instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: json_out(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
/* we needn't detoast because text_to_cstring will handle that */
Datum txt = PG_GETARG_DATUM(0);
PG_RETURN_CSTRING(TextDatumGetCString(txt));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::OnGetEntryInfoCompleteForCloseFile(
const FilePath& file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback,
GDataFileError error,
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProto> entry_proto) {
if (entry_proto.get() && !entry_proto->has_file_specific_info())
error = GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_FOUND;
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(error);
return;
}
cache_->GetFileOnUIThread(
entry_proto->resource_id(),
entry_proto->file_specific_info().file_md5(),
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnGetCacheFilePathCompleteForCloseFile,
ui_weak_ptr_,
file_path,
callback));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 116,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHPAPI PHP_FUNCTION(fseek)
{
zval *arg1;
long arg2, whence = SEEK_SET;
php_stream *stream;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rl|l", &arg1, &arg2, &whence) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
PHP_STREAM_TO_ZVAL(stream, &arg1);
RETURN_LONG(php_stream_seek(stream, arg2, whence));
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 52,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGLayoutSupport::layoutChildren(
LayoutObject* firstChild, bool forceLayout, bool screenScalingFactorChanged, bool layoutSizeChanged)
{
for (LayoutObject* child = firstChild; child; child = child->nextSibling()) {
bool forceChildLayout = forceLayout;
if (screenScalingFactorChanged) {
if (child->isSVGText())
toLayoutSVGText(child)->setNeedsTextMetricsUpdate();
forceChildLayout = true;
}
if (layoutSizeChanged) {
if (SVGElement* element = child->node()->isSVGElement() ? toSVGElement(child->node()) : 0) {
if (element->hasRelativeLengths()) {
if (child->isSVGShape()) {
toLayoutSVGShape(child)->setNeedsShapeUpdate();
} else if (child->isSVGText()) {
toLayoutSVGText(child)->setNeedsTextMetricsUpdate();
toLayoutSVGText(child)->setNeedsPositioningValuesUpdate();
}
forceChildLayout = true;
}
}
}
if (child->isSVGResourceContainer()) {
layoutResourcesIfNeeded(child);
child->layoutIfNeeded();
} else {
SubtreeLayoutScope layoutScope(*child);
if (forceChildLayout)
layoutScope.setNeedsLayout(child, LayoutInvalidationReason::SvgChanged);
layoutResourcesIfNeeded(child);
child->layoutIfNeeded();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 121,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ActivityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->activityLoggingAccessForIsolatedWorldsPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void gen_bpt_io(DisasContext *s, TCGv_i32 t_port, int ot)
{
if (s->flags & HF_IOBPT_MASK) {
TCGv_i32 t_size = tcg_const_i32(1 << ot);
TCGv t_next = tcg_const_tl(s->pc - s->cs_base);
gen_helper_bpt_io(cpu_env, t_port, t_size, t_next);
tcg_temp_free_i32(t_size);
tcg_temp_free(t_next);
}
}
Commit Message: tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 66,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
{
int i, j;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
if (i <= 0) {
s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
} else {
/*
* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the
* message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not
* worry too much.
*/
if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
(void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL) {
j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1];
cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
}
}
return (i);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 6,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void br_multicast_local_router_expired(unsigned long data)
{
}
Commit Message: bridge: Fix mglist corruption that leads to memory corruption
The list mp->mglist is used to indicate whether a multicast group
is active on the bridge interface itself as opposed to one of the
constituent interfaces in the bridge.
Unfortunately the operation that adds the mp->mglist node to the
list neglected to check whether it has already been added. This
leads to list corruption in the form of nodes pointing to itself.
Normally this would be quite obvious as it would cause an infinite
loop when walking the list. However, as this list is never actually
walked (which means that we don't really need it, I'll get rid of
it in a subsequent patch), this instead is hidden until we perform
a delete operation on the affected nodes.
As the same node may now be pointed to by more than one node, the
delete operations can then cause modification of freed memory.
This was observed in practice to cause corruption in 512-byte slabs,
most commonly leading to crashes in jbd2.
Thanks to Josef Bacik for pointing me in the right direction.
Reported-by: Ian Page Hands <ihands@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnSetOptionsFromDocument(
const PrintHostMsg_SetOptionsFromDocument_Params& params) {
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
print_preview_ui->OnSetOptionsFromDocument(params);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 126,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int formatIPTC(Image *ifile, Image *ofile)
{
char
temp[MagickPathExtent];
unsigned int
foundiptc,
tagsfound;
unsigned char
recnum,
dataset;
unsigned char
*readable,
*str;
ssize_t
tagindx,
taglen;
int
i,
tagcount = (int) (sizeof(tags) / sizeof(tag_spec));
int
c;
foundiptc = 0; /* found the IPTC-Header */
tagsfound = 0; /* number of tags found */
c = ReadBlobByte(ifile);
while (c != EOF)
{
if (c == 0x1c)
foundiptc = 1;
else
{
if (foundiptc)
return(-1);
else
{
c=0;
continue;
}
}
/* we found the 0x1c tag and now grab the dataset and record number tags */
c = ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
return(-1);
dataset = (unsigned char) c;
c = ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
return(-1);
recnum = (unsigned char) c;
/* try to match this record to one of the ones in our named table */
for (i=0; i< tagcount; i++)
{
if (tags[i].id == (short) recnum)
break;
}
if (i < tagcount)
readable = (unsigned char *) tags[i].name;
else
readable = (unsigned char *) "";
/*
We decode the length of the block that follows - ssize_t or short fmt.
*/
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
return(-1);
if (c & (unsigned char) 0x80)
return(0);
else
{
int
c0;
c0=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c0 == EOF)
return(-1);
taglen = (c << 8) | c0;
}
if (taglen < 0)
return(-1);
/* make a buffer to hold the tag datand snag it from the input stream */
str=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (taglen+MagickPathExtent),
sizeof(*str));
if (str == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(0);
for (tagindx=0; tagindx<taglen; tagindx++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
if (c == EOF)
{
str=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(str);
return(-1);
}
str[tagindx] = (unsigned char) c;
}
str[taglen] = 0;
/* now finish up by formatting this binary data into ASCII equivalent */
if (strlen((char *)readable) > 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(temp,MagickPathExtent,"%d#%d#%s=",
(unsigned int) dataset, (unsigned int) recnum, readable);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(temp,MagickPathExtent,"%d#%d=",
(unsigned int) dataset,(unsigned int) recnum);
(void) WriteBlobString(ofile,temp);
formatString( ofile, (char *)str, taglen );
str=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(str);
tagsfound++;
c=ReadBlobByte(ifile);
}
return((int) tagsfound);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 91,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ConstructType JSFloat64ArrayConstructor::getConstructData(JSCell*, ConstructData& constructData)
{
constructData.native.function = constructJSFloat64Array;
return ConstructTypeHost;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 101,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
{
EC_EXTRA_DATA *d;
if (dest->meth->group_copy == 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (dest->meth != src->meth) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
if (dest == src)
return 1;
EC_EX_DATA_free_all_data(&dest->extra_data);
for (d = src->extra_data; d != NULL; d = d->next) {
void *t = d->dup_func(d->data);
if (t == NULL)
return 0;
if (!EC_EX_DATA_set_data
(&dest->extra_data, t, d->dup_func, d->free_func,
d->clear_free_func))
return 0;
}
if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(src) && src->mont_data != NULL) {
if (dest->mont_data == NULL) {
dest->mont_data = BN_MONT_CTX_new();
if (dest->mont_data == NULL)
return 0;
}
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_copy(dest->mont_data, src->mont_data))
return 0;
} else {
/* src->generator == NULL */
if (EC_GROUP_VERSION(dest) && dest->mont_data != NULL) {
BN_MONT_CTX_free(dest->mont_data);
dest->mont_data = NULL;
}
}
if (src->generator != NULL) {
if (dest->generator == NULL) {
dest->generator = EC_POINT_new(dest);
if (dest->generator == NULL)
return 0;
}
if (!EC_POINT_copy(dest->generator, src->generator))
return 0;
} else {
/* src->generator == NULL */
if (dest->generator != NULL) {
EC_POINT_clear_free(dest->generator);
dest->generator = NULL;
}
}
if (!BN_copy(&dest->order, &src->order))
return 0;
if (!BN_copy(&dest->cofactor, &src->cofactor))
return 0;
dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
dest->asn1_flag = src->asn1_flag;
dest->asn1_form = src->asn1_form;
if (src->seed) {
if (dest->seed)
OPENSSL_free(dest->seed);
dest->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(src->seed_len);
if (dest->seed == NULL)
return 0;
if (!memcpy(dest->seed, src->seed, src->seed_len))
return 0;
dest->seed_len = src->seed_len;
} else {
if (dest->seed)
OPENSSL_free(dest->seed);
dest->seed = NULL;
dest->seed_len = 0;
}
return dest->meth->group_copy(dest, src);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 12,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void BeginPassHook(unsigned int /*pass*/) {
#if WRITE_COMPRESSED_STREAM
outfile_ = fopen("vp90-2-05-resize.ivf", "wb");
#endif
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 164,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8DOMWindow::eventAttrGetterCustom(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
v8::Handle<v8::Object> holder = info.This()->FindInstanceInPrototypeChain(V8DOMWindow::GetTemplate(info.GetIsolate(), worldTypeInMainThread(info.GetIsolate())));
if (holder.IsEmpty())
return v8::Undefined();
Frame* frame = V8DOMWindow::toNative(holder)->frame();
if (!BindingSecurity::shouldAllowAccessToFrame(frame))
return v8::Undefined();
ASSERT(frame);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = frame->script()->currentWorldContext();
if (context.IsEmpty())
return v8::Undefined();
v8::Handle<v8::String> eventSymbol = V8HiddenPropertyName::event();
v8::Handle<v8::Value> jsEvent = context->Global()->GetHiddenValue(eventSymbol);
if (jsEvent.IsEmpty())
return v8::Undefined();
return jsEvent;
}
Commit Message: Named access checks on DOMWindow miss navigator
The design of the named access check is very fragile. Instead of doing the
access check at the same time as the access, we need to check access in a
separate operation using different parameters. Worse, we need to implement a
part of the access check as a blacklist of dangerous properties.
This CL expands the blacklist slightly by adding in the real named properties
from the DOMWindow instance to the current list (which included the real named
properties of the shadow object).
In the longer term, we should investigate whether we can change the V8 API to
let us do the access check in the same callback as the property access itself.
BUG=237022
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15346002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150616 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 113,586
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static apr_byte_t oidc_authorization_response_match_state(request_rec *r,
oidc_cfg *c, const char *state, struct oidc_provider_t **provider,
oidc_proto_state_t **proto_state) {
oidc_debug(r, "enter (state=%s)", state);
if ((state == NULL) || (apr_strnatcmp(state, "") == 0)) {
oidc_error(r, "state parameter is not set");
return FALSE;
}
/* check the state parameter against what we stored in a cookie */
if (oidc_restore_proto_state(r, c, state, proto_state) == FALSE) {
oidc_error(r, "unable to restore state");
return FALSE;
}
*provider = oidc_get_provider_for_issuer(r, c,
oidc_proto_state_get_issuer(*proto_state), FALSE);
return (*provider != NULL);
}
Commit Message: release 2.3.10.2: fix XSS vulnerability for poll parameter
in OIDC Session Management RP iframe; CSNC-2019-001; thanks Mischa
Bachmann
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 87,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_note_freebsd_version(struct magic_set *ms, int swap, void *v)
{
uint32_t desc;
memcpy(&desc, v, sizeof(desc));
desc = elf_getu32(swap, desc);
if (file_printf(ms, ", for FreeBSD") == -1)
return;
/*
* Contents is __FreeBSD_version, whose relation to OS
* versions is defined by a huge table in the Porter's
* Handbook. This is the general scheme:
*
* Releases:
* Mmp000 (before 4.10)
* Mmi0p0 (before 5.0)
* Mmm0p0
*
* Development branches:
* Mmpxxx (before 4.6)
* Mmp1xx (before 4.10)
* Mmi1xx (before 5.0)
* M000xx (pre-M.0)
* Mmm1xx
*
* M = major version
* m = minor version
* i = minor version increment (491000 -> 4.10)
* p = patchlevel
* x = revision
*
* The first release of FreeBSD to use ELF by default
* was version 3.0.
