instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SessionService::SetTabExtensionAppID(
const SessionID& window_id,
const SessionID& tab_id,
const std::string& extension_app_id) {
if (!ShouldTrackChangesToWindow(window_id))
return;
ScheduleCommand(CreateSetTabExtensionAppIDCommand(
kCommandSetExtensionAppID,
tab_id.id(),
extension_app_id));
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 108,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::IsPrintingEnabled() {
bool result = false;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_IsPrintingEnabled(routing_id(), &result));
return result;
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadOneLayer(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image* image,
XCFDocInfo* inDocInfo,XCFLayerInfo *outLayer,const ssize_t layer,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickOffsetType
offset;
unsigned int
foundPropEnd = 0;
size_t
hierarchy_offset,
layer_mask_offset;
/* clear the block! */
(void) ResetMagickMemory( outLayer, 0, sizeof( XCFLayerInfo ) );
/* read in the layer width, height, type and name */
outLayer->width = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
outLayer->height = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
outLayer->type = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
(void) ReadBlobStringWithLongSize(image, outLayer->name,
sizeof(outLayer->name),exception);
/* read the layer properties! */
foundPropEnd = 0;
while ( (foundPropEnd == MagickFalse) && (EOFBlob(image) == MagickFalse) ) {
PropType prop_type = (PropType) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
size_t prop_size = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
switch (prop_type)
{
case PROP_END:
foundPropEnd = 1;
break;
case PROP_ACTIVE_LAYER:
outLayer->active = 1;
break;
case PROP_FLOATING_SELECTION:
outLayer->floating_offset = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
break;
case PROP_OPACITY:
outLayer->alpha = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
break;
case PROP_VISIBLE:
outLayer->visible = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
break;
case PROP_LINKED:
outLayer->linked = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
break;
case PROP_PRESERVE_TRANSPARENCY:
outLayer->preserve_trans = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
break;
case PROP_APPLY_MASK:
outLayer->apply_mask = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
break;
case PROP_EDIT_MASK:
outLayer->edit_mask = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
break;
case PROP_SHOW_MASK:
outLayer->show_mask = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
break;
case PROP_OFFSETS:
outLayer->offset_x = (int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
outLayer->offset_y = (int) ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
break;
case PROP_MODE:
outLayer->mode = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
break;
case PROP_TATTOO:
outLayer->preserve_trans = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
break;
case PROP_PARASITES:
{
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,prop_size) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
/*
ssize_t base = info->cp;
GimpParasite *p;
while (info->cp - base < prop_size)
{
p = xcf_load_parasite(info);
gimp_drawable_parasite_attach(GIMP_DRAWABLE(layer), p);
gimp_parasite_free(p);
}
if (info->cp - base != prop_size)
g_message ("Error detected while loading a layer's parasites");
*/
}
break;
default:
/* g_message ("unexpected/unknown layer property: %d (skipping)",
prop_type); */
{
int buf[16];
ssize_t amount;
/* read over it... */
while ((prop_size > 0) && (EOFBlob(image) == MagickFalse))
{
amount = (ssize_t) MagickMin(16, prop_size);
amount = ReadBlob(image, (size_t) amount, (unsigned char *) &buf);
if (!amount)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",
image->filename);
prop_size -= (size_t) MagickMin(16, (size_t) amount);
}
}
break;
}
}
if (foundPropEnd == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
/* allocate the image for this layer */
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
ssize_t
scene;
scene=inDocInfo->number_layers-layer-1;
if (scene > (ssize_t) (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
{
outLayer->image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (outLayer->image == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
InitXCFImage(outLayer,exception);
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
outLayer->image=CloneImage(image,outLayer->width, outLayer->height,MagickTrue,
exception);
if (outLayer->image == (Image *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
/* clear the image based on the layer opacity */
outLayer->image->background_color.alpha=
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) outLayer->alpha);
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(outLayer->image,exception);
InitXCFImage(outLayer,exception);
/* set the compositing mode */
outLayer->image->compose = GIMPBlendModeToCompositeOperator( outLayer->mode );
if ( outLayer->visible == MagickFalse )
{
/* BOGUS: should really be separate member var! */
outLayer->image->compose = NoCompositeOp;
}
/* read the hierarchy and layer mask offsets */
hierarchy_offset = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
layer_mask_offset = ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
/* read in the hierarchy */
offset=SeekBlob(image, (MagickOffsetType) hierarchy_offset, SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"InvalidImageHeader","`%s'",image->filename);
if (load_hierarchy (image, inDocInfo, outLayer, exception) == 0)
return(MagickFalse);
/* read in the layer mask */
if (layer_mask_offset != 0)
{
offset=SeekBlob(image, (MagickOffsetType) layer_mask_offset, SEEK_SET);
#if 0 /* BOGUS: support layer masks! */
layer_mask = xcf_load_layer_mask (info, gimage);
if (layer_mask == 0)
goto error;
/* set the offsets of the layer_mask */
GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer_mask)->offset_x = GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer)->offset_x;
GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer_mask)->offset_y = GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer)->offset_y;
gimp_layer_add_mask (layer, layer_mask, MagickFalse);
layer->mask->apply_mask = apply_mask;
layer->mask->edit_mask = edit_mask;
layer->mask->show_mask = show_mask;
#endif
}
/* attach the floating selection... */
#if 0 /* BOGUS: we may need to read this, even if we don't support it! */
if (add_floating_sel)
{
GimpLayer *floating_sel;
floating_sel = info->floating_sel;
floating_sel_attach (floating_sel, GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer));
}
#endif
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/104
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 73,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Layer::SetAnchorPointZ(float anchor_point_z) {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (anchor_point_z_ == anchor_point_z)
return;
anchor_point_z_ = anchor_point_z;
SetNeedsCommit();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned short snd_seq_file_flags(struct file *file)
{
switch (file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) {
case FMODE_WRITE:
return SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_OUTPUT;
case FMODE_READ:
return SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_INPUT;
default:
return SNDRV_SEQ_LFLG_OPEN;
}
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int32_t result() const { return result_; }
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 131,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void kvmppc_set_vsr_word(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
u32 gpr32)
{
union kvmppc_one_reg val;
int offset = kvmppc_get_vsr_word_offset(vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_offset);
int index = vcpu->arch.io_gpr & KVM_MMIO_REG_MASK;
int dword_offset, word_offset;
if (offset == -1)
return;
if (vcpu->arch.mmio_vsx_tx_sx_enabled) {
val.vval = VCPU_VSX_VR(vcpu, index);
val.vsx32val[offset] = gpr32;
VCPU_VSX_VR(vcpu, index) = val.vval;
} else {
dword_offset = offset / 2;
word_offset = offset % 2;
val.vsxval[0] = VCPU_VSX_FPR(vcpu, index, dword_offset);
val.vsx32val[word_offset] = gpr32;
VCPU_VSX_FPR(vcpu, index, dword_offset) = val.vsxval[0];
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 60,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HeadlessPrintManager::HeadlessPrintManager(content::WebContents* web_contents)
: PrintManager(web_contents) {
Reset();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 149,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeMetricsServiceClient::CollectFinalHistograms() {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
DCHECK(!waiting_for_collect_final_metrics_step_);
waiting_for_collect_final_metrics_step_ = true;
base::Closure callback =
base::Bind(&ChromeMetricsServiceClient::OnMemoryDetailCollectionDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
scoped_refptr<MetricsMemoryDetails> details(
new MetricsMemoryDetails(callback));
details->StartFetch();
scoped_refptr<ProcessMemoryMetricsEmitter> emitter(
new ProcessMemoryMetricsEmitter);
emitter->FetchAndEmitProcessMemoryMetrics();
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void path_count_init(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < PATH_ARR_SIZE; i++)
path_count[i] = 0;
}
Commit Message: epoll: clear the tfile_check_list on -ELOOP
An epoll_ctl(,EPOLL_CTL_ADD,,) operation can return '-ELOOP' to prevent
circular epoll dependencies from being created. However, in that case we
do not properly clear the 'tfile_check_list'. Thus, add a call to
clear_tfile_check_list() for the -ELOOP case.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Yurij M. Plotnikov <Yurij.Plotnikov@oktetlabs.ru>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <nelhage@nelhage.com>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Tested-by: Alexandra N. Kossovsky <Alexandra.Kossovsky@oktetlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Automation::GetCookies(const std::string& url,
ListValue** cookies,
Error** error) {
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendGetCookiesJSONRequest(automation(), url, cookies, &error_msg))
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScopedMessagePipeHandle Core::ExtractMessagePipeFromInvitation(
const std::string& name) {
RequestContext request_context;
ports::PortRef port0, port1;
GetNodeController()->node()->CreatePortPair(&port0, &port1);
MojoHandle handle = AddDispatcher(new MessagePipeDispatcher(
GetNodeController(), port0, kUnknownPipeIdForDebug, 1));
GetNodeController()->MergePortIntoParent(name, port1);
return ScopedMessagePipeHandle(MessagePipeHandle(handle));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const base::FilePath& DriveFsHost::GetMountPath() const {
DCHECK(IsMounted());
return mount_state_->mount_path();
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 124,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int PDFiumEngine::Form_GetFilePath(IPDF_JSPLATFORM* param,
void* file_path,
int length) {
PDFiumEngine* engine = static_cast<PDFiumEngine*>(param);
std::string rv = engine->client_->GetURL();
if (file_path && rv.size() <= static_cast<size_t>(length))
memcpy(file_path, rv.c_str(), rv.size());
return rv.size();
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InFlightBackendIO::DoomAllEntries(
const net::CompletionCallback& callback) {
scoped_refptr<BackendIO> operation(new BackendIO(this, backend_, callback));
operation->DoomAllEntries();
PostOperation(FROM_HERE, operation.get());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL GetEffectiveURLForInstant(const GURL& url, Profile* profile) {
CHECK(chrome::search::ShouldAssignURLToInstantRenderer(url, profile))
<< "Error granting Instant access.";
if (url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeSearchScheme))
return url;
GURL effective_url(url);
url_canon::Replacements<char> replacements;
std::string search_scheme(chrome::kChromeSearchScheme);
replacements.SetScheme(search_scheme.data(),
url_parse::Component(0, search_scheme.length()));
effective_url = effective_url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
return effective_url;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct page *get_read_data_page(struct inode *inode, pgoff_t index,
int op_flags, bool for_write)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct dnode_of_data dn;
struct page *page;
struct extent_info ei;
int err;
struct f2fs_io_info fio = {
.sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode),
.type = DATA,
.op = REQ_OP_READ,
.op_flags = op_flags,
.encrypted_page = NULL,
};
if (f2fs_encrypted_inode(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return read_mapping_page(mapping, index, NULL);
page = f2fs_grab_cache_page(mapping, index, for_write);
if (!page)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (f2fs_lookup_extent_cache(inode, index, &ei)) {
dn.data_blkaddr = ei.blk + index - ei.fofs;
goto got_it;
}
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, NULL, NULL, 0);
err = get_dnode_of_data(&dn, index, LOOKUP_NODE);
if (err)
goto put_err;
f2fs_put_dnode(&dn);
if (unlikely(dn.data_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR)) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto put_err;
}
got_it:
if (PageUptodate(page)) {
unlock_page(page);
return page;
}
/*
* A new dentry page is allocated but not able to be written, since its
* new inode page couldn't be allocated due to -ENOSPC.
