instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAt(WebContents* contents, int index) {
int old_active_index = tab_strip_model_->active_index();
if (index < old_active_index && !tab_strip_model_->closing_all()) {
SessionService* session_service =
SessionServiceFactory::GetForProfileIfExisting(profile_);
if (session_service)
session_service->SetSelectedTabInWindow(session_id(),
old_active_index - 1);
}
TabDetachedAtImpl(contents, index, DETACH_TYPE_DETACH);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 139,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ExecuteMoveToEndOfLine(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Modify(
SelectionModifyAlteration::kMove, SelectionModifyDirection::kForward,
TextGranularity::kLineBoundary, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 128,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ReadUserLogState::Rotation( int rotation,
StatStructType &statbuf,
bool initializing )
{
if ( !initializing && !m_initialized ) {
return -1;
}
if ( ( rotation < 0 ) || ( rotation > m_max_rotations ) ) {
return -1;
}
if ( m_cur_rot == rotation ) {
return 0;
}
m_uniq_id = "";
GeneratePath( rotation, m_cur_path, initializing );
m_cur_rot = rotation;
m_log_type = LOG_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
Update();
return StatFile( statbuf );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,638
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DownloadFileManager::DownloadFileManager(DownloadFileFactory* factory)
: download_file_factory_(factory) {
if (download_file_factory_ == NULL)
download_file_factory_.reset(new DownloadFileFactoryImpl);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ExprResolveModMask(struct xkb_context *ctx, const ExprDef *expr,
enum mod_type mod_type, const struct xkb_mod_set *mods,
xkb_mod_mask_t *mask_rtrn)
{
LookupModMaskPriv priv = { .mods = mods, .mod_type = mod_type };
return ExprResolveMaskLookup(ctx, expr, mask_rtrn, LookupModMask, &priv);
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't explode on invalid virtual modifiers
testcase: 'virtualModifiers=LevelThreC'
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 78,953
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bgp_attr_init (void)
{
aspath_init ();
attrhash_init ();
community_init ();
ecommunity_init ();
cluster_init ();
transit_init ();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void VoidMethodAttrArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodAttrArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())));
return;
}
Attr* attr_arg;
attr_arg = V8Attr::ToImplWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]);
if (!attr_arg) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("voidMethodAttrArg", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::ArgumentNotOfType(0, "Attr")));
return;
}
impl->voidMethodAttrArg(attr_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 135,352
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String takeWireString()
{
COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(BufferValueType) == 2, BufferValueTypeIsTwoBytes);
fillHole();
String data = String(m_buffer.data(), m_buffer.size());
data.impl()->truncateAssumingIsolated((m_position + 1) / sizeof(BufferValueType));
return data;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsDataSource::StartDataRequest(
const std::string& path,
const content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter& wc_getter,
const content::URLDataSource::GotDataCallback& callback) {
std::string bundled_path_prefix(chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsBundledPath);
bundled_path_prefix += "/";
if (base::StartsWith(path, bundled_path_prefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
StartBundledDataRequest(path.substr(bundled_path_prefix.length()),
callback);
return;
}
std::string remote_path_prefix(chrome::kChromeUIDevToolsRemotePath);
remote_path_prefix += "/";
if (base::StartsWith(path, remote_path_prefix,
base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII)) {
StartRemoteDataRequest(path.substr(remote_path_prefix.length()),
callback);
return;
}
callback.Run(NULL);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Move sanitize url to devtools_ui.cc.
Compatibility script is not reliable enough.
BUG=653134
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2403633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#425814}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 140,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual ~ClientBuffer() {}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,395
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBTransaction::Timeout() {
Abort(IndexedDBDatabaseError(
blink::kWebIDBDatabaseExceptionTimeoutError,
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Transaction timed out due to inactivity.")));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 155,489
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void comedi_unmap(struct vm_area_struct *area)
{
struct comedi_async *async;
struct comedi_device *dev;
async = area->vm_private_data;
dev = async->subdevice->device;
mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
async->mmap_count--;
mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
}
Commit Message: staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 41,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: float AudioParam::finalValue()
{
float value;
calculateFinalValues(&value, 1, false);
return value;
}
Commit Message: Initialize value since calculateFinalValues may fail to do so.
Fix threading issue where updateCoefficientsIfNecessary was not always
called from the audio thread. This causes the value not to be
initialized.
Thus,
o Initialize the variable to some value, just in case.
o Split updateCoefficientsIfNecessary into two functions with the code
that sets the coefficients pulled out in to the new function
updateCoefficients.
o Simplify updateCoefficientsIfNecessary since useSmoothing was always
true, and forceUpdate is not longer needed.
o Add process lock to prevent the audio thread from updating the
coefficients while they are being read in the main thread. The audio
thread will update them the next time around.
o Make getFrequencyResponse set the lock while reading the
coefficients of the biquad in preparation for computing the
frequency response.
BUG=389219
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/354213002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@177250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,659
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::AcceptAuthRequest(
ResourceLoader* loader,
net::AuthChallengeInfo* auth_info) {
if (delegate_ && !delegate_->AcceptAuthRequest(loader->request(), auth_info))
return false;
if (!auth_info->is_proxy) {
HttpAuthResourceType resource_type =
HttpAuthResourceTypeOf(loader->request());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Net.HttpAuthResource",
resource_type,
HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_LAST);
if (resource_type == HTTP_AUTH_RESOURCE_BLOCKED_CROSS)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 105,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int buffer_replace2(struct buffer *b, char *pos, char *end, const char *str, int len)
{
int delta;
delta = len - (end - pos);
if (bi_end(b) + delta > b->data + b->size)
return 0; /* no space left */
if (buffer_not_empty(b) &&
bi_end(b) + delta > bo_ptr(b) &&
bo_ptr(b) >= bi_end(b))
return 0; /* no space left before wrapping data */
/* first, protect the end of the buffer */
memmove(end + delta, end, bi_end(b) - end);
/* now, copy str over pos */
if (len)
memcpy(pos, str, len);
b->i += delta;
if (buffer_empty(b))
b->p = b->data;
return delta;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContextualSearchDelegate::SetDiscourseContextAndAddToHeader(
const ContextualSearchContext& context) {
search_term_fetcher_->AddExtraRequestHeader(GetDiscourseContext(context));
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *len)
{
ASN1_BIT_STRING *key;
key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(data);
if(!key) return 0;
return EVP_Digest(key->data, key->length, md, len, type, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 94,633
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OxideQQuickWebView::setConfirmDialog(QQmlComponent* confirmDialog) {
Q_D(OxideQQuickWebView);
if (d->confirm_dialog_ == confirmDialog) {
return;
}
d->confirm_dialog_ = confirmDialog;
emit confirmDialogChanged();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_qtdemux_prepare_current_sample (GstQTDemux * qtdemux,
QtDemuxStream * stream, guint64 * offset, guint * size, guint64 * timestamp,
guint64 * duration, gboolean * keyframe)
{
QtDemuxSample *sample;
guint64 time_position;
guint32 seg_idx;
g_return_val_if_fail (stream != NULL, FALSE);
time_position = stream->time_position;
if (time_position == -1)
goto eos;
seg_idx = stream->segment_index;
if (seg_idx == -1) {
/* find segment corresponding to time_position if we are looking
* for a segment. */
seg_idx = gst_qtdemux_find_segment (qtdemux, stream, time_position);
/* nothing found, we're really eos */
if (seg_idx == -1)
goto eos;
}
/* different segment, activate it, sample_index will be set. */
if (stream->segment_index != seg_idx)
gst_qtdemux_activate_segment (qtdemux, stream, seg_idx, time_position);
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "segment active, index = %u of %u",
stream->sample_index, stream->n_samples);
/* send out pending buffers */
while (stream->buffers) {
GstBuffer *buffer = (GstBuffer *) stream->buffers->data;
if (stream->discont) {
GST_LOG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "marking discont buffer");
GST_BUFFER_FLAG_SET (buffer, GST_BUFFER_FLAG_DISCONT);
stream->discont = FALSE;
}
gst_buffer_set_caps (buffer, stream->caps);
gst_pad_push (stream->pad, buffer);
stream->buffers = g_slist_delete_link (stream->buffers, stream->buffers);
}
if (stream->sample_index >= stream->n_samples)
goto eos;
/* now get the info for the sample we're at */
sample = &stream->samples[stream->sample_index];
*timestamp = sample->timestamp + sample->pts_offset;
*offset = sample->offset;
*size = sample->size;
*duration = sample->duration;
*keyframe = stream->all_keyframe || sample->keyframe;
/* add padding */
if (stream->padding) {
*offset += stream->padding;
*size -= stream->padding;
}
return TRUE;
/* special cases */
eos:
{
stream->time_position = -1;
return FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::setPlatformShadow(FloatSize const&, float, Color const&, ColorSpace)
{
notImplemented();
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,111
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ecdsa_restart_det_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx->rng_ctx );
ecdsa_restart_det_init( ctx );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/556' into mbedtls-2.16-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 87,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: download::InProgressCache* DownloadManagerDelegate::GetInProgressCache() {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,472
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ASN1_TIME_snprintf (char *buf, int buf_len, ASN1_TIME * tm)
{
char *expires = NULL;
BIO *inMem = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
ASN1_TIME_print (inMem, tm);
BIO_get_mem_data (inMem, &expires);
buf[0] = 0;
if (expires != NULL)
{
/* expires is not \0 terminated */
safe_strcpy (buf, expires, MIN(24, buf_len));
}
BIO_free (inMem);
}
Commit Message: ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 58,474
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int padlock_sha1_init_nano(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
*sctx = (struct sha1_state){
