instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPluginDelegateProxy::OnAcceleratedPluginEnabledRendering() {
uses_compositor_ = true;
OnSetWindow(gfx::kNullPluginWindow);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc(virConnectPtr conn, const char *file,
unsigned int flags)
{
VIR_DEBUG("conn=%p, file=%s, flags=%x",
conn, NULLSTR(file), flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckConnectReturn(conn, NULL);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(file, error);
if ((conn->flags & VIR_CONNECT_RO) && (flags & VIR_DOMAIN_XML_SECURE)) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED, "%s",
_("virDomainSaveImageGetXMLDesc with secure flag"));
goto error;
}
if (conn->driver->domainSaveImageGetXMLDesc) {
char *ret;
char *absolute_file;
/* We must absolutize the file path as the read is done out of process */
if (virFileAbsPath(file, &absolute_file) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("could not build absolute input file path"));
goto error;
}
ret = conn->driver->domainSaveImageGetXMLDesc(conn, absolute_file,
flags);
VIR_FREE(absolute_file);
if (!ret)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(conn);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_encode_table_config(enum ofputil_table_miss miss,
enum ofputil_table_eviction eviction,
enum ofputil_table_vacancy vacancy,
enum ofp_version version)
{
uint32_t config = 0;
/* Search for "OFPTC_* Table Configuration" in the documentation for more
* information on the crazy evolution of this field. */
switch (version) {
case OFP10_VERSION:
/* OpenFlow 1.0 didn't have such a field, any value ought to do. */
return htonl(0);
case OFP11_VERSION:
case OFP12_VERSION:
/* OpenFlow 1.1 and 1.2 define only OFPTC11_TABLE_MISS_*. */
switch (miss) {
case OFPUTIL_TABLE_MISS_DEFAULT:
/* Really this shouldn't be used for encoding (the caller should
* provide a specific value) but I can't imagine that defaulting to
* the fall-through case here will hurt. */
case OFPUTIL_TABLE_MISS_CONTROLLER:
default:
return htonl(OFPTC11_TABLE_MISS_CONTROLLER);
case OFPUTIL_TABLE_MISS_CONTINUE:
return htonl(OFPTC11_TABLE_MISS_CONTINUE);
case OFPUTIL_TABLE_MISS_DROP:
return htonl(OFPTC11_TABLE_MISS_DROP);
}
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
case OFP13_VERSION:
/* OpenFlow 1.3 removed OFPTC11_TABLE_MISS_* and didn't define any new
* flags, so this is correct. */
return htonl(0);
case OFP14_VERSION:
case OFP15_VERSION:
case OFP16_VERSION:
/* OpenFlow 1.4 introduced OFPTC14_EVICTION and
* OFPTC14_VACANCY_EVENTS. */
if (eviction == OFPUTIL_TABLE_EVICTION_ON) {
config |= OFPTC14_EVICTION;
}
if (vacancy == OFPUTIL_TABLE_VACANCY_ON) {
config |= OFPTC14_VACANCY_EVENTS;
}
return htonl(config);
}
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dns_send_query(struct dns_resolution *resolution)
{
struct dns_resolvers *resolvers = resolution->resolvers;
struct dns_nameserver *ns;
list_for_each_entry(ns, &resolvers->nameservers, list) {
int fd = ns->dgram->t.sock.fd;
if (fd == -1) {
if (dns_connect_namesaver(ns) == -1)
continue;
fd = ns->dgram->t.sock.fd;
resolvers->nb_nameservers++;
}
fd_want_send(fd);
}
/* Update resolution */
resolution->nb_queries = 0;
resolution->nb_responses = 0;
resolution->last_query = now_ms;
/* Push the resolution at the end of the active list */
LIST_DEL(&resolution->list);
LIST_ADDQ(&resolvers->resolutions.curr, &resolution->list);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void netif_device_detach(struct net_device *dev)
{
if (test_and_clear_bit(__LINK_STATE_PRESENT, &dev->state) &&
netif_running(dev)) {
netif_tx_stop_all_queues(dev);
}
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zip_read_data_zipx_xz(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff,
size_t *size, int64_t *offset)
{
struct zip* zip = (struct zip *)(a->format->data);
int ret;
lzma_ret lz_ret;
const void* compressed_buf;
ssize_t bytes_avail, in_bytes, to_consume = 0;
(void) offset; /* UNUSED */
/* Initialize decompressor if not yet initialized. */
if (!zip->decompress_init) {
ret = zipx_xz_init(a, zip);
if (ret != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ret);
}
compressed_buf = __archive_read_ahead(a, 1, &bytes_avail);
if (bytes_avail < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Truncated xz file body");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
in_bytes = zipmin(zip->entry_bytes_remaining, bytes_avail);
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.next_in = compressed_buf;
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.avail_in = in_bytes;
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.total_in = 0;
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.next_out = zip->uncompressed_buffer;
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.avail_out = zip->uncompressed_buffer_size;
zip->zipx_lzma_stream.total_out = 0;
/* Perform the decompression. */
lz_ret = lzma_code(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream, LZMA_RUN);
switch(lz_ret) {
case LZMA_DATA_ERROR:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"xz data error (error %d)", (int) lz_ret);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
case LZMA_NO_CHECK:
case LZMA_OK:
break;
default:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"xz unknown error %d", (int) lz_ret);
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
case LZMA_STREAM_END:
lzma_end(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream);
zip->zipx_lzma_valid = 0;
if((int64_t) zip->zipx_lzma_stream.total_in !=
zip->entry_bytes_remaining)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"xz premature end of stream");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
zip->end_of_entry = 1;
break;
}
to_consume = zip->zipx_lzma_stream.total_in;
__archive_read_consume(a, to_consume);
zip->entry_bytes_remaining -= to_consume;
zip->entry_compressed_bytes_read += to_consume;
zip->entry_uncompressed_bytes_read += zip->zipx_lzma_stream.total_out;
*size = zip->zipx_lzma_stream.total_out;
*buff = zip->uncompressed_buffer;
ret = consume_optional_marker(a, zip);
if (ret != ARCHIVE_OK)
return (ret);
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fix typo in preprocessor macro in archive_read_format_zip_cleanup()
Frees lzma_stream on cleanup()
Fixes #1165
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 90,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ConfirmInfoBar::Layout() {
InfoBarView::Layout();
int x = StartX();
Labels labels;
labels.push_back(label_);
labels.push_back(link_);
AssignWidths(&labels, std::max(0, EndX() - x - NonLabelWidth()));
ChromeLayoutProvider* layout_provider = ChromeLayoutProvider::Get();
label_->SetPosition(gfx::Point(x, OffsetY(label_)));
if (!label_->text().empty())
x = label_->bounds().right() +
layout_provider->GetDistanceMetric(
views::DISTANCE_RELATED_LABEL_HORIZONTAL);
if (ok_button_) {
ok_button_->SetPosition(gfx::Point(x, OffsetY(ok_button_)));
x = ok_button_->bounds().right() +
layout_provider->GetDistanceMetric(
views::DISTANCE_RELATED_BUTTON_HORIZONTAL);
}
if (cancel_button_)
cancel_button_->SetPosition(gfx::Point(x, OffsetY(cancel_button_)));
link_->SetPosition(gfx::Point(EndX() - link_->width(), OffsetY(link_)));
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionApiTest::SetUpOnMainThread() {
ExtensionBrowserTest::SetUpOnMainThread();
DCHECK(!test_config_.get()) << "Previous test did not clear config state.";
test_config_.reset(new base::DictionaryValue());
test_config_->SetString(kTestDataDirectory,
net::FilePathToFileURL(test_data_dir_).spec());
if (embedded_test_server()->Started()) {
test_config_->SetInteger(kEmbeddedTestServerPort,
embedded_test_server()->port());
}
test_config_->SetBoolean(
kNativeCrxBindingsEnabled,
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(extensions_features::kNativeCrxBindings));
TestGetConfigFunction::set_test_config_state(test_config_.get());
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 151,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_mainbar () {
GUI *g = &uzbl.gui;
g->mainbar = gtk_hbox_new (FALSE, 0);
g->mainbar_label = gtk_label_new ("");
gtk_label_set_selectable((GtkLabel *)g->mainbar_label, TRUE);
gtk_label_set_ellipsize(GTK_LABEL(g->mainbar_label), PANGO_ELLIPSIZE_END);
gtk_misc_set_alignment (GTK_MISC(g->mainbar_label), 0, 0);
gtk_misc_set_padding (GTK_MISC(g->mainbar_label), 2, 2);
gtk_box_pack_start (GTK_BOX (g->mainbar), g->mainbar_label, TRUE, TRUE, 0);
g_object_connect((GObject*)g->mainbar,
"signal::key-press-event", (GCallback)key_press_cb, NULL,
"signal::key-release-event", (GCallback)key_release_cb, NULL,
NULL);
return g->mainbar;
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool SniffCRX(const char* content,
size_t size,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& type_hint,
bool* have_enough_content,
std::string* result) {
static const struct MagicNumber kCRXMagicNumbers[] = {
MAGIC_NUMBER("application/x-chrome-extension", "Cr24\x02\x00\x00\x00")
};
if (!base::EndsWith(url.path_piece(), ".crx", base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE))
return false;
*have_enough_content &= TruncateSize(kBytesRequiredForMagic, &size);
return CheckForMagicNumbers(content, size, kCRXMagicNumbers,
arraysize(kCRXMagicNumbers), result);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol"
This reverts commit 3519e867dc606437f804561f889d7ed95b95876a.
