instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::DrawElements(GLenum mode,
GLsizei count,
GLenum type,
const void* indices) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glDrawElements("
<< GLES2Util::GetStringDrawMode(mode) << ", " << count
<< ", " << GLES2Util::GetStringIndexType(type) << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(indices) << ")");
DrawElementsImpl(mode, count, type, indices, "glDrawElements");
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 140,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::protocolEqualsSelf(const String& protocol) const {
return equalIgnoringCase(protocol, m_selfProtocol);
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 136,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nodeAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::nodeAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int wait_port_writable(struct port *port, bool nonblock)
{
int ret;
if (will_write_block(port)) {
if (nonblock)
return -EAGAIN;
ret = wait_event_freezable(port->waitqueue,
!will_write_block(port));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
/* Port got hot-unplugged. */
if (!port->guest_connected)
return -ENODEV;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 66,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mrb_equal_m(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_value arg;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "o", &arg);
return mrb_bool_value(mrb_equal(mrb, self, arg));
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 82,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
/* Point after session ID in client hello */
const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
unsigned short i;
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
/*
* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
return 0;
if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
return 0;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past DTLS cookie */
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
i = *(p++);
p += i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
}
/* Skip past cipher list */
n2s(p, i);
p += i;
if (p >= limit)
return -1;
/* Skip past compression algorithm list */
i = *(p++);
p += i;
if (p > limit)
return -1;
/* Now at start of extensions */
if ((p + 2) >= limit)
return 0;
n2s(p, i);
while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
unsigned short type, size;
n2s(p, type);
n2s(p, size);
if (p + size > limit)
return 0;
if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
int r;
if (size == 0) {
/*
* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
* one.
*/
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 1;
}
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
/*
* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
* generating the session from ticket now, trigger
* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
* calculate the master secret later.
*/
return 2;
}
r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
switch (r) {
case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 2;
case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
return r;
case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
return 3;
default: /* fatal error */
return -1;
}
}
p += size;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: auth_list_files(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char rbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
int rv;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0x34, 0, 0);
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.le = 0x40;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.resp = rbuf;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "Card returned error");
if (apdu.resplen == 0x100 && rbuf[0]==0 && rbuf[1]==0)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, 0);
buflen = buflen < apdu.resplen ? buflen : apdu.resplen;
memcpy(buf, rbuf, buflen);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, buflen);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __init init_list(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct kmem_cache_node *list,
int nodeid)
{
struct kmem_cache_node *ptr;
ptr = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node), GFP_NOWAIT, nodeid);
BUG_ON(!ptr);
memcpy(ptr, list, sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node));
/*
* Do not assume that spinlocks can be initialized via memcpy:
*/
spin_lock_init(&ptr->list_lock);
MAKE_ALL_LISTS(cachep, ptr, nodeid);
cachep->node[nodeid] = ptr;
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 68,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmx_set_vmx_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr_index, u64 data)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
switch (msr_index) {
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC:
return vmx_restore_vmx_basic(vmx, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS:
/*
* The "non-true" VMX capability MSRs are generated from the
* "true" MSRs, so we do not support restoring them directly.
*
* If userspace wants to emulate VMX_BASIC[55]=0, userspace
* should restore the "true" MSRs with the must-be-1 bits
* set according to the SDM Vol 3. A.2 "RESERVED CONTROLS AND
* DEFAULT SETTINGS".
*/
return -EINVAL;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2:
return vmx_restore_control_msr(vmx, msr_index, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC:
return vmx_restore_vmx_misc(vmx, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0:
return vmx_restore_fixed0_msr(vmx, msr_index, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1:
case MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1:
/*
* These MSRs are generated based on the vCPU's CPUID, so we
* do not support restoring them directly.
*/
return -EINVAL;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP:
return vmx_restore_vmx_ept_vpid_cap(vmx, data);
case MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM:
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vmcs_enum = data;
return 0;
default:
/*
* The rest of the VMX capability MSRs do not support restore.
*/
return -EINVAL;
}
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 48,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HB_Error HB_GPOS_Select_Language( HB_GPOSHeader* gpos,
HB_UInt language_tag,
HB_UShort script_index,
HB_UShort* language_index,
HB_UShort* req_feature_index )
{
HB_UShort n;
HB_ScriptList* sl;
HB_ScriptRecord* sr;
HB_ScriptTable* s;
HB_LangSysRecord* lsr;
if ( !gpos || !language_index || !req_feature_index )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_Argument);
sl = &gpos->ScriptList;
sr = sl->ScriptRecord;
if ( script_index >= sl->ScriptCount )
return ERR(HB_Err_Invalid_Argument);
s = &sr[script_index].Script;
lsr = s->LangSysRecord;
for ( n = 0; n < s->LangSysCount; n++ )
if ( language_tag == lsr[n].LangSysTag )
{
*language_index = n;
*req_feature_index = lsr[n].LangSys.ReqFeatureIndex;
return HB_Err_Ok;
}
return HB_Err_Not_Covered;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,564
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AddResourceIcon(const gfx::ImageSkia* skia_image, void* data) {
views::View* parent = static_cast<views::View*>(data);
views::ImageView* image_view = new views::ImageView();
image_view->SetImage(*skia_image);
parent->AddChildView(image_view);
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 131,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockJSBindings() : my_ip_address_count(0), my_ip_address_ex_count(0) {}
Commit Message: Test for error in handling getters changing element kind.
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Merged-In: I99def991ebcb7c26ba7ca4b4b31ef1cdeaea7721
Change-Id: I99def991ebcb7c26ba7ca4b4b31ef1cdeaea7721
(cherry picked from commit 59b9b11a462fe3aad313b8538fb98468f22d9095)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 164,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::IsSuitableHost(
RenderProcessHost* host,
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& site_url) {
if (run_renderer_in_process())
return true;
if (host->GetBrowserContext() != browser_context)
return false;
StoragePartition* dest_partition =
BrowserContext::GetStoragePartitionForSite(browser_context, site_url);
if (!host->InSameStoragePartition(dest_partition))
return false;
if (host->IsGuest())
return true;
if (!host->IsGuest() && site_url.SchemeIs(chrome::kGuestScheme))
return false;
if (ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->HasWebUIBindings(
host->GetID()) !=
WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->UseWebUIBindingsForURL(
browser_context, site_url)) {
return false;
}
return GetContentClient()->browser()->IsSuitableHost(host, site_url);
}
Commit Message: Check for appropriate bindings in process-per-site mode.
