instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init signals_init(void)
{
/* If this check fails, the __ARCH_SI_PREAMBLE_SIZE value is wrong! */
BUILD_BUG_ON(__ARCH_SI_PREAMBLE_SIZE
!= offsetof(struct siginfo, _sifields._pad));
sigqueue_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(sigqueue, SLAB_PANIC);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info
When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewDataSource::StartDataRequest(const std::string& path,
bool is_incognito,
int request_id) {
if (!EndsWith(path, "/print.pdf", true)) {
ChromeWebUIDataSource::StartDataRequest(path, is_incognito, request_id);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> data;
std::vector<std::string> url_substr;
base::SplitString(path, '/', &url_substr);
int page_index = 0;
if (url_substr.size() == 3 && base::StringToInt(url_substr[1], &page_index)) {
PrintPreviewDataService::GetInstance()->GetDataEntry(
url_substr[0], page_index, &data);
}
if (data.get()) {
SendResponse(request_id, data);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> empty_bytes(new base::RefCountedBytes);
SendResponse(request_id, empty_bytes);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 170,827
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int xstate_sigframe_size(void)
{
return use_xsave() ? fpu_user_xstate_size + FP_XSTATE_MAGIC2_SIZE :
fpu_user_xstate_size;
}
Commit Message: x86/fpu: Don't let userspace set bogus xcomp_bv
On x86, userspace can use the ptrace() or rt_sigreturn() system calls to
set a task's extended state (xstate) or "FPU" registers. ptrace() can
set them for another task using the PTRACE_SETREGSET request with
NT_X86_XSTATE, while rt_sigreturn() can set them for the current task.
In either case, registers can be set to any value, but the kernel
assumes that the XSAVE area itself remains valid in the sense that the
CPU can restore it.
However, in the case where the kernel is using the uncompacted xstate
format (which it does whenever the XSAVES instruction is unavailable),
it was possible for userspace to set the xcomp_bv field in the
xstate_header to an arbitrary value. However, all bits in that field
are reserved in the uncompacted case, so when switching to a task with
nonzero xcomp_bv, the XRSTOR instruction failed with a #GP fault. This
caused the WARN_ON_FPU(err) in copy_kernel_to_xregs() to be hit. In
addition, since the error is otherwise ignored, the FPU registers from
the task previously executing on the CPU were leaked.
Fix the bug by checking that the user-supplied value of xcomp_bv is 0 in
the uncompacted case, and returning an error otherwise.
The reason for validating xcomp_bv rather than simply overwriting it
with 0 is that we want userspace to see an error if it (incorrectly)
provides an XSAVE area in compacted format rather than in uncompacted
format.
Note that as before, in case of error we clear the task's FPU state.
This is perhaps non-ideal, especially for PTRACE_SETREGSET; it might be
better to return an error before changing anything. But it seems the
"clear on error" behavior is fine for now, and it's a little tricky to
do otherwise because it would mean we couldn't simply copy the full
userspace state into kernel memory in one __copy_from_user().
This bug was found by syzkaller, which hit the above-mentioned
WARN_ON_FPU():
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at ./arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h:373 __switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.13.0 #453
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
task: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0 task.stack: ffffa78cc036c000
RIP: 0010:__switch_to+0x5b5/0x5d0
RSP: 0000:ffffa78cc08bbb88 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff9ba2b8bf2180 RCX: 00000000c0000100
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: 000000005cb10700 RDI: ffff9ba2b8bf36c0
RBP: ffffa78cc08bbbd0 R08: 00000000929fdf46 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ba2bc8e42c0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff9ba2b8bf3680 R15: ffff9ba2bf5d7b40
FS: 00007f7e5cb10700(0000) GS:ffff9ba2bf400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004005cc CR3: 0000000079fd5000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
Call Trace:
Code: 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 11 fd ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 e7 fa ff ff 0f ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 c2 fa ff ff <0f> ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 e9 d4 fc ff ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f
Here is a C reproducer. The expected behavior is that the program spin
forever with no output. However, on a buggy kernel running on a
processor with the "xsave" feature but without the "xsaves" feature
(e.g. Sandy Bridge through Broadwell for Intel), within a second or two
the program reports that the xmm registers were corrupted, i.e. were not
restored correctly. With CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y it also hits the above
kernel warning.
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(void)
{
int pid = fork();
uint64_t xstate[512];
struct iovec iov = { .iov_base = xstate, .iov_len = sizeof(xstate) };
if (pid == 0) {
bool tracee = true;
for (int i = 0; i < sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN) && tracee; i++)
tracee = (fork() != 0);
uint32_t xmm0[4] = { [0 ... 3] = tracee ? 0x00000000 : 0xDEADBEEF };
asm volatile(" movdqu %0, %%xmm0\n"
" mov %0, %%rbx\n"
"1: movdqu %%xmm0, %0\n"
" mov %0, %%rax\n"
" cmp %%rax, %%rbx\n"
" je 1b\n"
: "+m" (xmm0) : : "rax", "rbx", "xmm0");
printf("BUG: xmm registers corrupted! tracee=%d, xmm0=%08X%08X%08X%08X\n",
tracee, xmm0[0], xmm0[1], xmm0[2], xmm0[3]);
} else {
usleep(100000);
ptrace(PTRACE_ATTACH, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
xstate[65] = -1;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, NT_X86_XSTATE, &iov);
ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, 0, 0);
wait(NULL);
}
return 1;
}
Note: the program only tests for the bug using the ptrace() system call.
The bug can also be reproduced using the rt_sigreturn() system call, but
only when called from a 32-bit program, since for 64-bit programs the
kernel restores the FPU state from the signal frame by doing XRSTOR
directly from userspace memory (with proper error checking).
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.17+]
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Fixes: 0b29643a5843 ("x86/xsaves: Change compacted format xsave area header")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170922174156.16780-2-ebiggers3@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170923130016.21448-25-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 60,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rawv6_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,
int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)msg->msg_name;
struct sk_buff *skb;
size_t copied;
int err;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (addr_len)
*addr_len=sizeof(*sin6);
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)
return ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
if (np->rxpmtu && np->rxopt.bits.rxpmtu)
return ipv6_recv_rxpmtu(sk, msg, len);
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
copied = len;
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
}
if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb)) {
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
} else if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_TRUNC) {
if (__skb_checksum_complete(skb))
goto csum_copy_err;
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
} else {
err = skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov);
if (err == -EINVAL)
goto csum_copy_err;
}
if (err)
goto out_free;
/* Copy the address. */
if (sin6) {
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = 0;
sin6->sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
sin6->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
}
sock_recv_ts_and_drops(msg, sk, skb);
if (np->rxopt.all)
ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
err = copied;
if (flags & MSG_TRUNC)
err = skb->len;
out_free:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
return err;
csum_copy_err:
skb_kill_datagram(sk, skb, flags);
/* Error for blocking case is chosen to masquerade
as some normal condition.
*/
err = (flags&MSG_DONTWAIT) ? -EAGAIN : -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 166,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataCache::Pin(const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
FileOperationType file_operation_type,
base::PlatformFileError* error) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
DCHECK(error);
FilePath source_path;
FilePath dest_path;
FilePath symlink_path;
bool create_symlink = true;
int cache_state = CACHE_STATE_PINNED;
CacheSubDirectoryType sub_dir_type = CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT;
scoped_ptr<CacheEntry> cache_entry = GetCacheEntry(resource_id, md5);
if (!cache_entry.get()) { // Entry does not exist in cache.
dest_path = FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(util::kSymLinkToDevNull);
source_path = dest_path;
sub_dir_type = CACHE_TYPE_PINNED;
} else { // File exists in cache, determines destination path.
cache_state |= cache_entry->cache_state;
if (cache_entry->IsDirty() || cache_entry->IsMounted()) {
DCHECK_EQ(CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT, cache_entry->sub_dir_type);
dest_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
cache_entry->sub_dir_type,
CACHED_FILE_LOCALLY_MODIFIED);
source_path = dest_path;
} else {
source_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
cache_entry->sub_dir_type,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
if (cache_entry->sub_dir_type == CACHE_TYPE_PINNED) {
dest_path = source_path;
create_symlink = false;
} else { // File exists, move it to persistent dir.
dest_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
}
}
}
if (create_symlink) {
symlink_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
std::string(),
CACHE_TYPE_PINNED,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
}
*error = ModifyCacheState(source_path,
dest_path,
file_operation_type,
symlink_path,
create_symlink);
if (*error == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
metadata_->UpdateCache(resource_id, md5, sub_dir_type, cache_state);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 170,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(int) gdTransformAffineBoundingBox(gdRectPtr src, const double affine[6], gdRectPtr bbox)
{
gdPointF extent[4], min, max, point;
int i;
extent[0].x=0.0;
extent[0].y=0.0;
extent[1].x=(double) src->width;
extent[1].y=0.0;
extent[2].x=(double) src->width;
extent[2].y=(double) src->height;
extent[3].x=0.0;
extent[3].y=(double) src->height;
for (i=0; i < 4; i++) {
point=extent[i];
if (gdAffineApplyToPointF(&extent[i], &point, affine) != GD_TRUE) {
return GD_FALSE;
}
}
min=extent[0];
max=extent[0];
for (i=1; i < 4; i++) {
if (min.x > extent[i].x)
min.x=extent[i].x;
if (min.y > extent[i].y)
min.y=extent[i].y;
if (max.x < extent[i].x)
max.x=extent[i].x;
if (max.y < extent[i].y)
max.y=extent[i].y;
}
bbox->x = (int) min.x;
bbox->y = (int) min.y;
bbox->width = (int) floor(max.x - min.x) - 1;
bbox->height = (int) floor(max.y - min.y);
return GD_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: gdImageScaleTwoPass memory leak fix
Fixing memory leak in gdImageScaleTwoPass, as reported by @cmb69 and
confirmed by @vapier. This bug actually bit me in production and I'm
very thankful that it was reported with an easy fix.