.state = { SHA1_H0, SHA1_H1, SHA1_H2, SHA1_H3, SHA1_H4 },
};
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LoadURLInContents(WebContents* target_contents,
const GURL& url,
NavigateParams* params) {
NavigationController::LoadURLParams load_url_params(url);
load_url_params.source_site_instance = params->source_site_instance;
load_url_params.referrer = params->referrer;
load_url_params.frame_name = params->frame_name;
load_url_params.frame_tree_node_id = params->frame_tree_node_id;
load_url_params.redirect_chain = params->redirect_chain;
load_url_params.transition_type = params->transition;
load_url_params.extra_headers = params->extra_headers;
load_url_params.should_replace_current_entry =
params->should_replace_current_entry;
load_url_params.is_renderer_initiated = params->is_renderer_initiated;
load_url_params.started_from_context_menu = params->started_from_context_menu;
load_url_params.has_user_gesture = params->user_gesture;
load_url_params.blob_url_loader_factory = params->blob_url_loader_factory;
if (params->frame_tree_node_id ==
content::RenderFrameHost::kNoFrameTreeNodeId) {
load_url_params.navigation_ui_data =
ChromeNavigationUIData::CreateForMainFrameNavigation(
target_contents, params->disposition);
}
if (params->uses_post) {
load_url_params.load_type = NavigationController::LOAD_TYPE_HTTP_POST;
load_url_params.post_data = params->post_data;
}
target_contents->GetController().LoadURLWithParams(load_url_params);
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 155,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_handle_unknown(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
png_uint_32 skip = 0;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_unknown");
#ifdef PNG_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->user_chunk_cache_max != 0)
{
if (png_ptr->user_chunk_cache_max == 1)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
if (--png_ptr->user_chunk_cache_max == 1)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "No space in chunk cache for unknown chunk");
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
return;
}
}
#endif
if (png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_CONST PNG_IDAT;
#endif
if (png_memcmp(png_ptr->chunk_name, png_IDAT, 4)) /* Not an IDAT */
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_AFTER_IDAT;
}
if (!(png_ptr->chunk_name[0] & 0x20))
{
#ifdef PNG_HANDLE_AS_UNKNOWN_SUPPORTED
if (png_handle_as_unknown(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunk_name) !=
PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_ALWAYS
#ifdef PNG_READ_USER_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED
&& png_ptr->read_user_chunk_fn == NULL
#endif
)
#endif
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "unknown critical chunk");
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED
if ((png_ptr->flags & PNG_FLAG_KEEP_UNKNOWN_CHUNKS)
#ifdef PNG_READ_USER_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED
|| (png_ptr->read_user_chunk_fn != NULL)
#endif
)
{
#ifdef PNG_MAX_MALLOC_64K
if (length > (png_uint_32)65535L)
{
png_warning(png_ptr, "unknown chunk too large to fit in memory");
skip = length - (png_uint_32)65535L;
length = (png_uint_32)65535L;
}
#endif
png_memcpy((png_charp)png_ptr->unknown_chunk.name,
(png_charp)png_ptr->chunk_name,
png_sizeof(png_ptr->unknown_chunk.name));
png_ptr->unknown_chunk.name[png_sizeof(png_ptr->unknown_chunk.name)-1]
= '\0';
png_ptr->unknown_chunk.size = (png_size_t)length;
if (length == 0)
png_ptr->unknown_chunk.data = NULL;
else
{
png_ptr->unknown_chunk.data = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, length);
png_crc_read(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_ptr->unknown_chunk.data, length);
}
#ifdef PNG_READ_USER_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->read_user_chunk_fn != NULL)
{
/* Callback to user unknown chunk handler */
int ret;
ret = (*(png_ptr->read_user_chunk_fn))
(png_ptr, &png_ptr->unknown_chunk);
if (ret < 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "error in user chunk");
if (ret == 0)
{
if (!(png_ptr->chunk_name[0] & 0x20))
#ifdef PNG_HANDLE_AS_UNKNOWN_SUPPORTED
if (png_handle_as_unknown(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunk_name) !=
PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_ALWAYS)
#endif
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "unknown critical chunk");
png_set_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, info_ptr,
&png_ptr->unknown_chunk, 1);
}
}
else
#endif
png_set_unknown_chunks(png_ptr, info_ptr, &png_ptr->unknown_chunk, 1);
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->unknown_chunk.data);
png_ptr->unknown_chunk.data = NULL;
}
else
#endif
skip = length;
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, skip);
#ifndef PNG_READ_USER_CHUNKS_SUPPORTED
info_ptr = info_ptr; /* Quiet compiler warnings about unused info_ptr */
#endif
}
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 109,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kernel_getsockname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr)
{
return sock->ops->getname(sock, addr, 0);
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 82,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int copy_to_user_tmpl(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct xfrm_user_tmpl vec[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
int i;
if (xp->xfrm_nr == 0)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < xp->xfrm_nr; i++) {
struct xfrm_user_tmpl *up = &vec[i];
struct xfrm_tmpl *kp = &xp->xfrm_vec[i];
memcpy(&up->id, &kp->id, sizeof(up->id));
up->family = kp->encap_family;
memcpy(&up->saddr, &kp->saddr, sizeof(up->saddr));
up->reqid = kp->reqid;
up->mode = kp->mode;
up->share = kp->share;
up->optional = kp->optional;
up->aalgos = kp->aalgos;
up->ealgos = kp->ealgos;
up->calgos = kp->calgos;
}
return nla_put(skb, XFRMA_TMPL,
sizeof(struct xfrm_user_tmpl) * xp->xfrm_nr, vec);
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl()
The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As
struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for
alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes
to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info leak.
Initial version of the patch by Brad Spengler.
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 169,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: emailfrom_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
FREE_PTR(global_data->email_from);
global_data->email_from = set_value(strvec);
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 75,819
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool skb_needs_check(struct sk_buff *skb, bool tx_path)
{
if (tx_path)
return skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
return skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_NONE;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: store_image_check(PNG_CONST png_store* ps, png_const_structp pp, int iImage)
{
png_const_bytep image = ps->image;
if (image[-1] != 0xed || image[ps->cb_image] != 0xfe)
png_error(pp, "image overwrite");
else
{
png_size_t cbRow = ps->cb_row;
png_uint_32 rows = ps->image_h;
image += iImage * (cbRow+5) * ps->image_h;
image += 2; /* skip image first row markers */
while (rows-- > 0)
{
if (image[-2] != 190 || image[-1] != 239)
png_error(pp, "row start overwritten");
if (image[cbRow] != 222 || image[cbRow+1] != 173 ||
image[cbRow+2] != 17)
png_error(pp, "row end overwritten");
image += cbRow+5;
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 173,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DatabaseMessageFilter::OnHandleSqliteError(
const string16& origin_identifier,
const string16& database_name,
int error) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::FILE));
db_tracker_->HandleSqliteError(origin_identifier, database_name, error);
}
Commit Message: WebDatabase: check path traversal in origin_identifier
BUG=172264
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12212091
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@183141 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 1
| 171,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_phy_toggle_apd(struct tg3 *tp, bool enable)
{
u32 reg;
if (!tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS) ||
(tg3_flag(tp, 5717_PLUS) &&
(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_MII_SERDES)))
return;
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_IS_FET) {
tg3_phy_fet_toggle_apd(tp, enable);
return;
}
reg = MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW_WREN |
MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW_SCR5_SEL |
MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW_SCR5_LPED |
MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW_SCR5_DLPTLM |
MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW_SCR5_SDTL |
MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW_SCR5_C125OE;
if (tg3_asic_rev(tp) != ASIC_REV_5784 || !enable)
reg |= MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW_SCR5_DLLAPD;
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW, reg);
reg = MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW_WREN |
MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW_APD_SEL |
MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW_APD_WKTM_84MS;
if (enable)
reg |= MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW_APD_ENABLE;
tg3_writephy(tp, MII_TG3_MISC_SHDW, reg);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 32,671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct super_block *freeze_bdev(struct block_device *bdev)
{
struct super_block *sb;
int error = 0;
mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
if (++bdev->bd_fsfreeze_count > 1) {
/*
* We don't even need to grab a reference - the first call
* to freeze_bdev grab an active reference and only the last
* thaw_bdev drops it.
*/
sb = get_super(bdev);
drop_super(sb);
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
return sb;
}
sb = get_active_super(bdev);
if (!sb)
goto out;
error = freeze_super(sb);
if (error) {
deactivate_super(sb);
bdev->bd_fsfreeze_count--;
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
return ERR_PTR(error);
}
deactivate_super(sb);
out:
sync_blockdev(bdev);
mutex_unlock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex);
return sb; /* thaw_bdev releases s->s_umount */
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OptimizationHintsComponentInstallerPolicy::GetRelativeInstallDir() const {
return base::FilePath(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("OptimizationHints"));
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 142,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mainloop(CLIENT *client) {
struct nbd_request request;
struct nbd_reply reply;
gboolean go_on=TRUE;
#ifdef DODBG
int i = 0;
#endif
negotiate(client->net, client, NULL, client->modern ? NEG_MODERN : (NEG_OLD | NEG_INIT));
DEBUG("Entering request loop!\n");
reply.magic = htonl(NBD_REPLY_MAGIC);
reply.error = 0;
while (go_on) {
char buf[BUFSIZE];
char* p;
size_t len;
size_t currlen;
size_t writelen;
uint16_t command;
#ifdef DODBG
i++;
printf("%d: ", i);
#endif
readit(client->net, &request, sizeof(request));
if (client->transactionlogfd != -1)
writeit(client->transactionlogfd, &request, sizeof(request));
request.from = ntohll(request.from);
request.type = ntohl(request.type);
command = request.type & NBD_CMD_MASK_COMMAND;
len = ntohl(request.len);
DEBUG("%s from %llu (%llu) len %u, ", getcommandname(command),
(unsigned long long)request.from,
(unsigned long long)request.from / 512, len);
if (request.magic != htonl(NBD_REQUEST_MAGIC))
err("Not enough magic.");
memcpy(reply.handle, request.handle, sizeof(reply.handle));
if ((command==NBD_CMD_WRITE) || (command==NBD_CMD_READ)) {
if (request.from + len < request.from) { // 64 bit overflow!!