*/
if (desc == 460002) {
if (file_printf(ms, " 4.6.2") == -1)
return;
} else if (desc < 460100) {
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d", desc / 100000,
desc / 10000 % 10) == -1)
return;
if (desc / 1000 % 10 > 0)
if (file_printf(ms, ".%d", desc / 1000 % 10) == -1)
return;
if ((desc % 1000 > 0) || (desc % 100000 == 0))
if (file_printf(ms, " (%d)", desc) == -1)
return;
} else if (desc < 500000) {
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d", desc / 100000,
desc / 10000 % 10 + desc / 1000 % 10) == -1)
return;
if (desc / 100 % 10 > 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, " (%d)", desc) == -1)
return;
} else if (desc / 10 % 10 > 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ".%d", desc / 10 % 10) == -1)
return;
}
} else {
if (file_printf(ms, " %d.%d", desc / 100000,
desc / 1000 % 100) == -1)
return;
if ((desc / 100 % 10 > 0) ||
(desc % 100000 / 100 == 0)) {
if (file_printf(ms, " (%d)", desc) == -1)
return;
} else if (desc / 10 % 10 > 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ".%d", desc / 10 % 10) == -1)
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid reading past the end of buffer (Rui Reis)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 83,119
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const Extension* ExtensionService::GetExtensionByIdInternal(
const std::string& id, bool include_enabled, bool include_disabled,
bool include_terminated) const {
std::string lowercase_id = StringToLowerASCII(id);
if (include_enabled) {
for (ExtensionList::const_iterator iter = extensions_.begin();
iter != extensions_.end(); ++iter) {
if ((*iter)->id() == lowercase_id)
return *iter;
}
}
if (include_disabled) {
for (ExtensionList::const_iterator iter = disabled_extensions_.begin();
iter != disabled_extensions_.end(); ++iter) {
if ((*iter)->id() == lowercase_id)
return *iter;
}
}
if (include_terminated) {
for (ExtensionList::const_iterator iter = terminated_extensions_.begin();
iter != terminated_extensions_.end(); ++iter) {
if ((*iter)->id() == lowercase_id)
return *iter;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_get_context(struct pmu *pmu, struct task_struct *task,
struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx, *clone_ctx = NULL;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
void *task_ctx_data = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
int ctxn, err;
int cpu = event->cpu;
if (!task) {
/* Must be root to operate on a CPU event: */
if (perf_paranoid_cpu() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
/*
* We could be clever and allow to attach a event to an
* offline CPU and activate it when the CPU comes up, but
* that's for later.
*/
if (!cpu_online(cpu))
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
cpuctx = per_cpu_ptr(pmu->pmu_cpu_context, cpu);
ctx = &cpuctx->ctx;
get_ctx(ctx);
++ctx->pin_count;
return ctx;
}
err = -EINVAL;
ctxn = pmu->task_ctx_nr;
if (ctxn < 0)
goto errout;
if (event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_TASK_DATA) {
task_ctx_data = kzalloc(pmu->task_ctx_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!task_ctx_data) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto errout;
}
}
retry:
ctx = perf_lock_task_context(task, ctxn, &flags);
if (ctx) {
clone_ctx = unclone_ctx(ctx);
++ctx->pin_count;
if (task_ctx_data && !ctx->task_ctx_data) {
ctx->task_ctx_data = task_ctx_data;
task_ctx_data = NULL;
}
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ctx->lock, flags);
if (clone_ctx)
put_ctx(clone_ctx);
} else {
ctx = alloc_perf_context(pmu, task);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!ctx)
goto errout;
if (task_ctx_data) {
ctx->task_ctx_data = task_ctx_data;
task_ctx_data = NULL;
}
err = 0;
mutex_lock(&task->perf_event_mutex);
/*
* If it has already passed perf_event_exit_task().
* we must see PF_EXITING, it takes this mutex too.
*/
if (task->flags & PF_EXITING)
err = -ESRCH;
else if (task->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn])
err = -EAGAIN;
else {
get_ctx(ctx);
++ctx->pin_count;
rcu_assign_pointer(task->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn], ctx);
}
mutex_unlock(&task->perf_event_mutex);
if (unlikely(err)) {
put_ctx(ctx);
if (err == -EAGAIN)
goto retry;
goto errout;
}
}
kfree(task_ctx_data);
return ctx;
errout:
kfree(task_ctx_data);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 56,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_group_attach(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event *group_leader = event->group_leader, *pos;
lockdep_assert_held(&event->ctx->lock);
/*
* We can have double attach due to group movement in perf_event_open.
*/
if (event->attach_state & PERF_ATTACH_GROUP)
return;
event->attach_state |= PERF_ATTACH_GROUP;
if (group_leader == event)
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(group_leader->ctx != event->ctx);
group_leader->group_caps &= event->event_caps;
list_add_tail(&event->group_entry, &group_leader->sibling_list);
group_leader->nr_siblings++;
perf_event__header_size(group_leader);
list_for_each_entry(pos, &group_leader->sibling_list, group_entry)
perf_event__header_size(pos);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix the perf_cpu_time_max_percent check
Use "proc_dointvec_minmax" instead of "proc_dointvec" to check the input
value from user-space.
If not, we can set a big value and some vars will overflow like
"sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate" which will cause a lot of unexpected
problems.
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487829879-56237-1-git-send-email-tanxiaojun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 85,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mov_parse_vc1_frame(AVPacket *pkt, MOVTrack *trk)
{
const uint8_t *start, *next, *end = pkt->data + pkt->size;
int seq = 0, entry = 0;
int key = pkt->flags & AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY;
start = find_next_marker(pkt->data, end);
for (next = start; next < end; start = next) {
next = find_next_marker(start + 4, end);
switch (AV_RB32(start)) {
case VC1_CODE_SEQHDR:
seq = 1;
break;
case VC1_CODE_ENTRYPOINT:
entry = 1;
break;
case VC1_CODE_SLICE:
trk->vc1_info.slices = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!trk->entry && trk->vc1_info.first_packet_seen)
trk->vc1_info.first_frag_written = 1;
if (!trk->entry && !trk->vc1_info.first_frag_written) {
/* First packet in first fragment */
trk->vc1_info.first_packet_seq = seq;
trk->vc1_info.first_packet_entry = entry;
trk->vc1_info.first_packet_seen = 1;
} else if ((seq && !trk->vc1_info.packet_seq) ||
(entry && !trk->vc1_info.packet_entry)) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < trk->entry; i++)
trk->cluster[i].flags &= ~MOV_SYNC_SAMPLE;
trk->has_keyframes = 0;
if (seq)
trk->vc1_info.packet_seq = 1;
if (entry)
trk->vc1_info.packet_entry = 1;
if (!trk->vc1_info.first_frag_written) {
/* First fragment */
if ((!seq || trk->vc1_info.first_packet_seq) &&
(!entry || trk->vc1_info.first_packet_entry)) {
/* First packet had the same headers as this one, readd the
* sync sample flag. */
trk->cluster[0].flags |= MOV_SYNC_SAMPLE;
trk->has_keyframes = 1;
}
}
}
if (trk->vc1_info.packet_seq && trk->vc1_info.packet_entry)
key = seq && entry;
else if (trk->vc1_info.packet_seq)
key = seq;
else if (trk->vc1_info.packet_entry)
key = entry;
if (key) {
trk->cluster[trk->entry].flags |= MOV_SYNC_SAMPLE;
trk->has_keyframes++;
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 79,320
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int red_channel_is_connected(RedChannel *channel)
{
return channel && (channel->clients_num > 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: checkAdd64(uint64 summand1, uint64 summand2, T2P* t2p)
{
uint64 bytes = summand1 + summand2;
if (bytes < summand1) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE, "Integer overflow");
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
bytes = 0;
}
return bytes;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 48,332
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct hlist_bl_head *in_lookup_hash(const struct dentry *parent,
unsigned int hash)
{
hash += (unsigned long) parent / L1_CACHE_BYTES;
return in_lookup_hashtable + hash_32(hash, IN_LOOKUP_SHIFT);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 67,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnSameDocumentCommitProcessed(
int64_t navigation_id,
bool should_replace_current_entry,
blink::mojom::CommitResult result) {
if (!same_document_navigation_request_ ||
same_document_navigation_request_->navigation_handle()
->GetNavigationId() != navigation_id) {
return;
}
if (result == blink::mojom::CommitResult::RestartCrossDocument) {
frame_tree_node_->navigator()->RestartNavigationAsCrossDocument(
std::move(same_document_navigation_request_));
}
if (result == blink::mojom::CommitResult::Aborted) {
same_document_navigation_request_.reset();
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jpc_dec_tiledecode(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_dec_tile_t *tile)
{
int i;
int j;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
int compno;
int rlvlno;
int bandno;
int adjust;
int v;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
if (jpc_dec_decodecblks(dec, tile)) {
jas_eprintf("jpc_dec_decodecblks failed\n");
return -1;
}
/* Perform dequantization. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcomp->rlvls; rlvlno < tcomp->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
if (!rlvl->bands) {
continue;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands;
bandno < rlvl->numbands; ++bandno, ++band) {
if (!band->data) {
continue;
}
jpc_undo_roi(band->data, band->roishift, ccp->roishift -
band->roishift, band->numbps);
if (tile->realmode) {
jas_matrix_asl(band->data, JPC_FIX_FRACBITS);
jpc_dequantize(band->data, band->absstepsize);
}
}
}
}
/* Apply an inverse wavelet transform if necessary. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
jpc_tsfb_synthesize(tcomp->tsfb, tcomp->data);
}
/* Apply an inverse intercomponent transform if necessary. */
switch (tile->cp->mctid) {
case JPC_MCT_RCT:
if (dec->numcomps < 3) {
jas_eprintf("RCT requires at least three components\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_irct(tile->tcomps[0].data, tile->tcomps[1].data,
tile->tcomps[2].data);
break;
case JPC_MCT_ICT:
if (dec->numcomps < 3) {
jas_eprintf("ICT requires at least three components\n");
return -1;
}
jpc_iict(tile->tcomps[0].data, tile->tcomps[1].data,
tile->tcomps[2].data);
break;
}
/* Perform rounding and convert to integer values. */
if (tile->realmode) {
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps; compno < dec->numcomps;
++compno, ++tcomp) {
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(tcomp->data); ++j) {
v = jas_matrix_get(tcomp->data, i, j);
v = jpc_fix_round(v);
jas_matrix_set(tcomp->data, i, j, jpc_fixtoint(v));
}
}
}
}
/* Perform level shift. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
adjust = cmpt->sgnd ? 0 : (1 << (cmpt->prec - 1));
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(tcomp->data); ++j) {
*jas_matrix_getref(tcomp->data, i, j) += adjust;
}
}
}
/* Perform clipping. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
jpc_fix_t mn;
jpc_fix_t mx;
mn = cmpt->sgnd ? (-(1 << (cmpt->prec - 1))) : (0);
mx = cmpt->sgnd ? ((1 << (cmpt->prec - 1)) - 1) : ((1 <<
cmpt->prec) - 1);
jas_matrix_clip(tcomp->data, mn, mx);
}
/* XXX need to free tsfb struct */
/* Write the data for each component of the image. */
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
if (jas_image_writecmpt(dec->image, compno, tcomp->xstart -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep), tcomp->ystart -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep), jas_matrix_numcols(
tcomp->data), jas_matrix_numrows(tcomp->data), tcomp->data)) {
jas_eprintf("write component failed\n");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The component domains must be the same for the ICT/RCT in the JPC codec.