Fixes #173.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 56,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_rgb_cmyk_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading raw-byte-format PPM files with any maxval and
converting to CMYK */
{
ppm_source_ptr source = (ppm_source_ptr)sinfo;
register JSAMPROW ptr;
register U_CHAR *bufferptr;
register JSAMPLE *rescale = source->rescale;
JDIMENSION col;
unsigned int maxval = source->maxval;
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->buffer_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
ptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
bufferptr = source->iobuffer;
if (maxval == MAXJSAMPLE) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
JSAMPLE r = *bufferptr++;
JSAMPLE g = *bufferptr++;
JSAMPLE b = *bufferptr++;
rgb_to_cmyk(r, g, b, ptr, ptr + 1, ptr + 2, ptr + 3);
ptr += 4;
}
} else {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
JSAMPLE r = rescale[UCH(*bufferptr++)];
JSAMPLE g = rescale[UCH(*bufferptr++)];
JSAMPLE b = rescale[UCH(*bufferptr++)];
rgb_to_cmyk(r, g, b, ptr, ptr + 1, ptr + 2, ptr + 3);
ptr += 4;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 93,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EvalNamedColorPCS(const cmsFloat32Number In[], cmsFloat32Number Out[], const cmsStage *mpe)
{
cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* NamedColorList = (cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST*) mpe ->Data;
cmsUInt16Number index = (cmsUInt16Number) _cmsQuickSaturateWord(In[0] * 65535.0);
if (index >= NamedColorList-> nColors) {
cmsSignalError(NamedColorList ->ContextID, cmsERROR_RANGE, "Color %d out of range; ignored", index);
}
else {
Out[0] = (cmsFloat32Number) (NamedColorList->List[index].PCS[0] / 65535.0);
Out[1] = (cmsFloat32Number) (NamedColorList->List[index].PCS[1] / 65535.0);
Out[2] = (cmsFloat32Number) (NamedColorList->List[index].PCS[2] / 65535.0);
}
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID:
| 0
| 40,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_string_on_virtaddr(struct magic_set *ms,
int swap, int clazz, int fd, off_t ph_off, int ph_num,
off_t fsize, uint64_t virtaddr, char *buf, ssize_t buflen)
{
char *bptr;
off_t offset;
if (buflen == 0)
return 0;
offset = get_offset_from_virtaddr(ms, swap, clazz, fd, ph_off, ph_num,
fsize, virtaddr);
if (offset < 0 ||
(buflen = pread(fd, buf, CAST(size_t, buflen), offset)) <= 0) {
file_badread(ms);
return 0;
}
buf[buflen - 1] = '\0';
/* We expect only printable characters, so return if buffer contains
* non-printable character before the '\0' or just '\0'. */
for (bptr = buf; *bptr && isprint((unsigned char)*bptr); bptr++)
continue;
if (*bptr != '\0')
return 0;
return bptr - buf;
}
Commit Message: Avoid OOB read (found by ASAN reported by F. Alonso)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 91,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err free_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_FreeSpaceBox *ptr = (GF_FreeSpaceBox *)s;
ptr->size += ptr->dataSize;
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_json(Datum val, bool is_null, StringInfo result,
Oid val_type, bool key_scalar)
{
JsonTypeCategory tcategory;
Oid outfuncoid;
if (val_type == InvalidOid)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("could not determine input data type")));
if (is_null)
{
tcategory = JSONTYPE_NULL;
outfuncoid = InvalidOid;
}
else
json_categorize_type(val_type,
&tcategory, &outfuncoid);
datum_to_json(val, is_null, result, tcategory, outfuncoid, key_scalar);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ShowBrokenPageTab(TabContents* contents) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ReportBug"), profile_);
string16 page_title = contents->GetTitle();
NavigationEntry* entry = contents->controller().GetActiveEntry();
if (!entry)
return;
std::string page_url = entry->url().spec();
std::vector<std::string> subst;
subst.push_back(UTF16ToASCII(page_title));
subst.push_back(page_url);
std::string report_page_url =
ReplaceStringPlaceholders(kBrokenPageUrl, subst, NULL);
ShowSingletonTab(GURL(report_page_url));
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,319
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ossl_cipher_set_key(VALUE self, VALUE key)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
int key_len;
StringValue(key);
GetCipher(self, ctx);
key_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx);
if (RSTRING_LEN(key) != key_len)
ossl_raise(rb_eArgError, "key must be %d bytes", key_len);
if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(key), NULL, -1) != 1)
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
return key;
}
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 1
| 168,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_compr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *f)
{
struct snd_compr *compr;
struct snd_compr_file *data;
struct snd_compr_runtime *runtime;
enum snd_compr_direction dirn;
int maj = imajor(inode);
int ret;
if ((f->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY)
dirn = SND_COMPRESS_PLAYBACK;
else if ((f->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)
dirn = SND_COMPRESS_CAPTURE;
else
return -EINVAL;
if (maj == snd_major)
compr = snd_lookup_minor_data(iminor(inode),
SNDRV_DEVICE_TYPE_COMPRESS);
else
return -EBADFD;
if (compr == NULL) {
pr_err("no device data!!!\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (dirn != compr->direction) {
pr_err("this device doesn't support this direction\n");
snd_card_unref(compr->card);
return -EINVAL;
}
data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data) {
snd_card_unref(compr->card);
return -ENOMEM;
}
data->stream.ops = compr->ops;
data->stream.direction = dirn;
data->stream.private_data = compr->private_data;
data->stream.device = compr;
runtime = kzalloc(sizeof(*runtime), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!runtime) {
kfree(data);
snd_card_unref(compr->card);
return -ENOMEM;
}
runtime->state = SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN;
init_waitqueue_head(&runtime->sleep);
data->stream.runtime = runtime;
f->private_data = (void *)data;
mutex_lock(&compr->lock);
ret = compr->ops->open(&data->stream);
mutex_unlock(&compr->lock);
if (ret) {
kfree(runtime);
kfree(data);
}
snd_card_unref(compr->card);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress: fix an integer overflow check
I previously added an integer overflow check here but looking at it now,
it's still buggy.
The bug happens in snd_compr_allocate_buffer(). We multiply
".fragments" and ".fragment_size" and that doesn't overflow but then we
save it in an unsigned int so it truncates the high bits away and we
allocate a smaller than expected size.
Fixes: b35cc8225845 ('ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 58,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: svc_release_buffer(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rqstp->rq_pages); i++)
if (rqstp->rq_pages[i])
put_page(rqstp->rq_pages[i]);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b)
{
if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host))
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path))
return 0;
if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host))
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path))
return 0;
if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_obj_freeze(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
struct RBasic *b;
switch (mrb_type(self)) {
case MRB_TT_FALSE:
case MRB_TT_TRUE:
case MRB_TT_FIXNUM:
case MRB_TT_SYMBOL:
#ifndef MRB_WITHOUT_FLOAT
case MRB_TT_FLOAT:
#endif
return self;
default:
break;
}
b = mrb_basic_ptr(self);
if (!MRB_FROZEN_P(b)) {
MRB_SET_FROZEN_FLAG(b);
}
return self;
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list,
struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
struct net *net;
int error;
LIST_HEAD(net_exit_list);
list_add_tail(&ops->list, list);
if (ops->init || (ops->id && ops->size)) {
for_each_net(net) {
error = ops_init(ops, net);
if (error)
goto out_undo;
list_add_tail(&net->exit_list, &net_exit_list);
}
}
return 0;
out_undo:
/* If I have an error cleanup all namespaces I initialized */
list_del(&ops->list);
ops_exit_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
ops_free_list(ops, &net_exit_list);
return error;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 86,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FramebufferManager::CreateFramebuffer(
GLuint client_id, GLuint service_id) {
std::pair<FramebufferMap::iterator, bool> result =
framebuffers_.insert(
std::make_pair(
client_id,
scoped_refptr<Framebuffer>(
new Framebuffer(this, service_id))));
DCHECK(result.second);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long mem_cgroup_soft_limit_reclaim(struct zone *zone, int order,
gfp_t gfp_mask,
unsigned long *total_scanned)
{
unsigned long nr_reclaimed = 0;
struct mem_cgroup_per_zone *mz, *next_mz = NULL;
unsigned long reclaimed;
int loop = 0;
struct mem_cgroup_tree_per_zone *mctz;
unsigned long long excess;
unsigned long nr_scanned;
if (order > 0)
return 0;
mctz = soft_limit_tree_node_zone(zone_to_nid(zone), zone_idx(zone));
/*
* This loop can run a while, specially if mem_cgroup's continuously
* keep exceeding their soft limit and putting the system under
* pressure
*/
do {
if (next_mz)
mz = next_mz;
else
mz = mem_cgroup_largest_soft_limit_node(mctz);
if (!mz)
break;
nr_scanned = 0;
reclaimed = mem_cgroup_soft_reclaim(mz->mem, zone,
gfp_mask, &nr_scanned);
nr_reclaimed += reclaimed;
*total_scanned += nr_scanned;
spin_lock(&mctz->lock);
/*
* If we failed to reclaim anything from this memory cgroup
* it is time to move on to the next cgroup
*/
next_mz = NULL;
if (!reclaimed) {
do {
/*
* Loop until we find yet another one.
*
* By the time we get the soft_limit lock
* again, someone might have aded the
* group back on the RB tree. Iterate to
* make sure we get a different mem.
* mem_cgroup_largest_soft_limit_node returns
* NULL if no other cgroup is present on
* the tree
*/
next_mz =
__mem_cgroup_largest_soft_limit_node(mctz);
if (next_mz == mz)
css_put(&next_mz->mem->css);
else /* next_mz == NULL or other memcg */
break;
} while (1);
}
__mem_cgroup_remove_exceeded(mz->mem, mz, mctz);
excess = res_counter_soft_limit_excess(&mz->mem->res);
/*
* One school of thought says that we should not add
* back the node to the tree if reclaim returns 0.
* But our reclaim could return 0, simply because due
* to priority we are exposing a smaller subset of
* memory to reclaim from. Consider this as a longer
* term TODO.
*/
/* If excess == 0, no tree ops */
__mem_cgroup_insert_exceeded(mz->mem, mz, mctz, excess);
spin_unlock(&mctz->lock);
css_put(&mz->mem->css);
loop++;
/*
* Could not reclaim anything and there are no more
* mem cgroups to try or we seem to be looping without
* reclaiming anything.
