instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int udf_find_anchor(struct super_block *sb,
struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
sector_t lastblock;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
lastblock = udf_scan_anchors(sb, sbi->s_last_block, fileset);
if (lastblock)
goto out;
/* No anchor found? Try VARCONV conversion of block numbers */
UDF_SET_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_VARCONV);
/* Firstly, we try to not convert number of the last block */
lastblock = udf_scan_anchors(sb,
udf_variable_to_fixed(sbi->s_last_block),
fileset);
if (lastblock)
goto out;
/* Secondly, we try with converted number of the last block */
lastblock = udf_scan_anchors(sb, sbi->s_last_block, fileset);
if (!lastblock) {
/* VARCONV didn't help. Clear it. */
UDF_CLEAR_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_VARCONV);
return 0;
}
out:
sbi->s_last_block = lastblock;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SampleTable::CompareIncreasingTime(const void *_a, const void *_b) {
const SampleTimeEntry *a = (const SampleTimeEntry *)_a;
const SampleTimeEntry *b = (const SampleTimeEntry *)_b;
if (a->mCompositionTime < b->mCompositionTime) {
return -1;
} else if (a->mCompositionTime > b->mCompositionTime) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix several ineffective integer overflow checks
Commit edd4a76 (which addressed bugs 15328708, 15342615, 15342751) added
several integer overflow checks. Unfortunately, those checks fail to take into
account integer promotion rules and are thus themselves subject to an integer
overflow. Cast the sizeof() operator to a uint64_t to force promotion while
multiplying.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit e2e812e58e8d2716b00d7d82db99b08d3afb4b32)
Change-Id: I080eb3fa147601f18cedab86e0360406c3963d7b
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void create_pit_timer(struct kvm_kpit_state *ps, u32 val, int is_period)
{
struct kvm_timer *pt = &ps->pit_timer;
s64 interval;
interval = muldiv64(val, NSEC_PER_SEC, KVM_PIT_FREQ);
pr_debug("create pit timer, interval is %llu nsec\n", interval);
/* TODO The new value only affected after the retriggered */
hrtimer_cancel(&pt->timer);
pt->period = interval;
ps->is_periodic = is_period;
pt->timer.function = kvm_timer_fn;
pt->t_ops = &kpit_ops;
pt->kvm = ps->pit->kvm;
pt->vcpu = pt->kvm->bsp_vcpu;
atomic_set(&pt->pending, 0);
ps->irq_ack = 1;
hrtimer_start(&pt->timer, ktime_add_ns(ktime_get(), interval),
HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
}
Commit Message: KVM: PIT: control word is write-only
PIT control word (address 0x43) is write-only, reads are undefined.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 43,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void DidCallWillRedirectRequest() {
will_redirect_called_++;
if (will_redirect_loop_runner_)
will_redirect_loop_runner_->Quit();
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo," attrs=("));
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp, ep2, map, nmap);
if (cp == NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
goto trunc;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo," status=("));
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
break;
default:
/*
* XXX - fill in more types here; see, for example,
* draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else {
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep))
goto trunc;
}
break;
}
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14469/ISAKMP: Add a missing bounds check
In ikev1_n_print() check bounds before trying to fetch the replay detection
status.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void assertCellInfo(BtCursor *pCur){
CellInfo info;
int iPage = pCur->iPage;
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
btreeParseCell(pCur->apPage[iPage], pCur->aiIdx[iPage], &info);
assert( CORRUPT_DB || memcmp(&info, &pCur->info, sizeof(info))==0 );
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 136,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::Observe(int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
DCHECK_EQ(chrome::NOTIFICATION_PROFILE_CACHED_INFO_CHANGED, type);
gtk_util::SetWindowIcon(window_, browser_->profile());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 117,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void * dev_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
{
struct sg_proc_deviter * it = kmalloc(sizeof(*it), GFP_KERNEL);
s->private = it;
if (! it)
return NULL;
it->index = *pos;
it->max = sg_last_dev();
if (it->index >= it->max)
return NULL;
return it;
}
Commit Message: sg_start_req(): make sure that there's not too many elements in iovec
unfortunately, allowing an arbitrary 16bit value means a possibility of
overflow in the calculation of total number of pages in bio_map_user_iov() -
we rely on there being no more than PAGE_SIZE members of sum in the
first loop there. If that sum wraps around, we end up allocating
too small array of pointers to pages and it's easy to overflow it in
the second loop.
X-Coverup: TINC (and there's no lumber cartel either)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # way, way back
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 42,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainGetSecurityLabelList(virDomainPtr domain,
virSecurityLabelPtr* seclabels)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "seclabels=%p", seclabels);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(seclabels, error);
conn = domain->conn;
if (conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabelList) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainGetSecurityLabelList(domain, seclabels);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 93,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: store_message(png_store *ps, png_const_structp pp, char *buffer, size_t bufsize,
size_t pos, PNG_CONST char *msg)
{
if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pread)
{
/* Reading a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "read: ");
if (ps->current != NULL)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->current->name);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
}
else if (pp != NULL && pp == ps->pwrite)
{
/* Writing a file */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "write: ");
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->wname);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
else
{
/* Neither reading nor writing (or a memory error in struct delete) */
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, "pngvalid: ");
}
if (ps->test[0] != 0)
{
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, ps->test);
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, sep);
}
pos = safecat(buffer, bufsize, pos, msg);
return pos;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_interface_by_number(long devnum)
{
pcap_if_t *dev, *devlist;
long i;
char ebuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE];
char *device;
if (pcap_findalldevs(&devlist, ebuf) < 0)
error("%s", ebuf);
/*
* Look for the devnum-th entry in the list of devices (1-based).
*/
for (i = 0, dev = devlist; i < devnum-1 && dev != NULL;
i++, dev = dev->next)
;
if (dev == NULL)
error("Invalid adapter index");
device = strdup(dev->name);
pcap_freealldevs(devlist);
return (device);
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14879/fix -V to fail invalid input safely
get_next_file() did not check the return value of strlen() and
underflowed an array index if the line read by fgets() from the file
started with \0. This caused an out-of-bounds read and could cause a
write. Add the missing check.
This vulnerability was discovered by Brian Carpenter & Geeknik Labs.
CWE ID: CWE-120
| 0
| 93,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Element::willModifyAttribute(const QualifiedName& name, const AtomicString& oldValue, const AtomicString& newValue)
{
if (isIdAttributeName(name))
updateId(oldValue, newValue);
else if (name == HTMLNames::nameAttr)
updateName(oldValue, newValue);
else if (name == HTMLNames::forAttr && hasTagName(labelTag)) {
TreeScope* scope = treeScope();
if (scope->shouldCacheLabelsByForAttribute())
updateLabel(scope, oldValue, newValue);
}
if (oldValue != newValue) {
if (attached() && document()->styleResolver() && document()->styleResolver()->hasSelectorForAttribute(name.localName()))
setNeedsStyleRecalc();
}
if (OwnPtr<MutationObserverInterestGroup> recipients = MutationObserverInterestGroup::createForAttributesMutation(this, name))
recipients->enqueueMutationRecord(MutationRecord::createAttributes(this, name, oldValue));
InspectorInstrumentation::willModifyDOMAttr(document(), this, oldValue, newValue);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,436
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn)
{
struct perf_event_context *child_ctx, *clone_ctx = NULL;
struct perf_event *child_event, *next;
WARN_ON_ONCE(child != current);
child_ctx = perf_pin_task_context(child, ctxn);
if (!child_ctx)
return;
/*
* In order to reduce the amount of tricky in ctx tear-down, we hold
* ctx::mutex over the entire thing. This serializes against almost
* everything that wants to access the ctx.
*
* The exception is sys_perf_event_open() /
* perf_event_create_kernel_count() which does find_get_context()
* without ctx::mutex (it cannot because of the move_group double mutex
* lock thing). See the comments in perf_install_in_context().
*/
mutex_lock(&child_ctx->mutex);
/*
* In a single ctx::lock section, de-schedule the events and detach the
* context from the task such that we cannot ever get it scheduled back
* in.
*/
raw_spin_lock_irq(&child_ctx->lock);
task_ctx_sched_out(__get_cpu_context(child_ctx), child_ctx, EVENT_ALL);
/*
* Now that the context is inactive, destroy the task <-> ctx relation
* and mark the context dead.
*/
RCU_INIT_POINTER(child->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn], NULL);
put_ctx(child_ctx); /* cannot be last */
WRITE_ONCE(child_ctx->task, TASK_TOMBSTONE);
put_task_struct(current); /* cannot be last */
clone_ctx = unclone_ctx(child_ctx);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&child_ctx->lock);
if (clone_ctx)
put_ctx(clone_ctx);
/*
* Report the task dead after unscheduling the events so that we
* won't get any samples after PERF_RECORD_EXIT. We can however still
* get a few PERF_RECORD_READ events.
*/
perf_event_task(child, child_ctx, 0);
list_for_each_entry_safe(child_event, next, &child_ctx->event_list, event_entry)
perf_event_exit_event(child_event, child_ctx, child);
mutex_unlock(&child_ctx->mutex);
put_ctx(child_ctx);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix the perf_cpu_time_max_percent check
Use "proc_dointvec_minmax" instead of "proc_dointvec" to check the input
value from user-space.
If not, we can set a big value and some vars will overflow like
"sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate" which will cause a lot of unexpected
problems.
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487829879-56237-1-git-send-email-tanxiaojun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 85,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void free_tty_struct(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
if (tty->dev)
put_device(tty->dev);
kfree(tty->write_buf);
tty_buffer_free_all(tty);
kfree(tty);
}
Commit Message: TTY: drop driver reference in tty_open fail path
When tty_driver_lookup_tty fails in tty_open, we forget to drop a
reference to the tty driver. This was added by commit 4a2b5fddd5 (Move
tty lookup/reopen to caller).