This was previously enforced with an assertion.
Now, it is handled in a more graceful manner.
CWE ID:
| 1
| 168,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int gfs2_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct gfs2_inode *ip = GFS2_I(file->f_mapping->host);
if (!(file->f_flags & O_NOATIME) &&
!IS_NOATIME(&ip->i_inode)) {
struct gfs2_holder i_gh;
int error;
gfs2_holder_init(ip->i_gl, LM_ST_SHARED, LM_FLAG_ANY, &i_gh);
error = gfs2_glock_nq(&i_gh);
if (error == 0) {
file_accessed(file);
gfs2_glock_dq(&i_gh);
}
gfs2_holder_uninit(&i_gh);
if (error)
return error;
}
vma->vm_ops = &gfs2_vm_ops;
vma->vm_flags |= VM_CAN_NONLINEAR;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 34,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HttpProxyClientSocketPoolSpdy2Test()
: session_deps_(kProtoSPDY2),
ssl_config_(),
ignored_transport_socket_params_(
new TransportSocketParams(HostPortPair("proxy", 80),
LOWEST,
false,
false,
OnHostResolutionCallback())),
ignored_ssl_socket_params_(
new SSLSocketParams(ignored_transport_socket_params_,
NULL,
NULL,
ProxyServer::SCHEME_DIRECT,
HostPortPair("www.google.com", 443),
ssl_config_,
0,
false,
false)),
tcp_histograms_("MockTCP"),
transport_socket_pool_(
kMaxSockets,
kMaxSocketsPerGroup,
&tcp_histograms_,
session_deps_.deterministic_socket_factory.get()),
ssl_histograms_("MockSSL"),
ssl_socket_pool_(kMaxSockets,
kMaxSocketsPerGroup,
&ssl_histograms_,
session_deps_.host_resolver.get(),
session_deps_.cert_verifier.get(),
NULL /* server_bound_cert_store */,
NULL /* transport_security_state */,
std::string() /* ssl_session_cache_shard */,
session_deps_.deterministic_socket_factory.get(),
&transport_socket_pool_,
NULL,
NULL,
session_deps_.ssl_config_service.get(),
BoundNetLog().net_log()),
session_(CreateNetworkSession()),
http_proxy_histograms_("HttpProxyUnitTest"),
spdy_util_(kProtoSPDY2),
ssl_data_(NULL),
data_(NULL),
pool_(kMaxSockets,
kMaxSocketsPerGroup,
&http_proxy_histograms_,
NULL,
&transport_socket_pool_,
&ssl_socket_pool_,
NULL) {
}
Commit Message: net: don't process truncated headers on HTTPS connections.
This change causes us to not process any headers unless they are correctly
terminated with a \r\n\r\n sequence.
BUG=244260
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15688012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202927 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,760
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::BlockNotifyReadyToActivateForTesting(bool block) {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ohci_read_hcca(OHCIState *ohci,
dma_addr_t addr, struct ohci_hcca *hcca)
{
return dma_memory_read(ohci->as, addr + ohci->localmem_base,
hcca, sizeof(*hcca));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *DestroyExceptionElement(void *exception)
{
register ExceptionInfo
*p;
p=(ExceptionInfo *) exception;
if (p->reason != (char *) NULL)
p->reason=DestroyString(p->reason);
if (p->description != (char *) NULL)
p->description=DestroyString(p->description);
p=(ExceptionInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(p);
return((void *) NULL);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::Reload() {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 148,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool imap_has_flag(struct ListHead *flag_list, const char *flag)
{
if (STAILQ_EMPTY(flag_list))
return false;
struct ListNode *np;
STAILQ_FOREACH(np, flag_list, entries)
{
if (mutt_str_strncasecmp(np->data, flag, strlen(np->data)) == 0)
return true;
if (mutt_str_strncmp(np->data, "\\*", strlen(np->data)) == 0)
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 79,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int cg_chown(const char *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
struct fuse_context *fc = fuse_get_context();
char *cgdir = NULL, *fpath = NULL, *path1, *path2, *controller;
struct cgfs_files *k = NULL;
const char *cgroup;
int ret;
if (!fc)
return -EIO;
if (strcmp(path, "/cgroup") == 0)
return -EINVAL;
controller = pick_controller_from_path(fc, path);
if (!controller)
return -EINVAL;
cgroup = find_cgroup_in_path(path);
if (!cgroup)
/* this is just /cgroup/controller */
return -EINVAL;
get_cgdir_and_path(cgroup, &cgdir, &fpath);
if (!fpath) {
path1 = "/";
path2 = cgdir;
} else {
path1 = cgdir;
path2 = fpath;
}
if (is_child_cgroup(controller, path1, path2)) {
k = cgfs_get_key(controller, cgroup, "tasks");
} else
k = cgfs_get_key(controller, path1, path2);
if (!k) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/*
* This being a fuse request, the uid and gid must be valid
* in the caller's namespace. So we can just check to make
* sure that the caller is root in his uid, and privileged
* over the file's current owner.
*/
if (!is_privileged_over(fc->pid, fc->uid, k->uid, NS_ROOT_REQD)) {
ret = -EACCES;
goto out;
}
ret = cgfs_chown_file(controller, cgroup, uid, gid);
out:
free_key(k);
free(cgdir);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Implement privilege check when moving tasks
When writing pids to a tasks file in lxcfs, lxcfs was checking
for privilege over the tasks file but not over the pid being
moved. Since the cgm_movepid request is done as root on the host,
not with the requestor's credentials, we must copy the check which
cgmanager was doing to ensure that the requesting task is allowed
to change the victim task's cgroup membership.
This is CVE-2015-1344
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxcfs/+bug/1512854
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 44,376
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ImageBitmap::isSourceSizeValid(int sourceWidth,
int sourceHeight,
ExceptionState& exceptionState) {
if (!sourceWidth || !sourceHeight) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(
IndexSizeError, String::format("The source %s provided is 0.",
sourceWidth ? "height" : "width"));
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 140,208
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hidp_sock_compat_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = compat_ptr(arg);
int err;
if (cmd == HIDPGETCONNLIST) {
struct hidp_connlist_req cl;
u32 __user *p = argp;
u32 uci;
if (get_user(cl.cnum, p) || get_user(uci, p + 1))
return -EFAULT;
cl.ci = compat_ptr(uci);
if (cl.cnum <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
err = hidp_get_connlist(&cl);
if (!err && put_user(cl.cnum, p))
err = -EFAULT;
return err;
} else if (cmd == HIDPCONNADD) {
struct compat_hidp_connadd_req ca32;
struct hidp_connadd_req ca;
struct socket *csock;
struct socket *isock;
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_user(&ca32, (void __user *) arg, sizeof(ca32)))
return -EFAULT;
ca.ctrl_sock = ca32.ctrl_sock;
ca.intr_sock = ca32.intr_sock;
ca.parser = ca32.parser;
ca.rd_size = ca32.rd_size;
ca.rd_data = compat_ptr(ca32.rd_data);
ca.country = ca32.country;
ca.subclass = ca32.subclass;
ca.vendor = ca32.vendor;
ca.product = ca32.product;
ca.version = ca32.version;
ca.flags = ca32.flags;
ca.idle_to = ca32.idle_to;
memcpy(ca.name, ca32.name, 128);
csock = sockfd_lookup(ca.ctrl_sock, &err);
if (!csock)
return err;
isock = sockfd_lookup(ca.intr_sock, &err);
if (!isock) {
sockfd_put(csock);
return err;
}
err = hidp_connection_add(&ca, csock, isock);
if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ca32, sizeof(ca32)))
err = -EFAULT;
sockfd_put(csock);
sockfd_put(isock);
return err;
}
return hidp_sock_ioctl(sock, cmd, arg);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-77
| 0
| 90,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
{
int err;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
int cpu;
if (!vmx)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
vmx->vpid = allocate_vpid();
err = kvm_vcpu_init(&vmx->vcpu, kvm, id);
if (err)
goto free_vcpu;
err = -ENOMEM;
/*
* If PML is turned on, failure on enabling PML just results in failure
* of creating the vcpu, therefore we can simplify PML logic (by
* avoiding dealing with cases, such as enabling PML partially on vcpus
* for the guest, etc.
*/
if (enable_pml) {
vmx->pml_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!vmx->pml_pg)
goto uninit_vcpu;
}
vmx->guest_msrs = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index) * sizeof(vmx->guest_msrs[0])
> PAGE_SIZE);
if (!vmx->guest_msrs)
goto free_pml;
vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs();
vmx->loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL;
if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
goto free_msrs;
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxon(__pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, raw_smp_processor_id())));
loaded_vmcs_init(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
if (!vmm_exclusive)
kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
cpu = get_cpu();
vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu);
vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu;
err = vmx_vcpu_setup(vmx);
vmx_vcpu_put(&vmx->vcpu);
put_cpu();
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
if (cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(&vmx->vcpu)) {
err = alloc_apic_access_page(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
if (enable_ept) {
if (!kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr)
kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr =
VMX_EPT_IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_ADDR;
err = init_rmode_identity_map(kvm);
if (err)
goto free_vmcs;
}
if (nested) {
nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(vmx);
vmx->nested.vpid02 = allocate_vpid();
}
vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
vmx->nested.current_vmcs12 = NULL;
vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED;
return &vmx->vcpu;
free_vmcs:
free_vpid(vmx->nested.vpid02);
free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
free_msrs:
kfree(vmx->guest_msrs);
free_pml:
vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
uninit_vcpu:
kvm_vcpu_uninit(&vmx->vcpu);
free_vcpu:
free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vmx);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 48,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int NavigationControllerImpl::GetEntryCount() const {
DCHECK_LE(entries_.size(), max_entry_count());
return static_cast<int>(entries_.size());
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int allocateBtreePage(
BtShared *pBt, /* The btree */
MemPage **ppPage, /* Store pointer to the allocated page here */
Pgno *pPgno, /* Store the page number here */
Pgno nearby, /* Search for a page near this one */
u8 eMode /* BTALLOC_EXACT, BTALLOC_LT, or BTALLOC_ANY */
){
MemPage *pPage1;
int rc;
u32 n; /* Number of pages on the freelist */
u32 k; /* Number of leaves on the trunk of the freelist */
MemPage *pTrunk = 0;
MemPage *pPrevTrunk = 0;
Pgno mxPage; /* Total size of the database file */
assert( sqlite3_mutex_held(pBt->mutex) );
assert( eMode==BTALLOC_ANY || (nearby>0 && IfNotOmitAV(pBt->autoVacuum)) );
pPage1 = pBt->pPage1;
mxPage = btreePagecount(pBt);
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-05119-02637 The 4-byte big-endian integer at offset 36
** stores stores the total number of pages on the freelist. */
n = get4byte(&pPage1->aData[36]);
testcase( n==mxPage-1 );
if( n>=mxPage ){
return SQLITE_CORRUPT_BKPT;
}
if( n>0 ){
/* There are pages on the freelist. Reuse one of those pages. */
Pgno iTrunk;