* In such the case, its blkaddr can be remained as NEW_ADDR.
* see, f2fs_add_link -> get_new_data_page -> init_inode_metadata.
*/
if (dn.data_blkaddr == NEW_ADDR) {
zero_user_segment(page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!PageUptodate(page))
SetPageUptodate(page);
unlock_page(page);
return page;
}
fio.new_blkaddr = fio.old_blkaddr = dn.data_blkaddr;
fio.page = page;
err = f2fs_submit_page_bio(&fio);
if (err)
goto put_err;
return page;
put_err:
f2fs_put_page(page, 1);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a dead loop in f2fs_fiemap()
A dead loop can be triggered in f2fs_fiemap() using the test case
as below:
...
fd = open();
fallocate(fd, 0, 0, 4294967296);
ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FIEMAP, fiemap_buf);
...
It's caused by an overflow in __get_data_block():
...
bh->b_size = map.m_len << inode->i_blkbits;
...
map.m_len is an unsigned int, and bh->b_size is a size_t which is 64 bits
on 64 bits archtecture, type conversion from an unsigned int to a size_t
will result in an overflow.
In the above-mentioned case, bh->b_size will be zero, and f2fs_fiemap()
will call get_data_block() at block 0 again an again.
Fix this by adding a force conversion before left shift.
Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <fangwei1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 85,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ucvector_init_buffer(ucvector* p, unsigned char* buffer, size_t size)
{
p->data = buffer;
p->allocsize = p->size = size;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int l2cap_connect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct l2cap_cmd_hdr *cmd, u8 *data)
{
struct l2cap_chan_list *list = &conn->chan_list;
struct l2cap_conn_req *req = (struct l2cap_conn_req *) data;
struct l2cap_conn_rsp rsp;
struct sock *sk, *parent;
int result, status = L2CAP_CS_NO_INFO;
u16 dcid = 0, scid = __le16_to_cpu(req->scid);
__le16 psm = req->psm;
BT_DBG("psm 0x%2.2x scid 0x%4.4x", psm, scid);
/* Check if we have socket listening on psm */
parent = l2cap_get_sock_by_psm(BT_LISTEN, psm, conn->src);
if (!parent) {
result = L2CAP_CR_BAD_PSM;
goto sendresp;
}
/* Check if the ACL is secure enough (if not SDP) */
if (psm != cpu_to_le16(0x0001) &&
!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn->hcon)) {
conn->disc_reason = 0x05;
result = L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK;
goto response;
}
result = L2CAP_CR_NO_MEM;
/* Check for backlog size */
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(parent)) {
BT_DBG("backlog full %d", parent->sk_ack_backlog);
goto response;
}
sk = l2cap_sock_alloc(sock_net(parent), NULL, BTPROTO_L2CAP, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!sk)
goto response;
write_lock_bh(&list->lock);
/* Check if we already have channel with that dcid */
if (__l2cap_get_chan_by_dcid(list, scid)) {
write_unlock_bh(&list->lock);
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
l2cap_sock_kill(sk);
goto response;
}
hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
l2cap_sock_init(sk, parent);
bacpy(&bt_sk(sk)->src, conn->src);
bacpy(&bt_sk(sk)->dst, conn->dst);
l2cap_pi(sk)->psm = psm;
l2cap_pi(sk)->dcid = scid;
__l2cap_chan_add(conn, sk, parent);
dcid = l2cap_pi(sk)->scid;
l2cap_sock_set_timer(sk, sk->sk_sndtimeo);
l2cap_pi(sk)->ident = cmd->ident;
if (conn->info_state & L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_DONE) {
if (l2cap_check_security(sk)) {
if (bt_sk(sk)->defer_setup) {
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT2;
result = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
status = L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND;
parent->sk_data_ready(parent, 0);
} else {
sk->sk_state = BT_CONFIG;
result = L2CAP_CR_SUCCESS;
status = L2CAP_CS_NO_INFO;
}
} else {
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT2;
result = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
status = L2CAP_CS_AUTHEN_PEND;
}
} else {
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT2;
result = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
status = L2CAP_CS_NO_INFO;
}
write_unlock_bh(&list->lock);
response:
bh_unlock_sock(parent);
sendresp:
rsp.scid = cpu_to_le16(scid);
rsp.dcid = cpu_to_le16(dcid);
rsp.result = cpu_to_le16(result);
rsp.status = cpu_to_le16(status);
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, cmd->ident, L2CAP_CONN_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
if (result == L2CAP_CR_PEND && status == L2CAP_CS_NO_INFO) {
struct l2cap_info_req info;
info.type = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_IT_FEAT_MASK);
conn->info_state |= L2CAP_INFO_FEAT_MASK_REQ_SENT;
conn->info_ident = l2cap_get_ident(conn);
mod_timer(&conn->info_timer, jiffies +
msecs_to_jiffies(L2CAP_INFO_TIMEOUT));
l2cap_send_cmd(conn, conn->info_ident,
L2CAP_INFO_REQ, sizeof(info), &info);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 58,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p,*d;
int i,j,nl,off,n;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
X509_NAME *name;
BUF_MEM *buf;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
{
buf=s->init_buf;
d=p=ssl_handshake_start(s);
/* get the list of acceptable cert types */
p++;
n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
d[0]=n;
p+=n;
n++;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
{
const unsigned char *psigs;
unsigned char *etmp = p;
nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
/* Skip over length for now */
p += 2;
nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
/* Now fill in length */
s2n(nl, etmp);
p += nl;
n += nl + 2;
}
off=n;
p+=2;
n+=2;
sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
nl=0;
if (sk != NULL)
{
for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
{
name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s)+n+j+2))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
{
s2n(j,p);
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
n+=2+j;
nl+=2+j;
}
else
{
d=p;
i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
n+=j;
nl+=j;
}
}
}
/* else no CA names */
p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
s2n(nl,p);
ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n);
#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
{
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
goto err;
}
p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
/* do the header */
*(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
*(p++)=0;
s->init_num += 4;
}
#endif
s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
return ssl_do_write(s);
err:
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: Unauthenticated DH client certificate fix.
Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.
If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.
We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 45,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t strnlen16(const char16_t *s, size_t maxlen)
{
const char16_t *ss = s;
/* Important: the maxlen test must precede the reference through ss;
since the byte beyond the maximum may segfault */
while ((maxlen > 0) && *ss) {
ss++;
maxlen--;
}
return ss-s;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 158,429
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void cJSON_DeleteItemFromArray(cJSON *array,int which) {cJSON_Delete(cJSON_DetachItemFromArray(array,which));}
Commit Message: fix buffer overflow (#30)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SendScrollEvents(ui::EventProcessor* dispatcher,
float x_start,
float y_start,
int dx,
int dy,
int touch_id,
int time_step,
int num_steps,
GestureEventConsumeDelegate* delegate) {
int x = x_start;
int y = y_start;
for (int i = 0; i < num_steps; i++) {
x += dx;
y += dy;
ui::TouchEvent move(ui::ET_TOUCH_MOVED, gfx::PointF(x, y),
touch_id,
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(simulated_now_));
ui::EventDispatchDetails details = dispatcher->OnEventFromSource(&move);
ASSERT_FALSE(details.dispatcher_destroyed);
simulated_now_ += time_step;
}
}
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,087
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: atmarp_addr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *ha, u_int ha_len, const u_char *srca,
u_int srca_len)
{
if (ha_len == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<No address>"));
else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", linkaddr_string(ndo, ha, LINKADDR_ATM, ha_len)));
if (srca_len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",%s",
linkaddr_string(ndo, srca, LINKADDR_ATM, srca_len)));
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13013/ARP: Fix printing of ARP protocol addresses.
If the protocol type isn't ETHERTYPE_IP or ETHERTYPE_TRAIL, or if the
protocol address length isn't 4, don't print the address as an IPv4 address.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update another test file's tcpdump output to reflect this change.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderBox::clientHeight() const
{
return height() - borderTop() - borderBottom() - horizontalScrollbarHeight();
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u_char *_our_safe_pcap_next(pcap_t *pcap, struct pcap_pkthdr *pkthdr,
const char *funcname, const int line, const char *file)
{
u_char *pktdata = (u_char *)pcap_next(pcap, pkthdr);
if (pktdata) {
if (pkthdr->len > MAXPACKET) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: %u is greater than maximum %u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, MAXPACKET);
exit(-1);
}
if (pkthdr->len < pkthdr->caplen) {
fprintf(stderr, "safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in %s:%s() line %d: packet length %u is less than capture length %u\n",
file, funcname, line, pkthdr->len, pkthdr->caplen);
exit(-1);
}
}
return pktdata;
}
Commit Message: Bug #520 Fix heap overflow on zero or 0xFFFF packet length
Add check for packets that report zero packet length. Example
of fix:
src/tcpprep --auto=bridge --pcap=poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow --cachefile=/dev/null
Warning: poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow was captured using a snaplen of 17 bytes. This may mean you have truncated packets.
safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in tcpprep.c:process_raw_packets() line 334: packet length=0 capture length=0
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 168,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OnPathReservationAvailable(
int32 download_id,
const content::DownloadTargetCallback& callback,
bool should_prompt,
content::DownloadDangerType danger_type,
const FilePath& reserved_path,
bool reserved_path_verified) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DownloadItem* download =
download_manager_->GetDownload(download_id);
if (!download || (download->GetState() != DownloadItem::IN_PROGRESS))
return;
if (should_prompt || !reserved_path_verified) {
ChooseDownloadPath(
download, reserved_path,
base::Bind(&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::OnTargetPathDetermined,
this, download_id, callback,
DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_PROMPT, danger_type));
} else {
OnTargetPathDetermined(download_id, callback,
DownloadItem::TARGET_DISPOSITION_OVERWRITE,
danger_type, reserved_path);
}
}
Commit Message: For "Dangerous" file type, no user gesture will bypass the download warning.
