instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cs_fail(const char *cs_name, int subr, const char *fmt, ...)
{
char buf[SMALL_BUF_SIZE];
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsprintf(buf, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (cs_name == NULL)
pdftex_warn("Subr (%i): %s", (int) subr, buf);
else
pdftex_warn("CharString (/%s): %s", cs_name, buf);
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 76,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry **pce;
zval *obj;
zval *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp(name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp(name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (!ent1->data) {
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
int new_len=0;
unsigned char *new_str;
new_str = php_base64_decode(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data), &new_len);
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data));
Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data) = new_str;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) = new_len;
}
/* Call __wakeup() method on the object. */
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zval *fname, *retval = NULL;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__wakeup", 1);
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (ent2->type == ST_FIELD && ent2->data == NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
if (zend_hash_find(EG(class_table), Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data),
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data)+1, (void **) &pce)==FAILURE) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = &PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
/* Initialize target object */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(obj);
object_init_ex(obj, *pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP_P(obj),
Z_ARRVAL_P(ent2->data),
(void (*)(void *)) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(obj, Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ent2->data = obj;
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE_P(ent2->data);
Z_DELREF_P(ent1->data);
add_property_zval(ent2->data, ent1->varname, ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname)+1, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = NULL;
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72749: wddx_deserialize allows illegal memory access
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 50,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::DidReceiveResponse(
ResourceLoader* loader,
network::ResourceResponse* response) {
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info = loader->GetRequestInfo();
net::URLRequest* request = loader->request();
if (delegate_)
delegate_->OnResponseStarted(request, info->GetContext(), response);
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 152,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CameraClient::lockIfMessageWanted(int32_t msgType) {
int sleepCount = 0;
while (mMsgEnabled & msgType) {
if (mLock.tryLock() == NO_ERROR) {
if (sleepCount > 0) {
LOG1("lockIfMessageWanted(%d): waited for %d ms",
msgType, sleepCount * CHECK_MESSAGE_INTERVAL);
}
return true;
}
if (sleepCount++ == 0) {
LOG1("lockIfMessageWanted(%d): enter sleep", msgType);
}
usleep(CHECK_MESSAGE_INTERVAL * 1000);
}
ALOGW("lockIfMessageWanted(%d): dropped unwanted message", msgType);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static av_cold int dnxhd_decode_init_thread_copy(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
DNXHDContext *ctx = avctx->priv_data;
ctx->avctx = avctx;
ctx->cid = -1;
ctx->rows = av_mallocz_array(avctx->thread_count, sizeof(RowContext));
if (!ctx->rows)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dnxhddec: Move mb height check out of non hr branch
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: poc.dnxhd
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 63,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int device_cmp(struct nf_conn *i, void *ifindex)
{
const struct nf_conn_nat *nat = nfct_nat(i);
if (!nat)
return 0;
if (nf_ct_l3num(i) != NFPROTO_IPV4)
return 0;
return nat->masq_index == (int)(long)ifindex;
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 54,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: node_get_ed25519_id(const node_t *node)
{
if (node->ri) {
if (node->ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert) {
const ed25519_public_key_t *pk =
&node->ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key;
if (BUG(ed25519_public_key_is_zero(pk)))
goto try_the_md;
return pk;
}
}
try_the_md:
if (node->md) {
if (node->md->ed25519_identity_pkey) {
return node->md->ed25519_identity_pkey;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 69,782
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void radeon_atombios_get_power_modes(struct radeon_device *rdev)
{
struct radeon_mode_info *mode_info = &rdev->mode_info;
int index = GetIndexIntoMasterTable(DATA, PowerPlayInfo);
u16 data_offset;
u8 frev, crev;
u32 misc, misc2 = 0, sclk, mclk;
union power_info *power_info;
struct _ATOM_PPLIB_NONCLOCK_INFO *non_clock_info;
struct _ATOM_PPLIB_STATE *power_state;
int num_modes = 0, i, j;
int state_index = 0, mode_index = 0;
struct radeon_i2c_bus_rec i2c_bus;
rdev->pm.default_power_state = NULL;
if (atom_parse_data_header(mode_info->atom_context, index, NULL,
&frev, &crev, &data_offset)) {
power_info = (union power_info *)(mode_info->atom_context->bios + data_offset);
if (frev < 4) {
/* add the i2c bus for thermal/fan chip */
if (power_info->info.ucOverdriveThermalController > 0) {
DRM_INFO("Possible %s thermal controller at 0x%02x\n",
thermal_controller_names[power_info->info.ucOverdriveThermalController],
power_info->info.ucOverdriveControllerAddress >> 1);
i2c_bus = radeon_lookup_i2c_gpio(rdev, power_info->info.ucOverdriveI2cLine);
rdev->pm.i2c_bus = radeon_i2c_create(rdev->ddev, &i2c_bus, "Thermal");
}
num_modes = power_info->info.ucNumOfPowerModeEntries;
if (num_modes > ATOM_MAX_NUMBEROF_POWER_BLOCK)
num_modes = ATOM_MAX_NUMBEROF_POWER_BLOCK;
for (i = 0; i < num_modes; i++) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.type = VOLTAGE_NONE;
switch (frev) {
case 1:
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].num_clock_modes = 1;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].mclk =
le16_to_cpu(power_info->info.asPowerPlayInfo[i].usMemoryClock);
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].sclk =
le16_to_cpu(power_info->info.asPowerPlayInfo[i].usEngineClock);
/* skip invalid modes */
if ((rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].mclk == 0) ||
(rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].sclk == 0))
continue;
/* skip overclock modes for now */
if ((rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].mclk >
rdev->clock.default_mclk + RADEON_MODE_OVERCLOCK_MARGIN) ||
(rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].sclk >
rdev->clock.default_sclk + RADEON_MODE_OVERCLOCK_MARGIN))
continue;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].non_clock_info.pcie_lanes =
power_info->info.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ucNumPciELanes;
misc = le32_to_cpu(power_info->info.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ulMiscInfo);
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_VOLTAGE_DROP_SUPPORT) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.type =
VOLTAGE_GPIO;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.gpio =
radeon_lookup_gpio(rdev,
power_info->info.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ucVoltageDropIndex);
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_VOLTAGE_DROP_ACTIVE_HIGH)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.active_high =
true;
else
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.active_high =
false;
} else if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_PROGRAM_VOLTAGE) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.type =
VOLTAGE_VDDC;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.vddc_id =
power_info->info.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ucVoltageDropIndex;
}
/* order matters! */
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_POWER_SAVING_MODE)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_POWERSAVE;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_DEFAULT_DC_STATE_ENTRY_TRUE)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BATTERY;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_DEFAULT_LOW_DC_STATE_ENTRY_TRUE)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BATTERY;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_LOAD_BALANCE_EN)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BALANCED;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_3D_ACCELERATION_EN)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_PERFORMANCE;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_DRIVER_DEFAULT_MODE) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_DEFAULT;
rdev->pm.default_power_state = &rdev->pm.power_state[state_index];
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].default_clock_mode =
&rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0];
}
state_index++;
break;
case 2:
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].num_clock_modes = 1;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].mclk =
le32_to_cpu(power_info->info_2.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ulMemoryClock);
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].sclk =
le32_to_cpu(power_info->info_2.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ulEngineClock);
/* skip invalid modes */
if ((rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].mclk == 0) ||
(rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].sclk == 0))
continue;
/* skip overclock modes for now */
if ((rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].mclk >
rdev->clock.default_mclk + RADEON_MODE_OVERCLOCK_MARGIN) ||
(rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].sclk >
rdev->clock.default_sclk + RADEON_MODE_OVERCLOCK_MARGIN))
continue;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].non_clock_info.pcie_lanes =
power_info->info_2.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ucNumPciELanes;
misc = le32_to_cpu(power_info->info_2.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ulMiscInfo);
misc2 = le32_to_cpu(power_info->info_2.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ulMiscInfo2);
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_VOLTAGE_DROP_SUPPORT) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.type =
VOLTAGE_GPIO;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.gpio =
radeon_lookup_gpio(rdev,
power_info->info_2.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ucVoltageDropIndex);
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_VOLTAGE_DROP_ACTIVE_HIGH)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.active_high =
true;
else
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.active_high =
false;
} else if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_PROGRAM_VOLTAGE) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.type =
VOLTAGE_VDDC;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.vddc_id =
power_info->info_2.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ucVoltageDropIndex;
}
/* order matters! */
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_POWER_SAVING_MODE)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_POWERSAVE;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_DEFAULT_DC_STATE_ENTRY_TRUE)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BATTERY;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_DEFAULT_LOW_DC_STATE_ENTRY_TRUE)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BATTERY;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_LOAD_BALANCE_EN)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BALANCED;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_3D_ACCELERATION_EN)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_PERFORMANCE;
if (misc2 & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO2_SYSTEM_AC_LITE_MODE)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BALANCED;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_DRIVER_DEFAULT_MODE) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_DEFAULT;
rdev->pm.default_power_state = &rdev->pm.power_state[state_index];
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].default_clock_mode =
&rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0];
}
state_index++;
break;
case 3:
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].num_clock_modes = 1;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].mclk =
le32_to_cpu(power_info->info_3.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ulMemoryClock);
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].sclk =
le32_to_cpu(power_info->info_3.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ulEngineClock);
/* skip invalid modes */
if ((rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].mclk == 0) ||
(rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].sclk == 0))
continue;
/* skip overclock modes for now */
if ((rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].mclk >
rdev->clock.default_mclk + RADEON_MODE_OVERCLOCK_MARGIN) ||
(rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].sclk >
rdev->clock.default_sclk + RADEON_MODE_OVERCLOCK_MARGIN))
continue;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].non_clock_info.pcie_lanes =
power_info->info_3.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ucNumPciELanes;
misc = le32_to_cpu(power_info->info_3.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ulMiscInfo);
misc2 = le32_to_cpu(power_info->info_3.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ulMiscInfo2);
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_VOLTAGE_DROP_SUPPORT) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.type =
VOLTAGE_GPIO;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.gpio =
radeon_lookup_gpio(rdev,
power_info->info_3.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ucVoltageDropIndex);
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_VOLTAGE_DROP_ACTIVE_HIGH)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.active_high =
true;
else
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.active_high =
false;
} else if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_PROGRAM_VOLTAGE) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.type =
VOLTAGE_VDDC;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.vddc_id =
power_info->info_3.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ucVoltageDropIndex;
if (misc2 & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO2_VDDCI_DYNAMIC_VOLTAGE_EN) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.vddci_enabled =
true;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.vddci_id =
power_info->info_3.asPowerPlayInfo[i].ucVDDCI_VoltageDropIndex;
}
}
/* order matters! */
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_POWER_SAVING_MODE)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_POWERSAVE;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_DEFAULT_DC_STATE_ENTRY_TRUE)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BATTERY;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_DEFAULT_LOW_DC_STATE_ENTRY_TRUE)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BATTERY;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_LOAD_BALANCE_EN)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BALANCED;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_3D_ACCELERATION_EN)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_PERFORMANCE;
if (misc2 & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO2_SYSTEM_AC_LITE_MODE)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BALANCED;
if (misc & ATOM_PM_MISCINFO_DRIVER_DEFAULT_MODE) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_DEFAULT;