Reason for revert: crbug.com/786150. Application compatibility for Android WebView applications means we need to allow sniffing on that platform.
Original change's description:
> Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol
>
> To reduce attack surface, Chrome should not MIME-sniff to text/html for
> any document delivered via the file protocol. This change only impacts
> the file protocol (documents served via HTTP/HTTPS/etc are unaffected).
>
> Bug: 777737
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
> Change-Id: I7086454356b8d2d092be9e1bca0f5ff6dd3b62c0
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/751402
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Achuith Bhandarkar <achuith@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Asanka Herath <asanka@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514372}
TBR=achuith@chromium.org,benwells@chromium.org,mmenke@chromium.org,sdefresne@chromium.org,asanka@chromium.org,elawrence@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 777737
Change-Id: I864ae060ce3277d41ea257ae75e0b80c51f3ea98
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/790790
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519347}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 148,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileAPIMessageFilter::OnCloneBlob(
const GURL& url, const GURL& src_url) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
blob_storage_context_->controller()->CloneBlob(url, src_url);
blob_urls_.insert(url.spec());
}
Commit Message: File permission fix: now we selectively grant read permission for Sandboxed files
We also need to check the read permission and call GrantReadFile() for
sandboxed files for CreateSnapshotFile().
BUG=162114
TEST=manual
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11280231
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@170181 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 119,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& HTMLLinkElement::Rel() const {
return getAttribute(relAttr);
}
Commit Message: Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
R=futhark@chromium.org
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 143,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteJNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter WriteJNGImage()");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
if ((image->columns > 65535UL) || (image->rows > 65535UL))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
/*
Allocate a MngInfo structure.
*/
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngInfo));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize members of the MngInfo structure.
*/
(void) memset(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
(void) WriteBlob(image,8,(const unsigned char *) "\213JNG\r\n\032\n");
status=WriteOneJNGImage(mng_info,image_info,image);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
(void) CatchImageException(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit WriteJNGImage()");
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1119
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_int32_info (WavpackStream *wps, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
int bytecnt = wpmd->byte_length;
char *byteptr = (char *)wpmd->data;
if (bytecnt != 4)
return FALSE;
wps->int32_sent_bits = *byteptr++;
wps->int32_zeros = *byteptr++;
wps->int32_ones = *byteptr++;
wps->int32_dups = *byteptr;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: issue #54: fix potential out-of-bounds heap read
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_NEQ( INS_ARG )
{
DO_NEQ
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChromeClientImpl::statusbarVisible()
{
return m_statusbarVisible;
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 118,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void preempt_latency_stop(int val) { }
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __net_exit default_device_exit_batch(struct list_head *net_list)
{
/* At exit all network devices most be removed from a network
* namespace. Do this in the reverse order of registeration.
* Do this across as many network namespaces as possible to
* improve batching efficiency.
*/
struct net_device *dev;
struct net *net;
LIST_HEAD(dev_kill_list);
rtnl_lock();
list_for_each_entry(net, net_list, exit_list) {
for_each_netdev_reverse(net, dev) {
if (dev->rtnl_link_ops)
dev->rtnl_link_ops->dellink(dev, &dev_kill_list);
else
unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, &dev_kill_list);
}
}
unregister_netdevice_many(&dev_kill_list);
rtnl_unlock();
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ecryptfs_put_lower_file(struct inode *inode)
{
struct ecryptfs_inode_info *inode_info;
inode_info = ecryptfs_inode_to_private(inode);
if (atomic_dec_and_mutex_lock(&inode_info->lower_file_count,
&inode_info->lower_file_mutex)) {
filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
fput(inode_info->lower_file);
inode_info->lower_file = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&inode_info->lower_file_mutex);
}
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 74,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidCreateWebSocket(Document* document,
unsigned long identifier,
const KURL& request_url,
const String&) {
std::unique_ptr<v8_inspector::protocol::Runtime::API::StackTrace>
current_stack_trace =
SourceLocation::Capture(document)->BuildInspectorObject();
if (!current_stack_trace) {
GetFrontend()->webSocketCreated(
IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier),
UrlWithoutFragment(request_url).GetString());
return;
}
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Initiator> initiator_object =
protocol::Network::Initiator::create()
.setType(protocol::Network::Initiator::TypeEnum::Script)
.build();
initiator_object->setStack(std::move(current_stack_trace));
GetFrontend()->webSocketCreated(IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier),
UrlWithoutFragment(request_url).GetString(),
std::move(initiator_object));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::setPreventsScreenDimming(bool keepAwake)
{
if (keepAwake) {
if (!m_preventIdleDimmingCount)
m_client->setPreventsScreenIdleDimming(true);
m_preventIdleDimmingCount++;
} else if (m_preventIdleDimmingCount > 0) {
m_preventIdleDimmingCount--;
if (!m_preventIdleDimmingCount)
m_client->setPreventsScreenIdleDimming(false);
} else
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED(); // SetPreventsScreenIdleDimming(false) called too many times.
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,415
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PermissionsGetAllFunction::RunImpl() {
scoped_ptr<Permissions> permissions =
helpers::PackPermissionSet(GetExtension()->GetActivePermissions());
results_ = GetAll::Results::Create(*permissions);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGenSharedIdsCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::GenSharedIdsCHROMIUM& c) {
GLuint namespace_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.namespace_id);
GLuint id_offset = static_cast<GLuint>(c.id_offset);
GLsizei n = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.n);
uint32 data_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(n, sizeof(GLuint), &data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
GLuint* ids = GetSharedMemoryAs<GLuint*>(
c.ids_shm_id, c.ids_shm_offset, data_size);
if (n < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "GenSharedIdsCHROMIUM", "n < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (ids == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DoGenSharedIdsCHROMIUM(namespace_id, id_offset, n, ids);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ospf6_print_lsa(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct lsa6 *lsap, const u_char *dataend)
{
register const struct rlalink6 *rlp;
#if 0
register const struct tos_metric *tosp;
#endif
register const rtrid_t *ap;
#if 0
register const struct aslametric *almp;
register const struct mcla *mcp;
#endif
register const struct llsa *llsap;
register const struct lsa6_prefix *lsapp;
#if 0
register const uint32_t *lp;
#endif
register u_int prefixes;
register int bytelen;
register u_int length, lsa_length;
uint32_t flags32;
const uint8_t *tptr;
if (ospf6_print_lshdr(ndo, &lsap->ls_hdr, dataend))
return (1);
ND_TCHECK(lsap->ls_hdr.ls_length);
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(&lsap->ls_hdr.ls_length);
/*
* The LSA length includes the length of the header;
* it must have a value that's at least that length.
* If it does, find the length of what follows the
* header.