*/
if (!nr_reclaimed &&
(next_mz == NULL ||
loop > MEM_CGROUP_MAX_SOFT_LIMIT_RECLAIM_LOOPS))
break;
} while (!nr_reclaimed);
if (next_mz)
css_put(&next_mz->mem->css);
return nr_reclaimed;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,126
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::GetNFC(device::mojom::NFCRequest request) {
if (!nfc_host_)
nfc_host_.reset(new NFCHost(this));
nfc_host_->GetNFC(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,723
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *OMXNodeInstance::findBufferHeader(OMX::buffer_id buffer) {
return (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)buffer;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Add buffer range check to emptyBuffer
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: If351dbd573bb4aeb6968bfa33f6d407225bc752c
(cherry picked from commit d971df0eb300356b3c995d533289216f43aa60de)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 163,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ext4_da_page_release_reservation(struct page *page,
unsigned long offset)
{
int to_release = 0;
struct buffer_head *head, *bh;
unsigned int curr_off = 0;
head = page_buffers(page);
bh = head;
do {
unsigned int next_off = curr_off + bh->b_size;
if ((offset <= curr_off) && (buffer_delay(bh))) {
to_release++;
clear_buffer_delay(bh);
}
curr_off = next_off;
} while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head);
ext4_da_release_space(page->mapping->host, to_release);
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofputil_put_ofp11_table_stats(const struct ofputil_table_stats *stats,
const struct ofputil_table_features *features,
struct ofpbuf *buf)
{
struct mf_bitmap wc = wild_or_nonmatchable_fields(features);
struct ofp11_table_stats *out;
out = ofpbuf_put_zeros(buf, sizeof *out);
out->table_id = features->table_id;
ovs_strlcpy(out->name, features->name, sizeof out->name);
out->wildcards = mf_bitmap_to_of11(&wc);
out->match = mf_bitmap_to_of11(&features->match);
out->instructions = ovsinst_bitmap_to_openflow(
features->nonmiss.instructions, OFP11_VERSION);
out->write_actions = ofpact_bitmap_to_openflow(
features->nonmiss.write.ofpacts, OFP11_VERSION);
out->apply_actions = ofpact_bitmap_to_openflow(
features->nonmiss.apply.ofpacts, OFP11_VERSION);
out->config = htonl(features->miss_config);
out->max_entries = htonl(features->max_entries);
out->active_count = htonl(stats->active_count);
out->lookup_count = htonll(stats->lookup_count);
out->matched_count = htonll(stats->matched_count);
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::OnDisplayMetricsChanged(
const display::Display& display,
uint32_t changed_metrics) {
const display::Display primary_display =
display::Screen::GetScreen()->GetPrimaryDisplay();
if (display.id() != primary_display.id() ||
!(changed_metrics & DISPLAY_METRIC_BOUNDS)) {
return;
}
if (GetOobeUI()) {
if (is_voice_interaction_oobe_)
login_window_->SetSize(primary_display.work_area_size());
const gfx::Size& size = primary_display.size();
GetOobeUI()->GetCoreOobeView()->SetClientAreaSize(size.width(),
size.height());
if (changed_metrics & DISPLAY_METRIC_PRIMARY)
GetOobeUI()->OnDisplayConfigurationChanged();
}
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long long VideoTrack::GetHeight() const { return m_height; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,773
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Object* Create(Object* next) { return new Object(next); }
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 153,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sfnt_init_face( FT_Stream stream,
TT_Face face,
FT_Int face_instance_index,
FT_Int num_params,
FT_Parameter* params )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_Memory memory = face->root.memory;
FT_Library library = face->root.driver->root.library;
SFNT_Service sfnt;
FT_Int face_index;
/* for now, parameters are unused */
FT_UNUSED( num_params );
FT_UNUSED( params );
sfnt = (SFNT_Service)face->sfnt;
if ( !sfnt )
{
sfnt = (SFNT_Service)FT_Get_Module_Interface( library, "sfnt" );
if ( !sfnt )
{
FT_ERROR(( "sfnt_init_face: cannot access `sfnt' module\n" ));
return FT_THROW( Missing_Module );
}
face->sfnt = sfnt;
face->goto_table = sfnt->goto_table;
}
FT_FACE_FIND_GLOBAL_SERVICE( face, face->psnames, POSTSCRIPT_CMAPS );
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_GX_VAR_SUPPORT
if ( !face->mm )
{
/* we want the MM interface from the `truetype' module only */
FT_Module tt_module = FT_Get_Module( library, "truetype" );
face->mm = ft_module_get_service( tt_module,
FT_SERVICE_ID_MULTI_MASTERS,
0 );
}
if ( !face->var )
{
/* we want the metrics variations interface */
/* from the `truetype' module only */
FT_Module tt_module = FT_Get_Module( library, "truetype" );
face->var = ft_module_get_service( tt_module,
FT_SERVICE_ID_METRICS_VARIATIONS,
0 );
}
#endif
FT_TRACE2(( "SFNT driver\n" ));
error = sfnt_open_font( stream, face );
if ( error )
return error;
/* Stream may have changed in sfnt_open_font. */
stream = face->root.stream;
FT_TRACE2(( "sfnt_init_face: %08p, %d\n", face, face_instance_index ));
face_index = FT_ABS( face_instance_index ) & 0xFFFF;
/* value -(N+1) requests information on index N */
if ( face_instance_index < 0 )
face_index--;
if ( face_index >= face->ttc_header.count )
{
if ( face_instance_index >= 0 )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
else
face_index = 0;
}
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK( face->ttc_header.offsets[face_index] ) )
return error;
/* check whether we have a valid TrueType file */
error = sfnt->load_font_dir( face, stream );
if ( error )
return error;
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_GX_VAR_SUPPORT
{
FT_ULong fvar_len;
FT_ULong version;
FT_ULong offset;
FT_UShort num_axes;
FT_UShort axis_size;
FT_UShort num_instances;
FT_UShort instance_size;
FT_Int instance_index;
FT_Byte* default_values = NULL;
FT_Byte* instance_values = NULL;
face->is_default_instance = 1;
instance_index = FT_ABS( face_instance_index ) >> 16;
/* test whether current face is a GX font with named instances */
if ( face->goto_table( face, TTAG_fvar, stream, &fvar_len ) ||
fvar_len < 20 ||
FT_READ_ULONG( version ) ||
FT_READ_USHORT( offset ) ||
FT_STREAM_SKIP( 2 ) /* reserved */ ||
FT_READ_USHORT( num_axes ) ||
FT_READ_USHORT( axis_size ) ||
FT_READ_USHORT( num_instances ) ||
FT_READ_USHORT( instance_size ) )
{
version = 0;
offset = 0;
num_axes = 0;
axis_size = 0;
num_instances = 0;
instance_size = 0;
}
/* check that the data is bound by the table length */
if ( version != 0x00010000UL ||
axis_size != 20 ||
num_axes == 0 ||
/* `num_axes' limit implied by 16-bit `instance_size' */
num_axes > 0x3FFE ||
!( instance_size == 4 + 4 * num_axes ||
instance_size == 6 + 4 * num_axes ) ||
/* `num_instances' limit implied by limited range of name IDs */
num_instances > 0x7EFF ||
offset +
axis_size * num_axes +
instance_size * num_instances > fvar_len )
num_instances = 0;
else
face->variation_support |= TT_FACE_FLAG_VAR_FVAR;
/*
* As documented in the OpenType specification, an entry for the
* default instance may be omitted in the named instance table. In
* particular this means that even if there is no named instance
* table in the font we actually do have a named instance, namely the
* default instance.
*
* For consistency, we always want the default instance in our list
* of named instances. If it is missing, we try to synthesize it
* later on. Here, we have to adjust `num_instances' accordingly.
*/
if ( !( FT_ALLOC( default_values, num_axes * 2 ) ||
FT_ALLOC( instance_values, num_axes * 2 ) ) )
{
/* the current stream position is 16 bytes after the table start */
FT_ULong array_start = FT_STREAM_POS() - 16 + offset;
FT_ULong default_value_offset, instance_offset;
FT_Byte* p;
FT_UInt i;
default_value_offset = array_start + 8;
p = default_values;
for ( i = 0; i < num_axes; i++ )
{
(void)FT_STREAM_READ_AT( default_value_offset, p, 2 );
default_value_offset += axis_size;
p += 2;
}
instance_offset = array_start + axis_size * num_axes + 4;
for ( i = 0; i < num_instances; i++ )
{
(void)FT_STREAM_READ_AT( instance_offset,
instance_values,
num_axes * 2 );
if ( !ft_memcmp( default_values, instance_values, num_axes * 2 ) )
break;
instance_offset += instance_size;
}
if ( i == num_instances )
{
/* no default instance in named instance table; */
/* we thus have to synthesize it */
num_instances++;
}
}
FT_FREE( default_values );
FT_FREE( instance_values );
/* we don't support Multiple Master CFFs yet */
if ( face->goto_table( face, TTAG_glyf, stream, 0 ) &&
!face->goto_table( face, TTAG_CFF, stream, 0 ) )
num_instances = 0;
if ( instance_index > num_instances )
{
if ( face_instance_index >= 0 )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
else
num_instances = 0;
}
face->root.style_flags = (FT_Long)num_instances << 16;
}
#endif
face->root.num_faces = face->ttc_header.count;
face->root.face_index = face_instance_index;
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 164,888
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void afiucv_pm_complete(struct device *dev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PM_DEBUG
printk(KERN_WARNING "afiucv_pm_complete\n");
#endif
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t show_tabletSize(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%dx%d\n",
input_abs_get_max(aiptek->inputdev, ABS_X) + 1,
input_abs_get_max(aiptek->inputdev, ABS_Y) + 1);
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void dentry_update_name_case(struct dentry *dentry, struct qstr *name)
{
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&dentry->d_parent->d_inode->i_mutex));
BUG_ON(dentry->d_name.len != name->len); /* d_lookup gives this */
spin_lock(&dentry->d_lock);
write_seqcount_begin(&dentry->d_seq);
memcpy((unsigned char *)dentry->d_name.name, name->name, name->len);
write_seqcount_end(&dentry->d_seq);
spin_unlock(&dentry->d_lock);
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 94,605
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: double RoundDouble(const long double invalue, const short numberOfPrecisions)
{
long long p = (long long) pow(10.0L, numberOfPrecisions);
double ret= (long long)(invalue * p + 0.5L) / (double)p;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Do not allow enters/returns in arguments (thanks to Fabio Carretto)
CWE ID: CWE-93
| 0
| 90,926
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnExecuteNoValueEditCommand(const std::string& name) {
frame_->executeCommand(WebString::fromUTF8(name), GetFocusedElement());
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int airo_open(struct net_device *dev) {
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
int rc = 0;
if (test_bit(FLAG_FLASHING, &ai->flags))
return -EIO;
/* Make sure the card is configured.