BUG=174059
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12188025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181386 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 116,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_decode_clone(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_clone *clone)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
status = nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &clone->cl_src_stateid);
if (status)
return status;
status = nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &clone->cl_dst_stateid);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(8 + 8 + 8);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &clone->cl_src_pos);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &clone->cl_dst_pos);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &clone->cl_count);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pix_fmt_match(enum AVPixelFormat pix_fmt, int components,
int bpc, uint32_t log2_chroma_wh, int pal8)
{
int match = 1;
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(pix_fmt);
if (desc->nb_components != components) {
return 0;
}
switch (components) {
case 4:
match = match && desc->comp[3].depth_minus1 + 1 >= bpc &&
(log2_chroma_wh >> 14 & 3) == 0 &&
(log2_chroma_wh >> 12 & 3) == 0;
case 3:
match = match && desc->comp[2].depth_minus1 + 1 >= bpc &&
(log2_chroma_wh >> 10 & 3) == desc->log2_chroma_w &&
(log2_chroma_wh >> 8 & 3) == desc->log2_chroma_h;
case 2:
match = match && desc->comp[1].depth_minus1 + 1 >= bpc &&
(log2_chroma_wh >> 6 & 3) == desc->log2_chroma_w &&
(log2_chroma_wh >> 4 & 3) == desc->log2_chroma_h;
case 1:
match = match && desc->comp[0].depth_minus1 + 1 >= bpc &&
(log2_chroma_wh >> 2 & 3) == 0 &&
(log2_chroma_wh & 3) == 0 &&
(desc->flags & AV_PIX_FMT_FLAG_PAL) == pal8 * AV_PIX_FMT_FLAG_PAL;
}
return match;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/jpeg2000dec: prevent out of array accesses in pixel addressing
Fixes Ticket2921
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: force_luks_teardown_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
ForceLuksTeardownData *data = user_data;
if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == 0 && !job_was_cancelled)
{
g_print ("**** NOTE: Successfully teared down luks device %s\n", device->priv->device_file);
if (data->fr_callback != NULL)
data->fr_callback (device, TRUE, data->fr_user_data);
}
else
{
g_print ("**** NOTE: force luks teardown failed: %s\n", stderr);
if (data->fr_callback != NULL)
data->fr_callback (device, FALSE, data->fr_user_data);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int arcmsr_polling_ccbdone(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb,
struct CommandControlBlock *poll_ccb)
{
int rtn = 0;
switch (acb->adapter_type) {
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_A: {
rtn = arcmsr_hbaA_polling_ccbdone(acb, poll_ccb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_B: {
rtn = arcmsr_hbaB_polling_ccbdone(acb, poll_ccb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_C: {
rtn = arcmsr_hbaC_polling_ccbdone(acb, poll_ccb);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_D:
rtn = arcmsr_hbaD_polling_ccbdone(acb, poll_ccb);
break;
}
return rtn;
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BN_clear_free(BIGNUM *a)
{
int i;
if (a == NULL) return;
bn_check_top(a);
if (a->d != NULL)
{
OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d,a->dmax*sizeof(a->d[0]));
if (!(BN_get_flags(a,BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA)))
OPENSSL_free(a->d);
}
i=BN_get_flags(a,BN_FLG_MALLOCED);
OPENSSL_cleanse(a,sizeof(BIGNUM));
if (i)
OPENSSL_free(a);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 14,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dtls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
{
unsigned char *pl;
unsigned short hbtype;
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
p, length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Read type and payload length */
if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(0) > length)
return 0; /* silently discard */
if (length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
hbtype = *p++;
n2s(p, payload);
if (HEARTBEAT_SIZE_STD(payload) > length)
return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
pl = p;
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
unsigned int write_length = HEARTBEAT_SIZE(payload, padding);
int r;
if (write_length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
/* Allocate memory for the response. */
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(write_length);
if (buffer == NULL)
return -1;
bp = buffer;
/* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
*bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
s2n(payload, bp);
memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
bp += payload;
/* Random padding */
if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
return -1;
}
r = dtls1_write_bytes(s, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, write_length);
if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, DTLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
buffer, write_length, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
unsigned int seq;
/*
* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
* random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
*/
n2s(pl, seq);
if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserWindowGtk::IsFullscreenBubbleVisible() const {
return fullscreen_exit_bubble_ != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FloatSize HTMLCanvasElement::ElementSize(const FloatSize&) const {
if (context_ && HasImageBitmapContext()) {
scoped_refptr<Image> image = context_->GetImage(kPreferNoAcceleration);
if (image)
return FloatSize(image->width(), image->height());
return FloatSize(0, 0);
}
if (PlaceholderFrame())
return FloatSize(PlaceholderFrame()->Size());
return FloatSize(width(), height());
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PermissionsData::SetPolicyHostRestrictions(
const URLPatternSet& policy_blocked_hosts,
const URLPatternSet& policy_allowed_hosts) const {
AutoLockOnValidThread lock(runtime_lock_, thread_checker_.get());
policy_blocked_hosts_unsafe_ = policy_blocked_hosts;
policy_allowed_hosts_unsafe_ = policy_allowed_hosts;
uses_default_policy_host_restrictions = false;
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 151,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pppol2tp_session_create(struct net *net, u32 tunnel_id, u32 session_id, u32 peer_session_id, struct l2tp_session_cfg *cfg)
{
int error;
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel;
struct l2tp_session *session;
struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_find(net, tunnel_id);
/* Error if we can't find the tunnel */
error = -ENOENT;
if (tunnel == NULL)
goto out;
/* Error if tunnel socket is not prepped */
if (tunnel->sock == NULL)
goto out;
/* Check that this session doesn't already exist */
error = -EEXIST;
session = l2tp_session_find(net, tunnel, session_id);
if (session != NULL)
goto out;
/* Default MTU values. */
if (cfg->mtu == 0)
cfg->mtu = 1500 - PPPOL2TP_HEADER_OVERHEAD;
if (cfg->mru == 0)
cfg->mru = cfg->mtu;
/* Allocate and initialize a new session context. */
error = -ENOMEM;
session = l2tp_session_create(sizeof(struct pppol2tp_session),
tunnel, session_id,
peer_session_id, cfg);
if (session == NULL)
goto out;
ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
ps->tunnel_sock = tunnel->sock;
l2tp_info(session, PPPOL2TP_MSG_CONTROL, "%s: created\n",
session->name);
error = 0;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: net/l2tp: don't fall back on UDP [get|set]sockopt
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.
As David Miller points out:
"If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"
Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 36,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t ZSTD_CCtx_refPrefix(ZSTD_CCtx* cctx, const void* prefix, size_t prefixSize)
{
return ZSTD_CCtx_refPrefix_advanced(cctx, prefix, prefixSize, ZSTD_dct_rawContent);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 89,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _vmxnet3_deassert_interrupt_line(VMXNET3State *s, int lidx)
{
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
/*
* This function should never be called for MSI(X) interrupts
* because deassertion never required for message interrupts
*/
assert(!s->msix_used || !msix_enabled(d));
/*
* This function should never be called for MSI(X) interrupts
* because deassertion never required for message interrupts
*/
assert(!msi_enabled(d));
VMW_IRPRN("Deasserting line for interrupt %u", lidx);
pci_irq_deassert(d);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 8,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8Console::CommandLineAPIScope::accessorSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::Name> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
CommandLineAPIScope* scope = static_cast<CommandLineAPIScope*>(info.Data().As<v8::External>()->Value());
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext();
if (!info.Holder()->Delete(context, name).FromMaybe(false))
return;
if (!info.Holder()->CreateDataProperty(context, name, value).FromMaybe(false))
return;
bool removed = scope->m_installedMethods->Delete(context, name).FromMaybe(false);
DCHECK(removed);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved_addr(entry_connection_t *conn,
const tor_addr_t *answer,
int ttl,
time_t expires)
{
if (tor_addr_family(answer) == AF_INET) {
uint32_t a = tor_addr_to_ipv4n(answer); /* network order */
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,4,
(uint8_t*)&a,
ttl, expires);
} else if (tor_addr_family(answer) == AF_INET6) {
const uint8_t *a = tor_addr_to_in6_addr8(answer);
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6,16,
a,
ttl, expires);
} else {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Got called with address of unexpected family %d",
tor_addr_family(answer));
connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,
RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR,0,NULL,-1,-1);
}
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 69,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u16 hostap_tx_callback_register(local_info_t *local,
void (*func)(struct sk_buff *, int ok, void *),
void *data)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct hostap_tx_callback_info *entry;
entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry),
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (entry == NULL)
return 0;
entry->func = func;
entry->data = data;
spin_lock_irqsave(&local->lock, flags);
entry->idx = local->tx_callback ? local->tx_callback->idx + 1 : 1;
entry->next = local->tx_callback;
local->tx_callback = entry;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&local->lock, flags);
return entry->idx;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DateTimeFieldElement::isFocusable() const
{
if (isReadOnly())
return false;
if (m_fieldOwner && m_fieldOwner->isFieldOwnerDisabledOrReadOnly())
return false;
return HTMLElement::isFocusable();
}
Commit Message: INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI: Inconsistent value of aria-valuetext attribute
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107897
Reviewed by Kentaro Hara.
Source/WebCore:
aria-valuetext and aria-valuenow attributes had inconsistent values in
a case of initial empty state and a case that a user clears a field.
- aria-valuetext attribute should have "blank" message in the initial
empty state.
- aria-valuenow attribute should be removed in the cleared empty state.
Also, we have a bug that aira-valuenow had a symbolic value such as "AM"
"January". It should always have a numeric value according to the
specification.
http://www.w3.org/TR/wai-aria/states_and_properties#aria-valuenow
No new tests. Updates fast/forms/*-multiple-fields/*-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::DateTimeFieldElement):
Set "blank" message to aria-valuetext attribute.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::updateVisibleValue):
aria-valuenow attribute should be a numeric value. Apply String::number
to the return value of valueForARIAValueNow.
Remove aria-valuenow attribute if nothing is selected.
(WebCore::DateTimeFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added.
* html/shadow/DateTimeFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.cpp:
(WebCore::DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement::valueForARIAValueNow):
Added. Returns 1 + internal selection index.
For example, the function returns 1 for January.