*/
if (length < sizeof(struct lsa6_hdr) || (const u_char *)lsap + length > dataend)
return (1);
lsa_length = length - sizeof(struct lsa6_hdr);
tptr = (const uint8_t *)lsap+sizeof(struct lsa6_hdr);
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&lsap->ls_hdr.ls_type)) {
case LS_TYPE_ROUTER | LS_SCOPE_AREA:
if (lsa_length < sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_rla.rla_options))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_rla.rla_options);
ND_TCHECK(lsap->lsa_un.un_rla.rla_options);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Options [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_option_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&lsap->lsa_un.un_rla.rla_options))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RLA-Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_rla_flag_values, "none",
lsap->lsa_un.un_rla.rla_flags)));
rlp = lsap->lsa_un.un_rla.rla_link;
while (lsa_length != 0) {
if (lsa_length < sizeof (*rlp))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (*rlp);
ND_TCHECK(*rlp);
switch (rlp->link_type) {
case RLA_TYPE_VIRTUAL:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Virtual Link: Neighbor Router-ID %s"
"\n\t Neighbor Interface-ID %s, Interface %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &rlp->link_nrtid),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &rlp->link_nifid),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &rlp->link_ifid)));
break;
case RLA_TYPE_ROUTER:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor Router-ID %s"
"\n\t Neighbor Interface-ID %s, Interface %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &rlp->link_nrtid),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &rlp->link_nifid),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &rlp->link_ifid)));
break;
case RLA_TYPE_TRANSIT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Neighbor Network-ID %s"
"\n\t Neighbor Interface-ID %s, Interface %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &rlp->link_nrtid),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &rlp->link_nifid),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &rlp->link_ifid)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Unknown Router Links Type 0x%02x",
rlp->link_type));
return (0);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(&rlp->link_metric)));
rlp++;
}
break;
case LS_TYPE_NETWORK | LS_SCOPE_AREA:
if (lsa_length < sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_nla.nla_options))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_nla.nla_options);
ND_TCHECK(lsap->lsa_un.un_nla.nla_options);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Options [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_option_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&lsap->lsa_un.un_nla.nla_options))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Connected Routers:"));
ap = lsap->lsa_un.un_nla.nla_router;
while (lsa_length != 0) {
if (lsa_length < sizeof (*ap))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (*ap);
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ap)));
++ap;
}
break;
case LS_TYPE_INTER_AP | LS_SCOPE_AREA:
if (lsa_length < sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_inter_ap.inter_ap_metric))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_inter_ap.inter_ap_metric);
ND_TCHECK(lsap->lsa_un.un_inter_ap.inter_ap_metric);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&lsap->lsa_un.un_inter_ap.inter_ap_metric) & SLA_MASK_METRIC));
tptr = (const uint8_t *)lsap->lsa_un.un_inter_ap.inter_ap_prefix;
while (lsa_length != 0) {
bytelen = ospf6_print_lsaprefix(ndo, tptr, lsa_length);
if (bytelen < 0)
goto trunc;
lsa_length -= bytelen;
tptr += bytelen;
}
break;
case LS_TYPE_ASE | LS_SCOPE_AS:
if (lsa_length < sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_asla.asla_metric))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_asla.asla_metric);
ND_TCHECK(lsap->lsa_un.un_asla.asla_metric);
flags32 = EXTRACT_32BITS(&lsap->lsa_un.un_asla.asla_metric);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_asla_flag_values, "none", flags32)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " metric %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&lsap->lsa_un.un_asla.asla_metric) &
ASLA_MASK_METRIC));
tptr = (const uint8_t *)lsap->lsa_un.un_asla.asla_prefix;
lsapp = (const struct lsa6_prefix *)tptr;
bytelen = ospf6_print_lsaprefix(ndo, tptr, lsa_length);
if (bytelen < 0)
goto trunc;
lsa_length -= bytelen;
tptr += bytelen;
if ((flags32 & ASLA_FLAG_FWDADDR) != 0) {
const struct in6_addr *fwdaddr6;
fwdaddr6 = (const struct in6_addr *)tptr;
if (lsa_length < sizeof (*fwdaddr6))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (*fwdaddr6);
ND_TCHECK(*fwdaddr6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " forward %s",
ip6addr_string(ndo, fwdaddr6)));
tptr += sizeof(*fwdaddr6);
}
if ((flags32 & ASLA_FLAG_ROUTETAG) != 0) {
if (lsa_length < sizeof (uint32_t))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (uint32_t);
ND_TCHECK(*(const uint32_t *)tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tag %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, (const uint32_t *)tptr)));
tptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
}
if (lsapp->lsa_p_metric) {
if (lsa_length < sizeof (uint32_t))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (uint32_t);
ND_TCHECK(*(const uint32_t *)tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RefLSID: %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, (const uint32_t *)tptr)));
tptr += sizeof(uint32_t);
}
break;
case LS_TYPE_LINK:
/* Link LSA */
llsap = &lsap->lsa_un.un_llsa;
if (lsa_length < sizeof (llsap->llsa_priandopt))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (llsap->llsa_priandopt);
ND_TCHECK(llsap->llsa_priandopt);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Options [%s]",
bittok2str(ospf6_option_values, "none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&llsap->llsa_options))));
if (lsa_length < sizeof (llsap->llsa_lladdr) + sizeof (llsap->llsa_nprefix))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (llsap->llsa_lladdr) + sizeof (llsap->llsa_nprefix);
ND_TCHECK(llsap->llsa_nprefix);
prefixes = EXTRACT_32BITS(&llsap->llsa_nprefix);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Priority %d, Link-local address %s, Prefixes %d:",
llsap->llsa_priority,
ip6addr_string(ndo, &llsap->llsa_lladdr),
prefixes));
tptr = (const uint8_t *)llsap->llsa_prefix;
while (prefixes > 0) {
bytelen = ospf6_print_lsaprefix(ndo, tptr, lsa_length);
if (bytelen < 0)
goto trunc;
prefixes--;
lsa_length -= bytelen;
tptr += bytelen;
}
break;
case LS_TYPE_INTRA_AP | LS_SCOPE_AREA:
/* Intra-Area-Prefix LSA */
if (lsa_length < sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_intra_ap.intra_ap_rtid))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_intra_ap.intra_ap_rtid);
ND_TCHECK(lsap->lsa_un.un_intra_ap.intra_ap_rtid);
ospf6_print_ls_type(ndo,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&lsap->lsa_un.un_intra_ap.intra_ap_lstype),
&lsap->lsa_un.un_intra_ap.intra_ap_lsid);
if (lsa_length < sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_intra_ap.intra_ap_nprefix))
return (1);
lsa_length -= sizeof (lsap->lsa_un.un_intra_ap.intra_ap_nprefix);
ND_TCHECK(lsap->lsa_un.un_intra_ap.intra_ap_nprefix);
prefixes = EXTRACT_16BITS(&lsap->lsa_un.un_intra_ap.intra_ap_nprefix);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Prefixes %d:", prefixes));
tptr = (const uint8_t *)lsap->lsa_un.un_intra_ap.intra_ap_prefix;
while (prefixes > 0) {
bytelen = ospf6_print_lsaprefix(ndo, tptr, lsa_length);
if (bytelen < 0)
goto trunc;
prefixes--;
lsa_length -= bytelen;
tptr += bytelen;
}
break;
case LS_TYPE_GRACE | LS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL:
if (ospf_print_grace_lsa(ndo, tptr, lsa_length) == -1) {
return 1;
}
break;
case LS_TYPE_INTRA_ATE | LS_SCOPE_LINKLOCAL:
if (ospf_print_te_lsa(ndo, tptr, lsa_length) == -1) {
return 1;
}
break;
default:
if(!print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr,
"\n\t ",
lsa_length)) {
return (1);
}
break;
}
return (0);
trunc:
return (1);
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14880/OSPFv3: Fix a bounds check
Need to test bounds check for the last field of the structure lsa6_hdr.
No need to test other fields.
Include Security working under the Mozilla SOS program had independently
identified this vulnerability in 2018 by means of code audit.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::PreviewsState ChromeContentBrowserClient::DetermineAllowedPreviews(
content::PreviewsState initial_state,
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle,
const GURL& current_navigation_url) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame() ||
navigation_handle->IsSameDocument()) {
return initial_state;
}
if (!current_navigation_url.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS()) {
return content::PREVIEWS_OFF;
}
content::WebContents* web_contents = navigation_handle->GetWebContents();
content::WebContentsDelegate* delegate = web_contents->GetDelegate();
auto* browser_context = web_contents->GetBrowserContext();
PreviewsService* previews_service = PreviewsServiceFactory::GetForProfile(
Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context));
auto* data_reduction_proxy_settings =
DataReductionProxyChromeSettingsFactory::GetForBrowserContext(
browser_context);
if (!previews_service || !previews_service->previews_ui_service() ||
!data_reduction_proxy_settings) {
return content::PREVIEWS_OFF;
}
PreviewsUITabHelper* ui_tab_helper =
PreviewsUITabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (!ui_tab_helper)
return content::PREVIEWS_OFF;
DCHECK(!browser_context->IsOffTheRecord());
previews::PreviewsDeciderImpl* previews_decider_impl =
previews_service->previews_ui_service()->previews_decider_impl();
DCHECK(previews_decider_impl);
content::PreviewsState previews_state = content::PREVIEWS_UNSPECIFIED;
previews::PreviewsUserData* previews_data =
ui_tab_helper->GetPreviewsUserData(navigation_handle);
bool is_redirect = false;
if (previews_data) {
is_redirect = !previews_data->server_lite_page_info();
} else {
previews_data = ui_tab_helper->CreatePreviewsUserDataForNavigationHandle(
navigation_handle, previews_decider_impl->GeneratePageId());
}
DCHECK(previews_data);
bool is_reload =
navigation_handle->GetReloadType() != content::ReloadType::NONE;
content::PreviewsState server_previews_enabled_state =
content::SERVER_LOFI_ON | content::SERVER_LITE_PAGE_ON;
if (is_redirect) {
