instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::stepDown(int n, ExceptionState& exception_state) {
input_type_->StepUp(-1.0 * n, exception_state);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long CuePoint::GetTime(const Segment* pSegment) const {
assert(pSegment);
assert(m_timecode >= 0);
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = pSegment->GetInfo();
assert(pInfo);
const long long scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
assert(scale >= 1);
const long long time = scale * m_timecode;
return time;
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 164,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_zap_acl_attr(struct inode *inode)
{
nfs4_set_cached_acl(inode, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ReceiverWasAdded(const RtpTransceiverState& transceiver_state) {
uintptr_t receiver_id = RTCRtpReceiver::getId(
transceiver_state.receiver_state()->webrtc_receiver().get());
for (const auto& receiver : handler_->rtp_receivers_) {
if (receiver->Id() == receiver_id)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 173,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ocfs2_dio_get_block(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh_result, int create)
{
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc;
struct ocfs2_write_cluster_desc *desc = NULL;
struct ocfs2_dio_write_ctxt *dwc = NULL;
struct buffer_head *di_bh = NULL;
u64 p_blkno;
loff_t pos = iblock << inode->i_sb->s_blocksize_bits;
unsigned len, total_len = bh_result->b_size;
int ret = 0, first_get_block = 0;
len = osb->s_clustersize - (pos & (osb->s_clustersize - 1));
len = min(total_len, len);
mlog(0, "get block of %lu at %llu:%u req %u\n",
inode->i_ino, pos, len, total_len);
/*
* Because we need to change file size in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), or
* we may need to add it to orphan dir. So can not fall to fast path
* while file size will be changed.
*/
if (pos + total_len <= i_size_read(inode)) {
down_read(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
/* This is the fast path for re-write. */
ret = ocfs2_get_block(inode, iblock, bh_result, create);
up_read(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
if (buffer_mapped(bh_result) &&
!buffer_new(bh_result) &&
ret == 0)
goto out;
/* Clear state set by ocfs2_get_block. */
bh_result->b_state = 0;
}
dwc = ocfs2_dio_alloc_write_ctx(bh_result, &first_get_block);
if (unlikely(dwc == NULL)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
if (ocfs2_clusters_for_bytes(inode->i_sb, pos + total_len) >
ocfs2_clusters_for_bytes(inode->i_sb, i_size_read(inode)) &&
!dwc->dw_orphaned) {
/*
* when we are going to alloc extents beyond file size, add the
* inode to orphan dir, so we can recall those spaces when
* system crashed during write.
*/
ret = ocfs2_add_inode_to_orphan(osb, inode);
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
dwc->dw_orphaned = 1;
}
ret = ocfs2_inode_lock(inode, &di_bh, 1);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
if (first_get_block) {
if (ocfs2_sparse_alloc(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb)))
ret = ocfs2_zero_tail(inode, di_bh, pos);
else
ret = ocfs2_expand_nonsparse_inode(inode, di_bh, pos,
total_len, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto unlock;
}
}
ret = ocfs2_write_begin_nolock(inode->i_mapping, pos, len,
OCFS2_WRITE_DIRECT, NULL,
(void **)&wc, di_bh, NULL);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto unlock;
}
desc = &wc->w_desc[0];
p_blkno = ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(inode->i_sb, desc->c_phys);
BUG_ON(p_blkno == 0);
p_blkno += iblock & (u64)(ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(inode->i_sb, 1) - 1);
map_bh(bh_result, inode->i_sb, p_blkno);
bh_result->b_size = len;
if (desc->c_needs_zero)
set_buffer_new(bh_result);
/* May sleep in end_io. It should not happen in a irq context. So defer
* it to dio work queue. */
set_buffer_defer_completion(bh_result);
if (!list_empty(&wc->w_unwritten_list)) {
struct ocfs2_unwritten_extent *ue = NULL;
ue = list_first_entry(&wc->w_unwritten_list,
struct ocfs2_unwritten_extent,
ue_node);
BUG_ON(ue->ue_cpos != desc->c_cpos);
/* The physical address may be 0, fill it. */
ue->ue_phys = desc->c_phys;
list_splice_tail_init(&wc->w_unwritten_list, &dwc->dw_zero_list);
dwc->dw_zero_count++;
}
ret = ocfs2_write_end_nolock(inode->i_mapping, pos, len, len, wc);
BUG_ON(ret != len);
ret = 0;
unlock:
up_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1);
brelse(di_bh);
out:
if (ret < 0)
ret = -EIO;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 169,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: i915_reset_gen7_sol_offsets(struct drm_device *dev,