BUG=170569
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12039015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178072 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageResource::AllClientsAndObserversRemoved() {
CHECK(is_during_finish_as_error_ || !GetContent()->HasImage() ||
!ErrorOccurred());
if (!ThreadHeap::WillObjectBeLazilySwept(this)) {
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->GetWebTaskRunner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, WTF::Bind(&ImageResourceContent::DoResetAnimation,
WrapWeakPersistent(GetContent())));
} else {
GetContent()->DoResetAnimation();
}
if (multipart_parser_)
multipart_parser_->Cancel();
Resource::AllClientsAndObserversRemoved();
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::InsertNamespace(
const NamespaceRecord* record) {
if (!LazyOpen(kCreateIfNeeded))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"INSERT INTO Namespaces"
" (cache_id, origin, type, namespace_url, target_url, is_pattern)"
" VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, record->cache_id);
statement.BindString(1, SerializeOrigin(record->origin));
statement.BindInt(2, record->namespace_.type);
statement.BindString(3, record->namespace_.namespace_url.spec());
statement.BindString(4, record->namespace_.target_url.spec());
statement.BindBool(5, record->namespace_.is_pattern);
return statement.Run();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DECLAREcpFunc(cpSeparateTiles2SeparateTiles)
{
return cpImage(in, out,
readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer,
writeBufferToSeparateTiles,
imagelength, imagewidth, spp);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 48,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Delete_FFMPEG_Demux(void *ifce)
{
FFDemux *ffd;
GF_InputService *ptr = (GF_InputService *)ifce;
if (!ptr)
return;
ffd = (FFDemux*)ptr->priv;
if (ffd) {
if (ffd->thread)
gf_th_del(ffd->thread);
ffd->thread = NULL;
if (ffd->mx)
gf_mx_del(ffd->mx);
#ifndef USE_PRE_0_7
if (ffd->options) av_dict_free(&ffd->options);
#endif
ffd->mx = NULL;
gf_free(ffd);
ptr->priv = NULL;
}
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fix some overflows due to strcpy
fixes #1184, #1186, #1187 among other things
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 92,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_inode_free_cowblocks(
struct xfs_inode *ip,
int flags,
void *args)
{
struct xfs_eofblocks *eofb = args;
struct xfs_ifork *ifp = XFS_IFORK_PTR(ip, XFS_COW_FORK);
int match;
int ret = 0;
if (!xfs_prep_free_cowblocks(ip, ifp))
return 0;
if (eofb) {
if (eofb->eof_flags & XFS_EOF_FLAGS_UNION)
match = xfs_inode_match_id_union(ip, eofb);
else
match = xfs_inode_match_id(ip, eofb);
if (!match)
return 0;
/* skip the inode if the file size is too small */
if (eofb->eof_flags & XFS_EOF_FLAGS_MINFILESIZE &&
XFS_ISIZE(ip) < eofb->eof_min_file_size)
return 0;
}
/* Free the CoW blocks */
xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL);
xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_MMAPLOCK_EXCL);
/*
* Check again, nobody else should be able to dirty blocks or change
* the reflink iflag now that we have the first two locks held.
*/
if (xfs_prep_free_cowblocks(ip, ifp))
ret = xfs_reflink_cancel_cow_range(ip, 0, NULLFILEOFF, false);
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_MMAPLOCK_EXCL);
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 79,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ash::wm::WindowState* ClientControlledShellSurface::GetWindowState() {
return ash::wm::GetWindowState(widget_->GetNativeWindow());
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 137,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleStencilThenCoverFillPathInstancedCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
static const char kFunctionName[] =
"glStencilThenCoverFillPathInstancedCHROMIUM";
const volatile gles2::cmds::StencilThenCoverFillPathInstancedCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::
StencilThenCoverFillPathInstancedCHROMIUM*>(cmd_data);
if (!features().chromium_path_rendering)
return error::kUnknownCommand;
PathCommandValidatorContext v(this, kFunctionName);
GLuint num_paths = 0;
GLenum path_name_type = GL_NONE;
GLenum fill_mode = GL_COUNT_UP_CHROMIUM;
GLuint mask = 0;
GLenum cover_mode = GL_BOUNDING_BOX_OF_BOUNDING_BOXES_CHROMIUM;
GLenum transform_type = GL_NONE;
if (!v.GetPathCountAndType(c, &num_paths, &path_name_type) ||
!v.GetFillModeAndMask(c, &fill_mode, &mask) ||
!v.GetCoverMode(c, &cover_mode) ||
!v.GetTransformType(c, &transform_type))
return v.error();
if (num_paths == 0)
return error::kNoError;
std::unique_ptr<GLuint[]> paths;
if (!v.GetPathNameData(c, num_paths, path_name_type, &paths))
return v.error();
const GLfloat* transforms = nullptr;
if (!v.GetTransforms(c, num_paths, transform_type, &transforms))
return v.error();
if (!CheckBoundDrawFramebufferValid(kFunctionName))
return error::kNoError;
ApplyDirtyState();
api()->glStencilThenCoverFillPathInstancedNVFn(
num_paths, GL_UNSIGNED_INT, paths.get(), 0, fill_mode, mask, cover_mode,
transform_type, transforms);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void op32_set_current_rxslot(struct b43_dmaring *ring, int slot)
{
b43_dma_write(ring, B43_DMA32_RXINDEX,
(u32) (slot * sizeof(struct b43_dmadesc32)));
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,560
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API inline int r_anal_bb_is_in_offset (RAnalBlock *bb, ut64 off) {
return (off >= bb->addr && off < bb->addr + bb->size);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10293 - Use-after-free in r_anal_bb_free()
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 82,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void BLEND_OP(int I, u64 *W)
{
W[I & 15] += s1(W[(I-2) & 15]) + W[(I-7) & 15] + s0(W[(I-15) & 15]);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smb_tcp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char * data, int length)
{
int caplen;
u_int smb_len;
const u_char *maxbuf;
if (length < 4)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend < data)
goto trunc;
caplen = ndo->ndo_snapend - data;
if (caplen < 4)
goto trunc;
maxbuf = data + caplen;
smb_len = EXTRACT_24BITS(data + 1);
length -= 4;
caplen -= 4;
startbuf = data;
data += 4;
if (smb_len >= 4 && caplen >= 4 && memcmp(data,"\377SMB",4) == 0) {
if ((int)smb_len > caplen) {
if ((int)smb_len > length)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " WARNING: Packet is continued in later TCP segments\n"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " WARNING: Short packet. Try increasing the snap length by %d\n",
smb_len - caplen));
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
print_smb(ndo, data, maxbuf > data + smb_len ? data + smb_len : maxbuf);
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " SMB-over-TCP packet:(raw data or continuation?)\n"));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) SMB: Add two missing bounds checks
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int copy_fpregs_to_sigframe(struct xregs_state __user *buf)
{
int err;
if (use_xsave())
err = copy_xregs_to_user(buf);
else if (use_fxsr())
err = copy_fxregs_to_user((struct fxregs_state __user *) buf);
else
err = copy_fregs_to_user((struct fregs_state __user *) buf);
if (unlikely(err) && __clear_user(buf, fpu_user_xstate_size))
err = -EFAULT;
return err;
}
Commit Message: x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 60,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void virgl_cmd_resource_flush(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
struct virtio_gpu_resource_flush rf;
int i;
VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(rf);
trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_res_flush(rf.resource_id,
rf.r.width, rf.r.height, rf.r.x, rf.r.y);
for (i = 0; i < g->conf.max_outputs; i++) {
if (g->scanout[i].resource_id != rf.resource_id) {
continue;
}
virtio_gpu_rect_update(g, i, rf.r.x, rf.r.y, rf.r.width, rf.r.height);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 9,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::DownloadInterrupted(
download::DownloadItemImpl* download) {
WebContents* web_contents = DownloadItemUtils::GetWebContents(download);
if (!web_contents) {
download::RecordDownloadCountWithSource(
download::INTERRUPTED_WITHOUT_WEBCONTENTS, download->download_source());
}
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 151,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOL CSoundFile::Create(LPCBYTE lpStream, DWORD dwMemLength)
{
int i;
m_nType = MOD_TYPE_NONE;
m_dwSongFlags = 0;
m_nChannels = 0;
m_nMixChannels = 0;
m_nSamples = 0;
m_nInstruments = 0;
m_nFreqFactor = m_nTempoFactor = 128;
m_nMasterVolume = 128;
m_nDefaultGlobalVolume = 256;
m_nGlobalVolume = 256;
m_nOldGlbVolSlide = 0;
m_nDefaultSpeed = 6;
m_nDefaultTempo = 125;
m_nPatternDelay = 0;
m_nFrameDelay = 0;
m_nNextRow = 0;
m_nRow = 0;
m_nPattern = 0;
m_nCurrentPattern = 0;
m_nNextPattern = 0;
m_nRestartPos = 0;
m_nMinPeriod = 16;
m_nMaxPeriod = 32767;
m_nSongPreAmp = 0x30;
m_nPatternNames = 0;
m_nMaxOrderPosition = 0;
m_lpszPatternNames = NULL;
m_lpszSongComments = NULL;
memset(Ins, 0, sizeof(Ins));
memset(ChnMix, 0, sizeof(ChnMix));
memset(Chn, 0, sizeof(Chn));
memset(Headers, 0, sizeof(Headers));
memset(Order, 0xFF, sizeof(Order));
memset(Patterns, 0, sizeof(Patterns));
memset(m_szNames, 0, sizeof(m_szNames));
memset(m_MixPlugins, 0, sizeof(m_MixPlugins));
ResetMidiCfg();
for (UINT npt=0; npt<MAX_PATTERNS; npt++) PatternSize[npt] = 64;
for (UINT nch=0; nch<MAX_BASECHANNELS; nch++)
{
ChnSettings[nch].nPan = 128;
ChnSettings[nch].nVolume = 64;
ChnSettings[nch].dwFlags = 0;
ChnSettings[nch].szName[0] = 0;
}
if (lpStream)
{
#ifdef MMCMP_SUPPORT
BOOL bMMCmp = MMCMP_Unpack(&lpStream, &dwMemLength);
#endif
if ((!ReadXM(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadIT(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadS3M(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadWav(lpStream, dwMemLength))
#ifndef MODPLUG_BASIC_SUPPORT
&& (!ReadSTM(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadMed(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadMTM(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadMDL(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadDBM(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!Read669(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadFAR(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadAMS(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadOKT(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadPTM(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadUlt(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadDMF(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadDSM(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadUMX(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadAMF(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadPSM(lpStream, dwMemLength))
&& (!ReadMT2(lpStream, dwMemLength))
#endif // MODPLUG_BASIC_SUPPORT
&& (!ReadMod(lpStream, dwMemLength))) m_nType = MOD_TYPE_NONE;
#ifdef MMCMP_SUPPORT
if (bMMCmp)
{
GlobalFreePtr(lpStream);
lpStream = NULL;
}
#endif
}
for (i=0; i<MAX_SAMPLES; i++)
{
LPSTR p = m_szNames[i];
int j = 31;
p[j] = 0;
while ((j>=0) && (p[j]<=' ')) p[j--] = 0;
while (j>=0)
{
if (((BYTE)p[j]) < ' ') p[j] = ' ';
j--;
}
}
for (i=0; i<MAX_BASECHANNELS; i++)
{
if (ChnSettings[i].nVolume > 64) ChnSettings[i].nVolume = 64;
if (ChnSettings[i].nPan > 256) ChnSettings[i].nPan = 128;
Chn[i].nPan = ChnSettings[i].nPan;
Chn[i].nGlobalVol = ChnSettings[i].nVolume;
Chn[i].dwFlags = ChnSettings[i].dwFlags;
Chn[i].nVolume = 256;
Chn[i].nCutOff = 0x7F;
}
MODINSTRUMENT *pins = Ins;
for (i=0; i<MAX_INSTRUMENTS; i++, pins++)
{
if (pins->pSample)
{
if (pins->nLoopEnd > pins->nLength) pins->nLoopEnd = pins->nLength;
if (pins->nLoopStart + 3 >= pins->nLoopEnd)
{
pins->nLoopStart = 0;
pins->nLoopEnd = 0;