previews_state |= (previews_data->allowed_previews_state() &
server_previews_enabled_state);
} else {
if (previews_decider_impl->ShouldAllowPreviewAtNavigationStart(
previews_data, current_navigation_url, is_reload,
previews::PreviewsType::LITE_PAGE)) {
previews_state |= server_previews_enabled_state;
}
}
previews_state |= previews::DetermineAllowedClientPreviewsState(
previews_data, current_navigation_url, is_reload, is_redirect,
data_reduction_proxy_settings->IsDataReductionProxyEnabled(),
previews_decider_impl);
if (previews_state & content::PREVIEWS_OFF) {
previews_data->set_allowed_previews_state(content::PREVIEWS_OFF);
return content::PREVIEWS_OFF;
}
if (previews_state & content::PREVIEWS_NO_TRANSFORM) {
previews_data->set_allowed_previews_state(content::PREVIEWS_NO_TRANSFORM);
return content::PREVIEWS_NO_TRANSFORM;
}
if (previews_state == content::PREVIEWS_UNSPECIFIED) {
previews_data->set_allowed_previews_state(content::PREVIEWS_OFF);
return content::PREVIEWS_OFF;
}
content::PreviewsState embedder_state = content::PREVIEWS_UNSPECIFIED;
if (delegate) {
delegate->AdjustPreviewsStateForNavigation(web_contents, &embedder_state);
}
if (embedder_state != content::PREVIEWS_UNSPECIFIED) {
previews_state = previews_state & embedder_state;
if (previews_state == content::PREVIEWS_UNSPECIFIED)
previews_state = content::PREVIEWS_OFF;
}
previews_data->set_allowed_previews_state(previews_state);
return previews_state;
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 152,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void CacheThru_put_string(HTStream *me, const char *str)
{
if (me->status == HT_OK) {
if (me->fp) {
fputs(str, me->fp);
} else if (me->chunk) {
me->last_chunk = HTChunkPuts2(me->last_chunk, str);
if (me->last_chunk == NULL || me->last_chunk->allocated == 0)
me->status = HT_ERROR;
}
}
(*me->actions->put_string) (me->target, str);
}
Commit Message: snapshot of project "lynx", label v2-8-9dev_15b
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 58,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
register_is_null(regs[regno]))
return 0;
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
regno, tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
slot = -(off + i) - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot ||
state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
STACK_MISC) {
verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: force strict alignment checks for stack pointers
Force strict alignment checks for stack pointers because the tracking of
stack spills relies on it; unaligned stack accesses can lead to corruption
of spilled registers, which is exploitable.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void remove_pidfile(const char *pid_file) {
if (pid_file == NULL)
return;
if (unlink(pid_file) != 0) {
vperror("Could not remove the pid file %s", pid_file);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,206
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NTSTATUS ZeroUnreadableSectors (PDEVICE_OBJECT deviceObject, LARGE_INTEGER startOffset, ULONG size, uint64 *zeroedSectorCount)
{
NTSTATUS status;
ULONG sectorSize;
ULONG sectorCount;
byte *sectorBuffer = NULL;
*zeroedSectorCount = 0;
status = GetDeviceSectorSize (deviceObject, §orSize);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
return status;
sectorBuffer = TCalloc (sectorSize);
if (!sectorBuffer)
return STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
for (sectorCount = size / sectorSize; sectorCount > 0; --sectorCount, startOffset.QuadPart += sectorSize)
{
status = TCReadDevice (deviceObject, sectorBuffer, startOffset, sectorSize);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
{
Dump ("Zeroing sector at %I64d\n", startOffset.QuadPart);
memset (sectorBuffer, 0, sectorSize);
status = TCWriteDevice (deviceObject, sectorBuffer, startOffset, sectorSize);
if (!NT_SUCCESS (status))
goto err;
++(*zeroedSectorCount);
}
}
status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
err:
if (sectorBuffer)
TCfree (sectorBuffer);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Windows: fix low severity vulnerability in driver that allowed reading 3 bytes of kernel stack memory (with a rare possibility of 25 additional bytes). Reported by Tim Harrison.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 87,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void efx_update_name(struct efx_nic *efx)
{
strcpy(efx->name, efx->net_dev->name);
efx_mtd_rename(efx);
efx_set_channel_names(efx);
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Document::visibilityState() const {
return PageHiddenStateString(hidden());
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 130,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SWFInput_getUInt32_BE(SWFInput input)
{
unsigned long num = SWFInput_getChar(input) << 24;
num += SWFInput_getChar(input) << 16;
num += SWFInput_getChar(input) << 8;
num += SWFInput_getChar(input);
return num;
}
Commit Message: Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 89,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void enabledAtRuntimeMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "enabledAtRuntimeMethod", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, longArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->enabledAtRuntimeMethod(longArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DownloadItem* CreateSlowTestDownload() {
std::unique_ptr<content::DownloadTestObserver> observer(
CreateInProgressDownloadObserver(1));
embedded_test_server()->RegisterRequestHandler(base::Bind(
&content::SlowDownloadHttpResponse::HandleSlowDownloadRequest));
EXPECT_TRUE(embedded_test_server()->Start());
GURL slow_download_url = embedded_test_server()->GetURL(
content::SlowDownloadHttpResponse::kKnownSizeUrl);
DownloadManager* manager = DownloadManagerForBrowser(browser());
EXPECT_EQ(0, manager->NonMaliciousInProgressCount());
EXPECT_EQ(0, manager->InProgressCount());
if (manager->InProgressCount() != 0)
return NULL;
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), slow_download_url);
observer->WaitForFinished();
EXPECT_EQ(1u, observer->NumDownloadsSeenInState(DownloadItem::IN_PROGRESS));
DownloadManager::DownloadVector items;
manager->GetAllDownloads(&items);
DownloadItem* new_item = NULL;
for (auto iter = items.begin(); iter != items.end(); ++iter) {
if ((*iter)->GetState() == DownloadItem::IN_PROGRESS) {
EXPECT_EQ(NULL, new_item);
new_item = *iter;
}
}
return new_item;
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 151,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SProcXvListImageFormats(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xvListImageFormatsReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xvListImageFormatsReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->port);
return XvProcVector[xv_ListImageFormats] (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,485
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void android_net_wifi_hal_cleaned_up_handler(wifi_handle handle) {
ALOGD("In wifi cleaned up handler");
JNIHelper helper(mVM);
helper.setStaticLongField(mCls, WifiHandleVarName, 0);
helper.deleteGlobalRef(mCls);
mCls = NULL;
mVM = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _nextA(int visited)
{
HmarkerList *hl = Currentbuf->hmarklist;
BufferPoint *po;
Anchor *an, *pan;
int i, x, y, n = searchKeyNum();
ParsedURL url;
if (Currentbuf->firstLine == NULL)
return;
if (!hl || hl->nmark == 0)
return;
an = retrieveCurrentAnchor(Currentbuf);
if (visited != TRUE && an == NULL)
an = retrieveCurrentForm(Currentbuf);
y = Currentbuf->currentLine->linenumber;
x = Currentbuf->pos;
if (visited == TRUE) {
n = hl->nmark;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
pan = an;
if (an && an->hseq >= 0) {
int hseq = an->hseq + 1;
do {
if (hseq >= hl->nmark) {
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
an = pan;
goto _end;
}
po = &hl->marks[hseq];
an = retrieveAnchor(Currentbuf->href, po->line, po->pos);
if (visited != TRUE && an == NULL)
an = retrieveAnchor(Currentbuf->formitem, po->line,
po->pos);
hseq++;
if (visited == TRUE && an) {
parseURL2(an->url, &url, baseURL(Currentbuf));
if (getHashHist(URLHist, parsedURL2Str(&url)->ptr)) {
goto _end;
}
}
} while (an == NULL || an == pan);
}
else {
an = closest_next_anchor(Currentbuf->href, NULL, x, y);
if (visited != TRUE)
an = closest_next_anchor(Currentbuf->formitem, an, x, y);
if (an == NULL) {
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
an = pan;
break;
}
x = an->start.pos;
y = an->start.line;
if (visited == TRUE) {
parseURL2(an->url, &url, baseURL(Currentbuf));
if (getHashHist(URLHist, parsedURL2Str(&url)->ptr)) {
goto _end;
}
}
}
}
if (visited == TRUE)
return;
_end:
if (an == NULL || an->hseq < 0)
return;
po = &hl->marks[an->hseq];
gotoLine(Currentbuf, po->line);
Currentbuf->pos = po->pos;
arrangeCursor(Currentbuf);
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_NORMAL);
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 84,460
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Automation::ExecuteScript(int tab_id,
const FramePath& frame_path,
const std::string& script,
std::string* result,
Error** error) {
int windex = 0, tab_index = 0;
*error = GetIndicesForTab(tab_id, &windex, &tab_index);
if (*error)
return;
Value* unscoped_value;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendExecuteJavascriptJSONRequest(automation(), windex, tab_index,
frame_path.value(), script,
&unscoped_value, &error_msg)) {
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
return;
}
scoped_ptr<Value> value(unscoped_value);
if (!value->GetAsString(result))
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, "Execute script did not return string");
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int verify_aead(struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD];
struct xfrm_algo_aead *algp;
if (!rt)
return 0;
algp = nla_data(rt);
if (nla_len(rt) < aead_len(algp))
return -EINVAL;
algp->alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME - 1] = '\0';
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 33,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _regulator_enable_delay(unsigned int delay)
{
unsigned int ms = delay / 1000;
unsigned int us = delay % 1000;
if (ms > 0) {
/*
* For small enough values, handle super-millisecond
* delays in the usleep_range() call below.
*/
if (ms < 20)
us += ms * 1000;
else
msleep(ms);
}
/*
* Give the scheduler some room to coalesce with any other
* wakeup sources. For delays shorter than 10 us, don't even
* bother setting up high-resolution timers and just busy-
* loop.