struct intel_ring_buffer *ring)
{
drm_i915_private_t *dev_priv = dev->dev_private;
int ret, i;
if (!IS_GEN7(dev) || ring != &dev_priv->ring[RCS])
return 0;
ret = intel_ring_begin(ring, 4 * 3);
if (ret)
return ret;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
intel_ring_emit(ring, MI_LOAD_REGISTER_IMM(1));
intel_ring_emit(ring, GEN7_SO_WRITE_OFFSET(i));
intel_ring_emit(ring, 0);
}
intel_ring_advance(ring);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_do_execbuffer()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->num_cliprects from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 432e58ed ("drm/i915: Avoid
allocation for execbuffer object list").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ImportSingleTIFF_Long ( const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & tagInfo, const bool nativeEndian,
SXMPMeta * xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp )
{
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others.
XMP_Uns32 binValue = GetUns32AsIs ( tagInfo.dataPtr );
if ( ! nativeEndian ) binValue = Flip4 ( binValue );
char strValue[20];
snprintf ( strValue, sizeof(strValue), "%lu", (unsigned long)binValue ); // AUDIT: Using sizeof(strValue) is safe.
xmp->SetProperty ( xmpNS, xmpProp, strValue );
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ImportSingleTIFF_Long
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 15,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLElement::dirAttributeChanged(const Attribute& attribute)
{
Element* parent = parentElement();
if (parent && parent->isHTMLElement() && parent->selfOrAncestorHasDirAutoAttribute())
toHTMLElement(parent)->adjustDirectionalityIfNeededAfterChildAttributeChanged(this);
if (equalIgnoringCase(attribute.value(), "auto"))
calculateAndAdjustDirectionality();
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ecb_crypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct blkcipher_walk *walk,
void (*fn)(struct bf_ctx *, u8 *, const u8 *),
void (*fn_4way)(struct bf_ctx *, u8 *, const u8 *))
{
struct bf_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
unsigned int bsize = BF_BLOCK_SIZE;
unsigned int nbytes;
int err;
err = blkcipher_walk_virt(desc, walk);
while ((nbytes = walk->nbytes)) {
u8 *wsrc = walk->src.virt.addr;
u8 *wdst = walk->dst.virt.addr;
/* Process four block batch */
if (nbytes >= bsize * 4) {
do {
fn_4way(ctx, wdst, wsrc);
wsrc += bsize * 4;
wdst += bsize * 4;
nbytes -= bsize * 4;
} while (nbytes >= bsize * 4);
if (nbytes < bsize)
goto done;
}
/* Handle leftovers */
do {
fn(ctx, wdst, wsrc);
wsrc += bsize;
wdst += bsize;
nbytes -= bsize;
} while (nbytes >= bsize);
done:
err = blkcipher_walk_done(desc, walk, nbytes);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsCrashed() const {
return (crashed_status_ == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_CRASHED ||
crashed_status_ == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_ABNORMAL_TERMINATION ||
crashed_status_ == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_WAS_KILLED ||
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
crashed_status_ ==
base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_WAS_KILLED_BY_OOM ||
#endif
crashed_status_ == base::TERMINATION_STATUS_LAUNCH_FAILED);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_prepare)
{
zval *pgsql_link = NULL;
char *query, *stmtname;
int query_len, stmtname_len, id = -1, argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
int leftover = 0;
PGconn *pgsql;
PGresult *pgsql_result;
ExecStatusType status;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
if (argc == 2) {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "ss", &stmtname, &stmtname_len, &query, &query_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
id = PGG(default_link);
CHECK_DEFAULT_LINK(id);
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "rss", &pgsql_link, &stmtname, &stmtname_len, &query, &query_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (pgsql_link == NULL && id == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE2(pgsql, PGconn *, &pgsql_link, id, "PostgreSQL link", le_link, le_plink);
if (PQ_SETNONBLOCKING(pgsql, 0)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE,"Cannot set connection to blocking mode");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
while ((pgsql_result = PQgetResult(pgsql))) {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
leftover = 1;
}
if (leftover) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_NOTICE, "Found results on this connection. Use pg_get_result() to get these results first");
}
pgsql_result = PQprepare(pgsql, stmtname, query, 0, NULL);