}
if (pins->nSustainEnd > pins->nLength) pins->nSustainEnd = pins->nLength;
if (pins->nSustainStart + 3 >= pins->nSustainEnd)
{
pins->nSustainStart = 0;
pins->nSustainEnd = 0;
}
} else
{
pins->nLength = 0;
pins->nLoopStart = 0;
pins->nLoopEnd = 0;
pins->nSustainStart = 0;
pins->nSustainEnd = 0;
}
if (!pins->nLoopEnd) pins->uFlags &= ~CHN_LOOP;
if (!pins->nSustainEnd) pins->uFlags &= ~CHN_SUSTAINLOOP;
if (pins->nGlobalVol > 64) pins->nGlobalVol = 64;
}
while ((m_nInstruments > 0) && (!Headers[m_nInstruments])) m_nInstruments--;
if (m_nSongPreAmp < 0x20) m_nSongPreAmp = 0x20;
if (m_nDefaultTempo < 32) m_nDefaultTempo = 125;
if (!m_nDefaultSpeed) m_nDefaultSpeed = 6;
m_nMusicSpeed = m_nDefaultSpeed;
m_nMusicTempo = m_nDefaultTempo;
m_nGlobalVolume = m_nDefaultGlobalVolume;
m_nNextPattern = 0;
m_nCurrentPattern = 0;
m_nPattern = 0;
m_nBufferCount = 0;
m_nTickCount = m_nMusicSpeed;
m_nNextRow = 0;
m_nRow = 0;
if ((m_nRestartPos >= MAX_ORDERS) || (Order[m_nRestartPos] >= MAX_PATTERNS)) m_nRestartPos = 0;
if (gpMixPluginCreateProc)
{
for (UINT iPlug=0; iPlug<MAX_MIXPLUGINS; iPlug++)
{
if ((m_MixPlugins[iPlug].Info.dwPluginId1)
|| (m_MixPlugins[iPlug].Info.dwPluginId2))
{
gpMixPluginCreateProc(&m_MixPlugins[iPlug]);
if (m_MixPlugins[iPlug].pMixPlugin)
{
m_MixPlugins[iPlug].pMixPlugin->RestoreAllParameters();
}
}
}
}
if (m_nType)
{
UINT maxpreamp = 0x10+(m_nChannels*8);
if (maxpreamp > 100) maxpreamp = 100;
if (m_nSongPreAmp > maxpreamp) m_nSongPreAmp = maxpreamp;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,468
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __munlock_isolation_failed(struct page *page)
{
if (PageUnevictable(page))
__count_vm_event(UNEVICTABLE_PGSTRANDED);
else
__count_vm_event(UNEVICTABLE_PGMUNLOCKED);
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 38,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int poll_urgent(struct file *fp,
struct poll_table_struct *pt)
{
struct hfi1_filedata *fd = fp->private_data;
struct hfi1_ctxtdata *uctxt = fd->uctxt;
struct hfi1_devdata *dd = uctxt->dd;
unsigned pollflag;
poll_wait(fp, &uctxt->wait, pt);
spin_lock_irq(&dd->uctxt_lock);
if (uctxt->urgent != uctxt->urgent_poll) {
pollflag = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
uctxt->urgent_poll = uctxt->urgent;
} else {
pollflag = 0;
set_bit(HFI1_CTXT_WAITING_URG, &uctxt->event_flags);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&dd->uctxt_lock);
return pollflag;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ip6_append_data(struct sock *sk, int getfrag(void *from, char *to,
int offset, int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb),
void *from, int length, int transhdrlen,
int hlimit, int tclass, struct ipv6_txoptions *opt, struct flowi6 *fl6,
struct rt6_info *rt, unsigned int flags, int dontfrag)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct inet_cork *cork;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int maxfraglen, fragheaderlen;
int exthdrlen;
int hh_len;
int mtu;
int copy;
int err;
int offset = 0;
int csummode = CHECKSUM_NONE;
__u8 tx_flags = 0;
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
return 0;
cork = &inet->cork.base;
if (skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_write_queue)) {
/*
* setup for corking
*/
if (opt) {
if (WARN_ON(np->cork.opt))
return -EINVAL;
np->cork.opt = kmalloc(opt->tot_len, sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(np->cork.opt == NULL))
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->tot_len = opt->tot_len;
np->cork.opt->opt_flen = opt->opt_flen;
np->cork.opt->opt_nflen = opt->opt_nflen;
np->cork.opt->dst0opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst0opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst0opt && !np->cork.opt->dst0opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->dst1opt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->dst1opt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->dst1opt && !np->cork.opt->dst1opt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->hopopt = ip6_opt_dup(opt->hopopt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->hopopt && !np->cork.opt->hopopt)
return -ENOBUFS;
np->cork.opt->srcrt = ip6_rthdr_dup(opt->srcrt,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (opt->srcrt && !np->cork.opt->srcrt)
return -ENOBUFS;
/* need source address above miyazawa*/
}
dst_hold(&rt->dst);
cork->dst = &rt->dst;
inet->cork.fl.u.ip6 = *fl6;
np->cork.hop_limit = hlimit;
np->cork.tclass = tclass;
mtu = np->pmtudisc == IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE ?
rt->dst.dev->mtu : dst_mtu(rt->dst.path);
if (np->frag_size < mtu) {
if (np->frag_size)
mtu = np->frag_size;
}
cork->fragsize = mtu;
if (dst_allfrag(rt->dst.path))
cork->flags |= IPCORK_ALLFRAG;
cork->length = 0;
sk->sk_sndmsg_page = NULL;
sk->sk_sndmsg_off = 0;
exthdrlen = rt->dst.header_len + (opt ? opt->opt_flen : 0) -
rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
length += exthdrlen;
transhdrlen += exthdrlen;
} else {
rt = (struct rt6_info *)cork->dst;
fl6 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip6;
opt = np->cork.opt;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
mtu = cork->fragsize;
}
hh_len = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
fragheaderlen = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + rt->rt6i_nfheader_len +
(opt ? opt->opt_nflen : 0);
maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen - sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (mtu <= sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
if (cork->length + length > sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + IPV6_MAXPLEN - fragheaderlen) {
ipv6_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
}
/* For UDP, check if TX timestamp is enabled */
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
err = sock_tx_timestamp(sk, &tx_flags);
if (err)
goto error;
}
/*
* Let's try using as much space as possible.
* Use MTU if total length of the message fits into the MTU.
* Otherwise, we need to reserve fragment header and
* fragment alignment (= 8-15 octects, in total).
*
* Note that we may need to "move" the data from the tail of
* of the buffer to the new fragment when we split
* the message.
*
* FIXME: It may be fragmented into multiple chunks
* at once if non-fragmentable extension headers
* are too large.
* --yoshfuji
*/
cork->length += length;
if (length > mtu) {
int proto = sk->sk_protocol;
if (dontfrag && (proto == IPPROTO_UDP || proto == IPPROTO_RAW)){
ipv6_local_rxpmtu(sk, fl6, mtu-exthdrlen);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (proto == IPPROTO_UDP &&
(rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO)) {
err = ip6_ufo_append_data(sk, getfrag, from, length,
hh_len, fragheaderlen,
transhdrlen, mtu, flags);
if (err)
goto error;
return 0;
}
}
if ((skb = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue)) == NULL)
goto alloc_new_skb;
while (length > 0) {
/* Check if the remaining data fits into current packet. */
copy = (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - skb->len;
if (copy < length)
copy = maxfraglen - skb->len;
if (copy <= 0) {
char *data;
unsigned int datalen;
unsigned int fraglen;
unsigned int fraggap;
unsigned int alloclen;
struct sk_buff *skb_prev;
alloc_new_skb:
skb_prev = skb;
/* There's no room in the current skb */
if (skb_prev)
fraggap = skb_prev->len - maxfraglen;
else
fraggap = 0;
/*
* If remaining data exceeds the mtu,
* we know we need more fragment(s).
*/
datalen = length + fraggap;
if (datalen > (cork->length <= mtu && !(cork->flags & IPCORK_ALLFRAG) ? mtu : maxfraglen) - fragheaderlen)
datalen = maxfraglen - fragheaderlen;
fraglen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
if ((flags & MSG_MORE) &&
!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG))
alloclen = mtu;
else
alloclen = datalen + fragheaderlen;
/*
* The last fragment gets additional space at tail.
* Note: we overallocate on fragments with MSG_MODE
* because we have no idea if we're the last one.
*/
if (datalen == length + fraggap)
alloclen += rt->dst.trailer_len;
/*
* We just reserve space for fragment header.
* Note: this may be overallocation if the message
* (without MSG_MORE) fits into the MTU.
*/
alloclen += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
if (transhdrlen) {
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
alloclen + hh_len,
(flags & MSG_DONTWAIT), &err);
} else {
skb = NULL;
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) <=
2 * sk->sk_sndbuf)
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk,
alloclen + hh_len, 1,
sk->sk_allocation);
if (unlikely(skb == NULL))
err = -ENOBUFS;
else {
/* Only the initial fragment
* is time stamped.
*/
tx_flags = 0;
}
}
if (skb == NULL)
goto error;
/*
* Fill in the control structures
*/
skb->ip_summed = csummode;
skb->csum = 0;
/* reserve for fragmentation */
skb_reserve(skb, hh_len+sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM)
skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags = tx_flags;
/*
* Find where to start putting bytes
*/
data = skb_put(skb, fraglen);
skb_set_network_header(skb, exthdrlen);
data += fragheaderlen;
skb->transport_header = (skb->network_header +
fragheaderlen);
if (fraggap) {
skb->csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(
skb_prev, maxfraglen,
data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0);
skb_prev->csum = csum_sub(skb_prev->csum,
skb->csum);
data += fraggap;
pskb_trim_unique(skb_prev, maxfraglen);
}
copy = datalen - transhdrlen - fraggap;
if (copy < 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
} else if (copy > 0 && getfrag(from, data + transhdrlen, offset, copy, fraggap, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
offset += copy;
length -= datalen - fraggap;
transhdrlen = 0;
exthdrlen = 0;
csummode = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/*
* Put the packet on the pending queue
*/
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_write_queue, skb);
continue;
}
if (copy > length)
copy = length;
if (!(rt->dst.dev->features&NETIF_F_SG)) {
unsigned int off;
off = skb->len;
if (getfrag(from, skb_put(skb, copy),
offset, copy, off, skb) < 0) {
__skb_trim(skb, off);
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
} else {
int i = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
skb_frag_t *frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i-1];
struct page *page = sk->sk_sndmsg_page;
int off = sk->sk_sndmsg_off;
unsigned int left;
if (page && (left = PAGE_SIZE - off) > 0) {
if (copy >= left)
copy = left;
if (page != frag->page) {
if (i == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto error;
}
get_page(page);
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, sk->sk_sndmsg_off, 0);
frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
}
} else if(i < MAX_SKB_FRAGS) {
if (copy > PAGE_SIZE)
copy = PAGE_SIZE;
page = alloc_pages(sk->sk_allocation, 0);
if (page == NULL) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
sk->sk_sndmsg_page = page;
sk->sk_sndmsg_off = 0;
skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page, 0, 0);
frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i];
} else {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto error;
}
if (getfrag(from, page_address(frag->page)+frag->page_offset+frag->size, offset, copy, skb->len, skb) < 0) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto error;
}
sk->sk_sndmsg_off += copy;
frag->size += copy;
skb->len += copy;
skb->data_len += copy;
skb->truesize += copy;
atomic_add(copy, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
}
offset += copy;
length -= copy;
}
return 0;
error:
cork->length -= length;
IP6_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), rt->rt6i_idev, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: make fragment identifications less predictable
IPv6 fragment identification generation is way beyond what we use for
IPv4 : It uses a single generator. Its not scalable and allows DOS
attacks.