u8 searchList = 0; /* If the free-list must be searched for 'nearby' */
u32 nSearch = 0; /* Count of the number of search attempts */
/* If eMode==BTALLOC_EXACT and a query of the pointer-map
** shows that the page 'nearby' is somewhere on the free-list, then
** the entire-list will be searched for that page.
*/
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_AUTOVACUUM
if( eMode==BTALLOC_EXACT ){
if( nearby<=mxPage ){
u8 eType;
assert( nearby>0 );
assert( pBt->autoVacuum );
rc = ptrmapGet(pBt, nearby, &eType, 0);
if( rc ) return rc;
if( eType==PTRMAP_FREEPAGE ){
searchList = 1;
}
}
}else if( eMode==BTALLOC_LE ){
searchList = 1;
}
#endif
/* Decrement the free-list count by 1. Set iTrunk to the index of the
** first free-list trunk page. iPrevTrunk is initially 1.
*/
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pPage1->pDbPage);
if( rc ) return rc;
put4byte(&pPage1->aData[36], n-1);
/* The code within this loop is run only once if the 'searchList' variable
** is not true. Otherwise, it runs once for each trunk-page on the
** free-list until the page 'nearby' is located (eMode==BTALLOC_EXACT)
** or until a page less than 'nearby' is located (eMode==BTALLOC_LT)
*/
do {
pPrevTrunk = pTrunk;
if( pPrevTrunk ){
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-01506-11053 The first integer on a freelist trunk page
** is the page number of the next freelist trunk page in the list or
** zero if this is the last freelist trunk page. */
iTrunk = get4byte(&pPrevTrunk->aData[0]);
}else{
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-59841-13798 The 4-byte big-endian integer at offset 32
** stores the page number of the first page of the freelist, or zero if
** the freelist is empty. */
iTrunk = get4byte(&pPage1->aData[32]);
}
testcase( iTrunk==mxPage );
if( iTrunk>mxPage || nSearch++ > n ){
rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_PGNO(pPrevTrunk ? pPrevTrunk->pgno : 1);
}else{
rc = btreeGetUnusedPage(pBt, iTrunk, &pTrunk, 0);
}
if( rc ){
pTrunk = 0;
goto end_allocate_page;
}
assert( pTrunk!=0 );
assert( pTrunk->aData!=0 );
/* EVIDENCE-OF: R-13523-04394 The second integer on a freelist trunk page
** is the number of leaf page pointers to follow. */
k = get4byte(&pTrunk->aData[4]);
if( k==0 && !searchList ){
/* The trunk has no leaves and the list is not being searched.
** So extract the trunk page itself and use it as the newly
** allocated page */
assert( pPrevTrunk==0 );
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pTrunk->pDbPage);
if( rc ){
goto end_allocate_page;
}
*pPgno = iTrunk;
memcpy(&pPage1->aData[32], &pTrunk->aData[0], 4);
*ppPage = pTrunk;
pTrunk = 0;
TRACE(("ALLOCATE: %d trunk - %d free pages left\n", *pPgno, n-1));
}else if( k>(u32)(pBt->usableSize/4 - 2) ){
/* Value of k is out of range. Database corruption */
rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_PGNO(iTrunk);
goto end_allocate_page;
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_AUTOVACUUM
}else if( searchList
&& (nearby==iTrunk || (iTrunk<nearby && eMode==BTALLOC_LE))
){
/* The list is being searched and this trunk page is the page
** to allocate, regardless of whether it has leaves.
*/
*pPgno = iTrunk;
*ppPage = pTrunk;
searchList = 0;
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pTrunk->pDbPage);
if( rc ){
goto end_allocate_page;
}
if( k==0 ){
if( !pPrevTrunk ){
memcpy(&pPage1->aData[32], &pTrunk->aData[0], 4);
}else{
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pPrevTrunk->pDbPage);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
goto end_allocate_page;
}
memcpy(&pPrevTrunk->aData[0], &pTrunk->aData[0], 4);
}
}else{
/* The trunk page is required by the caller but it contains
** pointers to free-list leaves. The first leaf becomes a trunk
** page in this case.
*/
MemPage *pNewTrunk;
Pgno iNewTrunk = get4byte(&pTrunk->aData[8]);
if( iNewTrunk>mxPage ){
rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_PGNO(iTrunk);
goto end_allocate_page;
}
testcase( iNewTrunk==mxPage );
rc = btreeGetUnusedPage(pBt, iNewTrunk, &pNewTrunk, 0);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
goto end_allocate_page;
}
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pNewTrunk->pDbPage);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
releasePage(pNewTrunk);
goto end_allocate_page;
}
memcpy(&pNewTrunk->aData[0], &pTrunk->aData[0], 4);
put4byte(&pNewTrunk->aData[4], k-1);
memcpy(&pNewTrunk->aData[8], &pTrunk->aData[12], (k-1)*4);
releasePage(pNewTrunk);
if( !pPrevTrunk ){
assert( sqlite3PagerIswriteable(pPage1->pDbPage) );
put4byte(&pPage1->aData[32], iNewTrunk);
}else{
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pPrevTrunk->pDbPage);
if( rc ){
goto end_allocate_page;
}
put4byte(&pPrevTrunk->aData[0], iNewTrunk);
}
}
pTrunk = 0;
TRACE(("ALLOCATE: %d trunk - %d free pages left\n", *pPgno, n-1));
#endif
}else if( k>0 ){
/* Extract a leaf from the trunk */
u32 closest;
Pgno iPage;
unsigned char *aData = pTrunk->aData;
if( nearby>0 ){
u32 i;
closest = 0;
if( eMode==BTALLOC_LE ){
for(i=0; i<k; i++){
iPage = get4byte(&aData[8+i*4]);
if( iPage<=nearby ){
closest = i;
break;
}
}
}else{
int dist;
dist = sqlite3AbsInt32(get4byte(&aData[8]) - nearby);
for(i=1; i<k; i++){
int d2 = sqlite3AbsInt32(get4byte(&aData[8+i*4]) - nearby);
if( d2<dist ){
closest = i;
dist = d2;
}
}
}
}else{
closest = 0;
}
iPage = get4byte(&aData[8+closest*4]);
testcase( iPage==mxPage );
if( iPage>mxPage ){
rc = SQLITE_CORRUPT_PGNO(iTrunk);
goto end_allocate_page;
}
testcase( iPage==mxPage );
if( !searchList
|| (iPage==nearby || (iPage<nearby && eMode==BTALLOC_LE))
){
int noContent;
*pPgno = iPage;
TRACE(("ALLOCATE: %d was leaf %d of %d on trunk %d"
": %d more free pages\n",
*pPgno, closest+1, k, pTrunk->pgno, n-1));
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pTrunk->pDbPage);
if( rc ) goto end_allocate_page;
if( closest<k-1 ){
memcpy(&aData[8+closest*4], &aData[4+k*4], 4);
}
put4byte(&aData[4], k-1);
noContent = !btreeGetHasContent(pBt, *pPgno)? PAGER_GET_NOCONTENT : 0;
rc = btreeGetUnusedPage(pBt, *pPgno, ppPage, noContent);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite((*ppPage)->pDbPage);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
releasePage(*ppPage);
*ppPage = 0;
}
}
searchList = 0;
}
}
releasePage(pPrevTrunk);
pPrevTrunk = 0;
}while( searchList );
}else{
/* There are no pages on the freelist, so append a new page to the
** database image.
**
** Normally, new pages allocated by this block can be requested from the
** pager layer with the 'no-content' flag set. This prevents the pager
** from trying to read the pages content from disk. However, if the
** current transaction has already run one or more incremental-vacuum
** steps, then the page we are about to allocate may contain content
** that is required in the event of a rollback. In this case, do
** not set the no-content flag. This causes the pager to load and journal
** the current page content before overwriting it.
**
** Note that the pager will not actually attempt to load or journal
** content for any page that really does lie past the end of the database
** file on disk. So the effects of disabling the no-content optimization
** here are confined to those pages that lie between the end of the
** database image and the end of the database file.
*/
int bNoContent = (0==IfNotOmitAV(pBt->bDoTruncate))? PAGER_GET_NOCONTENT:0;
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pBt->pPage1->pDbPage);
if( rc ) return rc;
pBt->nPage++;
if( pBt->nPage==PENDING_BYTE_PAGE(pBt) ) pBt->nPage++;
#ifndef SQLITE_OMIT_AUTOVACUUM
if( pBt->autoVacuum && PTRMAP_ISPAGE(pBt, pBt->nPage) ){
/* If *pPgno refers to a pointer-map page, allocate two new pages
** at the end of the file instead of one. The first allocated page
** becomes a new pointer-map page, the second is used by the caller.
*/
MemPage *pPg = 0;
TRACE(("ALLOCATE: %d from end of file (pointer-map page)\n", pBt->nPage));
assert( pBt->nPage!=PENDING_BYTE_PAGE(pBt) );
rc = btreeGetUnusedPage(pBt, pBt->nPage, &pPg, bNoContent);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite(pPg->pDbPage);
releasePage(pPg);
}
if( rc ) return rc;
pBt->nPage++;
if( pBt->nPage==PENDING_BYTE_PAGE(pBt) ){ pBt->nPage++; }
}
#endif
put4byte(28 + (u8*)pBt->pPage1->aData, pBt->nPage);
*pPgno = pBt->nPage;
assert( *pPgno!=PENDING_BYTE_PAGE(pBt) );
rc = btreeGetUnusedPage(pBt, *pPgno, ppPage, bNoContent);
if( rc ) return rc;
rc = sqlite3PagerWrite((*ppPage)->pDbPage);
if( rc!=SQLITE_OK ){
releasePage(*ppPage);
*ppPage = 0;
}
TRACE(("ALLOCATE: %d from end of file\n", *pPgno));
}
assert( CORRUPT_DB || *pPgno!=PENDING_BYTE_PAGE(pBt) );
end_allocate_page:
releasePage(pTrunk);
releasePage(pPrevTrunk);
assert( rc!=SQLITE_OK || sqlite3PagerPageRefcount((*ppPage)->pDbPage)<=1 );
assert( rc!=SQLITE_OK || (*ppPage)->isInit==0 );
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 151,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabsCaptureVisibleTabFunction::SendResultFromBitmap(
const SkBitmap& screen_capture) {
std::vector<unsigned char> data;
SkAutoLockPixels screen_capture_lock(screen_capture);
bool encoded = false;
std::string mime_type;
switch (image_format_) {
case FORMAT_JPEG:
encoded = gfx::JPEGCodec::Encode(
reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(screen_capture.getAddr32(0, 0)),
gfx::JPEGCodec::FORMAT_SkBitmap,
screen_capture.width(),
screen_capture.height(),
static_cast<int>(screen_capture.rowBytes()),
image_quality_,
&data);
mime_type = keys::kMimeTypeJpeg;
break;
case FORMAT_PNG:
encoded = gfx::PNGCodec::EncodeBGRASkBitmap(
screen_capture,
true, // Discard transparency.