if ((PGG(auto_reset_persistent) & 2) && PQstatus(pgsql) != CONNECTION_OK) {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
PQreset(pgsql);
pgsql_result = PQprepare(pgsql, stmtname, query, 0, NULL);
}
if (pgsql_result) {
status = PQresultStatus(pgsql_result);
} else {
status = (ExecStatusType) PQstatus(pgsql);
}
switch (status) {
case PGRES_EMPTY_QUERY:
case PGRES_BAD_RESPONSE:
case PGRES_NONFATAL_ERROR:
case PGRES_FATAL_ERROR:
PHP_PQ_ERROR("Query failed: %s", pgsql);
PQclear(pgsql_result);
RETURN_FALSE;
break;
case PGRES_COMMAND_OK: /* successful command that did not return rows */
default:
if (pgsql_result) {
pg_result = (pgsql_result_handle *) emalloc(sizeof(pgsql_result_handle));
pg_result->conn = pgsql;
pg_result->result = pgsql_result;
pg_result->row = 0;
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value, pg_result, le_result);
} else {
PQclear(pgsql_result);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 14,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncManager::MaybeSetSyncTabsInNigoriNode(
ModelTypeSet enabled_types) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
data_->MaybeSetSyncTabsInNigoriNode(enabled_types);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 170,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::setTabIndexExplicitly(short tabIndex)
{
ensureElementRareData()->setTabIndexExplicitly(tabIndex);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int LayoutTestBrowserMain(
const content::MainFunctionParams& parameters,
const scoped_ptr<content::BrowserMainRunner>& main_runner) {
base::ScopedTempDir browser_context_path_for_layout_tests;
CHECK(browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.CreateUniqueTempDir());
CHECK(!browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.path().MaybeAsASCII().empty());
base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->AppendSwitchASCII(
switches::kContentShellDataPath,
browser_context_path_for_layout_tests.path().MaybeAsASCII());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
content::EnsureInitializeForAndroidLayoutTests();
#endif
int exit_code = main_runner->Initialize(parameters);
DCHECK_LT(exit_code, 0)
<< "BrowserMainRunner::Initialize failed in LayoutTestBrowserMain";
if (exit_code >= 0)
return exit_code;
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kCheckLayoutTestSysDeps)) {
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::MessageLoop::QuitClosure());
main_runner->Run();
content::Shell::CloseAllWindows();
main_runner->Shutdown();
return 0;
}
exit_code = RunTests(main_runner);
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
main_runner->Shutdown();
#endif
return exit_code;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,451 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
svc_.encoding_mode = INTER_LAYER_PREDICTION_IP;
svc_.log_level = SVC_LOG_DEBUG;
svc_.log_print = 0;
codec_iface_ = vpx_codec_vp9_cx();
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
vpx_codec_enc_config_default(codec_iface_, &codec_enc_, 0);
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
codec_enc_.g_w = kWidth;
codec_enc_.g_h = kHeight;
codec_enc_.g_timebase.num = 1;
codec_enc_.g_timebase.den = 60;
codec_enc_.kf_min_dist = 100;
codec_enc_.kf_max_dist = 100;
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = {0};
VP9CodecFactory codec_factory;
decoder_ = codec_factory.CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, 0);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int efx_ioctl(struct net_device *net_dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
struct mii_ioctl_data *data = if_mii(ifr);
EFX_ASSERT_RESET_SERIALISED(efx);
/* Convert phy_id from older PRTAD/DEVAD format */
if ((cmd == SIOCGMIIREG || cmd == SIOCSMIIREG) &&
(data->phy_id & 0xfc00) == 0x0400)
data->phy_id ^= MDIO_PHY_ID_C45 | 0x0400;
return mdio_mii_ioctl(&efx->mdio, data, cmd);
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long addr)
{
int ret;
if (addr > (unsigned int)(-3 * PAGE_SIZE))
return -1;
ret = kvm_x86_ops->set_tss_addr(kvm, addr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t lifetime_write_kbytes_show(struct ext4_attr *a,
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi, char *buf)
{
struct super_block *sb = sbi->s_buddy_cache->i_sb;
return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
(unsigned long long)(sbi->s_kbytes_written +
((part_stat_read(sb->s_bdev->bd_part, sectors[1]) -
EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sectors_written_start) >> 1)));
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SWFInput_rewind(SWFInput input)
{
SWFInput_seek(input, 0, SEEK_SET);
}
Commit Message: Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1).
