instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputDispatcher::InputState::removeFallbackKey(int32_t originalKeyCode) {
mFallbackKeys.removeItem(originalKeyCode);
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 163,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void arcmsr_hbaD_doorbell_isr(struct AdapterControlBlock *pACB)
{
uint32_t outbound_doorbell;
struct MessageUnit_D *pmu = pACB->pmuD;
outbound_doorbell = readl(pmu->outbound_doorbell);
do {
writel(outbound_doorbell, pmu->outbound_doorbell);
if (outbound_doorbell & ARCMSR_ARC1214_IOP2DRV_MESSAGE_CMD_DONE)
arcmsr_hbaD_message_isr(pACB);
if (outbound_doorbell & ARCMSR_ARC1214_IOP2DRV_DATA_WRITE_OK)
arcmsr_iop2drv_data_wrote_handle(pACB);
if (outbound_doorbell & ARCMSR_ARC1214_IOP2DRV_DATA_READ_OK)
arcmsr_iop2drv_data_read_handle(pACB);
outbound_doorbell = readl(pmu->outbound_doorbell);
} while (outbound_doorbell & (ARCMSR_ARC1214_IOP2DRV_DATA_WRITE_OK
| ARCMSR_ARC1214_IOP2DRV_DATA_READ_OK
| ARCMSR_ARC1214_IOP2DRV_MESSAGE_CMD_DONE));
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ~PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument_Params() {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 149,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs4_remove_reclaim_record(struct nfs4_client_reclaim *crp, struct nfsd_net *nn)
{
list_del(&crp->cr_strhash);
kfree(crp);
nn->reclaim_str_hashtbl_size--;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableModernMediaControls(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetModernMediaControlsEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 154,638
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tioccons(struct file *file)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (file->f_op->write == redirected_tty_write) {
struct file *f;
spin_lock(&redirect_lock);
f = redirect;
redirect = NULL;
spin_unlock(&redirect_lock);
if (f)
fput(f);
return 0;
}
spin_lock(&redirect_lock);
if (redirect) {
spin_unlock(&redirect_lock);
return -EBUSY;
}
redirect = get_file(file);
spin_unlock(&redirect_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NavigationRequest::IsAllowedByCSPDirective(
CSPContext* context,
CSPDirective::Name directive,
bool has_followed_redirect,
bool url_upgraded_after_redirect,
bool is_response_check,
CSPContext::CheckCSPDisposition disposition) {
GURL url;
if (url_upgraded_after_redirect &&
disposition == CSPContext::CheckCSPDisposition::CHECK_REPORT_ONLY_CSP &&
common_params_.url.SchemeIs(url::kHttpsScheme)) {
GURL::Replacements replacements;
replacements.SetSchemeStr(url::kHttpScheme);
url = common_params_.url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
} else {
url = common_params_.url;
}
return context->IsAllowedByCsp(
directive, url, has_followed_redirect, is_response_check,
common_params_.source_location.value_or(SourceLocation()), disposition,
begin_params_->is_form_submission);
}
Commit Message: Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 152,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void release_one_tty(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct tty_struct *tty =
container_of(work, struct tty_struct, hangup_work);
struct tty_driver *driver = tty->driver;
if (tty->ops->cleanup)
tty->ops->cleanup(tty);
tty->magic = 0;
tty_driver_kref_put(driver);
module_put(driver->owner);
spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
list_del_init(&tty->tty_files);
spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
put_pid(tty->pgrp);
put_pid(tty->session);
free_tty_struct(tty);
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 58,736
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::SetUserWallpaperNow(const AccountId& account_id) {
ScheduleSetUserWallpaper(account_id, false);
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 128,091
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::ReadonlyCachedAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_readonlyCachedAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::ReadonlyCachedAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::removeAllEventListeners()
{
ContainerNode::removeAllEventListeners();
if (LocalDOMWindow* domWindow = this->domWindow())
domWindow->removeAllEventListeners();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t curl_progress(void *clientp, double dltotal, double dlnow, double ultotal, double ulnow)
{
php_curl *ch = (php_curl *)clientp;
php_curl_progress *t = ch->handlers->progress;
size_t rval = 0;
#if PHP_CURL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "curl_progress() called\n");
fprintf(stderr, "clientp = %x, dltotal = %f, dlnow = %f, ultotal = %f, ulnow = %f\n", clientp, dltotal, dlnow, ultotal, ulnow);
#endif
switch (t->method) {
case PHP_CURL_USER: {
zval argv[5];
zval retval;
int error;
zend_fcall_info fci;
ZVAL_RES(&argv[0], ch->res);
Z_ADDREF(argv[0]);
ZVAL_LONG(&argv[1], (zend_long)dltotal);
ZVAL_LONG(&argv[2], (zend_long)dlnow);
ZVAL_LONG(&argv[3], (zend_long)ultotal);
ZVAL_LONG(&argv[4], (zend_long)ulnow);
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = EG(function_table);
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&fci.function_name, &t->func_name);
fci.object = NULL;
fci.retval = &retval;
fci.param_count = 5;
fci.params = argv;
fci.no_separation = 0;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
ch->in_callback = 1;
error = zend_call_function(&fci, &t->fci_cache);
ch->in_callback = 0;
if (error == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Cannot call the CURLOPT_PROGRESSFUNCTION");
} else if (!Z_ISUNDEF(retval)) {
_php_curl_verify_handlers(ch, 1);
if (0 != zval_get_long(&retval)) {
rval = 1;
}
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[0]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[1]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[2]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[3]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[4]);
break;
}
}
return rval;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,139
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TrayPower::OnPowerStatusChanged(const PowerSupplyStatus& status) {
if (power_tray_.get())
power_tray_->UpdatePowerStatus(status);
if (power_.get())
power_->UpdatePowerStatus(status);
}
Commit Message: ash: Fix right-alignment of power-status text.
It turns out setting ALING_RIGHT on a Label isn't enough to get proper
right-aligned text. Label has to be explicitly told that it is multi-lined.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9918026
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@129898 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 106,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int usb_disable_link_state(struct usb_hcd *hcd, struct usb_device *udev,
enum usb3_link_state state)
{
switch (state) {
case USB3_LPM_U1:
case USB3_LPM_U2:
break;
default:
dev_warn(&udev->dev, "%s: Can't disable non-U1 or U2 state.\n",
__func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (usb_set_lpm_timeout(udev, state, 0))
return -EBUSY;
usb_set_device_initiated_lpm(udev, state, false);
if (hcd->driver->disable_usb3_lpm_timeout(hcd, udev, state))
dev_warn(&udev->dev, "Could not disable xHCI %s timeout, "
"bus schedule bandwidth may be impacted.\n",
usb3_lpm_names[state]);
/* As soon as usb_set_lpm_timeout(0) return 0, hub initiated LPM
* is disabled. Hub will disallows link to enter U1/U2 as well,
* even device is initiating LPM. Hence LPM is disabled if hub LPM
* timeout set to 0, no matter device-initiated LPM is disabled or
* not.
*/
if (state == USB3_LPM_U1)
udev->usb3_lpm_u1_enabled = 0;
else if (state == USB3_LPM_U2)
udev->usb3_lpm_u2_enabled = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 75,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nfc_llcp_sock_exit(void)
{
nfc_proto_unregister(&llcp_nfc_proto);
}
Commit Message: NFC: llcp: fix info leaks via msg_name in llcp_sock_recvmsg()
The code in llcp_sock_recvmsg() does not initialize all the members of
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp when filling the sockaddr info. Nor does it
initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by the compiler
for alignment.
Also, if the socket is in state LLCP_CLOSED or is shutting down during
receive the msg_namelen member is not updated to 0 while otherwise
returning with 0, i.e. "success". The msg_namelen update is also
missing for stream and seqpacket sockets which don't fill the sockaddr
info.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info
with memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early.