&data);
mime_type = keys::kMimeTypePng;
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Invalid image format.";
}
if (!encoded) {
error_ = keys::kInternalVisibleTabCaptureError;
SendResponse(false);
return;
}
std::string base64_result;
base::StringPiece stream_as_string(
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(vector_as_array(&data)), data.size());
base::Base64Encode(stream_as_string, &base64_result);
base64_result.insert(0, base::StringPrintf("data:%s;base64,",
mime_type.c_str()));
SetResult(new StringValue(base64_result));
SendResponse(true);
}
Commit Message: Don't allow extensions to take screenshots of interstitial pages. Branched from
https://codereview.chromium.org/14885004/ which is trying to test it.
BUG=229504
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14954004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@198297 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutSize Element::minimumSizeForResizing() const
{
return hasRareData() ? elementRareData()->minimumSizeForResizing() : defaultMinimumSizeForResizing();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool vmx_rdtscp_supported(void)
{
return cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp();
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,279
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPNGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging,
status;
MngInfo
*mng_info;
char
magic_number[MagickPathExtent];
ssize_t
count;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Enter ReadPNGImage()");
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
mng_info=(MngInfo *) NULL;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile");
/*
Verify PNG signature.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (count < 8 || memcmp(magic_number,"\211PNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/*
Verify that file size large enough to contain a PNG datastream.
*/
if (GetBlobSize(image) < 61)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
/*
Allocate a MngInfo structure.
*/
mng_info=(MngInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(MngInfo));
if (mng_info == (MngInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize members of the MngInfo structure.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(mng_info,0,sizeof(MngInfo));
mng_info->image=image;
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
mng_info=MngInfoFreeStruct(mng_info);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadPNGImage() with error.");
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
if ((IssRGBColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
((image->gamma < .45) || (image->gamma > .46)) &&
!(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x>0.6399f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x<0.6401f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y>0.3299f &&
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y<0.3301f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x>0.2999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x<0.3001f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y>0.5999f &&
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y<0.6001f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x>0.1499f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x<0.1501f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y>0.0599f &&
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y<0.0601f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x>0.3126f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.x<0.3128f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y>0.3289f &&
image->chromaticity.white_point.y<0.3291f))
{
SetImageColorspace(image,RGBColorspace,exception);
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" page.w: %.20g, page.h: %.20g,page.x: %.20g, page.y: %.20g.",
(double) image->page.width,(double) image->page.height,
(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->colorspace: %d", (int) image->colorspace);
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"exit ReadPNGImage()");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/58
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 63,307
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLint WebGLRenderingContextBase::GetMaxTextureLevelForTarget(GLenum target) {
switch (target) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
return max_texture_level_;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_X:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_X:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_Y:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_Y:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_Z:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_Z:
return max_cube_map_texture_level_;
case GL_TEXTURE_VIDEO_IMAGE_WEBGL:
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 142,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOL CSoundFile::SetResamplingMode(UINT nMode)
{
DWORD d = gdwSoundSetup & ~(SNDMIX_NORESAMPLING|SNDMIX_HQRESAMPLER|SNDMIX_ULTRAHQSRCMODE);
switch(nMode)
{
case SRCMODE_NEAREST: d |= SNDMIX_NORESAMPLING; break;
case SRCMODE_LINEAR: break;
case SRCMODE_SPLINE: d |= SNDMIX_HQRESAMPLER; break;
case SRCMODE_POLYPHASE: d |= (SNDMIX_HQRESAMPLER|SNDMIX_ULTRAHQSRCMODE); break;
default:
return FALSE;
}
gdwSoundSetup = d;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OfflinePageDownloadBridge::OfflinePageDownloadBridge(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj)
: weak_java_ref_(env, obj) {}
Commit Message: Open Offline Pages in CCT from Downloads Home.
When the respective feature flag is enabled, offline pages opened from
the Downloads Home will use CCT instead of normal tabs.
Bug: 824807
Change-Id: I6d968b8b0c51aaeb7f26332c7ada9f927e151a65
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/977321
Commit-Queue: Carlos Knippschild <carlosk@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernhard Bauer <bauerb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#546545}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 124,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned zero_mmap_capabilities(struct file *file)
{
return NOMMU_MAP_COPY;
}
Commit Message: mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 66,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::UpdateBookmarkBarState(BookmarkBarStateChangeReason reason) {
tracked_objects::ScopedTracker tracking_profile1(
FROM_HERE_WITH_EXPLICIT_FUNCTION(
"467185 Browser::UpdateBookmarkBarState1"));
BookmarkBar::State state;
if (profile_->IsGuestSession()) {
state = BookmarkBar::HIDDEN;
} else if (browser_defaults::bookmarks_enabled &&
profile_->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(bookmarks::prefs::kShowBookmarkBar) &&
!ShouldHideUIForFullscreen()) {
state = BookmarkBar::SHOW;
} else {
tracked_objects::ScopedTracker tracking_profile2(
FROM_HERE_WITH_EXPLICIT_FUNCTION(
"467185 Browser::UpdateBookmarkBarState2"));
WebContents* web_contents = tab_strip_model_->GetActiveWebContents();
BookmarkTabHelper* bookmark_tab_helper =
web_contents ? BookmarkTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents) : NULL;
if (bookmark_tab_helper && bookmark_tab_helper->ShouldShowBookmarkBar())
state = BookmarkBar::DETACHED;
else
state = BookmarkBar::HIDDEN;
}
if (state == bookmark_bar_state_)
return;
bookmark_bar_state_ = state;
if (!window_)
return; // This is called from the constructor when window_ is NULL.
if (reason == BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_TAB_SWITCH) {
return;
}
tracked_objects::ScopedTracker tracking_profile3(
FROM_HERE_WITH_EXPLICIT_FUNCTION(
"467185 Browser::UpdateBookmarkBarState3"));
bool should_animate = reason == BOOKMARK_BAR_STATE_CHANGE_PREF_CHANGE;
window_->BookmarkBarStateChanged(should_animate ?
BookmarkBar::ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE :
BookmarkBar::DONT_ANIMATE_STATE_CHANGE);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 139,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Extension::FormatPEMForFileOutput(const std::string& input,
std::string* output,
bool is_public) {
CHECK(output);
if (input.length() == 0)
return false;
*output = "";
output->append(kKeyBeginHeaderMarker);
output->append(" ");
output->append(is_public ? kPublic : kPrivate);
output->append(" ");
output->append(kKeyInfoEndMarker);
output->append("\n");
for (size_t i = 0; i < input.length(); ) {
int slice = std::min<int>(input.length() - i, kPEMOutputColumns);
output->append(input.substr(i, slice));
output->append("\n");
i += slice;
}
output->append(kKeyBeginFooterMarker);
output->append(" ");
output->append(is_public ? kPublic : kPrivate);
output->append(" ");
output->append(kKeyInfoEndMarker);
output->append("\n");
return true;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 99,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool readUCharString(v8::Handle<v8::Value>* value)
{
uint32_t length;
if (!doReadUint32(&length) || (length & 1))
return false;
if (m_position + length > m_length)
return false;
ASSERT(!(m_position & 1));
*value = v8::String::NewFromTwoByte(isolate(), reinterpret_cast<const uint16_t*>(m_buffer + m_position), v8::String::kNormalString, length / sizeof(UChar));
m_position += length;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~WindowedPersonalDataManagerObserver() {
if (!infobar_service_)
return;
InfoBarDelegate* infobar = NULL;
if (infobar_service_->GetInfoBarCount() > 0 &&
(infobar = infobar_service_->GetInfoBarDelegateAt(0))) {
infobar_service_->RemoveInfoBar(infobar);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix OS_MACOS typos. Should be OS_MACOSX.
BUG=163208
TEST=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12829005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@189130 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 118,741
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gs_malloc_memory_init(void)
{
gs_malloc_memory_t *mem =
(gs_malloc_memory_t *)Memento_label(malloc(sizeof(gs_malloc_memory_t)), "gs_malloc_memory_t");
if (mem == NULL)
return NULL;
mem->stable_memory = 0; /* just for tidyness, never referenced */
mem->procs = gs_malloc_memory_procs;
mem->allocated = 0;
mem->limit = max_long;
mem->used = 0;
mem->max_used = 0;
mem->gs_lib_ctx = 0;
mem->non_gc_memory = (gs_memory_t *)mem;
mem->thread_safe_memory = (gs_memory_t *)mem; /* this allocator is thread safe */
/* Allocate a monitor to serialize access to structures within */
mem->monitor = NULL; /* prevent use during initial allocation */
mem->monitor = gx_monitor_alloc((gs_memory_t *)mem);
return mem;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 3,553
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PSIR_FileWriter::DeleteExistingInfo()
{
XMP_Assert ( ! (this->memParsed && this->fileParsed) );
if ( this->memParsed ) {
if ( this->ownedContent ) free ( this->memContent );
} else if ( this->fileParsed ) {
InternalRsrcMap::iterator irPos = this->imgRsrcs.begin();
InternalRsrcMap::iterator irEnd = this->imgRsrcs.end();
for ( ; irPos != irEnd; ++irPos ) irPos->second.changed = true; // Fool the InternalRsrcInfo destructor.