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 89,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AutoplayAllowed(const ToRenderFrameHost& adapter,
bool with_user_gesture) {
RenderFrameHost* rfh = adapter.render_frame_host();
const char* test_script = "attemptPlay();";
bool worked = false;
if (with_user_gesture) {
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScriptAndExtractBool(rfh, test_script, &worked));
} else {
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScriptWithoutUserGestureAndExtractBool(
rfh, test_script, &worked));
}
return worked;
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,827 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_run *run = vcpu->run;
struct kvm_mmio_fragment *frag;
unsigned len;
BUG_ON(!vcpu->mmio_needed);
/* Complete previous fragment */
frag = &vcpu->mmio_fragments[vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment];
len = min(8u, frag->len);
if (!vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(frag->data, run->mmio.data, len);
if (frag->len <= 8) {
/* Switch to the next fragment. */
frag++;
vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment++;
} else {
/* Go forward to the next mmio piece. */
frag->data += len;
frag->gpa += len;
frag->len -= len;
}
if (vcpu->mmio_cur_fragment == vcpu->mmio_nr_fragments) {
vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
return 1;
vcpu->mmio_read_completed = 1;
return complete_emulated_io(vcpu);
}
run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_MMIO;
run->mmio.phys_addr = frag->gpa;
if (vcpu->mmio_is_write)
memcpy(run->mmio.data, frag->data, min(8u, frag->len));
run->mmio.len = min(8u, frag->len);
run->mmio.is_write = vcpu->mmio_is_write;
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_emulated_mmio;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,266 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_rename(void *opaque)
{
int32_t fid;
ssize_t err = 0;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsString name;
int32_t newdirfid;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
v9fs_string_init(&name);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dds", &fid, &newdirfid, &name);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (!strcmp(".", name.data) || !strcmp("..", name.data)) {
err = -EISDIR;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (fidp->fid_type != P9_FID_NONE) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* if fs driver is not path based, return EOPNOTSUPP */
if (!(pdu->s->ctx.export_flags & V9FS_PATHNAME_FSCONTEXT)) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
v9fs_path_write_lock(s);
err = v9fs_complete_rename(pdu, fidp, newdirfid, &name);
v9fs_path_unlock(s);
if (!err) {
err = offset;
}
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 1,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_event_index(struct perf_event *event)
{
if (event->hw.state & PERF_HES_STOPPED)
return 0;
if (event->state != PERF_EVENT_STATE_ACTIVE)
return 0;
return event->pmu->event_idx(event);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrame::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(ad_tracker_);
visitor->Trace(probe_sink_);
visitor->Trace(performance_monitor_);
visitor->Trace(idleness_detector_);
visitor->Trace(inspector_trace_events_);
visitor->Trace(loader_);
visitor->Trace(navigation_scheduler_);
visitor->Trace(view_);
visitor->Trace(dom_window_);
visitor->Trace(page_popup_owner_);
visitor->Trace(script_controller_);
visitor->Trace(editor_);
visitor->Trace(spell_checker_);
visitor->Trace(selection_);
visitor->Trace(event_handler_);
visitor->Trace(console_);
visitor->Trace(input_method_controller_);
visitor->Trace(text_suggestion_controller_);
visitor->Trace(computed_node_mapping_);
Frame::Trace(visitor);
Supplementable<LocalFrame>::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagetruecolortopalette)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool dither;
long ncolors;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rbl", &IM, &dither, &ncolors) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (ncolors <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number of colors has to be greater than zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageTrueColorToPalette(im, dither, ncolors);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 166,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestInterfaceNode* V8TestInterfaceNode::toImplWithTypeCheck(v8::Isolate* isolate, v8::Local<v8::Value> value)
{
return hasInstance(value, isolate) ? toImpl(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(value)) : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: binding: Removes unused code in templates/attributes.cpp.