DEBUG("[Number too large!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EINVAL);
continue;
}
if (((off_t)request.from + len) > client->exportsize) {
DEBUG("[RANGE!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EINVAL);
continue;
}
currlen = len;
if (currlen > BUFSIZE - sizeof(struct nbd_reply)) {
currlen = BUFSIZE - sizeof(struct nbd_reply);
if(!logged_oversized) {
msg(LOG_DEBUG, "oversized request (this is not a problem)");
logged_oversized = true;
}
}
}
switch (command) {
case NBD_CMD_DISC:
msg(LOG_INFO, "Disconnect request received.");
if (client->server->flags & F_COPYONWRITE) {
if (client->difmap) g_free(client->difmap) ;
close(client->difffile);
unlink(client->difffilename);
free(client->difffilename);
}
go_on=FALSE;
continue;
case NBD_CMD_WRITE:
DEBUG("wr: net->buf, ");
while(len > 0) {
readit(client->net, buf, currlen);
DEBUG("buf->exp, ");
if ((client->server->flags & F_READONLY) ||
(client->server->flags & F_AUTOREADONLY)) {
DEBUG("[WRITE to READONLY!]");
ERROR(client, reply, EPERM);
consume(client->net, buf, len-currlen, BUFSIZE);
continue;
}
if (expwrite(request.from, buf, currlen, client,
request.type & NBD_CMD_FLAG_FUA)) {
DEBUG("Write failed: %m" );
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
consume(client->net, buf, len-currlen, BUFSIZE);
continue;
}
len -= currlen;
request.from += currlen;
currlen = (len < BUFSIZE) ? len : BUFSIZE;
}
SEND(client->net, reply);
DEBUG("OK!\n");
continue;
case NBD_CMD_FLUSH:
DEBUG("fl: ");
if (expflush(client)) {
DEBUG("Flush failed: %m");
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
continue;
}
SEND(client->net, reply);
DEBUG("OK!\n");
continue;
case NBD_CMD_READ:
DEBUG("exp->buf, ");
if (client->transactionlogfd != -1)
writeit(client->transactionlogfd, &reply, sizeof(reply));
writeit(client->net, &reply, sizeof(reply));
p = buf;
writelen = currlen;
while(len > 0) {
if (expread(request.from, p, currlen, client)) {
DEBUG("Read failed: %m");
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
continue;
}
DEBUG("buf->net, ");
writeit(client->net, buf, writelen);
len -= currlen;
request.from += currlen;
currlen = (len < BUFSIZE) ? len : BUFSIZE;
p = buf;
writelen = currlen;
}
DEBUG("OK!\n");
continue;
case NBD_CMD_TRIM:
/* The kernel module sets discard_zeroes_data == 0,
* so it is okay to do nothing. */
if (exptrim(&request, client)) {
DEBUG("Trim failed: %m");
ERROR(client, reply, errno);
continue;
}
SEND(client->net, reply);
continue;
default:
DEBUG ("Ignoring unknown command\n");
continue;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: nbd-server: handle modern-style negotiation in a child process
Previously, the modern style negotiation was carried out in the root
server (listener) process before forking the actual client handler. This
made it possible for a malfunctioning or evil client to terminate the
root process simply by querying a non-existent export or aborting in the
middle of the negotation process (caused SIGPIPE in the server).
This commit moves the negotiation process to the child to keep the root
process up and running no matter what happens during the negotiation.
See http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=30410146
Signed-off-by: Tuomas Räsänen <tuomasjjrasanen@tjjr.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 46,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static PassOwnPtr<TextResourceDecoder> createXHRTextDecoder(const String& mimeType, const String& textEncodingName)
{
if (!textEncodingName.isEmpty())
return TextResourceDecoder::create("text/plain", textEncodingName);
if (DOMImplementation::isXMLMIMEType(mimeType)) {
OwnPtr<TextResourceDecoder> decoder = TextResourceDecoder::create("application/xml");
decoder->useLenientXMLDecoding();
return decoder.release();
}
if (equalIgnoringCase(mimeType, "text/html"))
return TextResourceDecoder::create("text/html", "UTF-8");
return TextResourceDecoder::create("text/plain", "UTF-8");
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeDouble(double val)
{
union {
double d;
unsigned long long ll;
} u;
u.d = val;
return writeAligned(u.ll);
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 157,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: store_tabletMouseRight(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int new_button = map_str_to_val(mouse_button_map, buf, count);
if (new_button == AIPTEK_INVALID_VALUE)
return -EINVAL;
aiptek->newSetting.mouseButtonRight = new_button;
return count;
}
Commit Message: Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 57,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kernel_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct kvec *vec, size_t num, size_t size)
{
mm_segment_t oldfs = get_fs();
int result;
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
/*
* the following is safe, since for compiler definitions of kvec and
* iovec are identical, yielding the same in-core layout and alignment
*/
iov_iter_init(&msg->msg_iter, WRITE, (struct iovec *)vec, num, size);
result = sock_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
set_fs(oldfs);
return result;
}
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 57,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_update_vlan_filters(VMXNET3State *s)
{
int i;
/* Copy configuration from shared memory */
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED(s->drv_shmem,
devRead.rxFilterConf.vfTable,
s->vlan_table,
sizeof(s->vlan_table));
/* Invert byte order when needed */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(s->vlan_table); i++) {
s->vlan_table[i] = le32_to_cpu(s->vlan_table[i]);
}
/* Dump configuration for debugging purposes */
VMW_CFPRN("Configured VLANs:");
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(s->vlan_table) * 8; i++) {
if (VMXNET3_VFTABLE_ENTRY_IS_SET(s->vlan_table, i)) {
VMW_CFPRN("\tVLAN %d is present", i);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static xmlNodePtr check_and_resolve_href(xmlNodePtr data)
{
if (data && data->properties) {
xmlAttrPtr href;
href = data->properties;
while (1) {
href = get_attribute(href, "href");
if (href == NULL || href->ns == NULL) {break;}
href = href->next;
}
if (href) {
/* Internal href try and find node */
if (href->children->content[0] == '#') {
xmlNodePtr ret = get_node_with_attribute_recursive(data->doc->children, NULL, "id", (char*)&href->children->content[1]);
if (!ret) {
soap_error1(E_ERROR, "Encoding: Unresolved reference '%s'", href->children->content);
}
return ret;
} else {
/* TODO: External href....? */
soap_error1(E_ERROR, "Encoding: External reference '%s'", href->children->content);
}
}
/* SOAP 1.2 enc:id enc:ref */
href = get_attribute_ex(data->properties, "ref", SOAP_1_2_ENC_NAMESPACE);
if (href) {
xmlChar* id;
xmlNodePtr ret;
if (href->children->content[0] == '#') {
id = href->children->content+1;
} else {
id = href->children->content;
}
ret = get_node_with_attribute_recursive_ex(data->doc->children, NULL, NULL, "id", (char*)id, SOAP_1_2_ENC_NAMESPACE);
if (!ret) {
soap_error1(E_ERROR, "Encoding: Unresolved reference '%s'", href->children->content);
} else if (ret == data) {
soap_error1(E_ERROR, "Encoding: Violation of id and ref information items '%s'", href->children->content);
}
return ret;
}
}
return data;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char comps_objmrtree_paircmp(void *obj1, void *obj2) {
if (strcmp(((COMPS_ObjMRTreePair*)obj1)->key,
((COMPS_ObjMRTreePair*)obj2)->key) != 0)
return 0;
return comps_object_cmp((COMPS_Object*)((COMPS_ObjMRTreePair*)obj1)->data,
(COMPS_Object*)((COMPS_ObjMRTreePair*)obj1)->data);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 91,774
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GfxPattern *GfxShadingPattern::copy() {
return new GfxShadingPattern(shading->copy(), matrix);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
{
int i, j, k = 0;
BN_ULONG mask;
if (BN_is_zero(a))
return 0;
for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (!a->d[i])
/* skip word if a->d[i] == 0 */
continue;
mask = BN_TBIT;
for (j = BN_BITS2 - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
if (a->d[i] & mask) {
if (k < max)
p[k] = BN_BITS2 * i + j;
k++;
}
mask >>= 1;
}
}
if (k < max) {
p[k] = -1;
k++;
}
return k;
}
Commit Message: bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 44,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sctp_v6_protosw_init(void)
{
int rc;
rc = proto_register(&sctpv6_prot, 1);
if (rc)
return rc;
/* Add SCTPv6(UDP and TCP style) to inetsw6 linked list. */
inet6_register_protosw(&sctpv6_seqpacket_protosw);
inet6_register_protosw(&sctpv6_stream_protosw);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not
being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport
does not seem to have the desired effect:
SCTP + IPv4:
22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116)
192.168.0.2 > 192.168.0.5: AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72
22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340)
192.168.0.5 > 192.168.0.2: AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1):
SCTP + IPv6:
22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364)
fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp
1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10]
Moreover, Alan says:
This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen
this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer
protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to
follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and
Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops
this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec
is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted.
In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext"
string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually
does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the
non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on
SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X):
...
0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l....
0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext...
Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the
receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by
Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this.
SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit().
This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with
changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers.
SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since
a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary
route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through
sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(),
we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in
tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in
sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect
of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst()
instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb.
Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with
ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095
it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1].
So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if
we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to
put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in
ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside,
result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on
the wire with this patch it now looks like:
SCTP + IPv6:
08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba:
AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72
08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a:
AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296
This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since
2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have
its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with
this patch.
[1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf
Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com>
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 29,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CanvasRenderingContextFactory* OffscreenCanvas::GetRenderingContextFactory(
int type) {
DCHECK_LE(type, CanvasRenderingContext::kMaxValue);
return RenderingContextFactories()[type].get();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 152,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestInterceptor()
: intercept_main_request_(false), restart_main_request_(false),
cancel_main_request_(false), cancel_then_restart_main_request_(false),
simulate_main_network_error_(false),
intercept_redirect_(false), cancel_redirect_request_(false),
intercept_final_response_(false), cancel_final_request_(false),
did_intercept_main_(false), did_restart_main_(false),
did_cancel_main_(false), did_cancel_then_restart_main_(false),
did_simulate_error_main_(false),
did_intercept_redirect_(false), did_cancel_redirect_(false),
did_intercept_final_(false), did_cancel_final_(false) {
URLRequest::Deprecated::RegisterRequestInterceptor(this);
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 102,276
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_send_NPSetWindowCallbackStruct(rpc_message_t *message, void *p_value)
{
NPSetWindowCallbackStruct *ws_info = (NPSetWindowCallbackStruct *)p_value;
int error;
if (ws_info) {
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, 1)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_int32(message, ws_info->type)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, ws_info->visual ? XVisualIDFromVisual(ws_info->visual) : 0)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, ws_info->colormap)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, ws_info->depth)) < 0)
return error;
}
else {
if ((error = rpc_message_send_uint32(message, 0)) < 0)
return error;
}
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SplashOutFontFileID(Ref *rA) { r = *rA; }
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cryp_blk_encrypt(struct ablkcipher_request *areq)
{
struct crypto_ablkcipher *cipher = crypto_ablkcipher_reqtfm(areq);
struct cryp_ctx *ctx = crypto_ablkcipher_ctx(cipher);
pr_debug(DEV_DBG_NAME " [%s]", __func__);
ctx->config.algodir = CRYP_ALGORITHM_ENCRYPT;
/*
* DMA does not work for DES due to a hw bug */
if (cryp_mode == CRYP_MODE_DMA && mode_is_aes(ctx->config.algomode))
return ablk_dma_crypt(areq);
/* For everything except DMA, we run the non DMA version. */
return ablk_crypt(areq);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 47,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compat_standard_to_user(void __user *dst, const void *src)
{
compat_int_t cv = *(int *)src;
if (cv > 0)
cv -= xt_compat_calc_jump(AF_INET, cv);
return copy_to_user(dst, &cv, sizeof(cv)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 52,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void netdev_adjacent_sysfs_del(struct net_device *dev,
char *name,
struct list_head *dev_list)
{
char linkname[IFNAMSIZ+7];
sprintf(linkname, dev_list == &dev->adj_list.upper ?