rdev->pm.default_power_state = &rdev->pm.power_state[state_index];
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].default_clock_mode =
&rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0];
}
state_index++;
break;
}
}
} else if (frev == 4) {
/* add the i2c bus for thermal/fan chip */
/* no support for internal controller yet */
if (power_info->info_4.sThermalController.ucType > 0) {
if ((power_info->info_4.sThermalController.ucType == ATOM_PP_THERMALCONTROLLER_RV6xx) ||
(power_info->info_4.sThermalController.ucType == ATOM_PP_THERMALCONTROLLER_RV770)) {
DRM_INFO("Internal thermal controller %s fan control\n",
(power_info->info_4.sThermalController.ucFanParameters &
ATOM_PP_FANPARAMETERS_NOFAN) ? "without" : "with");
} else {
DRM_INFO("Possible %s thermal controller at 0x%02x %s fan control\n",
pp_lib_thermal_controller_names[power_info->info_4.sThermalController.ucType],
power_info->info_4.sThermalController.ucI2cAddress >> 1,
(power_info->info_4.sThermalController.ucFanParameters &
ATOM_PP_FANPARAMETERS_NOFAN) ? "without" : "with");
i2c_bus = radeon_lookup_i2c_gpio(rdev, power_info->info_4.sThermalController.ucI2cLine);
rdev->pm.i2c_bus = radeon_i2c_create(rdev->ddev, &i2c_bus, "Thermal");
}
}
for (i = 0; i < power_info->info_4.ucNumStates; i++) {
mode_index = 0;
power_state = (struct _ATOM_PPLIB_STATE *)
(mode_info->atom_context->bios +
data_offset +
le16_to_cpu(power_info->info_4.usStateArrayOffset) +
i * power_info->info_4.ucStateEntrySize);
non_clock_info = (struct _ATOM_PPLIB_NONCLOCK_INFO *)
(mode_info->atom_context->bios +
data_offset +
le16_to_cpu(power_info->info_4.usNonClockInfoArrayOffset) +
(power_state->ucNonClockStateIndex *
power_info->info_4.ucNonClockSize));
for (j = 0; j < (power_info->info_4.ucStateEntrySize - 1); j++) {
if (rdev->flags & RADEON_IS_IGP) {
struct _ATOM_PPLIB_RS780_CLOCK_INFO *clock_info =
(struct _ATOM_PPLIB_RS780_CLOCK_INFO *)
(mode_info->atom_context->bios +
data_offset +
le16_to_cpu(power_info->info_4.usClockInfoArrayOffset) +
(power_state->ucClockStateIndices[j] *
power_info->info_4.ucClockInfoSize));
sclk = le16_to_cpu(clock_info->usLowEngineClockLow);
sclk |= clock_info->ucLowEngineClockHigh << 16;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].sclk = sclk;
/* skip invalid modes */
if (rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].sclk == 0)
continue;
/* skip overclock modes for now */
if (rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].sclk >
rdev->clock.default_sclk + RADEON_MODE_OVERCLOCK_MARGIN)
continue;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].voltage.type =
VOLTAGE_SW;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].voltage.voltage =
clock_info->usVDDC;
mode_index++;
} else {
struct _ATOM_PPLIB_R600_CLOCK_INFO *clock_info =
(struct _ATOM_PPLIB_R600_CLOCK_INFO *)
(mode_info->atom_context->bios +
data_offset +
le16_to_cpu(power_info->info_4.usClockInfoArrayOffset) +
(power_state->ucClockStateIndices[j] *
power_info->info_4.ucClockInfoSize));
sclk = le16_to_cpu(clock_info->usEngineClockLow);
sclk |= clock_info->ucEngineClockHigh << 16;
mclk = le16_to_cpu(clock_info->usMemoryClockLow);
mclk |= clock_info->ucMemoryClockHigh << 16;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].mclk = mclk;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].sclk = sclk;
/* skip invalid modes */
if ((rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].mclk == 0) ||
(rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].sclk == 0))
continue;
/* skip overclock modes for now */
if ((rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].mclk >
rdev->clock.default_mclk + RADEON_MODE_OVERCLOCK_MARGIN) ||
(rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].sclk >
rdev->clock.default_sclk + RADEON_MODE_OVERCLOCK_MARGIN))
continue;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].voltage.type =
VOLTAGE_SW;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index].voltage.voltage =
clock_info->usVDDC;
mode_index++;
}
}
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].num_clock_modes = mode_index;
if (mode_index) {
misc = le32_to_cpu(non_clock_info->ulCapsAndSettings);
misc2 = le16_to_cpu(non_clock_info->usClassification);
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].non_clock_info.pcie_lanes =
((misc & ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_MASK) >>
ATOM_PPLIB_PCIE_LINK_WIDTH_SHIFT) + 1;
switch (misc2 & ATOM_PPLIB_CLASSIFICATION_UI_MASK) {
case ATOM_PPLIB_CLASSIFICATION_UI_BATTERY:
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BATTERY;
break;
case ATOM_PPLIB_CLASSIFICATION_UI_BALANCED:
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_BALANCED;
break;
case ATOM_PPLIB_CLASSIFICATION_UI_PERFORMANCE:
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_PERFORMANCE;
break;
}
if (misc2 & ATOM_PPLIB_CLASSIFICATION_BOOT) {
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_DEFAULT;
rdev->pm.default_power_state = &rdev->pm.power_state[state_index];
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].default_clock_mode =
&rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[mode_index - 1];
}
state_index++;
}
}
}
} else {
/* XXX figure out some good default low power mode for cards w/out power tables */
}
if (rdev->pm.default_power_state == NULL) {
/* add the default mode */
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].type =
POWER_STATE_TYPE_DEFAULT;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].num_clock_modes = 1;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].mclk = rdev->clock.default_mclk;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].sclk = rdev->clock.default_sclk;
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].default_clock_mode =
&rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0];
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].clock_info[0].voltage.type = VOLTAGE_NONE;
if (rdev->asic->get_pcie_lanes)
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].non_clock_info.pcie_lanes = radeon_get_pcie_lanes(rdev);
else
rdev->pm.power_state[state_index].non_clock_info.pcie_lanes = 16;
rdev->pm.default_power_state = &rdev->pm.power_state[state_index];
state_index++;
}
rdev->pm.num_power_states = state_index;
rdev->pm.current_power_state = rdev->pm.default_power_state;
rdev->pm.current_clock_mode =
rdev->pm.default_power_state->default_clock_mode;
}
Commit Message: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,194
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int udf_build_ustr(struct ustr *dest, dstring *ptr, int size)
{
int usesize;
if (!dest || !ptr || !size)
return -1;
BUG_ON(size < 2);
usesize = min_t(size_t, ptr[size - 1], sizeof(dest->u_name));
usesize = min(usesize, size - 2);
dest->u_cmpID = ptr[0];
dest->u_len = usesize;
memcpy(dest->u_name, ptr + 1, usesize);
memset(dest->u_name + usesize, 0, sizeof(dest->u_name) - usesize);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: udf: Check path length when reading symlink
Symlink reading code does not check whether the resulting path fits into
the page provided by the generic code. This isn't as easy as just
checking the symlink size because of various encoding conversions we
perform on path. So we have to check whether there is still enough space
in the buffer on the fly.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Carl Henrik Lunde <chlunde@ping.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 45,271
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __init static int tracer_alloc_buffers(void)
{
int ring_buf_size;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
/*
* Make sure we don't accidently add more trace options
* than we have bits for.
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(TRACE_ITER_LAST_BIT > TRACE_FLAGS_MAX_SIZE);
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&tracing_buffer_mask, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out;
if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&global_trace.tracing_cpumask, GFP_KERNEL))
goto out_free_buffer_mask;
/* Only allocate trace_printk buffers if a trace_printk exists */
if (__stop___trace_bprintk_fmt != __start___trace_bprintk_fmt)
/* Must be called before global_trace.buffer is allocated */
trace_printk_init_buffers();
/* To save memory, keep the ring buffer size to its minimum */
if (ring_buffer_expanded)
ring_buf_size = trace_buf_size;
else
ring_buf_size = 1;
cpumask_copy(tracing_buffer_mask, cpu_possible_mask);
cpumask_copy(global_trace.tracing_cpumask, cpu_all_mask);
raw_spin_lock_init(&global_trace.start_lock);
/*
* The prepare callbacks allocates some memory for the ring buffer. We
* don't free the buffer if the if the CPU goes down. If we were to free
* the buffer, then the user would lose any trace that was in the
* buffer. The memory will be removed once the "instance" is removed.
*/
ret = cpuhp_setup_state_multi(CPUHP_TRACE_RB_PREPARE,
"trace/RB:preapre", trace_rb_cpu_prepare,
NULL);
if (ret < 0)
goto out_free_cpumask;
/* Used for event triggers */
ret = -ENOMEM;
temp_buffer = ring_buffer_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, RB_FL_OVERWRITE);
if (!temp_buffer)
goto out_rm_hp_state;
if (trace_create_savedcmd() < 0)
goto out_free_temp_buffer;
/* TODO: make the number of buffers hot pluggable with CPUS */
if (allocate_trace_buffers(&global_trace, ring_buf_size) < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "tracer: failed to allocate ring buffer!\n");
WARN_ON(1);
goto out_free_savedcmd;
}
if (global_trace.buffer_disabled)
tracing_off();
if (trace_boot_clock) {
ret = tracing_set_clock(&global_trace, trace_boot_clock);
if (ret < 0)
pr_warn("Trace clock %s not defined, going back to default\n",
trace_boot_clock);
}
/*
* register_tracer() might reference current_trace, so it
* needs to be set before we register anything. This is
* just a bootstrap of current_trace anyway.
*/
global_trace.current_trace = &nop_trace;
global_trace.max_lock = (arch_spinlock_t)__ARCH_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED;
ftrace_init_global_array_ops(&global_trace);
init_trace_flags_index(&global_trace);
register_tracer(&nop_trace);
/* Function tracing may start here (via kernel command line) */
init_function_trace();
/* All seems OK, enable tracing */
tracing_disabled = 0;
atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list,
&trace_panic_notifier);
register_die_notifier(&trace_die_notifier);
global_trace.flags = TRACE_ARRAY_FL_GLOBAL;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&global_trace.systems);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&global_trace.events);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&global_trace.hist_vars);
list_add(&global_trace.list, &ftrace_trace_arrays);
apply_trace_boot_options();
register_snapshot_cmd();
return 0;
out_free_savedcmd:
free_saved_cmdlines_buffer(savedcmd);
out_free_temp_buffer:
ring_buffer_free(temp_buffer);
out_rm_hp_state:
cpuhp_remove_multi_state(CPUHP_TRACE_RB_PREPARE);
out_free_cpumask:
free_cpumask_var(global_trace.tracing_cpumask);
out_free_buffer_mask:
free_cpumask_var(tracing_buffer_mask);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: validate_body_helper (DBusTypeReader *reader,
int byte_order,
dbus_bool_t walk_reader_to_end,
const unsigned char *p,
const unsigned char *end,
const unsigned char **new_p)
{
int current_type;
while ((current_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (reader)) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
{
const unsigned char *a;
case DBUS_TYPE_BYTE:
++p;
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
case DBUS_TYPE_INT16:
case DBUS_TYPE_UINT16:
case DBUS_TYPE_INT32:
case DBUS_TYPE_UINT32:
case DBUS_TYPE_UNIX_FD:
case DBUS_TYPE_INT64:
case DBUS_TYPE_UINT64:
case DBUS_TYPE_DOUBLE:
alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (current_type);
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, alignment);
if (a >= end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN)
{
dbus_uint32_t v = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order,
p);
if (!(v == 0 || v == 1))
return DBUS_INVALID_BOOLEAN_NOT_ZERO_OR_ONE;
}
p += alignment;
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY:
case DBUS_TYPE_STRING:
case DBUS_TYPE_OBJECT_PATH:
{
dbus_uint32_t claimed_len;
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, 4);
if (a + 4 > end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
claimed_len = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order, p);
p += 4;
/* p may now be == end */
_dbus_assert (p <= end);
if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY)
{
int array_elem_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_element_type (reader);
if (!_dbus_type_is_valid (array_elem_type))
{
return DBUS_INVALID_UNKNOWN_TYPECODE;
}
alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type);
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, alignment);
/* a may now be == end */
if (a > end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
}
if (claimed_len > (unsigned long) (end - p))
return DBUS_INVALID_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_OBJECT_PATH)
{
DBusString str;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len);
if (!_dbus_validate_path (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
return DBUS_INVALID_BAD_PATH;
p += claimed_len;
}
else if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_STRING)
{
DBusString str;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len);
if (!_dbus_string_validate_utf8 (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str)))
return DBUS_INVALID_BAD_UTF8_IN_STRING;
p += claimed_len;
}
else if (current_type == DBUS_TYPE_ARRAY && claimed_len > 0)
{
DBusTypeReader sub;
DBusValidity validity;
const unsigned char *array_end;
int array_elem_type;
if (claimed_len > DBUS_MAXIMUM_ARRAY_LENGTH)
return DBUS_INVALID_ARRAY_LENGTH_EXCEEDS_MAXIMUM;
/* Remember that the reader is types only, so we can't
* use it to iterate over elements. It stays the same
* for all elements.
*/
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (reader, &sub);
array_end = p + claimed_len;
array_elem_type = _dbus_type_reader_get_element_type (reader);
/* avoid recursive call to validate_body_helper if this is an array
* of fixed-size elements
*/
if (dbus_type_is_fixed (array_elem_type))
{
/* bools need to be handled differently, because they can
* have an invalid value
*/
if (array_elem_type == DBUS_TYPE_BOOLEAN)
{
dbus_uint32_t v;
alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (array_elem_type);
while (p < array_end)
{
v = _dbus_unpack_uint32 (byte_order, p);
if (!(v == 0 || v == 1))
return DBUS_INVALID_BOOLEAN_NOT_ZERO_OR_ONE;
p += alignment;
}
}
else
{
p = array_end;
}
}
else
{
while (p < array_end)
{
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
}
}
if (p != array_end)
return DBUS_INVALID_ARRAY_LENGTH_INCORRECT;
}
/* check nul termination */
{
while (p < array_end)
{
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
}
}
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_SIGNATURE:
{
dbus_uint32_t claimed_len;
DBusString str;
DBusValidity validity;
claimed_len = *p;
++p;
/* 1 is for nul termination */
if (claimed_len + 1 > (unsigned long) (end - p))
return DBUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&str, p, claimed_len);
validity =
_dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (&str, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&str));
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
p += claimed_len;
_dbus_assert (p < end);
if (*p != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
return DBUS_INVALID_SIGNATURE_MISSING_NUL;
++p;
_dbus_verbose ("p = %p end = %p claimed_len %u\n", p, end, claimed_len);
}
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_VARIANT:
{
/* 1 byte sig len, sig typecodes, align to
* contained-type-boundary, values.
*/
/* In addition to normal signature validation, we need to be sure
* the signature contains only a single (possibly container) type.