It will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::AddObserver(RenderProcessHostObserver* observer) {
observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rb_event_ts_length(struct ring_buffer_event *event)
{
unsigned len = 0;
if (event->type_len == RINGBUF_TYPE_TIME_EXTEND) {
/* time extends include the data event after it */
len = RB_LEN_TIME_EXTEND;
event = skip_time_extend(event);
}
return len + rb_event_length(event);
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Handle<JSArray> SliceImpl(Handle<JSObject> receiver, uint32_t start,
uint32_t end) {
Isolate* isolate = receiver->GetIsolate();
uint32_t result_len = end < start ? 0u : end - start;
Handle<JSArray> result_array = isolate->factory()->NewJSArray(
FAST_HOLEY_ELEMENTS, result_len, result_len);
DisallowHeapAllocation no_gc;
FixedArray* elements = FixedArray::cast(result_array->elements());
FixedArray* parameters = FixedArray::cast(receiver->elements());
uint32_t insertion_index = 0;
for (uint32_t i = start; i < end; i++) {
uint32_t entry = GetEntryForIndexImpl(isolate, *receiver, parameters, i,
ALL_PROPERTIES);
if (entry != kMaxUInt32 && HasEntryImpl(isolate, parameters, entry)) {
elements->set(insertion_index, *GetImpl(isolate, parameters, entry));
} else {
elements->set_the_hole(isolate, insertion_index);
}
insertion_index++;
}
return result_array;
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 163,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void didFailProvisionalLoad(WebFrame* frame, const WebURLError& error)
{
frame->loadHTMLString("This should appear", toKURL("data:text/html,chromewebdata"), error.unreachableURL, true);
runPendingTasks();
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: push_value(gs_main_instance *minst, ref * pvalue)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = minst->i_ctx_p;
int code = ref_stack_push(&o_stack, 1);
if (code < 0)
return code;
*ref_stack_index(&o_stack, 0L) = *pvalue;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::UnsignedLongLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_unsignedLongLongAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::UnsignedLongLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,305
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ipv6_saddr_preferred(int type)
{
if (type & (IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED|IPV6_ADDR_COMPATv4|IPV6_ADDR_LOOPBACK))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 41,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double ConvertToBlinkTime(const base::TimeTicks& time_ticks) {
return (time_ticks - base::TimeTicks()).InSecondsF();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 147,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftHEVC::logVersion() {
ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_ip_t s_ctl_ip;
ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_op_t s_ctl_op;
UWORD8 au1_buf[512];
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
s_ctl_ip.e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_ctl_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVD_CMD_CTL_GETVERSION;
s_ctl_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_ip_t);
s_ctl_op.u4_size = sizeof(ivd_ctl_getversioninfo_op_t);
s_ctl_ip.pv_version_buffer = au1_buf;
s_ctl_ip.u4_version_buffer_size = sizeof(au1_buf);
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_ctl_ip,
(void *)&s_ctl_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Error in getting version number: 0x%x",
s_ctl_op.u4_error_code);
} else {
ALOGV("Ittiam decoder version number: %s",
(char *)s_ctl_ip.pv_version_buffer);
}
return;
}
Commit Message: SoftHEVC: Exit gracefully in case of decoder errors
Exit for error in allocation and unsupported resolutions
Bug: 28816956
Change-Id: Ieb830bedeb3a7431d1d21a024927df630f7eda1e
CWE ID: CWE-172
| 0
| 159,414
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API void r_flag_item_set_realname(RFlagItem *item, const char *realname) {
if (item) {
if (item->name != item->realname) {
free (item->realname);
}
item->realname = ISNULLSTR (realname) ? NULL : strdup (realname);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in wasm disassembler
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 60,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuProcessHost::DisableGpuCompositing() {
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI, FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce([]() {
if (auto* factory = ImageTransportFactory::GetInstance())
factory->DisableGpuCompositing();
}));
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_put_smb_ses(struct cifsSesInfo *ses)
{
int xid;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server;
cFYI(1, "%s: ses_count=%d\n", __func__, ses->ses_count);
write_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
if (--ses->ses_count > 0) {
write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
return;
}
list_del_init(&ses->smb_ses_list);
write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
if (ses->status == CifsGood) {
xid = GetXid();
CIFSSMBLogoff(xid, ses);
_FreeXid(xid);
}
sesInfoFree(ses);
cifs_put_tcp_session(server);
}
Commit Message: cifs: clean up cifs_find_smb_ses (try #2)
This patch replaces the earlier patch by the same name. The only
difference is that MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE has been increased to attempt to
match the limits that windows enforces.
Do a better job of matching sessions by authtype. Matching by username
for a Kerberos session is incorrect, and anonymous sessions need special
handling.
Also, in the case where we do match by username, we also need to match
by password. That ensures that someone else doesn't "borrow" an existing
session without needing to know the password.
Finally, passwords can be longer than 16 bytes. Bump MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE
to 512 to match the size that the userspace mount helper allows.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebGLRenderingContextBase::ExtensionTracker::MatchesNameWithPrefixes(
const String& name) const {
const char* const* prefix_set = Prefixes();
for (; *prefix_set; ++prefix_set) {
String prefixed_name = String(*prefix_set) + ExtensionName();
if (DeprecatedEqualIgnoringCase(prefixed_name, name)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool numa_is_active_node(int nid, struct numa_group *ng)
{
return group_faults_cpu(ng, nid) * ACTIVE_NODE_FRACTION > ng->max_faults_cpu;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InitializePasswordAutofillManager(
TestPasswordManagerClient* client,
autofill::AutofillClient* autofill_client) {
password_autofill_manager_.reset(new PasswordAutofillManager(
client->mock_driver(), autofill_client, client));
password_autofill_manager_->OnAddPasswordFormMapping(fill_data_id_,
fill_data_);
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_lazyinit_thread(void *arg)
{
struct ext4_lazy_init *eli = (struct ext4_lazy_init *)arg;
struct list_head *pos, *n;
struct ext4_li_request *elr;
unsigned long next_wakeup, cur;
BUG_ON(NULL == eli);
cont_thread:
while (true) {
next_wakeup = MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET;
mutex_lock(&eli->li_list_mtx);
if (list_empty(&eli->li_request_list)) {
mutex_unlock(&eli->li_list_mtx);
goto exit_thread;
}
list_for_each_safe(pos, n, &eli->li_request_list) {
elr = list_entry(pos, struct ext4_li_request,
lr_request);
if (time_after_eq(jiffies, elr->lr_next_sched)) {
if (ext4_run_li_request(elr) != 0) {
/* error, remove the lazy_init job */
ext4_remove_li_request(elr);
continue;
}
}
if (time_before(elr->lr_next_sched, next_wakeup))
next_wakeup = elr->lr_next_sched;
}
mutex_unlock(&eli->li_list_mtx);
try_to_freeze();
cur = jiffies;
if ((time_after_eq(cur, next_wakeup)) ||
(MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET == next_wakeup)) {
cond_resched();
continue;
}
schedule_timeout_interruptible(next_wakeup - cur);
if (kthread_should_stop()) {
ext4_clear_request_list();
goto exit_thread;
}
}
exit_thread:
/*
* It looks like the request list is empty, but we need
* to check it under the li_list_mtx lock, to prevent any
* additions into it, and of course we should lock ext4_li_mtx
* to atomically free the list and ext4_li_info, because at
* this point another ext4 filesystem could be registering
* new one.
*/
mutex_lock(&ext4_li_mtx);
mutex_lock(&eli->li_list_mtx);
if (!list_empty(&eli->li_request_list)) {
mutex_unlock(&eli->li_list_mtx);
mutex_unlock(&ext4_li_mtx);
goto cont_thread;
}
mutex_unlock(&eli->li_list_mtx);
kfree(ext4_li_info);
ext4_li_info = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&ext4_li_mtx);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 56,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int RenderLayerScrollableArea::pixelSnappedScrollWidth() const
{
return snapSizeToPixel(scrollWidth(), box().clientLeft() + box().x());
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 120,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothRemoteGATTCharacteristic::setValue(DOMDataView* domDataView) {
m_value = domDataView;
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 129,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
{
EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
if (a == NULL || (*a) == NULL || (*a)->group == NULL) {
/*
* sorry, but a EC_GROUP-structur is necessary to set the public key
*/
ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
ret = *a;
if (ret->pub_key == NULL &&
(ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret->group, ret->pub_key, *in, len, NULL)) {
ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
return 0;
}
/* save the point conversion form */
ret->conv_form = (point_conversion_form_t) (*in[0] & ~0x01);
*in += len;
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExpectUnchangedState() {
EXPECT_FALSE(root->Changed(*root));
EXPECT_FALSE(node->Changed(*root));
EXPECT_FALSE(child1->Changed(*root));
EXPECT_FALSE(child2->Changed(*root));
EXPECT_FALSE(grandchild1->Changed(*root));
EXPECT_FALSE(grandchild2->Changed(*root));
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool CandidateMayMoveWithScroller(const LayoutObject* candidate,
const ScrollableArea* scroller) {
if (const ComputedStyle* style = candidate->Style()) {
if (style->HasViewportConstrainedPosition() ||
style->HasStickyConstrainedPosition())
return false;
}
LayoutObject::AncestorSkipInfo skip_info(ScrollerLayoutBox(scroller));
candidate->Container(&skip_info);
return !skip_info.AncestorSkipped();
}
Commit Message: Consider scroll-padding when determining scroll anchor node
Scroll anchoring should not anchor to a node that is behind scroll
padding.
Bug: 1010002
Change-Id: Icbd89fb85ea2c97a6de635930a9896f6a87b8f07
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1887745
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nick Burris <nburris@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#711020}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 136,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UntrackOriginOnIOThread(const url::Origin& origin) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
origins_.erase(origin);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderThreadImpl::OnControlMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& msg) {
ObserverListBase<RenderProcessObserver>::Iterator it(observers_);
RenderProcessObserver* observer;
while ((observer = it.GetNext()) != NULL) {
if (observer->OnControlMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
}
if (appcache_dispatcher_->OnMessageReceived(msg))
return true;
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(RenderThreadImpl, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetZoomLevelForCurrentURL,
OnSetZoomLevelForCurrentURL)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_SetCSSColors, OnSetCSSColors)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_New, OnCreateNewView)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_PurgePluginListCache, OnPurgePluginListCache)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_NetworkStateChanged, OnNetworkStateChanged)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(DOMStorageMsg_Event, OnDOMStorageEvent)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ViewMsg_TempCrashWithData, OnTempCrashWithData)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 107,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
int ok, ret = 0;
unsigned long n, nc, l;
unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
const unsigned char *p, *q;
unsigned char *d;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
-1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
if (!ok)
return ((int)n);
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
/*
* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
* wont be doing client auth.