Now inetpeer is IPv6 aware, we can use it to provide a more secure and
scalable frag ident generator (per destination, instead of system wide)
This patch :
1) defines a new secure_ipv6_id() helper
2) extends inet_getid() to provide 32bit results
3) extends ipv6_select_ident() with a new dest parameter
Reported-by: Fernando Gont <fernando@gont.com.ar>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 165,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_LIBXML_API void php_libxml_error_handler(void *ctx, const char *msg, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, msg);
php_libxml_internal_error_handler(PHP_LIBXML_ERROR, ctx, &msg, args);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,251
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothSocketDisconnectFunction::OnSuccess() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(work_thread_id());
Respond(ArgumentList(bluetooth_socket::Disconnect::Results::Create()));
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 154,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void decode_smpte_tc(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
skip_bits(gb, 16); /* Time_code[63..48] */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after Time_code[63..48]");
skip_bits(gb, 16); /* Time_code[47..32] */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after Time_code[47..32]");
skip_bits(gb, 16); /* Time_code[31..16] */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after Time_code[31..16]");
skip_bits(gb, 16); /* Time_code[15..0] */
check_marker(s->avctx, gb, "after Time_code[15..0]");
skip_bits(gb, 4); /* reserved_bits */
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 74,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_setup_request(struct cifs_ses *ses, struct smb_rqst *rqst)
{
int rc;
struct smb_hdr *hdr = (struct smb_hdr *)rqst->rq_iov[0].iov_base;
struct mid_q_entry *mid;
rc = allocate_mid(ses, hdr, &mid);
if (rc)
return ERR_PTR(rc);
rc = cifs_sign_rqst(rqst, ses->server, &mid->sequence_number);
if (rc) {
cifs_delete_mid(mid);
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
return mid;
}
Commit Message: cifs: move check for NULL socket into smb_send_rqst
Cai reported this oops:
[90701.616664] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000028
[90701.625438] IP: [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.632167] PGD fea319067 PUD 103fda4067 PMD 0
[90701.637255] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[90701.640878] Modules linked in: des_generic md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver binfmt_misc tun sg igb iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support lpc_ich pcspkr i2c_i801 i2c_core i7core_edac edac_core ioatdma dca mfd_core coretemp kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel microcode sr_mod cdrom ata_generic sd_mod pata_acpi crc_t10dif ata_piix libata megaraid_sas dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[90701.677655] CPU 10
[90701.679808] Pid: 9627, comm: ls Tainted: G W 3.7.1+ #10 QCI QSSC-S4R/QSSC-S4R
[90701.688950] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814a343e>] [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.698383] RSP: 0018:ffff88177b431bb8 EFLAGS: 00010206
[90701.704309] RAX: ffff88177b431fd8 RBX: 00007ffffffff000 RCX: ffff88177b431bec
[90701.712271] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000000
[90701.720223] RBP: ffff88177b431bc8 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000
[90701.728185] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[90701.736147] R13: ffff88184ef92000 R14: 0000000000000023 R15: ffff88177b431c88
[90701.744109] FS: 00007fd56a1a47c0(0000) GS:ffff88105fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[90701.753137] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[90701.759550] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 000000104f15f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
[90701.767512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[90701.775465] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[90701.783428] Process ls (pid: 9627, threadinfo ffff88177b430000, task ffff88185ca4cb60)
[90701.792261] Stack:
[90701.794505] 0000000000000023 ffff88177b431c50 ffff88177b431c38 ffffffffa014fcb1
[90701.802809] ffff88184ef921bc 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ffff88184ef921c0
[90701.811123] ffff88177b431c08 ffffffff815ca3d9 ffff88177b431c18 ffff880857758000
[90701.819433] Call Trace:
[90701.822183] [<ffffffffa014fcb1>] smb_send_rqst+0x71/0x1f0 [cifs]
[90701.828991] [<ffffffff815ca3d9>] ? schedule+0x29/0x70
[90701.834736] [<ffffffffa014fe6d>] smb_sendv+0x3d/0x40 [cifs]
[90701.841062] [<ffffffffa014fe96>] smb_send+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.847291] [<ffffffffa015801f>] send_nt_cancel+0x6f/0xd0 [cifs]
[90701.854102] [<ffffffffa015075e>] SendReceive+0x18e/0x360 [cifs]
[90701.860814] [<ffffffffa0134a78>] CIFSFindFirst+0x1a8/0x3f0 [cifs]
[90701.867724] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.875601] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.883477] [<ffffffffa01578e6>] cifs_query_dir_first+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.890869] [<ffffffffa015480d>] initiate_cifs_search+0xed/0x250 [cifs]
[90701.898354] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.904486] [<ffffffffa01554cb>] cifs_readdir+0x45b/0x8f0 [cifs]
[90701.911288] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.917410] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.923533] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.929657] [<ffffffff81195848>] vfs_readdir+0xb8/0xe0
[90701.935490] [<ffffffff81195b9f>] sys_getdents+0x8f/0x110
[90701.941521] [<ffffffff815d3b99>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[90701.948222] Code: 66 90 55 65 48 8b 04 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 83 fe 01 48 8b 98 48 e0 ff ff 48 c7 80 48 e0 ff ff ff ff ff ff 74 22 <48> 8b 47 28 ff 50 68 65 48 8b 14 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 9a 48 e0
[90701.970313] RIP [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.977125] RSP <ffff88177b431bb8>
[90701.981018] CR2: 0000000000000028
[90701.984809] ---[ end trace 24bd602971110a43 ]---
This is likely due to a race vs. a reconnection event.
The current code checks for a NULL socket in smb_send_kvec, but that's
too late. By the time that check is done, the socket will already have
been passed to kernel_setsockopt. Move the check into smb_send_rqst, so
that it's checked earlier.
In truth, this is a bit of a half-assed fix. The -ENOTSOCK error
return here looks like it could bubble back up to userspace. The locking
rules around the ssocket pointer are really unclear as well. There are
cases where the ssocket pointer is changed without holding the srv_mutex,
but I'm not clear whether there's a potential race here yet or not.
This code seems like it could benefit from some fundamental re-think of
how the socket handling should behave. Until then though, this patch
should at least fix the above oops in most cases.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.7+
Reported-and-Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 30,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mime_list_cancel (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
if (directory->details->mime_list_in_progress != NULL)
{
g_cancellable_cancel (directory->details->mime_list_in_progress->cancellable);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
{
unsigned long offset, addr = (unsigned long)from;
unsigned long size, len = 0;
struct page *page;
void *map;
int ret;
do {
ret = __get_user_pages_fast(addr, 1, 0, &page);
if (!ret)
break;
offset = addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
size = min(PAGE_SIZE - offset, n - len);
map = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(to, map+offset, size);
kunmap_atomic(map);
put_page(page);
len += size;
to += size;
addr += size;
} while (len < n);
return len;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VRDisplay::OnVSync(device::mojom::blink::VRPosePtr pose,
mojo::common::mojom::blink::TimeDeltaPtr time,
int16_t frame_id,
device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status error) {
v_sync_connection_failed_ = false;
switch (error) {
case device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status::SUCCESS:
break;
case device::mojom::blink::VRVSyncProvider::Status::CLOSING:
return;
}
pending_vsync_ = false;
WTF::TimeDelta time_delta =
WTF::TimeDelta::FromMicroseconds(time->microseconds);
if (timebase_ < 0) {
timebase_ = WTF::MonotonicallyIncreasingTime() - time_delta.InSecondsF();
}
frame_pose_ = std::move(pose);
vr_frame_id_ = frame_id;
Platform::Current()->CurrentThread()->GetWebTaskRunner()->PostTask(
BLINK_FROM_HERE,
WTF::Bind(&VRDisplay::ProcessScheduledAnimations,
WrapWeakPersistent(this), timebase_ + time_delta.InSecondsF()));
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 171,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PageHandler::OnSwapCompositorFrame(
viz::CompositorFrameMetadata frame_metadata) {
last_compositor_frame_metadata_ = std::move(frame_metadata);
has_compositor_frame_metadata_ = true;
if (screencast_enabled_)
InnerSwapCompositorFrame();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExtensionFunctionDispatcher::Delegate::GetAssociatedWebContents() const {
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 114,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: acpi_status acpi_os_signal_semaphore(acpi_handle handle, u32 units)
{
struct semaphore *sem = (struct semaphore *)handle;
if (!acpi_os_initialized)
return AE_OK;
if (!sem || (units < 1))
return AE_BAD_PARAMETER;
if (units > 1)
return AE_SUPPORT;
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_MUTEX, "Signaling semaphore[%p|%d]\n", handle,
units));
up(sem);
return AE_OK;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 53,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::CommandsUpdated() {
Q_Q(OxideQQuickWebView);
emit q->navigationHistoryChanged();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MessageLoop::MessageLoop(Type type)
: MessageLoop(type, MessagePumpFactoryCallback()) {
BindToCurrentThread();
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void setVerticalAdjustment(WebKitWebView* webView, GtkAdjustment* adjustment)
{
Page* page = core(webView);
if (page)
static_cast<WebKit::ChromeClient*>(page->chrome()->client())->adjustmentWatcher()->setVerticalAdjustment(adjustment);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int caif_seqpkt_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *m, size_t len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int ret;
int copylen;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (m->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto read_error;
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, 0 , &ret);
if (!skb)
goto read_error;
copylen = skb->len;
if (len < copylen) {
m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copylen = len;
}
ret = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, m->msg_iov, copylen);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
ret = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len : copylen;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
caif_check_flow_release(sk);
return ret;
read_error:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Sjur Braendeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 166,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int get_camera_metadata_entry(camera_metadata_t *src,
size_t index,
camera_metadata_entry_t *entry) {
if (src == NULL || entry == NULL) return ERROR;
if (index >= src->entry_count) return ERROR;
camera_metadata_buffer_entry_t *buffer_entry = get_entries(src) + index;
entry->index = index;
entry->tag = buffer_entry->tag;
entry->type = buffer_entry->type;
entry->count = buffer_entry->count;
if (buffer_entry->count *
camera_metadata_type_size[buffer_entry->type] > 4) {
entry->data.u8 = get_data(src) + buffer_entry->data.offset;
} else {
entry->data.u8 = buffer_entry->data.value;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Prevent data size overflow
Add a function to check overflow when calculating metadata
data size.