* Wireless Extensions may postpone config changes until the card
* is open (to pipeline changes and speed-up card setup). If
* those changes are not yet committed, do it now - Jean II */
if (test_bit(FLAG_COMMIT, &ai->flags)) {
disable_MAC(ai, 1);
writeConfigRid(ai, 1);
}
if (ai->wifidev != dev) {
clear_bit(JOB_DIE, &ai->jobs);
ai->airo_thread_task = kthread_run(airo_thread, dev, dev->name);
if (IS_ERR(ai->airo_thread_task))
return (int)PTR_ERR(ai->airo_thread_task);
rc = request_irq(dev->irq, airo_interrupt, IRQF_SHARED,
dev->name, dev);
if (rc) {
airo_print_err(dev->name,
"register interrupt %d failed, rc %d",
dev->irq, rc);
set_bit(JOB_DIE, &ai->jobs);
kthread_stop(ai->airo_thread_task);
return rc;
}
/* Power on the MAC controller (which may have been disabled) */
clear_bit(FLAG_RADIO_DOWN, &ai->flags);
enable_interrupts(ai);
try_auto_wep(ai);
}
enable_MAC(ai, 1);
netif_start_queue(dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XSLTProcessor::~XSLTProcessor()
{
ASSERT(!m_stylesheetRootNode || !m_stylesheet || m_stylesheet->hasOneRef());
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExceptionInfo *magick_unused(exception))
{
magick_unreferenced(exception);
if (module_list == (SplayTreeInfo *) NULL)
{
if (module_semaphore == (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
ActivateSemaphoreInfo(&module_semaphore);
LockSemaphoreInfo(module_semaphore);
if (module_list == (SplayTreeInfo *) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
ModuleInfo
*module_info;
module_list=NewSplayTree(CompareSplayTreeString,
(void *(*)(void *)) NULL,DestroyModuleNode);
if (module_list == (SplayTreeInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
module_info=AcquireModuleInfo((const char *) NULL,"[boot-strap]");
module_info->stealth=MagickTrue;
status=AddValueToSplayTree(module_list,module_info->tag,module_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (lt_dlinit() != 0)
ThrowFatalException(ModuleFatalError,
"UnableToInitializeModuleLoader");
}
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(module_semaphore);
}
return(module_list != (SplayTreeInfo *) NULL ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: Coder path traversal is not authorized, bug report provided by Masaaki Chida
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 71,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct crypto_alg *crypto_user_skcipher_alg(const char *name, u32 type,
u32 mask)
{
int err;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
type = crypto_skcipher_type(type);
mask = crypto_skcipher_mask(mask);
for (;;) {
alg = crypto_lookup_skcipher(name, type, mask);
if (!IS_ERR(alg))
return alg;
err = PTR_ERR(alg);
if (err != -EAGAIN)
break;
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -EINTR;
break;
}
}
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InitializeWithHTML(const String& html) {
WebView().MainFrameWidget()->Resize(WebSize(800, 600));
SimRequest request("https://example.com/test.html", "text/html");
LoadURL("https://example.com/test.html");
request.Complete(html);
UpdateAllLifecyclePhases();
DCHECK(paint_artifact_compositor());
paint_artifact_compositor()->EnableExtraDataForTesting();
UpdateAllLifecyclePhases();
DCHECK(paint_artifact_compositor()->GetExtraDataForTesting());
}
Commit Message: [BGPT] Add a fast-path for transform-origin changes.
This patch adds a fast-path for updating composited transform-origin
changes without requiring a PaintArtifactCompositor update. This
closely follows the approach of https://crrev.com/651338.
Bug: 952473
Change-Id: I8b82909c1761a7aa16705813207739d29596b0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580260
Commit-Queue: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: vmpstr <vmpstr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653749}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,116
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int setup_pivot_root(const struct lxc_rootfs *rootfs)
{
if (!rootfs->path)
return 0;
if (detect_ramfs_rootfs()) {
if (prepare_ramfs_root(rootfs->mount))
return -1;
} else if (setup_rootfs_pivot_root(rootfs->mount, rootfs->pivot)) {
ERROR("failed to setup pivot root");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 44,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: c_pdf14trans_get_cropping(const gs_composite_t *pcte, int *ry, int *rheight,
int cropping_min, int cropping_max)
{
gs_pdf14trans_t * pdf14pct = (gs_pdf14trans_t *) pcte;
switch (pdf14pct->params.pdf14_op) {
case PDF14_PUSH_DEVICE: return ALLBANDS; /* Applies to all bands. */
case PDF14_POP_DEVICE: return ALLBANDS; /* Applies to all bands. */
case PDF14_ABORT_DEVICE: return ALLBANDS; /* Applies to all bands */
case PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_GROUP:
{ gs_int_rect rect;
pdf14_compute_group_device_int_rect(&pdf14pct->params.ctm,
&pdf14pct->params.bbox, &rect);
/* We have to crop this by the parent object. */
*ry = max(rect.p.y, cropping_min);
*rheight = min(rect.q.y, cropping_max) - *ry;
return PUSHCROP; /* Push cropping. */
}
case PDF14_BEGIN_TRANS_MASK:
{ gs_int_rect rect;
pdf14_compute_group_device_int_rect(&pdf14pct->params.ctm,
&pdf14pct->params.bbox, &rect);
/* We have to crop this by the parent object and worry about the BC outside
the range, except for image SMask which don't affect areas outside the image */
if ( pdf14pct->params.GrayBackground == 1.0 || pdf14pct->params.mask_is_image) {
/* In this case there will not be a background effect to
worry about. The mask will not have any effect outside
the bounding box. This is NOT the default or common case. */
*ry = max(rect.p.y, cropping_min);
*rheight = min(rect.q.y, cropping_max) - *ry;
return PUSHCROP; /* Push cropping. */
} else {
/* We need to make the soft mask range as large as the parent
due to the fact that the background color can have an impact
OUTSIDE the bounding box of the soft mask */
*ry = cropping_min;
*rheight = cropping_max - cropping_min;
if (pdf14pct->params.subtype == TRANSPARENCY_MASK_None)
return SAMEAS_PUSHCROP_BUTNOPUSH;
else
return PUSHCROP; /* Push cropping. */
}
}
case PDF14_END_TRANS_GROUP: return POPCROP; /* Pop cropping. */
case PDF14_END_TRANS_MASK: return POPCROP; /* Pop the cropping */
case PDF14_PUSH_TRANS_STATE: return CURRBANDS;
case PDF14_POP_TRANS_STATE: return CURRBANDS;
case PDF14_SET_BLEND_PARAMS: return ALLBANDS;
case PDF14_PUSH_SMASK_COLOR: return POPCROP; /* Pop cropping. */
case PDF14_POP_SMASK_COLOR: return POPCROP; /* Pop the cropping */
}
return ALLBANDS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 13,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NonWhitelistedCommandsAreDisabled(CommandUpdaterImpl* command_updater) {
constexpr int kWhitelistedIds[] = {
IDC_CUT, IDC_COPY, IDC_PASTE,
IDC_FIND, IDC_FIND_NEXT, IDC_FIND_PREVIOUS,
IDC_ZOOM_PLUS, IDC_ZOOM_NORMAL, IDC_ZOOM_MINUS,
};
for (int id : command_updater->GetAllIds()) {
if (base::ContainsValue(kWhitelistedIds, id)) {
continue;
}
DCHECK(!command_updater->IsCommandEnabled(id));
}
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 153,517
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftrace_regex_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
{
loff_t ret;
if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
ret = seq_lseek(file, offset, whence);
else
file->f_pos = ret = 1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 166,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __kvm_io_bus_read(struct kvm_io_bus *bus, struct kvm_io_range *range,
void *val)
{
int idx;
idx = kvm_io_bus_get_first_dev(bus, range->addr, range->len);
if (idx < 0)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
while (idx < bus->dev_count &&
kvm_io_bus_cmp(range, &bus->range[idx]) == 0) {
if (!kvm_iodevice_read(bus->range[idx].dev, range->addr,
range->len, val))
return idx;
idx++;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,302
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SyncBackendHost::IsUsingExplicitPassphrase() {
return IsNigoriEnabled() &&
core_->sync_manager()->IsUsingExplicitPassphrase();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,861
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SMB2_query_info(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid,
struct smb2_file_all_info *data)
{
return query_info(xid, tcon, persistent_fid, volatile_fid,
FILE_ALL_INFORMATION,
sizeof(struct smb2_file_all_info) + PATH_MAX * 2,
sizeof(struct smb2_file_all_info), data);
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 84,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unsignedLongLongAttrAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValue(info, static_cast<double>(imp->unsignedLongLongAttr()));
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,026
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int evdns_resolve_ipv6(const char *name, int flags,
evdns_callback_type callback, void *ptr) {
return evdns_base_resolve_ipv6(current_base, name, flags, callback, ptr)
? 0 : -1;
}
Commit Message: evdns: fix searching empty hostnames
From #332:
Here follows a bug report by **Guido Vranken** via the _Tor bug bounty program_. Please credit Guido accordingly.
## Bug report
The DNS code of Libevent contains this rather obvious OOB read:
```c
static char *
search_make_new(const struct search_state *const state, int n, const char *const base_name) {
const size_t base_len = strlen(base_name);
const char need_to_append_dot = base_name[base_len - 1] == '.' ? 0 : 1;
```
If the length of ```base_name``` is 0, then line 3125 reads 1 byte before the buffer. This will trigger a crash on ASAN-protected builds.
To reproduce:
Build libevent with ASAN:
```
$ CFLAGS='-fomit-frame-pointer -fsanitize=address' ./configure && make -j4
```
Put the attached ```resolv.conf``` and ```poc.c``` in the source directory and then do:
```
$ gcc -fsanitize=address -fomit-frame-pointer poc.c .libs/libevent.a
$ ./a.out
=================================================================
==22201== ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60060000efdf at pc 0x4429da bp 0x7ffe1ed47300 sp 0x7ffe1ed472f8
READ of size 1 at 0x60060000efdf thread T0
```
P.S. we can add a check earlier, but since this is very uncommon, I didn't add it.