*/
if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
}
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
}
p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* get the certificate types */
ctype_num = *(p++);
if (s->cert->ctypes) {
OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
}
if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
/* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
}
for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
p += p[-1];
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
n2s(p, llen);
/*
* Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
* length value.
*/
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
/* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
}
if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p += llen;
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
n2s(p, llen);
#if 0
{
FILE *out;
out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
fclose(out);
}
#endif
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
n2s(p, l);
if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
q = p;
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
/* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
goto cont;
else {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
if (q != (p + l)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
p += l;
nc += l + 2;
}
if (0) {
cont:
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = 1;
goto done;
err:
s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
done:
if (ca_sk != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 3,589
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vivid_clear_fb(struct vivid_dev *dev)
{
void *p = dev->video_vbase;
const u16 *rgb = rgb555;
unsigned x, y;
if (dev->fb_defined.green.length == 6)
rgb = rgb565;
for (y = 0; y < dev->display_height; y++) {
u16 *d = p;
for (x = 0; x < dev->display_width; x++)
d[x] = rgb[(y / 16 + x / 16) % 16];
p += dev->display_byte_stride;
}
}
Commit Message: [media] media/vivid-osd: fix info leak in ioctl
The vivid_fb_ioctl() code fails to initialize the 16 _reserved bytes of
struct fb_vblank after the ->hcount member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speirofr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContents* WebContentsImpl::FromRenderFrameHostID(int render_process_host_id,
int render_frame_host_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host =
RenderFrameHost::FromID(render_process_host_id, render_frame_host_id);
if (!render_frame_host)
return nullptr;
return WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(render_frame_host);
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: isofile_free_hardlinks(struct iso9660 *iso9660)
{
struct archive_rb_node *n, *next;
for (n = ARCHIVE_RB_TREE_MIN(&(iso9660->hardlink_rbtree)); n;) {
next = __archive_rb_tree_iterate(&(iso9660->hardlink_rbtree),
n, ARCHIVE_RB_DIR_RIGHT);
free(n);
n = next;
}
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void virtnet_get_drvinfo(struct net_device *dev,
struct ethtool_drvinfo *info)
{
struct virtnet_info *vi = netdev_priv(dev);
struct virtio_device *vdev = vi->vdev;
strlcpy(info->driver, KBUILD_MODNAME, sizeof(info->driver));
strlcpy(info->version, VIRTNET_DRIVER_VERSION, sizeof(info->version));
strlcpy(info->bus_info, virtio_bus_name(vdev), sizeof(info->bus_info));
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *addr2str(hwaddr addr)
{
return nr2str(ehci_mmio_names, ARRAY_SIZE(ehci_mmio_names), addr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 5,769
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int search_keyring(struct key *keyring, struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
{
if (ctx->match_data.lookup_type == KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT) {
const void *object;
object = assoc_array_find(&keyring->keys,
&keyring_assoc_array_ops,
&ctx->index_key);
return object ? ctx->iterator(object, ctx) : 0;
}
return assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, ctx->iterator, ctx);
}
Commit Message: KEYS: ensure we free the assoc array edit if edit is valid
__key_link_end is not freeing the associated array edit structure
and this leads to a 512 byte memory leak each time an identical
existing key is added with add_key().
The reason the add_key() system call returns okay is that
key_create_or_update() calls __key_link_begin() before checking to see
whether it can update a key directly rather than adding/replacing - which
it turns out it can. Thus __key_link() is not called through
__key_instantiate_and_link() and __key_link_end() must cancel the edit.
CVE-2015-1333
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 44,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int run_filter(struct tap_filter *filter, const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/* Cannot use eth_hdr(skb) here because skb_mac_hdr() is incorrect
* at this point. */
struct ethhdr *eh = (struct ethhdr *) skb->data;
int i;
/* Exact match */
for (i = 0; i < filter->count; i++)
if (!compare_ether_addr(eh->h_dest, filter->addr[i]))
return 1;
/* Inexact match (multicast only) */
if (is_multicast_ether_addr(eh->h_dest))
return addr_hash_test(filter->mask, eh->h_dest);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int vrend_create_shader(struct vrend_context *ctx,
uint32_t handle,
const struct pipe_stream_output_info *so_info,
const char *shd_text, uint32_t offlen, uint32_t num_tokens,
uint32_t type, uint32_t pkt_length)
{
struct vrend_shader_selector *sel = NULL;
int ret_handle;
bool new_shader = true, long_shader = false;
bool finished = false;
int ret;
if (type > PIPE_SHADER_GEOMETRY)
return EINVAL;
if (offlen & VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_OFFSET_CONT)
new_shader = false;
else if (((offlen + 3) / 4) > pkt_length)
long_shader = true;
/* if we have an in progress one - don't allow a new shader
of that type or a different handle. */
if (ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type]) {
if (new_shader == true)
return EINVAL;
if (handle != ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type])
return EINVAL;
}
if (new_shader) {
sel = vrend_create_shader_state(ctx, so_info, type);
if (sel == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
if (long_shader) {
sel->buf_len = ((offlen + 3) / 4) * 4; /* round up buffer size */
sel->tmp_buf = malloc(sel->buf_len);
if (!sel->tmp_buf) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
memcpy(sel->tmp_buf, shd_text, pkt_length * 4);
sel->buf_offset = pkt_length * 4;
ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type] = handle;
} else
finished = true;
} else {
sel = vrend_object_lookup(ctx->sub->object_hash, handle, VIRGL_OBJECT_SHADER);
if (!sel) {
fprintf(stderr, "got continuation without original shader %d\n", handle);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
offlen &= ~VIRGL_OBJ_SHADER_OFFSET_CONT;
if (offlen != sel->buf_offset) {
fprintf(stderr, "Got mismatched shader continuation %d vs %d\n",
offlen, sel->buf_offset);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
/*make sure no overflow */
if (pkt_length * 4 < pkt_length ||
pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset < pkt_length * 4 ||
pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset < sel->buf_offset) {
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
if ((pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset) > sel->buf_len) {
fprintf(stderr, "Got too large shader continuation %d vs %d\n",
pkt_length * 4 + sel->buf_offset, sel->buf_len);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
memcpy(sel->tmp_buf + sel->buf_offset, shd_text, pkt_length * 4);
sel->buf_offset += pkt_length * 4;
if (sel->buf_offset >= sel->buf_len) {
finished = true;
shd_text = sel->tmp_buf;
}
}
if (finished) {
struct tgsi_token *tokens;
tokens = calloc(num_tokens + 10, sizeof(struct tgsi_token));
if (!tokens) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
if (vrend_dump_shaders)
fprintf(stderr,"shader\n%s\n", shd_text);
if (!tgsi_text_translate((const char *)shd_text, tokens, num_tokens + 10)) {
free(tokens);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
}
if (vrend_finish_shader(ctx, sel, tokens)) {
free(tokens);
ret = EINVAL;
goto error;
} else {
free(sel->tmp_buf);
sel->tmp_buf = NULL;
}
free(tokens);
ctx->sub->long_shader_in_progress_handle[type] = 0;
}
if (new_shader) {
ret_handle = vrend_renderer_object_insert(ctx, sel, sizeof(*sel), handle, VIRGL_OBJECT_SHADER);
if (ret_handle == 0) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
}
return 0;
error:
if (new_shader)
vrend_destroy_shader_selector(sel);
else
vrend_renderer_object_destroy(ctx, handle);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 8,833
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline static const char *asString(IOMX::InternalOptionType i, const char *def = "??") {
switch (i) {
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_SUSPEND: return "SUSPEND";
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_REPEAT_PREVIOUS_FRAME_DELAY:
return "REPEAT_PREVIOUS_FRAME_DELAY";
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_MAX_TIMESTAMP_GAP: return "MAX_TIMESTAMP_GAP";
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_MAX_FPS: return "MAX_FPS";
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_START_TIME: return "START_TIME";
case IOMX::INTERNAL_OPTION_TIME_LAPSE: return "TIME_LAPSE";
default: return def;
}
}
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 157,712
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::OnAfterPossibleChange(bool allow_keyword_ui_change) {
State new_state;
GetState(&new_state);
OmniboxView::StateChanges state_changes =
GetStateChanges(state_before_change_, new_state);
state_changes.text_differs =
state_changes.text_differs ||
(ime_composing_before_change_ != IsIMEComposing());
bool something_changed = model()->OnAfterPossibleChange(
state_changes, allow_keyword_ui_change && !IsIMEComposing());
if (state_changes.selection_differs && !is_mouse_pressed_ &&
UnapplySteadyStateElisions(UnelisionGesture::OTHER)) {
something_changed = true;
state_changes.text_differs = true;
}
if (something_changed &&
(state_changes.text_differs || state_changes.keyword_differs))
TextChanged();
else if (state_changes.selection_differs)
EmphasizeURLComponents();
return something_changed;
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 142,439
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void withScriptStateObjExceptionMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "withScriptStateObjException", "TestObject", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
ScriptState* currentState = ScriptState::current();
if (!currentState)
return;
ScriptState& state = *currentState;
RefPtr<TestObject> result = imp->withScriptStateObjException(&state, exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.throwIfNeeded())
return;
if (state.hadException()) {
v8::Local<v8::Value> exception = state.exception();
state.clearException();
throwError(exception, info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
v8SetReturnValue(info, result.release());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int csnmp_config_add_host_security_level(host_definition_t *hd,
oconfig_item_t *ci) {
char buffer[16];
int status;
status = cf_util_get_string_buffer(ci, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (status != 0)
return status;
if (strcasecmp("noAuthNoPriv", buffer) == 0)
hd->security_level = SNMP_SEC_LEVEL_NOAUTH;
else if (strcasecmp("authNoPriv", buffer) == 0)
hd->security_level = SNMP_SEC_LEVEL_AUTHNOPRIV;
else if (strcasecmp("authPriv", buffer) == 0)
hd->security_level = SNMP_SEC_LEVEL_AUTHPRIV;
else {
WARNING("snmp plugin: The `SecurityLevel' config option must be "
"`noAuthNoPriv', `authNoPriv', or `authPriv'.");
return (-1);
}
DEBUG("snmp plugin: host = %s; host->security_level = %d;", hd->name,
hd->security_level);
return (0);
} /* int csnmp_config_add_host_security_level */
Commit Message: snmp plugin: Fix double free of request PDU
snmp_sess_synch_response() always frees request PDU, in both case of request
error and success. If error condition occurs inside of `while (status == 0)`
loop, double free of `req` happens.