*/
if (us >= 10)
usleep_range(us, us + 100);
else
udelay(us);
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 74,455
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::MediaQueryAffectingValueChanged() {
GetStyleEngine().MediaQueryAffectingValueChanged();
if (NeedsLayoutTreeUpdate())
evaluate_media_queries_on_style_recalc_ = true;
else
EvaluateMediaQueryList();
probe::mediaQueryResultChanged(this);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: htmlParseHTMLName_nonInvasive(htmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int i = 0;
xmlChar loc[HTML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE];
if (!IS_ASCII_LETTER(NXT(1)) && (NXT(1) != '_') &&
(NXT(1) != ':')) return(NULL);
while ((i < HTML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE) &&
((IS_ASCII_LETTER(NXT(1+i))) || (IS_ASCII_DIGIT(NXT(1+i))) ||
(NXT(1+i) == ':') || (NXT(1+i) == '-') || (NXT(1+i) == '_'))) {
if ((NXT(1+i) >= 'A') && (NXT(1+i) <= 'Z')) loc[i] = NXT(1+i) + 0x20;
else loc[i] = NXT(1+i);
i++;
}
return(xmlDictLookup(ctxt->dict, loc, i));
}
Commit Message: Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <scottmg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <dominicc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 150,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, unserialize)
{
spl_dllist_object *intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
zval *flags, *elem;
char *buf;
size_t buf_len;
const unsigned char *p, *s;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &buf, &buf_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (buf_len == 0) {
return;
}
s = p = (const unsigned char*)buf;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
/* flags */
flags = var_tmp_var(&var_hash);
if (!php_var_unserialize(flags, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash) || Z_TYPE_P(flags) != IS_LONG) {
goto error;
}
intern->flags = (int)Z_LVAL_P(flags);
/* elements */
while(*p == ':') {
++p;
elem = var_tmp_var(&var_hash);
if (!php_var_unserialize(elem, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash)) {
goto error;
}
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, elem);
spl_ptr_llist_push(intern->llist, elem);
}
if (*p != '\0') {
goto error;
}
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return;
error:
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0, "Error at offset %pd of %d bytes", (zend_long)((char*)p - buf), buf_len);
return;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplDoublyLinkedList::add(mixed index, mixed newval)
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 54,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ScrollHitTestDisplayItem::Equals(const DisplayItem& other) const {
return DisplayItem::Equals(other) &&
&scroll_node() ==
&static_cast<const ScrollHitTestDisplayItem&>(other).scroll_node();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static RELOC_PTRS_WITH(dc_colored_masked_reloc_ptrs, gx_device_color *cptr)
{
RELOC_SUPER(gx_device_color, st_client_color, ccolor);
if (cptr->colors.colored.c_ht != 0) {
RELOC_PTR(gx_device_color, colors.colored.c_ht);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 1,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LocalFrame& GetFrame() const { return dummy_page_holder_->GetFrame(); }
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,836
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorTraceEvents::Init(CoreProbeSink* instrumenting_agents,
protocol::UberDispatcher*,
protocol::DictionaryValue*) {
instrumenting_agents_ = instrumenting_agents;
instrumenting_agents_->addInspectorTraceEvents(this);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XineramaPointInWindowIsVisible(WindowPtr pWin, int x, int y)
{
BoxRec box;
int i, xoff, yoff;
if (!pWin->realized)
return FALSE;
if (RegionContainsPoint(&pWin->borderClip, x, y, &box))
return TRUE;
if (!XineramaSetWindowPntrs(inputInfo.pointer, pWin))
return FALSE;
xoff = x + screenInfo.screens[0]->x;
yoff = y + screenInfo.screens[0]->y;
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD_SKIP(i) {
pWin = inputInfo.pointer->spriteInfo->sprite->windows[i];
x = xoff - screenInfo.screens[i]->x;
y = yoff - screenInfo.screens[i]->y;
if (RegionContainsPoint(&pWin->borderClip, x, y, &box)
&& (!wInputShape(pWin) ||
RegionContainsPoint(wInputShape(pWin),
x - pWin->drawable.x,
y - pWin->drawable.y, &box)))
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 get_coherent_dma_mask(struct device *dev)
{
u64 mask = (u64)arm_dma_limit;
if (dev) {
mask = dev->coherent_dma_mask;
/*
* Sanity check the DMA mask - it must be non-zero, and
* must be able to be satisfied by a DMA allocation.
*/
if (mask == 0) {
dev_warn(dev, "coherent DMA mask is unset\n");
return 0;
}
if ((~mask) & (u64)arm_dma_limit) {
dev_warn(dev, "coherent DMA mask %#llx is smaller "
"than system GFP_DMA mask %#llx\n",
mask, (u64)arm_dma_limit);
return 0;
}
}
return mask;
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 58,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: callout_tag_table_new(CalloutTagTable** rt)
{
CalloutTagTable* t;
*rt = 0;
t = onig_st_init_strend_table_with_size(INIT_TAG_NAMES_ALLOC_NUM);
CHECK_NULL_RETURN_MEMERR(t);
*rt = t;
return ONIG_NORMAL;
}
Commit Message: fix #147: Stack Exhaustion Problem caused by some parsing functions in regcomp.c making recursive calls to themselves.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 87,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VOID ParaNdis_DeviceFiltersUpdateVlanId(PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext)
{
if (pContext->bHasHardwareFilters)
{
ULONG newFilterSet;
if (IsVlanSupported(pContext))
newFilterSet = pContext->VlanId ? pContext->VlanId : (MAX_VLAN_ID + 1);
else
newFilterSet = IsPrioritySupported(pContext) ? (MAX_VLAN_ID + 1) : 0;
if (newFilterSet != pContext->ulCurrentVlansFilterSet)
{
if (pContext->ulCurrentVlansFilterSet > MAX_VLAN_ID)
SetAllVlanFilters(pContext, FALSE);
else if (pContext->ulCurrentVlansFilterSet)
SetSingleVlanFilter(pContext, pContext->ulCurrentVlansFilterSet, FALSE, 2);
pContext->ulCurrentVlansFilterSet = newFilterSet;
if (pContext->ulCurrentVlansFilterSet > MAX_VLAN_ID)
SetAllVlanFilters(pContext, TRUE);
else if (pContext->ulCurrentVlansFilterSet)
SetSingleVlanFilter(pContext, pContext->ulCurrentVlansFilterSet, TRUE, 2);
}
}
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WinScreenKeyboardObserver(RenderWidgetHostImpl* host,
const gfx::Point& location_in_screen,
float scale_factor,
aura::Window* window)
: host_(host),
location_in_screen_(location_in_screen),
device_scale_factor_(scale_factor),
window_(window) {
host_->GetView()->SetInsets(gfx::Insets());
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dumpnode(Renode *node)
{
Rune *p;
if (!node) { printf("Empty"); return; }
switch (node->type) {
case P_CAT: printf("Cat("); dumpnode(node->x); printf(", "); dumpnode(node->y); printf(")"); break;
case P_ALT: printf("Alt("); dumpnode(node->x); printf(", "); dumpnode(node->y); printf(")"); break;
case P_REP:
printf(node->ng ? "NgRep(%d,%d," : "Rep(%d,%d,", node->m, node->n);
dumpnode(node->x);
printf(")");
break;
case P_BOL: printf("Bol"); break;
case P_EOL: printf("Eol"); break;
case P_WORD: printf("Word"); break;
case P_NWORD: printf("NotWord"); break;
case P_PAR: printf("Par(%d,", node->n); dumpnode(node->x); printf(")"); break;
case P_PLA: printf("PLA("); dumpnode(node->x); printf(")"); break;
case P_NLA: printf("NLA("); dumpnode(node->x); printf(")"); break;
case P_ANY: printf("Any"); break;
case P_CHAR: printf("Char(%c)", node->c); break;
case P_CCLASS:
printf("Class(");
for (p = node->cc->spans; p < node->cc->end; p += 2) printf("%02X-%02X,", p[0], p[1]);
printf(")");
break;
case P_NCCLASS:
printf("NotClass(");
for (p = node->cc->spans; p < node->cc->end; p += 2) printf("%02X-%02X,", p[0], p[1]);
printf(")");
break;
case P_REF: printf("Ref(%d)", node->n); break;
}
}
Commit Message: Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 90,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void write_response(ESPState *s)
{
trace_esp_write_response(s->status);
s->ti_buf[0] = s->status;
s->ti_buf[1] = 0;
if (s->dma) {
s->dma_memory_write(s->dma_opaque, s->ti_buf, 2);
s->rregs[ESP_RSTAT] = STAT_TC | STAT_ST;
s->rregs[ESP_RINTR] = INTR_BS | INTR_FC;
s->rregs[ESP_RSEQ] = SEQ_CD;
} else {
s->ti_size = 2;
s->ti_rptr = 0;
s->ti_wptr = 0;
s->rregs[ESP_RFLAGS] = 2;
}
esp_raise_irq(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageLoader::updateFromElementIgnoringPreviousError()
{
clearFailedLoadURL();
updateFromElement();
}
Commit Message: Error event was fired synchronously blowing away the input element from underneath. Remove the FIXME and fire it asynchronously using errorEventSender().