*/
dbus_uint32_t claimed_len;
DBusString sig;
DBusTypeReader sub;
DBusValidity validity;
int contained_alignment;
int contained_type;
DBusValidity reason;
claimed_len = *p;
++p;
/* + 1 for nul */
if (claimed_len + 1 > (unsigned long) (end - p))
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_LENGTH_OUT_OF_BOUNDS;
_dbus_string_init_const_len (&sig, p, claimed_len);
reason = _dbus_validate_signature_with_reason (&sig, 0,
_dbus_string_get_length (&sig));
if (!(reason == DBUS_VALID))
{
if (reason == DBUS_VALIDITY_UNKNOWN_OOM_ERROR)
return reason;
else
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_BAD;
}
p += claimed_len;
if (*p != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_MISSING_NUL;
++p;
contained_type = _dbus_first_type_in_signature (&sig, 0);
if (contained_type == DBUS_TYPE_INVALID)
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_EMPTY;
contained_alignment = _dbus_type_get_alignment (contained_type);
a = _DBUS_ALIGN_ADDRESS (p, contained_alignment);
if (a > end)
return DBUS_INVALID_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA;
while (p != a)
{
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
_dbus_type_reader_init_types_only (&sub, &sig, 0);
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID);
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
if (_dbus_type_reader_next (&sub))
return DBUS_INVALID_VARIANT_SIGNATURE_SPECIFIES_MULTIPLE_VALUES;
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) == DBUS_TYPE_INVALID);
}
break;
case DBUS_TYPE_DICT_ENTRY:
case DBUS_TYPE_STRUCT:
_dbus_assert (_dbus_type_reader_get_current_type (&sub) != DBUS_TYPE_INVALID);
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, FALSE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
if (*p != '\0')
return DBUS_INVALID_ALIGNMENT_PADDING_NOT_NUL;
++p;
}
_dbus_type_reader_recurse (reader, &sub);
validity = validate_body_helper (&sub, byte_order, TRUE, p, end, &p);
if (validity != DBUS_VALID)
return validity;
}
break;
default:
_dbus_assert_not_reached ("invalid typecode in supposedly-validated signature");
break;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 164,886
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* Launcher::GetAppListButtonView() const {
return launcher_view_->GetAppListButtonView();
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,202
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int frame_cnt = 0;
FILE *outfile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec;
const VpxInterface *decoder = NULL;
VpxVideoReader *reader = NULL;
const VpxVideoInfo *info = NULL;
int n = 0;
int m = 0;
int is_range = 0;
char *nptr = NULL;
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 4)
die("Invalid number of arguments.");
reader = vpx_video_reader_open(argv[1]);
if (!reader)
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[1]);
if (!(outfile = fopen(argv[2], "wb")))
die("Failed to open %s for writing.", argv[2]);
n = strtol(argv[3], &nptr, 0);
m = strtol(nptr + 1, NULL, 0);
is_range = (*nptr == '-');
if (!n || !m || (*nptr != '-' && *nptr != '/'))
die("Couldn't parse pattern %s.\n", argv[3]);
info = vpx_video_reader_get_info(reader);
decoder = get_vpx_decoder_by_fourcc(info->codec_fourcc);
if (!decoder)
die("Unknown input codec.");
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(decoder->interface()));
if (vpx_codec_dec_init(&codec, decoder->interface(), NULL, 0))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize decoder.");
while (vpx_video_reader_read_frame(reader)) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
size_t frame_size = 0;
int skip;
const unsigned char *frame = vpx_video_reader_get_frame(reader,
&frame_size);
if (vpx_codec_decode(&codec, frame, (unsigned int)frame_size, NULL, 0))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to decode frame.");
++frame_cnt;
skip = (is_range && frame_cnt >= n && frame_cnt <= m) ||
(!is_range && m - (frame_cnt - 1) % m <= n);
if (!skip) {
putc('.', stdout);
while ((img = vpx_codec_get_frame(&codec, &iter)) != NULL)
vpx_img_write(img, outfile);
} else {
putc('X', stdout);
}
fflush(stdout);
}
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_cnt);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec.");
printf("Play: ffplay -f rawvideo -pix_fmt yuv420p -s %dx%d %s\n",
info->frame_width, info->frame_height, argv[2]);
vpx_video_reader_close(reader);
fclose(outfile);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: copy_opt_anc_info(OptAnc* to, OptAnc* from)
{
*to = *from;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 89,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int atl2_set_settings(struct net_device *netdev,
struct ethtool_cmd *ecmd)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
struct atl2_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
while (test_and_set_bit(__ATL2_RESETTING, &adapter->flags))
msleep(1);
if (ecmd->autoneg == AUTONEG_ENABLE) {
#define MY_ADV_MASK (ADVERTISE_10_HALF | \
ADVERTISE_10_FULL | \
ADVERTISE_100_HALF| \
ADVERTISE_100_FULL)
if ((ecmd->advertising & MY_ADV_MASK) == MY_ADV_MASK) {
hw->MediaType = MEDIA_TYPE_AUTO_SENSOR;
hw->autoneg_advertised = MY_ADV_MASK;
} else if ((ecmd->advertising & MY_ADV_MASK) ==
ADVERTISE_100_FULL) {
hw->MediaType = MEDIA_TYPE_100M_FULL;
hw->autoneg_advertised = ADVERTISE_100_FULL;
} else if ((ecmd->advertising & MY_ADV_MASK) ==
ADVERTISE_100_HALF) {
hw->MediaType = MEDIA_TYPE_100M_HALF;
hw->autoneg_advertised = ADVERTISE_100_HALF;
} else if ((ecmd->advertising & MY_ADV_MASK) ==
ADVERTISE_10_FULL) {
hw->MediaType = MEDIA_TYPE_10M_FULL;
hw->autoneg_advertised = ADVERTISE_10_FULL;
} else if ((ecmd->advertising & MY_ADV_MASK) ==
ADVERTISE_10_HALF) {
hw->MediaType = MEDIA_TYPE_10M_HALF;
hw->autoneg_advertised = ADVERTISE_10_HALF;
} else {
clear_bit(__ATL2_RESETTING, &adapter->flags);
return -EINVAL;
}
ecmd->advertising = hw->autoneg_advertised |
ADVERTISED_TP | ADVERTISED_Autoneg;
} else {
clear_bit(__ATL2_RESETTING, &adapter->flags);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* reset the link */
if (netif_running(adapter->netdev)) {
atl2_down(adapter);
atl2_up(adapter);
} else
atl2_reset_hw(&adapter->hw);
clear_bit(__ATL2_RESETTING, &adapter->flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 55,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pvscsi_log2(uint32_t input)
{
int log = 0;
assert(input > 0);
while (input >> ++log) {
}
return log;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: compute_nhash (uschar *subject, int value1, int value2, int *len)
{
uschar *s = subject;
int i = 0;
unsigned long int total = 0; /* no overflow */
while (*s != 0)
{
if (i == 0) i = sizeof(prime)/sizeof(int) - 1;
total += prime[i--] * (unsigned int)(*s++);
}
/* If value2 is unset, just compute one number */
if (value2 < 0)
{
s = string_sprintf("%d", total % value1);
}
/* Otherwise do a div/mod hash */
else
{
total = total % (value1 * value2);
s = string_sprintf("%d/%d", total/value2, total % value2);
}
*len = Ustrlen(s);
return s;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: sparse_skip_file (struct tar_stat_info *st)
{
bool rc = true;
struct tar_sparse_file file;
if (!tar_sparse_init (&file))
return dump_status_not_implemented;
file.stat_info = st;
file.fd = -1;
rc = tar_sparse_decode_header (&file);
skip_file (file.stat_info->archive_file_size - file.dumped_size);
return (tar_sparse_done (&file) && rc) ? dump_status_ok : dump_status_short;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ahci_init(AHCIState *s, DeviceState *qdev, AddressSpace *as, int ports)
{
qemu_irq *irqs;
int i;
s->as = as;
s->ports = ports;
s->dev = g_malloc0(sizeof(AHCIDevice) * ports);
ahci_reg_init(s);
/* XXX BAR size should be 1k, but that breaks, so bump it to 4k for now */
memory_region_init_io(&s->mem, OBJECT(qdev), &ahci_mem_ops, s,
"ahci", AHCI_MEM_BAR_SIZE);
memory_region_init_io(&s->idp, OBJECT(qdev), &ahci_idp_ops, s,
"ahci-idp", 32);
irqs = qemu_allocate_irqs(ahci_irq_set, s, s->ports);
for (i = 0; i < s->ports; i++) {
AHCIDevice *ad = &s->dev[i];
ide_bus_new(&ad->port, sizeof(ad->port), qdev, i, 1);
ide_init2(&ad->port, irqs[i]);
ad->hba = s;
ad->port_no = i;
ad->port.dma = &ad->dma;
ad->port.dma->ops = &ahci_dma_ops;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t handle_llistxattr(FsContext *ctx, V9fsPath *fs_path,
void *value, size_t size)
{
int fd, ret;
struct handle_data *data = (struct handle_data *)ctx->private;
fd = open_by_handle(data->mountfd, fs_path->data, O_NONBLOCK);
if (fd < 0) {
return fd;
}
ret = flistxattr(fd, value, size);
close(fd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,674
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IsFloating(DeviceIntPtr dev)
{
return !IsMaster(dev) && GetMaster(dev, MASTER_KEYBOARD) == NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,847
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderViewImpl::runModalConfirmDialog(WebFrame* frame,
const WebString& message) {
return RunJavaScriptMessage(JAVASCRIPT_MESSAGE_TYPE_CONFIRM,
message,
string16(),
frame->document().url(),
NULL);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint32_t GLES2Util::GetGLReadPixelsImplementationType(uint32_t internal_format,
uint32_t texture_type) {
switch (internal_format) {
case GL_R16UI:
case GL_RG16UI:
case GL_RGBA16UI:
case GL_RGB10_A2:
case GL_RGB10_A2UI:
return GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT;
case GL_R32UI:
case GL_RG32UI:
case GL_RGBA32UI:
return GL_UNSIGNED_INT;
case GL_R8I:
case GL_RG8I:
case GL_RGBA8I:
return GL_BYTE;
case GL_R16I:
case GL_RG16I:
case GL_RGBA16I:
return GL_SHORT;
case GL_R32I:
case GL_RG32I:
case GL_RGBA32I:
return GL_INT;
case GL_R32F:
case GL_RG32F:
case GL_RGB32F:
case GL_RGBA32F:
case GL_R11F_G11F_B10F:
return GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE;
case GL_R16F:
case GL_RG16F:
case GL_RGB16F:
case GL_RGBA16F:
return GL_HALF_FLOAT;
default:
return texture_type;
}
}
Commit Message: Validate glClearBuffer*v function |buffer| param on the client side
Otherwise we could read out-of-bounds even if an invalid |buffer| is passed
in and in theory we should not read the buffer at all.
BUG=908749
TEST=gl_tests in ASAN build
R=piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I94b69b56ce3358ff9bfc0e21f0618aec4371d1ec
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1354571
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#612023}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 153,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TabStripGtk::CompleteDrop(const guchar* data, bool is_plain_text) {
if (!drop_info_.get())
return false;
const int drop_index = drop_info_->drop_index;
const bool drop_before = drop_info_->drop_before;
drop_info_.reset();
hover_tab_selector_.CancelTabTransition();
GURL url;
if (is_plain_text) {
AutocompleteMatch match;
AutocompleteClassifierFactory::GetForProfile(model_->profile())->Classify(
UTF8ToUTF16(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data)), string16(),
false, false, &match, NULL);
url = match.destination_url;
} else {
std::string url_string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data));
url = GURL(url_string.substr(0, url_string.find_first_of('\n')));
}
if (!url.is_valid())
return false;
chrome::NavigateParams params(window()->browser(), url,
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK);
params.tabstrip_index = drop_index;
if (drop_before) {
params.disposition = NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB;
} else {
params.disposition = CURRENT_TAB;
params.source_contents = model_->GetTabContentsAt(drop_index);
}
chrome::Navigate(¶ms);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 118,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pmcraid_set_supported_devs(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd)
{
struct pmcraid_ioarcb *ioarcb = &cmd->ioa_cb->ioarcb;
void (*cmd_done) (struct pmcraid_cmd *) = pmcraid_complete_ioa_reset;
pmcraid_reinit_cmdblk(cmd);
ioarcb->resource_handle = cpu_to_le32(PMCRAID_IOA_RES_HANDLE);
ioarcb->request_type = REQ_TYPE_IOACMD;
ioarcb->cdb[0] = PMCRAID_SET_SUPPORTED_DEVICES;
ioarcb->cdb[1] = ALL_DEVICES_SUPPORTED;
/* If this was called as part of resource table reinitialization due to
* lost CCN, it is enough to return the command block back to free pool
* as part of set_supported_devs completion function.
*/
if (cmd->drv_inst->reinit_cfg_table) {
cmd->drv_inst->reinit_cfg_table = 0;
cmd->release = 1;
cmd_done = pmcraid_reinit_cfgtable_done;
}
/* we will be done with the reset sequence after set supported devices,
* setup the done function to return the command block back to free
* pool
*/
pmcraid_send_cmd(cmd,
cmd_done,
PMCRAID_SET_SUP_DEV_TIMEOUT,
pmcraid_timeout_handler);
return;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __inline USHORT CalculateIpv6PseudoHeaderChecksum(IPv6Header *pIpHeader, USHORT headerAndPayloadLen)
{
tIPv6PseudoHeader ipph;
USHORT checksum;
ipph.ipph_src[0] = pIpHeader->ip6_src_address[0];
ipph.ipph_src[1] = pIpHeader->ip6_src_address[1];
ipph.ipph_src[2] = pIpHeader->ip6_src_address[2];
ipph.ipph_src[3] = pIpHeader->ip6_src_address[3];
ipph.ipph_dest[0] = pIpHeader->ip6_dst_address[0];
ipph.ipph_dest[1] = pIpHeader->ip6_dst_address[1];
ipph.ipph_dest[2] = pIpHeader->ip6_dst_address[2];
ipph.ipph_dest[3] = pIpHeader->ip6_dst_address[3];
ipph.z1 = ipph.z2 = ipph.z3 = 0;
ipph.ipph_protocol = pIpHeader->ip6_next_header;
ipph.ipph_length = swap_short(headerAndPayloadLen);
checksum = CheckSumCalculatorFlat(&ipph, sizeof(ipph));
return ~checksum;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: More rigoruous testing of incoming packet
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 74,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mailimf_unstrict_msg_id_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx,
char ** result)
{
char * msgid;
size_t cur_token;
int r;
cur_token = * indx;
r = mailimf_cfws_parse(message, length, &cur_token);
if ((r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) && (r != MAILIMF_ERROR_PARSE))
return r;
r = mailimf_parse_unwanted_msg_id(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
r = mailimf_msg_id_parse(message, length, &cur_token, &msgid);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR)
return r;
r = mailimf_parse_unwanted_msg_id(message, length, &cur_token);
if (r != MAILIMF_NO_ERROR) {
free(msgid);
return r;
}
* result = msgid;
* indx = cur_token;
return MAILIMF_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 66,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void jas_icclut16_dump(jas_iccattrval_t *attrval, FILE *out)
{
jas_icclut16_t *lut16 = &attrval->data.lut16;
int i;
int j;
fprintf(out, "numinchans=%d, numoutchans=%d, clutlen=%d\n",
lut16->numinchans, lut16->numoutchans, lut16->clutlen);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < 3; ++j) {
fprintf(out, "e[%d][%d]=%f ", i, j, lut16->e[i][j] / 65536.0);
}
fprintf(out, "\n");
}
fprintf(out, "numintabents=%"PRIuFAST16", numouttabents=%"PRIuFAST16"\n",
lut16->numintabents, lut16->numouttabents);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothSocketAbstractConnectFunction::OnConnect(
scoped_refptr<device::BluetoothSocket> socket) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(work_thread_id());
BluetoothApiSocket* api_socket = GetSocket(params_->socket_id);
if (!api_socket) {
Respond(Error(kSocketNotFoundError));
return;
}
api_socket->AdoptConnectedSocket(socket,
params_->address,
device::BluetoothUUID(params_->uuid));
socket_event_dispatcher_->OnSocketConnect(extension_id(),
params_->socket_id);
Respond(ArgumentList(bluetooth_socket::Connect::Results::Create()));
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 154,068
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::string16 OmniboxEditModel::DisplayTextFromUserText(
const base::string16& text) const {
return KeywordIsSelected() ?