"upper_%s" : "lower_%s", name);
sysfs_remove_link(&(dev->dev.kobj), linkname);
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 93,415
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_guest_debug *dbg)
{
int ret = 0;
trace_kvm_set_guest_debug(vcpu, dbg->control);
if (dbg->control & ~KVM_GUESTDBG_VALID_MASK) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
if (dbg->control & KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE) {
vcpu->guest_debug = dbg->control;
/* Hardware assisted Break and Watch points */
if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW) {
vcpu->arch.external_debug_state = dbg->arch;
}
} else {
/* If not enabled clear all flags */
vcpu->guest_debug = 0;
}
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: Tighten guest core register access from userspace
We currently allow userspace to access the core register file
in about any possible way, including straddling multiple
registers and doing unaligned accesses.
This is not the expected use of the ABI, and nobody is actually
using it that way. Let's tighten it by explicitly checking
the size and alignment for each field of the register file.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 2f4a07c5f9fe ("arm64: KVM: guest one-reg interface")
Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
[maz: rewrote Dave's initial patch to be more easily backported]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 76,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::CancelKeyboardLockRequest(WebContents* web_contents) {
exclusive_access_manager_->keyboard_lock_controller()
->CancelKeyboardLockRequest(web_contents);
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 146,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int buildid_dir_command_config(const char *var, const char *value,
void *data)
{
struct buildid_dir_config *c = data;
const char *v;
/* same dir for all commands */
if (!prefixcmp(var, "buildid.") && !strcmp(var + 8, "dir")) {
v = perf_config_dirname(var, value);
if (!v)
return -1;
strncpy(c->dir, v, MAXPATHLEN-1);
c->dir[MAXPATHLEN-1] = '\0';
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf tools: do not look at ./config for configuration
In addition to /etc/perfconfig and $HOME/.perfconfig, perf looks for
configuration in the file ./config, imitating git which looks at
$GIT_DIR/config. If ./config is not a perf configuration file, it
fails, or worse, treats it as a configuration file and changes behavior
in some unexpected way.
"config" is not an unusual name for a file to be lying around and perf
does not have a private directory dedicated for its own use, so let's
just stop looking for configuration in the cwd. Callers needing
context-sensitive configuration can use the PERF_CONFIG environment
variable.
Requested-by: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: 632923@bugs.debian.org
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110805165838.GA7237@elie.gateway.2wire.net
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Camera3Device::sendCaptureResult(CameraMetadata &pendingMetadata,
CaptureResultExtras &resultExtras,
CameraMetadata &collectedPartialResult,
uint32_t frameNumber,
bool reprocess,
const AeTriggerCancelOverride_t &aeTriggerCancelOverride) {
if (pendingMetadata.isEmpty())
return;
Mutex::Autolock l(mOutputLock);
if (reprocess) {
if (frameNumber < mNextReprocessResultFrameNumber) {
SET_ERR("Out-of-order reprocess capture result metadata submitted! "
"(got frame number %d, expecting %d)",
frameNumber, mNextReprocessResultFrameNumber);
return;
}
mNextReprocessResultFrameNumber = frameNumber + 1;
} else {
if (frameNumber < mNextResultFrameNumber) {
SET_ERR("Out-of-order capture result metadata submitted! "
"(got frame number %d, expecting %d)",
frameNumber, mNextResultFrameNumber);
return;
}
mNextResultFrameNumber = frameNumber + 1;
}
CaptureResult captureResult;
captureResult.mResultExtras = resultExtras;
captureResult.mMetadata = pendingMetadata;
if (captureResult.mMetadata.update(ANDROID_REQUEST_FRAME_COUNT,
(int32_t*)&frameNumber, 1) != OK) {
SET_ERR("Failed to set frame# in metadata (%d)",
frameNumber);
return;
} else {
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Set frame# in metadata (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, frameNumber);
}
if (mUsePartialResult && !collectedPartialResult.isEmpty()) {
captureResult.mMetadata.append(collectedPartialResult);
}
captureResult.mMetadata.sort();
camera_metadata_entry entry =
captureResult.mMetadata.find(ANDROID_SENSOR_TIMESTAMP);
if (entry.count == 0) {
SET_ERR("No timestamp provided by HAL for frame %d!",
frameNumber);
return;
}
overrideResultForPrecaptureCancel(&captureResult.mMetadata, aeTriggerCancelOverride);
List<CaptureResult>::iterator queuedResult =
mResultQueue.insert(mResultQueue.end(), CaptureResult(captureResult));
ALOGVV("%s: result requestId = %" PRId32 ", frameNumber = %" PRId64
", burstId = %" PRId32, __FUNCTION__,
queuedResult->mResultExtras.requestId,
queuedResult->mResultExtras.frameNumber,
queuedResult->mResultExtras.burstId);
mResultSignal.signal();
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 161,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: u64 lvid_get_unique_id(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct udf_sb_info *sbi = UDF_SB(sb);
struct logicalVolIntegrityDesc *lvid;
struct logicalVolHeaderDesc *lvhd;
u64 uniqueID;
u64 ret;
bh = sbi->s_lvid_bh;
if (!bh)
return 0;
lvid = (struct logicalVolIntegrityDesc *)bh->b_data;
lvhd = (struct logicalVolHeaderDesc *)lvid->logicalVolContentsUse;
mutex_lock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
ret = uniqueID = le64_to_cpu(lvhd->uniqueID);
if (!(++uniqueID & 0xFFFFFFFF))
uniqueID += 16;
lvhd->uniqueID = cpu_to_le64(uniqueID);
mutex_unlock(&sbi->s_alloc_mutex);
mark_buffer_dirty(bh);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid run away loop when partition table length is corrupted
Check provided length of partition table so that (possibly maliciously)
corrupted partition table cannot cause accessing data beyond current buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int find_cpu_to_read(struct perf_event *event, int local_cpu)
{
int event_cpu = event->oncpu;
u16 local_pkg, event_pkg;
if (event->group_caps & PERF_EV_CAP_READ_ACTIVE_PKG) {
event_pkg = topology_physical_package_id(event_cpu);
local_pkg = topology_physical_package_id(local_cpu);
if (event_pkg == local_pkg)
return local_cpu;
}
return event_cpu;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 68,321
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoInitialize(const DoInitializeOptions& options) {
DCHECK(MessageLoop::current() == host_->core_thread_.message_loop());
processing_passphrase_ = false;
if (options.delete_sync_data_folder) {
DeleteSyncDataFolder();
}
bool success = file_util::CreateDirectory(host_->sync_data_folder_path());
DCHECK(success);
syncapi_->AddObserver(this);
const FilePath& path_str = host_->sync_data_folder_path();
success = syncapi_->Init(
path_str,
(options.service_url.host() + options.service_url.path()).c_str(),
options.service_url.EffectiveIntPort(),
options.service_url.SchemeIsSecure(),
options.http_bridge_factory,
host_, // ModelSafeWorkerRegistrar.
MakeUserAgentForSyncapi().c_str(),
options.credentials,
sync_notifier_.get(),
options.restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
options.setup_for_test_mode);
DCHECK(success) << "Syncapi initialization failed!";
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 101,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BaseAudioContext::RejectPendingResolvers() {
DCHECK(IsMainThread());
for (auto& resolver : resume_resolvers_) {
resolver->Reject(DOMException::Create(kInvalidStateError,
"Audio context is going away"));
}
resume_resolvers_.clear();
is_resolving_resume_promises_ = false;
RejectPendingDecodeAudioDataResolvers();
}
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 153,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeExtensionsDispatcherDelegate::InitOriginPermissions(
const extensions::Extension* extension,
bool is_extension_active) {
if (is_extension_active &&
extension->permissions_data()->HasAPIPermission(
extensions::APIPermission::kManagement)) {
blink::WebSecurityPolicy::addOriginAccessWhitelistEntry(
extension->url(),
blink::WebString::fromUTF8(content::kChromeUIScheme),
blink::WebString::fromUTF8(chrome::kChromeUIExtensionIconHost),
false);
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,514
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn_idx)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
const struct bpf_func_proto *fn = NULL;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;
bool changes_data;
int i, err;
/* find function prototype */
if (func_id < 0 || func_id >= __BPF_FUNC_MAX_ID) {
verbose("invalid func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto)
fn = env->prog->aux->ops->get_func_proto(func_id);
if (!fn) {
verbose("unknown func %s#%d\n", func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* eBPF programs must be GPL compatible to use GPL-ed functions */
if (!env->prog->gpl_compatible && fn->gpl_only) {
verbose("cannot call GPL only function from proprietary program\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
changes_data = bpf_helper_changes_pkt_data(fn->func);
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
meta.pkt_access = fn->pkt_access;
/* We only support one arg being in raw mode at the moment, which
* is sufficient for the helper functions we have right now.
*/
err = check_raw_mode(fn);
if (err) {
verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return err;
}
/* check args */
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_1, fn->arg1_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_2, fn->arg2_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_3, fn->arg3_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_4, fn->arg4_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
err = check_func_arg(env, BPF_REG_5, fn->arg5_type, &meta);
if (err)
return err;
/* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset
* is inferred from register state.