BUG=240124
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14741011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150232 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int hns_ppe_get_regs_count(void)
{
return ETH_PPE_DUMP_NUM;
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline ImageInputType::ImageInputType(HTMLInputElement& element)
: BaseButtonInputType(element)
, m_useFallbackContent(false)
{
}
Commit Message: ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
CWE ID: CWE-361
| 0
| 132,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnAudioTimeCallback(
base::TimeDelta current_time, base::TimeDelta max_time) {
CHECK(current_time <= max_time);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnSetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
bool value) {
frame_tree_node_->OnSetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(value);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,368
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XML_GetBase(XML_Parser parser)
{
if (parser == NULL)
return NULL;
return parser->m_curBase;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 92,244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: idToName(struct rx_call *call, idlist *aid, namelist *aname)
{
afs_int32 code;
struct ubik_trans *tt;
afs_int32 i;
int size;
int count = 0;
/* leave this first for rpc stub */
size = aid->idlist_len;
if (size == 0)
return 0;
if (size < 0 || size > INT_MAX / PR_MAXNAMELEN)
return PRTOOMANY;
aname->namelist_val = (prname *) malloc(size * PR_MAXNAMELEN);
aname->namelist_len = 0;
if (aname->namelist_val == 0)
return PRNOMEM;
if (aid->idlist_len == 0)
return 0;
if (size == 0)
return PRTOOMANY; /* rxgen will probably handle this */
code = Initdb();
if (code != PRSUCCESS)
return code;
code = ubik_BeginTransReadAny(dbase, UBIK_READTRANS, &tt);
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_SetLock(tt, 1, 1, LOCKREAD);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = read_DbHeader(tt);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
for (i = 0; i < aid->idlist_len; i++) {
code = IDToName(tt, aid->idlist_val[i], aname->namelist_val[i]);
if (code != PRSUCCESS)
sprintf(aname->namelist_val[i], "%d", aid->idlist_val[i]);
osi_audit(PTS_IdToNmEvent, code, AUD_ID, aid->idlist_val[i],
AUD_STR, aname->namelist_val[i], AUD_END);
ViceLog(125, ("PTS_idToName: code %d aid %d aname %s\n", code,
aid->idlist_val[i], aname->namelist_val[i]));
if (count++ > 50) {
#ifndef AFS_PTHREAD_ENV
IOMGR_Poll();
#endif
count = 0;
}
}
aname->namelist_len = aid->idlist_len;
code = ubik_EndTrans(tt);
if (code)
return code;
return PRSUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 12,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bgp_notification_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *dat, int length)
{
struct bgp_notification bgpn;
const u_char *tptr;
ND_TCHECK2(dat[0], BGP_NOTIFICATION_SIZE);
memcpy(&bgpn, dat, BGP_NOTIFICATION_SIZE);
/* some little sanity checking */
if (length<BGP_NOTIFICATION_SIZE)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u)",
tok2str(bgp_notify_major_values, "Unknown Error",
bgpn.bgpn_major),
bgpn.bgpn_major));
switch (bgpn.bgpn_major) {
case BGP_NOTIFY_MAJOR_MSG:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", subcode %s (%u)",
tok2str(bgp_notify_minor_msg_values, "Unknown",
bgpn.bgpn_minor),
bgpn.bgpn_minor));
break;
case BGP_NOTIFY_MAJOR_OPEN:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", subcode %s (%u)",
tok2str(bgp_notify_minor_open_values, "Unknown",
bgpn.bgpn_minor),
bgpn.bgpn_minor));
break;
case BGP_NOTIFY_MAJOR_UPDATE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", subcode %s (%u)",
tok2str(bgp_notify_minor_update_values, "Unknown",
bgpn.bgpn_minor),
bgpn.bgpn_minor));
break;
case BGP_NOTIFY_MAJOR_FSM:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " subcode %s (%u)",
tok2str(bgp_notify_minor_fsm_values, "Unknown",
bgpn.bgpn_minor),
bgpn.bgpn_minor));
break;
case BGP_NOTIFY_MAJOR_CAP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " subcode %s (%u)",
tok2str(bgp_notify_minor_cap_values, "Unknown",
bgpn.bgpn_minor),
bgpn.bgpn_minor));
break;
case BGP_NOTIFY_MAJOR_CEASE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", subcode %s (%u)",
tok2str(bgp_notify_minor_cease_values, "Unknown",
bgpn.bgpn_minor),
bgpn.bgpn_minor));
/* draft-ietf-idr-cease-subcode-02 mentions optionally 7 bytes
* for the maxprefix subtype, which may contain AFI, SAFI and MAXPREFIXES
*/
if(bgpn.bgpn_minor == BGP_NOTIFY_MINOR_CEASE_MAXPRFX && length >= BGP_NOTIFICATION_SIZE + 7) {
tptr = dat + BGP_NOTIFICATION_SIZE;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 7);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", AFI %s (%u), SAFI %s (%u), Max Prefixes: %u",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr),
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown", *(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+3)));
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16300/BGP: prevent stack exhaustion
Enforce a limit on how many times bgp_attr_print() can recurse.
This fixes a stack exhaustion discovered by Include Security working
under the Mozilla SOS program in 2018 by means of code audit.
CWE ID: CWE-674
| 0
| 93,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DateTimeFieldElement::setReadOnly()
{
setBooleanAttribute(readonlyAttr, true);
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 103,239
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: acpi_status acpi_os_delete_semaphore(acpi_handle handle)
{
struct semaphore *sem = (struct semaphore *)handle;
if (!sem)
return AE_BAD_PARAMETER;
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_MUTEX, "Deleting semaphore[%p].\n", handle));
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&sem->wait_list));
kfree(sem);
sem = NULL;
return AE_OK;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputHandler::handleInputLocaleChanged(bool isRTL)
{
if (!isActiveTextEdit())
return;
ASSERT(m_currentFocusElement->document() && m_currentFocusElement->document()->frame());
RenderObject* renderer = m_currentFocusElement->renderer();
if (!renderer)
return;
Editor* editor = m_currentFocusElement->document()->frame()->editor();
ASSERT(editor);
if ((renderer->style()->direction() == RTL) != isRTL)
editor->setBaseWritingDirection(isRTL ? RightToLeftWritingDirection : LeftToRightWritingDirection);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLIFrameElement::ParseAttribute(
const AttributeModificationParams& params) {
const QualifiedName& name = params.name;
const AtomicString& value = params.new_value;
if (name == nameAttr) {
if (IsInDocumentTree() && GetDocument().IsHTMLDocument()) {
HTMLDocument& document = ToHTMLDocument(this->GetDocument());
document.RemoveNamedItem(name_);
document.AddNamedItem(value);
}
AtomicString old_name = name_;
name_ = value;
if (name_ != old_name)
FrameOwnerPropertiesChanged();
} else if (name == sandboxAttr) {
sandbox_->DidUpdateAttributeValue(params.old_value, value);
String invalid_tokens;
SetSandboxFlags(value.IsNull() ? kSandboxNone
: ParseSandboxPolicy(sandbox_->TokenSet(),
invalid_tokens));
if (!invalid_tokens.IsNull()) {
GetDocument().AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kOtherMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"Error while parsing the 'sandbox' attribute: " + invalid_tokens));
}
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument(), WebFeature::kSandboxViaIFrame);
} else if (name == referrerpolicyAttr) {
referrer_policy_ = kReferrerPolicyDefault;
if (!value.IsNull()) {
SecurityPolicy::ReferrerPolicyFromString(
value, kSupportReferrerPolicyLegacyKeywords, &referrer_policy_);
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument(),
WebFeature::kHTMLIFrameElementReferrerPolicyAttribute);
}
} else if (name == allowfullscreenAttr) {
bool old_allow_fullscreen = allow_fullscreen_;
allow_fullscreen_ = !value.IsNull();
if (allow_fullscreen_ != old_allow_fullscreen) {
if (allow_fullscreen_ && ContentFrame()) {
UseCounter::Count(
GetDocument(),
WebFeature::
kHTMLIFrameElementAllowfullscreenAttributeSetAfterContentLoad);
}
FrameOwnerPropertiesChanged();
UpdateContainerPolicy();
}
} else if (name == allowpaymentrequestAttr) {
bool old_allow_payment_request = allow_payment_request_;
allow_payment_request_ = !value.IsNull();
if (allow_payment_request_ != old_allow_payment_request) {
FrameOwnerPropertiesChanged();
UpdateContainerPolicy();
}
} else if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::EmbedderCSPEnforcementEnabled() &&
name == cspAttr) {
if (!ContentSecurityPolicy::IsValidCSPAttr(value.GetString())) {
csp_ = g_null_atom;
GetDocument().AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kOtherMessageSource, kErrorMessageLevel,
"'csp' attribute is not a valid policy: " + value));
return;
}
if (csp_ != value) {
csp_ = value;
FrameOwnerPropertiesChanged();
}
} else if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::FeaturePolicyEnabled() &&
name == allowAttr) {
if (allow_ != value) {
allow_ = value;
Vector<String> messages;
bool old_syntax = false;
UpdateContainerPolicy(&messages, &old_syntax);
if (!messages.IsEmpty()) {
for (const String& message : messages) {
GetDocument().AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
kOtherMessageSource, kWarningMessageLevel, message));
}
}
if (!value.IsEmpty()) {
if (old_syntax) {
UseCounter::Count(
GetDocument(),
WebFeature::kFeaturePolicyAllowAttributeDeprecatedSyntax);
} else {
UseCounter::Count(GetDocument(),
WebFeature::kFeaturePolicyAllowAttribute);
}
}
}
} else {
if (name == srcAttr)
LogUpdateAttributeIfIsolatedWorldAndInDocument("iframe", params);
HTMLFrameElementBase::ParseAttribute(params);
}
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601
| 0
| 150,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hub_set_port_link_state(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1,
unsigned int link_status)
{
return set_port_feature(hub->hdev,
port1 | (link_status << 3),
USB_PORT_FEAT_LINK_STATE);
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ApplyFilePathAlias(blink::WebURLRequest* request) {
const base::CommandLine::StringType file_url_path_alias =
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueNative(
switches::kFileUrlPathAlias);
if (file_url_path_alias.empty())
return;
const auto alias_mapping =
base::SplitString(file_url_path_alias, FILE_PATH_LITERAL("="),
base::TRIM_WHITESPACE, base::SPLIT_WANT_NONEMPTY);
if (alias_mapping.size() != 2) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid file path alias format.";
return;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::string16 path = request->Url().GetString().Utf16();
const base::string16 file_prefix =
base::ASCIIToUTF16(url::kFileScheme) +
base::ASCIIToUTF16(url::kStandardSchemeSeparator);
#else
std::string path = request->Url().GetString().Utf8();
const std::string file_prefix =
std::string(url::kFileScheme) + url::kStandardSchemeSeparator;
#endif
if (!base::StartsWith(path, file_prefix + alias_mapping[0],
base::CompareCase::SENSITIVE)) {
return;
}
base::ReplaceFirstSubstringAfterOffset(&path, 0, alias_mapping[0],
alias_mapping[1]);
request->SetUrl(blink::WebURL(GURL(path)));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: poolCopyStringN(STRING_POOL *pool, const XML_Char *s, int n) {
if (! pool->ptr && ! poolGrow(pool)) {
/* The following line is unreachable given the current usage of
* poolCopyStringN(). Currently it is called from exactly one
* place to copy the text of a simple general entity. By that
* point, the name of the entity is already stored in the pool, so
* pool->ptr cannot be NULL.