Faking {{cpp_class}} and {{c8_class}} doesn't make sense.
Probably it made sense before the introduction of virtual
ScriptWrappable::wrap().
Checking the existence of window->document() doesn't seem
making sense to me, and CQ tests seem passing without the
check.
BUG=
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2268433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#413375}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 119,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Browser::ShouldDisplayURLField() {
return !IsApplication();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bte_scan_filt_param_cfg_evt(UINT8 action_type,
tBTA_DM_BLE_PF_AVBL_SPACE avbl_space,
tBTA_DM_BLE_REF_VALUE ref_value, tBTA_STATUS status)
{
/* This event occurs on calling BTA_DmBleCfgFilterCondition internally,
** and that is why there is no HAL callback
*/
if(BTA_SUCCESS != status)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s, %d", __FUNCTION__, status);
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kfree_skb_partial(struct sk_buff *skb, bool head_stolen)
{
if (head_stolen) {
skb_release_head_state(skb);
kmem_cache_free(skbuff_head_cache, skb);
} else {
__kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 39,864 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void prefetch_table(const volatile byte *tab, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8 * 32)
{
(void)tab[i + 0 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 1 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 2 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 3 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 4 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 5 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 6 * 32];
(void)tab[i + 7 * 32];
}
(void)tab[len - 1];
}
Commit Message: AES: move look-up tables to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/rijndael-internal.h (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
* cipher/rijndael-tables.h (encT): Move to 'enc_tables' structure.
(enc_tables): New structure for encryption table with counters before
and after.
(encT): New macro.
(dec_tables): Add counters before and after encryption table; Move
from .rodata to .data section.
(do_encrypt): Change 'encT' to 'enc_tables.T'.
(do_decrypt): Change '&dec_tables' to 'dec_tables.T'.
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (prefetch_table): Make inline; Handle input
with length not multiple of 256.