*/
for (i = 0; i < meta.access_size; i++) {
err = check_mem_access(env, meta.regno, i, BPF_B, BPF_WRITE, -1);
if (err)
return err;
}
/* reset caller saved regs */
for (i = 0; i < CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {
reg = regs + caller_saved[i];
reg->type = NOT_INIT;
reg->imm = 0;
}
/* update return register */
if (fn->ret_type == RET_INTEGER) {
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_VOID) {
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = NOT_INIT;
} else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;
regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL;
regs[BPF_REG_0].max_value = regs[BPF_REG_0].min_value = 0;
/* remember map_ptr, so that check_map_access()
* can check 'value_size' boundary of memory access
* to map element returned from bpf_map_lookup_elem()
*/
if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
verbose("kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
regs[BPF_REG_0].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen;
insn_aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx];
if (!insn_aux->map_ptr)
insn_aux->map_ptr = meta.map_ptr;
else if (insn_aux->map_ptr != meta.map_ptr)
insn_aux->map_ptr = BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON;
} else {
verbose("unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n",
fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
return -EINVAL;
}
err = check_map_func_compatibility(meta.map_ptr, func_id);
if (err)
return err;
if (changes_data)
clear_all_pkt_pointers(env);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
The patch fixes two things at once:
1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 65,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int crypto_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
{
struct aead_tfm *crt = crypto_aead_crt(tfm);
int err;
if (authsize > crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->maxauthsize)
return -EINVAL;
if (crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setauthsize) {
err = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setauthsize(crt->base, authsize);
if (err)
return err;
}
crypto_aead_crt(crt->base)->authsize = authsize;
crt->authsize = authsize;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 31,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::OnNavigate(const ViewMsg_Navigate_Params& params) {
if (!webview())
return;
bool is_reload =
params.navigation_type == ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD ||
params.navigation_type == ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE;
if (IsBackForwardToStaleEntry(params, is_reload))
return;
if (is_swapped_out_)
SetSwappedOut(false);
history_list_offset_ = params.current_history_list_offset;
history_list_length_ = params.current_history_list_length;
if (history_list_length_ >= 0)
history_page_ids_.resize(history_list_length_, -1);
if (params.pending_history_list_offset >= 0 &&
params.pending_history_list_offset < history_list_length_)
history_page_ids_[params.pending_history_list_offset] = params.page_id;
content::GetContentClient()->SetActiveURL(params.url);
WebFrame* main_frame = webview()->mainFrame();
if (is_reload && main_frame->currentHistoryItem().isNull()) {
is_reload = false;
}
if (!params.url.SchemeIs(chrome::kJavaScriptScheme)) {
NavigationState* state = NavigationState::CreateBrowserInitiated(
params.page_id,
params.pending_history_list_offset,
params.transition,
params.request_time);
if (params.navigation_type == ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RESTORE) {
state->set_cache_policy_override(WebURLRequest::UseProtocolCachePolicy);
}
pending_navigation_state_.reset(state);
}
NavigationState* navigation_state = pending_navigation_state_.get();
if (navigation_state) {
navigation_state->set_alt_error_page_fetcher(NULL);
}
if (is_reload) {
if (navigation_state)
navigation_state->set_load_type(NavigationState::RELOAD);
bool ignore_cache = (params.navigation_type ==
ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE);
main_frame->reload(ignore_cache);
} else if (!params.state.empty()) {
DCHECK_NE(params.page_id, -1);
if (navigation_state)
navigation_state->set_load_type(NavigationState::HISTORY_LOAD);
main_frame->loadHistoryItem(
webkit_glue::HistoryItemFromString(params.state));
} else {
WebURLRequest request(params.url);
DCHECK_EQ(params.page_id, -1);
if (main_frame->isViewSourceModeEnabled())
request.setCachePolicy(WebURLRequest::ReturnCacheDataElseLoad);
if (params.referrer.is_valid()) {
if (!WebSecurityPolicy::shouldHideReferrer(
params.url,
WebString::fromUTF8(params.referrer.spec()))) {
request.setHTTPHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"),
WebString::fromUTF8(params.referrer.spec()));
}
}
if (!params.extra_headers.empty()) {
for (net::HttpUtil::HeadersIterator i(params.extra_headers.begin(),
params.extra_headers.end(), "\n");
i.GetNext(); ) {
request.addHTTPHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8(i.name()),
WebString::fromUTF8(i.values()));
}
}
if (navigation_state)
navigation_state->set_load_type(NavigationState::NORMAL_LOAD);
main_frame->loadRequest(request);
}
pending_navigation_state_.reset();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 98,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void set_language(AVFormatContext *s, const char *rfc1766, AVDictionary **met)
{
if (rfc1766 && strlen(rfc1766) > 1) {
const char primary_tag[3] = { rfc1766[0], rfc1766[1], '\0' }; // ignore country code if any
const char *iso6392 = ff_convert_lang_to(primary_tag,
AV_LANG_ISO639_2_BIBL);
if (iso6392)
if (av_dict_set(met, "language", iso6392, 0) < 0)
av_log(s, AV_LOG_WARNING, "av_dict_set failed.\n");
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec_o: Check size_bmp more fully
Fixes: integer overflow and out of array access
Fixes: asfo-crash-46080c4341572a7137a162331af77f6ded45cbd7
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 74,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void update_guest_rom_state(VAPICROMState *s)
{
read_guest_rom_state(s);
s->rom_state.real_tpr_addr = cpu_to_le32(s->real_tpr_addr);
s->rom_state.vcpu_shift = cpu_to_le32(VAPIC_CPU_SHIFT);
write_guest_rom_state(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DevToolsWindow::BeforeUnloadFired(content::WebContents* tab,
bool proceed,
bool* proceed_to_fire_unload) {
if (!intercepted_page_beforeunload_) {
if (proceed) {
content::DevToolsManager::GetInstance()->ClientHostClosing(
frontend_host_.get());
}
*proceed_to_fire_unload = proceed;
} else {
content::WebContents* inspected_web_contents = GetInspectedWebContents();
if (proceed) {
inspected_web_contents->GetRenderViewHost()->FirePageBeforeUnload(false);
} else {
bool should_proceed;
inspected_web_contents->GetDelegate()->BeforeUnloadFired(
inspected_web_contents, false, &should_proceed);
DCHECK(!should_proceed);
}
*proceed_to_fire_unload = false;
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 113,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parse_part_encr_aes256 (sockent_t *se, /* {{{ */
void **ret_buffer, size_t *ret_buffer_len,
int flags)
{
char *buffer = *ret_buffer;
size_t buffer_len = *ret_buffer_len;
size_t payload_len;
size_t part_size;
size_t buffer_offset;
uint16_t username_len;
part_encryption_aes256_t pea;
unsigned char hash[sizeof (pea.hash)];
gcry_cipher_hd_t cypher;
gcry_error_t err;
/* Make sure at least the header if available. */
if (buffer_len <= PART_ENCRYPTION_AES256_SIZE)
{
NOTICE ("network plugin: parse_part_encr_aes256: "
"Discarding short packet.");
return (-1);
}
buffer_offset = 0;
/* Copy the unencrypted information into `pea'. */
BUFFER_READ (&pea.head.type, sizeof (pea.head.type));
BUFFER_READ (&pea.head.length, sizeof (pea.head.length));
/* Check the `part size'. */
part_size = ntohs (pea.head.length);
if ((part_size <= PART_ENCRYPTION_AES256_SIZE)
|| (part_size > buffer_len))
{
NOTICE ("network plugin: parse_part_encr_aes256: "
"Discarding part with invalid size.");
return (-1);
}
/* Read the username */
BUFFER_READ (&username_len, sizeof (username_len));
username_len = ntohs (username_len);
if ((username_len <= 0)
|| (username_len > (part_size - (PART_ENCRYPTION_AES256_SIZE + 1))))
{
NOTICE ("network plugin: parse_part_encr_aes256: "
"Discarding part with invalid username length.");
return (-1);
}
assert (username_len > 0);
pea.username = malloc (username_len + 1);
if (pea.username == NULL)
return (-ENOMEM);
BUFFER_READ (pea.username, username_len);
pea.username[username_len] = 0;
/* Last but not least, the initialization vector */
BUFFER_READ (pea.iv, sizeof (pea.iv));
/* Make sure we are at the right position */
assert (buffer_offset == (username_len +
PART_ENCRYPTION_AES256_SIZE - sizeof (pea.hash)));
cypher = network_get_aes256_cypher (se, pea.iv, sizeof (pea.iv),
pea.username);
if (cypher == NULL)
{
sfree (pea.username);
return (-1);
}
payload_len = part_size - (PART_ENCRYPTION_AES256_SIZE + username_len);
assert (payload_len > 0);
/* Decrypt the packet in-place */
err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (cypher,
buffer + buffer_offset,
part_size - buffer_offset,
/* in = */ NULL, /* in len = */ 0);
if (err != 0)
{
sfree (pea.username);
ERROR ("network plugin: gcry_cipher_decrypt returned: %s",
gcry_strerror (err));
return (-1);
}
/* Read the hash */
BUFFER_READ (pea.hash, sizeof (pea.hash));
/* Make sure we're at the right position - again */
assert (buffer_offset == (username_len + PART_ENCRYPTION_AES256_SIZE));
assert (buffer_offset == (part_size - payload_len));
/* Check hash sum */
memset (hash, 0, sizeof (hash));
gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, hash,
buffer + buffer_offset, payload_len);
if (memcmp (hash, pea.hash, sizeof (hash)) != 0)
{
sfree (pea.username);
ERROR ("network plugin: Decryption failed: Checksum mismatch.");
return (-1);
}
parse_packet (se, buffer + buffer_offset, payload_len,
flags | PP_ENCRYPTED, pea.username);
/* XXX: Free pea.username?!? */
/* Update return values */
*ret_buffer = buffer + part_size;
*ret_buffer_len = buffer_len - part_size;
sfree (pea.username);
return (0);
} /* }}} int parse_part_encr_aes256 */
Commit Message: network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 50,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
FILE *infile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec = {0};
vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t cfg = {0};