Fix that by adding tty_driver_kref_put to the fail path.
I will refactor the code later. This is for the ease of backporting to
stable.
Introduced-in: v2.6.28-rc2
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 58,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockResponseReader(int64_t response_id,
net::HttpResponseInfo* info,
int info_size,
const char* data,
int data_size)
: AppCacheResponseReader(response_id, /*disk_cache=*/nullptr),
info_(info),
info_size_(info_size),
data_(data),
data_size_(data_size) {}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool is_imm8(int value)
{
return value <= 127 && value >= -128;
}
Commit Message: net: bpf_jit: fix an off-one bug in x86_64 cond jump target
x86 jump instruction size is 2 or 5 bytes (near/long jump), not 2 or 6
bytes.
In case a conditional jump is followed by a long jump, conditional jump
target is one byte past the start of target instruction.
Signed-off-by: Markus Kötter <nepenthesdev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameSelection::CommitAppearanceIfNeeded() {
return layout_selection_->Commit();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 124,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadLABELImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
geometry[MaxTextExtent],
*property;
const char
*label;
DrawInfo
*draw_info;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
TypeMetric
metrics;
size_t
height,
width;
/*
Initialize Image structure.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
(void) ResetImagePage(image,"0x0+0+0");
property=InterpretImageProperties(image_info,image,image_info->filename);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label",property);
property=DestroyString(property);
label=GetImageProperty(image,"label");
draw_info=CloneDrawInfo(image_info,(DrawInfo *) NULL);
draw_info->text=ConstantString(label);
metrics.width=0;
metrics.ascent=0.0;
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
if ((image->columns == 0) && (image->rows == 0))
{
image->columns=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
image->rows=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
}
else
if ((strlen(label) > 0) &&
(((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0)) ||
(fabs(image_info->pointsize) < MagickEpsilon)))
{
double
high,
low;
/*
Auto fit text into bounding box.
*/
for ( ; ; draw_info->pointsize*=2.0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
(void) GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width >= image->columns) && (height >= image->rows))
break;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width >= image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height >= image->rows)))
break;
}
high=draw_info->pointsize;
for (low=1.0; (high-low) > 0.5; )
{
draw_info->pointsize=(low+high)/2.0;
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
-metrics.bounds.x1,metrics.ascent);
if (draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity)
(void) CloneString(&draw_info->geometry,geometry);
(void) GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
width=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
height=(size_t) floor(metrics.height+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if ((image->columns != 0) && (image->rows != 0))
{
if ((width < image->columns) && (height < image->rows))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
else
if (((image->columns != 0) && (width < image->columns)) ||
((image->rows != 0) && (height < image->rows)))
low=draw_info->pointsize+0.5;
else
high=draw_info->pointsize-0.5;
}
draw_info->pointsize=(low+high)/2.0-0.5;
}
status=GetMultilineTypeMetrics(image,draw_info,&metrics);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image->columns == 0)
image->columns=(size_t) floor(metrics.width+draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if (image->columns == 0)
image->columns=(size_t) floor(draw_info->pointsize+draw_info->stroke_width+
0.5);
if (image->rows == 0)
image->rows=(size_t) floor(metrics.ascent-metrics.descent+
draw_info->stroke_width+0.5);
if (image->rows == 0)
image->rows=(size_t) floor(draw_info->pointsize+draw_info->stroke_width+
0.5);
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image) == MagickFalse)
{
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Draw label.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%+g%+g",
draw_info->direction == RightToLeftDirection ? image->columns-
metrics.bounds.x2 : 0.0,draw_info->gravity == UndefinedGravity ?
metrics.ascent : 0.0);
draw_info->geometry=AcquireString(geometry);
status=AnnotateImage(image,draw_info);
if (image_info->pointsize == 0.0)
{
char
pointsize[MaxTextExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(pointsize,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g",
draw_info->pointsize);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"label:pointsize",pointsize);
}
draw_info=DestroyDrawInfo(draw_info);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: Fix a small memory leak
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 168,523
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
int lvl, int opt, char __user *ov, unsigned int ol)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_port *tport = tipc_sk_port(sk);
u32 value;
int res;
if ((lvl == IPPROTO_TCP) && (sock->type == SOCK_STREAM))
return 0;
if (lvl != SOL_TIPC)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (ol < sizeof(value))
return -EINVAL;
res = get_user(value, (u32 __user *)ov);
if (res)
return res;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (opt) {
case TIPC_IMPORTANCE:
res = tipc_set_portimportance(tport->ref, value);
break;
case TIPC_SRC_DROPPABLE:
if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
res = tipc_set_portunreliable(tport->ref, value);
else
res = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
case TIPC_DEST_DROPPABLE:
res = tipc_set_portunreturnable(tport->ref, value);
break;
case TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT:
tipc_sk(sk)->conn_timeout = value;
/* no need to set "res", since already 0 at this point */
break;
default:
res = -EINVAL;
}
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,464
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pptp_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
if (!(sk->sk_state & PPPOX_DEAD)) {
del_chan(pppox_sk(sk));
pppox_unbind_sock(sk);
}
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
}
Commit Message: pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect()
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t local_llistxattr(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *fs_path,
void *value, size_t size)
{
char *path = fs_path->data;
return v9fs_list_xattr(ctx, path, value, size);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 17,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabStripModel::SetTabPinned(int index, bool pinned) {
DCHECK(ContainsIndex(index));
if (contents_data_[index]->pinned == pinned)
return;
if (IsAppTab(index)) {
if (!pinned) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
contents_data_[index]->pinned = pinned;
} else {
int non_mini_tab_index = IndexOfFirstNonMiniTab();
contents_data_[index]->pinned = pinned;
if (pinned && index != non_mini_tab_index) {
MoveTabContentsAtImpl(index, non_mini_tab_index, false);
index = non_mini_tab_index;
} else if (!pinned && index + 1 != non_mini_tab_index) {
MoveTabContentsAtImpl(index, non_mini_tab_index - 1, false);
index = non_mini_tab_index - 1;
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabMiniStateChanged(contents_data_[index]->contents,
index));
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(TabStripModelObserver, observers_,
TabPinnedStateChanged(contents_data_[index]->contents,
index));
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit BpCrypto(const sp<IBinder> &impl)
: BpInterface<ICrypto>(impl) {
}
Commit Message: Fix information disclosure in mediadrmserver
Test:POC provided in bug
Bug:79218474
Change-Id: Iba12c07a5e615f8ed234b01ac53e3559ba9ac12e
(cherry picked from commit c1bf68a8d1321d7cdf7da6933f0b89b171d251c6)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 162,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: connection_ap_process_natd(entry_connection_t *conn)
{
char tmp_buf[36], *tbuf, *daddr;
size_t tlen = 30;
int err, port_ok;
socks_request_t *socks;
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state == AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT);
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
socks = conn->socks_request;
log_debug(LD_APP,"entered.");
/* look for LF-terminated "[DEST ip_addr port]"
* where ip_addr is a dotted-quad and port is in string form */
err = connection_fetch_from_buf_line(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn), tmp_buf, &tlen);
if (err == 0)
return 0;
if (err < 0) {
log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake failed (DEST too long). Closing");
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
return -1;
}
if (strcmpstart(tmp_buf, "[DEST ")) {
log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake was ill-formed; closing. The client "
"said: %s",
escaped(tmp_buf));
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
return -1;
}
daddr = tbuf = &tmp_buf[0] + 6; /* after end of "[DEST " */
if (!(tbuf = strchr(tbuf, ' '))) {
log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake was ill-formed; closing. The client "
"said: %s",
escaped(tmp_buf));
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
return -1;
}
*tbuf++ = '\0';
/* pretend that a socks handshake completed so we don't try to
* send a socks reply down a natd conn */
strlcpy(socks->address, daddr, sizeof(socks->address));
socks->port = (uint16_t)
tor_parse_long(tbuf, 10, 1, 65535, &port_ok, &daddr);
if (!port_ok) {
log_warn(LD_APP,"NATD handshake failed; port %s is ill-formed or out "
"of range.", escaped(tbuf));
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST);
return -1;
}
socks->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
socks->has_finished = 1;
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
return connection_ap_rewrite_and_attach_if_allowed(conn, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 69,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::prepareForDestruction()
{
disconnectDescendantFrames();
if (DOMWindow* window = this->domWindow())
window->willDetachDocumentFromFrame();
detach();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct netdev_queue *dev_pick_tx(struct net_device *dev,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int queue_index;
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
if (dev->real_num_tx_queues == 1)
queue_index = 0;
else if (ops->ndo_select_queue) {
queue_index = ops->ndo_select_queue(dev, skb);
queue_index = dev_cap_txqueue(dev, queue_index);
} else {
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
queue_index = sk_tx_queue_get(sk);
if (queue_index < 0 || skb->ooo_okay ||
queue_index >= dev->real_num_tx_queues) {
int old_index = queue_index;
queue_index = get_xps_queue(dev, skb);
if (queue_index < 0)
queue_index = skb_tx_hash(dev, skb);
if (queue_index != old_index && sk) {
struct dst_entry *dst =
rcu_dereference_check(sk->sk_dst_cache, 1);
if (dst && skb_dst(skb) == dst)
sk_tx_queue_set(sk, queue_index);
}
}
}
skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, queue_index);
return netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, queue_index);
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pvclock_update_vm_gtod_copy(struct kvm *kvm)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
struct kvm_arch *ka = &kvm->arch;
int vclock_mode;
bool host_tsc_clocksource, vcpus_matched;
vcpus_matched = (ka->nr_vcpus_matched_tsc + 1 ==
atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus));
/*
* If the host uses TSC clock, then passthrough TSC as stable
* to the guest.