Issue: #2291
Signed-off-by: Florian Forster <octo@collectd.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 59,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long ocfs2_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset,
loff_t len)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct ocfs2_space_resv sr;
int change_size = 1;
int cmd = OCFS2_IOC_RESVSP64;
if (mode & ~(FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!ocfs2_writes_unwritten_extents(osb))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
change_size = 0;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE)
cmd = OCFS2_IOC_UNRESVSP64;
sr.l_whence = 0;
sr.l_start = (s64)offset;
sr.l_len = (s64)len;
return __ocfs2_change_file_space(NULL, inode, offset, cmd, &sr,
change_size);
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 85,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fdctrl_seek_to_next_sect(FDCtrl *fdctrl, FDrive *cur_drv)
{
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("seek to next sector (%d %02x %02x => %d)\n",
cur_drv->head, cur_drv->track, cur_drv->sect,
fd_sector(cur_drv));
/* XXX: cur_drv->sect >= cur_drv->last_sect should be an
error in fact */
uint8_t new_head = cur_drv->head;
uint8_t new_track = cur_drv->track;
uint8_t new_sect = cur_drv->sect;
int ret = 1;
if (new_sect >= cur_drv->last_sect ||
new_sect == fdctrl->eot) {
new_sect = 1;
if (FD_MULTI_TRACK(fdctrl->data_state)) {
if (new_head == 0 &&
(cur_drv->flags & FDISK_DBL_SIDES) != 0) {
new_head = 1;
} else {
new_head = 0;
new_track++;
fdctrl->status0 |= FD_SR0_SEEK;
if ((cur_drv->flags & FDISK_DBL_SIDES) == 0) {
ret = 0;
}
}
} else {
fdctrl->status0 |= FD_SR0_SEEK;
new_track++;
ret = 0;
}
if (ret == 1) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("seek to next track (%d %02x %02x => %d)\n",
new_head, new_track, new_sect, fd_sector(cur_drv));
}
} else {
new_sect++;
}
fd_seek(cur_drv, new_head, new_track, new_sect, 1);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,339
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Current_Ppem( EXEC_OP )
{
return TT_MULFIX( CUR.tt_metrics.ppem, CURRENT_Ratio() );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: php_apache_sapi_header_handler(sapi_header_struct *sapi_header, sapi_header_op_enum op, sapi_headers_struct *sapi_headers TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_struct *ctx;
char *val, *ptr;
ctx = SG(server_context);
switch (op) {
case SAPI_HEADER_DELETE:
apr_table_unset(ctx->r->headers_out, sapi_header->header);
return 0;
case SAPI_HEADER_DELETE_ALL:
apr_table_clear(ctx->r->headers_out);
return 0;
case SAPI_HEADER_ADD:
case SAPI_HEADER_REPLACE:
val = strchr(sapi_header->header, ':');
if (!val) {
return 0;
}
ptr = val;
*val = '\0';
do {
val++;
} while (*val == ' ');
if (!strcasecmp(sapi_header->header, "content-type")) {
if (ctx->content_type) {
efree(ctx->content_type);
}
ctx->content_type = estrdup(val);
} else if (!strcasecmp(sapi_header->header, "content-length")) {
#ifdef PHP_WIN32
# ifdef APR_HAS_LARGE_FILES
ap_set_content_length(ctx->r, (apr_off_t) _strtoui64(val, (char **)NULL, 10));
# else
ap_set_content_length(ctx->r, (apr_off_t) strtol(val, (char **)NULL, 10));
# endif
#else
ap_set_content_length(ctx->r, (apr_off_t) strtol(val, (char **)NULL, 10));
#endif
} else if (op == SAPI_HEADER_REPLACE) {
apr_table_set(ctx->r->headers_out, sapi_header->header, val);
} else {
apr_table_add(ctx->r->headers_out, sapi_header->header, val);
}
*ptr = ':';
return SAPI_HEADER_ADD;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline uint32_t ne2000_mem_readl(NE2000State *s, uint32_t addr)
{
addr &= ~1; /* XXX: check exact behaviour if not even */
if (addr < 32
|| (addr >= NE2000_PMEM_START
&& addr + sizeof(uint32_t) <= NE2000_MEM_SIZE)) {
return ldl_le_p(s->mem + addr);
} else {
return 0xffffffff;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GoogleServiceAuthError ConnectionStatusToAuthError(
sync_api::ConnectionStatus status) {
switch (status) {
case sync_api::CONNECTION_OK:
return GoogleServiceAuthError::None();
break;
case sync_api::CONNECTION_AUTH_ERROR:
return GoogleServiceAuthError(
GoogleServiceAuthError::INVALID_GAIA_CREDENTIALS);
break;
case sync_api::CONNECTION_SERVER_ERROR:
return GoogleServiceAuthError(GoogleServiceAuthError::CONNECTION_FAILED);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return GoogleServiceAuthError(GoogleServiceAuthError::CONNECTION_FAILED);
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int key_notify_sa_flush(const struct km_event *c)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
skb = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return -ENOBUFS;
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
hdr->sadb_msg_satype = pfkey_proto2satype(c->data.proto);
hdr->sadb_msg_type = SADB_FLUSH;
hdr->sadb_msg_seq = c->seq;
hdr->sadb_msg_pid = c->portid;
hdr->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) 0;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) / sizeof(uint64_t));
hdr->sadb_msg_reserved = 0;
pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, BROADCAST_ALL, NULL, c->net);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLenum WebGLRenderingContextBase::getError() {
if (!lost_context_errors_.IsEmpty()) {
GLenum error = lost_context_errors_.front();
lost_context_errors_.erase(0);
return error;
}
if (isContextLost())
return GL_NO_ERROR;
if (!synthetic_errors_.IsEmpty()) {
GLenum error = synthetic_errors_.front();
synthetic_errors_.erase(0);
return error;
}
return ContextGL()->GetError();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 133,826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __be32 mark_session_dead_locked(struct nfsd4_session *ses, int ref_held_by_me)
{
if (atomic_read(&ses->se_ref) > ref_held_by_me)
return nfserr_jukebox;
ses->se_flags |= NFS4_SESSION_DEAD;
return nfs_ok;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::RestoreScrollPositionAndViewState(
FrameLoadType load_type,
bool is_same_document,
HistoryItem::ViewState* view_state,
HistoryScrollRestorationType scroll_restoration_type) {
LocalFrameView* view = frame_->View();
if (!view || !view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea() ||
!state_machine_.CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad() ||
!frame_->IsAttached()) {
return;
}
if (!NeedsHistoryItemRestore(load_type) || !view_state)
return;
bool should_restore_scroll =
scroll_restoration_type != kScrollRestorationManual;
bool should_restore_scale = view_state->page_scale_factor_;
bool can_restore_without_clamping =
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->ClampScrollOffset(
view_state->scroll_offset_) == view_state->scroll_offset_;
bool should_force_clamping = !frame_->IsLoading() || is_same_document;
if (!can_restore_without_clamping && should_force_clamping)
frame_->GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayout();
bool can_restore_without_annoying_user =
!GetDocumentLoader()->GetInitialScrollState().was_scrolled_by_user &&
(can_restore_without_clamping || should_force_clamping ||
!should_restore_scroll);
if (!can_restore_without_annoying_user)
return;
if (should_restore_scroll) {
ScrollOffset previous_offset =
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->GetScrollOffset();
bool did_restore =
ShouldSerializeScrollAnchor() &&
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->RestoreScrollAnchor(
{view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.selector_,
LayoutPoint(view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.offset_.x,
view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.offset_.y),
view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.simhash_});
if (!did_restore) {
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->SetScrollOffset(
view_state->scroll_offset_, kProgrammaticScroll);
}
did_restore |= (previous_offset !=
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->GetScrollOffset());
if (did_restore) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(
"Layout.ScrollRestoration.PrecededByJsScroll",
GetDocumentLoader()->GetInitialScrollState().was_scrolled_by_js);
}
}
if (frame_->IsMainFrame()) {
ScrollOffset visual_viewport_offset(
view_state->visual_viewport_scroll_offset_);
if (visual_viewport_offset.Width() == -1 &&
visual_viewport_offset.Height() == -1) {
visual_viewport_offset =
view_state->scroll_offset_ -
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->GetScrollOffset();
}
VisualViewport& visual_viewport = frame_->GetPage()->GetVisualViewport();
if (should_restore_scale && should_restore_scroll) {
visual_viewport.SetScaleAndLocation(view_state->page_scale_factor_,
FloatPoint(visual_viewport_offset));
} else if (should_restore_scale) {
visual_viewport.SetScale(view_state->page_scale_factor_);
} else if (should_restore_scroll) {
visual_viewport.SetLocation(FloatPoint(visual_viewport_offset));