* html/shadow/DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement.h:
(DateTimeSymbolicFieldElement): Declare valueForARIAValueNow.
LayoutTests:
Fix existing tests to show aria-valuenow attribute values.
* fast/forms/resources/multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js: Added.
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/date-multiple-fields/date-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
Add tests for initial empty-value state.
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/month-multiple-fields/month-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes-expected.txt:
* fast/forms/time-multiple-fields/time-multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.html:
Use multiple-fields-ax-aria-attributes.js.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@140803 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 103,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagecreatefromjpeg)
{
_php_image_create_from(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_JPG, "JPEG", gdImageCreateFromJpeg, gdImageCreateFromJpegCtx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vsock_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len, int flags)
{
int err;
struct sock *sk;
struct vsock_sock *vsk;
struct sockaddr_vm *remote_addr;
long timeout;
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
err = 0;
sk = sock->sk;
vsk = vsock_sk(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
/* XXX AF_UNSPEC should make us disconnect like AF_INET. */
switch (sock->state) {
case SS_CONNECTED:
err = -EISCONN;
goto out;
case SS_DISCONNECTING:
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
case SS_CONNECTING:
/* This continues on so we can move sock into the SS_CONNECTED
* state once the connection has completed (at which point err
* will be set to zero also). Otherwise, we will either wait
* for the connection or return -EALREADY should this be a
* non-blocking call.
*/
err = -EALREADY;
break;
default:
if ((sk->sk_state == SS_LISTEN) ||
vsock_addr_cast(addr, addr_len, &remote_addr) != 0) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* The hypervisor and well-known contexts do not have socket
* endpoints.
*/
if (!transport->stream_allow(remote_addr->svm_cid,
remote_addr->svm_port)) {
err = -ENETUNREACH;
goto out;
}
/* Set the remote address that we are connecting to. */
memcpy(&vsk->remote_addr, remote_addr,
sizeof(vsk->remote_addr));
err = vsock_auto_bind(vsk);
if (err)
goto out;
sk->sk_state = SS_CONNECTING;
err = transport->connect(vsk);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
/* Mark sock as connecting and set the error code to in
* progress in case this is a non-blocking connect.
*/
sock->state = SS_CONNECTING;
err = -EINPROGRESS;
}
/* The receive path will handle all communication until we are able to
* enter the connected state. Here we wait for the connection to be
* completed or a notification of an error.
*/
timeout = vsk->connect_timeout;
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
while (sk->sk_state != SS_CONNECTED && sk->sk_err == 0) {
if (flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
/* If we're not going to block, we schedule a timeout
* function to generate a timeout on the connection
* attempt, in case the peer doesn't respond in a
* timely manner. We hold on to the socket until the
* timeout fires.
*/
sock_hold(sk);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&vsk->dwork,
vsock_connect_timeout);
schedule_delayed_work(&vsk->dwork, timeout);
/* Skip ahead to preserve error code set above. */
goto out_wait;
}
release_sock(sk);
timeout = schedule_timeout(timeout);
lock_sock(sk);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = sock_intr_errno(timeout);
goto out_wait_error;
} else if (timeout == 0) {
err = -ETIMEDOUT;
goto out_wait_error;
}
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
}
if (sk->sk_err) {
err = -sk->sk_err;
goto out_wait_error;
} else
err = 0;
out_wait:
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
out_wait_error:
sk->sk_state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
goto out_wait;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL RequestSender::BuildUpdateUrl(const GURL& url,
const std::string& query_params) {
const std::string query_string(
url.has_query() ? base::StringPrintf("%s&%s", url.query().c_str(),
query_params.c_str())
: query_params);
GURL::Replacements replacements;
replacements.SetQueryStr(query_string);
return url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
}
Commit Message: Fix error handling in the request sender and url fetcher downloader.
That means handling the network errors by primarily looking at net_error.
Bug: 1028369
Change-Id: I8181bced25f8b56144ea336a03883d0dceea5108
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1935428
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sorin Jianu <sorin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#719199}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,818
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport QuantumInfo *DestroyQuantumInfo(QuantumInfo *quantum_info)
{
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (quantum_info->pixels != (unsigned char **) NULL)
DestroyQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
if (quantum_info->semaphore != (SemaphoreInfo *) NULL)
DestroySemaphoreInfo(&quantum_info->semaphore);
quantum_info->signature=(~MagickSignature);
quantum_info=(QuantumInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(quantum_info);
return(quantum_info);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/110
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 96,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: raptor_rss_promote_namespace_uri(raptor_world *world, raptor_uri* nspace_URI)
{
/* RSS 0.9 and RSS 1.1 namespaces => RSS 1.0 namespace */
if((raptor_uri_equals(nspace_URI,
world->rss_namespaces_info_uris[RSS0_9_NS]) ||
raptor_uri_equals(nspace_URI,
world->rss_namespaces_info_uris[RSS1_1_NS]))) {
nspace_URI = world->rss_namespaces_info_uris[RSS1_0_NS];
}
/* Atom 0.3 namespace => Atom 1.0 namespace */
if(raptor_uri_equals(nspace_URI,
world->rss_namespaces_info_uris[ATOM0_3_NS])) {
nspace_URI = world->rss_namespaces_info_uris[ATOM1_0_NS];
}
return nspace_URI;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 22,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API zval* zend_object_proxy_get(zval *property TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_proxy_object *probj = zend_object_store_get_object(property TSRMLS_CC);
if (Z_OBJ_HT_P(probj->object) && Z_OBJ_HT_P(probj->object)->read_property) {
return Z_OBJ_HT_P(probj->object)->read_property(probj->object, probj->property, BP_VAR_R, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Cannot read property of object - no read handler defined");
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 49,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dev_valid_name(const char *name)
{
if (*name == '\0')
return 0;
if (strlen(name) >= IFNAMSIZ)
return 0;
if (!strcmp(name, ".") || !strcmp(name, ".."))
return 0;
while (*name) {
if (*name == '/' || isspace(*name))
return 0;
name++;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,154
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GpuProcessHost::DidFailInitialize() {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.GPUProcessInitialized", false);
status_ = FAILURE;
GpuDataManagerImpl* gpu_data_manager = GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance();
gpu_data_manager->FallBackToNextGpuMode();
RunRequestGPUInfoCallbacks(gpu_data_manager->GetGPUInfo());
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 172,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *__netdev_alloc_frag(unsigned int fragsz, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
struct netdev_alloc_cache *nc;
void *data = NULL;
int order;
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_save(flags);
nc = &__get_cpu_var(netdev_alloc_cache);
if (unlikely(!nc->frag.page)) {
refill:
for (order = NETDEV_FRAG_PAGE_MAX_ORDER; ;) {
gfp_t gfp = gfp_mask;
if (order)
gfp |= __GFP_COMP | __GFP_NOWARN;
nc->frag.page = alloc_pages(gfp, order);
if (likely(nc->frag.page))
break;
if (--order < 0)
goto end;
}
nc->frag.size = PAGE_SIZE << order;
recycle:
atomic_set(&nc->frag.page->_count, NETDEV_PAGECNT_MAX_BIAS);
nc->pagecnt_bias = NETDEV_PAGECNT_MAX_BIAS;
nc->frag.offset = 0;
}
if (nc->frag.offset + fragsz > nc->frag.size) {
/* avoid unnecessary locked operations if possible */
if ((atomic_read(&nc->frag.page->_count) == nc->pagecnt_bias) ||
atomic_sub_and_test(nc->pagecnt_bias, &nc->frag.page->_count))
goto recycle;
goto refill;
}
data = page_address(nc->frag.page) + nc->frag.offset;
nc->frag.offset += fragsz;
nc->pagecnt_bias--;
end:
local_irq_restore(flags);
return data;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 39,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bra(RAnal* anal, RAnalOp* op, ut16 code){
/* Unconditional branch, relative to PC */
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_JMP;
op->delay = 1;
op->jump = disarm_12bit_offset (op, GET_BRA_OFFSET(code));
op->eob = true;
return op->size;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9903 - oobread in RAnal.sh
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 82,678
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Extension::ShowConfigureContextMenus() const {
return location() != Manifest::COMPONENT;
}
Commit Message: Tighten restrictions on hosted apps calling extension APIs
Only allow component apps to make any API calls, and for them only allow the namespaces they explicitly have permission for (plus chrome.test - I need to see if I can rework some WebStore tests to remove even this).