Fixes: #332
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 70,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gx_pattern1_clist_has_trans(const gx_device_color *pdevc)
{
if (pdevc->colors.pattern.p_tile != NULL &&
pdevc->colors.pattern.p_tile->cdev != NULL) {
return pdevc->colors.pattern.p_tile->cdev->common.page_uses_transparency;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 1,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::OnSubtreeWillBeDeleted(
ui::AXTree* tree,
ui::AXNode* node) {
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 156,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: storeAttributeValue(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, XML_Bool isCdata,
const char *ptr, const char *end, STRING_POOL *pool) {
enum XML_Error result
= appendAttributeValue(parser, enc, isCdata, ptr, end, pool);
if (result)
return result;
if (! isCdata && poolLength(pool) && poolLastChar(pool) == 0x20)
poolChop(pool);
if (! poolAppendChar(pool, XML_T('\0')))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 88,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ClientDiscardableSharedMemoryManager::AllocateOnIO(
size_t size,
int32_t id,
base::SharedMemoryHandle* handle,
base::ScopedClosureRunner closure_runner) {
(*manager_mojo_)
->AllocateLockedDiscardableSharedMemory(
static_cast<uint32_t>(size), id,
base::Bind(
&ClientDiscardableSharedMemoryManager::AllocateCompletedOnIO,
base::Unretained(this), handle, base::Passed(&closure_runner)));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cxusb_mygica_t230_frontend_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
struct dvb_usb_device *d = adap->dev;
struct cxusb_state *st = d->priv;
struct i2c_adapter *adapter;
struct i2c_client *client_demod;
struct i2c_client *client_tuner;
struct i2c_board_info info;
struct si2168_config si2168_config;
struct si2157_config si2157_config;
/* Select required USB configuration */
if (usb_set_interface(d->udev, 0, 0) < 0)
err("set interface failed");
/* Unblock all USB pipes */
usb_clear_halt(d->udev,
usb_sndbulkpipe(d->udev, d->props.generic_bulk_ctrl_endpoint));
usb_clear_halt(d->udev,
usb_rcvbulkpipe(d->udev, d->props.generic_bulk_ctrl_endpoint));
usb_clear_halt(d->udev,
usb_rcvbulkpipe(d->udev, d->props.adapter[0].fe[0].stream.endpoint));
/* attach frontend */
si2168_config.i2c_adapter = &adapter;
si2168_config.fe = &adap->fe_adap[0].fe;
si2168_config.ts_mode = SI2168_TS_PARALLEL;
si2168_config.ts_clock_inv = 1;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(struct i2c_board_info));
strlcpy(info.type, "si2168", I2C_NAME_SIZE);
info.addr = 0x64;
info.platform_data = &si2168_config;
request_module(info.type);
client_demod = i2c_new_device(&d->i2c_adap, &info);
if (client_demod == NULL || client_demod->dev.driver == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (!try_module_get(client_demod->dev.driver->owner)) {
i2c_unregister_device(client_demod);
return -ENODEV;
}
st->i2c_client_demod = client_demod;
/* attach tuner */
memset(&si2157_config, 0, sizeof(si2157_config));
si2157_config.fe = adap->fe_adap[0].fe;
si2157_config.if_port = 1;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(struct i2c_board_info));
strlcpy(info.type, "si2157", I2C_NAME_SIZE);
info.addr = 0x60;
info.platform_data = &si2157_config;
request_module(info.type);
client_tuner = i2c_new_device(adapter, &info);
if (client_tuner == NULL || client_tuner->dev.driver == NULL) {
module_put(client_demod->dev.driver->owner);
i2c_unregister_device(client_demod);
return -ENODEV;
}
if (!try_module_get(client_tuner->dev.driver->owner)) {
i2c_unregister_device(client_tuner);
module_put(client_demod->dev.driver->owner);
i2c_unregister_device(client_demod);
return -ENODEV;
}
st->i2c_client_tuner = client_tuner;
/* hook fe: need to resync the slave fifo when signal locks. */
mutex_init(&st->stream_mutex);
st->last_lock = 0;
st->fe_read_status = adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.read_status;
adap->fe_adap[0].fe->ops.read_status = cxusb_read_status;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,743
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vsock_connect_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct vsock_sock *vsk;
vsk = container_of(work, struct vsock_sock, dwork.work);
sk = sk_vsock(vsk);
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == SS_CONNECTING &&
(sk->sk_shutdown != SHUTDOWN_MASK)) {
sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sk->sk_err = ETIMEDOUT;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
}
release_sock(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(ftruncate, unsigned int, fd, compat_ulong_t, length)
{
return do_sys_ftruncate(fd, length, 1);
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 46,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int restore_mixer_value(struct usb_mixer_elem_list *list)
{
struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval = (struct usb_mixer_elem_info *)list;
int c, err, idx;
if (cval->cmask) {
idx = 0;
for (c = 0; c < MAX_CHANNELS; c++) {
if (!(cval->cmask & (1 << c)))
continue;
if (cval->cached & (1 << (c + 1))) {
err = snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value(cval, c + 1, idx,
cval->cache_val[idx]);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
idx++;
}
} else {
/* master */
if (cval->cached) {
err = snd_usb_set_cur_mix_value(cval, 0, 0, *cval->cache_val);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,993
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: encode_MULTIPATH(const struct ofpact_multipath *mp,
enum ofp_version ofp_version OVS_UNUSED, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
struct nx_action_multipath *nam = put_NXAST_MULTIPATH(out);
nam->fields = htons(mp->fields);
nam->basis = htons(mp->basis);
nam->algorithm = htons(mp->algorithm);
nam->max_link = htons(mp->max_link);
nam->arg = htonl(mp->arg);
nam->ofs_nbits = nxm_encode_ofs_nbits(mp->dst.ofs, mp->dst.n_bits);
nam->dst = htonl(nxm_header_from_mff(mp->dst.field));
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct posix_acl *gfs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(inode);
struct gfs2_holder gh;
bool need_unlock = false;
struct posix_acl *acl;
if (!gfs2_glock_is_locked_by_me(ip->i_gl)) {
int ret = gfs2_glock_nq_init(ip->i_gl, LM_ST_SHARED,
LM_FLAG_ANY, &gh);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
need_unlock = true;
}
acl = __gfs2_get_acl(inode, type);
if (need_unlock)
gfs2_glock_dq_uninit(&gh);
return acl;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 50,344
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DEFINE_TRACE(ReadableStream)
{
visitor->trace(m_source);
visitor->trace(m_exception);
visitor->trace(m_reader);
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int string_to_crypto_compat_type(const char* crypto_compat_type)
{
if (strcmp(crypto_compat_type, "2.0") == 0) {
return CRYPTO_COMPAT_2_0;
} else if (strcmp(crypto_compat_type, "2.1") == 0) {
return CRYPTO_COMPAT_2_2;
}
return CRYPTO_COMPAT_2_2;
}
Commit Message: totemcrypto: fix hmac key initialization
Signed-off-by: Fabio M. Di Nitto <fdinitto@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _6502_anal_esil_push(RAnalOp *op, ut8 data0) {
char *reg = (data0==0x08) ? "flags" : "a";
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "%s,sp,0x100,+,=[1],sp,--=", reg);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10294 - crash in r2_hoobr__6502_op
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_init(void *opaque, unsigned vcpu_size, unsigned vcpu_align,
struct module *module)
{
int r;
int cpu;
r = kvm_arch_init(opaque);
if (r)
goto out_fail;
bad_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (bad_page == NULL) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
bad_pfn = page_to_pfn(bad_page);
hwpoison_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (hwpoison_page == NULL) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_0;
}
hwpoison_pfn = page_to_pfn(hwpoison_page);
fault_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (fault_page == NULL) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_0;
}
fault_pfn = page_to_pfn(fault_page);
if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&cpus_hardware_enabled, GFP_KERNEL)) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_0;
}
r = kvm_arch_hardware_setup();
if (r < 0)
goto out_free_0a;
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
smp_call_function_single(cpu,
kvm_arch_check_processor_compat,
&r, 1);
if (r < 0)
goto out_free_1;
}
r = register_cpu_notifier(&kvm_cpu_notifier);
if (r)
goto out_free_2;
register_reboot_notifier(&kvm_reboot_notifier);
/* A kmem cache lets us meet the alignment requirements of fx_save. */
if (!vcpu_align)
vcpu_align = __alignof__(struct kvm_vcpu);
kvm_vcpu_cache = kmem_cache_create("kvm_vcpu", vcpu_size, vcpu_align,
0, NULL);
if (!kvm_vcpu_cache) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free_3;
}
r = kvm_async_pf_init();
if (r)
goto out_free;
kvm_chardev_ops.owner = module;
kvm_vm_fops.owner = module;
kvm_vcpu_fops.owner = module;
r = misc_register(&kvm_dev);
if (r) {
printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: misc device register failed\n");
goto out_unreg;
}
register_syscore_ops(&kvm_syscore_ops);
kvm_preempt_ops.sched_in = kvm_sched_in;
kvm_preempt_ops.sched_out = kvm_sched_out;
kvm_init_debug();
return 0;
out_unreg:
kvm_async_pf_deinit();
out_free:
kmem_cache_destroy(kvm_vcpu_cache);
out_free_3:
unregister_reboot_notifier(&kvm_reboot_notifier);
unregister_cpu_notifier(&kvm_cpu_notifier);
out_free_2:
out_free_1:
kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup();
out_free_0a:
free_cpumask_var(cpus_hardware_enabled);
out_free_0:
if (fault_page)
__free_page(fault_page);
if (hwpoison_page)
__free_page(hwpoison_page);
__free_page(bad_page);
out:
kvm_arch_exit();
out_fail:
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa.takuya@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 32,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: daemon_msg_startcap_req(uint8 ver, struct daemon_slpars *pars, uint32 plen,
char *source, struct session **sessionp,
struct rpcap_sampling *samp_param _U_)
{
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for network errors
char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to send to the client
char portdata[PCAP_BUF_SIZE]; // temp variable needed to derive the data port
char peerhost[PCAP_BUF_SIZE]; // temp variable needed to derive the host name of our peer
struct session *session = NULL; // saves state of session
int status;
char sendbuf[RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE]; // temporary buffer in which data to be sent is buffered
int sendbufidx = 0; // index which keeps the number of bytes currently buffered
struct addrinfo hints; // temp, needed to open a socket connection
struct addrinfo *addrinfo; // temp, needed to open a socket connection
struct sockaddr_storage saddr; // temp, needed to retrieve the network data port chosen on the local machine
socklen_t saddrlen; // temp, needed to retrieve the network data port chosen on the local machine
int ret; // return value from functions
struct rpcap_startcapreq startcapreq; // start capture request message
struct rpcap_startcapreply *startcapreply; // start capture reply message
int serveropen_dp; // keeps who is going to open the data connection
addrinfo = NULL;
status = rpcapd_recv(pars->sockctrl, (char *) &startcapreq,
sizeof(struct rpcap_startcapreq), &plen, errmsgbuf);
if (status == -1)
{
goto fatal_error;
}
if (status == -2)
{
goto error;
}
startcapreq.flags = ntohs(startcapreq.flags);
session = malloc(sizeof(struct session));
if (session == NULL)
{
pcap_snprintf(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Can't allocate session structure");
goto error;
}
session->sockdata = INVALID_SOCKET;
session->have_thread = 0;
#ifdef _WIN32
session->thread = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
#else
memset(&session->thread, 0, sizeof(session->thread));
#endif
if ((session->fp = pcap_open_live(source,
ntohl(startcapreq.snaplen),
(startcapreq.flags & RPCAP_STARTCAPREQ_FLAG_PROMISC) ? 1 : 0 /* local device, other flags not needed */,
ntohl(startcapreq.read_timeout),
errmsgbuf)) == NULL)
goto error;
#if 0
fp->rmt_samp.method = samp_param->method;
fp->rmt_samp.value = samp_param->value;
#endif
/*
We're in active mode if:
- we're using TCP, and the user wants us to be in active mode
- we're using UDP
*/
serveropen_dp = (startcapreq.flags & RPCAP_STARTCAPREQ_FLAG_SERVEROPEN) || (startcapreq.flags & RPCAP_STARTCAPREQ_FLAG_DGRAM) || pars->isactive;
/*
Gets the sockaddr structure referred to the other peer in the ctrl connection
We need that because:
- if we're in passive mode, we need to know the address family we want to use
(the same used for the ctrl socket)
- if we're in active mode, we need to know the network address of the other host
we want to connect to
*/
saddrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