}
if (ScrollingCoordinator* scrolling_coordinator =
frame_->GetPage()->GetScrollingCoordinator())
scrolling_coordinator->FrameViewRootLayerDidChange(view);
}
GetDocumentLoader()->GetInitialScrollState().did_restore_from_history = true;
}
Commit Message: Only allow downloading in response to real keyboard modifiers
BUG=848531
Change-Id: I97554c8d312243b55647f1376945aee32dbd95bf
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1082216
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564051}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 154,768
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileSystemOperation::GetUsageAndQuotaThenRunTask(
const GURL& origin, FileSystemType type,
const base::Closure& task,
const base::Closure& error_callback) {
quota::QuotaManagerProxy* quota_manager_proxy =
file_system_context()->quota_manager_proxy();
if (!quota_manager_proxy ||
!file_system_context()->GetQuotaUtil(type)) {
operation_context_.set_allowed_bytes_growth(kint64max);
task.Run();
return;
}
TaskParamsForDidGetQuota params;
params.origin = origin;
params.type = type;
params.task = task;
params.error_callback = error_callback;
DCHECK(quota_manager_proxy);
DCHECK(quota_manager_proxy->quota_manager());
quota_manager_proxy->quota_manager()->GetUsageAndQuota(
origin,
FileSystemTypeToQuotaStorageType(type),
base::Bind(&FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask,
base::Unretained(this), params));
}
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 1
| 170,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::EnsurePaintLocationDataValidForNode(const Node* node) {
DCHECK(node);
if (!node->InActiveDocument())
return;
UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
if (View() && node->GetLayoutObject() &&
node->GetLayoutObject()->StyleRef().SubtreeIsSticky()) {
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SlimmingPaintV2Enabled()) {
View()->UpdateAllLifecyclePhasesExceptPaint();
} else {
View()->UpdateLifecycleToCompositingInputsClean();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err tkhd_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_TrackHeaderBox *ptr = (GF_TrackHeaderBox *)s;
if (ptr->version == 1) {
ptr->creationTime = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
ptr->modificationTime = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
ptr->trackID = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->reserved1 = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->duration = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
} else {
ptr->creationTime = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->modificationTime = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->trackID = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->reserved1 = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->duration = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
ptr->reserved2[0] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->reserved2[1] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->layer = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
ptr->alternate_group = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
ptr->volume = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
ptr->reserved3 = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
ptr->matrix[0] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[1] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[2] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[3] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[4] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[5] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[6] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[7] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[8] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->width = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->height = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Element::recalcStyle(StyleChange change)
{
ASSERT(document()->inStyleRecalc());
if (hasCustomStyleCallbacks())
willRecalcStyle(change);
RefPtr<RenderStyle> currentStyle(renderStyle());
bool hasParentStyle = parentNodeForRenderingAndStyle() ? static_cast<bool>(parentNodeForRenderingAndStyle()->renderStyle()) : false;
bool hasDirectAdjacentRules = childrenAffectedByDirectAdjacentRules();
bool hasIndirectAdjacentRules = childrenAffectedByForwardPositionalRules();
if ((change > NoChange || needsStyleRecalc())) {
if (hasRareData())
elementRareData()->resetComputedStyle();
}
if (hasParentStyle && (change >= Inherit || needsStyleRecalc())) {
StyleChange localChange = Detach;
RefPtr<RenderStyle> newStyle;
if (currentStyle) {
newStyle = styleForRenderer();
localChange = Node::diff(currentStyle.get(), newStyle.get(), document());
} else if (attached() && isActiveInsertionPoint(this)) {
localChange = change;
}
if (localChange == Detach) {
AttachContext reattachContext;
reattachContext.resolvedStyle = newStyle.get();
reattach(reattachContext);
clearNeedsStyleRecalc();
clearChildNeedsStyleRecalc();
if (hasCustomStyleCallbacks())
didRecalcStyle(change);
return;
}
InspectorInstrumentation::didRecalculateStyleForElement(this);
if (RenderObject* renderer = this->renderer()) {
if (localChange != NoChange || pseudoStyleCacheIsInvalid(currentStyle.get(), newStyle.get()) || (change == Force && renderer->requiresForcedStyleRecalcPropagation()) || styleChangeType() == SyntheticStyleChange)
renderer->setAnimatableStyle(newStyle.get());
else if (needsStyleRecalc()) {
renderer->setStyleInternal(newStyle.get());
}
}
if (document()->styleSheetCollection()->usesRemUnits() && document()->documentElement() == this && localChange != NoChange && currentStyle && newStyle && currentStyle->fontSize() != newStyle->fontSize()) {
document()->styleResolver()->invalidateMatchedPropertiesCache();
change = Force;
}
if (styleChangeType() == FullStyleChange)
change = Force;
else if (change != Force)
change = localChange;
}
StyleResolverParentPusher parentPusher(this);
if (ElementShadow* shadow = this->shadow()) {
if (shouldRecalcStyle(change, shadow)) {
parentPusher.push();
shadow->recalcStyle(change);
}
}
if (shouldRecalcStyle(change, this))
updatePseudoElement(BEFORE, change);
bool forceCheckOfNextElementSibling = false;
bool forceCheckOfAnyElementSibling = false;
for (Node *n = firstChild(); n; n = n->nextSibling()) {
if (n->isTextNode()) {
toText(n)->recalcTextStyle(change);
continue;
}
if (!n->isElementNode())
continue;
Element* element = toElement(n);
bool childRulesChanged = element->needsStyleRecalc() && element->styleChangeType() == FullStyleChange;
if ((forceCheckOfNextElementSibling || forceCheckOfAnyElementSibling))
element->setNeedsStyleRecalc();
if (shouldRecalcStyle(change, element)) {
parentPusher.push();
element->recalcStyle(change);
}
forceCheckOfNextElementSibling = childRulesChanged && hasDirectAdjacentRules;
forceCheckOfAnyElementSibling = forceCheckOfAnyElementSibling || (childRulesChanged && hasIndirectAdjacentRules);
}
if (shouldRecalcStyle(change, this))
updatePseudoElement(AFTER, change);
clearNeedsStyleRecalc();
clearChildNeedsStyleRecalc();
if (hasCustomStyleCallbacks())
didRecalcStyle(change);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(xml_set_object)
{
xml_parser *parser;
zval *pind, *mythis;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ro", &pind, &mythis) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(parser,xml_parser *, &pind, -1, "XML Parser", le_xml_parser);
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
if (parser->object) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&parser->object);
}
/* please leave this commented - or ask thies@thieso.net before doing it (again) */
/* #ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval_add_ref(&parser->object);
#endif */
ALLOC_ZVAL(parser->object);
MAKE_COPY_ZVAL(&mythis, parser->object);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 165,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PermissionsData::PageAccess PermissionsData::GetContentScriptAccess(
const GURL& document_url,
int tab_id,
std::string* error) const {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
const PermissionSet* tab_permissions = GetTabSpecificPermissions(tab_id);
return CanRunOnPage(
document_url, tab_id, active_permissions_unsafe_->scriptable_hosts(),
withheld_permissions_unsafe_->scriptable_hosts(),
tab_permissions ? &tab_permissions->scriptable_hosts() : nullptr, error);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check schemes
Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check the schemes of the patterns
when evaluating if one pattern contains another. This is important in
order to prevent extensions from requesting chrome:-scheme permissions
via the permissions API when <all_urls> is specified as an optional
permission.