BUG=172369
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12095095
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180426 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 114,376
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pfn_t gfn_to_pfn_memslot_atomic(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
{
return __gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, gfn, true, NULL, true, NULL);
}
Commit Message: KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long hung_up_tty_compat_ioctl(struct file *file,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
return cmd == TIOCSPGRP ? -ENOTTY : -EIO;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 55,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& TextTrack::SubtitlesKeyword() {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(const AtomicString, subtitles, ("subtitles"));
return subtitles;
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API RBinObject *r_bin_get_object(RBin *bin) {
RBinObject *o = r_bin_cur_object (bin);
if (o) {
o->referenced++;
}
return o;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 60,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::createInputSurface(
OMX_U32 portIndex, android_dataspace dataSpace,
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> *bufferProducer, MetadataBufferType *type) {
if (bufferProducer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autolock(mLock);
status_t err = createGraphicBufferSource(portIndex, NULL /* bufferConsumer */, type);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
mGraphicBufferSource->setDefaultDataSpace(dataSpace);
*bufferProducer = mGraphicBufferSource->getIGraphicBufferProducer();
return OK;
}
Commit Message: IOMX: allow configuration after going to loaded state
This was disallowed recently but we still use it as MediaCodcec.stop
only goes to loaded state, and does not free component.
Bug: 31450460
Change-Id: I72e092e4e55c9f23b1baee3e950d76e84a5ef28d
(cherry picked from commit e03b22839d78c841ce0a1a0a1ee1960932188b0b)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 157,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DocumentInit& DocumentInit::WithRegistrationContext(
V0CustomElementRegistrationContext* registration_context) {
DCHECK(!create_new_registration_context_);
DCHECK(!registration_context_);
registration_context_ = registration_context;
return *this;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 144,080
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ip_send_unicast_reply(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 daddr,
__be32 saddr, const struct ip_reply_arg *arg,
unsigned int len)
{
struct ip_options_data replyopts;
struct ipcm_cookie ipc;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
struct sk_buff *nskb;
struct sock *sk;
struct inet_sock *inet;
if (ip_options_echo(&replyopts.opt.opt, skb))
return;
ipc.addr = daddr;
ipc.opt = NULL;
ipc.tx_flags = 0;
if (replyopts.opt.opt.optlen) {
ipc.opt = &replyopts.opt;
if (replyopts.opt.opt.srr)
daddr = replyopts.opt.opt.faddr;
}
flowi4_init_output(&fl4, arg->bound_dev_if, 0,
RT_TOS(arg->tos),
RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, ip_hdr(skb)->protocol,
ip_reply_arg_flowi_flags(arg),
daddr, saddr,
tcp_hdr(skb)->source, tcp_hdr(skb)->dest);
security_skb_classify_flow(skb, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
rt = ip_route_output_key(net, &fl4);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
return;
inet = &get_cpu_var(unicast_sock);
inet->tos = arg->tos;
sk = &inet->sk;
sk->sk_priority = skb->priority;
sk->sk_protocol = ip_hdr(skb)->protocol;
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = arg->bound_dev_if;
sock_net_set(sk, net);
__skb_queue_head_init(&sk->sk_write_queue);
sk->sk_sndbuf = sysctl_wmem_default;
ip_append_data(sk, &fl4, ip_reply_glue_bits, arg->iov->iov_base, len, 0,
&ipc, &rt, MSG_DONTWAIT);
nskb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_write_queue);
if (nskb) {
if (arg->csumoffset >= 0)
*((__sum16 *)skb_transport_header(nskb) +
arg->csumoffset) = csum_fold(csum_add(nskb->csum,
arg->csum));
nskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
skb_orphan(nskb);
skb_set_queue_mapping(nskb, skb_get_queue_mapping(skb));
ip_push_pending_frames(sk, &fl4);
}
put_cpu_var(unicast_sock);
ip_rt_put(rt);
}
Commit Message: ip_output: do skb ufo init for peeked non ufo skb as well
Now, if user application does:
sendto len<mtu flag MSG_MORE
sendto len>mtu flag 0
The skb is not treated as fragmented one because it is not initialized
that way. So move the initialization to fix this.
introduced by:
commit e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac "[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach"
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CMD_FUNC(m_svslogin)
{
if (!SASL_SERVER || MyClient(sptr) || (parc < 3) || !parv[3])
return 0;
if (!stricmp(parv[1], me.name))
{
aClient *target_p;
/* is the PUID valid? */
if ((target_p = decode_puid(parv[2])) == NULL)
return 0;
if (target_p->user == NULL)
make_user(target_p);
strlcpy(target_p->user->svid, parv[3], sizeof(target_p->user->svid));
sendto_one(target_p, err_str(RPL_LOGGEDIN), me.name,
BadPtr(target_p->name) ? "*" : target_p->name,
BadPtr(target_p->name) ? "*" : target_p->name,
BadPtr(target_p->user->username) ? "*" : target_p->user->username,
BadPtr(target_p->user->realhost) ? "*" : target_p->user->realhost,
target_p->user->svid, target_p->user->svid);
return 0;
}
/* not for us; propagate. */
sendto_server(cptr, 0, 0, ":%s SVSLOGIN %s %s %s",
sptr->name, parv[1], parv[2], parv[3]);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix AUTHENTICATE bug
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 73,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
{
int r;
sigset_t sigsaved;
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &vcpu->sigset, &sigsaved);
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_UNINITIALIZED)) {
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
clear_bit(KVM_REQ_UNHALT, &vcpu->requests);
r = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
if (vcpu->mmio_needed) {
memcpy(vcpu->mmio_data, kvm_run->mmio.data, 8);
kvm_set_mmio_data(vcpu);
vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 1;
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
}
r = __vcpu_run(vcpu, kvm_run);
out:
if (vcpu->sigset_active)
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigsaved, NULL);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BrowserCommandController::IsShowingMainUI() {
return browser_->SupportsWindowFeature(Browser::FEATURE_TABSTRIP);
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 153,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ims_pcu_parse_cdc_data(struct usb_interface *intf, struct ims_pcu *pcu)
{
const struct usb_cdc_union_desc *union_desc;
struct usb_host_interface *alt;
union_desc = ims_pcu_get_cdc_union_desc(intf);
if (!union_desc)
return -EINVAL;
pcu->ctrl_intf = usb_ifnum_to_if(pcu->udev,
union_desc->bMasterInterface0);
if (!pcu->ctrl_intf)
return -EINVAL;
alt = pcu->ctrl_intf->cur_altsetting;
if (alt->desc.bNumEndpoints < 1)
return -ENODEV;
pcu->ep_ctrl = &alt->endpoint[0].desc;
pcu->max_ctrl_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_ctrl);
pcu->data_intf = usb_ifnum_to_if(pcu->udev,
union_desc->bSlaveInterface0);
if (!pcu->data_intf)
return -EINVAL;
alt = pcu->data_intf->cur_altsetting;
if (alt->desc.bNumEndpoints != 2) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Incorrect number of endpoints on data interface (%d)\n",
alt->desc.bNumEndpoints);
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->ep_out = &alt->endpoint[0].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_bulk_out(pcu->ep_out)) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"First endpoint on data interface is not BULK OUT\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->max_out_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_out);
if (pcu->max_out_size < 8) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Max OUT packet size is too small (%zd)\n",
pcu->max_out_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->ep_in = &alt->endpoint[1].desc;
if (!usb_endpoint_is_bulk_in(pcu->ep_in)) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Second endpoint on data interface is not BULK IN\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
pcu->max_in_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(pcu->ep_in);
if (pcu->max_in_size < 8) {
dev_err(pcu->dev,
"Max IN packet size is too small (%zd)\n",