if (getpeername(pars->sockctrl, (struct sockaddr *) &saddr, &saddrlen) == -1)
{
sock_geterror("getpeername()", errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE);
goto error;
}
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
hints.ai_socktype = (startcapreq.flags & RPCAP_STARTCAPREQ_FLAG_DGRAM) ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_family = saddr.ss_family;
if (serveropen_dp) // Data connection is opened by the server toward the client
{
pcap_snprintf(portdata, sizeof portdata, "%d", ntohs(startcapreq.portdata));
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *) &saddr, saddrlen, peerhost,
sizeof(peerhost), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST))
{
sock_geterror("getnameinfo()", errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE);
goto error;
}
if (sock_initaddress(peerhost, portdata, &hints, &addrinfo, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
if ((session->sockdata = sock_open(addrinfo, SOCKOPEN_CLIENT, 0, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE)) == INVALID_SOCKET)
goto error;
}
else // Data connection is opened by the client toward the server
{
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
if (sock_initaddress(NULL, "0", &hints, &addrinfo, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
if ((session->sockdata = sock_open(addrinfo, SOCKOPEN_SERVER, 1 /* max 1 connection in queue */, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE)) == INVALID_SOCKET)
goto error;
saddrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
if (getsockname(session->sockdata, (struct sockaddr *) &saddr, &saddrlen) == -1)
{
sock_geterror("getsockname()", errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE);
goto error;
}
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *) &saddr, saddrlen, NULL,
0, portdata, sizeof(portdata), NI_NUMERICSERV))
{
sock_geterror("getnameinfo()", errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE);
goto error;
}
}
freeaddrinfo(addrinfo);
addrinfo = NULL;
session->sockctrl = pars->sockctrl;
session->protocol_version = ver;
ret = daemon_unpackapplyfilter(pars->sockctrl, session, &plen, errmsgbuf);
if (ret == -1)
{
goto fatal_error;
}
if (ret == -2)
{
goto error;
}
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_header), NULL, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
rpcap_createhdr((struct rpcap_header *) sendbuf, ver,
RPCAP_MSG_STARTCAP_REPLY, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_startcapreply));
startcapreply = (struct rpcap_startcapreply *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_startcapreply), NULL,
&sendbufidx, RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
memset(startcapreply, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_startcapreply));
startcapreply->bufsize = htonl(pcap_bufsize(session->fp));
if (!serveropen_dp)
{
unsigned short port = (unsigned short)strtoul(portdata,NULL,10);
startcapreply->portdata = htons(port);
}
if (sock_send(pars->sockctrl, sendbuf, sendbufidx, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
goto fatal_error;
}
if (!serveropen_dp)
{
SOCKET socktemp; // We need another socket, since we're going to accept() a connection
saddrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
socktemp = accept(session->sockdata, (struct sockaddr *) &saddr, &saddrlen);
if (socktemp == INVALID_SOCKET)
{
sock_geterror("accept()", errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE);
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Accept of data connection failed: %s",
errbuf);
goto error;
}
sock_close(session->sockdata, NULL, 0);
session->sockdata = socktemp;
}
#ifdef _WIN32
session->thread = (HANDLE)_beginthreadex(NULL, 0, daemon_thrdatamain,
(void *) session, 0, NULL);
if (session->thread == 0)
{
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Error creating the data thread");
goto error;
}
#else
ret = pthread_create(&session->thread, NULL, daemon_thrdatamain,
(void *) session);
if (ret != 0)
{
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
ret, "Error creating the data thread");
goto error;
}
#endif
session->have_thread = 1;
if (rpcapd_discard(pars->sockctrl, plen) == -1)
goto fatal_error;
*sessionp = session;
return 0;
error:
*sessionp = NULL;
if (addrinfo)
freeaddrinfo(addrinfo);
if (session)
{
session_close(session);
free(session);
}
if (rpcap_senderror(pars->sockctrl, ver, PCAP_ERR_STARTCAPTURE,
errmsgbuf, errbuf) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
if (rpcapd_discard(pars->sockctrl, plen) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
return 0;
fatal_error:
*sessionp = NULL;
if (session)
{
session_close(session);
free(session);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: In the open request, reject capture sources that are URLs.
You shouldn't be able to ask a server to open a remote device on some
*other* server; just open it yourself.
This addresses Include Security issue F13: [libpcap] Remote Packet
Capture Daemon Allows Opening Capture URLs.
CWE ID: CWE-918
| 0
| 88,412
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FinishDisabledPolicy_GroupPolicyNotSupported() {
VerifyExpectations(!kUpdateDisabled);
cur_test_case_ = TestCase();
CallAsync(&ComponentUpdaterPolicyTest::EndTest);
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ecryptfs_read_update_atime(struct kiocb *iocb,
struct iov_iter *to)
{
ssize_t rc;
struct path *path;
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
rc = generic_file_read_iter(iocb, to);
if (rc >= 0) {
path = ecryptfs_dentry_to_lower_path(file->f_path.dentry);
touch_atime(path);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: ecryptfs: don't allow mmap when the lower fs doesn't support it
There are legitimate reasons to disallow mmap on certain files, notably
in sysfs or procfs. We shouldn't emulate mmap support on file systems
that don't offer support natively.
CVE-2016-1583
Signed-off-by: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[tyhicks: clean up f_op check by using ecryptfs_file_to_lower()]
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserEventRouter::TabUpdated(WebContents* contents, bool did_navigate) {
TabEntry* entry = GetTabEntry(contents);
DictionaryValue* changed_properties = NULL;
DCHECK(entry);
if (did_navigate)
changed_properties = entry->DidNavigate(contents);
else
changed_properties = entry->UpdateLoadState(contents);
if (changed_properties)
DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(contents, changed_properties);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,717
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool MediaControlPanelElement::keepEventInNode(Event* event) {
return isUserInteractionEvent(event);
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 126,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::IsSecureContext() const {
bool is_secure = secure_context_state_ == SecureContextState::kSecure;
if (GetSandboxFlags() != kSandboxNone) {
UseCounter::Count(
*this, is_secure
? WebFeature::kSecureContextCheckForSandboxedOriginPassed
: WebFeature::kSecureContextCheckForSandboxedOriginFailed);
}
UseCounter::Count(*this, is_secure ? WebFeature::kSecureContextCheckPassed
: WebFeature::kSecureContextCheckFailed);
return is_secure;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TopSitesImpl::Init(const base::FilePath& db_name) {
backend_ = new TopSitesBackend();
backend_->Init(db_name);
backend_->GetMostVisitedThumbnails(
base::Bind(&TopSitesImpl::OnGotMostVisitedThumbnails,
base::Unretained(this)),
&cancelable_task_tracker_);
}
Commit Message: TopSites: Clear thumbnails from the cache when their URLs get removed
We already cleared the thumbnails from persistent storage, but they
remained in the in-memory cache, so they remained accessible (until the
next Chrome restart) even after all browsing data was cleared.
Bug: 758169
Change-Id: Id916d22358430a82e6d5043ac04fa463a32f824f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758640
Commit-Queue: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514861}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 147,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void del_session(SSL_CTX *sctx, SSL_SESSION *session)
{
simple_ssl_session *sess, *prev = NULL;
const unsigned char *id;
unsigned int idlen;
id = SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &idlen);
for (sess = first; sess; sess = sess->next) {
if (idlen == sess->idlen && !memcmp(sess->id, id, idlen)) {
if (prev)
prev->next = sess->next;
else
first = sess->next;
OPENSSL_free(sess->id);
OPENSSL_free(sess->der);
OPENSSL_free(sess);
return;
}
prev = sess;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLvoid StubGLUniform1fv(GLint location, GLsizei count, const GLfloat* v) {
glUniform1fv(location, count, v);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 99,601
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<WebContentsImpl*> WebContentsImpl::GetAllWebContents() {
std::vector<WebContentsImpl*> result;
scoped_ptr<RenderWidgetHostIterator> widgets(
RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetRenderWidgetHosts());
while (RenderWidgetHost* rwh = widgets->GetNextHost()) {
RenderViewHost* rvh = RenderViewHost::From(rwh);
if (!rvh)
continue;
WebContents* web_contents = WebContents::FromRenderViewHost(rvh);
if (!web_contents)
continue;
if (web_contents->GetRenderViewHost() != rvh)
continue;
result.push_back(static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(web_contents));
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,835
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dnaddr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, u_short dnaddr)
{
register struct hnamemem *tp;
for (tp = &dnaddrtable[dnaddr & (HASHNAMESIZE-1)]; tp->nxt != NULL;
tp = tp->nxt)
if (tp->addr == dnaddr)
return (tp->name);
tp->addr = dnaddr;
tp->nxt = newhnamemem(ndo);
if (ndo->ndo_nflag)
tp->name = dnnum_string(ndo, dnaddr);
else
tp->name = dnname_string(ndo, dnaddr);
return(tp->name);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MessageLoop::DecrementHighResTaskCountIfNeeded(
const PendingTask& pending_task) {
if (!pending_task.is_high_res)
return;
--pending_high_res_tasks_;
DCHECK_GE(pending_high_res_tasks_, 0);
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterSCTImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("SCT");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadSCTImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsSCT;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("Scitex HandShake");
entry->module=ConstantString("SCT");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool samldb_krbtgtnumber_available(struct samldb_ctx *ac,
uint32_t krbtgt_number)
{
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(ac);
struct ldb_result *res;
const char * const no_attrs[] = { NULL };
int ret;
ret = dsdb_module_search(ac->module, tmp_ctx, &res,
ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_module_get_ctx(ac->module)),
LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, no_attrs,
DSDB_FLAG_NEXT_MODULE,
ac->req,
"(msDC-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u)",
krbtgt_number);
if (ret == LDB_SUCCESS && res->count == 0) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return true;
}
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Gfx::opSetLineWidth(Object args[], int numArgs) {
state->setLineWidth(args[0].getNum());
out->updateLineWidth(state);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionSystemImpl::UnregisterExtensionWithRequestContexts(
const std::string& extension_id,
const extension_misc::UnloadedExtensionReason reason) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ExtensionInfoMap::RemoveExtension, info_map(),
extension_id, reason));
}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoFinish() {
glFinish();
ProcessPendingReadPixels();
ProcessPendingQueries();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void inet6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
/* Release rx options */
skb = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
if (skb)
kfree_skb(skb);
skb = xchg(&np->rxpmtu, NULL);
if (skb)
kfree_skb(skb);
/* Free flowlabels */
fl6_free_socklist(sk);
/* Free tx options */
opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt, NULL);
if (opt) {
atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
txopt_put(opt);
}
}
Commit Message: net: add validation for the socket syscall protocol argument
郭永刚 reported that one could simply crash the kernel as root by
using a simple program:
int socket_fd;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_port = 0;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;
addr.sin_family = 10;
socket_fd = socket(10,3,0x40000000);
connect(socket_fd , &addr,16);
AF_INET, AF_INET6 sockets actually only support 8-bit protocol
identifiers. inet_sock's skc_protocol field thus is sized accordingly,
thus larger protocol identifiers simply cut off the higher bits and
store a zero in the protocol fields.