KeywordProvider::SplitReplacementStringFromInput(text, false) : text;
}
Commit Message: [OriginChip] Re-enable the chip as necessary when switching tabs.
BUG=369500
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/292493003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@271161 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 111,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: V8DebuggerAgentImpl* debuggerAgent()
{
if (V8InspectorSessionImpl* session = currentSession()) {
if (session && session->debuggerAgent()->enabled())
return session->debuggerAgent();
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 130,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Browser::ExecuteCommandIfEnabled(int id) {
if (command_updater_.SupportsCommand(id) &&
command_updater_.IsCommandEnabled(id)) {
ExecuteCommand(id);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::vertexAttrib2fvCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.vertexAttrib2fv()");
return vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf(args, kVertexAttrib2v);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int i_ipmi_req_lan(struct ipmi_smi *intf,
struct ipmi_addr *addr,
long msgid,
struct kernel_ipmi_msg *msg,
struct ipmi_smi_msg *smi_msg,
struct ipmi_recv_msg *recv_msg,
unsigned char source_lun,
int retries,
unsigned int retry_time_ms)
{
struct ipmi_lan_addr *lan_addr;
unsigned char ipmb_seq;
long seqid;
struct ipmi_channel *chans;
int rv = 0;
if (addr->channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, sent_invalid_commands);
return -EINVAL;
}
chans = READ_ONCE(intf->channel_list)->c;
if ((chans[addr->channel].medium
!= IPMI_CHANNEL_MEDIUM_8023LAN)
&& (chans[addr->channel].medium
!= IPMI_CHANNEL_MEDIUM_ASYNC)) {
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, sent_invalid_commands);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* 11 for the header and 1 for the checksum. */
if ((msg->data_len + 12) > IPMI_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, sent_invalid_commands);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
lan_addr = (struct ipmi_lan_addr *) addr;
if (lan_addr->lun > 3) {
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, sent_invalid_commands);
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(&recv_msg->addr, lan_addr, sizeof(*lan_addr));
if (recv_msg->msg.netfn & 0x1) {
/*
* It's a response, so use the user's sequence
* from msgid.
*/
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, sent_lan_responses);
format_lan_msg(smi_msg, msg, lan_addr, msgid,
msgid, source_lun);
/*
* Save the receive message so we can use it
* to deliver the response.
*/
smi_msg->user_data = recv_msg;
} else {
/* It's a command, so get a sequence for it. */
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&intf->seq_lock, flags);
/*
* Create a sequence number with a 1 second
* timeout and 4 retries.
*/
rv = intf_next_seq(intf,
recv_msg,
retry_time_ms,
retries,
0,
&ipmb_seq,
&seqid);
if (rv)
/*
* We have used up all the sequence numbers,
* probably, so abort.
*/
goto out_err;
ipmi_inc_stat(intf, sent_lan_commands);
/*
* Store the sequence number in the message,
* so that when the send message response
* comes back we can start the timer.
*/
format_lan_msg(smi_msg, msg, lan_addr,
STORE_SEQ_IN_MSGID(ipmb_seq, seqid),
ipmb_seq, source_lun);
/*
* Copy the message into the recv message data, so we
* can retransmit it later if necessary.
*/
memcpy(recv_msg->msg_data, smi_msg->data,
smi_msg->data_size);
recv_msg->msg.data = recv_msg->msg_data;
recv_msg->msg.data_len = smi_msg->data_size;
/*
* We don't unlock until here, because we need
* to copy the completed message into the
* recv_msg before we release the lock.
* Otherwise, race conditions may bite us. I
* know that's pretty paranoid, but I prefer
* to be correct.
*/
out_err:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&intf->seq_lock, flags);
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t SampleTable::setSyncSampleParams(off64_t data_offset, size_t data_size) {
if (mSyncSampleOffset >= 0 || data_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mSyncSampleOffset = data_offset;
uint8_t header[8];
if (mDataSource->readAt(
data_offset, header, sizeof(header)) < (ssize_t)sizeof(header)) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
if (U32_AT(header) != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
mNumSyncSamples = U32_AT(&header[4]);
if (mNumSyncSamples < 2) {
ALOGV("Table of sync samples is empty or has only a single entry!");
}
uint64_t allocSize = mNumSyncSamples * (uint64_t)sizeof(uint32_t);
if (allocSize > SIZE_MAX) {
return ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
mSyncSamples = new uint32_t[mNumSyncSamples];
size_t size = mNumSyncSamples * sizeof(uint32_t);
if (mDataSource->readAt(mSyncSampleOffset + 8, mSyncSamples, size)
!= (ssize_t)size) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < mNumSyncSamples; ++i) {
mSyncSamples[i] = ntohl(mSyncSamples[i]) - 1;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow during MP4 atom processing
A few sample table related FourCC values are handled by the
setSampleToChunkParams function. An integer overflow exists within this
function. Validate that mNumSampleToChunkOffets will not cause an integer
overflow.
Bug: 20139950
(cherry picked from commit c24607c29c96f939aed9e33bfa702b1dd79da4b7)
Change-Id: I49086952451b09a234d8b82669251ab9f1ef58d9
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 157,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_ftrace_function_enable(struct perf_event *event)
{
ftrace_function_local_enable(&event->ftrace_ops);
}
Commit Message: perf/ftrace: Fix paranoid level for enabling function tracer
The current default perf paranoid level is "1" which has
"perf_paranoid_kernel()" return false, and giving any operations that
use it, access to normal users. Unfortunately, this includes function
tracing and normal users should not be allowed to enable function
tracing by default.
The proper level is defined at "-1" (full perf access), which
"perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" will only give access to. Use that
check instead for enabling function tracing.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4+
CVE: CVE-2013-2930
Fixes: ced39002f5ea ("ftrace, perf: Add support to use function tracepoint in perf")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 30,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGetUniformiv(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::GetUniformiv& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::GetUniformiv*>(cmd_data);
GLuint program = c.program;
GLint fake_location = c.location;
GLuint service_id;
GLenum result_type;
GLsizei result_size;
GLint real_location = -1;
Error error;
cmds::GetUniformiv::Result* result;
if (GetUniformSetup<GLint>(program, fake_location, c.params_shm_id,
c.params_shm_offset, &error, &real_location,
&service_id, &result, &result_type,
&result_size)) {
api()->glGetUniformivFn(service_id, real_location, result->GetData());
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: exsltDateHourInDay (const xmlChar *dateTime)
{
exsltDateValPtr dt;
double ret;
if (dateTime == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_TIME
dt = exsltDateCurrent();
if (dt == NULL)
#endif
return xmlXPathNAN;
} else {
dt = exsltDateParse(dateTime);
if (dt == NULL)
return xmlXPathNAN;
if ((dt->type != XS_DATETIME) && (dt->type != XS_TIME)) {
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return xmlXPathNAN;
}
}
ret = (double) dt->value.date.hour;
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,613
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcXF86DRIDestroyContext(register ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xXF86DRIDestroyContextReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXF86DRIDestroyContextReq);
if (stuff->screen >= screenInfo.numScreens) {
client->errorValue = stuff->screen;
return BadValue;
}
if (!DRIDestroyContext(screenInfo.screens[stuff->screen], stuff->context)) {
return BadValue;
}
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BlinkTestRunner::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(BlinkTestRunner, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ShellViewMsg_SetTestConfiguration,
OnSetTestConfiguration)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ShellViewMsg_SessionHistory, OnSessionHistory)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ShellViewMsg_Reset, OnReset)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ShellViewMsg_NotifyDone, OnNotifyDone)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(ShellViewMsg_TryLeakDetection, OnTryLeakDetection)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 123,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int i2d_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG *p8)
{
return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(X509_SIG,i2d_X509_SIG,fp,p8);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,679
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct in_device *ip_mc_find_dev(struct net *net, struct ip_mreqn *imr)
{
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
struct in_device *idev = NULL;
if (imr->imr_ifindex) {
idev = inetdev_by_index(net, imr->imr_ifindex);
return idev;
}
if (imr->imr_address.s_addr) {
dev = __ip_dev_find(net, imr->imr_address.s_addr, false);
if (!dev)
return NULL;
}
if (!dev) {
struct rtable *rt = ip_route_output(net,
imr->imr_multiaddr.s_addr,
0, 0, 0);
if (!IS_ERR(rt)) {
dev = rt->dst.dev;
ip_rt_put(rt);
}
}
if (dev) {
imr->imr_ifindex = dev->ifindex;
idev = __in_dev_get_rtnl(dev);
}
return idev;
}
Commit Message: igmp: Avoid zero delay when receiving odd mixture of IGMP queries
Commit 5b7c84066733c5dfb0e4016d939757b38de189e4 ('ipv4: correct IGMP
behavior on v3 query during v2-compatibility mode') added yet another
case for query parsing, which can result in max_delay = 0. Substitute
a value of 1, as in the usual v3 case.
Reported-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
References: http://bugs.debian.org/654876
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smb2_async_writev(struct cifs_writedata *wdata,
void (*release)(struct kref *kref))
{
int rc = -EACCES, flags = 0;
struct smb2_write_req *req = NULL;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon = tlink_tcon(wdata->cfile->tlink);
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = tcon->ses->server;
struct kvec iov;
struct smb_rqst rqst;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_WRITE, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc) {
if (rc == -EAGAIN && wdata->credits) {
/* credits was reset by reconnect */
wdata->credits = 0;
/* reduce in_flight value since we won't send the req */
spin_lock(&server->req_lock);
server->in_flight--;
spin_unlock(&server->req_lock);
}
goto async_writev_out;
}
req->hdr.ProcessId = cpu_to_le32(wdata->cfile->pid);
req->PersistentFileId = wdata->cfile->fid.persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = wdata->cfile->fid.volatile_fid;
req->WriteChannelInfoOffset = 0;
req->WriteChannelInfoLength = 0;
req->Channel = 0;
req->Offset = cpu_to_le64(wdata->offset);
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field */
req->DataOffset = cpu_to_le16(
offsetof(struct smb2_write_req, Buffer) - 4);
req->RemainingBytes = 0;
/* 4 for rfc1002 length field and 1 for Buffer */
iov.iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4 - 1;
iov.iov_base = req;
rqst.rq_iov = &iov;
rqst.rq_nvec = 1;
rqst.rq_pages = wdata->pages;
rqst.rq_npages = wdata->nr_pages;
rqst.rq_pagesz = wdata->pagesz;
rqst.rq_tailsz = wdata->tailsz;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "async write at %llu %u bytes\n",
wdata->offset, wdata->bytes);
req->Length = cpu_to_le32(wdata->bytes);
inc_rfc1001_len(&req->hdr, wdata->bytes - 1 /* Buffer */);
if (wdata->credits) {
req->hdr.CreditCharge = cpu_to_le16(DIV_ROUND_UP(wdata->bytes,
SMB2_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE));
spin_lock(&server->req_lock);
server->credits += wdata->credits -
le16_to_cpu(req->hdr.CreditCharge);
spin_unlock(&server->req_lock);
wake_up(&server->request_q);
flags = CIFS_HAS_CREDITS;
}
kref_get(&wdata->refcount);
rc = cifs_call_async(server, &rqst, NULL, smb2_writev_callback, wdata,
flags);
if (rc) {
kref_put(&wdata->refcount, release);
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_WRITE_HE);
}
async_writev_out:
cifs_small_buf_release(req);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 36,006
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: user_path_parent(int dfd, const char __user *path,
struct path *parent,
struct qstr *last,
int *type,
unsigned int flags)
{
/* only LOOKUP_REVAL is allowed in extra flags */
return filename_parentat(dfd, getname(path), flags & LOOKUP_REVAL,
parent, last, type);
}
Commit Message: vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 43,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int llc_ui_autoport(void)
{
struct llc_sap *sap;
int i, tries = 0;
while (tries < LLC_SAP_DYN_TRIES) {
for (i = llc_ui_sap_last_autoport;
i < LLC_SAP_DYN_STOP; i += 2) {
sap = llc_sap_find(i);
if (!sap) {
llc_ui_sap_last_autoport = i + 2;
goto out;
}
llc_sap_put(sap);
}
llc_ui_sap_last_autoport = LLC_SAP_DYN_START;
tries++;
}
i = 0;
out:
return i;
}
Commit Message: llc: Fix missing msg_namelen update in llc_ui_recvmsg()
For stream sockets the code misses to update the msg_namelen member
to 0 and therefore makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized
sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack
memory. The msg_namelen update is also missing for datagram sockets
in case the socket is shutting down during receive.