Bug: 30741779
Change-Id: I6405fe608567a4f4113674050f826f305ecae030
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Con_DrawConsole( void ) {
Con_CheckResize();
if ( clc.state == CA_DISCONNECTED ) {
if ( !( Key_GetCatcher( ) & (KEYCATCH_UI | KEYCATCH_CGAME)) ) {
Con_DrawSolidConsole( 1.0 );
return;
}
}
if ( con.displayFrac ) {
Con_DrawSolidConsole( con.displayFrac );
} else {
if ( clc.state == CA_ACTIVE ) {
Con_DrawNotify();
}
}
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int megasas_dcmd_ld_list_query(MegasasState *s, MegasasCmd *cmd)
{
uint16_t flags;
struct mfi_ld_targetid_list info;
size_t dcmd_size = sizeof(info), resid;
uint32_t num_ld_disks = 0, max_ld_disks = s->fw_luns;
BusChild *kid;
/* mbox0 contains flags */
flags = le16_to_cpu(cmd->frame->dcmd.mbox[0]);
trace_megasas_dcmd_ld_list_query(cmd->index, flags);
if (flags != MR_LD_QUERY_TYPE_ALL &&
flags != MR_LD_QUERY_TYPE_EXPOSED_TO_HOST) {
max_ld_disks = 0;
}
memset(&info, 0, dcmd_size);
if (cmd->iov_size < 12) {
trace_megasas_dcmd_invalid_xfer_len(cmd->index, cmd->iov_size,
dcmd_size);
return MFI_STAT_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
dcmd_size = sizeof(uint32_t) * 2 + 3;
max_ld_disks = cmd->iov_size - dcmd_size;
if (megasas_is_jbod(s)) {
max_ld_disks = 0;
}
if (max_ld_disks > MFI_MAX_LD) {
max_ld_disks = MFI_MAX_LD;
}
QTAILQ_FOREACH(kid, &s->bus.qbus.children, sibling) {
SCSIDevice *sdev = SCSI_DEVICE(kid->child);
if (num_ld_disks >= max_ld_disks) {
break;
}
info.targetid[num_ld_disks] = sdev->lun;
num_ld_disks++;
dcmd_size++;
}
info.ld_count = cpu_to_le32(num_ld_disks);
info.size = dcmd_size;
trace_megasas_dcmd_ld_get_list(cmd->index, num_ld_disks, max_ld_disks);
resid = dma_buf_read((uint8_t *)&info, dcmd_size, &cmd->qsg);
cmd->iov_size = dcmd_size - resid;
return MFI_STAT_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RendererSchedulerImpl::ShouldPrioritizeInputEvent(
const blink::WebInputEvent& web_input_event) {
if ((web_input_event.GetType() == blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseDown ||
web_input_event.GetType() == blink::WebInputEvent::kMouseMove) &&
(web_input_event.GetModifiers() &
blink::WebInputEvent::kLeftButtonDown)) {
return true;
}
if (blink::WebInputEvent::IsMouseEventType(web_input_event.GetType()) ||
blink::WebInputEvent::IsKeyboardEventType(web_input_event.GetType())) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 143,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::string16 DevToolsConfirmInfoBarDelegate::GetButtonLabel(
InfoBarButton button) const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16((button == BUTTON_OK) ?
IDS_DEV_TOOLS_CONFIRM_ALLOW_BUTTON : IDS_DEV_TOOLS_CONFIRM_DENY_BUTTON);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 138,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHost::BeginCommitOnImplThread(LayerTreeHostImpl* host_impl) {
DCHECK(proxy_->IsImplThread());
TRACE_EVENT0("cc", "LayerTreeHost::CommitTo");
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static s32 snto32(__u32 value, unsigned n)
{
switch (n) {
case 8: return ((__s8)value);
case 16: return ((__s16)value);
case 32: return ((__s32)value);
}
return value & (1 << (n - 1)) ? value | (-1 << n) : value;
}
Commit Message: HID: core: prevent out-of-bound readings
Plugging a Logitech DJ receiver with KASAN activated raises a bunch of
out-of-bound readings.
The fields are allocated up to MAX_USAGE, meaning that potentially, we do
not have enough fields to fit the incoming values.
Add checks and silence KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 49,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int bio_add_page(struct bio *bio, struct page *page,
unsigned int len, unsigned int offset)
{
struct bio_vec *bv;
/*
* cloned bio must not modify vec list
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_flagged(bio, BIO_CLONED)))
return 0;
/*
* For filesystems with a blocksize smaller than the pagesize
* we will often be called with the same page as last time and
* a consecutive offset. Optimize this special case.
*/
if (bio->bi_vcnt > 0) {
bv = &bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt - 1];
if (page == bv->bv_page &&
offset == bv->bv_offset + bv->bv_len) {
bv->bv_len += len;
goto done;
}
}
if (bio->bi_vcnt >= bio->bi_max_vecs)
return 0;
bv = &bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt];
bv->bv_page = page;
bv->bv_len = len;
bv->bv_offset = offset;
bio->bi_vcnt++;
done:
bio->bi_iter.bi_size += len;
return len;
}
Commit Message: fix unbalanced page refcounting in bio_map_user_iov
bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if
IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page.
bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never
dropped.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 62,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLTextAreaElement::accessKeyAction(bool)
{
focus();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 114,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsPrintScalingDisabled() {
if (ppp_printing_ != NULL) {
PP_Bool result = ppp_printing_->IsScalingDisabled(plugin_->pp_instance());
return result == PP_TRUE;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 103,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LogKeyboardControlEvent(KeyboardControlEvent event) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"VirtualKeyboard.KeyboardControlEvent",
event,
keyboard::KEYBOARD_CONTROL_MAX);
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int raw_send_hdrinc(struct sock *sk, struct flowi4 *fl4,
void *from, size_t length,
struct rtable **rtp,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct iphdr *iph;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int iphlen;
int err;
struct rtable *rt = *rtp;
int hlen, tlen;
if (length > rt->dst.dev->mtu) {
ip_local_error(sk, EMSGSIZE, fl4->daddr, inet->inet_dport,
rt->dst.dev->mtu);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (flags&MSG_PROBE)
goto out;
hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev);
tlen = rt->dst.dev->needed_tailroom;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk,
length + hlen + tlen + 15,
flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (skb == NULL)
goto error;
skb_reserve(skb, hlen);
skb->priority = sk->sk_priority;
skb->mark = sk->sk_mark;
skb_dst_set(skb, &rt->dst);
*rtp = NULL;
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
iph = ip_hdr(skb);
skb_put(skb, length);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb->transport_header = skb->network_header;
err = -EFAULT;
if (memcpy_fromiovecend((void *)iph, from, 0, length))
goto error_free;
iphlen = iph->ihl * 4;
/*
* We don't want to modify the ip header, but we do need to
* be sure that it won't cause problems later along the network
* stack. Specifically we want to make sure that iph->ihl is a
* sane value. If ihl points beyond the length of the buffer passed
* in, reject the frame as invalid
*/
err = -EINVAL;
if (iphlen > length)
goto error_free;
if (iphlen >= sizeof(*iph)) {
if (!iph->saddr)
iph->saddr = fl4->saddr;
iph->check = 0;
iph->tot_len = htons(length);
if (!iph->id)
ip_select_ident(skb, &rt->dst, NULL);
iph->check = ip_fast_csum((unsigned char *)iph, iph->ihl);
}
if (iph->protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP)
icmp_out_count(net, ((struct icmphdr *)
skb_transport_header(skb))->type);
err = NF_HOOK(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, skb, NULL,
rt->dst.dev, dst_output);
if (err > 0)
err = net_xmit_errno(err);
if (err)
goto error;
out:
return 0;
error_free:
kfree_skb(skb);
error:
IP_INC_STATS(net, IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
if (err == -ENOBUFS && !inet->recverr)
err = 0;
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 40,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CompositorImpl::TearDownDisplayAndUnregisterRootFrameSink() {
SCOPED_UMA_HISTOGRAM_LONG_TIMER("CompositorImplAndroid.TearDownDisplayTime");
if (enable_viz_) {
if (display_private_ && HavePendingReadbacks()) {
display_private_->ForceImmediateDrawAndSwapIfPossible();
}
GetHostFrameSinkManager()->InvalidateFrameSinkId(frame_sink_id_);
display_private_.reset();
} else {
if (display_ && HavePendingReadbacks())
display_->ForceImmediateDrawAndSwapIfPossible();
if (display_) {
GetFrameSinkManager()->UnregisterBeginFrameSource(
root_window_->GetBeginFrameSource());
}
GetHostFrameSinkManager()->InvalidateFrameSinkId(frame_sink_id_);
display_.reset();
}
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 130,862
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void op_attr_secret_value_clear(void *attr)
{
struct tee_cryp_obj_secret *key = attr;
key->key_size = 0;
memset(key + 1, 0, key->alloc_size);
}
Commit Message: svc: check for allocation overflow in crypto calls part 2
Without checking for overflow there is a risk of allocating a buffer
with size smaller than anticipated and as a consequence of that it might
lead to a heap based overflow with attacker controlled data written
outside the boundaries of the buffer.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0011: "Integer overflow in crypto system calls (x2)"
Signed-off-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <joakim.bech@linaro.org> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Riscure <inforequest@riscure.com>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <a.a.milburn@vu.nl>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,844
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_one_file(Image *image)
{
if (!(image->opts & READ_FILE) || (image->opts & USE_STDIO))
{
/* memory or stdio. */
FILE *f = fopen(image->file_name, "rb");
if (f != NULL)
{
if (image->opts & READ_FILE)
image->input_file = f;
else /* memory */
{
if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END) == 0)
{
long int cb = ftell(f);
if (cb > 0 && (unsigned long int)cb < (size_t)~(size_t)0)
{
png_bytep b = voidcast(png_bytep, malloc((size_t)cb));
if (b != NULL)
{
rewind(f);
if (fread(b, (size_t)cb, 1, f) == 1)
{
fclose(f);
image->input_memory_size = cb;
image->input_memory = b;
}
else
{
free(b);
return logclose(image, f, image->file_name,
": read failed: ");
}
}
else
return logclose(image, f, image->file_name,
": out of memory: ");
}
else if (cb == 0)
return logclose(image, f, image->file_name,
": zero length: ");
else
return logclose(image, f, image->file_name,
": tell failed: ");
}
else
return logclose(image, f, image->file_name, ": seek failed: ");
}
}
else
return logerror(image, image->file_name, ": open failed: ",
strerror(errno));
}
return read_file(image, FORMAT_NO_CHANGE, NULL);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,596
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RuleMatchCandidateTxArrayInit(DetectEngineThreadCtx *det_ctx, uint32_t size)
{
DEBUG_VALIDATE_BUG_ON(det_ctx->tx_candidates);
det_ctx->tx_candidates = SCCalloc(size, sizeof(RuleMatchCandidateTx));
if (det_ctx->tx_candidates == NULL) {
FatalError(SC_ERR_MEM_ALLOC, "failed to allocate %"PRIu64" bytes",
(uint64_t)(size * sizeof(RuleMatchCandidateTx)));
}
det_ctx->tx_candidates_size = size;
SCLogDebug("array initialized to %u elements (%"PRIu64" bytes)",
size, (uint64_t)(size * sizeof(RuleMatchCandidateTx)));
}
Commit Message: stream: still inspect packets dropped by stream
The detect engine would bypass packets that are set as dropped. This
seems sane, as these packets are going to be dropped anyway.