int frame_count = 0;
vpx_image_t raw;
vpx_codec_err_t res;
VpxVideoInfo info = {0};
VpxVideoWriter *writer = NULL;
const VpxInterface *encoder = NULL;
int update_frame_num = 0;
const int fps = 30; // TODO(dkovalev) add command line argument
const int bitrate = 200; // kbit/s TODO(dkovalev) add command line argument
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 6)
die("Invalid number of arguments");
encoder = get_vpx_encoder_by_name("vp8");
if (!encoder)
die("Unsupported codec.");
update_frame_num = atoi(argv[5]);
if (!update_frame_num)
die("Couldn't parse frame number '%s'\n", argv[5]);
info.codec_fourcc = encoder->fourcc;
info.frame_width = strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0);
info.frame_height = strtol(argv[2], NULL, 0);
info.time_base.numerator = 1;
info.time_base.denominator = fps;
if (info.frame_width <= 0 ||
info.frame_height <= 0 ||
(info.frame_width % 2) != 0 ||
(info.frame_height % 2) != 0) {
die("Invalid frame size: %dx%d", info.frame_width, info.frame_height);
}
if (!vpx_img_alloc(&raw, VPX_IMG_FMT_I420, info.frame_width,
info.frame_height, 1)) {
die("Failed to allocate image.");
}
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(encoder->interface()));
res = vpx_codec_enc_config_default(encoder->interface(), &cfg, 0);
if (res)
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to get default codec config.");
cfg.g_w = info.frame_width;
cfg.g_h = info.frame_height;
cfg.g_timebase.num = info.time_base.numerator;
cfg.g_timebase.den = info.time_base.denominator;
cfg.rc_target_bitrate = bitrate;
writer = vpx_video_writer_open(argv[4], kContainerIVF, &info);
if (!writer)
die("Failed to open %s for writing.", argv[4]);
if (!(infile = fopen(argv[3], "rb")))
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[3]);
if (vpx_codec_enc_init(&codec, encoder->interface(), &cfg, 0))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize encoder");
while (vpx_img_read(&raw, infile)) {
if (frame_count + 1 == update_frame_num) {
vpx_ref_frame_t ref;
ref.frame_type = VP8_LAST_FRAME;
ref.img = raw;
if (vpx_codec_control(&codec, VP8_SET_REFERENCE, &ref))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to set reference frame");
}
encode_frame(&codec, &raw, frame_count++, writer);
}
encode_frame(&codec, NULL, -1, writer);
printf("\n");
fclose(infile);
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_count);
vpx_img_free(&raw);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec.");
vpx_video_writer_close(writer);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 174,498
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pf_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
{
struct pf_unit *pf = disk->private_data;
mutex_lock(&pf_mutex);
if (pf->access <= 0) {
mutex_unlock(&pf_mutex);
WARN_ON(1);
return;
}
pf->access--;
if (!pf->access && pf->removable)
pf_lock(pf, 0);
mutex_unlock(&pf_mutex);
}
Commit Message: paride/pf: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
pf: pf version 1.04, major 47, cluster 64, nice 0
pf: No ATAPI disk detected
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 9887 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pf_init+0x7af/0x1000 [pf]
Code: 46 77 d2 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 03 25 a6 d2 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 e6 24 a6 d2 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 79 34
RSP: 0018:ffff8881abcbf998 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc1e4a8a8 RCX: ffffffffaec50788
RDX: 0000000000039b10 RSI: ffffc9000153c000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee44e59 R09: ffffed103ee44e59
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee44e58 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc1e4b028 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000020
FS: 00007f1b78a91700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6d72b207f8 CR3: 00000001d5790004 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1e50000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f1b78a90c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f1b78a90c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f1b78a916bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pf(+) paride gpio_tps65218 tps65218 i2c_cht_wc ati_remote dc395x act_meta_skbtcindex act_ife ife ecdh_generic rc_xbox_dvd sky81452_regulator v4l2_fwnode leds_blinkm snd_usb_hiface comedi(C) aes_ti slhc cfi_cmdset_0020 mtd cfi_util sx8654 mdio_gpio of_mdio fixed_phy mdio_bitbang libphy alcor_pci matrix_keymap hid_uclogic usbhid scsi_transport_fc videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_dma_sg snd_soc_pcm179x_spi snd_soc_pcm179x_codec i2c_demux_pinctrl mdev snd_indigodj isl6405 mii enc28j60 cmac adt7316_i2c(C) adt7316(C) fmc_trivial fmc nf_reject_ipv4 authenc rc_dtt200u rtc_ds1672 dvb_usb_dibusb_mc dvb_usb_dibusb_mc_common dib3000mc dibx000_common dvb_usb_dibusb_common dvb_usb dvb_core videobuf2_common videobuf2_vmalloc videobuf2_memops regulator_haptic adf7242 mac802154 ieee802154 s5h1409 da9034_ts snd_intel8x0m wmi cx24120 usbcore sdhci_cadence sdhci_pltfm sdhci mmc_core joydev i2c_algo_bit scsi_transport_iscsi iscsi_boot_sysfs ves1820 lockd grace nfs_acl auth_rpcgss sunrp
c
ip_vs snd_soc_adau7002 snd_cs4281 snd_rawmidi gameport snd_opl3_lib snd_seq_device snd_hwdep snd_ac97_codec ad7418 hid_primax hid snd_soc_cs4265 snd_soc_core snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer ac97_bus snd_compress snd soundcore ti_adc108s102 eeprom_93cx6 i2c_algo_pca mlxreg_hotplug st_pressure st_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio v4l2_common videodev media snd_soc_adau_utils rc_pinnacle_grey rc_core pps_gpio leds_lm3692x nandcore ledtrig_pattern iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun mousedev ppdev tpm kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel ide_pci_generic aes_x86_64 piix crypto_simd input_leds psmouse cryp
td
glue_helper ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt agpgart ata_generic i2c_piix4 pata_acpi parport_pc parport rtc_cmos floppy sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: paride]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace 7a818cf5f210d79e ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pf_init_units, pf->disk will be
NULL, however in pf_detect and pf_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6ce59025f118 ("paride/pf: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 88,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcXvShmPutImage(ClientPtr client)
{
return BadImplementation;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,477
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uncompress_image(Gif_Context *gfc, Gif_Image *gfi, Gif_Reader *grr)
{
int old_nerrors;
if (!Gif_CreateUncompressedImage(gfi, gfi->interlace))
return 0;
gfc->width = gfi->width;
gfc->height = gfi->height;
gfc->image = gfi->image_data;
gfc->maximage = gfi->image_data + (unsigned) gfi->width * (unsigned) gfi->height;
old_nerrors = gfc->errors[1];
read_image_data(gfc, grr);
gfi->compressed_errors = gfc->errors[1] - old_nerrors;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 86,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_intel_port_stats_property(const struct ofpbuf *payload,
uint32_t exp_type,
struct ofputil_port_stats *ops)
{
enum ofperr error;
switch (exp_type) {
case INTEL_PORT_STATS_RFC2819:
error = parse_intel_port_stats_rfc2819_property(payload, ops);
break;
default:
error = OFPERR_OFPBPC_BAD_EXP_TYPE;
break;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType AssignImageColors(Image *image,CubeInfo *cube_info)
{
#define AssignImageTag "Assign/Image"
ssize_t
y;
/*
Allocate image colormap.
*/
if ((cube_info->quantize_info->colorspace != UndefinedColorspace) &&
(cube_info->quantize_info->colorspace != CMYKColorspace))
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,cube_info->quantize_info->colorspace);
else
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,cube_info->colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
image->colors=0;
cube_info->transparent_pixels=0;
cube_info->transparent_index=(-1);
(void) DefineImageColormap(image,cube_info,cube_info->root);
/*
Create a reduced color image.
*/
if ((cube_info->quantize_info->dither != MagickFalse) &&
(cube_info->quantize_info->dither_method != NoDitherMethod))
(void) DitherImage(image,cube_info);
else
{
CacheView
*image_view;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
MagickBooleanType
status;
status=MagickTrue;
exception=(&image->exception);
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
CubeInfo
cube;
register IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
count;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
indexes=GetCacheViewAuthenticIndexQueue(image_view);
cube=(*cube_info);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=count)
{
DoublePixelPacket
pixel;
register const NodeInfo
*node_info;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
id,
index;
/*
Identify the deepest node containing the pixel's color.
*/
for (count=1; (x+count) < (ssize_t) image->columns; count++)
if (IsSameColor(image,q,q+count) == MagickFalse)
break;
AssociateAlphaPixel(&cube,q,&pixel);
node_info=cube.root;
for (index=MaxTreeDepth-1; (ssize_t) index > 0; index--)
{
id=ColorToNodeId(&cube,&pixel,index);
if (node_info->child[id] == (NodeInfo *) NULL)
break;
node_info=node_info->child[id];
}
/*
Find closest color among siblings and their children.
*/
cube.target=pixel;
cube.distance=(MagickRealType) (4.0*(QuantumRange+1.0)*
(QuantumRange+1.0)+1.0);
ClosestColor(image,&cube,node_info->parent);
index=cube.color_number;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+i,index);
if (cube.quantize_info->measure_error == MagickFalse)
{
SetPixelRgb(q,image->colormap+index);
if (cube.associate_alpha != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,image->colormap[index].opacity);
}
q++;
}
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp critical (MagickCore_AssignImageColors)
#endif
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,AssignImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
}
if (cube_info->quantize_info->measure_error != MagickFalse)
(void) GetImageQuantizeError(image);
if ((cube_info->quantize_info->number_colors == 2) &&
(cube_info->quantize_info->colorspace == GRAYColorspace))
{
double
intensity;
/*
Monochrome image.