Fix both issues by setting msg_namelen to 0 early. It will be
updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,537
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EditorClientBlackBerry::handleInputMethodKeydown(KeyboardEvent*)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Prevent text selection inside Colour and Date/Time input fields
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=111733
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
PR 305194.
Prevent selection for popup input fields as they are buttons.
Informally Reviewed Gen Mak.
* WebCoreSupport/EditorClientBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::EditorClientBlackBerry::shouldChangeSelectedRange):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@145121 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 104,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XItoCoreType(int xitype)
{
int coretype = 0;
if (xitype == DeviceMotionNotify)
coretype = MotionNotify;
else if (xitype == DeviceButtonPress)
coretype = ButtonPress;
else if (xitype == DeviceButtonRelease)
coretype = ButtonRelease;
else if (xitype == DeviceKeyPress)
coretype = KeyPress;
else if (xitype == DeviceKeyRelease)
coretype = KeyRelease;
return coretype;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,903
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool decode_flag_request(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
if (in.length != 0) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 638
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RecordDownloadTextType(const std::string& mime_type_string) {
DownloadText download_text = DownloadText(
GetMimeTypeMatch(mime_type_string, getMimeTypeToDownloadTextMap()));
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Download.ContentType.Text", download_text,
DOWNLOAD_TEXT_MAX);
}
Commit Message: Add .desktop file to download_file_types.asciipb
.desktop files act as shortcuts on Linux, allowing arbitrary code
execution. We should send pings for these files.
Bug: 904182
Change-Id: Ibc26141fb180e843e1ffaf3f78717a9109d2fa9a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1344552
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#611272}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 153,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PageHandler::ScreenshotCaptured(
std::unique_ptr<CaptureScreenshotCallback> callback,
const std::string& format,
int quality,
const gfx::Size& original_view_size,
const gfx::Size& requested_image_size,
const blink::WebDeviceEmulationParams& original_emulation_params,
const gfx::Image& image) {
if (original_view_size.width()) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* widget_host = host_->GetRenderWidgetHost();
widget_host->GetView()->SetSize(original_view_size);
emulation_handler_->SetDeviceEmulationParams(original_emulation_params);
}
if (image.IsEmpty()) {
callback->sendFailure(Response::Error("Unable to capture screenshot"));
return;
}
if (!requested_image_size.IsEmpty() &&
(image.Width() != requested_image_size.width() ||
image.Height() != requested_image_size.height())) {
const SkBitmap* bitmap = image.ToSkBitmap();
SkBitmap cropped = SkBitmapOperations::CreateTiledBitmap(
*bitmap, 0, 0, requested_image_size.width(),
requested_image_size.height());
gfx::Image croppedImage = gfx::Image::CreateFrom1xBitmap(cropped);
callback->sendSuccess(EncodeImage(croppedImage, format, quality));
} else {
callback->sendSuccess(EncodeImage(image, format, quality));
}
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 143,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void parser(void)
{
char *arg;
#ifndef MINIMAL
char *sitearg;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_RFC2640
char *narg = NULL;
#endif
size_t n;
#ifdef IMPLICIT_TLS
(void) tls_init_new_session();
data_protection_level = CPL_PRIVATE;
#endif
for (;;) {
xferfd = -1;
if (state_needs_update != 0) {
state_needs_update = 0;
setprocessname("pure-ftpd (IDLE)");
#ifdef FTPWHO
if (shm_data_cur != NULL) {
ftpwho_lock();
shm_data_cur->state = FTPWHO_STATE_IDLE;
*shm_data_cur->filename = 0;
ftpwho_unlock();
}
#endif
}
doreply();
alarm(idletime * 2);
switch (sfgets()) {
case -1:
#ifdef BORING_MODE
die(421, LOG_INFO, MSG_TIMEOUT);
#else
die(421, LOG_INFO, MSG_TIMEOUT_PARSER);
#endif
case -2:
return;
}
#ifdef DEBUG
if (debug != 0) {
addreply(0, "%s", cmd);
}
#endif
n = (size_t) 0U;
while ((isalpha((unsigned char) cmd[n]) || cmd[n] == '@') &&
n < cmdsize) {
cmd[n] = (char) tolower((unsigned char) cmd[n]);
n++;
}
if (n >= cmdsize) { /* overparanoid, it should never happen */
die(421, LOG_WARNING, MSG_LINE_TOO_LONG);
}
if (n == (size_t) 0U) {
nop:
addreply_noformat(500, "?");
continue;
}
#ifdef SKIP_COMMAND_TRAILING_SPACES
while (isspace((unsigned char) cmd[n]) && n < cmdsize) {
cmd[n++] = 0;
}
arg = cmd + n;
while (cmd[n] != 0 && n < cmdsize) {
n++;
}
n--;
while (isspace((unsigned char) cmd[n])) {
cmd[n--] = 0;
}
#else
if (cmd[n] == 0) {
arg = cmd + n;
} else if (isspace((unsigned char) cmd[n])) {
cmd[n] = 0;
arg = cmd + n + 1;
} else {
goto nop;
}
#endif
if (logging != 0) {
#ifdef DEBUG
logfile(LOG_DEBUG, MSG_DEBUG_COMMAND " [%s] [%s]",
cmd, arg);
#else
logfile(LOG_DEBUG, MSG_DEBUG_COMMAND " [%s] [%s]",
cmd, strcmp(cmd, "pass") ? arg : "<*>");
#endif
}
#ifdef WITH_RFC2640
narg = charset_client2fs(arg);
arg = narg;
#endif
/*
* antiidle() is called with dummy commands, usually used by clients
* who are wanting extra idle time. We give them some, but not too much.
* When we jump to wayout, the idle timer is not zeroed. It means that
* we didn't issue an 'active' command like RETR.
*/
#ifndef MINIMAL
if (!strcmp(cmd, "noop")) {
antiidle();
donoop();
goto wayout;
}
#endif
if (!strcmp(cmd, "user")) {
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if (enforce_tls_auth > 1 && tls_cnx == NULL) {
die(421, LOG_WARNING, MSG_TLS_NEEDED);
}
#endif
douser(arg);
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "acct")) {
addreply(202, MSG_WHOAREYOU);
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "pass")) {
if (guest == 0) {
randomdelay();
}
dopass(arg);
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "quit")) {
addreply(221, MSG_GOODBYE,
(unsigned long long) ((uploaded + 1023ULL) / 1024ULL),
(unsigned long long) ((downloaded + 1023ULL) / 1024ULL));
return;
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "syst")) {
antiidle();
addreply_noformat(215, "UNIX Type: L8");
goto wayout;
#ifdef WITH_TLS
} else if (enforce_tls_auth > 0 &&
!strcmp(cmd, "auth") && !strcasecmp(arg, "tls")) {
addreply_noformat(234, "AUTH TLS OK.");
doreply();
if (tls_cnx == NULL) {
(void) tls_init_new_session();
}
goto wayout;
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "pbsz")) {
addreply_noformat(tls_cnx == NULL ? 503 : 200, "PBSZ=0");
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "prot")) {
if (tls_cnx == NULL) {
addreply_noformat(503, MSG_PROT_BEFORE_PBSZ);
goto wayout;
}
switch (*arg) {
case 0:
addreply_noformat(503, MSG_MISSING_ARG);
data_protection_level = CPL_NONE;
break;
case 'C':
if (arg[1] == 0) {
addreply(200, MSG_PROT_OK, "clear");
data_protection_level = CPL_CLEAR;
break;
}
case 'S':
case 'E':
if (arg[1] == 0) {
addreply(200, MSG_PROT_UNKNOWN_LEVEL, arg, "private");
data_protection_level = CPL_PRIVATE;
break;
}
case 'P':
if (arg[1] == 0) {
addreply(200, MSG_PROT_OK, "private");
data_protection_level = CPL_PRIVATE;
break;
}
default:
addreply_noformat(534, "Fallback to [C]");
data_protection_level = CPL_CLEAR;
break;
}
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "auth") || !strcmp(cmd, "adat")) {
addreply_noformat(500, MSG_AUTH_UNIMPLEMENTED);
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "type")) {
antiidle();
dotype(arg);
goto wayout;
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "mode")) {
antiidle();
domode(arg);
goto wayout;
#ifndef MINIMAL
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "feat")) {
dofeat();
goto wayout;
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "opts")) {
doopts(arg);
goto wayout;
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "stru")) {
dostru(arg);
goto wayout;
#ifndef MINIMAL
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "help")) {
goto help_site;
#endif
#ifdef DEBUG
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "xdbg")) {
debug++;
addreply(200, MSG_XDBG_OK, debug);
goto wayout;
#endif
} else if (loggedin == 0) {
/* from this point, all commands need authentication */
addreply_noformat(530, MSG_NOT_LOGGED_IN);
goto wayout;
} else {
if (!strcmp(cmd, "cwd") || !strcmp(cmd, "xcwd")) {
antiidle();
docwd(arg);
goto wayout;
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "port")) {
doport(arg);
#ifndef MINIMAL
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "eprt")) {
doeprt(arg);
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "esta") &&
disallow_passive == 0 &&
STORAGE_FAMILY(force_passive_ip) == 0) {
doesta();
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "estp")) {
doestp();
#endif
} else if (disallow_passive == 0 &&
(!strcmp(cmd, "pasv") || !strcmp(cmd, "p@sw"))) {
dopasv(0);
} else if (disallow_passive == 0 &&
(!strcmp(cmd, "epsv") &&
(broken_client_compat == 0 ||
STORAGE_FAMILY(ctrlconn) == AF_INET6))) {
if (!strcasecmp(arg, "all")) {
epsv_all = 1;
addreply_noformat(220, MSG_ACTIVE_DISABLED);
} else if (!strcmp(arg, "2") && !v6ready) {
addreply_noformat(522, MSG_ONLY_IPV4);
} else {
dopasv(1);
}
#ifndef MINIMAL
} else if (disallow_passive == 0 && !strcmp(cmd, "spsv")) {
dopasv(2);
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "allo")) {
if (*arg == 0) {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_STAT_FAILURE);
} else {
const off_t size = (off_t) strtoull(arg, NULL, 10);
if (size < (off_t) 0) {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_STAT_FAILURE);
} else {
doallo(size);
}
}
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "pwd") || !strcmp(cmd, "xpwd")) {
#ifdef WITH_RFC2640
char *nwd;
#endif
antiidle();
#ifdef WITH_RFC2640
nwd = charset_fs2client(wd);
addreply(257, "\"%s\" " MSG_IS_YOUR_CURRENT_LOCATION, nwd);
free(nwd);
#else
addreply(257, "\"%s\" " MSG_IS_YOUR_CURRENT_LOCATION, wd);
#endif
goto wayout;
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "cdup") || !strcmp(cmd, "xcup")) {
docwd("..");
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "retr")) {
if (*arg != 0) {
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if (enforce_tls_auth == 3 &&
data_protection_level != CPL_PRIVATE) {
addreply_noformat(521, MSG_PROT_PRIVATE_NEEDED);
}
else
#endif
{
doretr(arg);
}
} else {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_NO_FILE_NAME);
}
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "rest")) {
antiidle();
if (*arg != 0) {
dorest(arg);
} else {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_NO_RESTART_POINT);
restartat = (off_t) 0;
}
goto wayout;
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "dele")) {
if (*arg != 0) {
dodele(arg);
} else {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_NO_FILE_NAME);
}
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "stor")) {
arg = revealextraspc(arg);
if (*arg != 0) {
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if (enforce_tls_auth == 3 &&
data_protection_level != CPL_PRIVATE) {
addreply_noformat(521, MSG_PROT_PRIVATE_NEEDED);
} else
#endif
{
dostor(arg, 0, autorename);
}
} else {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_NO_FILE_NAME);
}
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "appe")) {
arg = revealextraspc(arg);
if (*arg != 0) {
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if (enforce_tls_auth == 3 &&
data_protection_level != CPL_PRIVATE) {
addreply_noformat(521, MSG_PROT_PRIVATE_NEEDED);
} else
#endif
{
dostor(arg, 1, 0);
}
} else {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_NO_FILE_NAME);
}
#ifndef MINIMAL
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "stou")) {
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if (enforce_tls_auth == 3 &&
data_protection_level != CPL_PRIVATE) {
addreply_noformat(521, MSG_PROT_PRIVATE_NEEDED);
} else
#endif
{
dostou();
}
#endif
#ifndef DISABLE_MKD_RMD
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "mkd") || !strcmp(cmd, "xmkd")) {
arg = revealextraspc(arg);
if (*arg != 0) {
domkd(arg);
} else {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_NO_DIRECTORY_NAME);
}
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "rmd") || !strcmp(cmd, "xrmd")) {
if (*arg != 0) {
dormd(arg);
} else {
addreply_noformat(550, MSG_NO_DIRECTORY_NAME);
}
#endif
#ifndef MINIMAL
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "stat")) {
if (*arg != 0) {
modern_listings = 0;
donlist(arg, 1, 1, 1, 1);
} else {
addreply_noformat(211, "http://www.pureftpd.org/");
}
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "list")) {
#ifndef MINIMAL
modern_listings = 0;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if (enforce_tls_auth == 3 &&
data_protection_level != CPL_PRIVATE) {
addreply_noformat(521, MSG_PROT_PRIVATE_NEEDED);
} else
#endif
{
donlist(arg, 0, 1, 0, 1);
}
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "nlst")) {
#ifndef MINIMAL
modern_listings = 0;
#endif
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if (enforce_tls_auth == 3 &&
data_protection_level != CPL_PRIVATE) {
addreply_noformat(521, MSG_PROT_PRIVATE_NEEDED);
} else
#endif
{
donlist(arg, 0, 0, 0, broken_client_compat);