*/
host_tsc_clocksource = kvm_get_time_and_clockread(
&ka->master_kernel_ns,
&ka->master_cycle_now);
ka->use_master_clock = host_tsc_clocksource && vcpus_matched
&& !backwards_tsc_observed
&& !ka->boot_vcpu_runs_old_kvmclock;
if (ka->use_master_clock)
atomic_set(&kvm_guest_has_master_clock, 1);
vclock_mode = pvclock_gtod_data.clock.vclock_mode;
trace_kvm_update_master_clock(ka->use_master_clock, vclock_mode,
vcpus_matched);
#endif
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,797
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::DeleteCachedPagesByURLPredicate(
const UrlPredicate& predicate,
const DeletePageCallback& callback) {
RunWhenLoaded(
base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::DoDeleteCachedPagesByURLPredicate,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), predicate, callback));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 155,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned getBitsPerSample() const {
return mStreamInfo.bits_per_sample;
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool AdvanceToStartCode(const uint8_t* buffer,
int buffer_size,
int* offset,
int bytes_needed,
int num_bits,
uint32_t start_code) {
DCHECK_GE(bytes_needed, 3);
DCHECK_LE(num_bits, 24); // Only supports up to 24 bits.
uint32_t bits_to_shift = 24 - num_bits;
uint32_t mask = (1 << num_bits) - 1;
while (*offset + bytes_needed < buffer_size) {
uint32_t next = Read24(buffer + *offset);
if (((next >> bits_to_shift) & mask) == start_code)
return true;
++(*offset);
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup media BitReader ReadBits() calls
Initialize temporary values, check return values.
Small tweaks to solution proposed by adtolbar@microsoft.com.
Bug: 929962
Change-Id: Iaa7da7534174882d040ec7e4c353ba5cd0da5735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1481085
Commit-Queue: Chrome Cunningham <chcunningham@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#634889}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 151,859
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string SafeBrowsingBlockingPageV2::GetHTMLContents() {
DictionaryValue strings;
ResourceBundle& rb = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
std::string html;
if (unsafe_resources_.empty()) {
NOTREACHED();
return std::string();
}
if (unsafe_resources_.size() > 1) {
NOTREACHED();
} else {
SBThreatType threat_type = unsafe_resources_[0].threat_type;
if (threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_URL_MALWARE) {
PopulateMalwareStringDictionary(&strings);
} else { // Phishing.
DCHECK(threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_URL_PHISHING ||
threat_type == SB_THREAT_TYPE_CLIENT_SIDE_PHISHING_URL);
PopulatePhishingStringDictionary(&strings);
}
html = rb.GetRawDataResource(IDR_SAFE_BROWSING_MALWARE_BLOCK_V2).
as_string();
}
interstitial_show_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
return jstemplate_builder::GetTemplatesHtml(html, &strings, "template-root");
}
Commit Message: Check for a negative integer properly.
BUG=169966
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11892002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176879 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 115,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Texture::Destroy() {
if (id_ != 0) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
glDeleteTextures(1, &id_);
id_ = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,112
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void VideoCaptureManager::AddVideoCaptureObserver(
media::VideoCaptureObserver* observer) {
DCHECK(observer);
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
capture_observers_.AddObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 153,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForFilters(RenderObject* renderer) const
{
if (!(m_compositingTriggers & ChromeClient::FilterTrigger))
return false;
return renderer->hasFilter();
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 113,838
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CSSRule* CSSStyleSheet::item(unsigned index) {
unsigned rule_count = length();
if (index >= rule_count)
return nullptr;
if (child_rule_cssom_wrappers_.IsEmpty())
child_rule_cssom_wrappers_.Grow(rule_count);
DCHECK_EQ(child_rule_cssom_wrappers_.size(), rule_count);
TraceWrapperMember<CSSRule>& css_rule = child_rule_cssom_wrappers_[index];
if (!css_rule)
css_rule = contents_->RuleAt(index)->CreateCSSOMWrapper(this);
return css_rule.Get();
}
Commit Message: Disallow access to opaque CSS responses.
Bug: 848786
Change-Id: Ie53fbf644afdd76d7c65649a05c939c63d89b4ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1088335
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Matt Falkenhagen <falken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565537}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 153,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_pass_rows(png_uint_32 height, int pass)
{
png_uint_32 tiles = height>>3;
png_uint_32 rows = 0;
unsigned int x, y;
height &= 7;
++pass;
for (y=0; y<8; ++y) for (x=0; x<8; ++x) if (adam7[y][x] == pass)
{
rows += tiles;
if (y < height) ++rows;
break; /* i.e. break the 'x', column, loop. */
}
return rows;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ioc_set_batching(struct request_queue *q, struct io_context *ioc)
{
if (!ioc || ioc_batching(q, ioc))
return;
ioc->nr_batch_requests = q->nr_batching;
ioc->last_waited = jiffies;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 92,057
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int key_change_login(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, PKCS11_SLOT *slot, const char *pin_regex)
{
char *old = NULL, *new = NULL, *retyped = NULL;
int ok;
if (0 == slot->token->loginRequired) {
/* we can't change a PIN */
ok = 0;
goto err;
}
ok = 0;
/* We need a R/W public session to change the PIN via PUK or
* a R/W user session to change the PIN via PIN */
if (0 != PKCS11_open_session(slot, 1)
|| (0 == slot->token->userPinLocked
&& 1 != key_login(pamh, flags, slot, pin_regex))) {
goto err;
}
/* prompt for new PIN (and PUK if needed) */
if (0 != slot->token->secureLogin) {
if (0 != slot->token->userPinLocked) {
prompt(flags, pamh, PAM_TEXT_INFO, NULL,
_("Change PIN with PUK on PIN pad for %s"),
slot->token->label);
} else {
prompt(flags, pamh, PAM_TEXT_INFO, NULL,
_("Change PIN on PIN pad for %s"),
slot->token->label);
}
} else {
if (0 != slot->token->userPinLocked) {
if (PAM_SUCCESS == prompt(flags, pamh,
PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, &old,
_("PUK for %s: "),
slot->token->label)) {
goto err;
}
} else {
#ifdef TEST
/* In the tests we're calling pam_sm_chauthtok() directly, so
* pam_get_item(PAM_AUTHTOK) will return PAM_BAD_ITEM. As
* workaround, we simply enter the current PIN twice. */
if (PAM_SUCCESS != prompt(flags, pamh,
PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, &old,
_("Current PIN: "))) {
goto err;
}
#else
if (PAM_SUCCESS != pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, (void *)&old)
|| NULL == old) {
goto err;
}
old = strdup(old);
if (NULL == old) {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "strdup() failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
goto err;
}
#endif
}
if (PAM_SUCCESS != prompt(flags, pamh,
PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, &new,
_("Enter new PIN: "))
|| PAM_SUCCESS != prompt(flags, pamh,
PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF, &retyped,
_("Retype new PIN: "))) {
goto err;
}
if (0 != strcmp(new, retyped)) {
prompt(flags, pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("PINs don't match"));
goto err;
}
}
if (0 != PKCS11_change_pin(slot, old, new)) {
if (slot->token->userPinLocked) {
prompt(flags, pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("PIN not changed; PIN locked"));
} else if (slot->token->userPinFinalTry) {
prompt(flags, pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("PIN not changed; one try remaining"));
} else {
prompt(flags, pamh, PAM_ERROR_MSG, NULL, _("PIN not changed"));
}
goto err;
}
pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, new);
ok = 1;
err:
if (NULL != retyped) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(retyped, strlen(retyped));
free(retyped);
}
if (NULL != new) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(new, strlen(new));
free(new);
}
if (NULL != old) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(old, strlen(old));
free(old);
}
return ok;
}
Commit Message: Use EVP_PKEY_size() to allocate correct size of signature buffer. (#18)
Do not use fixed buffer size for signature, EVP_SignFinal() requires
buffer for signature at least EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) bytes in size.