(prefetch_enc, prefetch_dec): Modify pre- and post-table counters
to unshare look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 1 | 170,215 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int iscsi_set_keys_to_negotiate(
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list,
bool iser)
{
struct iscsi_param *param;
param_list->iser = iser;
list_for_each_entry(param, ¶m_list->param_list, p_list) {
param->state = 0;
if (!strcmp(param->name, AUTHMETHOD)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, HEADERDIGEST)) {
if (iser == false)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, DATADIGEST)) {
if (iser == false)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXCONNECTIONS)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, TARGETNAME)) {
continue;
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, INITIATORNAME)) {
continue;
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, TARGETALIAS)) {
if (param->value)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, INITIATORALIAS)) {
continue;
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, TARGETPORTALGROUPTAG)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, INITIALR2T)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, IMMEDIATEDATA)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH)) {
if (iser == false)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXXMITDATASEGMENTLENGTH)) {
continue;
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXBURSTLENGTH)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, FIRSTBURSTLENGTH)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, DEFAULTTIME2WAIT)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, DEFAULTTIME2RETAIN)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, MAXOUTSTANDINGR2T)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, DATAPDUINORDER)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, DATASEQUENCEINORDER)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, ERRORRECOVERYLEVEL)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, SESSIONTYPE)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, IFMARKER)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, OFMARKER)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, IFMARKINT)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, OFMARKINT)) {
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, RDMAEXTENSIONS)) {
if (iser == true)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, INITIATORRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH)) {
if (iser == true)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
} else if (!strcmp(param->name, TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH)) {
if (iser == true)
SET_PSTATE_NEGOTIATE(param);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 30,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::fillRect(const FloatRect& rect, const Color& color, ColorSpace colorSpace)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
savePlatformState();
m_data->context->SetPen(*wxTRANSPARENT_PEN);
m_data->context->SetBrush(wxBrush(color));
m_data->context->DrawRectangle(rect.x(), rect.y(), rect.width(), rect.height());
restorePlatformState();
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void spl_object_storage_dtor(spl_SplObjectStorageElement *element) /* {{{ */
{
zval_ptr_dtor(&element->obj);
zval_ptr_dtor(&element->inf);
} /* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SubstituteData FrameLoader::DefaultSubstituteDataForURL(const KURL& url) {
if (!ShouldTreatURLAsSrcdocDocument(url))
return SubstituteData();
String srcdoc = frame_->DeprecatedLocalOwner()->FastGetAttribute(kSrcdocAttr);
DCHECK(!srcdoc.IsNull());
CString encoded_srcdoc = srcdoc.Utf8();
return SubstituteData(
SharedBuffer::Create(encoded_srcdoc.data(), encoded_srcdoc.length()),
"text/html", "UTF-8", NullURL());
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_hdr(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct http_txn *txn = l7;
struct hdr_idx *idx = &txn->hdr_idx;
struct hdr_ctx *ctx = smp->ctx.a[0];
const struct http_msg *msg = ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) ? &txn->req : &txn->rsp;
int occ = 0;
const char *name_str = NULL;
int name_len = 0;
if (!ctx) {
/* first call */
ctx = &static_hdr_ctx;
ctx->idx = 0;
smp->ctx.a[0] = ctx;
}
if (args) {
if (args[0].type != ARGT_STR)
return 0;
name_str = args[0].data.str.str;
name_len = args[0].data.str.len;
if (args[1].type == ARGT_UINT || args[1].type == ARGT_SINT)
occ = args[1].data.uint;
}
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
if (ctx && !(smp->flags & SMP_F_NOT_LAST))
/* search for header from the beginning */
ctx->idx = 0;
if (!occ && !(opt & SMP_OPT_ITERATE))
/* no explicit occurrence and single fetch => last header by default */
occ = -1;
if (!occ)
/* prepare to report multiple occurrences for ACL fetches */
smp->flags |= SMP_F_NOT_LAST;
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->flags |= SMP_F_VOL_HDR | SMP_F_CONST;
if (http_get_hdr(msg, name_str, name_len, idx, occ, ctx, &smp->data.str.str, &smp->data.str.len))
return 1;
smp->flags &= ~SMP_F_NOT_LAST;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned Element::getUnsignedIntegralAttribute(const QualifiedName& attributeName) const
{
return getAttribute(attributeName).string().toUInt();
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pfkey_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg *hdr)
{
void *ext_hdrs[SADB_EXT_MAX];
int err;
pfkey_broadcast(skb_clone(skb, GFP_KERNEL), GFP_KERNEL,
BROADCAST_PROMISC_ONLY, NULL, sock_net(sk));
memset(ext_hdrs, 0, sizeof(ext_hdrs));
err = parse_exthdrs(skb, hdr, ext_hdrs);
if (!err) {
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (pfkey_funcs[hdr->sadb_msg_type])
err = pfkey_funcs[hdr->sadb_msg_type](sk, skb, hdr, ext_hdrs);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SystemClipboard::WriteDataObject(DataObject* data_object) {
HashMap<String, String> custom_data;
WebDragData data = data_object->ToWebDragData();
for (const WebDragData::Item& item : data.Items()) {
if (item.storage_type == WebDragData::Item::kStorageTypeString) {
if (item.string_type == blink::kMimeTypeTextPlain) {
clipboard_->WriteText(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard,
NonNullString(item.string_data));
} else if (item.string_type == blink::kMimeTypeTextHTML) {
clipboard_->WriteHtml(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard,
NonNullString(item.string_data), KURL());
} else if (item.string_type != blink::kMimeTypeDownloadURL) {
custom_data.insert(item.string_type, NonNullString(item.string_data));
}
}
}
if (!custom_data.IsEmpty()) {
clipboard_->WriteCustomData(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard,
std::move(custom_data));
}
clipboard_->CommitWrite(mojom::ClipboardBuffer::kStandard);
}
Commit Message: System Clipboard: Remove extraneous check for bitmap.getPixels()
Bug 369621 originally led to this check being introduced via
https://codereview.chromium.org/289573002/patch/40001/50002, but after
https://crrev.com/c/1345809, I'm not sure that it's still necessary.
