);
}
proc_tty_unregister_driver(driver);
if (driver->flags & TTY_DRIVER_DYNAMIC_ALLOC)
cdev_del(driver->cdevs[0]);
}
kfree(driver->cdevs);
kfree(driver->ports);
kfree(driver->termios);
kfree(driver->ttys);
kfree(driver);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,857 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Write_CVT( EXEC_OP_ FT_ULong idx,
FT_F26Dot6 value )
{
CUR.cvt[idx] = value;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool V8DOMWrapper::hasInternalFieldsSet(v8::Local<v8::Value> value)
{
if (value.IsEmpty() || !value->IsObject())
return false;
v8::Local<v8::Object> object = v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value);
if (object->InternalFieldCount() < v8DefaultWrapperInternalFieldCount)
return false;
const ScriptWrappable* untrustedScriptWrappable = toScriptWrappable(object);
const WrapperTypeInfo* untrustedWrapperTypeInfo = toWrapperTypeInfo(object);
return untrustedScriptWrappable
&& untrustedWrapperTypeInfo
&& untrustedWrapperTypeInfo->ginEmbedder == gin::kEmbedderBlink;
}
Commit Message: Rethrow cross-site exceptions as security errors
BUG=530301
R=epertoso@chromium.org,haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1339023002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@202211 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 129,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 StripWWW(const base::string16& text) {
const base::string16 www(base::ASCIIToUTF16("www."));
return base::StartsWith(text, www, base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)
? text.substr(www.length()) : text;
}
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 137,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::RestoreActiveTexture() const {}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderProcessHost* RenderProcessHostImpl::GetProcessHostForSite(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) {
SiteProcessMap* map = GetSiteProcessMapForBrowserContext(browser_context);
GURL site_url = SiteInstance::GetSiteForURL(browser_context, url);
RenderProcessHost* host = map->FindProcess(site_url.possibly_invalid_spec());
if (host && (!host->MayReuseHost() ||
!IsSuitableHost(host, browser_context, site_url))) {
RecordAction(
base::UserMetricsAction("BindingsMismatch_GetProcessHostPerSite"));
map->RemoveProcess(host);
host = nullptr;
}
return host;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iakerb_gss_get_mic(OM_uint32 *minor_status, gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
gss_qop_t qop_req, gss_buffer_t message_buffer,
gss_buffer_t message_token)
{
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)context_handle;
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
return krb5_gss_get_mic(minor_status, ctx->gssc, qop_req, message_buffer,
message_token);
}
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context export/import [CVE-2015-2698]
The patches for CVE-2015-2696 contained a regression in the newly
added IAKERB iakerb_gss_export_sec_context() function, which could
cause it to corrupt memory. Fix the regression by properly
dereferencing the context_handle pointer before casting it.
Also, the patches did not implement an IAKERB gss_import_sec_context()
function, under the erroneous belief that an exported IAKERB context
would be tagged as a krb5 context. Implement it now to allow IAKERB
contexts to be successfully exported and imported after establishment.
CVE-2015-2698:
In any MIT krb5 release with the patches for CVE-2015-2696 applied, an
application which calls gss_export_sec_context() may experience memory
corruption if the context was established using the IAKERB mechanism.
Historically, some vulnerabilities of this nature can be translated
into remote code execution, though the necessary exploits must be
tailored to the individual application and are usually quite
complicated.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8273 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vcard_apdu_set_class(VCardAPDU *apdu) {
apdu->a_channel = 0;
apdu->a_secure_messaging = 0;
apdu->a_type = apdu->a_cla & 0xf0;
apdu->a_gen_type = VCARD_7816_ISO;
/* parse the class tables 8 & 9 of the 7816-4 Part 4 spec */
switch (apdu->a_type) {
/* we only support the basic types */
case 0x00:
case 0x80:
case 0x90:
case 0xa0:
apdu->a_channel = apdu->a_cla & 3;
apdu->a_secure_messaging = apdu->a_cla & 0xe;
break;
case 0xb0:
case 0xc0:
break;
case 0x10:
case 0x20:
case 0x30:
case 0x40:
case 0x50:
case 0x60:
case 0x70:
/* Reserved for future use */
apdu->a_gen_type = VCARD_7816_RFU;
break;
case 0xd0:
case 0xe0:
case 0xf0:
default:
apdu->a_gen_type =
(apdu->a_cla == 0xff) ? VCARD_7816_PTS : VCARD_7816_PROPRIETARY;
break;
}
return VCARD7816_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,738 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport PixelPacket *QueueAuthenticPixels(Image *image,const ssize_t x,
const ssize_t y,const size_t columns,const size_t rows,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*restrict cache_info;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (cache_info->methods.queue_authentic_pixels_handler !=
(QueueAuthenticPixelsHandler) NULL)
return(cache_info->methods.queue_authentic_pixels_handler(image,x,y,columns,
rows,exception));
assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads);
return(QueueAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(image,x,y,columns,rows,MagickFalse,
cache_info->nexus_info[id],exception));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 73,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vrend_hw_emit_framebuffer_state(struct vrend_context *ctx)
{
static const GLenum buffers[8] = {
GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0_EXT,
GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT1_EXT,
GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT2_EXT,
GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT3_EXT,
GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT4_EXT,
GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT5_EXT,
GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT6_EXT,
GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT7_EXT,
};
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, ctx->sub->fb_id);
if (ctx->sub->nr_cbufs == 0) {
glReadBuffer(GL_NONE);
glDisable(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_SRGB_EXT);
} else {
struct vrend_surface *surf = NULL;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->sub->nr_cbufs; i++) {
if (ctx->sub->surf[i]) {
surf = ctx->sub->surf[i];
}
}
if (util_format_is_srgb(surf->format)) {
glEnable(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_SRGB_EXT);
} else {
glDisable(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_SRGB_EXT);
}
}
glDrawBuffers(ctx->sub->nr_cbufs, buffers);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 9,275 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::isTextType() const
{
return m_inputType->isTextType();
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CookPointers(cmsIT8* it8)
{
int idField, i;
char* Fld;
cmsUInt32Number j;
cmsUInt32Number nOldTable = it8 ->nTable;
for (j=0; j < it8 ->TablesCount; j++) {
TABLE* t = it8 ->Tab + j;
t -> SampleID = 0;
it8 ->nTable = j;
for (idField = 0; idField < t -> nSamples; idField++)
{
if (t ->DataFormat == NULL){
SynError(it8, "Undefined DATA_FORMAT");
return;
}
Fld = t->DataFormat[idField];
if (!Fld) continue;