Fixes crash when using 4K RSA signatures (https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/16, https://github.com/OpenSC/pam_p11/issues/15)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 87,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
const char *section_name = "";
const char *link_section_name = "";
char *end = NULL;
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
ut8 dfs[sizeof (Elf_(Verdef))] = {0};
Sdb *sdb;
int cnt, i;
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return false;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if ((int)shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return false;
}
Elf_(Verdef) *defs = calloc (shdr->sh_size, sizeof (char));
if (!defs) {
return false;
}
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (link_shdr && bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!defs) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory (Check Elf_(Verdef))\n");
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
end = (char *)defs + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
for (cnt = 0, i = 0; i >= 0 && cnt < shdr->sh_info && ((char *)defs + i < end); ++cnt) {
Sdb *sdb_verdef = sdb_new0 ();
char *vstart = ((char*)defs) + i;
char key[32] = {0};
Elf_(Verdef) *verdef = (Elf_(Verdef)*)vstart;
Elf_(Verdaux) aux = {0};
int j = 0;
int isum = 0;
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset + i, dfs, sizeof (Elf_(Verdef)));
verdef->vd_version = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_flags = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_ndx = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_cnt = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_hash = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_aux = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_next = READ32 (dfs, j)
int vdaux = verdef->vd_aux;
if (vdaux < 1 || vstart + vdaux < vstart) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
vstart += vdaux;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
j = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, j)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
isum = i + verdef->vd_aux;
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "idx", i, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_version", verdef->vd_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_ndx", verdef->vd_ndx, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_cnt", verdef->vd_cnt, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "flags", get_ver_flags (verdef->vd_flags), 0);
for (j = 1; j < verdef->vd_cnt; ++j) {
int k;
Sdb *sdb_parent = sdb_new0 ();
isum += aux.vda_next;
vstart += aux.vda_next;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
k = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "idx", isum, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "parent", j, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_parent, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "parent%d", j - 1);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_verdef, key, sdb_parent);
}
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "verdef%d", cnt);
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_verdef);
if (!verdef->vd_next) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
if ((st32)verdef->vd_next < 1) {
eprintf ("Warning: Invalid vd_next in the ELF version\n");
break;
}
i += verdef->vd_next;
}
free (defs);
return sdb;
out_error:
free (defs);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 a 3rd time since 2nd time is UB and can be optimized away
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 170,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void JBIG2Bitmap::duplicateRow(int yDest, int ySrc) {
memcpy(data + yDest * line, data + ySrc * line, line);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,169
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Document::CanAcceptChild(const Node& new_child,
const Node* next,
const Node* old_child,
ExceptionState& exception_state) const {
DCHECK(!(next && old_child));
if (old_child && old_child->getNodeType() == new_child.getNodeType())
return true;
int num_doctypes = 0;
int num_elements = 0;
bool has_doctype_after_reference_node = false;
bool has_element_after_reference_node = false;
bool saw_reference_node = false;
for (Node& child : NodeTraversal::ChildrenOf(*this)) {
if (old_child && *old_child == child) {
saw_reference_node = true;
continue;
}
if (&child == next)
saw_reference_node = true;
switch (child.getNodeType()) {
case kDocumentTypeNode:
num_doctypes++;
has_doctype_after_reference_node = saw_reference_node;
break;
case kElementNode:
num_elements++;
has_element_after_reference_node = saw_reference_node;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (new_child.IsDocumentFragment()) {
for (Node& child :
NodeTraversal::ChildrenOf(ToDocumentFragment(new_child))) {
switch (child.getNodeType()) {
case kAttributeNode:
case kCdataSectionNode:
case kDocumentFragmentNode:
case kDocumentNode:
case kTextNode:
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kHierarchyRequestError,
"Nodes of type '" + new_child.nodeName() +
"' may not be inserted inside nodes of type '#document'.");
return false;
case kCommentNode:
case kProcessingInstructionNode:
break;
case kDocumentTypeNode:
num_doctypes++;
break;
case kElementNode:
num_elements++;
if (has_doctype_after_reference_node) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kHierarchyRequestError,
"Can't insert an element before a doctype.");
return false;
}
break;
}
}
} else {
switch (new_child.getNodeType()) {
case kAttributeNode:
case kCdataSectionNode:
case kDocumentFragmentNode:
case kDocumentNode:
case kTextNode:
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kHierarchyRequestError,
"Nodes of type '" + new_child.nodeName() +
"' may not be inserted inside nodes of type '#document'.");
return false;
case kCommentNode:
case kProcessingInstructionNode:
return true;
case kDocumentTypeNode:
num_doctypes++;
if (num_elements > 0 && !has_element_after_reference_node) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kHierarchyRequestError,
"Can't insert a doctype before the root element.");
return false;
}
break;
case kElementNode:
num_elements++;
if (has_doctype_after_reference_node) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kHierarchyRequestError,
"Can't insert an element before a doctype.");
return false;
}
break;
}
}
if (num_elements > 1 || num_doctypes > 1) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kHierarchyRequestError,
String::Format("Only one %s on document allowed.",
num_elements > 1 ? "element" : "doctype"));
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 129,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rds_cmsg_recv(struct rds_incoming *inc, struct msghdr *msg,
struct rds_sock *rs)
{
int ret = 0;
if (inc->i_rdma_cookie) {
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RDS, RDS_CMSG_RDMA_DEST,
sizeof(inc->i_rdma_cookie), &inc->i_rdma_cookie);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if ((inc->i_rx_tstamp != 0) &&
sock_flag(rds_rs_to_sk(rs), SOCK_RCVTSTAMP)) {
struct __kernel_old_timeval tv = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(inc->i_rx_tstamp);
if (!sock_flag(rds_rs_to_sk(rs), SOCK_TSTAMP_NEW)) {
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMP_OLD,
sizeof(tv), &tv);
} else {
struct __kernel_sock_timeval sk_tv;
sk_tv.tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
sk_tv.tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMP_NEW,
sizeof(sk_tv), &sk_tv);
}
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (rs->rs_rx_traces) {
struct rds_cmsg_rx_trace t;
int i, j;
memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
inc->i_rx_lat_trace[RDS_MSG_RX_CMSG] = local_clock();
t.rx_traces = rs->rs_rx_traces;
for (i = 0; i < rs->rs_rx_traces; i++) {
j = rs->rs_rx_trace[i];
t.rx_trace_pos[i] = j;
t.rx_trace[i] = inc->i_rx_lat_trace[j + 1] -
inc->i_rx_lat_trace[j];
}
ret = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_RDS, RDS_CMSG_RXPATH_LATENCY,
sizeof(t), &t);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: net/rds: Fix info leak in rds6_inc_info_copy()
The rds6_inc_info_copy() function has a couple struct members which
are leaking stack information. The ->tos field should hold actual
information and the ->flags field needs to be zeroed out.
Fixes: 3eb450367d08 ("rds: add type of service(tos) infrastructure")
Fixes: b7ff8b1036f0 ("rds: Extend RDS API for IPv6 support")
Reported-by: 黄ID蝴蝶 <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ka-Cheong Poon <ka-cheong.poon@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 87,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnCancelDesktopNotification(int notification_id) {
GetContentClient()->browser()->CancelDesktopNotification(
GetProcess()->GetID(), GetRoutingID(), notification_id);
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 117,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DOMMessageQueue::~DOMMessageQueue() {}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 156,224
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterSCRImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("SCR");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,680
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: async_redirect_stdin ()
{
int fd;
fd = open ("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
if (fd > 0)
{
dup2 (fd, 0);
close (fd);
}
else if (fd < 0)
internal_error (_("cannot redirect standard input from /dev/null: %s"), strerror (errno));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int opdec(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
if (op->operands[1].type) {
eprintf ("Error: Invalid operands\n");
return -1;
}
int l = 0;
int size = op->operands[0].type & ALL_SIZE;
if (op->operands[0].explicit_size) {
size = op->operands[0].dest_size;
}
if (size & OT_WORD) {
data[l++] = 0x66;
}
int rex = 1 << 6;
bool use_rex = false;
if (size & OT_QWORD) { //W field
use_rex = true;
rex |= 1 << 3;
}
if (op->operands[0].extended) { //B field
use_rex = true;
rex |= 1;
}
int opcode;
if (size & OT_BYTE) {
opcode = 0xfe;
} else {
opcode = 0xff;
}
if (!(op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY)) {
if (use_rex) {
data[l++] = rex;
}
if (a->bits > 32 || size & OT_BYTE) {
data[l++] = opcode;
}
if (a->bits == 32 && size & (OT_DWORD | OT_WORD)) {
data[l++] = 0x48 | op->operands[0].reg;
} else {
data[l++] = 0xc8 | op->operands[0].reg;
}
return l;
}
bool rip_rel = op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_RIP;
int offset = op->operands[0].offset * op->operands[0].offset_sign;
int modrm = 0;
int mod;
int reg = 0;
int rm;
bool use_sib = false;
int sib;
if (offset == 0) {
mod = 0;
} else if (offset < 128 && offset > -129) {
mod = 1;
} else {
mod = 2;
}
if (op->operands[0].regs[0] & OT_WORD) {
if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_BX && op->operands[0].regs[1] == X86R_SI) {
rm = B0000;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_BX && op->operands[0].regs[1] == X86R_DI) {
rm = B0001;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_BP && op->operands[0].regs[1] == X86R_SI) {
rm = B0010;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_BP && op->operands[0].regs[1] == X86R_DI) {
rm = B0011;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_SI && op->operands[0].regs[1] == -1) {
rm = B0100;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_DI && op->operands[0].regs[1] == -1) {
rm = B0101;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_BX && op->operands[0].regs[1] == -1) {
rm = B0111;
} else {
return -1;
}
modrm = (mod << 6) | (reg << 3) | rm;
} else {
if (op->operands[0].extended) {
rm = op->operands[0].reg;
} else {
rm = op->operands[0].regs[0];
}
if (rm == 5 && mod == 0) {
mod = 1;
}
int index = op->operands[0].regs[1];
int scale = getsib(op->operands[0].scale[1]);
if (index != -1) {
use_sib = true;
sib = (scale << 6) | (index << 3) | rm;
} else if (rm == 4) {
use_sib = true;
sib = 0x24;
}
if (use_sib) {
rm = B0100;
}
if (rip_rel) {