}
this->imgRsrcs.clear();
this->memContent = 0;
this->memLength = 0;
this->changed = false;
this->legacyDeleted = false;
this->memParsed = false;
this->fileParsed = false;
this->ownedContent = false;
} // PSIR_FileWriter::DeleteExistingInfo
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 9,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PushMessagingServiceImpl::OnStoreReset() {
for (const auto& identifier : PushMessagingAppIdentifier::GetAll(profile_)) {
RecordUnsubscribeReason(
content::mojom::PushUnregistrationReason::GCM_STORE_RESET);
ClearPushSubscriptionId(profile_, identifier.origin(),
identifier.service_worker_registration_id(),
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing));
}
PushMessagingAppIdentifier::DeleteAllFromPrefs(profile_);
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 150,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PanelSettingsMenuModel::ExtensionUninstallAccepted() {
const Extension* extension = panel_->GetExtension();
DCHECK(extension);
panel_->browser()->GetProfile()->GetExtensionService()->
UninstallExtension(extension->id(), false, NULL);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 107,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t aac_show_vendor(struct device *device,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct aac_dev *dev = (struct aac_dev*)class_to_shost(device)->hostdata;
int len;
if (dev->supplement_adapter_info.AdapterTypeText[0]) {
char * cp = dev->supplement_adapter_info.AdapterTypeText;
while (*cp && *cp != ' ')
++cp;
len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%.*s\n",
(int)(cp - (char *)dev->supplement_adapter_info.AdapterTypeText),
dev->supplement_adapter_info.AdapterTypeText);
} else
len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",
aac_drivers[dev->cardtype].vname);
return len;
}
Commit Message: aacraid: missing capable() check in compat ioctl
In commit d496f94d22d1 ('[SCSI] aacraid: fix security weakness') we
added a check on CAP_SYS_RAWIO to the ioctl. The compat ioctls need the
check as well.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void virtio_gpu_gl_block(void *opaque, bool block)
{
VirtIOGPU *g = opaque;
if (block) {
g->renderer_blocked++;
} else {
g->renderer_blocked--;
}
assert(g->renderer_blocked >= 0);
if (g->renderer_blocked == 0) {
virtio_gpu_process_cmdq(g);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 6,246
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: format_CT_CLEAR(const struct ofpact_null *a OVS_UNUSED, struct ds *s)
{
ds_put_format(s, "%sct_clear%s", colors.value, colors.end);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 76,919
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebPreferences WebContentsImpl::GetWebkitPrefs(RenderViewHost* rvh,
const GURL& url) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser", "WebContentsImpl::GetWebkitPrefs");
WebPreferences prefs;
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
prefs.javascript_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableJavaScript);
prefs.web_security_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableWebSecurity);
prefs.plugins_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisablePlugins);
prefs.java_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableJava);
prefs.remote_fonts_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableRemoteFonts);
prefs.xss_auditor_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableXSSAuditor);
prefs.application_cache_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableApplicationCache);
prefs.local_storage_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableLocalStorage);
prefs.databases_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableDatabases);
prefs.webaudio_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableWebAudio);
prefs.experimental_webgl_enabled =
GpuProcessHost::gpu_enabled() &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisable3DAPIs) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableExperimentalWebGL);
prefs.flash_3d_enabled =
GpuProcessHost::gpu_enabled() &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableFlash3d);
prefs.flash_stage3d_enabled =
GpuProcessHost::gpu_enabled() &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableFlashStage3d);
prefs.flash_stage3d_baseline_enabled =
GpuProcessHost::gpu_enabled() &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableFlashStage3d);
prefs.gl_multisampling_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGLMultisampling);
prefs.privileged_webgl_extensions_enabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnablePrivilegedWebGLExtensions);
prefs.site_specific_quirks_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSiteSpecificQuirks);
prefs.allow_file_access_from_file_urls =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowFileAccessFromFiles);
prefs.accelerated_compositing_for_overflow_scroll_enabled = false;
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAcceleratedOverflowScroll))
prefs.accelerated_compositing_for_overflow_scroll_enabled = true;
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedOverflowScroll))
prefs.accelerated_compositing_for_overflow_scroll_enabled = false;
prefs.accelerated_compositing_for_scrollable_frames_enabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAcceleratedScrollableFrames);
prefs.composited_scrolling_for_frames_enabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableCompositedScrollingForFrames);
prefs.show_paint_rects =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kShowPaintRects);
prefs.accelerated_compositing_enabled =
GpuProcessHost::gpu_enabled() &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedCompositing);
prefs.force_compositing_mode =
content::IsForceCompositingModeEnabled() &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableForceCompositingMode);
prefs.accelerated_2d_canvas_enabled =
GpuProcessHost::gpu_enabled() &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAccelerated2dCanvas);
prefs.antialiased_2d_canvas_disabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisable2dCanvasAntialiasing);
prefs.accelerated_filters_enabled =
GpuProcessHost::gpu_enabled() &&
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAcceleratedFilters);
prefs.accelerated_compositing_for_3d_transforms_enabled =
prefs.accelerated_compositing_for_animation_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedLayers);
prefs.accelerated_compositing_for_plugins_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedPlugins);
prefs.accelerated_compositing_for_video_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableAcceleratedVideo);
prefs.fullscreen_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableFullScreen);
prefs.css_sticky_position_enabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures);
prefs.css_shaders_enabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableCssShaders);
prefs.lazy_layout_enabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableExperimentalWebPlatformFeatures);
prefs.region_based_columns_enabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableRegionBasedColumns);
prefs.threaded_html_parser =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableThreadedHTMLParser);
prefs.experimental_websocket_enabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableExperimentalWebSocket);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(cc::switches::kEnablePinchVirtualViewport)) {
prefs.pinch_virtual_viewport_enabled = true;
prefs.pinch_overlay_scrollbar_thickness = 10;
}
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
prefs.use_solid_color_scrollbars = true;
prefs.user_gesture_required_for_media_playback = !command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableGestureRequirementForMediaPlayback);
prefs.user_gesture_required_for_media_fullscreen = !command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableGestureRequirementForMediaFullscreen);
#endif
prefs.touch_enabled = ui::AreTouchEventsEnabled();
prefs.device_supports_touch = prefs.touch_enabled &&
ui::IsTouchDevicePresent();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
prefs.device_supports_mouse = false;
#endif
prefs.touch_adjustment_enabled =
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableTouchAdjustment);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
bool default_enable_scroll_animator = true;
#else
bool default_enable_scroll_animator = false;
#endif
prefs.enable_scroll_animator = default_enable_scroll_animator;
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSmoothScrolling))
prefs.enable_scroll_animator = true;
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableSmoothScrolling))
prefs.enable_scroll_animator = false;
prefs.visual_word_movement_enabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableVisualWordMovement);
GpuDataManagerImpl::GetInstance()->UpdateRendererWebPrefs(&prefs);
if (ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->HasWebUIBindings(
rvh->GetProcess()->GetID())) {
prefs.loads_images_automatically = true;
prefs.javascript_enabled = true;
}
prefs.is_online = !net::NetworkChangeNotifier::IsOffline();
#if !defined(USE_AURA)
if ((url.SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme) ||
(url.SchemeIs(chrome::kAboutScheme) &&
url.spec() != kAboutBlankURL)) &&
!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kAllowWebUICompositing)) {
prefs.accelerated_compositing_enabled = false;
prefs.accelerated_2d_canvas_enabled = false;
}
#endif
prefs.fixed_position_creates_stacking_context = !command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableFixedPositionCreatesStackingContext);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
prefs.gesture_tap_highlight_enabled = !command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableGestureTapHighlight);
#else
prefs.gesture_tap_highlight_enabled = command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableGestureTapHighlight);
#endif
prefs.number_of_cpu_cores = base::SysInfo::NumberOfProcessors();
prefs.viewport_enabled = command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableViewport);
prefs.deferred_image_decoding_enabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDeferredImageDecoding) ||
cc::switches::IsImplSidePaintingEnabled();
prefs.spatial_navigation_enabled = command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableSpatialNavigation);
GetContentClient()->browser()->OverrideWebkitPrefs(rvh, url, &prefs);
bool guest_compositing_enabled = !command_line.HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableBrowserPluginCompositing);
if (rvh->GetProcess()->IsGuest() && !guest_compositing_enabled) {
prefs.force_compositing_mode = false;
prefs.accelerated_compositing_enabled = false;
}
return prefs;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::NotifyFrameSwapped(RenderFrameHost* old_host,
RenderFrameHost* new_host) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.RenderFrameHostChanged(old_host, new_host);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: write_to_temp(struct archive_write *a, const void *buff, size_t s)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660 = a->format_data;
ssize_t written;
const unsigned char *b;
b = (const unsigned char *)buff;
while (s) {
written = write(iso9660->temp_fd, b, s);
if (written < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
"Can't write to temporary file");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
s -= written;
b += written;
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool client_proto(SBuf *sbuf, SBufEvent evtype, struct MBuf *data)
{
bool res = false;
PgSocket *client = container_of(sbuf, PgSocket, sbuf);
PktHdr pkt;
Assert(!is_server_socket(client));
Assert(client->sbuf.sock);
Assert(client->state != CL_FREE);
/* may happen if close failed */
if (client->state == CL_JUSTFREE)
return false;
switch (evtype) {
case SBUF_EV_CONNECT_OK:
case SBUF_EV_CONNECT_FAILED:
/* ^ those should not happen */
case SBUF_EV_RECV_FAILED:
disconnect_client(client, false, "client unexpected eof");
break;
case SBUF_EV_SEND_FAILED:
disconnect_server(client->link, false, "Server connection closed");
break;
case SBUF_EV_READ:
/* Wait until full packet headers is available. */
if (incomplete_header(data)) {
slog_noise(client, "C: got partial header, trying to wait a bit");
return false;
}
if (!get_header(data, &pkt)) {
char hex[8*2 + 1];
disconnect_client(client, true, "bad packet header: '%s'",
hdr2hex(data, hex, sizeof(hex)));
return false;
}
slog_noise(client, "pkt='%c' len=%d", pkt_desc(&pkt), pkt.len);
client->request_time = get_cached_time();
switch (client->state) {
case CL_LOGIN:
res = handle_client_startup(client, &pkt);
break;
case CL_ACTIVE:
if (client->wait_for_welcome)
res = handle_client_startup(client, &pkt);
else
res = handle_client_work(client, &pkt);
break;
case CL_WAITING:
fatal("why waiting client in client_proto()");
default:
fatal("bad client state: %d", client->state);
}
break;
case SBUF_EV_FLUSH:
/* client is not interested in it */
break;
case SBUF_EV_PKT_CALLBACK:
/* unused ATM */
break;
case SBUF_EV_TLS_READY:
sbuf_continue(&client->sbuf);
res = true;
break;
}
return res;
}
Commit Message: Remove too early set of auth_user
When query returns 0 rows (user not found),
this user stays as login user...
Should fix #69.
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 74,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parse_one_option(const char *option)
{
if (skip_prefix(option, "max-pack-size=", &option)) {
unsigned long v;
if (!git_parse_ulong(option, &v))
return 0;
if (v < 8192) {
warning("max-pack-size is now in bytes, assuming --max-pack-size=%lum", v);
v *= 1024 * 1024;
} else if (v < 1024 * 1024) {
warning("minimum max-pack-size is 1 MiB");
v = 1024 * 1024;
}
max_packsize = v;
} else if (skip_prefix(option, "big-file-threshold=", &option)) {
unsigned long v;
if (!git_parse_ulong(option, &v))
return 0;
big_file_threshold = v;
} else if (skip_prefix(option, "depth=", &option)) {
option_depth(option);
} else if (skip_prefix(option, "active-branches=", &option)) {
option_active_branches(option);
} else if (skip_prefix(option, "export-pack-edges=", &option)) {
option_export_pack_edges(option);
} else if (starts_with(option, "quiet")) {
show_stats = 0;
} else if (starts_with(option, "stats")) {
show_stats = 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jpc_enc_tile_destroy(jpc_enc_tile_t *tile)
{
jpc_enc_tcmpt_t *tcmpt;
uint_fast16_t cmptno;
if (tile->tcmpts) {
for (cmptno = 0, tcmpt = tile->tcmpts; cmptno <
tile->numtcmpts; ++cmptno, ++tcmpt) {
tcmpt_destroy(tcmpt);
}
jas_free(tile->tcmpts);
}
if (tile->lyrsizes) {
jas_free(tile->lyrsizes);
}
if (tile->pi) {
jpc_pi_destroy(tile->pi);
}
jas_free(tile);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<HTMLCollection> ContainerNode::children()
{
return ensureRareData()->ensureNodeLists()->addCacheWithAtomicName<HTMLCollection>(this, NodeChildren);
}
Commit Message: Notify nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event
This patch changes notifying nodes removal to Range/Selection after dispatching blur and mutation event. In willRemoveChildren(), like willRemoveChild(); r115686 did same change, although it didn't change willRemoveChildren().
The issue 295010, use-after-free, is caused by setting removed node to Selection in mutation event handler.