if (cmsstrcasecmp(Fld, "SAMPLE_ID") == 0) {
t -> SampleID = idField;
for (i=0; i < t -> nPatches; i++) {
char *Data = GetData(it8, i, idField);
if (Data) {
char Buffer[256];
strncpy(Buffer, Data, 255);
Buffer[255] = 0;
if (strlen(Buffer) <= strlen(Data))
strcpy(Data, Buffer);
else
SetData(it8, i, idField, Buffer);
}
}
}
if ((cmsstrcasecmp(Fld, "LABEL") == 0) || Fld[0] == '$' ) {
for (i=0; i < t -> nPatches; i++) {
char *Label = GetData(it8, i, idField);
if (Label) {
cmsUInt32Number k;
for (k=0; k < it8 ->TablesCount; k++) {
TABLE* Table = it8 ->Tab + k;
KEYVALUE* p;
if (IsAvailableOnList(Table->HeaderList, Label, NULL, &p)) {
char Buffer[256];
char *Type = p ->Value;
int nTable = (int) k;
snprintf(Buffer, 255, "%s %d %s", Label, nTable, Type );
SetData(it8, i, idField, Buffer);
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
it8 ->nTable = nOldTable;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint8_t ltp_data(NeAACDecStruct *hDecoder, ic_stream *ics, ltp_info *ltp, bitfile *ld)
{
uint8_t sfb, w;
ltp->lag = 0;
#ifdef LD_DEC
if (hDecoder->object_type == LD)
{
ltp->lag_update = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 1
DEBUGVAR(1,142,"ltp_data(): lag_update"));
if (ltp->lag_update)
{
ltp->lag = (uint16_t)faad_getbits(ld, 10
DEBUGVAR(1,81,"ltp_data(): lag"));
}
} else {
#endif
ltp->lag = (uint16_t)faad_getbits(ld, 11
DEBUGVAR(1,81,"ltp_data(): lag"));
#ifdef LD_DEC
}
#endif
/* Check length of lag */
if (ltp->lag > (hDecoder->frameLength << 1))
return 18;
ltp->coef = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 3
DEBUGVAR(1,82,"ltp_data(): coef"));
if (ics->window_sequence == EIGHT_SHORT_SEQUENCE)
{
for (w = 0; w < ics->num_windows; w++)
{
if ((ltp->short_used[w] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,83,"ltp_data(): short_used"))) & 1)
{
ltp->short_lag_present[w] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,84,"ltp_data(): short_lag_present"));
if (ltp->short_lag_present[w])
{
ltp->short_lag[w] = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, 4
DEBUGVAR(1,85,"ltp_data(): short_lag"));
}
}
}
} else {
ltp->last_band = (ics->max_sfb < MAX_LTP_SFB ? ics->max_sfb : MAX_LTP_SFB);
for (sfb = 0; sfb < ltp->last_band; sfb++)
{
ltp->long_used[sfb] = faad_get1bit(ld
DEBUGVAR(1,86,"ltp_data(): long_used"));
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_mig_target_client_disconnect_all(void)
{
RingItem *now, *next;
RING_FOREACH_SAFE(now, next, &reds->mig_target_clients) {
RedsMigTargetClient *mig_client = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(now, RedsMigTargetClient, link);
reds_client_disconnect(mig_client->client);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init igmp_mc_proc_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&igmp_net_ops);
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 21,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 AuthenticatorTimeoutErrorModel::GetStepTitle() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_ERROR_GENERIC_TITLE);
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~AsyncUploadTokenCompletionObserver() {
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,066 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GURL RenderFrameImpl::GetLoadingUrl() const {
WebDataSource* ds = frame_->dataSource();
if (ds->hasUnreachableURL())
return ds->unreachableURL();
const WebURLRequest& request = ds->request();
return request.url();
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,128 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::showContextMenu(
WebFrame* frame, const WebContextMenuData& data) {
ContextMenuParams params(data);
if (ShouldUpdateSelectionTextFromContextMenuParams(selection_text_,
selection_text_offset_,
selection_range_,
params)) {
selection_text_ = params.selection_text;
selection_text_offset_ = 0;
selection_range_ = ui::Range(0, selection_text_.length());
Send(new ViewHostMsg_SelectionChanged(routing_id_,
selection_text_,
selection_text_offset_,
selection_range_));
}
if (frame)
params.frame_id = frame->identifier();
if (params.src_url.spec().size() > kMaxURLChars)
params.src_url = GURL();
context_menu_node_ = data.node;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
gfx::Rect start_rect;
gfx::Rect end_rect;
GetSelectionBounds(&start_rect, &end_rect);
params.selection_start = gfx::Point(start_rect.x(), start_rect.bottom());
params.selection_end = gfx::Point(end_rect.right(), end_rect.bottom());
#endif
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ContextMenu(routing_id_, params));
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(
RenderViewObserver, observers_, DidRequestShowContextMenu(frame, data));
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb2_lockv(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
const __u64 persist_fid, const __u64 volatile_fid, const __u32 pid,
const __u32 num_lock, struct smb2_lock_element *buf)
{
int rc = 0;
struct smb2_lock_req *req = NULL;
struct kvec iov[2];
struct kvec rsp_iov;
int resp_buf_type;
unsigned int count;
int flags = CIFS_NO_RESP;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "smb2_lockv num lock %d\n", num_lock);
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_LOCK, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (encryption_required(tcon))
flags |= CIFS_TRANSFORM_REQ;
req->hdr.sync_hdr.ProcessId = cpu_to_le32(pid);
req->LockCount = cpu_to_le16(num_lock);
req->PersistentFileId = persist_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = volatile_fid;
count = num_lock * sizeof(struct smb2_lock_element);
inc_rfc1001_len(req, count - sizeof(struct smb2_lock_element));
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field and count for all locks */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4 - count;
iov[1].iov_base = (char *)buf;
iov[1].iov_len = count;
cifs_stats_inc(&tcon->stats.cifs_stats.num_locks);
rc = SendReceive2(xid, tcon->ses, iov, 2, &resp_buf_type, flags,
&rsp_iov);
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Send error in smb2_lockv = %d\n", rc);
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_LOCK_HE);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 84,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::ensureFramebufferCHROMIUM() {
gl_->Flush();
command_buffer_->EnsureBackbuffer();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
{
int idx;
size_t i;
const EVP_MD *md;
CERT *c = s->cert;
TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
return 1;
/* Should never happen */
if (!c)
return 0;
if (c->peer_sigalgs)
OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
return 0;
c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
{
/* Use first set signature preference to force message
* digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
*/
const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
if (s->server)
sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
else
sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
if (sigs)
{
idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
{
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
}
}
}
#endif
for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
{
idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
{
md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
{
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
}
}
}
/* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
* use the certificate for signing.