Bug: 859600,918470
Change-Id: If04d945ad0c939e84a80d83502c0f84b6ef0923d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1396561
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621410}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 153,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int hugetlb_overcommit_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer,
size_t *length, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct hstate *h = &default_hstate;
unsigned long tmp;
int ret;
if (!hugepages_supported())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
tmp = h->nr_overcommit_huge_pages;
if (write && hstate_is_gigantic(h))
return -EINVAL;
table->data = &tmp;
table->maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long);
ret = proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, length, ppos);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (write) {
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
h->nr_overcommit_huge_pages = tmp;
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xor_init(struct loop_device *lo, const struct loop_info64 *info)
{
if (unlikely(info->lo_encrypt_key_size <= 0))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 84,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ClearBounds(Image *image,RectangleInfo *bounds)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
ssize_t
y;
if (bounds->x < 0)
return;
if (image->matte == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageAlphaChannel(image,OpaqueAlphaChannel);
exception=(&image->exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) bounds->height; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,bounds->x,bounds->y+y,bounds->width,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) bounds->width; x++)
{
q->opacity=(Quantum) TransparentOpacity;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1629
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 88,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void srpt_set_ioc(u8 *c_list, u32 slot, u8 value)
{
u16 id;
u8 tmp;
id = (slot - 1) / 2;
if (slot & 0x1) {
tmp = c_list[id] & 0xf;
c_list[id] = (value << 4) | tmp;
} else {
tmp = c_list[id] & 0xf0;
c_list[id] = (value & 0xf) | tmp;
}
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 50,703
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Downmix_foldFrom7Point1(int16_t *pSrc, int16_t*pDst, size_t numFrames, bool accumulate) {
int32_t lt, rt, centerPlusLfeContrib; // samples in Q19.12 format
if (accumulate) {
while (numFrames) {
centerPlusLfeContrib = (pSrc[2] * MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12)
+ (pSrc[3] * MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12);
lt = (pSrc[0] << 12) + centerPlusLfeContrib + (pSrc[6] << 12) + (pSrc[4] << 12);
rt = (pSrc[1] << 12) + centerPlusLfeContrib + (pSrc[7] << 12) + (pSrc[5] << 12);
pDst[0] = clamp16(pDst[0] + (lt >> 13));
pDst[1] = clamp16(pDst[1] + (rt >> 13));
pSrc += 8;
pDst += 2;
numFrames--;
}
} else { // same code as above but without adding and clamping pDst[i] to itself
while (numFrames) {
centerPlusLfeContrib = (pSrc[2] * MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12)
+ (pSrc[3] * MINUS_3_DB_IN_Q19_12);
lt = (pSrc[0] << 12) + centerPlusLfeContrib + (pSrc[6] << 12) + (pSrc[4] << 12);
rt = (pSrc[1] << 12) + centerPlusLfeContrib + (pSrc[7] << 12) + (pSrc[5] << 12);
pDst[0] = clamp16(lt >> 13); // differs from when accumulate is true above
pDst[1] = clamp16(rt >> 13); // differs from when accumulate is true above
pSrc += 8;
pDst += 2;
numFrames--;
}
}
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dwc3_gadget_get_frame(struct usb_gadget *g)
{
struct dwc3 *dwc = gadget_to_dwc(g);
return __dwc3_gadget_get_frame(dwc);
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 88,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_usbmidi_in_endpoint_create(struct snd_usb_midi *umidi,
struct snd_usb_midi_endpoint_info *ep_info,
struct snd_usb_midi_endpoint *rep)
{
struct snd_usb_midi_in_endpoint *ep;
void *buffer;
unsigned int pipe;
int length;
unsigned int i;
rep->in = NULL;
ep = kzalloc(sizeof(*ep), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ep)
return -ENOMEM;
ep->umidi = umidi;
for (i = 0; i < INPUT_URBS; ++i) {
ep->urbs[i] = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ep->urbs[i]) {
snd_usbmidi_in_endpoint_delete(ep);
return -ENOMEM;
}
}
if (ep_info->in_interval)
pipe = usb_rcvintpipe(umidi->dev, ep_info->in_ep);
else
pipe = usb_rcvbulkpipe(umidi->dev, ep_info->in_ep);
length = usb_maxpacket(umidi->dev, pipe, 0);
for (i = 0; i < INPUT_URBS; ++i) {
buffer = usb_alloc_coherent(umidi->dev, length, GFP_KERNEL,
&ep->urbs[i]->transfer_dma);
if (!buffer) {
snd_usbmidi_in_endpoint_delete(ep);
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (ep_info->in_interval)
usb_fill_int_urb(ep->urbs[i], umidi->dev,
pipe, buffer, length,
snd_usbmidi_in_urb_complete,
ep, ep_info->in_interval);
else
usb_fill_bulk_urb(ep->urbs[i], umidi->dev,
pipe, buffer, length,
snd_usbmidi_in_urb_complete, ep);
ep->urbs[i]->transfer_flags = URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
}
rep->in = ep;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ioapic_mmio_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_io_device *this,
gpa_t addr, int len, void *val)
{
struct kvm_ioapic *ioapic = to_ioapic(this);
u32 result;
if (!ioapic_in_range(ioapic, addr))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ioapic_debug("addr %lx\n", (unsigned long)addr);
ASSERT(!(addr & 0xf)); /* check alignment */
addr &= 0xff;
spin_lock(&ioapic->lock);
switch (addr) {
case IOAPIC_REG_SELECT:
result = ioapic->ioregsel;
break;
case IOAPIC_REG_WINDOW:
result = ioapic_read_indirect(ioapic, addr, len);
break;
default:
result = 0;
break;
}
spin_unlock(&ioapic->lock);
switch (len) {
case 8:
*(u64 *) val = result;
break;
case 1:
case 2:
case 4:
memcpy(val, (char *)&result, len);
break;
default:
printk(KERN_WARNING "ioapic: wrong length %d\n", len);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix out-of-bounds accesses of rtc_eoi map
KVM was using arrays of size KVM_MAX_VCPUS with vcpu_id, but ID can be
bigger that the maximal number of VCPUs, resulting in out-of-bounds
access.
Found by syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 at addr [...]
Write of size 1 by task a.out/27101
CPU: 1 PID: 27101 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.9.0-rc5+ #49
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[...]
Call Trace:
[...] __apic_accept_irq+0xb33/0xb50 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:905
[...] kvm_apic_set_irq+0x10e/0x180 arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:495
[...] kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic+0x732/0xc10 arch/x86/kvm/irq_comm.c:86
[...] ioapic_service+0x41d/0x760 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:360
[...] ioapic_set_irq+0x275/0x6c0 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:222
[...] kvm_ioapic_inject_all arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:235
[...] kvm_set_ioapic+0x223/0x310 arch/x86/kvm/ioapic.c:670
[...] kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3668
[...] kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0x1a08/0x23c0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:3999
[...] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x1fa/0x1a70 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3099
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: af1bae5497b9 ("KVM: x86: bump KVM_MAX_VCPU_ID to 1023")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 47,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perf_event_init_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
{
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx, *parent_ctx;
struct perf_event_context *cloned_ctx;
struct perf_event *event;
struct task_struct *parent = current;
int inherited_all = 1;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
if (likely(!parent->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn]))
return 0;
/*
* If the parent's context is a clone, pin it so it won't get
* swapped under us.
*/
parent_ctx = perf_pin_task_context(parent, ctxn);
if (!parent_ctx)
return 0;
/*
* No need to check if parent_ctx != NULL here; since we saw
* it non-NULL earlier, the only reason for it to become NULL
* is if we exit, and since we're currently in the middle of
* a fork we can't be exiting at the same time.
*/
/*
* Lock the parent list. No need to lock the child - not PID
* hashed yet and not running, so nobody can access it.
*/
mutex_lock(&parent_ctx->mutex);
/*
* We dont have to disable NMIs - we are only looking at
* the list, not manipulating it:
*/
list_for_each_entry(event, &parent_ctx->pinned_groups, group_entry) {
ret = inherit_task_group(event, parent, parent_ctx,
child, ctxn, &inherited_all);
if (ret)
break;
}
/*
* We can't hold ctx->lock when iterating the ->flexible_group list due
* to allocations, but we need to prevent rotation because
* rotate_ctx() will change the list from interrupt context.
*/
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&parent_ctx->lock, flags);
parent_ctx->rotate_disable = 1;
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&parent_ctx->lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(event, &parent_ctx->flexible_groups, group_entry) {
ret = inherit_task_group(event, parent, parent_ctx,
child, ctxn, &inherited_all);
if (ret)
break;
}
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&parent_ctx->lock, flags);
parent_ctx->rotate_disable = 0;
child_ctx = child->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn];
if (child_ctx && inherited_all) {
/*
* Mark the child context as a clone of the parent
* context, or of whatever the parent is a clone of.
*
* Note that if the parent is a clone, the holding of
* parent_ctx->lock avoids it from being uncloned.