*
* If poolCopyStringN() is used elsewhere as it well might be,
* this line may well become executable again. Regardless, this
* sort of check shouldn't be removed lightly, so we just exclude
* it from the coverage statistics.
*/
return NULL; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
for (; n > 0; --n, s++) {
if (! poolAppendChar(pool, *s))
return NULL;
}
s = pool->start;
poolFinish(pool);
return s;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 88,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void comps_mrtree_data_destroy(COMPS_MRTreeData * rtd) {
free(rtd->key);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtd->data);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtd->subnodes);
free(rtd);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool checkComposite(StateBase* top)
{
ASSERT(top);
if (m_depth > maxDepth)
return false;
if (!shouldCheckForCycles(m_depth))
return true;
v8::Handle<v8::Value> composite = top->composite();
for (StateBase* state = top->nextState(); state; state = state->nextState()) {
if (state->composite() == composite)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,435
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static WORD32 ihevcd_parse_sub_layer_hrd_parameters(bitstrm_t *ps_bitstrm,
sub_lyr_hrd_params_t *ps_sub_layer_hrd_params,
WORD32 cpb_cnt,
WORD32 sub_pic_cpb_params_present_flag)
{
WORD32 ret = (IHEVCD_ERROR_T)IHEVCD_SUCCESS;
WORD32 i;
for(i = 0; i <= cpb_cnt; i++)
{
UEV_PARSE("bit_rate_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_bit_rate_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("cpb_size_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_cpb_size_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
if(sub_pic_cpb_params_present_flag)
{
UEV_PARSE("cpb_size_du_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_cpb_size_du_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
UEV_PARSE("bit_rate_du_value_minus1[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au4_bit_rate_du_value_minus1[i], ps_bitstrm);
}
BITS_PARSE("cbr_flag[ i ]", ps_sub_layer_hrd_params->au1_cbr_flag[i], ps_bitstrm, 1);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Ensure CTB size > 16 for clips with tiles and width/height >= 4096
For clips with tiles and dimensions >= 4096,
CTB size of 16 can result in tile position > 255.
This is not supported by the decoder
Bug: 37930177
Test: ran poc w/o crashing
Change-Id: I2f223a124c4ea9bfd98343343fd010d80a5dd8bd
(cherry picked from commit 248e72c7a8c7c382ff4397868a6c7453a6453141)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 162,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __attribute__((no_instrument_function)) trace_swap_gd(void)
{
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 89,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebKeyEvent::WebKeyEvent(automation::KeyEventTypes type,
ui::KeyboardCode key_code,
const std::string& unmodified_text,
const std::string& modified_text,
int modifiers)
: type(type),
key_code(key_code),
unmodified_text(unmodified_text),
modified_text(modified_text),
modifiers(modifiers) {}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_DECLARE(void) ap_register_errorlog_handler(apr_pool_t *p, char *tag,
ap_errorlog_handler_fn_t *handler,
int flags)
{
ap_errorlog_handler *log_struct = apr_palloc(p, sizeof(*log_struct));
log_struct->func = handler;
log_struct->flags = flags;
apr_hash_set(errorlog_hash, tag, 1, (const void *)log_struct);
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool shouldFlipBeforeAfterMargins(const RenderStyle* containingBlockStyle, const RenderStyle* childStyle)
{
ASSERT(containingBlockStyle->isHorizontalWritingMode() != childStyle->isHorizontalWritingMode());
WritingMode childWritingMode = childStyle->writingMode();
bool shouldFlip = false;
switch (containingBlockStyle->writingMode()) {
case TopToBottomWritingMode:
shouldFlip = (childWritingMode == RightToLeftWritingMode);
break;
case BottomToTopWritingMode:
shouldFlip = (childWritingMode == RightToLeftWritingMode);
break;
case RightToLeftWritingMode:
shouldFlip = (childWritingMode == BottomToTopWritingMode);
break;
case LeftToRightWritingMode:
shouldFlip = (childWritingMode == BottomToTopWritingMode);
break;
}
if (!containingBlockStyle->isLeftToRightDirection())
shouldFlip = !shouldFlip;
return shouldFlip;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,607
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OpenAboutChromeDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("AboutChrome"));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
std::string chrome_settings(chrome::kChromeUISettingsURL);
ShowSingletonTab(GURL(chrome_settings.append(chrome::kAboutOptionsSubPage)));
#else
window_->ShowAboutChromeDialog();
#endif
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,278
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftp_open(const char *host, short port, long timeout_sec TSRMLS_DC)
{
ftpbuf_t *ftp;
socklen_t size;
struct timeval tv;
/* alloc the ftp structure */
ftp = ecalloc(1, sizeof(*ftp));
tv.tv_sec = timeout_sec;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
ftp->fd = php_network_connect_socket_to_host(host,
(unsigned short) (port ? port : 21), SOCK_STREAM,
0, &tv, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (ftp->fd == -1) {
goto bail;
}
/* Default Settings */
ftp->timeout_sec = timeout_sec;
ftp->nb = 0;
size = sizeof(ftp->localaddr);
memset(&ftp->localaddr, 0, size);
if (getsockname(ftp->fd, (struct sockaddr*) &ftp->localaddr, &size) != 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "getsockname failed: %s (%d)", strerror(errno), errno);
goto bail;
}
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp) || ftp->resp != 220) {
goto bail;
}
return ftp;
bail:
if (ftp->fd != -1) {
closesocket(ftp->fd);
}
efree(ftp);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ieee80211_iface_exit(void)
{
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&mac80211_netdev_notifier);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,326
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: icc_base_conv_color(fz_context *ctx, fz_color_converter *cc, float *dstv, const float *srcv)
{
const fz_colorspace *srcs = cc->ss;
float local_src_map[FZ_MAX_COLORS];
float local_src_map2[FZ_MAX_COLORS];
float *src_map = local_src_map;
do
{
srcs->to_ccs(ctx, srcs, srcv, src_map);
srcs = srcs->get_base(srcs);
srcs->clamp(srcs, src_map, src_map);
srcv = src_map;
src_map = (src_map == local_src_map ? local_src_map2 : local_src_map);
}
while (!fz_colorspace_is_icc(ctx, srcs) && !fz_colorspace_is_cal(ctx, srcs));
icc_conv_color(ctx, cc, dstv, srcv);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 414
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t IPCThreadState::requestDeathNotification(int32_t handle, BpBinder* proxy)
{
mOut.writeInt32(BC_REQUEST_DEATH_NOTIFICATION);
mOut.writeInt32((int32_t)handle);
mOut.writePointer((uintptr_t)proxy);
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftG711::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
const uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
if (mIsMLaw) {
DecodeMLaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
} else {
DecodeALaw(
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer),
inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = inHeader->nFilledLen * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void get_openreq4(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
struct seq_file *f, int i, int uid, int *len)
{
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
int ttd = req->expires - jiffies;
seq_printf(f, "%4d: %08X:%04X %08X:%04X"
" %02X %08X:%08X %02X:%08lX %08X %5d %8d %u %d %p%n",
i,
ireq->loc_addr,
ntohs(inet_sk(sk)->inet_sport),
ireq->rmt_addr,
ntohs(ireq->rmt_port),
TCP_SYN_RECV,
0, 0, /* could print option size, but that is af dependent. */
1, /* timers active (only the expire timer) */
jiffies_to_clock_t(ttd),
req->retrans,
uid,
0, /* non standard timer */
0, /* open_requests have no inode */
atomic_read(&sk->sk_refcnt),
req,
len);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int calculate_nss_hash(
struct crypto_instance *instance,
const unsigned char *buf,
const size_t buf_len,
unsigned char *hash)
{
PK11Context* hash_context = NULL;
SECItem hash_param;
unsigned int hash_tmp_outlen = 0;
unsigned char hash_block[hash_block_len[instance->crypto_hash_type]];
int err = -1;
/* Now do the digest */
hash_param.type = siBuffer;
hash_param.data = 0;
hash_param.len = 0;
hash_context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type],
CKA_SIGN,
instance->nss_sym_key_sign,
&hash_param);
if (!hash_context) {
log_printf(instance->log_level_security,
"PK11_CreateContext failed (hash) hash_type=%d (err %d)",
(int)hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type],
PR_GetError());
goto out;
}
if (PK11_DigestBegin(hash_context) != SECSuccess) {
log_printf(instance->log_level_security,
"PK11_DigestBegin failed (hash) hash_type=%d (err %d)",
(int)hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type],
PR_GetError());
goto out;
}
if (PK11_DigestOp(hash_context,
buf,
buf_len) != SECSuccess) {
log_printf(instance->log_level_security,
"PK11_DigestOp failed (hash) hash_type=%d (err %d)",
(int)hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type],
PR_GetError());
goto out;
}
if (PK11_DigestFinal(hash_context,
hash_block,
&hash_tmp_outlen,
hash_block_len[instance->crypto_hash_type]) != SECSuccess) {
log_printf(instance->log_level_security,
"PK11_DigestFinale failed (hash) hash_type=%d (err %d)",
(int)hash_to_nss[instance->crypto_hash_type],
PR_GetError());
goto out;
}
memcpy(hash, hash_block, hash_len[instance->crypto_hash_type]);
err = 0;
out:
if (hash_context) {
PK11_DestroyContext(hash_context, PR_TRUE);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: totemcrypto: fix hmac key initialization
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. Di Nitto <fdinitto@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,054
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_METER(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols)
{
*usable_protocols &= OFPUTIL_P_OF13_UP;
return str_to_u32(arg, &ofpact_put_METER(ofpacts)->meter_id);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 77,052
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: prepare_task_switch(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev,
struct task_struct *next)
{
sched_info_switch(prev, next);
perf_event_task_sched_out(prev, next);
fire_sched_out_preempt_notifiers(prev, next);
prepare_lock_switch(rq, next);
prepare_arch_switch(next);
trace_sched_switch(prev, next);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)
{
vm_flags_t vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
int write = (gup_flags & FOLL_WRITE);
int foreign = (gup_flags & FOLL_REMOTE);
if (vm_flags & (VM_IO | VM_PFNMAP))
return -EFAULT;
if (gup_flags & FOLL_ANON && !vma_is_anonymous(vma))
return -EFAULT;
if (write) {
if (!(vm_flags & VM_WRITE)) {
if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* We used to let the write,force case do COW in a
* VM_MAYWRITE VM_SHARED !VM_WRITE vma, so ptrace could
* set a breakpoint in a read-only mapping of an
* executable, without corrupting the file (yet only
* when that file had been opened for writing!).