*/
if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
{
/* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
* not supported it stays as NULL.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
{
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 10,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry **pce;
zval *obj;
zval *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp(name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp(name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (!ent1->data) {
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
int new_len=0;
unsigned char *new_str;
new_str = php_base64_decode(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data), &new_len);
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data));
if (new_str) {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data) = new_str;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) = new_len;
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(ent1->data);
}
}
/* Call __wakeup() method on the object. */
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zval *fname, *retval = NULL;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__wakeup", 1);
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (ent2->data == NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
if (zend_hash_find(EG(class_table), Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data),
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data)+1, (void **) &pce)==FAILURE) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = &PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
/* Initialize target object */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(obj);
object_init_ex(obj, *pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP_P(obj),
Z_ARRVAL_P(ent2->data),
(void (*)(void *)) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(obj, Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ent2->data = obj;
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE_P(ent2->data);
Z_DELREF_P(ent1->data);
add_property_zval(ent2->data, ent1->varname, ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname)+1, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = NULL;
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 168,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& Document::alinkColor() const {
return BodyAttributeValue(kAlinkAttr);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::ReloadIgnoringCache(bool check_for_repost) {
ReloadInternal(check_for_repost, RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::CustomCallEpilogueVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_customCallEpilogueVoidMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::CustomCallEpilogueVoidMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dev_queue_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct netdev_queue *txq;
struct Qdisc *q;
int rc = -ENOMEM;
/* Disable soft irqs for various locks below. Also
* stops preemption for RCU.
*/
rcu_read_lock_bh();
txq = dev_pick_tx(dev, skb);
q = rcu_dereference_bh(txq->qdisc);
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT
skb->tc_verd = SET_TC_AT(skb->tc_verd, AT_EGRESS);
#endif
if (q->enqueue) {
rc = __dev_xmit_skb(skb, q, dev, txq);
goto out;
}
/* The device has no queue. Common case for software devices:
loopback, all the sorts of tunnels...
Really, it is unlikely that netif_tx_lock protection is necessary
here. (f.e. loopback and IP tunnels are clean ignoring statistics
counters.)
However, it is possible, that they rely on protection
made by us here.
Check this and shot the lock. It is not prone from deadlocks.
Either shot noqueue qdisc, it is even simpler 8)
*/
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
int cpu = smp_processor_id(); /* ok because BHs are off */
if (txq->xmit_lock_owner != cpu) {
HARD_TX_LOCK(dev, txq, cpu);
if (!netif_tx_queue_stopped(txq)) {
rc = dev_hard_start_xmit(skb, dev, txq);
if (dev_xmit_complete(rc)) {
HARD_TX_UNLOCK(dev, txq);
goto out;
}
}
HARD_TX_UNLOCK(dev, txq);
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_CRIT "Virtual device %s asks to "
"queue packet!\n", dev->name);
} else {
/* Recursion is detected! It is possible,
* unfortunately */
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_CRIT "Dead loop on virtual device "
"%s, fix it urgently!\n", dev->name);
}
}
rc = -ENETDOWN;
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
kfree_skb(skb);
return rc;
out:
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return rc;
}
Commit Message: netdevice.h net/core/dev.c: Convert netdev_<level> logging macros to functions
Reduces an x86 defconfig text and data ~2k.
text is smaller, data is larger.
$ size vmlinux*
text data bss dec hex filename
7198862 720112 1366288 9285262 8dae8e vmlinux
7205273 716016 1366288 9287577 8db799 vmlinux.device_h
Uses %pV and struct va_format
Format arguments are verified before printk
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 37,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsAgent::clearBrowserCookies() {
Send(new DevToolsHostMsg_ClearBrowserCookies(routing_id()));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(struct kvm *kvm)
{
long dirty_count = kvm->tlbs_dirty;
smp_mb();
if (make_all_cpus_request(kvm, KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH))
++kvm->stat.remote_tlb_flush;
cmpxchg(&kvm->tlbs_dirty, dirty_count, 0);
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType DecodeImage(Image *image,const ssize_t opacity)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
IndexPacket
index;
int
c;
LZWInfo
*lzw_info;
ssize_t
offset,
y;
unsigned char
data_size;
size_t
pass;
/*
Allocate decoder tables.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
data_size=(unsigned char) ReadBlobByte(image);
if (data_size > MaximumLZWBits)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
lzw_info=AcquireLZWInfo(image,data_size);
if (lzw_info == (LZWInfo *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
exception=(&image->exception);
pass=0;
offset=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register IndexPacket
*restrict indexes;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,offset,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; )
{
c=ReadBlobLZWByte(lzw_info);
if (c < 0)
break;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(size_t) c);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
SetPixelOpacity(q,(ssize_t) index == opacity ? TransparentOpacity :