However, it lead to the following corner case: stream events that
triggered the drop could not be matched on the rules. The packet
with the event wouldn't make it to the detect engine due to the bypass.
This patch changes the logic to not bypass DROP packets anymore.
Packets that are dropped by the stream engine will set the no payload
inspection flag, so avoid needless cost.
CWE ID: CWE-693
| 0
| 84,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual status_t allocateBufferWithBackup(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
buffer_id *buffer) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32(port_index);
data.writeStrongBinder(params->asBinder());
remote()->transact(ALLOC_BUFFER_WITH_BACKUP, data, &reply);
status_t err = reply.readInt32();
if (err != OK) {
*buffer = 0;
return err;
}
*buffer = (buffer_id)reply.readInt32();
return err;
}
Commit Message: Clear allocation to avoid info leak
Bug: 26914474
Change-Id: Ie1a86e86d78058d041149fe599a4996e7f8185cf
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,313
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JSC::JSValue toJS(JSC::ExecState* exec, JSDOMGlobalObject* globalObject, TestInterface* impl)
{
return wrap<JSTestInterface>(exec, globalObject, impl);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::computePositionedLogicalHeight(LogicalExtentComputedValues& computedValues) const
{
if (isReplaced()) {
computePositionedLogicalHeightReplaced(computedValues);
return;
}
const RenderBoxModelObject* containerBlock = toRenderBoxModelObject(container());
const LayoutUnit containerLogicalHeight = containingBlockLogicalHeightForPositioned(containerBlock);
RenderStyle* styleToUse = style();
const LayoutUnit bordersPlusPadding = borderAndPaddingLogicalHeight();
const Length marginBefore = styleToUse->marginBefore();
const Length marginAfter = styleToUse->marginAfter();
Length logicalTopLength = styleToUse->logicalTop();
Length logicalBottomLength = styleToUse->logicalBottom();
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*\
* For the purposes of this section and the next, the term "static position"
* (of an element) refers, roughly, to the position an element would have had
* in the normal flow. More precisely, the static position for 'top' is the
* distance from the top edge of the containing block to the top margin edge
* of a hypothetical box that would have been the first box of the element if
* its 'position' property had been 'static' and 'float' had been 'none'. The
* value is negative if the hypothetical box is above the containing block.
*
* But rather than actually calculating the dimensions of that hypothetical
* box, user agents are free to make a guess at its probable position.
*
* For the purposes of calculating the static position, the containing block
* of fixed positioned elements is the initial containing block instead of
* the viewport.
\*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
computeBlockStaticDistance(logicalTopLength, logicalBottomLength, this, containerBlock);
LayoutUnit logicalHeight = computedValues.m_extent;
computePositionedLogicalHeightUsing(styleToUse->logicalHeight(), containerBlock, containerLogicalHeight, bordersPlusPadding, logicalHeight,
logicalTopLength, logicalBottomLength, marginBefore, marginAfter,
computedValues);
if (!styleToUse->logicalMaxHeight().isUndefined()) {
LogicalExtentComputedValues maxValues;
computePositionedLogicalHeightUsing(styleToUse->logicalMaxHeight(), containerBlock, containerLogicalHeight, bordersPlusPadding, logicalHeight,
logicalTopLength, logicalBottomLength, marginBefore, marginAfter,
maxValues);
if (computedValues.m_extent > maxValues.m_extent) {
computedValues.m_extent = maxValues.m_extent;
computedValues.m_position = maxValues.m_position;
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = maxValues.m_margins.m_before;
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = maxValues.m_margins.m_after;
}
}
if (!styleToUse->logicalMinHeight().isZero() || styleToUse->logicalMinHeight().isIntrinsic()) {
LogicalExtentComputedValues minValues;
computePositionedLogicalHeightUsing(styleToUse->logicalMinHeight(), containerBlock, containerLogicalHeight, bordersPlusPadding, logicalHeight,
logicalTopLength, logicalBottomLength, marginBefore, marginAfter,
minValues);
if (computedValues.m_extent < minValues.m_extent) {
computedValues.m_extent = minValues.m_extent;
computedValues.m_position = minValues.m_position;
computedValues.m_margins.m_before = minValues.m_margins.m_before;
computedValues.m_margins.m_after = minValues.m_margins.m_after;
}
}
computedValues.m_extent += bordersPlusPadding;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutObject* ImageInputType::createLayoutObject(const ComputedStyle& style) const
{
if (m_useFallbackContent)
return new LayoutBlockFlow(&element());
LayoutImage* image = new LayoutImage(&element());
image->setImageResource(LayoutImageResource::create());
return image;
}
Commit Message: ImageInputType::ensurePrimaryContent should recreate UA shadow tree.
Once the fallback shadow tree was created, it was never recreated even if
ensurePrimaryContent was called. Such situation happens by updating |src|
attribute.
BUG=589838
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1732753004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#377804}
CWE ID: CWE-361
| 0
| 133,004
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NoticeEventTime(InternalEvent *ev, DeviceIntPtr dev)
{
if (!syncEvents.playingEvents)
NoticeTimeMillis(dev, &ev->any.time);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int filemap_fdatawrite(struct address_space *mapping)
{
return __filemap_fdatawrite(mapping, WB_SYNC_ALL);
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 58,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BitReaderCore::RefillCurrentRegister() {
if (nbits_ == kRegWidthInBits || nbits_next_ == 0)
return;
reg_ |= (reg_next_ >> nbits_);
int free_nbits = kRegWidthInBits - nbits_;
if (free_nbits >= nbits_next_) {
nbits_ += nbits_next_;
reg_next_ = 0;
nbits_next_ = 0;
return;
}
nbits_ += free_nbits;
reg_next_ <<= free_nbits;
nbits_next_ -= free_nbits;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::StartPluginIme() {
IPC::Message* msg = new ViewHostMsg_StartPluginIme(routing_id());
msg->set_unblock(true);
Send(msg);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: usage (int argc,
char *argv[])
{
execlp ("man", "man", "part_id", NULL);
g_printerr ("Cannot show man page: %m\n");
exit (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u2fh_devs_discover (u2fh_devs * devs, unsigned *max_index)
{
struct hid_device_info *di, *cur_dev;
u2fh_rc res = U2FH_NO_U2F_DEVICE;
struct u2fdevice *dev;
di = hid_enumerate (0, 0);
for (cur_dev = di; cur_dev; cur_dev = cur_dev->next)
{
int found = 0;
unsigned short usage_page = 0, usage = 0;
/* check if we already opened this device */
for (dev = devs->first; dev != NULL; dev = dev->next)
{
if (strcmp (dev->device_path, cur_dev->path) == 0)
{
if (ping_device (devs, dev->id) == U2FH_OK)
{
found = 1;
res = U2FH_OK;
}
else
{
if (debug)
{
fprintf (stderr, "Device %s failed ping, dead.\n",
dev->device_path);
}
close_device (devs, dev);
}
break;
}
}
if (found)
{
continue;
}
get_usages (cur_dev, &usage_page, &usage);
if (usage_page == FIDO_USAGE_PAGE && usage == FIDO_USAGE_U2FHID)
{
dev = new_device (devs);
dev->devh = hid_open_path (cur_dev->path);
if (dev->devh != NULL)
{
dev->device_path = strdup (cur_dev->path);
if (dev->device_path == NULL)
{
close_device (devs, dev);
goto out;
}
if (init_device (devs, dev) == U2FH_OK)
{
if (cur_dev->product_string)
{
size_t len =
wcstombs (NULL, cur_dev->product_string, 0);
dev->device_string = malloc (len + 1);
if (dev->device_string == NULL)
{
close_device (devs, dev);
goto out;
}
memset (dev->device_string, 0, len + 1);
wcstombs (dev->device_string, cur_dev->product_string,
len);
if (debug)
{
fprintf (stderr, "device %s discovered as '%s'\n",
dev->device_path, dev->device_string);
fprintf (stderr,
" version (Interface, Major, "
"Minor, Build): %d, %d, "
"%d, %d capFlags: %d\n",
dev->versionInterface,
dev->versionMajor,
dev->versionMinor,
dev->versionBuild, dev->capFlags);
}
}
res = U2FH_OK;
continue;
}
}
close_device (devs, dev);
}
}
/* loop through all open devices and make sure we find them in the enumeration */
dev = devs->first;
while (dev)
{
int found = 0;
for (cur_dev = di; cur_dev; cur_dev = cur_dev->next)
{
if (strcmp (cur_dev->path, dev->device_path) == 0)
{
found = 1;
dev = dev->next;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
{
if (debug)
{
fprintf (stderr, "device %s looks dead.\n", dev->device_path);
}
dev = close_device (devs, dev);
}
}
out:
hid_free_enumeration (di);
if (res == U2FH_OK && max_index)
*max_index = devs->max_id - 1;
return res;
}
Commit Message: fix filling out of initresp
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 91,186
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void seq_local_event(unsigned char *event_rec)
{
unsigned char cmd = event_rec[1];
unsigned int parm = *((unsigned int *) &event_rec[4]);
switch (cmd)
{
case LOCL_STARTAUDIO:
DMAbuf_start_devices(parm);
break;
default:;
}
}
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 27,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int atl2_get_eeprom(struct net_device *netdev,
struct ethtool_eeprom *eeprom, u8 *bytes)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
struct atl2_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
u32 *eeprom_buff;
int first_dword, last_dword;
int ret_val = 0;
int i;
if (eeprom->len == 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (atl2_check_eeprom_exist(hw))
return -EINVAL;
eeprom->magic = hw->vendor_id | (hw->device_id << 16);
first_dword = eeprom->offset >> 2;
last_dword = (eeprom->offset + eeprom->len - 1) >> 2;
eeprom_buff = kmalloc(sizeof(u32) * (last_dword - first_dword + 1),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!eeprom_buff)
return -ENOMEM;
for (i = first_dword; i < last_dword; i++) {
if (!atl2_read_eeprom(hw, i*4, &(eeprom_buff[i-first_dword]))) {
ret_val = -EIO;
goto free;
}
}
memcpy(bytes, (u8 *)eeprom_buff + (eeprom->offset & 3),
eeprom->len);
free:
kfree(eeprom_buff);
return ret_val;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::playbackStateChanged() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "playbackStateChanged(" << (void*)this << ")";
if (!webMediaPlayer())
return;
if (webMediaPlayer()->paused())
pauseInternal();
else
playInternal();
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_uint32 (Header *header, guint8 *ptr)
{
if (header->big_endian)
return GUINT32_FROM_BE (*(guint32 *) ptr);
else
return GUINT32_FROM_LE (*(guint32 *) ptr);
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436
| 0
| 84,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_make_slave(struct mount *mnt)
{
struct mount *peer_mnt = mnt, *master = mnt->mnt_master;
struct mount *slave_mnt;
/*
* slave 'mnt' to a peer mount that has the
* same root dentry. If none is available then
* slave it to anything that is available.