BUG=295010
TEST=LayoutTests/fast/dom/Range/range-created-during-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-mutation-event-by-remove-children.html, LayoutTests/editing/selection/selection-change-in-blur-event-by-remove-children.html
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25389004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 110,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SocketStream::DidReceiveData(int result) {
DCHECK(read_buf_.get());
DCHECK_GT(result, 0);
net_log_.AddEvent(NetLog::TYPE_SOCKET_STREAM_RECEIVED);
int len = result;
metrics_->OnRead(len);
if (delegate_) {
delegate_->OnReceivedData(this, read_buf_->data(), len);
}
read_buf_ = NULL;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,670
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __kprobes do_translation_fault(unsigned long addr,
unsigned int esr,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (addr < TASK_SIZE)
return do_page_fault(addr, esr, regs);
do_bad_area(addr, esr, regs);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"
This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.
While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 58,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: intel_get_event_constraints(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc, struct perf_event *event)
{
struct event_constraint *c;
c = intel_bts_constraints(event);
if (c)
return c;
c = intel_pebs_constraints(event);
if (c)
return c;
c = intel_shared_regs_constraints(cpuc, event);
if (c)
return c;
return x86_get_event_constraints(cpuc, event);
}
Commit Message: perf/x86: Fix offcore_rsp valid mask for SNB/IVB
The valid mask for both offcore_response_0 and
offcore_response_1 was wrong for SNB/SNB-EP,
IVB/IVB-EP. It was possible to write to
reserved bit and cause a GP fault crashing
the kernel.
This patch fixes the problem by correctly marking the
reserved bits in the valid mask for all the processors
mentioned above.
A distinction between desktop and server parts is introduced
because bits 24-30 are only available on the server parts.
This version of the patch is just a rebase to perf/urgent tree
and should apply to older kernels as well.
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: jolsa@redhat.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 31,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CStarter::ShutdownGraceful( void )
{
bool jobRunning = false;
UserProc *job;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "ShutdownGraceful all jobs.\n");
if ( this->deferral_tid != -1 ) {
this->removeDeferredJobs();
}
m_job_list.Rewind();
while ((job = m_job_list.Next()) != NULL) {
if ( job->ShutdownGraceful() ) {
m_job_list.DeleteCurrent();
delete job;
} else {
jobRunning = true;
}
}
ShuttingDown = TRUE;
if (!jobRunning) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,
"Got ShutdownGraceful when no jobs running.\n");
this->allJobsDone();
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int fanout_demux_rollover(struct packet_fanout *f,
struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int idx, unsigned int skip,
unsigned int num)
{
unsigned int i, j;
i = j = min_t(int, f->next[idx], num - 1);
do {
if (i != skip && packet_rcv_has_room(pkt_sk(f->arr[i]), skb)) {
if (i != j)
f->next[idx] = i;
return i;
}
if (++i == num)
i = 0;
} while (i != j);
return idx;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Browser* Browser::Create(Profile* profile) {
Browser* browser = new Browser(TYPE_NORMAL, profile);
browser->CreateBrowserWindow();
return browser;
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 102,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::allow_cross_origin_auth_prompt() {
return allow_cross_origin_auth_prompt_;
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ape_dumpinfo(AVFormatContext * s, APEContext * ape_ctx)
{
#if ENABLE_DEBUG
int i;
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "Descriptor Block:\n\n");
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "magic = \"%c%c%c%c\"\n", ape_ctx->magic[0], ape_ctx->magic[1], ape_ctx->magic[2], ape_ctx->magic[3]);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "fileversion = %d\n", ape_ctx->fileversion);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "descriptorlength = %d\n", ape_ctx->descriptorlength);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "headerlength = %d\n", ape_ctx->headerlength);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "seektablelength = %d\n", ape_ctx->seektablelength);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "wavheaderlength = %d\n", ape_ctx->wavheaderlength);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "audiodatalength = %d\n", ape_ctx->audiodatalength);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "audiodatalength_high = %d\n", ape_ctx->audiodatalength_high);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "wavtaillength = %d\n", ape_ctx->wavtaillength);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "md5 = ");
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%02x", ape_ctx->md5[i]);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "\n");
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "\nHeader Block:\n\n");
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "compressiontype = %d\n", ape_ctx->compressiontype);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "formatflags = %d\n", ape_ctx->formatflags);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "blocksperframe = %d\n", ape_ctx->blocksperframe);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "finalframeblocks = %d\n", ape_ctx->finalframeblocks);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "totalframes = %d\n", ape_ctx->totalframes);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "bps = %d\n", ape_ctx->bps);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "channels = %d\n", ape_ctx->channels);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "samplerate = %d\n", ape_ctx->samplerate);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "\nSeektable\n\n");
if ((ape_ctx->seektablelength / sizeof(uint32_t)) != ape_ctx->totalframes) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "No seektable\n");
} else {
for (i = 0; i < ape_ctx->seektablelength / sizeof(uint32_t); i++) {
if (i < ape_ctx->totalframes - 1) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%8d %d (%d bytes)\n", i, ape_ctx->seektable[i], ape_ctx->seektable[i + 1] - ape_ctx->seektable[i]);
} else {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%8d %d\n", i, ape_ctx->seektable[i]);
}
}
}
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "\nFrames\n\n");
for (i = 0; i < ape_ctx->totalframes; i++)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "%8d %8lld %8d (%d samples)\n", i, ape_ctx->frames[i].pos, ape_ctx->frames[i].size, ape_ctx->frames[i].nblocks);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "\nCalculated information:\n\n");
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "junklength = %d\n", ape_ctx->junklength);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "firstframe = %d\n", ape_ctx->firstframe);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_DEBUG, "totalsamples = %d\n", ape_ctx->totalsamples);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Do not attempt to decode APE file with no frames
This fixes invalid reads/writes with this sample:
http://packetstorm.linuxsecurity.com/1103-exploits/vlc105-dos.txt
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,414
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool try_wait_for_completion(struct completion *x)
{
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&x->wait.lock, flags);
if (!x->done)
ret = 0;
else
x->done--;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&x->wait.lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,638
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *missing_container_arg(cmd_parms *cmd)
{
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, cmd->cmd->name,
"> directive requires additional arguments", NULL);
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 64,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_find_smb_ses(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, char *username)
{
struct list_head *tmp;
struct cifsSesInfo *ses;
write_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_for_each(tmp, &server->smb_ses_list) {
ses = list_entry(tmp, struct cifsSesInfo, smb_ses_list);
if (strncmp(ses->userName, username, MAX_USERNAME_SIZE))
continue;
++ses->ses_count;
write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
return ses;
}
write_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: cifs: clean up cifs_find_smb_ses (try #2)
This patch replaces the earlier patch by the same name. The only
difference is that MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE has been increased to attempt to
match the limits that windows enforces.
Do a better job of matching sessions by authtype. Matching by username
for a Kerberos session is incorrect, and anonymous sessions need special
handling.
Also, in the case where we do match by username, we also need to match
by password. That ensures that someone else doesn't "borrow" an existing
session without needing to know the password.
Finally, passwords can be longer than 16 bytes. Bump MAX_PASSWORD_SIZE
to 512 to match the size that the userspace mount helper allows.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 166,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: invoke_NPN_GetValue(PluginInstance *plugin, NPNVariable variable, void *value)
{
npw_return_val_if_fail(rpc_method_invoke_possible(g_rpc_connection),
NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR);
int error = rpc_method_invoke(g_rpc_connection,
RPC_METHOD_NPN_GET_VALUE,
RPC_TYPE_NPW_PLUGIN_INSTANCE, plugin,
RPC_TYPE_UINT32, variable,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_GetValue() invoke", error);
return NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
int32_t ret;
switch (rpc_type_of_NPNVariable(variable)) {
case RPC_TYPE_UINT32:
{
uint32_t n = 0;
error = rpc_method_wait_for_reply(g_rpc_connection, RPC_TYPE_INT32, &ret, RPC_TYPE_UINT32, &n, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_GetValue() wait for reply", error);
ret = NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
D(bug("-> value: %u\n", n));
*((unsigned int *)value) = n;
break;
}
case RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
{
uint32_t b = 0;
error = rpc_method_wait_for_reply(g_rpc_connection, RPC_TYPE_INT32, &ret, RPC_TYPE_BOOLEAN, &b, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_GetValue() wait for reply", error);
ret = NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
D(bug("-> value: %s\n", b ? "true" : "false"));
*((NPBool *)value) = b ? TRUE : FALSE;
break;
}
case RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT:
{
NPObject *npobj = NULL;
error = rpc_method_wait_for_reply(g_rpc_connection, RPC_TYPE_INT32, &ret, RPC_TYPE_NP_OBJECT, &npobj, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_GetValue() wait for reply", error);
ret = NPERR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
D(bug("-> value: <object %p>\n", npobj));
*((NPObject **)value) = npobj;
break;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int bta_hh_co_write(int fd, UINT8* rpt, UINT16 len)
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: UHID write %d", __func__, len);
struct uhid_event ev;
memset(&ev, 0, sizeof(ev));
ev.type = UHID_INPUT;
ev.u.input.size = len;
if(len > sizeof(ev.u.input.data)){
APPL_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Report size greater than allowed size",
__FUNCTION__);
return -1;
}
memcpy(ev.u.input.data, rpt, len);
return uhid_write(fd, &ev);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 158,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QQuickWebViewExperimental::QQuickWebViewExperimental(QQuickWebView *webView)
: QObject(webView)
, q_ptr(webView)
, d_ptr(webView->d_ptr.data())
, schemeParent(new QObject(this))
, m_viewportInfo(new QWebViewportInfo(webView->d_ptr.data(), this))
{
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs4_proc_setclientid_confirm(struct nfs_client *clp,
struct nfs4_setclientid_res *arg,
struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM],
.rpc_argp = arg,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
int status;
dprintk("NFS call setclientid_confirm auth=%s, (client ID %llx)\n",
clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_auth->au_ops->au_name,
clp->cl_clientid);
status = rpc_call_sync(clp->cl_rpcclient, &msg, RPC_TASK_TIMEOUT);
trace_nfs4_setclientid_confirm(clp, status);
dprintk("NFS reply setclientid_confirm: %d\n", status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void bt_sock_unregister(int proto)
{
if (proto < 0 || proto >= BT_MAX_PROTO)
return;
write_lock(&bt_proto_lock);
bt_proto[proto] = NULL;
write_unlock(&bt_proto_lock);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t CameraService::onTransact(
uint32_t code, const Parcel& data, Parcel* reply, uint32_t flags) {
switch (code) {
case BnCameraService::CONNECT:
case BnCameraService::CONNECT_PRO:
case BnCameraService::CONNECT_DEVICE:
const int pid = getCallingPid();
const int self_pid = getpid();
if (pid != self_pid) {
if (!checkCallingPermission(
String16("android.permission.CAMERA"))) {
const int uid = getCallingUid();
ALOGE("Permission Denial: "
"can't use the camera pid=%d, uid=%d", pid, uid);
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
}
break;
}
return BnCameraService::onTransact(code, data, reply, flags);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __rb_allocate_pages(long nr_pages, struct list_head *pages, int cpu)
{
struct buffer_page *bpage, *tmp;
long i;
for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
struct page *page;
/*
* __GFP_NORETRY flag makes sure that the allocation fails
* gracefully without invoking oom-killer and the system is
* not destabilized.