OpaqueOpacity);
x++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (x < (ssize_t) image->columns)
break;
if (image->interlace == NoInterlace)
offset++;
else
{
switch (pass)
{
case 0:
default:
{
offset+=8;
break;
}
case 1:
{
offset+=8;
break;
}
case 2:
{
offset+=4;
break;
}
case 3:
{
offset+=2;
break;
}
}
if ((pass == 0) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=4;
}
if ((pass == 1) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=2;
}
if ((pass == 2) && (offset >= (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
pass++;
offset=1;
}
}
}
lzw_info=RelinquishLZWInfo(lzw_info);
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetFilterCallback(const FilterCallback& callback) {
callback_ = callback;
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 151,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PVGetDecFramerate(VideoDecControls *decCtrl)
{
VideoDecData *video = (VideoDecData *)decCtrl->videoDecoderData;
return video->frameRate;
}
Commit Message: Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,445 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int usb_get_descriptor(struct usb_device *dev, unsigned char type,
unsigned char index, void *buf, int size)
{
int i;
int result;
memset(buf, 0, size); /* Make sure we parse really received data */
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
/* retry on length 0 or error; some devices are flakey */
result = usb_control_msg(dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(dev, 0),
USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR, USB_DIR_IN,
(type << 8) + index, 0, buf, size,
USB_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT);
if (result <= 0 && result != -ETIMEDOUT)
continue;
if (result > 1 && ((u8 *)buf)[1] != type) {
result = -ENODATA;
continue;
}
break;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t macvlan_get_size(const struct net_device *dev)
{
return nla_total_size(4);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void fslib_copy_libs(const char *full_path) {
assert(full_path);
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf(" fslib_copy_libs %s\n", full_path);
if (access(full_path, R_OK)) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf("cannot find %s for private-lib, skipping...\n", full_path);
return;
}
unlink(RUN_LIB_FILE); // in case is there
create_empty_file_as_root(RUN_LIB_FILE, 0644);
if (chown(RUN_LIB_FILE, getuid(), getgid()))
errExit("chown");
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_private_lib)
printf(" running fldd %s\n", full_path);
sbox_run(SBOX_USER | SBOX_SECCOMP | SBOX_CAPS_NONE, 3, PATH_FLDD, full_path, RUN_LIB_FILE);
FILE *fp = fopen(RUN_LIB_FILE, "r");
if (!fp)
errExit("fopen");
char buf[MAXBUF];
while (fgets(buf, MAXBUF, fp)) {
char *ptr = strchr(buf, '\n');
if (ptr)
*ptr = '\0';
fslib_duplicate(buf);
}
fclose(fp);
}
Commit Message: mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 169,657 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: perf_cgroup_set_timestamp(struct task_struct *task,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
struct perf_cgroup *cgrp;
struct perf_cgroup_info *info;
/*
* ctx->lock held by caller
* ensure we do not access cgroup data
* unless we have the cgroup pinned (css_get)
*/
if (!task || !ctx->nr_cgroups)
return;
cgrp = perf_cgroup_from_task(task, ctx);
info = this_cpu_ptr(cgrp->info);
info->timestamp = ctx->timestamp;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool cmd_set_multiple_mode(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
if (s->drive_kind == IDE_CFATA && s->nsector == 0) {
/* Disable Read and Write Multiple */
s->mult_sectors = 0;
} else if ((s->nsector & 0xff) != 0 &&
((s->nsector & 0xff) > MAX_MULT_SECTORS ||
(s->nsector & (s->nsector - 1)) != 0)) {
ide_abort_command(s);
} else {
s->mult_sectors = s->nsector & 0xff;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContext::setCachePath(const QUrl& url) {
DCHECK(!IsInitialized());
DCHECK(url.isLocalFile() || url.isEmpty());
construct_props_->cache_path =
base::FilePath(url.toLocalFile().toStdString());
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,998 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioRendererHost::DoSendPausedMessage(
media::AudioOutputController* controller) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
AudioEntry* entry = LookupByController(controller);
if (!entry)
return;
Send(new AudioMsg_NotifyStreamStateChanged(
entry->stream_id, media::AudioOutputIPCDelegate::kPaused));
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 118,562 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SelectionController* SelectionController::Create(LocalFrame& frame) {
return new SelectionController(frame);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int loadingStateToDifferentDocumentCount() const {
return loadingStateToDifferentDocumentCount_;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintDialogGtk::UseDefaultSettings() {
DCHECK(!page_setup_);
gtk_settings_ = gtk_print_settings_new();
scoped_ptr<GtkPrinterList> printer_list(new GtkPrinterList);
printer_ = printer_list->default_printer();
if (printer_) {
g_object_ref(printer_);
gtk_print_settings_set_printer(gtk_settings_,
gtk_printer_get_name(printer_));
page_setup_ = gtk_printer_get_default_page_size(printer_);
}
if (!page_setup_)
page_setup_ = gtk_page_setup_new();
PageRanges ranges_vector;
InitPrintSettings(ranges_vector);
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void rfcomm_dev_modem_status(struct rfcomm_dlc *dlc, u8 v24_sig)
{
struct rfcomm_dev *dev = dlc->owner;
if (!dev)
return;
BT_DBG("dlc %p dev %p v24_sig 0x%02x", dlc, dev, v24_sig);
if ((dev->modem_status & TIOCM_CD) && !(v24_sig & RFCOMM_V24_DV)) {
if (dev->port.tty && !C_CLOCAL(dev->port.tty))
tty_hangup(dev->port.tty);
}
dev->modem_status =
((v24_sig & RFCOMM_V24_RTC) ? (TIOCM_DSR | TIOCM_DTR) : 0) |
((v24_sig & RFCOMM_V24_RTR) ? (TIOCM_RTS | TIOCM_CTS) : 0) |
((v24_sig & RFCOMM_V24_IC) ? TIOCM_RI : 0) |
((v24_sig & RFCOMM_V24_DV) ? TIOCM_CD : 0);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix info leak in ioctl(RFCOMMGETDEVLIST)
The RFCOMM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
rfcomm_dev_list_req inserted for alignment before copying it to
userland. Additionally there are two padding bytes in each instance of
struct rfcomm_dev_info. The ioctl() that for disclosures two bytes plus
dev_num times two bytes uninitialized kernel heap memory.