*/
cloned_ctx = parent_ctx->parent_ctx;
if (cloned_ctx) {
child_ctx->parent_ctx = cloned_ctx;
child_ctx->parent_gen = parent_ctx->parent_gen;
} else {
child_ctx->parent_ctx = parent_ctx;
child_ctx->parent_gen = parent_ctx->generation;
}
get_ctx(child_ctx->parent_ctx);
}
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&parent_ctx->lock, flags);
mutex_unlock(&parent_ctx->mutex);
perf_unpin_context(parent_ctx);
put_ctx(parent_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 50,481
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mprint(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic *m)
{
uint64_t v;
float vf;
double vd;
int64_t t = 0;
char buf[128], tbuf[26];
union VALUETYPE *p = &ms->ms_value;
switch (m->type) {
case FILE_BYTE:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->b);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%c",
(unsigned char)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%c"),
(unsigned char) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(char);
break;
case FILE_SHORT:
case FILE_BESHORT:
case FILE_LESHORT:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->h);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%hu",
(unsigned short)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%hu"),
(unsigned short) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(short);
break;
case FILE_LONG:
case FILE_BELONG:
case FILE_LELONG:
case FILE_MELONG:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, (uint64_t)p->l);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u", (uint32_t)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%u"),
(uint32_t) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case FILE_QUAD:
case FILE_BEQUAD:
case FILE_LEQUAD:
v = file_signextend(ms, m, p->q);
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)v);
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%llu"),
(unsigned long long) v) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(int64_t);
break;
case FILE_STRING:
case FILE_PSTRING:
case FILE_BESTRING16:
case FILE_LESTRING16:
if (m->reln == '=' || m->reln == '!') {
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"), m->value.s) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + m->vallen;
}
else {
char *str = p->s;
/* compute t before we mangle the string? */
t = ms->offset + strlen(str);
if (*m->value.s == '\0')
str[strcspn(str, "\n")] = '\0';
if (m->str_flags & STRING_TRIM) {
char *last;
while (isspace((unsigned char)*str))
str++;
last = str;
while (*last)
last++;
--last;
while (isspace((unsigned char)*last))
last--;
*++last = '\0';
}
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"), str) == -1)
return -1;
if (m->type == FILE_PSTRING)
t += file_pstring_length_size(m);
}
break;
case FILE_DATE:
case FILE_BEDATE:
case FILE_LEDATE:
case FILE_MEDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->l, FILE_T_LOCAL,
tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case FILE_LDATE:
case FILE_BELDATE:
case FILE_LELDATE:
case FILE_MELDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->l, 0, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case FILE_QDATE:
case FILE_BEQDATE:
case FILE_LEQDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, FILE_T_LOCAL, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_QLDATE:
case FILE_BEQLDATE:
case FILE_LEQLDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, 0, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_QWDATE:
case FILE_BEQWDATE:
case FILE_LEQWDATE:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"),
file_fmttime(p->q, FILE_T_WINDOWS, tbuf)) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset + sizeof(uint64_t);
break;
case FILE_FLOAT:
case FILE_BEFLOAT:
case FILE_LEFLOAT:
vf = p->f;
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%g", vf);
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%g"), vf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(float);
break;
case FILE_DOUBLE:
case FILE_BEDOUBLE:
case FILE_LEDOUBLE:
vd = p->d;
switch (check_fmt(ms, m)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 1:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%g", vd);
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"), buf) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%g"), vd) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
t = ms->offset + sizeof(double);
break;
case FILE_REGEX: {
char *cp;
int rval;
cp = strndup((const char *)ms->search.s, ms->search.rm_len);
if (cp == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, ms->search.rm_len);
return -1;
}
rval = file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"), cp);
free(cp);
if (rval == -1)
return -1;
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START))
t = ms->search.offset;
else
t = ms->search.offset + ms->search.rm_len;
break;
}
case FILE_SEARCH:
if (file_printf(ms, F(m->desc, "%s"), m->value.s) == -1)
return -1;
if ((m->str_flags & REGEX_OFFSET_START))
t = ms->search.offset;
else
t = ms->search.offset + m->vallen;
break;
case FILE_DEFAULT:
case FILE_CLEAR:
if (file_printf(ms, "%s", m->desc) == -1)
return -1;
t = ms->offset;
break;
case FILE_INDIRECT:
case FILE_USE:
case FILE_NAME:
t = ms->offset;
break;
default:
file_magerror(ms, "invalid m->type (%d) in mprint()", m->type);
return -1;
}
return (int32_t)t;
}
Commit Message: PR/313: Aaron Reffett: Check properly for exceeding the offset.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 39,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::shouldMergeWithLegacyDescription(ViewportDescription::Type origin)
{
return settings() && settings()->viewportMetaMergeContentQuirk() && m_legacyViewportDescription.isMetaViewportType() && m_legacyViewportDescription.type == origin;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tipc_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *new_sock, int flags)
{
struct sock *new_sk, *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *buf;
struct tipc_sock *new_tsock;
struct tipc_msg *msg;
long timeo;
int res;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sock->state != SS_LISTENING) {
res = -EINVAL;
goto exit;
}
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & O_NONBLOCK);
res = tipc_wait_for_accept(sock, timeo);
if (res)
goto exit;
buf = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
res = tipc_sk_create(sock_net(sock->sk), new_sock, 0, 1);
if (res)
goto exit;
security_sk_clone(sock->sk, new_sock->sk);
new_sk = new_sock->sk;
new_tsock = tipc_sk(new_sk);
msg = buf_msg(buf);
/* we lock on new_sk; but lockdep sees the lock on sk */
lock_sock_nested(new_sk, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
/*
* Reject any stray messages received by new socket
* before the socket lock was taken (very, very unlikely)
*/
tsk_rej_rx_queue(new_sk);
/* Connect new socket to it's peer */
tipc_sk_finish_conn(new_tsock, msg_origport(msg), msg_orignode(msg));
new_sock->state = SS_CONNECTED;
tsk_set_importance(new_tsock, msg_importance(msg));
if (msg_named(msg)) {
new_tsock->conn_type = msg_nametype(msg);
new_tsock->conn_instance = msg_nameinst(msg);
}
/*
* Respond to 'SYN-' by discarding it & returning 'ACK'-.
* Respond to 'SYN+' by queuing it on new socket.
*/
if (!msg_data_sz(msg)) {
struct msghdr m = {NULL,};
tsk_advance_rx_queue(sk);
__tipc_send_stream(new_sock, &m, 0);
} else {
__skb_dequeue(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
__skb_queue_head(&new_sk->sk_receive_queue, buf);
skb_set_owner_r(buf, new_sk);
}
release_sock(new_sk);
exit:
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 52,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void armv8pmu_reset(void *info)
{
u32 idx, nb_cnt = cpu_pmu->num_events;
/* The counter and interrupt enable registers are unknown at reset. */
for (idx = ARMV8_IDX_CYCLE_COUNTER; idx < nb_cnt; ++idx)
armv8pmu_disable_event(NULL, idx);
/* Initialize & Reset PMNC: C and P bits. */
armv8pmu_pmcr_write(ARMV8_PMCR_P | ARMV8_PMCR_C);
/* Disable access from userspace. */
asm volatile("msr pmuserenr_el0, %0" :: "r" (0));
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 56,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
int err;
struct super_block *sb;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
char *options;
if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) {
ns = (struct pid_namespace *)data;
options = NULL;
} else {
ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
options = data;
/* Does the mounter have privilege over the pid namespace? */
if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
}
sb = sget(fs_type, proc_test_super, proc_set_super, flags, ns);
if (IS_ERR(sb))
return ERR_CAST(sb);
if (!proc_parse_options(options, ns)) {
deactivate_locked_super(sb);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
if (!sb->s_root) {
err = proc_fill_super(sb);
if (err) {
deactivate_locked_super(sb);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
sb->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
/* User space would break if executables appear on proc */
sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC;
}
return dget(sb->s_root);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 167,444
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pvscsi_on_cmd_config(PVSCSIState *s)
{
trace_pvscsi_on_cmd_noimpl("PVSCSI_CMD_CONFIG");
return PVSCSI_COMMAND_PROCESSING_FAILED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DocumentLoader::checkLoadComplete()
{
if (!m_frame || isLoading())
return;
#if !ENABLE(THREADED_HTML_PARSER)
ASSERT(this == frameLoader()->activeDocumentLoader());
#endif
m_frame->document()->domWindow()->finishedLoading();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sigpending, old_sigset_t __user *, set)
{
return do_sigpending(set, sizeof(*set));
}
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 33,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SimulateFreezeSignal(content::WebContents* contents) {
static_cast<TabLifecycleUnitSource::TabLifecycleUnit*>(
TabLifecycleUnitExternal::FromWebContents(contents))
->UpdateLifecycleState(mojom::LifecycleState::kFrozen);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,146
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: psf_get_filelen (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{
#if 0
/*
** Windoze is SOOOOO FUCKED!!!!!!!
** This code should work but doesn't. Why?
** Code below does work.
*/
struct _stati64 statbuf ;
if (_fstati64 (psf->file.filedes, &statbuf))
{ psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
return (sf_count_t) -1 ;
} ;
return statbuf.st_size ;
#else
sf_count_t current, filelen ;
if (psf->virtual_io)
return psf->vio.get_filelen (psf->vio_user_data) ;
if ((current = _telli64 (psf->file.filedes)) < 0)
{ psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
return (sf_count_t) -1 ;
} ;
/*
** Lets face it, windoze if FUBAR!!!
**
** For some reason, I have to call _lseeki64() TWICE to get to the
** end of the file.
**
** This might have been avoided if windows had implemented the POSIX
** standard function fsync() but NO, that would have been too easy.
**
** I am VERY close to saying that windoze will no longer be supported
** by libsndfile and changing the license to GPL at the same time.
*/
_lseeki64 (psf->file.filedes, 0, SEEK_END) ;
if ((filelen = _lseeki64 (psf->file.filedes, 0, SEEK_END)) < 0)
{ psf_log_syserr (psf, errno) ;
return (sf_count_t) -1 ;
} ;
if (filelen > current)
_lseeki64 (psf->file.filedes, current, SEEK_SET) ;
switch (psf->file.mode)
{ case SFM_WRITE :
filelen = filelen - psf->fileoffset ;
break ;
case SFM_READ :
if (psf->fileoffset > 0 && psf->filelength > 0)
filelen = psf->filelength ;
break ;
case SFM_RDWR :
/*
** Cannot open embedded files SFM_RDWR so we don't need to
** subtract psf->fileoffset. We already have the answer we
** need.
*/
break ;
default :
filelen = 0 ;
} ;
return filelen ;
#endif
} /* psf_get_filelen */
Commit Message: src/file_io.c : Prevent potential divide-by-zero.
Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/92
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 45,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: http_dissect_hdrs(struct worker *w, struct http *hp, int fd, char *p,
const struct http_conn *htc)
{
char *q, *r;
txt t = htc->rxbuf;
if (*p == '\r')
p++;
hp->nhd = HTTP_HDR_FIRST;
hp->conds = 0;
r = NULL; /* For FlexeLint */
for (; p < t.e; p = r) {
/* Find end of next header */
q = r = p;
while (r < t.e) {
if (!vct_iscrlf(r)) {
r++;
continue;
}
q = r;
assert(r < t.e);
r += vct_skipcrlf(r);
if (r >= t.e)
break;
/* If line does not continue: got it. */
if (!vct_issp(*r))
break;
/* Clear line continuation LWS to spaces */
while (vct_islws(*q))
*q++ = ' ';
}
if (q - p > htc->maxhdr) {
VSC_C_main->losthdr++;
WSL(w, SLT_LostHeader, fd, "%.*s",
q - p > 20 ? 20 : q - p, p);
return (413);
}
/* Empty header = end of headers */
if (p == q)
break;
if ((p[0] == 'i' || p[0] == 'I') &&
(p[1] == 'f' || p[1] == 'F') &&
p[2] == '-')
hp->conds = 1;
while (q > p && vct_issp(q[-1]))
q--;
*q = '\0';
if (hp->nhd < hp->shd) {
hp->hdf[hp->nhd] = 0;
hp->hd[hp->nhd].b = p;
hp->hd[hp->nhd].e = q;
WSLH(w, fd, hp, hp->nhd);
hp->nhd++;
} else {
VSC_C_main->losthdr++;
WSL(w, SLT_LostHeader, fd, "%.*s",
q - p > 20 ? 20 : q - p, p);
return (413);
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Check for duplicate Content-Length headers in requests
If a duplicate CL header is in the request, we fail the request with a
400 (Bad Request)
Fix a test case that was sending duplicate CL by misstake and would
not fail because of that.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_zip_free_dir(zend_resource *rsrc)
{
zip_rsrc * zip_int = (zip_rsrc *) rsrc->ptr;
if (zip_int) {
if (zip_int->za) {
if (zip_close(zip_int->za) != 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Cannot destroy the zip context");
}
zip_int->za = NULL;
}
efree(rsrc->ptr);
rsrc->ptr = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 54,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ip_vs_copy_udest_compat(struct ip_vs_dest_user_kern *udest,
struct ip_vs_dest_user *udest_compat)
{
memset(udest, 0, sizeof(*udest));
udest->addr.ip = udest_compat->addr;
udest->port = udest_compat->port;
udest->conn_flags = udest_compat->conn_flags;
udest->weight = udest_compat->weight;
udest->u_threshold = udest_compat->u_threshold;
udest->l_threshold = udest_compat->l_threshold;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 34,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vlan_dev_open(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct vlan_dev_info *vlan = vlan_dev_info(dev);
struct net_device *real_dev = vlan->real_dev;
int err;
if (!(real_dev->flags & IFF_UP) &&
!(vlan->flags & VLAN_FLAG_LOOSE_BINDING))
return -ENETDOWN;
if (compare_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr, real_dev->dev_addr)) {
err = dev_uc_add(real_dev, dev->dev_addr);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
}
if (dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI) {
err = dev_set_allmulti(real_dev, 1);
if (err < 0)
goto del_unicast;
}
if (dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC) {
err = dev_set_promiscuity(real_dev, 1);
if (err < 0)
goto clear_allmulti;
}
memcpy(vlan->real_dev_addr, real_dev->dev_addr, ETH_ALEN);
if (vlan->flags & VLAN_FLAG_GVRP)
vlan_gvrp_request_join(dev);
if (netif_carrier_ok(real_dev))
netif_carrier_on(dev);
return 0;
clear_allmulti:
if (dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI)
dev_set_allmulti(real_dev, -1);
del_unicast:
if (compare_ether_addr(dev->dev_addr, real_dev->dev_addr))
dev_uc_del(real_dev, dev->dev_addr);
out:
netif_carrier_off(dev);
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: same_verf(nfs4_verifier *v1, nfs4_verifier *v2)
{
return 0 == memcmp(v1->data, v2->data, sizeof(v1->data));
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int udp_ioctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCOUTQ:
{
int amount = sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
return put_user(amount, (int __user *)arg);
}
case SIOCINQ:
{
unsigned int amount = first_packet_length(sk);
if (amount)
/*
* We will only return the amount
* of this packet since that is all
* that will be read.
*/
amount -= sizeof(struct udphdr);
return put_user(amount, (int __user *)arg);
}
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<const SecurityOrigin> Document::TopFrameOrigin() const {
if (!GetFrame())
return scoped_refptr<const SecurityOrigin>();
return GetFrame()->Tree().Top().GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FetchContext& FetchContext::NullInstance() {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(FetchContext, instance, (new FetchContext));
return instance;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
{
EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL;
if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
return NULL;
}
if ((group = ec_asn1_pkparameters2group(params)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
if (a && *a)
EC_GROUP_clear_free(*a);
if (a)
*a = group;
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
return (group);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_GFV( INS_ARG )
{
args[0] = CUR.GS.freeVector.x;
args[1] = CUR.GS.freeVector.y;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(set_mempolicy, int, mode, unsigned long __user *, nmask,
unsigned long, maxnode)
{
int err;
nodemask_t nodes;
unsigned short flags;
flags = mode & MPOL_MODE_FLAGS;
mode &= ~MPOL_MODE_FLAGS;
if ((unsigned int)mode >= MPOL_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
if ((flags & MPOL_F_STATIC_NODES) && (flags & MPOL_F_RELATIVE_NODES))
return -EINVAL;
err = get_nodes(&nodes, nmask, maxnode);
if (err)
return err;
return do_set_mempolicy(mode, flags, &nodes);
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,284
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::removeChildren()
{
if (!m_firstChild)
return;
RefPtr<ContainerNode> protect(this);
if (FullscreenElementStack* fullscreen = FullscreenElementStack::fromIfExists(&document()))
fullscreen->removeFullScreenElementOfSubtree(this, true);
willRemoveChildren(protect.get());
{
SubframeLoadingDisabler disabler(this);
document().removeFocusedElementOfSubtree(this, true);
}
NodeVector removedChildren;
{
RenderWidget::UpdateSuspendScope suspendWidgetHierarchyUpdates;
{
NoEventDispatchAssertion assertNoEventDispatch;
removedChildren.reserveInitialCapacity(childNodeCount());
while (m_firstChild) {
removedChildren.append(m_firstChild);
removeBetween(0, m_firstChild->nextSibling(), m_firstChild);
}
}
childrenChanged(false, 0, 0, -static_cast<int>(removedChildren.size()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < removedChildren.size(); ++i)
ChildNodeRemovalNotifier(this).notify(removedChildren[i].get());
}
dispatchSubtreeModifiedEvent();
}
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 171,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XML_ExpatVersion(void) {
/* V1 is used to string-ize the version number. However, it would
string-ize the actual version macro *names* unless we get them
substituted before being passed to V1. CPP is defined to expand
a macro, then rescan for more expansions. Thus, we use V2 to expand
the version macros, then CPP will expand the resulting V1() macro
with the correct numerals. */
/* ### I'm assuming cpp is portable in this respect... */
#define V1(a,b,c) XML_L(#a)XML_L(".")XML_L(#b)XML_L(".")XML_L(#c)
#define V2(a,b,c) XML_L("expat_")V1(a,b,c)
return V2(XML_MAJOR_VERSION, XML_MINOR_VERSION, XML_MICRO_VERSION);
#undef V1
#undef V2
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 92,239
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static av_cold int init(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
DelogoContext *s = ctx->priv;
#define CHECK_UNSET_OPT(opt) \
if (s->opt == -1) { \
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Option %s was not set.\n", #opt); \
return AVERROR(EINVAL); \
}
CHECK_UNSET_OPT(x);
CHECK_UNSET_OPT(y);
CHECK_UNSET_OPT(w);
CHECK_UNSET_OPT(h);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "x:%d y:%d, w:%d h:%d band:%d show:%d\n",
s->x, s->y, s->w, s->h, s->band, s->show);
s->w += s->band*2;
s->h += s->band*2;
s->x -= s->band;
s->y -= s->band;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,725
|
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