}
#ifndef MINIMAL
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "mlst")) {
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if (enforce_tls_auth == 3 &&
data_protection_level != CPL_PRIVATE) {
addreply_noformat(521, MSG_PROT_PRIVATE_NEEDED);
} else
#endif
{
domlst(*arg != 0 ? arg : ".");
}
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "mlsd")) {
modern_listings = 1;
#ifdef WITH_TLS
if (enforce_tls_auth == 3 &&
data_protection_level != CPL_PRIVATE) {
addreply_noformat(521, MSG_PROT_PRIVATE_NEEDED);
} else
#endif
{
donlist(arg, 0, 1, 1, 0);
}
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "abor")) {
addreply_noformat(226, MSG_ABOR_SUCCESS);
#ifndef MINIMAL
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "site")) {
if ((sitearg = arg) != NULL) {
while (*sitearg != 0 && !isspace((unsigned char) *sitearg)) {
sitearg++;
}
if (*sitearg != 0) {
*sitearg++ = 0;
}
}
if (!strcasecmp(arg, "idle")) {
if (sitearg == NULL || *sitearg == 0) {
addreply_noformat(501, "SITE IDLE: " MSG_MISSING_ARG);
} else {
unsigned long int i = 0;
i = strtoul(sitearg, &sitearg, 10);
if (sitearg && *sitearg)
addreply(501, MSG_GARBAGE_FOUND " : %s", sitearg);
else if (i > MAX_SITE_IDLE)
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_VALUE_TOO_LARGE);
else {
idletime = i;
addreply(200, MSG_IDLE_TIME, idletime);
idletime_noop = (double) idletime * 2.0;
}
}
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "time")) {
dositetime();
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "help")) {
help_site:
addreply_noformat(214, MSG_SITE_HELP CRLF
# ifdef WITH_DIRALIASES
" ALIAS" CRLF
# endif
" CHMOD" CRLF " IDLE" CRLF " UTIME");
addreply_noformat(214, "Pure-FTPd - http://pureftpd.org/");
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "chmod")) {
char *sitearg2;
mode_t mode;
parsechmod:
if (sitearg == NULL || *sitearg == 0) {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_MISSING_ARG);
goto chmod_wayout;
}
sitearg2 = sitearg;
while (*sitearg2 != 0 && !isspace((unsigned char) *sitearg2)) {
sitearg2++;
}
while (*sitearg2 != 0 && isspace((unsigned char) *sitearg2)) {
sitearg2++;
}
if (*sitearg2 == 0) {
addreply_noformat(550, MSG_NO_FILE_NAME);
goto chmod_wayout;
}
mode = (mode_t) strtoul(sitearg, NULL, 8);
if (mode > (mode_t) 07777) {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_BAD_CHMOD);
goto chmod_wayout;
}
dochmod(sitearg2, mode);
chmod_wayout:
(void) 0;
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "utime")) {
char *sitearg2;
if (sitearg == NULL || *sitearg == 0) {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_NO_FILE_NAME);
goto utime_wayout;
}
if ((sitearg2 = strrchr(sitearg, ' ')) == NULL ||
sitearg2 == sitearg) {
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_MISSING_ARG);
goto utime_wayout;
}
if (strcasecmp(sitearg2, " UTC") != 0) {
addreply_noformat(500, "UTC Only");
goto utime_wayout;
}
*sitearg2-- = 0;
if ((sitearg2 = strrchr(sitearg, ' ')) == NULL ||
sitearg2 == sitearg) {
utime_no_arg:
addreply_noformat(501, MSG_MISSING_ARG);
goto utime_wayout;
}
*sitearg2-- = 0;
if ((sitearg2 = strrchr(sitearg, ' ')) == NULL ||
sitearg2 == sitearg) {
goto utime_no_arg;
}
*sitearg2-- = 0;
if ((sitearg2 = strrchr(sitearg, ' ')) == NULL ||
sitearg2 == sitearg) {
goto utime_no_arg;
}
*sitearg2++ = 0;
if (*sitearg2 == 0) {
goto utime_no_arg;
}
doutime(sitearg, sitearg2);
utime_wayout:
(void) 0;
# ifdef WITH_DIRALIASES
} else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "alias")) {
if (sitearg == NULL || *sitearg == 0) {
print_aliases();
} else {
const char *alias;
if ((alias = lookup_alias(sitearg)) != NULL) {
addreply(214, MSG_ALIASES_ALIAS, sitearg, alias);
} else {
addreply(502, MSG_ALIASES_UNKNOWN, sitearg);
}
}
# endif
} else if (*arg != 0) {
addreply(500, "SITE %s " MSG_UNKNOWN_EXTENSION, arg);
} else {
addreply_noformat(500, "SITE: " MSG_MISSING_ARG);
}
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "mdtm")) {
domdtm(arg);
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "size")) {
dosize(arg);
#ifndef MINIMAL
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "chmod")) {
sitearg = arg;
goto parsechmod;
#endif
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "rnfr")) {
if (*arg != 0) {
dornfr(arg);
} else {
addreply_noformat(550, MSG_NO_FILE_NAME);
}
} else if (!strcmp(cmd, "rnto")) {
arg = revealextraspc(arg);
if (*arg != 0) {
dornto(arg);
} else {
addreply_noformat(550, MSG_NO_FILE_NAME);
}
} else {
addreply_noformat(500, MSG_UNKNOWN_COMMAND);
}
}
noopidle = (time_t) -1;
wayout:
#ifdef WITH_RFC2640
free(narg);
narg = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef THROTTLING
if (throttling_delay != 0UL) {
usleep2(throttling_delay);
}
#else
(void) 0;
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Flush the command buffer after switching to TLS.
Fixes a flaw similar to CVE-2011-0411.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 165,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void flush_vsx_to_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
if (tsk->thread.regs) {
preempt_disable();
if (tsk->thread.regs->msr & MSR_VSX) {
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
BUG_ON(tsk != current);
#endif
giveup_vsx(tsk);
}
preempt_enable();
}
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Fix crash when forking inside a transaction
When we fork/clone we currently don't copy any of the TM state to the new
thread. This results in a TM bad thing (program check) when the new process is
switched in as the kernel does a tmrechkpt with TEXASR FS not set. Also, since
R1 is from userspace, we trigger the bad kernel stack pointer detection. So we
end up with something like this:
Bad kernel stack pointer 0 at c0000000000404fc
cpu 0x2: Vector: 700 (Program Check) at [c00000003ffefd40]
pc: c0000000000404fc: restore_gprs+0xc0/0x148
lr: 0000000000000000
sp: 0
msr: 9000000100201030
current = 0xc000001dd1417c30
paca = 0xc00000000fe00800 softe: 0 irq_happened: 0x01
pid = 0, comm = swapper/2
WARNING: exception is not recoverable, can't continue
The below fixes this by flushing the TM state before we copy the task_struct to
the clone. To do this we go through the tmreclaim patch, which removes the
checkpointed registers from the CPU and transitions the CPU out of TM suspend
mode. Hence we need to call tmrechkpt after to restore the checkpointed state
and the TM mode for the current task.
To make this fail from userspace is simply:
tbegin
li r0, 2
sc
<boom>
Kudos to Adhemerval Zanella Neto for finding this.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
cc: Adhemerval Zanella Neto <azanella@br.ibm.com>
cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 38,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sc_mutex_destroy(const sc_context_t *ctx, void *mutex)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
if (ctx->thread_ctx != NULL && ctx->thread_ctx->destroy_mutex != NULL)
return ctx->thread_ctx->destroy_mutex(mutex);
else
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 78,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _zip_dirent_read(zip_dirent_t *zde, zip_source_t *src, zip_buffer_t *buffer, bool local, zip_error_t *error)
{
zip_uint8_t buf[CDENTRYSIZE];
zip_uint16_t dostime, dosdate;
zip_uint32_t size, variable_size;
zip_uint16_t filename_len, comment_len, ef_len;
bool from_buffer = (buffer != NULL);
size = local ? LENTRYSIZE : CDENTRYSIZE;
if (buffer) {
if (_zip_buffer_left(buffer) < size) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_NOZIP, 0);
return -1;
}
}
else {
if ((buffer = _zip_buffer_new_from_source(src, size, buf, error)) == NULL) {
return -1;
}
}
if (memcmp(_zip_buffer_get(buffer, 4), (local ? LOCAL_MAGIC : CENTRAL_MAGIC), 4) != 0) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_NOZIP, 0);
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
/* convert buffercontents to zip_dirent */
_zip_dirent_init(zde);
if (!local)
zde->version_madeby = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
else
zde->version_madeby = 0;
zde->version_needed = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
zde->bitflags = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
zde->comp_method = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
/* convert to time_t */
dostime = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
dosdate = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
zde->last_mod = _zip_d2u_time(dostime, dosdate);
zde->crc = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
zde->comp_size = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
zde->uncomp_size = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
filename_len = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
ef_len = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
if (local) {
comment_len = 0;
zde->disk_number = 0;
zde->int_attrib = 0;
zde->ext_attrib = 0;
zde->offset = 0;
} else {
comment_len = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
zde->disk_number = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
zde->int_attrib = _zip_buffer_get_16(buffer);
zde->ext_attrib = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
zde->offset = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
}
if (!_zip_buffer_ok(buffer)) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INTERNAL, 0);
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
if (zde->bitflags & ZIP_GPBF_ENCRYPTED) {
if (zde->bitflags & ZIP_GPBF_STRONG_ENCRYPTION) {
/* TODO */
zde->encryption_method = ZIP_EM_UNKNOWN;
}
else {
zde->encryption_method = ZIP_EM_TRAD_PKWARE;
}
}
else {
zde->encryption_method = ZIP_EM_NONE;
}
zde->filename = NULL;
zde->extra_fields = NULL;
zde->comment = NULL;
variable_size = (zip_uint32_t)filename_len+(zip_uint32_t)ef_len+(zip_uint32_t)comment_len;
if (from_buffer) {
if (_zip_buffer_left(buffer) < variable_size) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
return -1;
}
}
else {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
if ((buffer = _zip_buffer_new_from_source(src, variable_size, NULL, error)) == NULL) {
return -1;
}
}
if (filename_len) {
zde->filename = _zip_read_string(buffer, src, filename_len, 1, error);
if (!zde->filename) {
if (zip_error_code_zip(error) == ZIP_ER_EOF) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
}
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
if (zde->bitflags & ZIP_GPBF_ENCODING_UTF_8) {
if (_zip_guess_encoding(zde->filename, ZIP_ENCODING_UTF8_KNOWN) == ZIP_ENCODING_ERROR) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
}
}
if (ef_len) {
zip_uint8_t *ef = _zip_read_data(buffer, src, ef_len, 0, error);
if (ef == NULL) {
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
if (!_zip_ef_parse(ef, ef_len, local ? ZIP_EF_LOCAL : ZIP_EF_CENTRAL, &zde->extra_fields, error)) {
free(ef);
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
free(ef);
if (local)
zde->local_extra_fields_read = 1;
}
if (comment_len) {
zde->comment = _zip_read_string(buffer, src, comment_len, 0, error);
if (!zde->comment) {
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
if (zde->bitflags & ZIP_GPBF_ENCODING_UTF_8) {
if (_zip_guess_encoding(zde->comment, ZIP_ENCODING_UTF8_KNOWN) == ZIP_ENCODING_ERROR) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
}
}
zde->filename = _zip_dirent_process_ef_utf_8(zde, ZIP_EF_UTF_8_NAME, zde->filename);
zde->comment = _zip_dirent_process_ef_utf_8(zde, ZIP_EF_UTF_8_COMMENT, zde->comment);
/* Zip64 */
if (zde->uncomp_size == ZIP_UINT32_MAX || zde->comp_size == ZIP_UINT32_MAX || zde->offset == ZIP_UINT32_MAX) {
zip_uint16_t got_len;
zip_buffer_t *ef_buffer;
const zip_uint8_t *ef = _zip_ef_get_by_id(zde->extra_fields, &got_len, ZIP_EF_ZIP64, 0, local ? ZIP_EF_LOCAL : ZIP_EF_CENTRAL, error);
/* TODO: if got_len == 0 && !ZIP64_EOCD: no error, 0xffffffff is valid value */
if (ef == NULL) {
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
if ((ef_buffer = _zip_buffer_new((zip_uint8_t *)ef, got_len)) == NULL) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_MEMORY, 0);
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
if (zde->uncomp_size == ZIP_UINT32_MAX)
zde->uncomp_size = _zip_buffer_get_64(ef_buffer);
else if (local) {
/* From appnote.txt: This entry in the Local header MUST
include BOTH original and compressed file size fields. */
(void)_zip_buffer_skip(ef_buffer, 8); /* error is caught by _zip_buffer_eof() call */
}
if (zde->comp_size == ZIP_UINT32_MAX)
zde->comp_size = _zip_buffer_get_64(ef_buffer);
if (!local) {
if (zde->offset == ZIP_UINT32_MAX)
zde->offset = _zip_buffer_get_64(ef_buffer);
if (zde->disk_number == ZIP_UINT16_MAX)
zde->disk_number = _zip_buffer_get_32(buffer);
}
if (!_zip_buffer_eof(ef_buffer)) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INCONS, 0);
_zip_buffer_free(ef_buffer);
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
_zip_buffer_free(ef_buffer);
}
if (!_zip_buffer_ok(buffer)) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_INTERNAL, 0);
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
/* zip_source_seek / zip_source_tell don't support values > ZIP_INT64_MAX */
if (zde->offset > ZIP_INT64_MAX) {
zip_error_set(error, ZIP_ER_SEEK, EFBIG);
return -1;
}
if (!_zip_dirent_process_winzip_aes(zde, error)) {
if (!from_buffer) {
_zip_buffer_free(buffer);
}
return -1;
}
zde->extra_fields = _zip_ef_remove_internal(zde->extra_fields);
return (zip_int64_t)(size + variable_size);
}
Commit Message: Fix double free().