modrm = (B0000 << 6) | (reg << 3) | B0101;
sib = (scale << 6) | (B0100 << 3) | B0101;
} else {
modrm = (mod << 6) | (reg << 3) | rm;
}
modrm |= 1<<3;
}
if (use_rex) {
data[l++] = rex;
}
data[l++] = opcode;
data[l++] = modrm;
if (use_sib) {
data[l++] = sib;
}
if (mod == 1) {
data[l++] = offset;
} else if (op->operands[0].regs[0] & OT_WORD && mod == 2) {
data[l++] = offset;
data[l++] = offset >> 8;
} else if (mod == 2 || rip_rel) {
data[l++] = offset;
data[l++] = offset >> 8;
data[l++] = offset >> 16;
data[l++] = offset >> 24;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12242 - Crash in x86.nz assembler (#12266)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void clear_gigantic_page(struct page *page,
unsigned long addr,
unsigned int pages_per_huge_page)
{
int i;
struct page *p = page;
might_sleep();
for (i = 0; i < pages_per_huge_page;
i++, p = mem_map_next(p, page, i)) {
cond_resched();
clear_user_highpage(p, addr + i * PAGE_SIZE);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 21,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sp<MetaData> AMRExtractor::getMetaData() {
sp<MetaData> meta = new MetaData;
if (mInitCheck != OK) {
return meta;
}
meta->setCString(kKeyMIMEType, mIsWide ? "audio/amr-wb" : "audio/amr");
return meta;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow and divide-by-zero
Bug: 35763994
Test: ran CTS with and without fix
Change-Id: If835e97ce578d4fa567e33e349e48fb7b2559e0e
(cherry picked from commit 8538a603ef992e75f29336499cb783f3ec19f18c)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 162,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::CopyMaxPageIDsFrom(WebContentsImpl* web_contents) {
max_page_ids_ = web_contents->max_page_ids_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,568
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::computeAndSetBlockDirectionMargins(const RenderBlock* containingBlock)
{
LayoutUnit marginBefore;
LayoutUnit marginAfter;
computeBlockDirectionMargins(containingBlock, marginBefore, marginAfter);
containingBlock->setMarginBeforeForChild(this, marginBefore);
containingBlock->setMarginAfterForChild(this, marginAfter);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int filter_pred_pchar(struct filter_pred *pred, void *event)
{
char **addr = (char **)(event + pred->offset);
int cmp, match;
int len = strlen(*addr) + 1; /* including tailing '\0' */
cmp = pred->regex.match(*addr, &pred->regex, len);
match = cmp ^ pred->not;
return match;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,577
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void output_item_help(struct output_struct *words)
{
short *levels = words == info_words ? info_levels : debug_levels;
const char **verbosity = words == info_words ? info_verbosity : debug_verbosity;
char buf[128], *opt, *fmt = "%-10s %s\n";
int j;
reset_output_levels();
rprintf(FINFO, "Use OPT or OPT1 for level 1 output, OPT2 for level 2, etc.; OPT0 silences.\n");
rprintf(FINFO, "\n");
for (j = 0; words[j].name; j++)
rprintf(FINFO, fmt, words[j].name, words[j].help);
rprintf(FINFO, "\n");
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Set all %s options (e.g. all%d)",
words[j].help, MAX_OUT_LEVEL);
rprintf(FINFO, fmt, "ALL", buf);
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Silence all %s options (same as all0)",
words[j].help);
rprintf(FINFO, fmt, "NONE", buf);
rprintf(FINFO, fmt, "HELP", "Output this help message");
rprintf(FINFO, "\n");
rprintf(FINFO, "Options added for each increase in verbose level:\n");
for (j = 1; j <= MAX_VERBOSITY; j++) {
parse_output_words(words, levels, verbosity[j], HELP_PRIORITY);
opt = make_output_option(words, levels, W_CLI|W_SRV|W_SND|W_REC);
if (opt) {
rprintf(FINFO, "%d) %s\n", j, strchr(opt, '=')+1);
free(opt);
}
reset_output_levels();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ServiceWorkerContextCore::RegisterProviderHostByClientID(
const std::string& client_uuid,
ServiceWorkerProviderHost* provider_host) {
DCHECK(!ContainsKey(*provider_by_uuid_, client_uuid));
(*provider_by_uuid_)[client_uuid] = provider_host;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct saved *last = nd->stack + --nd->depth;
do_delayed_call(&last->done);
if (!(nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU))
path_put(&last->link);
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 51,043
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int snd_compr_poll(struct file *f, poll_table *wait)
{
struct snd_compr_file *data = f->private_data;
struct snd_compr_stream *stream;
size_t avail;
int retval = 0;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!data))
return -EFAULT;
stream = &data->stream;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!stream))
return -EFAULT;
mutex_lock(&stream->device->lock);
if (stream->runtime->state == SNDRV_PCM_STATE_PAUSED ||
stream->runtime->state == SNDRV_PCM_STATE_OPEN) {
retval = -EBADFD;
goto out;
}
poll_wait(f, &stream->runtime->sleep, wait);
avail = snd_compr_get_avail(stream);
pr_debug("avail is %ld\n", (unsigned long)avail);
/* check if we have at least one fragment to fill */
switch (stream->runtime->state) {
case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_DRAINING:
/* stream has been woken up after drain is complete
* draining done so set stream state to stopped
*/
retval = snd_compr_get_poll(stream);
stream->runtime->state = SNDRV_PCM_STATE_SETUP;
break;
case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_RUNNING:
case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_PREPARED:
case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_PAUSED:
if (avail >= stream->runtime->fragment_size)
retval = snd_compr_get_poll(stream);
break;
default:
if (stream->direction == SND_COMPRESS_PLAYBACK)
retval = POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLERR;
else
retval = POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLERR;
break;
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&stream->device->lock);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: compress_core: integer overflow in snd_compr_allocate_buffer()
These are 32 bit values that come from the user, we need to check for
integer overflows or we could end up allocating a smaller buffer than
expected.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 58,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0,
const struct ip6t_replace *repl)
{
struct xt_percpu_counter_alloc_state alloc_state = { 0 };
struct ip6t_entry *iter;
unsigned int *offsets;
unsigned int i;
int ret = 0;
newinfo->size = repl->size;
newinfo->number = repl->num_entries;
/* Init all hooks to impossible value. */
for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
newinfo->hook_entry[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
newinfo->underflow[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
}
offsets = xt_alloc_entry_offsets(newinfo->number);
if (!offsets)
return -ENOMEM;
i = 0;
/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, newinfo->size) {
ret = check_entry_size_and_hooks(iter, newinfo, entry0,
entry0 + repl->size,
repl->hook_entry,
repl->underflow,
repl->valid_hooks);
if (ret != 0)
goto out_free;
if (i < repl->num_entries)
offsets[i] = (void *)iter - entry0;
++i;
if (strcmp(ip6t_get_target(iter)->u.user.name,
XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
++newinfo->stacksize;
}
ret = -EINVAL;
if (i != repl->num_entries)
goto out_free;
/* Check hooks all assigned */
for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
/* Only hooks which are valid */
if (!(repl->valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
continue;
if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF)
goto out_free;
if (newinfo->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF)
goto out_free;
}
if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0, offsets)) {
ret = -ELOOP;
goto out_free;
}
kvfree(offsets);
/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
i = 0;
xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, newinfo->size) {
ret = find_check_entry(iter, net, repl->name, repl->size,
&alloc_state);
if (ret != 0)
break;
++i;
}
if (ret != 0) {
xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, newinfo->size) {
if (i-- == 0)
break;
cleanup_entry(iter, net);
}
return ret;
}
return ret;
out_free:
kvfree(offsets);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unhash_nsid(struct net *net, struct net *last)
{
struct net *tmp;
/* This function is only called from cleanup_net() work,
* and this work is the only process, that may delete
* a net from net_namespace_list. So, when the below
* is executing, the list may only grow. Thus, we do not
* use for_each_net_rcu() or net_rwsem.
*/
for_each_net(tmp) {
int id;
spin_lock_bh(&tmp->nsid_lock);
id = __peernet2id(tmp, net);
if (id >= 0)
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id);
spin_unlock_bh(&tmp->nsid_lock);
if (id >= 0)
rtnl_net_notifyid(tmp, RTM_DELNSID, id);
if (tmp == last)
break;
}
spin_lock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
idr_destroy(&net->netns_ids);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->nsid_lock);
}
Commit Message: netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 91,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GetSelection(std::string* input_text) {
return ExecuteScriptAndExtractString(interstitial_->GetMainFrame(),
"get_selection()", input_text);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 136,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init hwsim_init_netlink(void)
{
int rc;
printk(KERN_INFO "mac80211_hwsim: initializing netlink\n");
rc = genl_register_family(&hwsim_genl_family);
if (rc)
goto failure;
rc = netlink_register_notifier(&hwsim_netlink_notifier);
if (rc) {
genl_unregister_family(&hwsim_genl_family);
goto failure;
}
return 0;
failure:
pr_debug("mac80211_hwsim: error occurred in %s\n", __func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 83,799
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *page;
unsigned long src = *ppos;
int ret = 0;
struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
unsigned long env_start, env_end;
if (!mm)
return 0;
page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
if (!page)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = 0;
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&mm->mm_users))
goto free;
down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
env_start = mm->env_start;
env_end = mm->env_end;
up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
while (count > 0) {
size_t this_len, max_len;
int retval;
if (src >= (env_end - env_start))
break;
this_len = env_end - (env_start + src);
max_len = min_t(size_t, PAGE_SIZE, count);
this_len = min(max_len, this_len);
retval = access_remote_vm(mm, (env_start + src),
page, this_len, 0);
if (retval <= 0) {
ret = retval;
break;
}
if (copy_to_user(buf, page, retval)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
ret += retval;
src += retval;
buf += retval;
count -= retval;
}
*ppos = src;
mmput(mm);
free:
free_page((unsigned long) page);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 166,920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool cs_ss_rpl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_segment cs, ss;
vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
return ((cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK) ==
(ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK));
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 42,647
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void blk_queue_usage_counter_release(struct percpu_ref *ref)
{
struct request_queue *q =
container_of(ref, struct request_queue, q_usage_counter);
wake_up_all(&q->mq_freeze_wq);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 92,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntRect ChromeClientImpl::PageRect() {
return RootWindowRect();
}
Commit Message: If a page shows a popup, end fullscreen.
This was implemented in Blink r159834, but it is susceptible
to a popup/fullscreen race. This CL reverts that implementation
and re-implements it in WebContents.