pcu->max_in_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-psu - check if CDC union descriptor is sane
Before trying to use CDC union descriptor, try to validate whether that it
is sane by checking that intf->altsetting->extra is big enough and that
descriptor bLength is not too big and not too small.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 59,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pppoe_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk = (struct sock *)chan->private;
return __pppoe_xmit(sk, skb);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool OffscreenCanvas::ShouldAccelerate2dContext() const {
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper> context_provider_wrapper =
SharedGpuContext::ContextProviderWrapper();
return context_provider_wrapper &&
context_provider_wrapper->Utils()->Accelerated2DCanvasFeatureEnabled();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _xfs_buf_ioend(
xfs_buf_t *bp,
int schedule)
{
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&bp->b_io_remaining) == 1)
xfs_buf_ioend(bp, schedule);
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 33,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __init raw_proc_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&raw_net_ops);
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int lookup_flags(unsigned int f)
{
unsigned long retval = LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
if (f & O_NOFOLLOW)
retval &= ~LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
if (f & O_DIRECTORY)
retval |= LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 39,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::OnPassphraseAccepted() {
if (!sync_loop_)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
host_.Call(
FROM_HERE,
&SyncBackendHost::NotifyPassphraseAccepted);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 104,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t NuPlayer::GenericSource::initFromDataSource() {
sp<MediaExtractor> extractor;
CHECK(mDataSource != NULL);
if (mIsWidevine) {
String8 mimeType;
float confidence;
sp<AMessage> dummy;
bool success;
success = SniffWVM(mDataSource, &mimeType, &confidence, &dummy);
if (!success
|| strcasecmp(
mimeType.string(), MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_WVM)) {
ALOGE("unsupported widevine mime: %s", mimeType.string());
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
mWVMExtractor = new WVMExtractor(mDataSource);
mWVMExtractor->setAdaptiveStreamingMode(true);
if (mUIDValid) {
mWVMExtractor->setUID(mUID);
}
extractor = mWVMExtractor;
} else {
extractor = MediaExtractor::Create(mDataSource,
mSniffedMIME.empty() ? NULL: mSniffedMIME.c_str());
}
if (extractor == NULL) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
if (extractor->getDrmFlag()) {
checkDrmStatus(mDataSource);
}
mFileMeta = extractor->getMetaData();
if (mFileMeta != NULL) {
int64_t duration;
if (mFileMeta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &duration)) {
mDurationUs = duration;
}
}
int32_t totalBitrate = 0;
size_t numtracks = extractor->countTracks();
if (numtracks == 0) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < numtracks; ++i) {
sp<MediaSource> track = extractor->getTrack(i);
sp<MetaData> meta = extractor->getTrackMetaData(i);
const char *mime;
CHECK(meta->findCString(kKeyMIMEType, &mime));
if (!strncasecmp(mime, "audio/", 6)) {
if (mAudioTrack.mSource == NULL) {
mAudioTrack.mIndex = i;
mAudioTrack.mSource = track;
mAudioTrack.mPackets =
new AnotherPacketSource(mAudioTrack.mSource->getFormat());
if (!strcasecmp(mime, MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_VORBIS)) {
mAudioIsVorbis = true;
} else {
mAudioIsVorbis = false;
}
}
} else if (!strncasecmp(mime, "video/", 6)) {
if (mVideoTrack.mSource == NULL) {
mVideoTrack.mIndex = i;
mVideoTrack.mSource = track;
mVideoTrack.mPackets =
new AnotherPacketSource(mVideoTrack.mSource->getFormat());
int32_t secure;
if (meta->findInt32(kKeyRequiresSecureBuffers, &secure)
&& secure) {
mIsWidevine = true;
if (mUIDValid) {
extractor->setUID(mUID);
}
}
}
}
if (track != NULL) {
mSources.push(track);
int64_t durationUs;
if (meta->findInt64(kKeyDuration, &durationUs)) {
if (durationUs > mDurationUs) {
mDurationUs = durationUs;
}
}
int32_t bitrate;
if (totalBitrate >= 0 && meta->findInt32(kKeyBitRate, &bitrate)) {
totalBitrate += bitrate;
} else {
totalBitrate = -1;
}
}
}
mBitrate = totalBitrate;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: GenericSource: reset mDrmManagerClient when mDataSource is cleared.
Bug: 25070434
Change-Id: Iade3472c496ac42456e42db35e402f7b66416f5b
(cherry picked from commit b41fd0d4929f0a89811bafcc4fd944b128f00ce2)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 161,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ApplyConfig() {
DCHECK(context_->ui_task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!config_.GetString(kHostIdConfigPath, &host_id_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "host_id is not defined in the config.";
return false;
}
if (!key_pair_.Load(config_)) {
return false;
}
std::string host_secret_hash_string;
if (!config_.GetString(kHostSecretHashConfigPath,
&host_secret_hash_string)) {
host_secret_hash_string = "plain:";
}
if (!host_secret_hash_.Parse(host_secret_hash_string)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid host_secret_hash.";
return false;
}
if (!config_.GetString(kXmppLoginConfigPath, &xmpp_login_) ||
!(config_.GetString(kXmppAuthTokenConfigPath, &xmpp_auth_token_) ||
config_.GetString(kOAuthRefreshTokenConfigPath,
&oauth_refresh_token_))) {
LOG(ERROR) << "XMPP credentials are not defined in the config.";
return false;
}
config_.GetBoolean(kOAuthUseOfficialClientIdConfigPath,
&oauth_use_official_client_id_);
if (!oauth_refresh_token_.empty()) {
xmpp_auth_token_ = ""; // This will be set to the access token later.
xmpp_auth_service_ = "oauth2";
} else if (!config_.GetString(kXmppAuthServiceConfigPath,
&xmpp_auth_service_)) {
xmpp_auth_service_ = kChromotingTokenDefaultServiceName;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in CreateAuthenticatorFactory().
CreateAuthenticatorFactory() is called asynchronously, but it didn't handle
the case when it's called after host object is destroyed.
BUG=150644
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11090036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@161077 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintFormatNumber(void * ValuePtr, int Format, int ByteCount)
{
int s,n;
for(n=0;n<16;n++){
switch(Format){
case FMT_SBYTE:
case FMT_BYTE: printf("%02x",*(uchar *)ValuePtr); s=1; break;
case FMT_USHORT: printf("%d",Get16u(ValuePtr)); s=2; break;
case FMT_ULONG:
case FMT_SLONG: printf("%d",Get32s(ValuePtr)); s=4; break;
case FMT_SSHORT: printf("%hd",(signed short)Get16u(ValuePtr)); s=2; break;
case FMT_URATIONAL:
case FMT_SRATIONAL:
printf("%d/%d",Get32s(ValuePtr), Get32s(4+(char *)ValuePtr));
s = 8;
break;
case FMT_SINGLE: printf("%f",(double)*(float *)ValuePtr); s=8; break;
case FMT_DOUBLE: printf("%f",*(double *)ValuePtr); s=8; break;
default:
printf("Unknown format %d:", Format);
return;
}
ByteCount -= s;
if (ByteCount <= 0) break;
printf(", ");
ValuePtr = (void *)((char *)ValuePtr + s);
}
if (n >= 16) printf("...");
}
Commit Message: Fix possible out of bounds access
Bug: 28868315
Change-Id: I2b416c662f9ad7f9b3c6cf973a39c6693c66775a
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 159,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Gfx::pushMarkedContent() {
MarkedContentStack *mc = new MarkedContentStack();
mc->ocSuppressed = gFalse;
mc->next = mcStack;
mcStack = mc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Closure MessageLoop::QuitWhenIdleClosure() {
return Bind(&RunLoop::QuitCurrentWhenIdleDeprecated);
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean attachCallback(WebKitWebInspector*, InspectorTest* test)
{
return test->attach();
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 108,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType IsJPEG(const unsigned char *magick,const size_t length)
{
if (length < 3)
return(MagickFalse);
if (memcmp(magick,"\377\330\377",3) == 0)
return(MagickTrue);
return(MagickFalse);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 63,365
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::RendererUnresponsive(TabContents* source) {
browser::ShowHungRendererDialog(source);
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_range(fz_context *ctx, pdf_cmap *cmap, unsigned int low, unsigned int high, unsigned int out, int check_for_overlap, int many)
{