Found by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter using AFL.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 1
| 167,965
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tst_QQuickWebView::tst_QQuickWebView()
{
addQtWebProcessToPath();
prepareWebViewComponent();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 101,828
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: display_init(struct display *dp)
/* Call this only once right at the start to initialize the control
* structure, the (struct buffer) lists are maintained across calls - the
* memory is not freed.
*/
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
dp->options = WARNINGS; /* default to !verbose, !quiet */
dp->filename = NULL;
dp->operation = NULL;
dp->original_pp = NULL;
dp->original_ip = NULL;
dp->original_rows = NULL;
dp->read_pp = NULL;
dp->read_ip = NULL;
buffer_init(&dp->original_file);
# ifdef PNG_WRITE_SUPPORTED
dp->write_pp = NULL;
buffer_init(&dp->written_file);
# endif
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 159,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unregister_prot_hook(struct sock *sk, bool sync)
{
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
if (po->running)
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, sync);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: magic_version(void)
{
return MAGIC_VERSION;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 45,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImageResource::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(multipart_parser_);
visitor->Trace(content_);
Resource::Trace(visitor);
MultipartImageResourceParser::Client::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 149,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xdr_dpol_arg(XDR *xdrs, dpol_arg *objp)
{
if (!xdr_ui_4(xdrs, &objp->api_version)) {
return (FALSE);
}
if (!xdr_nullstring(xdrs, &objp->name)) {
return (FALSE);
}
return (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: Fix kadm5/gssrpc XDR double free [CVE-2014-9421]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] In auth_gssapi_unwrap_data(), do not free
partial deserialization results upon failure to deserialize. This
responsibility belongs to the callers, svctcp_getargs() and
svcudp_getargs(); doing it in the unwrap function results in freeing
the results twice.
In xdr_krb5_tl_data() and xdr_krb5_principal(), null out the pointers
we are freeing, as other XDR functions such as xdr_bytes() and
xdr_string().
ticket: 8056 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID:
| 0
| 46,049
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void md_finish_reshape(struct mddev *mddev)
{
/* called be personality module when reshape completes. */
struct md_rdev *rdev;
rdev_for_each(rdev, mddev) {
if (rdev->data_offset > rdev->new_data_offset)
rdev->sectors += rdev->data_offset - rdev->new_data_offset;
else
rdev->sectors -= rdev->new_data_offset - rdev->data_offset;
rdev->data_offset = rdev->new_data_offset;
}
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct posix_acl *jffs2_iget_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl **i_acl)
{
struct posix_acl *acl = JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
if (*i_acl != JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED)
acl = posix_acl_dup(*i_acl);
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
return acl;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_rgb_to_gray_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_COLOR) != 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PermissionsData::GetPermissionMessageDetailsStrings() const {
if (ShouldSkipPermissionWarnings(extension_id_))
return std::vector<base::string16>();
return PermissionMessageProvider::Get()->GetWarningMessagesDetails(
active_permissions(), manifest_type_);
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 120,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u8 vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u8 mode = 0;
if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() &&
(vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL) &
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) {
mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC;
if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV;
}
if (is_long_mode(vcpu))
mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_LM;
return mode;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 81,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void OctetAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueUnsigned(info, impl->octetAttribute());
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 134,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IPCThreadState::blockUntilThreadAvailable()
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&mProcess->mThreadCountLock);
while (mProcess->mExecutingThreadsCount >= mProcess->mMaxThreads) {
ALOGW("Waiting for thread to be free. mExecutingThreadsCount=%lu mMaxThreads=%lu\n",
static_cast<unsigned long>(mProcess->mExecutingThreadsCount),
static_cast<unsigned long>(mProcess->mMaxThreads));
pthread_cond_wait(&mProcess->mThreadCountDecrement, &mProcess->mThreadCountLock);
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&mProcess->mThreadCountLock);
}
Commit Message: Fix issue #27252896: Security Vulnerability -- weak binder
Sending transaction to freed BBinder through weak handle
can cause use of a (mostly) freed object. We need to try to
safely promote to a strong reference first.
Change-Id: Ic9c6940fa824980472e94ed2dfeca52a6b0fd342
(cherry picked from commit c11146106f94e07016e8e26e4f8628f9a0c73199)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1(
rend_intro_cell_t *intro,
const uint8_t *buf,
size_t plaintext_len,
char **err_msg_out)
{
const char *rp_nickname, *endptr;
size_t nickname_field_len, ver_specific_len;
if (intro->version == 1) {
ver_specific_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN + 2;
rp_nickname = ((const char *)buf) + 1;
nickname_field_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1;
} else if (intro->version == 0) {
ver_specific_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1;
rp_nickname = (const char *)buf;
nickname_field_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN + 1;
} else {
if (err_msg_out)
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
"rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1() called with "
"bad version %d on INTRODUCE%d cell (this is a bug)",
intro->version,
(int)(intro->type));
goto err;
}
if (plaintext_len < ver_specific_len) {
if (err_msg_out)
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
"short plaintext of encrypted part in v1 INTRODUCE%d "
"cell (%lu bytes, needed %lu)",
(int)(intro->type),
(unsigned long)plaintext_len,
(unsigned long)ver_specific_len);
goto err;
}
endptr = memchr(rp_nickname, 0, nickname_field_len);
if (!endptr || endptr == rp_nickname) {
if (err_msg_out) {
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
"couldn't find a nul-padded nickname in "
"INTRODUCE%d cell",
(int)(intro->type));
}
goto err;
}
if ((intro->version == 0 &&
!is_legal_nickname(rp_nickname)) ||
(intro->version == 1 &&
!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(rp_nickname))) {
if (err_msg_out) {
tor_asprintf(err_msg_out,
"bad nickname in INTRODUCE%d cell",
(int)(intro->type));
}
goto err;
}
memcpy(intro->u.v0_v1.rp, rp_nickname, endptr - rp_nickname + 1);
return ver_specific_len;
err:
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532
| 0
| 69,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sched_avg_update(struct rq *rq)
{
s64 period = sched_avg_period();
while ((s64)(rq_clock(rq) - rq->age_stamp) > period) {
/*
* Inline assembly required to prevent the compiler
* optimising this loop into a divmod call.
* See __iter_div_u64_rem() for another example of this.
*/
asm("" : "+rm" (rq->age_stamp));
rq->age_stamp += period;
rq->rt_avg /= 2;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 55,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& InputType::NormalizeTypeName(
const AtomicString& type_name) {
if (type_name.IsEmpty())
return InputTypeNames::text;
InputTypeFactoryMap::const_iterator it =
FactoryMap()->find(type_name.LowerASCII());
return it == FactoryMap()->end() ? InputTypeNames::text : it->key;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 126,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ceil_at_intervals(int x, int step)
{
int mo = x % step;
if (mo > 0)
x += step - mo;
else if (mo < 0)
x -= mo;
return x;
}
Commit Message: Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 84,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_external_key_maxtries(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *maxtries)
{
unsigned char maxcounter[2] = { 0 };
static const sc_path_t file_path = {
{0x3f, 0x00, 0x50, 0x15, 0x9f, 0x00, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}, 6,
0,
0,
SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH,
{{0}, 0}
};
int ret;
ret = sc_select_file(card, &file_path, NULL);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, ret, "select max counter file failed");
ret = sc_read_binary(card, 0, maxcounter, 2, 0);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, ret, "read max counter file failed");
*maxtries = maxcounter[0];
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int dir_is_empty(const char *path) {
DIR *d;
int r;
struct dirent buf, *de;
if (!(d = opendir(path)))
return -errno;
for (;;) {
if ((r = readdir_r(d, &buf, &de)) > 0) {
r = -r;
break;
}
if (!de) {
r = 1;
break;
}
if (!ignore_file(de->d_name)) {
r = 0;
break;
}
}
closedir(d);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 11,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::CommitNavigation(
ResourceResponse* response,
std::unique_ptr<StreamHandle> body,
mojo::ScopedDataPipeConsumerHandle handle,
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const RequestNavigationParams& request_params,
bool is_view_source) {
DCHECK(
(response && (body.get() || handle.is_valid())) ||
common_params.url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme) ||
!ShouldMakeNetworkRequestForURL(common_params.url) ||
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::IsSameDocument(common_params.navigation_type) ||
IsRendererDebugURL(common_params.url));
UpdatePermissionsForNavigation(common_params, request_params);
ResetWaitingState();
if (is_view_source &&
this == frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->current_frame_host()) {
DCHECK(!GetParent());
render_view_host()->Send(new FrameMsg_EnableViewSourceMode(routing_id_));
}
const GURL body_url = body.get() ? body->GetURL() : GURL();
const ResourceResponseHead head = response ?
response->head : ResourceResponseHead();
Send(new FrameMsg_CommitNavigation(routing_id_, head, body_url,
handle.release(), common_params,
request_params));
if (ShouldMakeNetworkRequestForURL(common_params.url) &&
!FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::IsSameDocument(common_params.navigation_type)) {
last_navigation_previews_state_ = common_params.previews_state;
}
stream_handle_ = std::move(body);
if (!IsRendererDebugURL(common_params.url)) {
pending_commit_ = true;
is_loading_ = true;
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 127,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: calc_rate (wgint bytes, double secs, int *units)
{
double dlrate;
double bibyte = 1000.0;
if (!opt.report_bps)
bibyte = 1024.0;
assert (secs >= 0);
assert (bytes >= 0);
if (secs == 0)
/* If elapsed time is exactly zero, it means we're under the
resolution of the timer. This can easily happen on systems
that use time() for the timer. Since the interval lies between
0 and the timer's resolution, assume half the resolution. */
secs = ptimer_resolution () / 2.0;
dlrate = convert_to_bits (bytes) / secs;
if (dlrate < bibyte)
*units = 0;
else if (dlrate < (bibyte * bibyte))
*units = 1, dlrate /= bibyte;
else if (dlrate < (bibyte * bibyte * bibyte))
*units = 2, dlrate /= (bibyte * bibyte);
else
/* Maybe someone will need this, one day. */
*units = 3, dlrate /= (bibyte * bibyte * bibyte);
return dlrate;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t GetBytesPerRow(size_t columns,
size_t samples_per_pixel,size_t bits_per_pixel,
MagickBooleanType pad)
{
size_t
bytes_per_row;
switch (bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
bytes_per_row=4*(((size_t) samples_per_pixel*columns*
bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
break;
}
case 8:
default:
{
bytes_per_row=4*(((size_t) samples_per_pixel*columns*
bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
break;
}
case 10:
{
if (pad == MagickFalse)
{
bytes_per_row=4*(((size_t) samples_per_pixel*columns*
bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
break;
}
bytes_per_row=4*(((size_t) (32*((samples_per_pixel*columns+2)/3))+31)/32);
break;
}
case 12:
{
if (pad == MagickFalse)
{
bytes_per_row=4*(((size_t) samples_per_pixel*columns*
bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
break;
}
bytes_per_row=2*(((size_t) (16*samples_per_pixel*columns)+15)/16);
break;
}
case 16:
{
bytes_per_row=2*(((size_t) samples_per_pixel*columns*
bits_per_pixel+8)/16);
break;
}
case 32:
{
bytes_per_row=4*(((size_t) samples_per_pixel*columns*
bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
break;
}
case 64:
{
bytes_per_row=8*(((size_t) samples_per_pixel*columns*
bits_per_pixel+63)/64);
break;
}
}
return(bytes_per_row);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage long compat_sys_sendmsg(int fd, struct compat_msghdr __user *msg, unsigned int flags)
{
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
return __sys_sendmsg(fd, (struct msghdr __user *)msg, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT);
}
Commit Message: x86, x32: Correct invalid use of user timespec in the kernel
The x32 case for the recvmsg() timout handling is broken:
asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct compat_timespec __user *timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec ktspec;
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT,
(struct timespec *) timeout);
...
The timeout pointer parameter is provided by userland (hence the __user
annotation) but for x32 syscalls it's simply cast to a kernel pointer
and is passed to __sys_recvmmsg which will eventually directly
dereference it for both reading and writing. Other callers to
__sys_recvmmsg properly copy from userland to the kernel first.
The bug was introduced by commit ee4fa23c4bfc ("compat: Use
COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/compat.c") and should affect all kernels
since 3.4 (and perhaps vendor kernels if they backported x32 support
along with this code).
Note that CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI gets enabled at build time and only if
CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled and ld can build x32 executables.
Other uses of COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME seem fine.
This addresses CVE-2014-0038.