BUG=752003
TEST=WebContentsImplBrowserTest.PopupsFromJavaScriptEndFullscreen
Change-Id: Ia345cdeda273693c3231ad8f486bebfc3d83927f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/606987
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498171}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 150,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_vcpu_read_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, void *data, unsigned long len)
{
gfn_t gfn = gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int seg;
int offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
int ret;
while ((seg = next_segment(len, offset)) != 0) {
ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, gfn, data, offset, seg);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
offset = 0;
len -= seg;
data += seg;
++gfn;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 71,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long Cluster::GetLast(const BlockEntry*& pLast) const {
for (;;) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
if (status < 0) { // error
pLast = NULL;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) // no new block
break;
}
if (m_entries_count <= 0) {
pLast = NULL;
return 0;
}
assert(m_entries);
const long idx = m_entries_count - 1;
pLast = m_entries[idx];
assert(pLast);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 160,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lrw_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct serpent_lrw_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
be128 buf[SERPENT_PARALLEL_BLOCKS];
struct crypt_priv crypt_ctx = {
.ctx = &ctx->serpent_ctx,
.fpu_enabled = false,
};
struct lrw_crypt_req req = {
.tbuf = buf,
.tbuflen = sizeof(buf),
.table_ctx = &ctx->lrw_table,
.crypt_ctx = &crypt_ctx,
.crypt_fn = decrypt_callback,
};
int ret;
desc->flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
ret = lrw_crypt(desc, dst, src, nbytes, &req);
serpent_fpu_end(crypt_ctx.fpu_enabled);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lookup_node(unsigned long addr)
{
struct page *p;
int err;
err = get_user_pages(addr & PAGE_MASK, 1, 0, &p, NULL);
if (err >= 0) {
err = page_to_nid(p);
put_page(p);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 67,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void snd_ctl_elem_user_free(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol)
{
struct user_element *ue = kcontrol->private_data;
kfree(ue->tlv_data);
kfree(ue->priv_data);
kfree(ue);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 36,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bin_list_sasl_mechs(conn *c) {
if (!settings.sasl) {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_UNKNOWN_COMMAND, NULL,
c->binary_header.request.bodylen
- c->binary_header.request.keylen);
return;
}
init_sasl_conn(c);
const char *result_string = NULL;
unsigned int string_length = 0;
int result=sasl_listmech(c->sasl_conn, NULL,
"", /* What to prepend the string with */
" ", /* What to separate mechanisms with */
"", /* What to append to the string */
&result_string, &string_length,
NULL);
if (result != SASL_OK) {
/* Perhaps there's a better error for this... */
if (settings.verbose) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to list SASL mechanisms.\n");
}
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_AUTH_ERROR, NULL, 0);
return;
}
write_bin_response(c, (char*)result_string, 0, 0, string_length);
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 75,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 data;
if (test_bit(KVM_APIC_PV_EOI_PENDING, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention))
apic_sync_pv_eoi_from_guest(vcpu, vcpu->arch.apic);
if (!test_bit(KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC, &vcpu->arch.apic_attention))
return;
kvm_read_guest_cached(vcpu->kvm, &vcpu->arch.apic->vapic_cache, &data,
sizeof(u32));
apic_set_tpr(vcpu->arch.apic, data & 0xff);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void assertObjectHasGCInfo(const void* payload, size_t gcInfoIndex) {
ASSERT(HeapObjectHeader::fromPayload(payload)->checkHeader());
#if !defined(COMPONENT_BUILD)
ASSERT(HeapObjectHeader::fromPayload(payload)->gcInfoIndex() == gcInfoIndex);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 172,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t notsup_listxattr(FsContext *ctx, const char *path, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 7,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hstore_to_array(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
HStore *hs = PG_GETARG_HS(0);
ArrayType *out = hstore_to_array_internal(hs, 1);
PG_RETURN_POINTER(out);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 38,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: application_launch_parameters_new (GAppInfo *application,
GList *uris)
{
ApplicationLaunchParameters *result;
result = g_new0 (ApplicationLaunchParameters, 1);
result->application = g_object_ref (application);
result->uris = g_list_copy_deep (uris, (GCopyFunc) g_strdup, NULL);
return result;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ChunkedUploadDataStream::Writer::AppendData(const char* data,
int data_len,
bool is_done) {
if (!upload_data_stream_)
return false;
upload_data_stream_->AppendData(data, data_len, is_done);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Replace base::MakeUnique with std::make_unique in net/.
base/memory/ptr_util.h includes will be cleaned up later.
Bug: 755727
Change-Id: Ibaf46f05c9b02b76f9a91e819984b087a8c0d434
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/627300
Commit-Queue: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498123}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 156,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void copy_deblock_data(decoder_info_t *decoder_info, block_info_dec_t *block_info){
int size = block_info->block_pos.size;
int block_posy = block_info->block_pos.ypos/MIN_PB_SIZE;
int block_posx = block_info->block_pos.xpos/MIN_PB_SIZE;
int block_stride = decoder_info->width/MIN_PB_SIZE;
int block_index;
int m,n,m0,n0,index;
int div = size/(2*MIN_PB_SIZE);
int bwidth = block_info->block_pos.bwidth;
int bheight = block_info->block_pos.bheight;
uint8_t tb_split = block_info->block_param.tb_split > 0;
part_t pb_part = block_info->block_param.mode == MODE_INTER ? block_info->block_param.pb_part : PART_NONE; //TODO: Set pb_part properly for SKIP and BIPRED
for (m=0;m<bheight/MIN_PB_SIZE;m++){
for (n=0;n<bwidth/MIN_PB_SIZE;n++){
block_index = (block_posy+m)*block_stride + block_posx+n;
m0 = div > 0 ? m/div : 0;
n0 = div > 0 ? n/div : 0;
index = 2*m0+n0;
if (index > 3) printf("error: index=%4d\n",index);
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].cbp = block_info->cbp;
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].tb_split = tb_split;
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].pb_part = pb_part;
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].size = block_info->block_pos.size;
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].mode = block_info->block_param.mode;
if (decoder_info->bit_count.stat_frame_type == B_FRAME && decoder_info->interp_ref == 2 && block_info->block_param.mode == MODE_SKIP && block_info->block_param.skip_idx==0) {
int phase = decoder_info->frame_info.phase;
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].inter_pred.mv0 = decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].inter_pred_arr[phase].mv0;
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].inter_pred.mv1 = decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].inter_pred_arr[phase].mv0;
if (decoder_info->num_reorder_pics == 2 && phase == 1) {
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].inter_pred.mv1.x *= 2;
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].inter_pred.mv1.y *= 2;
}
}
else {
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].inter_pred.mv0 = block_info->block_param.mv_arr0[index];
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].inter_pred.mv1 = block_info->block_param.mv_arr1[index];
}
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].inter_pred.ref_idx0 = block_info->block_param.ref_idx0;
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].inter_pred.ref_idx1 = block_info->block_param.ref_idx1;
decoder_info->deblock_data[block_index].inter_pred.bipred_flag = block_info->block_param.dir;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix possible stack overflows in decoder for illegal bit streams
Fixes CVE-2018-0429
A vulnerability in the Thor decoder (available at:
https://github.com/cisco/thor) could allow an authenticated, local
attacker to cause segmentation faults and stack overflows when using a
non-conformant Thor bitstream as input.
The vulnerability is due to lack of input validation when parsing the
bitstream. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a
stack overflow and potentially inject and execute arbitrary code.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 85,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *npck_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_NPCKBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_NPCK);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Resource::LastPluginRefWasDeleted(bool instance_destroyed) {
DCHECK(resource_id_ != 0);
instance()->module()->GetCallbackTracker()->PostAbortForResource(
resource_id_);
resource_id_ = 0;
if (instance_destroyed)
instance_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 170,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BN_cmp(const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b)
{
int i;
int gt,lt;
BN_ULONG t1,t2;
if ((a == NULL) || (b == NULL))
{
if (a != NULL)
return(-1);
else if (b != NULL)
return(1);
else
return(0);
}
bn_check_top(a);
bn_check_top(b);
if (a->neg != b->neg)
{
if (a->neg)
return(-1);
else return(1);
}
if (a->neg == 0)
{ gt=1; lt= -1; }
else { gt= -1; lt=1; }
if (a->top > b->top) return(gt);
if (a->top < b->top) return(lt);
for (i=a->top-1; i>=0; i--)
{
t1=a->d[i];
t2=b->d[i];
if (t1 > t2) return(gt);
if (t1 < t2) return(lt);
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 14,542
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlFatalErr(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error, const char *info)
{
const char *errmsg;
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->disableSAX != 0) &&
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF))
return;
switch (error) {
case XML_ERR_INVALID_HEX_CHARREF:
errmsg = "CharRef: invalid hexadecimal value";
break;
case XML_ERR_INVALID_DEC_CHARREF:
errmsg = "CharRef: invalid decimal value";
break;
case XML_ERR_INVALID_CHARREF:
errmsg = "CharRef: invalid value";
break;
case XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
errmsg = "internal error";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_AT_EOF:
errmsg = "PEReference at end of document";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_IN_PROLOG:
errmsg = "PEReference in prolog";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_IN_EPILOG:
errmsg = "PEReference in epilog";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_NO_NAME:
errmsg = "PEReference: no name";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_SEMICOL_MISSING:
errmsg = "PEReference: expecting ';'";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENTITY_LOOP:
errmsg = "Detected an entity reference loop";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "EntityValue: \" or ' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENTITY_PE_INTERNAL:
errmsg = "PEReferences forbidden in internal subset";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "EntityValue: \" or ' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "AttValue: \" or ' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE:
errmsg = "Unescaped '<' not allowed in attributes values";
break;
case XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "SystemLiteral \" or ' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_LITERAL_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "Unfinished System or Public ID \" or ' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_MISPLACED_CDATA_END:
errmsg = "Sequence ']]>' not allowed in content";
break;
case XML_ERR_URI_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "SYSTEM or PUBLIC, the URI is missing";
break;
case XML_ERR_PUBID_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "PUBLIC, the Public Identifier is missing";