int current;
cmap_splay *tree;
if (low > high)
{
fz_warn(ctx, "range limits out of range in cmap %s", cmap->cmap_name);
return;
}
tree = cmap->tree;
if (cmap->tlen)
{
unsigned int move = cmap->ttop;
unsigned int gt = EMPTY;
unsigned int lt = EMPTY;
if (check_for_overlap)
{
/* Check for collision with the current node */
do
{
current = move;
/* Cases we might meet:
* tree[i]: <----->
* case 0: <->
* case 1: <------->
* case 2: <------------->
* case 3: <->
* case 4: <------->
* case 5: <->
*/
if (low <= tree[current].low && tree[current].low <= high)
{
/* case 1, reduces to case 0 */
/* or case 2, deleting the node */
tree[current].out += high + 1 - tree[current].low;
tree[current].low = high + 1;
if (tree[current].low > tree[current].high)
{
move = delete_node(cmap, current);
current = EMPTY;
continue;
}
}
else if (low <= tree[current].high && tree[current].high <= high)
{
/* case 4, reduces to case 5 */
tree[current].high = low - 1;
assert(tree[current].low <= tree[current].high);
}
else if (tree[current].low < low && high < tree[current].high)
{
/* case 3, reduces to case 5 */
int new_high = tree[current].high;
tree[current].high = low-1;
add_range(ctx, cmap, high+1, new_high, tree[current].out + high + 1 - tree[current].low, 0, tree[current].many);
}
/* Now look for where to move to next (left for case 0, right for case 5) */
if (tree[current].low > high) {
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
}
while (move != EMPTY);
}
else
{
do
{
current = move;
if (tree[current].low > high)
{
move = tree[current].left;
gt = current;
}
else
{
move = tree[current].right;
lt = current;
}
} while (move != EMPTY);
}
/* current is now the node to which we would be adding the new node */
/* lt is the last node we traversed which is lt the new node. */
/* gt is the last node we traversed which is gt the new node. */
if (!many)
{
/* Check for the 'merge' cases. */
if (lt != EMPTY && !tree[lt].many && tree[lt].high == low-1 && tree[lt].out - tree[lt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = high;
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[lt].high = tree[gt].high;
delete_node(cmap, gt);
}
goto exit;
}
if (gt != EMPTY && !tree[gt].many && tree[gt].low == high+1 && tree[gt].out - tree[gt].low == out - low)
{
tree[gt].low = low;
tree[gt].out = out;
goto exit;
}
}
}
else
current = EMPTY;
if (cmap->tlen == cmap->tcap)
{
int new_cap = cmap->tcap ? cmap->tcap * 2 : 256;
tree = cmap->tree = fz_resize_array(ctx, cmap->tree, new_cap, sizeof *cmap->tree);
cmap->tcap = new_cap;
}
tree[cmap->tlen].low = low;
tree[cmap->tlen].high = high;
tree[cmap->tlen].out = out;
tree[cmap->tlen].parent = current;
tree[cmap->tlen].left = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].right = EMPTY;
tree[cmap->tlen].many = many;
cmap->tlen++;
if (current == EMPTY)
cmap->ttop = 0;
else if (tree[current].low > high)
tree[current].left = cmap->tlen-1;
else
{
assert(tree[current].high < low);
tree[current].right = cmap->tlen-1;
}
move_to_root(tree, cmap->tlen-1);
cmap->ttop = cmap->tlen-1;
exit:
{}
#ifdef CHECK_SPLAY
check_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0);
#endif
#ifdef DUMP_SPLAY
dump_splay(cmap->tree, cmap->ttop, 0, "");
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 164,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AttachOutputGPU(ScreenPtr pScreen, ScreenPtr new)
{
assert(new->isGPU);
xorg_list_add(&new->output_head, &pScreen->output_slave_list);
new->current_master = pScreen;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 14,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline RemoteFrame::RemoteFrame(RemoteFrameClient* client,
Page& page,
FrameOwner* owner)
: Frame(client, page, owner, RemoteWindowProxyManager::Create(*this)),
security_context_(RemoteSecurityContext::Create()) {
dom_window_ = RemoteDOMWindow::Create(*this);
UpdateInertIfPossible();
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 152,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: drive_ata_smart_refresh_data_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
gint rc;
SkDisk *d;
gchar *blob;
gsize blob_size;
time_t time_collected;
SkSmartOverall overall;
PROFILE ("drive_ata_smart_refresh_data_completed_cb(device=%s) start", device->priv->native_path);
d = NULL;
blob = NULL;
if (job_was_cancelled || stdout == NULL)
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
if (context != NULL)
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
if (context != NULL)
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error retrieving ATA SMART data: no output",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
goto out;
}
rc = WEXITSTATUS (status);
if (rc != 0)
{
if (rc == 2)
{
if (context != NULL)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_ATA_SMART_WOULD_WAKEUP, "Error retrieving ATA SMART data: %s", stderr);
}
}
else
{
if (context != NULL)
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error retrieving ATA SMART data: helper failed with exit code %d: %s",
rc,
stderr);
}
}
goto out;
}
PROFILE ("drive_ata_smart_refresh_data_completed_cb(device=%s) decode blob", device->priv->native_path);
blob = (gchar *) g_base64_decode (stdout, &blob_size);
PROFILE ("drive_ata_smart_refresh_data_completed_cb(device=%s) set blob", device->priv->native_path);
if (blob == NULL)
{
if (context != NULL)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Error decoding ATA SMART data: invalid base64 format: %s", stdout);
}
else
{
g_warning ("Error decoding ATA SMART data: invalid base64 format: %s", stdout);
}
goto out;
}
if (sk_disk_open (NULL, &d) != 0)
{
if (context != NULL)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "unable to open a SkDisk");
}
goto out;
}
if (sk_disk_set_blob (d, blob, blob_size) != 0)
{
if (context != NULL)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "error parsing blob: %s", strerror (errno));
}
goto out;
}
PROFILE ("drive_ata_smart_refresh_data_completed_cb(device=%s) time collected", device->priv->native_path);
time_collected = time (NULL);
device_set_drive_ata_smart_time_collected (device, time_collected);
PROFILE ("drive_ata_smart_refresh_data_completed_cb(device=%s) overall smart status", device->priv->native_path);
if (sk_disk_smart_get_overall (d, &overall) != 0)
overall = -1;
device_set_drive_ata_smart_status (device, overall);
device_set_drive_ata_smart_blob_steal (device, blob, blob_size);
blob = NULL;
/* emit change event since we've updated the smart data */
PROFILE ("drive_ata_smart_refresh_data_completed_cb(device=%s) drain pending changes", device->priv->native_path);
drain_pending_changes (device, FALSE);
if (context != NULL)
dbus_g_method_return (context);
out:
g_free (blob);
if (d != NULL)
sk_disk_free (d);
PROFILE ("drive_ata_smart_refresh_data_completed_cb(device=%s) end", device->priv->native_path);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void iucv_sock_link(struct iucv_sock_list *l, struct sock *sk)
{
write_lock_bh(&l->lock);
sk_add_node(sk, &l->head);
write_unlock_bh(&l->lock);
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::initPopupWebView(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage* webPage)
{
d->m_selectPopup->init(webPage);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,232
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<NodeList> Document::nodesFromRect(int centerX, int centerY, unsigned topPadding, unsigned rightPadding, unsigned bottomPadding, unsigned leftPadding, HitTestRequest::HitTestRequestType hitType) const
{
if (!renderer())
return 0;
Frame* frame = this->frame();
if (!frame)
return 0;
FrameView* frameView = frame->view();
if (!frameView)
return 0;
float zoomFactor = frame->pageZoomFactor();
LayoutPoint point = roundedLayoutPoint(FloatPoint(centerX * zoomFactor + view()->scrollX(), centerY * zoomFactor + view()->scrollY()));
HitTestRequest request(hitType);
if (!request.ignoreClipping() && !frameView->visibleContentRect().intersects(HitTestLocation::rectForPoint(point, topPadding, rightPadding, bottomPadding, leftPadding)))
return 0;
if (!topPadding && !rightPadding && !bottomPadding && !leftPadding) {
HitTestResult result(point);
return handleZeroPadding(request, result);
}
HitTestResult result(point, topPadding, rightPadding, bottomPadding, leftPadding);
renderView()->hitTest(request, result);
return StaticHashSetNodeList::adopt(result.rectBasedTestResult());
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NotifyRefreshBluetooth() {
ash::BluetoothObserver* observer = tray_->bluetooth_observer();
if (observer)
observer->OnBluetoothRefresh();
}
Commit Message: Use display_email() for Uber Tray messages.