Signed-off-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 40,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void usage_alloc(struct snd_seq_usage *res, int num)
{
res->cur += num;
if (res->cur > res->peak)
res->peak = res->cur;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 54,739
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameFetchContext::DispatchDidChangeResourcePriority(
unsigned long identifier,
ResourceLoadPriority load_priority,
int intra_priority_value) {
if (IsDetached())
return;
TRACE_EVENT1(
"devtools.timeline", "ResourceChangePriority", "data",
InspectorChangeResourcePriorityEvent::Data(identifier, load_priority));
probe::didChangeResourcePriority(GetFrame(), identifier, load_priority);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 138,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputConnectionImpl::FinishComposingText() {
StartStateUpdateTimer();
if (composing_text_.empty()) {
UpdateTextInputState(true);
return;
}
std::string error;
if (!ime_engine_->CommitText(input_context_id_,
base::UTF16ToUTF8(composing_text_).c_str(),
&error)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "FinishComposingText: CommitText() failed, error=\"" << error
<< "\"";
}
composing_text_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Clear |composing_text_| after CommitText() is called.
|composing_text_| of InputConnectionImpl should be cleared after
CommitText() is called. Otherwise, FinishComposingText() will commit the
same text twice.
Bug: 899736
Test: unit_tests
Change-Id: Idb22d968ffe95d946789fbe62454e8e79cb0b384
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1304773
Commit-Queue: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#603518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 156,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::UpdateWebContentsVisibility(Visibility visibility) {
const bool occlusion_is_disabled =
!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kWebContentsOcclusion) ||
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableBackgroundingOccludedWindowsForTesting);
if (occlusion_is_disabled && visibility == Visibility::OCCLUDED)
visibility = Visibility::VISIBLE;
if (!did_first_set_visible_) {
if (visibility == Visibility::VISIBLE) {
WasShown();
did_first_set_visible_ = true;
}
return;
}
if (visibility == visibility_)
return;
if (visibility == Visibility::VISIBLE)
WasShown();
else if (visibility == Visibility::OCCLUDED)
WasOccluded();
else
WasHidden();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 145,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContents* Browser::OpenURLFromTab(WebContents* source,
const OpenURLParams& params) {
if (is_devtools()) {
DevToolsWindow* window = DevToolsWindow::AsDevToolsWindow(source);
DCHECK(window);
return window->OpenURLFromTab(source, params);
}
NavigateParams nav_params(this, params.url, params.transition);
nav_params.FillNavigateParamsFromOpenURLParams(params);
nav_params.source_contents = source;
nav_params.tabstrip_add_types = TabStripModel::ADD_NONE;
if (params.user_gesture)
nav_params.window_action = NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW;
nav_params.user_gesture = params.user_gesture;
nav_params.blob_url_loader_factory = params.blob_url_loader_factory;
bool is_popup = source && PopupBlockerTabHelper::ConsiderForPopupBlocking(
params.disposition);
if (is_popup && PopupBlockerTabHelper::MaybeBlockPopup(
source, base::Optional<GURL>(), &nav_params, ¶ms,
blink::mojom::WindowFeatures())) {
return nullptr;
}
Navigate(&nav_params);
if (is_popup && nav_params.navigated_or_inserted_contents)
PopupTracker::CreateForWebContents(
nav_params.navigated_or_inserted_contents, source);
return nav_params.navigated_or_inserted_contents;
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InProcessBrowserTest::SetUp() {
DCHECK(!g_browser_process);
CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
command_line->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableOfflineAutoReload);
SetUpCommandLine(command_line);
PrepareTestCommandLine(command_line);
ASSERT_TRUE(CreateUserDataDirectory())
<< "Could not create user data directory.";
ASSERT_TRUE(SetUpUserDataDirectory())
<< "Could not set up user data directory.";
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
base::FilePath log_dir = logging::GetSessionLogFile(*command_line).DirName();
base::CreateDirectory(log_dir);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
OSCrypt::UseMockKeychain(true);
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_CAPTIVE_PORTAL_DETECTION)
CaptivePortalService::set_state_for_testing(
CaptivePortalService::DISABLED_FOR_TESTING);
#endif
chrome_browser_net::NetErrorTabHelper::set_state_for_testing(
chrome_browser_net::NetErrorTabHelper::TESTING_FORCE_DISABLED);
google_util::SetMockLinkDoctorBaseURLForTesting();
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::win::Version version = base::win::GetVersion();
if (version >= base::win::VERSION_VISTA &&
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(switches::kAshBrowserTests)) {
com_initializer_.reset(new base::win::ScopedCOMInitializer());
ui::win::CreateATLModuleIfNeeded();
if (version >= base::win::VERSION_WIN8)
ASSERT_TRUE(win8::MakeTestDefaultBrowserSynchronously());
}
#endif
BrowserTestBase::SetUp();
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 110,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: populate_recordset_array_element_start(void *state, bool isnull)
{
PopulateRecordsetState *_state = (PopulateRecordsetState *) state;
if (_state->lex->lex_level == 1 &&
_state->lex->token_type != JSON_TOKEN_OBJECT_START)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("argument of %s must be an array of objects",
_state->function_name)));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,640
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TextIterator::handleTextBox()
{
RenderText* renderer = m_firstLetterText ? m_firstLetterText : toRenderText(m_node->renderer());
if (renderer->style()->visibility() != VISIBLE && !m_ignoresStyleVisibility) {
m_textBox = 0;
return;
}
String str = renderer->text();
unsigned start = m_offset;
unsigned end = (m_node == m_endContainer) ? static_cast<unsigned>(m_endOffset) : UINT_MAX;
while (m_textBox) {
unsigned textBoxStart = m_textBox->start();
unsigned runStart = max(textBoxStart, start);
InlineTextBox* firstTextBox = renderer->containsReversedText() ? (m_sortedTextBoxes.isEmpty() ? 0 : m_sortedTextBoxes[0]) : renderer->firstTextBox();
bool needSpace = m_lastTextNodeEndedWithCollapsedSpace
|| (m_textBox == firstTextBox && textBoxStart == runStart && runStart > 0);
if (needSpace && !isCollapsibleWhitespace(m_lastCharacter) && m_lastCharacter) {
if (m_lastTextNode == m_node && runStart > 0 && str[runStart - 1] == ' ') {
unsigned spaceRunStart = runStart - 1;
while (spaceRunStart > 0 && str[spaceRunStart - 1] == ' ')
--spaceRunStart;
emitText(m_node, renderer, spaceRunStart, spaceRunStart + 1);
} else
emitCharacter(' ', m_node, 0, runStart, runStart);
return;
}
unsigned textBoxEnd = textBoxStart + m_textBox->len();
unsigned runEnd = min(textBoxEnd, end);
InlineTextBox* nextTextBox = 0;
if (renderer->containsReversedText()) {
if (m_sortedTextBoxesPosition + 1 < m_sortedTextBoxes.size())
nextTextBox = m_sortedTextBoxes[m_sortedTextBoxesPosition + 1];
} else
nextTextBox = m_textBox->nextTextBox();
ASSERT(!nextTextBox || nextTextBox->renderer() == renderer);
if (runStart < runEnd) {
if (str[runStart] == '\n') {
emitCharacter(' ', m_node, 0, runStart, runStart + 1);
m_offset = runStart + 1;
} else {
size_t subrunEnd = str.find('\n', runStart);
if (subrunEnd == notFound || subrunEnd > runEnd)
subrunEnd = runEnd;
m_offset = subrunEnd;
emitText(m_node, renderer, runStart, subrunEnd);
}
if (static_cast<unsigned>(m_positionEndOffset) < textBoxEnd)
return;
unsigned nextRunStart = nextTextBox ? nextTextBox->start() : str.length();
if (nextRunStart > runEnd)
m_lastTextNodeEndedWithCollapsedSpace = true; // collapsed space between runs or at the end
m_textBox = nextTextBox;
if (renderer->containsReversedText())
++m_sortedTextBoxesPosition;
return;
}
m_textBox = nextTextBox;
if (renderer->containsReversedText())
++m_sortedTextBoxesPosition;
}
if (!m_textBox && m_remainingTextBox) {
m_textBox = m_remainingTextBox;
m_remainingTextBox = 0;
m_firstLetterText = 0;
m_offset = 0;
handleTextBox();
}
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 113,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLCanvasElement::WouldTaintOrigin() const {
return !OriginClean();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHost::InitializeForTesting(
std::unique_ptr<TaskRunnerProvider> task_runner_provider,
std::unique_ptr<Proxy> proxy_for_testing) {
task_runner_provider_ = std::move(task_runner_provider);
InitializeProxy(std::move(proxy_for_testing));
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 137,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExprCreateIdent(xkb_atom_t ident)
{
EXPR_CREATE(ExprIdent, expr, EXPR_IDENT, EXPR_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
expr->ident.ident = ident;
return expr;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: fix pointer value for FreeStmt
Signed-off-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 78,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool check_underflow(const struct arpt_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
if (!unconditional(&e->arp))
return false;
t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
return false;
verdict = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
verdict = -verdict - 1;
return verdict == NF_DROP || verdict == NF_ACCEPT;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,238
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __net_init ip6mr_rules_init(struct net *net)
{
struct fib_rules_ops *ops;
struct mr6_table *mrt;
int err;
ops = fib_rules_register(&ip6mr_rules_ops_template, net);
if (IS_ERR(ops))
return PTR_ERR(ops);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->ipv6.mr6_tables);
mrt = ip6mr_new_table(net, RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (!mrt) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
err = fib_default_rule_add(ops, 0x7fff, RT6_TABLE_DFLT, 0);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
net->ipv6.mr6_rules_ops = ops;
return 0;
err2:
ip6mr_free_table(mrt);
err1:
fib_rules_unregister(ops);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 93,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sit_gro_complete(struct sk_buff *skb, int nhoff)
{
skb->encapsulation = 1;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type |= SKB_GSO_IPXIP4;
return ipv6_gro_complete(skb, nhoff);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program. The reproducer is basically:
int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.
This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.
[ 42.361487] ==================================================================
[ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[ 42.366469]
[ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 42.368824] Call Trace:
[ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[ 42.397257]
[ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.403718]
[ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.409513]
[ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 42.415604]
[ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 42.418273] ^
[ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 65,178
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ikev2_nonce_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, "nonce", e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (1 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," nonce=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,") "));
} else if(ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
if(!ike_show_somedata(ndo, (const u_char *)(ext+1), ep)) goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 62,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fz_keep_colorspace(fz_context *ctx, fz_colorspace *cs)
{
return fz_keep_key_storable(ctx, &cs->key_storable);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContainerNode::removeBetween(Node* previousChild, Node* nextChild, Node& oldChild)
{
EventDispatchForbiddenScope assertNoEventDispatch;
ASSERT(oldChild.parentNode() == this);
if (!oldChild.needsAttach())
oldChild.detach();
if (nextChild)
nextChild->setPreviousSibling(previousChild);
if (previousChild)
previousChild->setNextSibling(nextChild);
if (m_firstChild == &oldChild)
m_firstChild = nextChild;
if (m_lastChild == &oldChild)
m_lastChild = previousChild;
oldChild.setPreviousSibling(nullptr);
oldChild.setNextSibling(nullptr);
oldChild.setParentOrShadowHostNode(nullptr);
document().adoptIfNeeded(oldChild);
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,098
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MODRET set_userdirroot(cmd_rec *cmd) {
int bool = -1;
config_rec *c = NULL;
CHECK_ARGS(cmd, 1);
CHECK_CONF(cmd, CONF_ANON);
bool = get_boolean(cmd, 1);
if (bool == -1)
CONF_ERROR(cmd, "expected Boolean parameter");
c = add_config_param(cmd->argv[0], 1, NULL);
c->argv[0] = pcalloc(c->pool, sizeof(unsigned char));
*((unsigned char *) c->argv[0]) = bool;
return PR_HANDLED(cmd);
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 67,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool HasLoadListener(Element* element) {
if (element->HasEventListeners(event_type_names::kLoad))
return true;
for (element = element->ParentOrShadowHostElement(); element;
element = element->ParentOrShadowHostElement()) {
EventListenerVector* entry =
element->GetEventListeners(event_type_names::kLoad);
if (!entry)
continue;
for (wtf_size_t i = 0; i < entry->size(); ++i) {
if (entry->at(i).Capture())
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 152,762
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void set_queue_events(bool queue) { queue_events_ = queue; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 112,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int posix_get_monotonic_raw(clockid_t which_clock, struct timespec64 *tp)
{
ktime_get_raw_ts64(tp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 81,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_InitRenderer( void ) {
re.BeginRegistration( &cls.glconfig );
cls.charSetShader = re.RegisterShader( "gfx/2d/hudchars" );
cls.whiteShader = re.RegisterShader( "white" );
cls.consoleShader = re.RegisterShader( "console-16bit" ); // JPW NERVE shader works with 16bit
cls.consoleShader2 = re.RegisterShader( "console2-16bit" ); // JPW NERVE same
g_console_field_width = cls.glconfig.vidWidth / SMALLCHAR_WIDTH - 2;
g_consoleField.widthInChars = g_console_field_width;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 95,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __u8 *kye_consumer_control_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize, int offset, const char *device_name) {
/*
* the fixup that need to be done:
* - change Usage Maximum in the Comsumer Control
* (report ID 3) to a reasonable value
*/
if (*rsize >= offset + 31 &&
/* Usage Page (Consumer Devices) */
rdesc[offset] == 0x05 && rdesc[offset + 1] == 0x0c &&
/* Usage (Consumer Control) */
rdesc[offset + 2] == 0x09 && rdesc[offset + 3] == 0x01 &&
/* Usage Maximum > 12287 */
rdesc[offset + 10] == 0x2a && rdesc[offset + 12] > 0x2f) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up %s report descriptor\n", device_name);
rdesc[offset + 12] = 0x2f;
}
return rdesc;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 38,109
|
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