break;
case XML_ERR_HYPHEN_IN_COMMENT:
errmsg = "Comment must not contain '--' (double-hyphen)";
break;
case XML_ERR_PI_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "xmlParsePI : no target name";
break;
case XML_ERR_RESERVED_XML_NAME:
errmsg = "Invalid PI name";
break;
case XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "NOTATION: Name expected here";
break;
case XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "'>' required to close NOTATION declaration";
break;
case XML_ERR_VALUE_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "Entity value required";
break;
case XML_ERR_URI_FRAGMENT:
errmsg = "Fragment not allowed";
break;
case XML_ERR_ATTLIST_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "'(' required to start ATTLIST enumeration";
break;
case XML_ERR_NMTOKEN_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "NmToken expected in ATTLIST enumeration";
break;
case XML_ERR_ATTLIST_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "')' required to finish ATTLIST enumeration";
break;
case XML_ERR_MIXED_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "MixedContentDecl : '|' or ')*' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_PCDATA_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "MixedContentDecl : '#PCDATA' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "ContentDecl : Name or '(' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_ELEMCONTENT_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "ContentDecl : ',' '|' or ')' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_PEREF_IN_INT_SUBSET:
errmsg =
"PEReference: forbidden within markup decl in internal subset";
break;
case XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "expected '>'";
break;
case XML_ERR_CONDSEC_INVALID:
errmsg = "XML conditional section '[' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_EXT_SUBSET_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "Content error in the external subset";
break;
case XML_ERR_CONDSEC_INVALID_KEYWORD:
errmsg =
"conditional section INCLUDE or IGNORE keyword expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_CONDSEC_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "XML conditional section not closed";
break;
case XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "Text declaration '<?xml' required";
break;
case XML_ERR_XMLDECL_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "parsing XML declaration: '?>' expected";
break;
case XML_ERR_EXT_ENTITY_STANDALONE:
errmsg = "external parsed entities cannot be standalone";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING:
errmsg = "EntityRef: expecting ';'";
break;
case XML_ERR_DOCTYPE_NOT_FINISHED:
errmsg = "DOCTYPE improperly terminated";
break;
case XML_ERR_LTSLASH_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "EndTag: '</' not found";
break;
case XML_ERR_EQUAL_REQUIRED:
errmsg = "expected '='";
break;
case XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_CLOSED:
errmsg = "String not closed expecting \" or '";
break;
case XML_ERR_STRING_NOT_STARTED:
errmsg = "String not started expecting ' or \"";
break;
case XML_ERR_ENCODING_NAME:
errmsg = "Invalid XML encoding name";
break;
case XML_ERR_STANDALONE_VALUE:
errmsg = "standalone accepts only 'yes' or 'no'";
break;
case XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY:
errmsg = "Document is empty";
break;
case XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END:
errmsg = "Extra content at the end of the document";
break;
case XML_ERR_NOT_WELL_BALANCED:
errmsg = "chunk is not well balanced";
break;
case XML_ERR_EXTRA_CONTENT:
errmsg = "extra content at the end of well balanced chunk";
break;
case XML_ERR_VERSION_MISSING:
errmsg = "Malformed declaration expecting version";
break;
case XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG:
errmsg = "Name too long use XML_PARSE_HUGE option";
break;
#if 0
case:
errmsg = "";
break;
#endif
default:
errmsg = "Unregistered error message";
}
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->errNo = error;
if (info == NULL) {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_PARSER, error,
XML_ERR_FATAL, NULL, 0, info, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, "%s\n",
errmsg);
} else {
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_PARSER, error,
XML_ERR_FATAL, NULL, 0, info, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, "%s: %s\n",
errmsg, info);
}
if (ctxt != NULL) {
ctxt->wellFormed = 0;
if (ctxt->recovery == 0)
ctxt->disableSAX = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 59,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TextTrackCueList::TraceWrappers(
const ScriptWrappableVisitor* visitor) const {
for (auto cue : list_) {
visitor->TraceWrappers(cue);
}
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,052
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipxitf_insert(struct ipx_interface *intrfc)
{
spin_lock_bh(&ipx_interfaces_lock);
list_add_tail(&intrfc->node, &ipx_interfaces);
spin_unlock_bh(&ipx_interfaces_lock);
if (ipxcfg_auto_select_primary && !ipx_primary_net)
ipx_primary_net = intrfc;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t tcpr_random(uint32_t *seed)
{
unsigned int next = *seed;
int result;
next *= 1103515245;
next += 12345;
result = (unsigned int) (next / 65536) % 2048;
next *= 1103515245;
next += 12345;
result <<= 10;
result ^= (unsigned int) (next / 65536) % 1024;
next *= 1103515245;
next += 12345;
result <<= 10;
result ^= (unsigned int) (next / 65536) % 1024;
*seed = next;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Bug #520 Fix heap overflow on zero or 0xFFFF packet length
Add check for packets that report zero packet length. Example
of fix:
src/tcpprep --auto=bridge --pcap=poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow --cachefile=/dev/null
Warning: poc16-get_l2len-heapoverflow was captured using a snaplen of 17 bytes. This may mean you have truncated packets.
safe_pcap_next ERROR: Invalid packet length in tcpprep.c:process_raw_packets() line 334: packet length=0 capture length=0
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,350
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: channel_free(Channel *c)
{
char *s;
u_int i, n;
struct channel_confirm *cc;
for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++)
if (channels[i])
n++;
debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self,
c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n);
s = channel_open_message();
debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s);
free(s);
if (c->sock != -1)
shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR);
channel_close_fds(c);
buffer_free(&c->input);
buffer_free(&c->output);
buffer_free(&c->extended);
free(c->remote_name);
c->remote_name = NULL;
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
free(c->listening_addr);
c->listening_addr = NULL;
while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) {
if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
free(cc);
}
if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL)
c->filter_cleanup(c->self, c->filter_ctx);
channels[c->self] = NULL;
free(c);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,244
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DoResolveRelativeHost(const char* base_url,
const url_parse::Parsed& base_parsed,
const CHAR* relative_url,
const url_parse::Component& relative_component,
CharsetConverter* query_converter,
CanonOutput* output,
url_parse::Parsed* out_parsed) {
url_parse::Parsed relative_parsed; // Everything but the scheme is valid.
url_parse::ParseAfterScheme(&relative_url[relative_component.begin],
relative_component.len, relative_component.begin,
&relative_parsed);
Replacements<CHAR> replacements;
replacements.SetUsername(relative_url, relative_parsed.username);
replacements.SetPassword(relative_url, relative_parsed.password);
replacements.SetHost(relative_url, relative_parsed.host);
replacements.SetPort(relative_url, relative_parsed.port);
replacements.SetPath(relative_url, relative_parsed.path);
replacements.SetQuery(relative_url, relative_parsed.query);
replacements.SetRef(relative_url, relative_parsed.ref);
return ReplaceStandardURL(base_url, base_parsed, replacements,
query_converter, output, out_parsed);
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB read when parsing protocol-relative URLs
BUG=285742
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23902014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@223735 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,192
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ztype(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
ref tnref;
int code = array_get(imemory, op, (long)r_btype(op - 1), &tnref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_has_type(&tnref, t_name)) {
/* Must be either a stack underflow or a t_[a]struct. */
check_op(2);
{ /* Get the type name from the structure. */
if (op[-1].value.pstruct != 0x00) {
const char *sname =
gs_struct_type_name_string(gs_object_type(imemory,
op[-1].value.pstruct));
int code = name_ref(imemory, (const byte *)sname, strlen(sname),
(ref *) (op - 1), 0);
if (code < 0)
return code;
} else
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
}
r_set_attrs(op - 1, a_executable);
} else {
ref_assign(op - 1, &tnref);
}
pop(1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 1
| 164,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void unregister_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt * fmt)
{
write_lock(&binfmt_lock);
list_del(&fmt->lh);
write_unlock(&binfmt_lock);
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 30,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderBlockFlow::hitTestFloats(const HitTestRequest& request, HitTestResult& result, const HitTestLocation& locationInContainer, const LayoutPoint& accumulatedOffset)
{
if (!m_floatingObjects)
return false;
LayoutPoint adjustedLocation = accumulatedOffset;
if (isRenderView()) {
adjustedLocation += toLayoutSize(toRenderView(this)->frameView()->scrollPosition());
}
const FloatingObjectSet& floatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator begin = floatingObjectSet.begin();
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = floatingObjectSet.end(); it != begin;) {
--it;
FloatingObject* floatingObject = *it;
if (floatingObject->shouldPaint() && !floatingObject->renderer()->hasSelfPaintingLayer()) {
LayoutUnit xOffset = xPositionForFloatIncludingMargin(floatingObject) - floatingObject->renderer()->x();
LayoutUnit yOffset = yPositionForFloatIncludingMargin(floatingObject) - floatingObject->renderer()->y();
LayoutPoint childPoint = flipFloatForWritingModeForChild(floatingObject, adjustedLocation + LayoutSize(xOffset, yOffset));
if (floatingObject->renderer()->hitTest(request, result, locationInContainer, childPoint)) {
updateHitTestResult(result, locationInContainer.point() - toLayoutSize(childPoint));
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 116,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const VP56mv *get_bmv_ptr(const VP8Macroblock *mb, int subblock)
{
return &mb->bmv[mb->mode == VP8_MVMODE_SPLIT ? vp8_mbsplits[mb->partitioning][subblock] : 0];
}
Commit Message: avcodec/webp: Always set pix_fmt
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1434/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6314998085189632
Fixes: 1435/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-6483783723253760
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: "Ronald S. Bultje" <rsbultje@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 63,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pmcraid_querycfg(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd)
{
struct pmcraid_ioarcb *ioarcb = &cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb;
struct pmcraid_ioadl_desc *ioadl = ioarcb->add_data.u.ioadl;
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance = cmd->drv_inst;
int cfg_table_size = cpu_to_be32(sizeof(struct pmcraid_config_table));
if (be16_to_cpu(pinstance->inq_data->fw_version) <=
PMCRAID_FW_VERSION_1)
pinstance->config_table_entry_size =
sizeof(struct pmcraid_config_table_entry);
else
pinstance->config_table_entry_size =
sizeof(struct pmcraid_config_table_entry_ext);
ioarcb->request_type = REQ_TYPE_IOACMD;
ioarcb->resource_handle = cpu_to_le32(PMCRAID_IOA_RES_HANDLE);
ioarcb->cdb[0] = PMCRAID_QUERY_IOA_CONFIG;
/* firmware requires 4-byte length field, specified in B.E format */