*/
bpage = kzalloc_node(ALIGN(sizeof(*bpage), cache_line_size()),
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NORETRY,
cpu_to_node(cpu));
if (!bpage)
goto free_pages;
list_add(&bpage->list, pages);
page = alloc_pages_node(cpu_to_node(cpu),
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NORETRY, 0);
if (!page)
goto free_pages;
bpage->page = page_address(page);
rb_init_page(bpage->page);
}
return 0;
free_pages:
list_for_each_entry_safe(bpage, tmp, pages, list) {
list_del_init(&bpage->list);
free_buffer_page(bpage);
}
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_flush_pml_buffers(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int i;
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
/*
* We only need to kick vcpu out of guest mode here, as PML buffer
* is flushed at beginning of all VMEXITs, and it's obvious that only
* vcpus running in guest are possible to have unflushed GPAs in PML
* buffer.
*/
kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,682
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CustomScrollableView() {}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 131,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void copyMultiCh24(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i] >> 8;
}
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static XHCIPort *xhci_lookup_port(XHCIState *xhci, struct USBPort *uport)
{
int index;
if (!uport->dev) {
return NULL;
}
switch (uport->dev->speed) {
case USB_SPEED_LOW:
case USB_SPEED_FULL:
case USB_SPEED_HIGH:
if (xhci_get_flag(xhci, XHCI_FLAG_SS_FIRST)) {
index = uport->index + xhci->numports_3;
} else {
index = uport->index;
}
break;
case USB_SPEED_SUPER:
if (xhci_get_flag(xhci, XHCI_FLAG_SS_FIRST)) {
index = uport->index;
} else {
index = uport->index + xhci->numports_2;
}
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
return &xhci->ports[index];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 5,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_op_error_space(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
size_t size)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_ERROR, 0,
sizeof(sctp_errhdr_t) + size);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
*/
if (chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
nodata:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 35,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::SelectNumberedTab(int index) {
if (index < tab_count()) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("SelectNumberedTab"),
profile_);
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->ActivateTabAt(index, true);
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void snd_pcm_period_elapsed(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime;
unsigned long flags;
if (PCM_RUNTIME_CHECK(substream))
return;
runtime = substream->runtime;
snd_pcm_stream_lock_irqsave(substream, flags);
if (!snd_pcm_running(substream) ||
snd_pcm_update_hw_ptr0(substream, 1) < 0)
goto _end;
#ifdef CONFIG_SND_PCM_TIMER
if (substream->timer_running)
snd_timer_interrupt(substream->timer, 1);
#endif
_end:
snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irqrestore(substream, flags);
kill_fasync(&runtime->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 166,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int alpha_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
{
int err;
switch (event->attr.type) {
case PERF_TYPE_RAW:
case PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE:
case PERF_TYPE_HW_CACHE:
break;
default:
return -ENOENT;
}
if (!alpha_pmu)
return -ENODEV;
/* Do the real initialisation work. */
err = __hw_perf_event_init(event);
return err;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Camera3Device::insert3AResult(CameraMetadata& result, int32_t tag,
const T* value, uint32_t frameNumber) {
if (result.update(tag, value, 1) != NO_ERROR) {
mResultQueue.erase(--mResultQueue.end(), mResultQueue.end());
SET_ERR("Frame %d: Failed to set %s in partial metadata",
frameNumber, get_camera_metadata_tag_name(tag));
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sk_sp<SkImage> ImageBitmap::getSkImageFromDecoder(
std::unique_ptr<ImageDecoder> decoder) {
if (!decoder->frameCount())
return nullptr;
ImageFrame* frame = decoder->frameBufferAtIndex(0);
if (!frame || frame->getStatus() != ImageFrame::FrameComplete)
return nullptr;
DCHECK(!frame->bitmap().isNull() && !frame->bitmap().empty());
return frame->finalizePixelsAndGetImage();
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 140,203
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static jboolean android_net_wifi_setLazyRoam(
JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jint iface, jint id, jboolean enabled, jobject roam_param) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_error status = WIFI_SUCCESS;
wifi_roam_params params;
memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ALOGD("configure lazy roam request [%d] = %p", id, handle);
if (roam_param != NULL) {
params.A_band_boost_threshold = helper.getIntField(roam_param, "A_band_boost_threshold");
params.A_band_penalty_threshold = helper.getIntField(roam_param, "A_band_penalty_threshold");
params.A_band_boost_factor = helper.getIntField(roam_param, "A_band_boost_factor");
params.A_band_penalty_factor = helper.getIntField(roam_param, "A_band_penalty_factor");
params.A_band_max_boost = helper.getIntField(roam_param, "A_band_max_boost");
params.lazy_roam_hysteresis = helper.getIntField(roam_param, "lazy_roam_hysteresis");
params.alert_roam_rssi_trigger = helper.getIntField(roam_param, "alert_roam_rssi_trigger");
status = hal_fn.wifi_set_gscan_roam_params(id, handle, ¶ms);
}
ALOGE("android_net_wifi_setLazyRoam configured params status=%d\n", status);
if (status >= 0) {
int doEnable = enabled ? 1 : 0;
status = hal_fn.wifi_enable_lazy_roam(id, handle, doEnable);
ALOGE("android_net_wifi_setLazyRoam enabled roam status=%d\n", status);
}
return status >= 0;
}
Commit Message: Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 159,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_wrapper_data (WavpackContext *wpc, WavpackMetadata *wpmd)
{
if ((wpc->open_flags & OPEN_WRAPPER) && wpc->wrapper_bytes < MAX_WRAPPER_BYTES && wpmd->byte_length) {
wpc->wrapper_data = (unsigned char *)realloc (wpc->wrapper_data, wpc->wrapper_bytes + wpmd->byte_length);
if (!wpc->wrapper_data)
return FALSE;
memcpy (wpc->wrapper_data + wpc->wrapper_bytes, wpmd->data, wpmd->byte_length);
wpc->wrapper_bytes += wpmd->byte_length;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: issue #54: fix potential out-of-bounds heap read
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int current_is_64bit(void)
{
/*
* We can't use test_thread_flag() here because we may be on an
* interrupt stack, and the thread flags don't get copied over
* from the thread_info on the main stack to the interrupt stack.
*/
return !test_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(current), TIF_32BIT);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/perf: Cap 64bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
We cap 32bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
(currently 127), but we forgot to do the same for 64bit backtraces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CheckWhitelists() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
if (!database_manager_.get()) {
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, REASON_SB_DISABLED);
return;
}
const GURL& url = url_chain_.back();
if (url.is_valid() && database_manager_->MatchDownloadWhitelistUrl(url)) {
DVLOG(2) << url << " is on the download whitelist.";
RecordCountOfSignedOrWhitelistedDownload();
PostFinishTask(SAFE, REASON_WHITELISTED_URL);
return;
}
if (signature_info_.trusted()) {
RecordCountOfSignedOrWhitelistedDownload();
for (int i = 0; i < signature_info_.certificate_chain_size(); ++i) {
if (CertificateChainIsWhitelisted(
signature_info_.certificate_chain(i))) {
PostFinishTask(SAFE, REASON_TRUSTED_EXECUTABLE);
return;
}
}
}
if (!pingback_enabled_) {
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, REASON_PING_DISABLED);
return;
}
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX)
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&CheckClientDownloadRequest::GetTabRedirects, this));
#else
PostFinishTask(UNKNOWN, REASON_OS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 123,738
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int usb_req_set_sel(struct usb_device *udev, enum usb3_link_state state)
{
struct usb_set_sel_req *sel_values;
unsigned long long u1_sel;
unsigned long long u1_pel;
unsigned long long u2_sel;
unsigned long long u2_pel;
int ret;
if (udev->state != USB_STATE_CONFIGURED)
return 0;
/* Convert SEL and PEL stored in ns to us */
u1_sel = DIV_ROUND_UP(udev->u1_params.sel, 1000);
u1_pel = DIV_ROUND_UP(udev->u1_params.pel, 1000);
u2_sel = DIV_ROUND_UP(udev->u2_params.sel, 1000);
u2_pel = DIV_ROUND_UP(udev->u2_params.pel, 1000);
/*
* Make sure that the calculated SEL and PEL values for the link
* state we're enabling aren't bigger than the max SEL/PEL
* value that will fit in the SET SEL control transfer.
* Otherwise the device would get an incorrect idea of the exit
* latency for the link state, and could start a device-initiated
* U1/U2 when the exit latencies are too high.
*/
if ((state == USB3_LPM_U1 &&
(u1_sel > USB3_LPM_MAX_U1_SEL_PEL ||
u1_pel > USB3_LPM_MAX_U1_SEL_PEL)) ||
(state == USB3_LPM_U2 &&
(u2_sel > USB3_LPM_MAX_U2_SEL_PEL ||
u2_pel > USB3_LPM_MAX_U2_SEL_PEL))) {
dev_dbg(&udev->dev, "Device-initiated %s disabled due to long SEL %llu us or PEL %llu us\n",
usb3_lpm_names[state], u1_sel, u1_pel);
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* If we're enabling device-initiated LPM for one link state,
* but the other link state has a too high SEL or PEL value,
* just set those values to the max in the Set SEL request.
*/
if (u1_sel > USB3_LPM_MAX_U1_SEL_PEL)
u1_sel = USB3_LPM_MAX_U1_SEL_PEL;
if (u1_pel > USB3_LPM_MAX_U1_SEL_PEL)
u1_pel = USB3_LPM_MAX_U1_SEL_PEL;
if (u2_sel > USB3_LPM_MAX_U2_SEL_PEL)
u2_sel = USB3_LPM_MAX_U2_SEL_PEL;
if (u2_pel > USB3_LPM_MAX_U2_SEL_PEL)
u2_pel = USB3_LPM_MAX_U2_SEL_PEL;
/*
* usb_enable_lpm() can be called as part of a failed device reset,
* which may be initiated by an error path of a mass storage driver.
* Therefore, use GFP_NOIO.
*/
sel_values = kmalloc(sizeof *(sel_values), GFP_NOIO);
if (!sel_values)
return -ENOMEM;
sel_values->u1_sel = u1_sel;
sel_values->u1_pel = u1_pel;
sel_values->u2_sel = cpu_to_le16(u2_sel);
sel_values->u2_pel = cpu_to_le16(u2_pel);
ret = usb_control_msg(udev, usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_SEL,
USB_RECIP_DEVICE,
0, 0,
sel_values, sizeof *(sel_values),
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
kfree(sel_values);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppLayerProtoDetectPPRegister(uint8_t ipproto,
const char *portstr,
AppProto alproto,
uint16_t min_depth, uint16_t max_depth,
uint8_t direction,
ProbingParserFPtr ProbingParser1,
ProbingParserFPtr ProbingParser2)
{
SCEnter();
DetectPort *head = NULL;
DetectPortParse(NULL,&head, portstr);
DetectPort *temp_dp = head;
while (temp_dp != NULL) {
uint32_t port = temp_dp->port;
if (port == 0 && temp_dp->port2 != 0)
port++;
for ( ; port <= temp_dp->port2; port++) {
AppLayerProtoDetectInsertNewProbingParser(&alpd_ctx.ctx_pp,
ipproto,
port,
alproto,
min_depth, max_depth,
direction,
ProbingParser1,
ProbingParser2);
}
temp_dp = temp_dp->next;
}
DetectPortCleanupList(NULL,head);
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 96,491
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const HttpResponseInfo* SpdyProxyClientSocket::GetConnectResponseInfo() const {
return response_.headers.get() ? &response_ : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 129,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLMediaElement::textTracksAreReady() const {
for (const auto& textTrack : m_textTracksWhenResourceSelectionBegan) {
if (textTrack->getReadinessState() == TextTrack::Loading ||
textTrack->getReadinessState() == TextTrack::NotLoaded)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,945
|
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