* Anon pages in shared mappings are surprising: now
* just reject it.
*/
if (!is_cow_mapping(vm_flags))
return -EFAULT;
}
} else if (!(vm_flags & VM_READ)) {
if (!(gup_flags & FOLL_FORCE))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* Is there actually any vma we can reach here which does not
* have VM_MAYREAD set?
*/
if (!(vm_flags & VM_MAYREAD))
return -EFAULT;
}
/*
* gups are always data accesses, not instruction
* fetches, so execute=false here
*/
if (!arch_vma_access_permitted(vma, write, false, foreign))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 96,945
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ssh_hostport_setup(const char *host, int port, Conf *conf,
char **savedhost, int *savedport,
char **loghost_ret)
{
char *loghost = conf_get_str(conf, CONF_loghost);
if (loghost_ret)
*loghost_ret = loghost;
if (*loghost) {
char *tmphost;
char *colon;
tmphost = dupstr(loghost);
*savedport = 22; /* default ssh port */
/*
* A colon suffix on the hostname string also lets us affect
* savedport. (Unless there are multiple colons, in which case
* we assume this is an unbracketed IPv6 literal.)
*/
colon = host_strrchr(tmphost, ':');
if (colon && colon == host_strchr(tmphost, ':')) {
*colon++ = '\0';
if (*colon)
*savedport = atoi(colon);
}
*savedhost = host_strduptrim(tmphost);
sfree(tmphost);
} else {
*savedhost = host_strduptrim(host);
if (port < 0)
port = 22; /* default ssh port */
*savedport = port;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::Commit(int64_t transaction_id) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
IndexedDBTransaction* transaction =
connection_->GetTransaction(transaction_id);
if (!transaction)
return;
if (transaction->size() == 0) {
connection_->database()->Commit(transaction);
return;
}
indexed_db_context_->quota_manager_proxy()->GetUsageAndQuota(
indexed_db_context_->TaskRunner(), origin_.GetURL(),
storage::kStorageTypeTemporary,
base::Bind(&IDBThreadHelper::OnGotUsageAndQuotaForCommit,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), transaction_id));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 136,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tracing_saved_cmdlines_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
if (tracing_disabled)
return -ENODEV;
return seq_open(filp, &tracing_saved_cmdlines_seq_ops);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void llc_sk_reset(struct sock *sk)
{
struct llc_sock *llc = llc_sk(sk);
llc_conn_ac_stop_all_timers(sk, NULL);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);
skb_queue_purge(&llc->pdu_unack_q);
llc->remote_busy_flag = 0;
llc->cause_flag = 0;
llc->retry_count = 0;
llc_conn_set_p_flag(sk, 0);
llc->f_flag = 0;
llc->s_flag = 0;
llc->ack_pf = 0;
llc->first_pdu_Ns = 0;
llc->ack_must_be_send = 0;
llc->dec_step = 1;
llc->inc_cntr = 2;
llc->dec_cntr = 2;
llc->X = 0;
llc->failed_data_req = 0 ;
llc->last_nr = 0;
}
Commit Message: net/llc: avoid BUG_ON() in skb_orphan()
It seems nobody used LLC since linux-3.12.
Fortunately fuzzers like syzkaller still know how to run this code,
otherwise it would be no fun.
Setting skb->sk without skb->destructor leads to all kinds of
bugs, we now prefer to be very strict about it.
Ideally here we would use skb_set_owner() but this helper does not exist yet,
only CAN seems to have a private helper for that.
Fixes: 376c7311bdb6 ("net: add a temporary sanity check in skb_orphan()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 68,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::InitAsFullscreen(
RenderWidgetHostView* reference_host_view) {
is_fullscreen_ = true;
CreateDelegatedFrameHostClient();
CreateAuraWindow(ui::wm::WINDOW_TYPE_NORMAL);
window_->SetProperty(aura::client::kShowStateKey, ui::SHOW_STATE_FULLSCREEN);
aura::Window* parent = NULL;
gfx::Rect bounds;
if (reference_host_view) {
aura::Window* reference_window =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewAura*>(reference_host_view)->window_;
event_handler_->TrackHost(reference_window);
display::Display display =
display::Screen::GetScreen()->GetDisplayNearestWindow(reference_window);
parent = reference_window->GetRootWindow();
bounds = display.bounds();
}
aura::client::ParentWindowWithContext(window_, parent, bounds);
Show();
Focus();
device_scale_factor_ = ui::GetScaleFactorForNativeView(window_);
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 132,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HRESULT CGaiaCredentialBase::GetStringValue(DWORD field_id, wchar_t** value) {
return GetStringValueImpl(field_id, value);
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 130,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t SampleTable::setCompositionTimeToSampleParams(
off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
ALOGI("There are reordered frames present.");
if (mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries != NULL || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header))
< (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
size_t numEntries = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (data_size != (numEntries + 1) * 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = numEntries;
uint64_t allocSize = numEntries * 2 * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = new uint32_t[2 * numEntries];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset + 8, mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries, numEntries * 8)
< (ssize_t)numEntries * 8) {
delete[] mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries;
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = NULL;
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < 2 * numEntries; ++i) {
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries[i] = ntohl(mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries[i]);
}
mCompositionDeltaLookup->setEntries(
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries, mNumCompositionTimeDeltaEntries);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 173,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::CloseFileOnUIThread(
const FilePath& file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (open_files_.find(file_path) == open_files_.end()) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(callback, GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND));
return;
}
GetEntryInfoByPathAsyncOnUIThread(
file_path,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnGetEntryInfoCompleteForCloseFile,
ui_weak_ptr_,
file_path,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnCloseFileFinished,
ui_weak_ptr_,
file_path,
callback)));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 116,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ACodec::BaseState::onOMXMessageList(const sp<AMessage> &msg) {
sp<RefBase> obj;
CHECK(msg->findObject("messages", &obj));
sp<MessageList> msgList = static_cast<MessageList *>(obj.get());
bool receivedRenderedEvents = false;
for (std::list<sp<AMessage>>::const_iterator it = msgList->getList().cbegin();
it != msgList->getList().cend(); ++it) {
(*it)->setWhat(ACodec::kWhatOMXMessageItem);
mCodec->handleMessage(*it);
int32_t type;
CHECK((*it)->findInt32("type", &type));
if (type == omx_message::FRAME_RENDERED) {
receivedRenderedEvents = true;
}
}
if (receivedRenderedEvents) {
mCodec->notifyOfRenderedFrames();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const SSL_CIPHER *dtls1_get_cipher(unsigned int u)
{
const SSL_CIPHER *ciph = ssl3_get_cipher(u);
if (ciph != NULL) {
if (ciph->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
return NULL;
}
return ciph;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: camera_metadata_t *allocate_camera_metadata(size_t entry_capacity,
size_t data_capacity) {
size_t memory_needed = calculate_camera_metadata_size(entry_capacity,
data_capacity);
void *buffer = malloc(memory_needed);
return place_camera_metadata(buffer, memory_needed,
entry_capacity,
data_capacity);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,916
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::getOwnPropertySlot(JSCell* cell, ExecState* exec, const Identifier& propertyName, PropertySlot& slot)
{
return getStaticValueSlot<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor, JSDOMWrapper>(exec, &JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructorTable, jsCast<JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor*>(cell), propertyName, slot);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void updateProgramMapPID(unsigned programMapPID) {
mProgramMapPID = programMapPID;
}
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 160,520
|
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