Allocate the memory using kzalloc() to fix this issue.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,484 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_lock_prepare(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_lockdata *data = calldata;
struct nfs4_state *state = data->lsp->ls_state;
dprintk("%s: begin!\n", __func__);
if (nfs_wait_on_sequence(data->arg.lock_seqid, task) != 0)
return;
/* Do we need to do an open_to_lock_owner? */
if (!(data->arg.lock_seqid->sequence->flags & NFS_SEQID_CONFIRMED)) {
if (nfs_wait_on_sequence(data->arg.open_seqid, task) != 0)
return;
data->arg.open_stateid = &state->stateid;
data->arg.new_lock_owner = 1;
data->res.open_seqid = data->arg.open_seqid;
} else
data->arg.new_lock_owner = 0;
data->timestamp = jiffies;
rpc_call_start(task);
dprintk("%s: done!, ret = %d\n", __func__, data->rpc_status);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,876 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vfs_whiteout(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
if (error)
return error;
if (!dir->i_op->mknod)
return -EPERM;
return dir->i_op->mknod(dir, dentry,
S_IFCHR | WHITEOUT_MODE, WHITEOUT_DEV);
}
Commit Message: path_openat(): fix double fput()
path_openat() jumps to the wrong place after do_tmpfile() - it has
already done path_cleanup() (as part of path_lookupat() called by
do_tmpfile()), so doing that again can lead to double fput().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: | 0 | 42,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::OnSelectAll() {
if (!webview())
return;
webview()->focusedFrame()->executeCommand(
WebString::fromUTF8("SelectAll"));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int drm_mode_page_flip_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev,
void *data, struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_mode_crtc_page_flip *page_flip = data;
struct drm_mode_object *obj;
struct drm_crtc *crtc;
struct drm_framebuffer *fb;
struct drm_pending_vblank_event *e = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if (page_flip->flags & ~DRM_MODE_PAGE_FLIP_FLAGS ||
page_flip->reserved != 0)
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, page_flip->crtc_id, DRM_MODE_OBJECT_CRTC);
if (!obj)
goto out;
crtc = obj_to_crtc(obj);
if (crtc->fb == NULL) {
/* The framebuffer is currently unbound, presumably
* due to a hotplug event, that userspace has not
* yet discovered.
*/
ret = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
if (crtc->funcs->page_flip == NULL)
goto out;
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, page_flip->fb_id, DRM_MODE_OBJECT_FB);
if (!obj)
goto out;
fb = obj_to_fb(obj);
if (page_flip->flags & DRM_MODE_PAGE_FLIP_EVENT) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock, flags);
if (file_priv->event_space < sizeof e->event) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->event_lock, flags);
goto out;
}
file_priv->event_space -= sizeof e->event;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->event_lock, flags);
e = kzalloc(sizeof *e, GFP_KERNEL);
if (e == NULL) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock, flags);
file_priv->event_space += sizeof e->event;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->event_lock, flags);
goto out;
}
e->event.base.type = DRM_EVENT_FLIP_COMPLETE;
e->event.base.length = sizeof e->event;
e->event.user_data = page_flip->user_data;
e->base.event = &e->event.base;
e->base.file_priv = file_priv;
e->base.destroy =
(void (*) (struct drm_pending_event *)) kfree;
}
ret = crtc->funcs->page_flip(crtc, fb, e);
if (ret) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock, flags);
file_priv->event_space += sizeof e->event;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->event_lock, flags);
kfree(e);
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 21,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport ChannelStatistics *GetImageChannelStatistics(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
ChannelStatistics
*channel_statistics;
double
area,
standard_deviation;
MagickPixelPacket
number_bins,
*histogram;
QuantumAny
range;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
channels,
depth,
length;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
length=CompositeChannels+1UL;
channel_statistics=(ChannelStatistics *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
sizeof(*channel_statistics));
histogram=(MagickPixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1U,
sizeof(*histogram));
if ((channel_statistics == (ChannelStatistics *) NULL) ||
(histogram == (MagickPixelPacket *) NULL))
{
if (histogram != (MagickPixelPacket *) NULL)
histogram=(MagickPixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(histogram);
if (channel_statistics != (ChannelStatistics *) NULL)
channel_statistics=(ChannelStatistics *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
channel_statistics);
return(channel_statistics);
}
(void) memset(channel_statistics,0,length*
sizeof(*channel_statistics));
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) CompositeChannels; i++)
{
channel_statistics[i].depth=1;
channel_statistics[i].maxima=(-MagickMaximumValue);
channel_statistics[i].minima=MagickMaximumValue;
}
(void) memset(histogram,0,(MaxMap+1U)*sizeof(*histogram));
(void) memset(&number_bins,0,sizeof(number_bins));
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
/*
Compute pixel statistics.