BUG=124087
TEST=manually
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10388171
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137721 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 106,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ComponentUpdaterPolicyTest::DisabledPolicy_GroupPolicySupported() {
SetEnableComponentUpdates(false);
UpdateComponent(MakeCrxComponent(true));
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 157,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void deprecatedConstructorConstructorGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String> property, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
UseCounter::countDeprecation(callingExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate()), UseCounter::ConstructorAttribute);
TestObjectV8Internal::TestObjectConstructorGetter(property, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void video_sample_entry_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox *ptr = (GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox *)s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
gf_isom_sample_entry_predestroy((GF_SampleEntryBox *)s);
if (ptr->esd) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->esd);
if (ptr->slc) gf_odf_desc_del((GF_Descriptor *)ptr->slc);
/*for publishing*/
if (ptr->emul_esd) gf_odf_desc_del((GF_Descriptor *)ptr->emul_esd);
if (ptr->avc_config) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *) ptr->avc_config);
if (ptr->svc_config) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *) ptr->svc_config);
if (ptr->mvc_config) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *) ptr->mvc_config);
if (ptr->hevc_config) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *) ptr->hevc_config);
if (ptr->lhvc_config) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *) ptr->lhvc_config);
if (ptr->av1_config) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->av1_config);
if (ptr->vp_config) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->vp_config);
if (ptr->cfg_3gpp) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->cfg_3gpp);
if (ptr->descr) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *) ptr->descr);
if (ptr->ipod_ext) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->ipod_ext);
if (ptr->pasp) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->pasp);
if (ptr->clap) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->clap);
if (ptr->rinf) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->rinf);
if (ptr->ccst) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->ccst);
if (ptr->rvcc) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->rvcc);
if (ptr->auxi) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *)ptr->auxi);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183)
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 91,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcRenderSetPictureTransform(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderSetPictureTransformReq);
PicturePtr pPicture;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xRenderSetPictureTransformReq);
VERIFY_PICTURE(pPicture, stuff->picture, client, DixSetAttrAccess);
return SetPictureTransform(pPicture, (PictTransform *) &stuff->transform);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int copy_from_user_sec_ctx(struct xfrm_policy *pol, struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX];
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx;
if (!rt)
return 0;
uctx = nla_data(rt);
return security_xfrm_policy_alloc(&pol->security, uctx, GFP_KERNEL);
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 59,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ar6000_dbglog_event(struct ar6_softc *ar, u32 dropped,
s8 *buffer, u32 length)
{
#ifdef REPORT_DEBUG_LOGS_TO_APP
#define MAX_WIRELESS_EVENT_SIZE 252
/*
* Break it up into chunks of MAX_WIRELESS_EVENT_SIZE bytes of messages.
* There seems to be a limitation on the length of message that could be
* transmitted to the user app via this mechanism.
*/
u32 send, sent;
sent = 0;
send = dbglog_get_debug_fragment(&buffer[sent], length - sent,
MAX_WIRELESS_EVENT_SIZE);
while (send) {
sent += send;
send = dbglog_get_debug_fragment(&buffer[sent], length - sent,
MAX_WIRELESS_EVENT_SIZE);
}
#else
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_ERR,("Dropped logs: 0x%x\nDebug info length: %d\n",
dropped, length));
/* Interpret the debug logs */
dbglog_parse_debug_logs((s8 *)buffer, length);
#endif /* REPORT_DEBUG_LOGS_TO_APP */
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void convert_1u32s_C1R(const OPJ_BYTE* pSrc, OPJ_INT32* pDst,
OPJ_SIZE_T length)
{
OPJ_SIZE_T i;
for (i = 0; i < (length & ~(OPJ_SIZE_T)7U); i += 8U) {
OPJ_UINT32 val = *pSrc++;
pDst[i + 0] = (OPJ_INT32)(val >> 7);
pDst[i + 1] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 6) & 0x1U);
pDst[i + 2] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 5) & 0x1U);
pDst[i + 3] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 4) & 0x1U);
pDst[i + 4] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 3) & 0x1U);
pDst[i + 5] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 2) & 0x1U);
pDst[i + 6] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 1) & 0x1U);
pDst[i + 7] = (OPJ_INT32)(val & 0x1U);
}
if (length & 7U) {
OPJ_UINT32 val = *pSrc++;
length = length & 7U;
pDst[i + 0] = (OPJ_INT32)(val >> 7);
if (length > 1U) {
pDst[i + 1] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 6) & 0x1U);
if (length > 2U) {
pDst[i + 2] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 5) & 0x1U);
if (length > 3U) {
pDst[i + 3] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 4) & 0x1U);
if (length > 4U) {
pDst[i + 4] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 3) & 0x1U);
if (length > 5U) {
pDst[i + 5] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 2) & 0x1U);
if (length > 6U) {
pDst[i + 6] = (OPJ_INT32)((val >> 1) & 0x1U);
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: pgxtoimage(): fix write stack buffer overflow (#997)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 61,869
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unix_dgram_disconnected(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other)
{
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
wake_up_interruptible_all(&unix_sk(sk)->peer_wait);
/* If one link of bidirectional dgram pipe is disconnected,
* we signal error. Messages are lost. Do not make this,
* when peer was not connected to us.
*/
if (!sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) && unix_peer(other) == sk) {
other->sk_err = ECONNRESET;
other->sk_error_report(other);
}
}
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 19,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ndisc_ifinfo_sysctl_change(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write, void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net_device *dev = ctl->extra1;
struct inet6_dev *idev;
int ret;
if ((strcmp(ctl->procname, "retrans_time") == 0) ||
(strcmp(ctl->procname, "base_reachable_time") == 0))
ndisc_warn_deprecated_sysctl(ctl, "syscall", dev ? dev->name : "default");
if (strcmp(ctl->procname, "retrans_time") == 0)
ret = neigh_proc_dointvec(ctl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
else if (strcmp(ctl->procname, "base_reachable_time") == 0)
ret = neigh_proc_dointvec_jiffies(ctl, write,
buffer, lenp, ppos);
else if ((strcmp(ctl->procname, "retrans_time_ms") == 0) ||
(strcmp(ctl->procname, "base_reachable_time_ms") == 0))
ret = neigh_proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies(ctl, write,
buffer, lenp, ppos);
else
ret = -1;
if (write && ret == 0 && dev && (idev = in6_dev_get(dev)) != NULL) {
if (ctl->data == &NEIGH_VAR(idev->nd_parms, BASE_REACHABLE_TIME))
idev->nd_parms->reachable_time =
neigh_rand_reach_time(NEIGH_VAR(idev->nd_parms, BASE_REACHABLE_TIME));
idev->tstamp = jiffies;
inet6_ifinfo_notify(RTM_NEWLINK, idev);
in6_dev_put(idev);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 43,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStrip::Init() {
SetID(VIEW_ID_TAB_STRIP);
set_notify_enter_exit_on_child(true);
new_tab_button_ = new NewTabButton(this, this);
new_tab_button_->SetTooltipText(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_TOOLTIP_NEW_TAB));
new_tab_button_->SetAccessibleName(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_ACCNAME_NEWTAB));
new_tab_button_->SetImageVerticalAlignment(views::ImageButton::ALIGN_BOTTOM);
new_tab_button_->SetEventTargeter(
std::make_unique<views::ViewTargeter>(new_tab_button_));
AddChildView(new_tab_button_);
UpdateNewTabButtonBorder();
new_tab_button_bounds_.set_size(new_tab_button_->GetPreferredSize());
if (g_drop_indicator_width == 0) {
gfx::ImageSkia* drop_image = GetDropArrowImage(true);
g_drop_indicator_width = drop_image->width();
g_drop_indicator_height = drop_image->height();
}
UpdateContrastRatioValues();
if (!gfx::Animation::ShouldRenderRichAnimation())
bounds_animator_.SetAnimationDuration(0);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpu::gles2::MemoryTracker* GpuCommandBufferStub::GetMemoryTracker() const {
return context_group_->memory_tracker();
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssh_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
{
if (!success)
fatal("stdio forwarding failed");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidFinishDocumentLoad() {
TRACE_EVENT1("navigation,benchmark,rail",
"RenderFrameImpl::didFinishDocumentLoad", "id", routing_id_);
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidFinishDocumentLoad(routing_id_));
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidFinishDocumentLoad();
UpdateEncoding(frame_, frame_->View()->PageEncoding().Utf8());
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,597
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mxf_read_random_index_pack(AVFormatContext *s)
{
MXFContext *mxf = s->priv_data;
uint32_t length;
int64_t file_size, max_rip_length, min_rip_length;
KLVPacket klv;
if (!(s->pb->seekable & AVIO_SEEKABLE_NORMAL))
return;
file_size = avio_size(s->pb);
/* S377m says to check the RIP length for "silly" values, without defining "silly".