*/
intensity=0.0;
if ((image->colors > 1) &&
(GetPixelLuma(image,image->colormap+0) >
GetPixelLuma(image,image->colormap+1)))
intensity=(double) QuantumRange;
image->colormap[0].red=intensity;
image->colormap[0].green=intensity;
image->colormap[0].blue=intensity;
if (image->colors > 1)
{
image->colormap[1].red=(double) QuantumRange-intensity;
image->colormap[1].green=(double) QuantumRange-intensity;
image->colormap[1].blue=(double) QuantumRange-intensity;
}
}
(void) SyncImage(image);
if ((cube_info->quantize_info->colorspace != UndefinedColorspace) &&
(cube_info->quantize_info->colorspace != CMYKColorspace))
(void) TransformImageColorspace((Image *) image,sRGBColorspace);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 62,694
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fz_icc_data_from_icc_colorspace(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs)
{
fz_iccprofile *profile;
if (cs == NULL || !fz_colorspace_is_icc(ctx, cs))
return NULL;
profile = cs->data;
if (!profile)
return NULL;
return profile->buffer;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 380
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int xtables_lock_or_exit(int wait, struct timeval *wait_interval)
{
int lock = xtables_lock(wait, wait_interval);
if (lock == XT_LOCK_FAILED) {
xtables_free_opts(1);
exit(RESOURCE_PROBLEM);
}
if (lock == XT_LOCK_BUSY) {
fprintf(stderr, "Another app is currently holding the xtables lock. ");
if (wait == 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Perhaps you want to use the -w option?\n");
else
fprintf(stderr, "Stopped waiting after %ds.\n", wait);
xtables_free_opts(1);
exit(RESOURCE_PROBLEM);
}
return lock;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nsc_encode_sse2(NSC_CONTEXT* context, const BYTE* data,
UINT32 scanline)
{
nsc_encode_argb_to_aycocg_sse2(context, data, scanline);
if (context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel > 0)
{
nsc_encode_subsampling_sse2(context);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 169,291
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_timer_user_tselect(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_select __user *_tselect)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
struct snd_timer_select tselect;
char str[32];
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
if (tu->timeri) {
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
tu->timeri = NULL;
}
if (copy_from_user(&tselect, _tselect, sizeof(tselect))) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto __err;
}
sprintf(str, "application %i", current->pid);
if (tselect.id.dev_class != SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_SLAVE)
tselect.id.dev_sclass = SNDRV_TIMER_SCLASS_APPLICATION;
err = snd_timer_open(&tu->timeri, str, &tselect.id, current->pid);
if (err < 0)
goto __err;
kfree(tu->queue);
tu->queue = NULL;
kfree(tu->tqueue);
tu->tqueue = NULL;
if (tu->tread) {
tu->tqueue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu->tqueue == NULL)
err = -ENOMEM;
} else {
tu->queue = kmalloc(tu->queue_size * sizeof(struct snd_timer_read),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (tu->queue == NULL)
err = -ENOMEM;
}
if (err < 0) {
snd_timer_close(tu->timeri);
tu->timeri = NULL;
} else {
tu->timeri->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_FAST;
tu->timeri->callback = tu->tread
? snd_timer_user_tinterrupt : snd_timer_user_interrupt;
tu->timeri->ccallback = snd_timer_user_ccallback;
tu->timeri->callback_data = (void *)tu;
tu->timeri->disconnect = snd_timer_user_disconnect;
}
__err:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix missing queue indices reset at SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT
snd_timer_user_tselect() reallocates the queue buffer dynamically, but
it forgot to reset its indices. Since the read may happen
concurrently with ioctl and snd_timer_user_tselect() allocates the
buffer via kmalloc(), this may lead to the leak of uninitialized
kernel-space data, as spotted via KMSAN:
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory in snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10
CPU: 0 PID: 1037 Comm: probe Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2739
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x143/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:52
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1007
kmsan_check_memory+0xc2/0x140 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1086
copy_to_user ./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:725
snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10 sound/core/timer.c:2004
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:716
__do_readv_writev+0x94c/0x1380 fs/read_write.c:864
do_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:894
vfs_readv fs/read_write.c:908
do_readv+0x52a/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:934
SYSC_readv+0xb6/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:1021
SyS_readv+0x87/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1018
This patch adds the missing reset of queue indices. Together with the
previous fix for the ioctl/read race, we cover the whole problem.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 167,619
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void draw_pattern_push( wmfAPI* API,
unsigned long id,
unsigned long columns,
unsigned long rows )
{
char
pattern_id[30];
(void) FormatLocaleString(pattern_id,MaxTextExtent,"brush_%lu",id);
(void) DrawPushPattern(WmfDrawingWand,pattern_id,0,0,columns,rows);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 71,807
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CastConfigDelegateChromeos::~CastConfigDelegateChromeos() {
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 119,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int srpt_refresh_port(struct srpt_port *sport)
{
struct ib_mad_reg_req reg_req;
struct ib_port_modify port_modify;
struct ib_port_attr port_attr;
int ret;
memset(&port_modify, 0, sizeof port_modify);
port_modify.set_port_cap_mask = IB_PORT_DEVICE_MGMT_SUP;
port_modify.clr_port_cap_mask = 0;
ret = ib_modify_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &port_modify);
if (ret)
goto err_mod_port;
ret = ib_query_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, &port_attr);
if (ret)
goto err_query_port;
sport->sm_lid = port_attr.sm_lid;
sport->lid = port_attr.lid;
ret = ib_query_gid(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &sport->gid,
NULL);
if (ret)
goto err_query_port;
if (!sport->mad_agent) {
memset(®_req, 0, sizeof reg_req);
reg_req.mgmt_class = IB_MGMT_CLASS_DEVICE_MGMT;
reg_req.mgmt_class_version = IB_MGMT_BASE_VERSION;
set_bit(IB_MGMT_METHOD_GET, reg_req.method_mask);
set_bit(IB_MGMT_METHOD_SET, reg_req.method_mask);
sport->mad_agent = ib_register_mad_agent(sport->sdev->device,
sport->port,
IB_QPT_GSI,
®_req, 0,
srpt_mad_send_handler,
srpt_mad_recv_handler,
sport, 0);
if (IS_ERR(sport->mad_agent)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(sport->mad_agent);
sport->mad_agent = NULL;
goto err_query_port;
}
}
return 0;
err_query_port:
port_modify.set_port_cap_mask = 0;
port_modify.clr_port_cap_mask = IB_PORT_DEVICE_MGMT_SUP;
ib_modify_port(sport->sdev->device, sport->port, 0, &port_modify);
err_mod_port:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 50,690
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ::mojom::LifecycleUnitLoadingState TestLifecycleUnit::GetLoadingState() const {
return ::mojom::LifecycleUnitLoadingState::LOADED;
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 132,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: evutil_make_listen_socket_reuseable_port(evutil_socket_t sock)
{
#if defined __linux__ && defined(SO_REUSEPORT)
int one = 1;
/* REUSEPORT on Linux 3.9+ means, "Multiple servers (processes or
* threads) can bind to the same port if they each set the option. */
return setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, (void*) &one,
(ev_socklen_t)sizeof(one));
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 70,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gpgsm_decrypt (void *engine, gpgme_data_t ciph, gpgme_data_t plain)
{
engine_gpgsm_t gpgsm = engine;
gpgme_error_t err;
if (!gpgsm)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
gpgsm->input_cb.data = ciph;
err = gpgsm_set_fd (gpgsm, INPUT_FD, map_data_enc (gpgsm->input_cb.data));
if (err)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); /* FIXME */
gpgsm->output_cb.data = plain;
err = gpgsm_set_fd (gpgsm, OUTPUT_FD, 0);
if (err)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); /* FIXME */
gpgsm_clear_fd (gpgsm, MESSAGE_FD);
gpgsm->inline_data = NULL;
err = start (engine, "DECRYPT");
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,264
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, const u8 **master_key,
size_t *master_keylen)
{
const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
struct key *ukey;
ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ukey))
goto error;
down_read(&ukey->sem);
upayload = user_key_payload_locked(ukey);
if (!upayload) {
/* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */
up_read(&ukey->sem);
key_put(ukey);
ukey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
goto error;
}
*master_key = upayload->data;
*master_keylen = upayload->datalen;
error:
return ukey;
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 60,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __driver_rfc4106_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
u8 one_entry_in_sg = 0;
u8 *src, *dst, *assoc;
unsigned long tempCipherLen = 0;
__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
int retval = 0;
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
u32 key_len = ctx->aes_key_expanded.key_length;
void *aes_ctx = &(ctx->aes_key_expanded);
unsigned long auth_tag_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
u8 iv_and_authTag[32+AESNI_ALIGN];
u8 *iv = (u8 *) PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)iv_and_authTag, AESNI_ALIGN);
u8 *authTag = iv + 16;
struct scatter_walk src_sg_walk;
struct scatter_walk assoc_sg_walk;
struct scatter_walk dst_sg_walk;
unsigned int i;
if (unlikely((req->cryptlen < auth_tag_len) ||
(req->assoclen != 8 && req->assoclen != 12)))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(auth_tag_len != 8 && auth_tag_len != 12 && auth_tag_len != 16))
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_256))
return -EINVAL;
/* Assuming we are supporting rfc4106 64-bit extended */
/* sequence numbers We need to have the AAD length */
/* equal to 8 or 12 bytes */
tempCipherLen = (unsigned long)(req->cryptlen - auth_tag_len);
/* IV below built */
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
*(iv+i) = ctx->nonce[i];
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
*(iv+4+i) = req->iv[i];
*((__be32 *)(iv+12)) = counter;
if ((sg_is_last(req->src)) && (sg_is_last(req->assoc))) {
one_entry_in_sg = 1;
scatterwalk_start(&src_sg_walk, req->src);
scatterwalk_start(&assoc_sg_walk, req->assoc);
src = scatterwalk_map(&src_sg_walk);
assoc = scatterwalk_map(&assoc_sg_walk);
dst = src;
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
scatterwalk_start(&dst_sg_walk, req->dst);
dst = scatterwalk_map(&dst_sg_walk);
}
} else {
/* Allocate memory for src, dst, assoc */
src = kmalloc(req->cryptlen + req->assoclen, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!src)
return -ENOMEM;
assoc = (src + req->cryptlen + auth_tag_len);
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(src, req->src, 0, req->cryptlen, 0);
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(assoc, req->assoc, 0,
req->assoclen, 0);
dst = src;
}
aesni_gcm_dec_tfm(aes_ctx, dst, src, tempCipherLen, iv,
ctx->hash_subkey, assoc, (unsigned long)req->assoclen,
authTag, auth_tag_len);
/* Compare generated tag with passed in tag. */
retval = crypto_memneq(src + tempCipherLen, authTag, auth_tag_len) ?