*/
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; )
{
if (channel_statistics[RedChannel].depth != MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH)
{
depth=channel_statistics[RedChannel].depth;
range=GetQuantumRange(depth);
if (IsPixelAtDepth(GetPixelRed(p),range) == MagickFalse)
{
channel_statistics[RedChannel].depth++;
continue;
}
}
if (channel_statistics[GreenChannel].depth != MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH)
{
depth=channel_statistics[GreenChannel].depth;
range=GetQuantumRange(depth);
if (IsPixelAtDepth(GetPixelGreen(p),range) == MagickFalse)
{
channel_statistics[GreenChannel].depth++;
continue;
}
}
if (channel_statistics[BlueChannel].depth != MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH)
{
depth=channel_statistics[BlueChannel].depth;
range=GetQuantumRange(depth);
if (IsPixelAtDepth(GetPixelBlue(p),range) == MagickFalse)
{
channel_statistics[BlueChannel].depth++;
continue;
}
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
if (channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].depth != MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH)
{
depth=channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].depth;
range=GetQuantumRange(depth);
if (IsPixelAtDepth(GetPixelAlpha(p),range) == MagickFalse)
{
channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].depth++;
continue;
}
}
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
if (channel_statistics[BlackChannel].depth != MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH)
{
depth=channel_statistics[BlackChannel].depth;
range=GetQuantumRange(depth);
if (IsPixelAtDepth(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x),range) == MagickFalse)
{
channel_statistics[BlackChannel].depth++;
continue;
}
}
}
if ((double) GetPixelRed(p) < channel_statistics[RedChannel].minima)
channel_statistics[RedChannel].minima=(double) GetPixelRed(p);
if ((double) GetPixelRed(p) > channel_statistics[RedChannel].maxima)
channel_statistics[RedChannel].maxima=(double) GetPixelRed(p);
channel_statistics[RedChannel].sum+=GetPixelRed(p);
channel_statistics[RedChannel].sum_squared+=(double) GetPixelRed(p)*
GetPixelRed(p);
channel_statistics[RedChannel].sum_cubed+=(double)
GetPixelRed(p)*GetPixelRed(p)*GetPixelRed(p);
channel_statistics[RedChannel].sum_fourth_power+=(double)
GetPixelRed(p)*GetPixelRed(p)*GetPixelRed(p)*GetPixelRed(p);
if ((double) GetPixelGreen(p) < channel_statistics[GreenChannel].minima)
channel_statistics[GreenChannel].minima=(double) GetPixelGreen(p);
if ((double) GetPixelGreen(p) > channel_statistics[GreenChannel].maxima)
channel_statistics[GreenChannel].maxima=(double) GetPixelGreen(p);
channel_statistics[GreenChannel].sum+=GetPixelGreen(p);
channel_statistics[GreenChannel].sum_squared+=(double) GetPixelGreen(p)*
GetPixelGreen(p);
channel_statistics[GreenChannel].sum_cubed+=(double) GetPixelGreen(p)*
GetPixelGreen(p)*GetPixelGreen(p);
channel_statistics[GreenChannel].sum_fourth_power+=(double)
GetPixelGreen(p)*GetPixelGreen(p)*GetPixelGreen(p)*GetPixelGreen(p);
if ((double) GetPixelBlue(p) < channel_statistics[BlueChannel].minima)
channel_statistics[BlueChannel].minima=(double) GetPixelBlue(p);
if ((double) GetPixelBlue(p) > channel_statistics[BlueChannel].maxima)
channel_statistics[BlueChannel].maxima=(double) GetPixelBlue(p);
channel_statistics[BlueChannel].sum+=GetPixelBlue(p);
channel_statistics[BlueChannel].sum_squared+=(double) GetPixelBlue(p)*
GetPixelBlue(p);
channel_statistics[BlueChannel].sum_cubed+=(double) GetPixelBlue(p)*
GetPixelBlue(p)*GetPixelBlue(p);
channel_statistics[BlueChannel].sum_fourth_power+=(double)
GetPixelBlue(p)*GetPixelBlue(p)*GetPixelBlue(p)*GetPixelBlue(p);
histogram[ScaleQuantumToMap(GetPixelRed(p))].red++;
histogram[ScaleQuantumToMap(GetPixelGreen(p))].green++;
histogram[ScaleQuantumToMap(GetPixelBlue(p))].blue++;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
if ((double) GetPixelAlpha(p) < channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].minima)
channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].minima=(double) GetPixelAlpha(p);
if ((double) GetPixelAlpha(p) > channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].maxima)
channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].maxima=(double) GetPixelAlpha(p);
channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].sum+=GetPixelAlpha(p);
channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].sum_squared+=(double)
GetPixelAlpha(p)*GetPixelAlpha(p);
channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].sum_cubed+=(double)
GetPixelAlpha(p)*GetPixelAlpha(p)*GetPixelAlpha(p);
channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].sum_fourth_power+=(double)
GetPixelAlpha(p)*GetPixelAlpha(p)*GetPixelAlpha(p)*GetPixelAlpha(p);
histogram[ScaleQuantumToMap(GetPixelAlpha(p))].opacity++;
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
if ((double) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) < channel_statistics[BlackChannel].minima)
channel_statistics[BlackChannel].minima=(double)
GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
if ((double) GetPixelIndex(indexes+x) > channel_statistics[BlackChannel].maxima)
channel_statistics[BlackChannel].maxima=(double)
GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
channel_statistics[BlackChannel].sum+=GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
channel_statistics[BlackChannel].sum_squared+=(double)
GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)*GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
channel_statistics[BlackChannel].sum_cubed+=(double)
GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)*GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)*
GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
channel_statistics[BlackChannel].sum_fourth_power+=(double)
GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)*GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)*
GetPixelIndex(indexes+x)*GetPixelIndex(indexes+x);
histogram[ScaleQuantumToMap(GetPixelIndex(indexes+x))].index++;
}
x++;
p++;
}
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) CompositeChannels; i++)
{
double
area,
mean,
standard_deviation;
/*
Normalize pixel statistics.
*/
area=PerceptibleReciprocal((double) image->columns*image->rows);
mean=channel_statistics[i].sum*area;
channel_statistics[i].sum=mean;
channel_statistics[i].sum_squared*=area;
channel_statistics[i].sum_cubed*=area;
channel_statistics[i].sum_fourth_power*=area;
channel_statistics[i].mean=mean;
channel_statistics[i].variance=channel_statistics[i].sum_squared;
standard_deviation=sqrt(channel_statistics[i].variance-(mean*mean));
area=PerceptibleReciprocal((double) image->columns*image->rows-1.0)*
((double) image->columns*image->rows);
standard_deviation=sqrt(area*standard_deviation*standard_deviation);
channel_statistics[i].standard_deviation=standard_deviation;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (MaxMap+1U); i++)
{
if (histogram[i].red > 0.0)
number_bins.red++;
if (histogram[i].green > 0.0)
number_bins.green++;
if (histogram[i].blue > 0.0)
number_bins.blue++;
if ((image->matte != MagickFalse) && (histogram[i].opacity > 0.0))
number_bins.opacity++;
if ((image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace) && (histogram[i].index > 0.0))
number_bins.index++;
}
area=PerceptibleReciprocal((double) image->columns*image->rows);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (MaxMap+1U); i++)
{
/*
Compute pixel entropy.