* The limit below assumes a file with nothing but partition packs and a RIP.
* Before changing this, consider that a muxer may place each sample in its own partition.
*
* 105 is the size of the smallest possible PartitionPack
* 12 is the size of each RIP entry
* 28 is the size of the RIP header and footer, assuming an 8-byte BER
*/
max_rip_length = ((file_size - mxf->run_in) / 105) * 12 + 28;
max_rip_length = FFMIN(max_rip_length, INT_MAX); //2 GiB and up is also silly
/* We're only interested in RIPs with at least two entries.. */
min_rip_length = 16+1+24+4;
/* See S377m section 11 */
avio_seek(s->pb, file_size - 4, SEEK_SET);
length = avio_rb32(s->pb);
if (length < min_rip_length || length > max_rip_length)
goto end;
avio_seek(s->pb, file_size - length, SEEK_SET);
if (klv_read_packet(&klv, s->pb) < 0 ||
!IS_KLV_KEY(klv.key, mxf_random_index_pack_key) ||
klv.length != length - 20)
goto end;
avio_skip(s->pb, klv.length - 12);
mxf->footer_partition = avio_rb64(s->pb);
/* sanity check */
if (mxf->run_in + mxf->footer_partition >= file_size) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "bad FooterPartition in RIP - ignoring\n");
mxf->footer_partition = 0;
}
end:
avio_seek(s->pb, mxf->run_in, SEEK_SET);
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 61,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool _cmsRegisterMultiProcessElementPlugin(cmsContext id, cmsPluginBase* Data)
{
return RegisterTypesPlugin(id, Data,MPEPlugin);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 71,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::ShowWebUI() {
if (!login_window_ || !login_view_) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
VLOG(1) << "Login WebUI >> Show already initialized UI";
login_window_->Show();
login_view_->GetWebContents()->Focus();
login_view_->SetStatusAreaVisible(status_area_saved_visibility_);
login_view_->OnPostponedShow();
initialize_webui_hidden_ = false;
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 131,661
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallbackForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::activityLoggingGetterForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterForMainWorld(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int fuse_iter_npages(const struct iov_iter *ii_p)
{
return iov_iter_npages(ii_p, FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ);
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 56,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hook_completion_list_add (struct t_gui_completion *completion,
const char *word, int nick_completion,
const char *where)
{
gui_completion_list_add (completion, word, nick_completion, where);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _archive_filter_code(struct archive *_a, int n)
{
struct archive_read_filter *f = get_filter(_a, n);
return f == NULL ? -1 : f->code;
}
Commit Message: Fix a potential crash issue discovered by Alexander Cherepanov:
It seems bsdtar automatically handles stacked compression. This is a
nice feature but it could be problematic when it's completely
unlimited. Most clearly it's illustrated with quines:
$ curl -sRO http://www.maximumcompression.com/selfgz.gz
$ (ulimit -v 10000000 && bsdtar -tvf selfgz.gz)
bsdtar: Error opening archive: Can't allocate data for gzip decompression
Without ulimit, bsdtar will eat all available memory. This could also
be a problem for other applications using libarchive.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 50,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fillContainerFromString(ContainerNode* paragraph, const String& string)
{
Document* document = paragraph->document();
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
if (string.isEmpty()) {
paragraph->appendChild(createBlockPlaceholderElement(document), ec);
ASSERT(!ec);
return;
}
ASSERT(string.find('\n') == notFound);
Vector<String> tabList;
string.split('\t', true, tabList);
String tabText = "";
bool first = true;
size_t numEntries = tabList.size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < numEntries; ++i) {
const String& s = tabList[i];
if (!s.isEmpty()) {
if (!tabText.isEmpty()) {
paragraph->appendChild(createTabSpanElement(document, tabText), ec);
ASSERT(!ec);
tabText = "";
}
RefPtr<Node> textNode = document->createTextNode(stringWithRebalancedWhitespace(s, first, i + 1 == numEntries));
paragraph->appendChild(textNode.release(), ec);
ASSERT(!ec);
}
if (i + 1 != numEntries)
tabText.append('\t');
else if (!tabText.isEmpty()) {
paragraph->appendChild(createTabSpanElement(document, tabText), ec);
ASSERT(!ec);
}
first = false;
}
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 100,325
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(renameat, int, olddfd, const char __user *, oldname,
int, newdfd, const char __user *, newname)
{
return sys_renameat2(olddfd, oldname, newdfd, newname, 0);
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 36,286
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zsetpagedevice(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
int code;
/******
if ( igs->in_cachedevice )
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
******/
if (r_has_type(op, t_dictionary)) {
check_dict_read(*op);
#if 0 /****************/
/*
* In order to avoid invalidaccess errors on setpagedevice,
* the dictionary must be allocated in local VM.
*/
if (!(r_is_local(op)))
return_error(gs_error_invalidaccess);
#endif /****************/
/* Make the dictionary read-only. */
code = zreadonly(i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
return code;
} else {
check_type(*op, t_null);
}
istate->pagedevice = *op;
pop(1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sec_init(uint32 flags, int maxlen)
{
int hdrlen;
STREAM s;
if (!g_licence_issued && !g_licence_error_result)
hdrlen = (flags & SEC_ENCRYPT) ? 12 : 4;
else
hdrlen = (flags & SEC_ENCRYPT) ? 12 : 0;
s = mcs_init(maxlen + hdrlen);
s_push_layer(s, sec_hdr, hdrlen);
return s;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 93,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void handle_port_owner_write(EHCIState *s, int port, uint32_t owner)
{
USBDevice *dev = s->ports[port].dev;
uint32_t *portsc = &s->portsc[port];
uint32_t orig;
if (s->companion_ports[port] == NULL)
return;
owner = owner & PORTSC_POWNER;
orig = *portsc & PORTSC_POWNER;
if (!(owner ^ orig)) {
return;
}
if (dev && dev->attached) {
usb_detach(&s->ports[port]);
}
*portsc &= ~PORTSC_POWNER;
*portsc |= owner;
if (dev && dev->attached) {
usb_attach(&s->ports[port]);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 5,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int search_binary_handler(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
bool need_retry = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULES);
struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
int retval;
/* This allows 4 levels of binfmt rewrites before failing hard. */
if (bprm->recursion_depth > 5)
return -ELOOP;
retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = audit_bprm(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = -ENOENT;
retry:
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_for_each_entry(fmt, &formats, lh) {
if (!try_module_get(fmt->module))
continue;
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
bprm->recursion_depth++;
retval = fmt->load_binary(bprm);
bprm->recursion_depth--;
if (retval >= 0 || retval != -ENOEXEC ||
bprm->mm == NULL || bprm->file == NULL) {
put_binfmt(fmt);
return retval;
}
read_lock(&binfmt_lock);
put_binfmt(fmt);
}
read_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
if (need_retry && retval == -ENOEXEC) {
if (printable(bprm->buf[0]) && printable(bprm->buf[1]) &&
printable(bprm->buf[2]) && printable(bprm->buf[3]))
return retval;
if (request_module("binfmt-%04x", *(ushort *)(bprm->buf + 2)) < 0)
return retval;
need_retry = false;
goto retry;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 30,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pit_load_count(struct kvm *kvm, int channel, u32 val)
{
struct kvm_kpit_state *ps = &kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state;
WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&ps->lock));
pr_debug("load_count val is %d, channel is %d\n", val, channel);
/*
* The largest possible initial count is 0; this is equivalent
* to 216 for binary counting and 104 for BCD counting.
*/
if (val == 0)
val = 0x10000;
ps->channels[channel].count = val;
if (channel != 0) {
ps->channels[channel].count_load_time = ktime_get();
return;
}
/* Two types of timer
* mode 1 is one shot, mode 2 is period, otherwise del timer */
switch (ps->channels[0].mode) {
case 0:
case 1:
/* FIXME: enhance mode 4 precision */
case 4:
create_pit_timer(kvm, val, 0);
break;
case 2:
case 3:
create_pit_timer(kvm, val, 1);
break;
default:
destroy_pit_timer(kvm->arch.vpit);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Improve thread safety in pit
There's a race condition in the PIT emulation code in KVM. In
__kvm_migrate_pit_timer the pit_timer object is accessed without
synchronization. If the race condition occurs at the wrong time this
can crash the host kernel.
This fixes CVE-2014-3611.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 37,726
|
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