This could lead to e.g. NULL function pointer because as a result of
the cut off inet_num is zero and we call down to inet_autobind, which
is NULL for raw sockets.
kernel: Call Trace:
kernel: [<ffffffff816db90e>] ? inet_autobind+0x2e/0x70
kernel: [<ffffffff816db9a4>] inet_dgram_connect+0x54/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff81645069>] SYSC_connect+0xd9/0x110
kernel: [<ffffffff810ac51b>] ? ptrace_notify+0x5b/0x80
kernel: [<ffffffff810236d8>] ? syscall_trace_enter_phase2+0x108/0x200
kernel: [<ffffffff81645e0e>] SyS_connect+0xe/0x10
kernel: [<ffffffff81779515>] tracesys_phase2+0x84/0x89
I found no particular commit which introduced this problem.
CVE: CVE-2015-8543
Cc: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 41,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CapturerMac::CaptureInvalidRects(CaptureCompletedCallback* callback) {
scoped_refptr<CaptureData> data;
if (capturing_) {
InvalidRects rects;
helper_.SwapInvalidRects(rects);
VideoFrameBuffer& current_buffer = buffers_[current_buffer_];
current_buffer.Update();
bool flip = true; // GL capturers need flipping.
if (cgl_context_) {
if (pixel_buffer_object_.get() != 0) {
GlBlitFast(current_buffer);
} else {
GlBlitSlow(current_buffer);
}
} else {
CgBlit(current_buffer, rects);
flip = false;
}
DataPlanes planes;
planes.data[0] = current_buffer.ptr();
planes.strides[0] = current_buffer.bytes_per_row();
if (flip) {
planes.strides[0] = -planes.strides[0];
planes.data[0] +=
(current_buffer.size().height() - 1) * current_buffer.bytes_per_row();
}
data = new CaptureData(planes, gfx::Size(current_buffer.size()),
pixel_format());
data->mutable_dirty_rects() = rects;
current_buffer_ = (current_buffer_ + 1) % kNumBuffers;
helper_.set_size_most_recent(data->size());
}
callback->Run(data);
delete callback;
}
Commit Message: Workaround for bad driver issue with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5.
BUG=87283
TEST=Run on a machine with NVIDIA GeForce 7300 GT on Mac 10.5 immediately after booting.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7373018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@92651 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,316
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sched_domain_debug_one(struct sched_domain *sd, int cpu, int level,
struct cpumask *groupmask)
{
struct sched_group *group = sd->groups;
char str[256];
cpulist_scnprintf(str, sizeof(str), sched_domain_span(sd));
cpumask_clear(groupmask);
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%*s domain %d: ", level, "", level);
if (!(sd->flags & SD_LOAD_BALANCE)) {
printk("does not load-balance\n");
if (sd->parent)
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: !SD_LOAD_BALANCE domain"
" has parent");
return -1;
}
printk(KERN_CONT "span %s level %s\n", str, sd->name);
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, sched_domain_span(sd))) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: domain->span does not contain "
"CPU%d\n", cpu);
}
if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, sched_group_cpus(group))) {
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: domain->groups does not contain"
" CPU%d\n", cpu);
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%*s groups:", level + 1, "");
do {
if (!group) {
printk("\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: group is NULL\n");
break;
}
/*
* Even though we initialize ->power to something semi-sane,
* we leave power_orig unset. This allows us to detect if
* domain iteration is still funny without causing /0 traps.
*/
if (!group->sgp->power_orig) {
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: domain->cpu_power not "
"set\n");
break;
}
if (!cpumask_weight(sched_group_cpus(group))) {
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: empty group\n");
break;
}
if (!(sd->flags & SD_OVERLAP) &&
cpumask_intersects(groupmask, sched_group_cpus(group))) {
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: repeated CPUs\n");
break;
}
cpumask_or(groupmask, groupmask, sched_group_cpus(group));
cpulist_scnprintf(str, sizeof(str), sched_group_cpus(group));
printk(KERN_CONT " %s", str);
if (group->sgp->power != SCHED_POWER_SCALE) {
printk(KERN_CONT " (cpu_power = %d)",
group->sgp->power);
}
group = group->next;
} while (group != sd->groups);
printk(KERN_CONT "\n");
if (!cpumask_equal(sched_domain_span(sd), groupmask))
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: groups don't span domain->span\n");
if (sd->parent &&
!cpumask_subset(groupmask, sched_domain_span(sd->parent)))
printk(KERN_ERR "ERROR: parent span is not a superset "
"of domain->span\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 58,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool is_slave_up(struct net_device *dev)
{
return dev && is_admin_up(dev) && netif_oper_up(dev);
}
Commit Message: net: hsr: fix memory leak in hsr_dev_finalize()
If hsr_add_port(hsr, hsr_dev, HSR_PT_MASTER) failed to
add port, it directly returns res and forgets to free the node
that allocated in hsr_create_self_node(), and forgets to delete
the node->mac_list linked in hsr->self_node_db.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881cfa0c780 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor.0", pid 2077, jiffies 4294717969 (age 2415.377s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 c7 a0 cf 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de ................
00 e6 49 cd 81 88 ff ff c0 9b 87 d0 81 88 ff ff ..I.............
backtrace:
[<00000000e2ff5070>] hsr_dev_finalize+0x736/0x960 [hsr]
[<000000003ed2e597>] hsr_newlink+0x2b2/0x3e0 [hsr]
[<000000003fa8c6b6>] __rtnl_newlink+0xf1f/0x1600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3182
[<000000001247a7ad>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3240
[<00000000e7d1b61d>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x54e/0xb90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5130
[<000000005556bd3a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x129/0x340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
[<000000009d56f9b7>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg+0xc3/0x100 net/socket.c:631
[<00000000d208adc9>] __sys_sendto+0x33e/0x560 net/socket.c:1786
[<00000000b582837a>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1798 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1794 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1794
[<00000000c866801d>] do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000fea382d9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<00000000e01dacb3>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: c5a759117210 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 87,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DataPipeConsumerDispatcher::InitializeNoLock() {
lock_.AssertAcquired();
if (!shared_ring_buffer_.IsValid())
return false;
DCHECK(!ring_buffer_mapping_.IsValid());
ring_buffer_mapping_ = shared_ring_buffer_.Map();
if (!ring_buffer_mapping_.IsValid()) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to map shared buffer.";
shared_ring_buffer_ = base::UnsafeSharedMemoryRegion();
return false;
}
base::AutoUnlock unlock(lock_);
node_controller_->SetPortObserver(
control_port_, base::MakeRefCounted<PortObserverThunk>(this));
return true;
}
Commit Message: [mojo-core] Validate data pipe endpoint metadata
Ensures that we don't blindly trust specified buffer size and offset
metadata when deserializing data pipe consumer and producer handles.
Bug: 877182
Change-Id: I30f3eceafb5cee06284c2714d08357ef911d6fd9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1192922
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586704}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 154,389
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 cdc_ncm_min_dgram_size(struct usbnet *dev)
{
if (cdc_ncm_comm_intf_is_mbim(dev->intf->cur_altsetting))
return CDC_MBIM_MIN_DATAGRAM_SIZE;
return CDC_NCM_MIN_DATAGRAM_SIZE;
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 53,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::ResumeMediaSession() {
MediaSession::Get(this)->Resume();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nvmet_fc_makeconnid(struct nvmet_fc_tgt_assoc *assoc, u16 qid)
{
return (assoc->association_id | qid);
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,624
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perWorldBindingsReadonlyLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perWorldBindingsReadonlyLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __mem_cgroup_commit_charge_swapin(struct page *page, struct mem_cgroup *memcg,
enum charge_type ctype)
{
if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
return;
if (!memcg)
return;
cgroup_exclude_rmdir(&memcg->css);
__mem_cgroup_commit_charge_lrucare(page, memcg, ctype);
/*
* Now swap is on-memory. This means this page may be
* counted both as mem and swap....double count.
* Fix it by uncharging from memsw. Basically, this SwapCache is stable
* under lock_page(). But in do_swap_page()::memory.c, reuse_swap_page()
* may call delete_from_swap_cache() before reach here.
*/
if (do_swap_account && PageSwapCache(page)) {
swp_entry_t ent = {.val = page_private(page)};
struct mem_cgroup *swap_memcg;
unsigned short id;
id = swap_cgroup_record(ent, 0);
rcu_read_lock();
swap_memcg = mem_cgroup_lookup(id);
if (swap_memcg) {
/*
* This recorded memcg can be obsolete one. So, avoid
* calling css_tryget
*/
if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(swap_memcg))
res_counter_uncharge(&swap_memcg->memsw,
PAGE_SIZE);
mem_cgroup_swap_statistics(swap_memcg, false);
mem_cgroup_put(swap_memcg);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
/*
* At swapin, we may charge account against cgroup which has no tasks.
* So, rmdir()->pre_destroy() can be called while we do this charge.
* In that case, we need to call pre_destroy() again. check it here.