*/
histogram[i].red*=area;
channel_statistics[RedChannel].entropy+=-histogram[i].red*
MagickLog10(histogram[i].red)*
PerceptibleReciprocal(MagickLog10((double) number_bins.red));
histogram[i].green*=area;
channel_statistics[GreenChannel].entropy+=-histogram[i].green*
MagickLog10(histogram[i].green)*
PerceptibleReciprocal(MagickLog10((double) number_bins.green));
histogram[i].blue*=area;
channel_statistics[BlueChannel].entropy+=-histogram[i].blue*
MagickLog10(histogram[i].blue)*
PerceptibleReciprocal(MagickLog10((double) number_bins.blue));
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
histogram[i].opacity*=area;
channel_statistics[OpacityChannel].entropy+=-histogram[i].opacity*
MagickLog10(histogram[i].opacity)*
PerceptibleReciprocal(MagickLog10((double) number_bins.opacity));
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
histogram[i].index*=area;
channel_statistics[IndexChannel].entropy+=-histogram[i].index*
MagickLog10(histogram[i].index)*
PerceptibleReciprocal(MagickLog10((double) number_bins.index));
}
}
/*
Compute overall statistics.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) CompositeChannels; i++)
{
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].depth=(size_t) EvaluateMax((double)
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].depth,(double)
channel_statistics[i].depth);
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].minima=MagickMin(
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].minima,
channel_statistics[i].minima);
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].maxima=EvaluateMax(
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].maxima,
channel_statistics[i].maxima);
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].sum+=channel_statistics[i].sum;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].sum_squared+=
channel_statistics[i].sum_squared;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].sum_cubed+=
channel_statistics[i].sum_cubed;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].sum_fourth_power+=
channel_statistics[i].sum_fourth_power;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean+=channel_statistics[i].mean;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].variance+=
channel_statistics[i].variance-channel_statistics[i].mean*
channel_statistics[i].mean;
standard_deviation=sqrt(channel_statistics[i].variance-
(channel_statistics[i].mean*channel_statistics[i].mean));
area=PerceptibleReciprocal((double) image->columns*image->rows-1.0)*
((double) image->columns*image->rows);
standard_deviation=sqrt(area*standard_deviation*standard_deviation);
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation=standard_deviation;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].entropy+=
channel_statistics[i].entropy;
}
channels=3;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
channels++;
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
channels++;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].sum/=channels;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].sum_squared/=channels;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].sum_cubed/=channels;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].sum_fourth_power/=channels;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean/=channels;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].kurtosis/=channels;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].skewness/=channels;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].entropy/=channels;
i=CompositeChannels;
area=PerceptibleReciprocal((double) channels*image->columns*image->rows);
channel_statistics[i].variance=channel_statistics[i].sum_squared;
channel_statistics[i].mean=channel_statistics[i].sum;
standard_deviation=sqrt(channel_statistics[i].variance-
(channel_statistics[i].mean*channel_statistics[i].mean));
standard_deviation=sqrt(PerceptibleReciprocal((double) channels*
image->columns*image->rows-1.0)*channels*image->columns*image->rows*
standard_deviation*standard_deviation);
channel_statistics[i].standard_deviation=standard_deviation;
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) CompositeChannels; i++)
{
/*
Compute kurtosis & skewness statistics.
*/
standard_deviation=PerceptibleReciprocal(
channel_statistics[i].standard_deviation);
channel_statistics[i].skewness=(channel_statistics[i].sum_cubed-3.0*
channel_statistics[i].mean*channel_statistics[i].sum_squared+2.0*
channel_statistics[i].mean*channel_statistics[i].mean*
channel_statistics[i].mean)*(standard_deviation*standard_deviation*
standard_deviation);
channel_statistics[i].kurtosis=(channel_statistics[i].sum_fourth_power-4.0*
channel_statistics[i].mean*channel_statistics[i].sum_cubed+6.0*
channel_statistics[i].mean*channel_statistics[i].mean*
channel_statistics[i].sum_squared-3.0*channel_statistics[i].mean*
channel_statistics[i].mean*1.0*channel_statistics[i].mean*
channel_statistics[i].mean)*(standard_deviation*standard_deviation*
standard_deviation*standard_deviation)-3.0;
}
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean=0.0;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation=0.0;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) CompositeChannels; i++)
{
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean+=
channel_statistics[i].mean;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation+=
channel_statistics[i].standard_deviation;
}
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].mean/=(double) channels;
channel_statistics[CompositeChannels].standard_deviation/=(double) channels;
histogram=(MagickPixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(histogram);
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows)
channel_statistics=(ChannelStatistics *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
channel_statistics);
return(channel_statistics);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GahpClient::gt4_gram_client_job_start(const char * job_contact)
{
static const char* command = "GT4_GRAM_JOB_START";
if (server->m_commands_supported->contains_anycase(command)==FALSE) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (!job_contact) job_contact=NULLSTRING;
std::string reqline;
int x = sprintf(reqline,"%s",escapeGahpString(job_contact));
ASSERT( x > 0 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command,buf,normal_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command,buf);
if ( result ) {
if (result->argc != 3) {
EXCEPT("Bad %s Result",command);
}
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
if ( strcasecmp(result->argv[2], NULLSTRING) ) {
error_string = result->argv[2];
} else {
error_string = "";
}
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLvoid StubGLDeleteFramebuffers(GLsizei n, const GLuint* framebuffers) {
glDeleteFramebuffersEXT(n, framebuffers);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 99,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: openssl_callback_ignore_crls(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
{
if (!ok) {
switch (ctx->error) {
case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
return ok;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStripModel::NotifyIfActiveTabChanged(TabContents* old_contents,
NotifyTypes notify_types) {
TabContents* new_contents = GetTabContentsAtImpl(active_index());
if (old_contents != new_contents) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
ActiveTabChanged(old_contents, new_contents,
active_index(),
notify_types == NOTIFY_USER_GESTURE));
contents_data_[active_index()]->discarded = false;
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
{
if (u < SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS)
return (&(ssl3_ciphers[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS - 1 - u]));
else
return (NULL);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,690 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SMB2_get_srv_num(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid, __le64 *uniqueid)