*/
while ((peer_mnt = next_peer(peer_mnt)) != mnt &&
peer_mnt->mnt.mnt_root != mnt->mnt.mnt_root) ;
if (peer_mnt == mnt) {
peer_mnt = next_peer(mnt);
if (peer_mnt == mnt)
peer_mnt = NULL;
}
if (IS_MNT_SHARED(mnt) && list_empty(&mnt->mnt_share))
mnt_release_group_id(mnt);
list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_share);
mnt->mnt_group_id = 0;
if (peer_mnt)
master = peer_mnt;
if (master) {
list_for_each_entry(slave_mnt, &mnt->mnt_slave_list, mnt_slave)
slave_mnt->mnt_master = master;
list_move(&mnt->mnt_slave, &master->mnt_slave_list);
list_splice(&mnt->mnt_slave_list, master->mnt_slave_list.prev);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mnt->mnt_slave_list);
} else {
struct list_head *p = &mnt->mnt_slave_list;
while (!list_empty(p)) {
slave_mnt = list_first_entry(p,
struct mount, mnt_slave);
list_del_init(&slave_mnt->mnt_slave);
slave_mnt->mnt_master = NULL;
}
}
mnt->mnt_master = master;
CLEAR_MNT_SHARED(mnt);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,426
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_connect (struct t_irc_server *server)
{
int set, length;
char *option_name;
struct t_config_option *proxy_type, *proxy_ipv6, *proxy_address, *proxy_port;
const char *proxy, *str_proxy_type, *str_proxy_address;
if (!server->buffer)
{
if (!irc_server_create_buffer (server))
return 0;
weechat_buffer_set (server->buffer, "display", "auto");
}
weechat_bar_item_update ("buffer_name");
irc_server_set_index_current_address (server,
server->index_current_address);
if (!server->current_address)
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s%s: unknown address server \"%s\", "
"cannot connect"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME,
server->name);
return 0;
}
/* free some old values (from a previous connection to server) */
if (server->isupport)
{
free (server->isupport);
server->isupport = NULL;
}
if (server->prefix_modes)
{
free (server->prefix_modes);
server->prefix_modes = NULL;
}
if (server->prefix_chars)
{
free (server->prefix_chars);
server->prefix_chars = NULL;
}
proxy_type = NULL;
proxy_ipv6 = NULL;
proxy_address = NULL;
proxy_port = NULL;
str_proxy_type = NULL;
str_proxy_address = NULL;
proxy = IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_PROXY);
if (proxy && proxy[0])
{
length = 32 + strlen (proxy) + 1;
option_name = malloc (length);
if (!option_name)
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s%s: not enough memory"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME);
return 0;
}
snprintf (option_name, length, "weechat.proxy.%s.type", proxy);
proxy_type = weechat_config_get (option_name);
snprintf (option_name, length, "weechat.proxy.%s.ipv6", proxy);
proxy_ipv6 = weechat_config_get (option_name);
snprintf (option_name, length, "weechat.proxy.%s.address", proxy);
proxy_address = weechat_config_get (option_name);
snprintf (option_name, length, "weechat.proxy.%s.port", proxy);
proxy_port = weechat_config_get (option_name);
free (option_name);
if (!proxy_type || !proxy_address)
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s%s: proxy \"%s\" not found for server "
"\"%s\", cannot connect"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, proxy,
server->name);
return 0;
}
str_proxy_type = weechat_config_string (proxy_type);
str_proxy_address = weechat_config_string (proxy_address);
if (!str_proxy_type[0] || !proxy_ipv6 || !str_proxy_address[0]
|| !proxy_port)
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s%s: missing proxy settings, check options "
"for proxy \"%s\""),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME, proxy);
return 0;
}
}
if (!server->nicks_array)
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s%s: nicks not defined for server \"%s\", "
"cannot connect"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME,
server->name);
return 0;
}
#ifndef HAVE_GNUTLS
if (IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL))
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot connect with SSL because WeeChat "
"was not built with GnuTLS support"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME);
return 0;
}
#endif
if (proxy_type)
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s: connecting to server %s/%d%s%s via %s "
"proxy %s/%d%s..."),
IRC_PLUGIN_NAME,
server->current_address,
server->current_port,
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_IPV6)) ?
" (IPv6)" : "",
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL)) ?
" (SSL)" : "",
str_proxy_type,
str_proxy_address,
weechat_config_integer (proxy_port),
(weechat_config_boolean (proxy_ipv6)) ? " (IPv6)" : "");
weechat_log_printf (_("Connecting to server %s/%d%s%s via %s proxy "
"%s/%d%s..."),
server->current_address,
server->current_port,
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_IPV6)) ?
" (IPv6)" : "",
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL)) ?
" (SSL)" : "",
str_proxy_type,
str_proxy_address,
weechat_config_integer (proxy_port),
(weechat_config_boolean (proxy_ipv6)) ? " (IPv6)" : "");
}
else
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s: connecting to server %s/%d%s%s..."),
IRC_PLUGIN_NAME,
server->current_address,
server->current_port,
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_IPV6)) ?
" (IPv6)" : "",
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL)) ?
" (SSL)" : "");
weechat_log_printf (_("%s%s: connecting to server %s/%d%s%s..."),
"",
IRC_PLUGIN_NAME,
server->current_address,
server->current_port,
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_IPV6)) ?
" (IPv6)" : "",
(IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL)) ?
" (SSL)" : "");
}
/* close connection if opened */
irc_server_close_connection (server);
/* create socket and set options */
if (proxy_type)
{
server->sock = socket ((weechat_config_integer (proxy_ipv6)) ?
AF_INET6 : AF_INET,
SOCK_STREAM, 0);
}
else
{
server->sock = socket ((IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_IPV6)) ?
AF_INET6 : AF_INET,
SOCK_STREAM, 0);
}
if (server->sock == -1)
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot create socket"),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME);
return 0;
}
/* set SO_REUSEADDR option for socket */
set = 1;
if (setsockopt (server->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
(void *) &set, sizeof (set)) == -1)
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot set socket option "
"\"SO_REUSEADDR\""),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME);
}
/* set SO_KEEPALIVE option for socket */
set = 1;
if (setsockopt (server->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE,
(void *) &set, sizeof (set)) == -1)
{
weechat_printf (server->buffer,
_("%s%s: cannot set socket option "
"\"SO_KEEPALIVE\""),
weechat_prefix ("error"), IRC_PLUGIN_NAME);
}
/* init SSL if asked and connect */
server->ssl_connected = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS
if (IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL))
server->ssl_connected = 1;
server->hook_connect = weechat_hook_connect (proxy,
server->current_address,
server->current_port,
server->sock,
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_IPV6),
(server->ssl_connected) ? &server->gnutls_sess : NULL,
(server->ssl_connected) ? irc_server_gnutls_callback : NULL,
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_INTEGER(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_SSL_DHKEY_SIZE),
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_LOCAL_HOSTNAME),
&irc_server_connect_cb,
server);
#else
server->hook_connect = weechat_hook_connect (proxy,
server->current_address,
server->current_port,
server->sock,
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_BOOLEAN(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_IPV6),
NULL, NULL, 0,
IRC_SERVER_OPTION_STRING(server, IRC_SERVER_OPTION_LOCAL_HOSTNAME),
&irc_server_connect_cb,
server);
#endif
/* send signal "irc_server_connecting" with server name */
weechat_hook_signal_send ("irc_server_connecting",
WEECHAT_HOOK_SIGNAL_STRING, server->name);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,472
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LogHTMLForm(SavePasswordProgressLogger* logger,
SavePasswordProgressLogger::StringID message_id,
const blink::WebFormElement& form) {
logger->LogHTMLForm(message_id,
form.name().utf8(),
GURL(form.action().utf8()));
}
Commit Message: Remove WeakPtrFactory from PasswordAutofillAgent
Unlike in AutofillAgent, the factory is no longer used in PAA.
R=dvadym@chromium.org
BUG=609010,609007,608100,608101,433486
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1945723003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391475}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 156,978
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Camera3Device::prepare(int maxCount, int streamId) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Preparing stream %d", __FUNCTION__, mId, streamId);
Mutex::Autolock il(mInterfaceLock);
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
sp<Camera3StreamInterface> stream;
ssize_t outputStreamIdx = mOutputStreams.indexOfKey(streamId);
if (outputStreamIdx == NAME_NOT_FOUND) {
CLOGE("Stream %d does not exist", streamId);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
stream = mOutputStreams.editValueAt(outputStreamIdx);
if (stream->isUnpreparable() || stream->hasOutstandingBuffers() ) {
CLOGE("Stream %d has already been a request target", streamId);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
if (mRequestThread->isStreamPending(stream)) {
CLOGE("Stream %d is already a target in a pending request", streamId);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
return mPreparerThread->prepare(maxCount, stream);
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_lo_tell)
{
zval *pgsql_id = NULL;
int offset = 0;
pgLofp *pgsql;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "r", &pgsql_id) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pgsql, pgLofp *, &pgsql_id, -1, "PostgreSQL large object", le_lofp);
offset = lo_tell((PGconn *)pgsql->conn, pgsql->lofd);
RETURN_LONG(offset);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool swipe_right() const { return swipe_right_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InputType::CanSetValue(const String&) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err sdp_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_SDPBox *p = (GF_SDPBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "SDPBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (p->sdpText)
fprintf(trace, "<!-- sdp text: %s -->\n", p->sdpText);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("SDPBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GSList *nicklist_get_same_unique(SERVER_REC *server, void *id)
{
NICKLIST_GET_SAME_UNIQUE_REC rec;
GSList *tmp;
g_return_val_if_fail(IS_SERVER(server), NULL);
g_return_val_if_fail(id != NULL, NULL);
rec.id = id;
rec.list = NULL;
for (tmp = server->channels; tmp != NULL; tmp = tmp->next) {
rec.channel = tmp->data;
g_hash_table_foreach(rec.channel->nicks,
(GHFunc) get_nicks_same_hash_unique,
&rec);
}
return rec.list;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 63,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<IMediaSource> FLACExtractor::getTrack(size_t index)
{
if (mInitCheck != OK || index > 0) {
return NULL;
}
return new FLACSource(mDataSource, mTrackMetadata);
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_header(void *arg, const char *name, const char *val)
{
struct check_header_ctx *ctx = arg;
if (name[0] == '\0') {
ctx->error = 1;
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, ctx->r, APLOGNO(02428)
"Empty response header name, aborting request");
return 0;
}
if (ap_has_cntrl(name)) {
ctx->error = 1;
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, ctx->r, APLOGNO(02429)
"Response header name '%s' contains control "
"characters, aborting request",
name);
return 0;
}
if (ap_has_cntrl(val)) {
ctx->error = 1;
ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, ctx->r, APLOGNO(02430)
"Response header '%s' contains control characters, "
"aborting request: %s",
name, val);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Limit accepted chunk-size to 2^63-1 and be strict about chunk-ext
authorized characters.
Submitted by: Yann Ylavic
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1684513 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 43,629
|
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