memcpy(&(ioarcb->cdb[10]), &cfg_table_size, sizeof(cfg_table_size));
/* Since entire config table can be described by single IOADL, it can
* be part of IOARCB itself
*/
ioarcb->ioadl_bus_addr = cpu_to_le64((cmd->ioa_cb_bus_addr) +
offsetof(struct pmcraid_ioarcb,
add_data.u.ioadl[0]));
ioarcb->ioadl_length = cpu_to_le32(sizeof(struct pmcraid_ioadl_desc));
ioarcb->ioarcb_bus_addr &= ~(0x1FULL);
ioarcb->request_flags0 |= NO_LINK_DESCS;
ioarcb->data_transfer_length =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(struct pmcraid_config_table));
ioadl = &(ioarcb->add_data.u.ioadl[0]);
ioadl->flags = IOADL_FLAGS_LAST_DESC;
ioadl->address = cpu_to_le64(pinstance->cfg_table_bus_addr);
ioadl->data_len = cpu_to_le32(sizeof(struct pmcraid_config_table));
pmcraid_send_cmd(cmd, pmcraid_init_res_table,
PMCRAID_INTERNAL_TIMEOUT, pmcraid_timeout_handler);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AutofillManager::ShouldShowScanCreditCard(const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field) {
if (!client_->HasCreditCardScanFeature())
return false;
AutofillField* autofill_field = GetAutofillField(form, field);
if (!autofill_field)
return false;
bool is_card_number_field =
autofill_field->Type().GetStorableType() == CREDIT_CARD_NUMBER &&
base::ContainsOnlyChars(CreditCard::StripSeparators(field.value),
base::ASCIIToUTF16("0123456789"));
bool is_scannable_name_on_card_field =
autofill_field->Type().GetStorableType() == CREDIT_CARD_NAME_FULL &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kAutofillScanCardholderName);
if (!is_card_number_field && !is_scannable_name_on_card_field)
return false;
if (IsFormNonSecure(form))
return false;
static const int kShowScanCreditCardMaxValueLength = 6;
return field.value.size() <= kShowScanCreditCardMaxValueLength;
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::UpdateItemInPersistentStore(
DownloadItem* item) {
download_history_->UpdateEntry(item);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void iucv_callback_connrej(struct iucv_path *path, u8 ipuser[16])
{
struct sock *sk = path->private;
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_CLOSED)
return;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
iucv_sever_path(sk, 1);
sk->sk_state = IUCV_DISCONN;
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteWEBPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
Image *image)
{
const char
*value;
int
webp_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register uint32_t
*restrict q;
ssize_t
y;
WebPConfig
configure;
WebPPicture
picture;
WebPAuxStats
statistics;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->columns > 16383UL) || (image->rows > 16383UL))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
if ((WebPPictureInit(&picture) == 0) || (WebPConfigInit(&configure) == 0))
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToEncodeImageFile");
picture.writer=WebPEncodeWriter;
picture.custom_ptr=(void *) image;
#if WEBP_DECODER_ABI_VERSION >= 0x0100
picture.progress_hook=WebPEncodeProgress;
#endif
picture.stats=(&statistics);
picture.width=(int) image->columns;
picture.height=(int) image->rows;
picture.argb_stride=(int) image->columns;
picture.use_argb=1;
if (image->quality != UndefinedCompressionQuality)
configure.quality=(float) image->quality;
if (image->quality >= 100)
configure.lossless=1;
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:lossless");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.lossless=(int) ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:method");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.method=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:image-hint");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
{
if (LocaleCompare(value,"default") == 0)
configure.image_hint=WEBP_HINT_DEFAULT;
if (LocaleCompare(value,"photo") == 0)
configure.image_hint=WEBP_HINT_PHOTO;
if (LocaleCompare(value,"picture") == 0)
configure.image_hint=WEBP_HINT_PICTURE;
#if WEBP_DECODER_ABI_VERSION >= 0x0200
if (LocaleCompare(value,"graph") == 0)
configure.image_hint=WEBP_HINT_GRAPH;
#endif
}
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:target-size");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.target_size=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:target-psnr");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.target_PSNR=(float) StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:segments");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.segments=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:sns-strength");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.sns_strength=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:filter-strength");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.filter_strength=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:filter-sharpness");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.filter_sharpness=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:filter-type");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.filter_type=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:auto-filter");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.autofilter=(int) ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:alpha-compression");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.alpha_compression=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:alpha-filtering");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.alpha_filtering=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:alpha-quality");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.alpha_quality=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:pass");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.pass=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:show-compressed");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.show_compressed=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:preprocessing");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.preprocessing=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:partitions");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.partitions=StringToInteger(value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:partition-limit");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.partition_limit=StringToInteger(value);
#if WEBP_DECODER_ABI_VERSION >= 0x0201
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:emulate-jpeg-size");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.emulate_jpeg_size=(int) ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:low-memory");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.low_memory=(int) ParseCommandOption(MagickBooleanOptions,
MagickFalse,value);
value=GetImageOption(image_info,"webp:thread-level");
if (value != (char *) NULL)
configure.thread_level=StringToInteger(value);
#endif
if (WebPValidateConfig(&configure) == 0)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"UnableToEncodeImageFile");
/*
Allocate memory for pixels.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
sizeof(*picture.argb));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
picture.argb=(uint32_t *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
/*
Convert image to WebP raster pixels.
*/
q=picture.argb;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(uint32_t) (image->matte != MagickFalse ?
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelAlpha(p)) << 24 : 0xff000000u) |
(ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p)) << 16) |
(ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p)) << 8) |
(ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p)));
p++;
}
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
webp_status=WebPEncode(&configure,&picture);
if (webp_status == 0)
{
const char
*message;
switch (picture.error_code)
{
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY:
{
message="out of memory";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_BITSTREAM_OUT_OF_MEMORY:
{
message="bitstream out of memory";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_NULL_PARAMETER:
{
message="NULL parameter";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_INVALID_CONFIGURATION:
{
message="invalid configuration";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_BAD_DIMENSION:
{
message="bad dimension";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_PARTITION0_OVERFLOW:
{
message="partition 0 overflow (> 512K)";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_PARTITION_OVERFLOW:
{
message="partition overflow (> 16M)";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_BAD_WRITE:
{
message="bad write";
break;
}
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_FILE_TOO_BIG:
{
message="file too big (> 4GB)";
break;
}
#if WEBP_DECODER_ABI_VERSION >= 0x0100
case VP8_ENC_ERROR_USER_ABORT:
{
message="user abort";
break;
}
#endif
default:
{
message="unknown exception";
break;
}
}
(void) ThrowMagickException(&image->exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,(char *) message,"`%s'",image->filename);
}
picture.argb=(uint32_t *) NULL;
WebPPictureFree(&picture);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(webp_status == 0 ? MagickFalse : MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GrantDeleteFrom(
int child_id, const base::FilePath& dir) {
GrantPermissionsForFile(child_id, dir, DELETE_FILE_GRANT);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,151
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vmw_surface_handle_reference(struct vmw_private *dev_priv,
struct drm_file *file_priv,
uint32_t u_handle,
enum drm_vmw_handle_type handle_type,
struct ttm_base_object **base_p)
{
struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
struct vmw_user_surface *user_srf;
uint32_t handle;
struct ttm_base_object *base;
int ret;
bool require_exist = false;
if (handle_type == DRM_VMW_HANDLE_PRIME) {
ret = ttm_prime_fd_to_handle(tfile, u_handle, &handle);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
} else {
if (unlikely(drm_is_render_client(file_priv)))
require_exist = true;
if (ACCESS_ONCE(vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->locked_master)) {
DRM_ERROR("Locked master refused legacy "
"surface reference.\n");
return -EACCES;
}
handle = u_handle;
}
ret = -EINVAL;
base = ttm_base_object_lookup_for_ref(dev_priv->tdev, handle);
if (unlikely(!base)) {
DRM_ERROR("Could not find surface to reference.\n");
goto out_no_lookup;
}
if (unlikely(ttm_base_object_type(base) != VMW_RES_SURFACE)) {
DRM_ERROR("Referenced object is not a surface.\n");
goto out_bad_resource;
}
if (handle_type != DRM_VMW_HANDLE_PRIME) {
user_srf = container_of(base, struct vmw_user_surface,
prime.base);
/*
* Make sure the surface creator has the same
* authenticating master, or is already registered with us.
*/
if (drm_is_primary_client(file_priv) &&
user_srf->master != file_priv->master)
require_exist = true;
ret = ttm_ref_object_add(tfile, base, TTM_REF_USAGE, NULL,
require_exist);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
DRM_ERROR("Could not add a reference to a surface.\n");
goto out_bad_resource;
}
}
*base_p = base;
return 0;
out_bad_resource:
ttm_base_object_unref(&base);
out_no_lookup:
if (handle_type == DRM_VMW_HANDLE_PRIME)
(void) ttm_ref_object_base_unref(tfile, handle, TTM_REF_USAGE);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <murray.mcallister@insomniasec.com>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <syeh@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <drawat@vmware.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 64,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutoFillManager::OnLoadedAutoFillHeuristics(
const std::string& heuristic_xml) {
UploadRequired upload_required;
FormStructure::ParseQueryResponse(heuristic_xml,
form_structures_.get(),
&upload_required,
*metric_logger_);
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void destroy_cfs_bandwidth(struct cfs_bandwidth *cfs_b) {}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 92,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~TransientWindowObserver() {}
Commit Message: Removed requirement for ash::Window::transient_parent() presence for system modal dialogs.
BUG=130420
TEST=SystemModalContainerLayoutManagerTest.ModalTransientAndNonTransient
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10514012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@140647 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 105,267
|
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