{
return query_info(xid, tcon, persistent_fid, volatile_fid,
FILE_INTERNAL_INFORMATION, SMB2_O_INFO_FILE, 0,
sizeof(struct smb2_file_internal_info),
sizeof(struct smb2_file_internal_info),
(void **)&uniqueid, NULL);
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,073 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Vector<String> ParseAcceptAttribute(const String& accept_string,
bool (*predicate)(const String&)) {
Vector<String> types;
if (accept_string.IsEmpty())
return types;
Vector<String> split_types;
accept_string.Split(',', false, split_types);
for (const String& split_type : split_types) {
String trimmed_type = StripLeadingAndTrailingHTMLSpaces(split_type);
if (trimmed_type.IsEmpty())
continue;
if (!predicate(trimmed_type))
continue;
types.push_back(trimmed_type.DeprecatedLower());
}
return types;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_xdr_enc_close(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs_closeargs *args)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
encode_close(xdr, args, &hdr);
encode_getfattr(xdr, args->bitmask, &hdr);
encode_nops(&hdr);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::CreateNewFullscreenWidget(int route_id) {
delegate_->CreateNewFullscreenWidget(route_id);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::DidChangeValueInTextField(
HTMLFormControlElement& element) {
Document& doc = element.GetDocument();
if (auto* fill_client = AutofillClientFromFrame(doc.GetFrame()))
fill_client->TextFieldDidChange(WebFormControlElement(&element));
UseCounter::Count(doc, doc.IsSecureContext()
? WebFeature::kFieldEditInSecureContext
: WebFeature::kFieldEditInNonSecureContext);
doc.MaybeQueueSendDidEditFieldInInsecureContext();
web_view_->PageImportanceSignals()->SetHadFormInteraction();
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 150,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned lodepng_add_text(LodePNGInfo* info, const char* key, const char* str)
{
char** new_keys = (char**)(realloc(info->text_keys, sizeof(char*) * (info->text_num + 1)));
char** new_strings = (char**)(realloc(info->text_strings, sizeof(char*) * (info->text_num + 1)));
if(!new_keys || !new_strings)
{
free(new_keys);
free(new_strings);
return 83; /*alloc fail*/
}
info->text_num++;
info->text_keys = new_keys;
info->text_strings = new_strings;
string_init(&info->text_keys[info->text_num - 1]);
string_set(&info->text_keys[info->text_num - 1], key);
string_init(&info->text_strings[info->text_num - 1]);
string_set(&info->text_strings[info->text_num - 1], str);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::ExposeInterfacesToRenderer(
service_manager::BinderRegistry* registry,
blink::AssociatedInterfaceRegistry* associated_registry,
content::RenderProcessHost* render_process_host) {
associated_registry->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&CacheStatsRecorder::Create, render_process_host->GetID()));
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> ui_task_runner =
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits(
{content::BrowserThread::UI});
registry->AddInterface(
base::Bind(&rappor::RapporRecorderImpl::Create,
g_browser_process->rappor_service()),
ui_task_runner);
registry->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&metrics::CallStackProfileCollector::Create));
if (NetBenchmarking::CheckBenchmarkingEnabled()) {
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(render_process_host->GetBrowserContext());
auto* loading_predictor =
predictors::LoadingPredictorFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
registry->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(
&NetBenchmarking::Create,
loading_predictor ? loading_predictor->GetWeakPtr() : nullptr,
render_process_host->GetID()),
ui_task_runner);
}
#if defined(SAFE_BROWSING_DB_LOCAL) || defined(SAFE_BROWSING_DB_REMOTE)
if (safe_browsing_service_) {
content::ResourceContext* resource_context =
render_process_host->GetBrowserContext()->GetResourceContext();
registry->AddInterface(
base::Bind(
&safe_browsing::MojoSafeBrowsingImpl::MaybeCreate,
render_process_host->GetID(), resource_context,
base::Bind(
&ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetSafeBrowsingUrlCheckerDelegate,
base::Unretained(this), resource_context)),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::IO}));
}
#endif // defined(SAFE_BROWSING_DB_LOCAL) || defined(SAFE_BROWSING_DB_REMOTE)
if (data_reduction_proxy::params::IsEnabledWithNetworkService()) {
registry->AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&AddDataReductionProxyBinding,
render_process_host->GetBrowserContext()->GetResourceContext()));
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
auto get_process = base::BindRepeating(
[](content::RenderProcessHost* host) -> base::Process {
return host->GetProcess().Duplicate();
},
base::Unretained(render_process_host));
registry->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&ModuleEventSinkImpl::Create, std::move(get_process),
content::PROCESS_TYPE_RENDERER,
base::Unretained(ModuleDatabase::GetInstance())),
ui_task_runner);
#endif
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(render_process_host->GetBrowserContext());
registry->AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&android::AvailableOfflineContentProvider::Create,
profile),
base::CreateSingleThreadTaskRunnerWithTraits({BrowserThread::UI}));
#endif
for (auto* ep : extra_parts_) {
ep->ExposeInterfacesToRenderer(registry, associated_registry,
render_process_host);
}
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 152,374 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8ContextNativeHandler::GetAvailability(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK_EQ(args.Length(), 1);
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
std::string api_name = *v8::String::Utf8Value(args[0]);
Feature::Availability availability = context_->GetAvailability(api_name);
v8::Local<v8::Object> ret = v8::Object::New(isolate);
ret->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "is_available"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, availability.is_available()));
ret->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "message"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, availability.message().c_str()));
ret->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "result"),
v8::Integer::New(isolate, availability.result()));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(ret);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hidp_stop(struct hid_device *hid)
{
struct hidp_session *session = hid->driver_data;
skb_queue_purge(&session->ctrl_transmit);
skb_queue_purge(&session->intr_transmit);
hid->claimed = 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 33,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue Notification::data(ScriptState* scriptState)
{
if (m_developerData.isEmpty()) {
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> serializedValue;
const WebVector<char>& serializedData = m_data.data;
if (serializedData.size())
serializedValue = SerializedScriptValueFactory::instance().createFromWireBytes(serializedData.data(), serializedData.size());
else
serializedValue = SerializedScriptValueFactory::instance().create();
m_developerData = ScriptValue(scriptState, serializedValue->deserialize(scriptState->isolate()));
}
return m_developerData;
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | 0 | 119,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u8* h264bsdGetRefPicData(dpbStorage_t *dpb, u32 index)
{
/* Variables */
/* Code */
if(index > 16 || dpb->list[index] == NULL)
return(NULL);
else if(!IS_EXISTING(*dpb->list[index]))
return(NULL);
else
return(dpb->list[index]->data);
}
Commit Message: Fix potential overflow
Bug: 28533562
Change-Id: I798ab24caa4c81f3ba564cad7c9ee019284fb702
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,585 |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.