-EBADMSG : 0;
if (one_entry_in_sg) {
if (unlikely(req->src != req->dst)) {
scatterwalk_unmap(dst);
scatterwalk_done(&dst_sg_walk, 0, 0);
}
scatterwalk_unmap(src);
scatterwalk_unmap(assoc);
scatterwalk_done(&src_sg_walk, 0, 0);
scatterwalk_done(&assoc_sg_walk, 0, 0);
} else {
scatterwalk_map_and_copy(dst, req->dst, 0, req->cryptlen, 1);
kfree(src);
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 166,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void netdev_init_queue_locks(struct net_device *dev)
{
netdev_for_each_tx_queue(dev, __netdev_init_queue_locks_one, NULL);
__netdev_init_queue_locks_one(dev, &dev->rx_queue, NULL);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProcDbeGetVisualInfo(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xDbeGetVisualInfoReq);
DbeScreenPrivPtr pDbeScreenPriv;
xDbeGetVisualInfoReply rep;
Drawable *drawables;
DrawablePtr *pDrawables = NULL;
register int i, j, rc;
register int count; /* number of visual infos in reply */
register int length; /* length of reply */
ScreenPtr pScreen;
XdbeScreenVisualInfo *pScrVisInfo;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xDbeGetVisualInfoReq);
if (stuff->n > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(DrawablePtr))
return BadAlloc;
return BadAlloc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 165,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::AdjustSelectionByCharacterOffset(int start_adjust,
int end_adjust) {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->GetFrameInputHandler()->AdjustSelectionByCharacterOffset(
start_adjust, end_adjust);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 135,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2tp_ip_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int rc;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
struct flowi4 *fl4;
int connected = 0;
__be32 daddr;
lock_sock(sk);
rc = -ENOTCONN;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
goto out;
/* Get and verify the address. */
if (msg->msg_name) {
struct sockaddr_l2tpip *lip = (struct sockaddr_l2tpip *) msg->msg_name;
rc = -EINVAL;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*lip))
goto out;
if (lip->l2tp_family != AF_INET) {
rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (lip->l2tp_family != AF_UNSPEC)
goto out;
}
daddr = lip->l2tp_addr.s_addr;
} else {
rc = -EDESTADDRREQ;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
connected = 1;
}
/* Allocate a socket buffer */
rc = -ENOMEM;
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, 2 + NET_SKB_PAD + sizeof(struct iphdr) +
4 + len, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
goto error;
/* Reserve space for headers, putting IP header on 4-byte boundary. */
skb_reserve(skb, 2 + NET_SKB_PAD);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb_reserve(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
/* Insert 0 session_id */
*((__be32 *) skb_put(skb, 4)) = 0;
/* Copy user data into skb */
rc = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len);
if (rc < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
fl4 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip4;
if (connected)
rt = (struct rtable *) __sk_dst_check(sk, 0);
rcu_read_lock();
if (rt == NULL) {
const struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
/* Use correct destination address if we have options. */
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.srr)
daddr = inet_opt->opt.faddr;
/* If this fails, retransmit mechanism of transport layer will
* keep trying until route appears or the connection times
* itself out.
*/
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), fl4, sk,
daddr, inet->inet_saddr,
inet->inet_dport, inet->inet_sport,
sk->sk_protocol, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto no_route;
if (connected) {
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
} else {
skb_dst_set(skb, &rt->dst);
goto xmit;
}
}
/* We dont need to clone dst here, it is guaranteed to not disappear.
* __dev_xmit_skb() might force a refcount if needed.
*/
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rt->dst);
xmit:
/* Queue the packet to IP for output */
rc = ip_queue_xmit(skb, &inet->cork.fl);
rcu_read_unlock();
error:
if (rc >= 0)
rc = len;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
no_route:
rcu_read_unlock();
IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
kfree_skb(skb);
rc = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 40,235
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void XSLStyleSheet::loadChildSheets()
{
if (!document())
return;
xmlNodePtr stylesheetRoot = document()->children;
while (stylesheetRoot && stylesheetRoot->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
stylesheetRoot = stylesheetRoot->next;
if (m_embedded) {
xmlAttrPtr idNode = xmlGetID(document(), (const xmlChar*)(finalURL().string().utf8().data()));
if (!idNode)
return;
stylesheetRoot = idNode->parent;
} else {
}
if (stylesheetRoot) {
xmlNodePtr curr = stylesheetRoot->children;
while (curr) {
if (curr->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
curr = curr->next;
continue;
}
if (IS_XSLT_ELEM(curr) && IS_XSLT_NAME(curr, "import")) {
xmlChar* uriRef = xsltGetNsProp(curr, (const xmlChar*)"href", XSLT_NAMESPACE);
loadChildSheet(String::fromUTF8((const char*)uriRef));
xmlFree(uriRef);
} else
break;
curr = curr->next;
}
while (curr) {
if (curr->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE && IS_XSLT_ELEM(curr) && IS_XSLT_NAME(curr, "include")) {
xmlChar* uriRef = xsltGetNsProp(curr, (const xmlChar*)"href", XSLT_NAMESPACE);
loadChildSheet(String::fromUTF8((const char*)uriRef));
xmlFree(uriRef);
}
curr = curr->next;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid reparsing an XSLT stylesheet after the first failure.
Certain libxslt versions appear to leave the doc in an invalid state when parsing fails. We should cache this result and avoid re-parsing.
(The test cannot be converted to text-only due to its invalid stylesheet).
R=inferno@chromium.org,abarth@chromium.org,pdr@chromium.org
BUG=271939
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23103007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@156248 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 111,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tsqueryout(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
TSQuery query = PG_GETARG_TSQUERY(0);
INFIX nrm;
if (query->size == 0)
{
char *b = palloc(1);
*b = '\0';
PG_RETURN_POINTER(b);
}
nrm.curpol = GETQUERY(query);
nrm.buflen = 32;
nrm.cur = nrm.buf = (char *) palloc(sizeof(char) * nrm.buflen);
*(nrm.cur) = '\0';
nrm.op = GETOPERAND(query);
infix(&nrm, true);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(query, 0);
PG_RETURN_CSTRING(nrm.buf);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 39,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ShutDown() {
BrowserThread::GetTaskRunnerForThread(BrowserThread::IO)->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&InProcessServiceManagerContext::ShutDownOnIOThread, this));
}
Commit Message: media: Support hosting mojo CDM in a standalone service
Currently when mojo CDM is enabled it is hosted in the MediaService
running in the process specified by "mojo_media_host". However, on
some platforms we need to run mojo CDM and other mojo media services in
different processes. For example, on desktop platforms, we want to run
mojo video decoder in the GPU process, but run the mojo CDM in the
utility process.
This CL adds a new build flag "enable_standalone_cdm_service". When
enabled, the mojo CDM service will be hosted in a standalone "cdm"
service running in the utility process. All other mojo media services
will sill be hosted in the "media" servie running in the process
specified by "mojo_media_host".
BUG=664364
TEST=Encrypted media browser tests using mojo CDM is still working.
Change-Id: I95be6e05adc9ebcff966b26958ef1d7becdfb487
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/567172
Commit-Queue: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dan Sanders <sandersd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486947}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 127,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct btrfs_trans_handle *btrfs_join_transaction_nolock(struct btrfs_root *root)
{
return start_transaction(root, 0, TRANS_JOIN_NOLOCK, 0);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 34,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tcp_drop(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
sk_drops_add(sk, skb);
__kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: tcp: make challenge acks less predictable
Yue Cao claims that current host rate limiting of challenge ACKS
(RFC 5961) could leak enough information to allow a patient attacker
to hijack TCP sessions. He will soon provide details in an academic
paper.
This patch increases the default limit from 100 to 1000, and adds
some randomization so that the attacker can no longer hijack
sessions without spending a considerable amount of probes.
Based on initial analysis and patch from Linus.
Note that we also have per socket rate limiting, so it is tempting
to remove the host limit in the future.
v2: randomize the count of challenge acks per second, not the period.
Fixes: 282f23c6ee34 ("tcp: implement RFC 5961 3.2")
Reported-by: Yue Cao <ycao009@ucr.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 51,535
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: zisofs_free(struct archive_write *a)
{
struct iso9660 *iso9660 = a->format_data;
int ret = ARCHIVE_OK;
free(iso9660->zisofs.block_pointers);
if (iso9660->zisofs.stream_valid &&
deflateEnd(&(iso9660->zisofs.stream)) != Z_OK) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
"Failed to clean up compressor");
ret = ARCHIVE_FATAL;
}
iso9660->zisofs.block_pointers = NULL;
iso9660->zisofs.stream_valid = 0;
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 50,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageFilledRectangle (gdImagePtr im, int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2,
int color)
{
_gdImageFilledVRectangle(im, x1, y1, x2, y2, color);
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 73,067
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int md_check_no_bitmap(struct mddev *mddev)
{
if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file && !mddev->bitmap_info.offset)
return 0;
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: bitmaps are not supported for %s\n",
mdname(mddev), mddev->pers->name);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 42,417
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gss_wrap_iov (minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count)
OM_uint32 * minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
int * conf_state;
gss_iov_buffer_desc * iov;
int iov_count;
{
/* EXPORT DELETE START */
OM_uint32 status;
gss_union_ctx_id_t ctx;
gss_mechanism mech;
status = val_wrap_iov_args(minor_status, context_handle,
conf_req_flag, qop_req,
conf_state, iov, iov_count);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return (status);
/*
* select the approprate underlying mechanism routine and
* call it.
*/
ctx = (gss_union_ctx_id_t) context_handle;
mech = gssint_get_mechanism (ctx->mech_type);
if (mech) {
if (mech->gss_wrap_iov) {
status = mech->gss_wrap_iov(
minor_status,
ctx->internal_ctx_id,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
if (status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
map_error(minor_status, mech);
} else
status = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
return(status);
}
/* EXPORT DELETE END */
return (GSS_S_BAD_MECH);
}
Commit Message: Preserve GSS context on init/accept failure
After gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() has created a
context, don't delete the mechglue context on failures from subsequent
calls, even if the mechanism deletes the mech-specific context (which
is allowed by RFC 2744 but not preferred). Check for union contexts
with no mechanism context in each GSS function which accepts a
gss_ctx_id_t.
CVE-2017-11462:
RFC 2744 permits a GSS-API implementation to delete an existing
security context on a second or subsequent call to
gss_init_sec_context() or gss_accept_sec_context() if the call results
in an error. This API behavior has been found to be dangerous,
leading to the possibility of memory errors in some callers. For
safety, GSS-API implementations should instead preserve existing
security contexts on error until the caller deletes them.
All versions of MIT krb5 prior to this change may delete acceptor
contexts on error. Versions 1.13.4 through 1.13.7, 1.14.1 through
1.14.5, and 1.15 through 1.15.1 may also delete initiator contexts on
error.
ticket: 8598 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 1
| 168,031
|
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