*/
cgroup_release_and_wakeup_rmdir(&memcg->css);
}
Commit Message: mm: memcg: Correct unregistring of events attached to the same eventfd
There is an issue when memcg unregisters events that were attached to
the same eventfd:
- On the first call mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() removes all
events attached to a given eventfd, and if there were no events left,
thresholds->primary would become NULL;
- Since there were several events registered, cgroups core will call
mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() again, but now kernel will oops,
as the function doesn't expect that threshold->primary may be NULL.
That's a good question whether mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event()
should actually remove all events in one go, but nowadays it can't
do any better as cftype->unregister_event callback doesn't pass
any private event-associated cookie. So, let's fix the issue by
simply checking for threshold->primary.
FWIW, w/o the patch the following oops may be observed:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000004
IP: [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
Pid: 574, comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 3.3.0-rc4+ #9 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff810be32c>] [<ffffffff810be32c>] mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0x9c/0x1f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88001d0b9d60 EFLAGS: 00010246
Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 574, threadinfo ffff88001d0b8000, task ffff88001de91cc0)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8107092b>] cgroup_event_remove+0x2b/0x60
[<ffffffff8103db94>] process_one_work+0x174/0x450
[<ffffffff8103e413>] worker_thread+0x123/0x2d0
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Anton Vorontsov <anton.vorontsov@linaro.org>
Acked-by: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int AppLayerProtoDetectTest12(void)
{
AppLayerProtoDetectUnittestCtxBackup();
AppLayerProtoDetectSetup();
int r = 0;
AppLayerProtoDetectPMRegisterPatternCS(IPPROTO_TCP, ALPROTO_HTTP, "HTTP", 4, 0, STREAM_TOSERVER);
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].head == NULL ||
alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].map != NULL)
{
printf("failure 1\n");
goto end;
}
AppLayerProtoDetectPrepareState();
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].max_pat_id != 1) {
printf("failure 2\n");
goto end;
}
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].head != NULL ||
alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].map == NULL)
{
printf("failure 3\n");
goto end;
}
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].map[0]->alproto != ALPROTO_HTTP) {
printf("failure 4\n");
goto end;
}
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].map[0]->cd->id != 0) {
printf("failure 5\n");
goto end;
}
if (alpd_ctx.ctx_ipp[FLOW_PROTO_TCP].ctx_pm[0].map[0]->next != NULL) {
printf("failure 6\n");
goto end;
}
r = 1;
end:
AppLayerProtoDetectDeSetup();
AppLayerProtoDetectUnittestCtxRestore();
return r;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 96,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ath_max_framelen(int usec, int mcs, bool ht40, bool sgi)
{
int streams = HT_RC_2_STREAMS(mcs);
int symbols, bits;
int bytes = 0;
symbols = sgi ? TIME_SYMBOLS_HALFGI(usec) : TIME_SYMBOLS(usec);
bits = symbols * bits_per_symbol[mcs % 8][ht40] * streams;
bits -= OFDM_PLCP_BITS;
bytes = bits / 8;
bytes -= L_STF + L_LTF + L_SIG + HT_SIG + HT_STF + HT_LTF(streams);
if (bytes > 65532)
bytes = 65532;
return bytes;
}
Commit Message: ath9k: protect tid->sched check
We check tid->sched without a lock taken on ath_tx_aggr_sleep(). That
is race condition which can result of doing list_del(&tid->list) twice
(second time with poisoned list node) and cause crash like shown below:
[424271.637220] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00100104
[424271.637328] IP: [<f90fc072>] ath_tx_aggr_sleep+0x62/0xe0 [ath9k]
...
[424271.639953] Call Trace:
[424271.639998] [<f90f6900>] ? ath9k_get_survey+0x110/0x110 [ath9k]
[424271.640083] [<f90f6942>] ath9k_sta_notify+0x42/0x50 [ath9k]
[424271.640177] [<f809cfef>] sta_ps_start+0x8f/0x1c0 [mac80211]
[424271.640258] [<c10f730e>] ? free_compound_page+0x2e/0x40
[424271.640346] [<f809e915>] ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x9d5/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.640437] [<c112f048>] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1d8/0x1f0
[424271.640510] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640578] [<c10fc23c>] ? put_page+0x2c/0x40
[424271.640640] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640706] [<c1345a84>] ? kfree_skbmem+0x34/0x90
[424271.640787] [<f809dde3>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers_result+0x73/0x1d0 [mac80211]
[424271.640897] [<f80a07a0>] ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle+0x520/0xad0 [mac80211]
[424271.641009] [<f809e22d>] ? ieee80211_rx_handlers+0x2ed/0x2340 [mac80211]
[424271.641104] [<c13846ce>] ? ip_output+0x7e/0xd0
[424271.641182] [<f80a1057>] ieee80211_rx+0x307/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641266] [<f90fa6ee>] ath_rx_tasklet+0x88e/0xf70 [ath9k]
[424271.641358] [<f80a0f2c>] ? ieee80211_rx+0x1dc/0x7c0 [mac80211]
[424271.641445] [<f90f82db>] ath9k_tasklet+0xcb/0x130 [ath9k]
Bug report:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70551
Reported-and-tested-by: Max Sydorenko <maxim.stargazer@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 38,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::disableDNSPrefetch()
{
d->m_page->settings()->setDNSPrefetchingEnabled(false);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void* Type_ProfileSequenceId_Dup(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, const void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number n)
{
return (void*) cmsDupProfileSequenceDescription((cmsSEQ*) Ptr);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(n);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 71,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationController::DisablePromptOnRepost() {
g_check_for_repost = false;
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 111,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfs4_state_destroy_net(struct net *net)
{
int i;
struct nfs4_client *clp = NULL;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(net, nfsd_net_id);
for (i = 0; i < CLIENT_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
while (!list_empty(&nn->conf_id_hashtbl[i])) {
clp = list_entry(nn->conf_id_hashtbl[i].next, struct nfs4_client, cl_idhash);
destroy_client(clp);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < CLIENT_HASH_SIZE; i++) {
while (!list_empty(&nn->unconf_id_hashtbl[i])) {
clp = list_entry(nn->unconf_id_hashtbl[i].next, struct nfs4_client, cl_idhash);
destroy_client(clp);
}
}
kfree(nn->sessionid_hashtbl);
kfree(nn->unconf_id_hashtbl);
kfree(nn->conf_id_hashtbl);
put_net(net);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool KeyMap::Press(const scoped_refptr<WindowProxy>& window,
const ui::KeyboardCode key_code,
const wchar_t& key) {
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_SHIFT) {
shift_ = !shift_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_CONTROL) {
control_ = !control_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_MENU) { // ALT
alt_ = !alt_;
} else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_COMMAND) {
command_ = !command_;
}
int modifiers = 0;
if (shift_ || shifted_keys_.find(key) != shifted_keys_.end()) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_SHIFT_DOWN;
}
if (control_) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_CONTROL_DOWN;
}
if (alt_) {
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_ALT_DOWN;
}
if (command_) {
VLOG(1) << "Pressing command key on linux!!";
modifiers = modifiers | ui::EF_COMMAND_DOWN;
}
window->SimulateOSKeyPress(key_code, modifiers);
return true;
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TabContents* Browser::OpenURL(const OpenURLParams& params) {
return OpenURLFromTab(NULL, params);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,321
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: remove_callback_link (NautilusDirectory *directory,
GList *link)
{
ReadyCallback *callback;
callback = link->data;
remove_callback_link_keep_data (directory, link);
g_free (callback);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,987
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int hfi1_set_uevent_bits(struct hfi1_pportdata *ppd, const int evtbit)
{
struct hfi1_ctxtdata *uctxt;
struct hfi1_devdata *dd = ppd->dd;
unsigned ctxt;
int ret = 0;
unsigned long flags;
if (!dd->events) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&dd->uctxt_lock, flags);
for (ctxt = dd->first_user_ctxt; ctxt < dd->num_rcv_contexts;
ctxt++) {
uctxt = dd->rcd[ctxt];
if (uctxt) {
unsigned long *evs = dd->events +
(uctxt->ctxt - dd->first_user_ctxt) *
HFI1_MAX_SHARED_CTXTS;
int i;
/*
* subctxt_cnt is 0 if not shared, so do base
* separately, first, then remaining subctxt, if any
*/
set_bit(evtbit, evs);
for (i = 1; i < uctxt->subctxt_cnt; i++)
set_bit(evtbit, evs + i);
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dd->uctxt_lock, flags);
done:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 52,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int wvlan_uil(struct uilreq *urq, struct wl_private *lp)
{
int ioctl_ret = 0;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
DBG_FUNC("wvlan_uil");
DBG_ENTER(DbgInfo);
switch (urq->command) {
case UIL_FUN_CONNECT:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_UIL -- WVLAN2_UIL_CONNECT\n");
ioctl_ret = wvlan_uil_connect(urq, lp);
break;
case UIL_FUN_DISCONNECT:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_UIL -- WVLAN2_UIL_DISCONNECT\n");
ioctl_ret = wvlan_uil_disconnect(urq, lp);
break;
case UIL_FUN_ACTION:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_UIL -- WVLAN2_UIL_ACTION\n");
ioctl_ret = wvlan_uil_action(urq, lp);
break;
case UIL_FUN_SEND_DIAG_MSG:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_UIL -- WVLAN2_UIL_SEND_DIAG_MSG\n");
ioctl_ret = wvlan_uil_send_diag_msg(urq, lp);
break;
case UIL_FUN_GET_INFO:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_UIL -- WVLAN2_UIL_GET_INFO\n");
ioctl_ret = wvlan_uil_get_info(urq, lp);
break;
case UIL_FUN_PUT_INFO:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_UIL -- WVLAN2_UIL_PUT_INFO\n");
ioctl_ret = wvlan_uil_put_info(urq, lp);
break;
default:
DBG_TRACE(DbgInfo, "IOCTL: WVLAN2_IOCTL_UIL -- UNSUPPORTED UIL CODE: 0x%X", urq->command);
ioctl_ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
DBG_LEAVE(DbgInfo);
return ioctl_ret;
} /* wvlan_uil */
Commit Message: staging: wlags49_h2: buffer overflow setting station name
We need to check the length parameter before doing the memcpy(). I've
actually changed it to strlcpy() as well so that it's NUL terminated.
You need CAP_NET_ADMIN to trigger these so it's not the end of the
world.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,473
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int HttpProxyClientSocket::DoGenerateAuthToken() {
next_state_ = STATE_GENERATE_AUTH_TOKEN_COMPLETE;
return auth_->MaybeGenerateAuthToken(&request_, io_callback_, net_log_);
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 129,315
|
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