This change succeeds when tested against the "minimized test case" provided in
crbug.com/369621 's description, but I'm unsure how to make the minimized test
case fail, so this doesn't prove that the change would succeed against the
fuzzer's test case (which originally filed the bug).
As I'm unable to view the relevant fuzzer test case, (see crbug.com/918705),
I don't know exactly what may have caused the fuzzer to fail. Therefore,
I've added a CHECK for the time being, so that we will be notified in canary
if my assumption was incorrect.
Bug: 369621
Change-Id: Ie9b47a4b38ba1ed47624de776015728e541d27f7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1393436
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#619591}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_pack_inflate(struct packed_git *p,
struct pack_window **w_curs,
off_t offset,
off_t len,
unsigned long expect)
{
git_zstream stream;
unsigned char fakebuf[4096], *in;
int st;
memset(&stream, 0, sizeof(stream));
git_inflate_init(&stream);
do {
in = use_pack(p, w_curs, offset, &stream.avail_in);
stream.next_in = in;
stream.next_out = fakebuf;
stream.avail_out = sizeof(fakebuf);
st = git_inflate(&stream, Z_FINISH);
offset += stream.next_in - in;
} while (st == Z_OK || st == Z_BUF_ERROR);
git_inflate_end(&stream);
return (st == Z_STREAM_END &&
stream.total_out == expect &&
stream.total_in == len) ? 0 : -1;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void limitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectV8Internal::limitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void testUriUserInfoHostPort2() {
UriParserStateA stateA;
UriUriA uriA;
stateA.uri = &uriA;
const char * const input = "http" "://" "abc:def" "@" "localhost"
":" "123";
TEST_ASSERT(0 == uriParseUriA(&stateA, input));
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.userInfo.first == input + 4 + 3);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.userInfo.afterLast == input + 4 + 3 + 7);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostText.first == input + 4 + 3 + 7 + 1);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.hostText.afterLast == input + 4 + 3 + 7 + 1 + 9);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.portText.first == input + 4 + 3 + 7 + 1 + 9 + 1);
TEST_ASSERT(uriA.portText.afterLast == input + 4 + 3 + 7 + 1 + 9 + 1 + 3);
uriFreeUriMembersA(&uriA);
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 75,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CURLcode smtp_state_command_resp(struct connectdata *conn, int smtpcode,
smtpstate instate)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct Curl_easy *data = conn->data;
struct SMTP *smtp = data->req.protop;
char *line = data->state.buffer;
size_t len = strlen(line);
(void)instate; /* no use for this yet */
if((smtp->rcpt && smtpcode/100 != 2 && smtpcode != 553 && smtpcode != 1) ||
(!smtp->rcpt && smtpcode/100 != 2 && smtpcode != 1)) {
failf(data, "Command failed: %d", smtpcode);
result = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
}
else {
/* Temporarily add the LF character back and send as body to the client */
if(!data->set.opt_no_body) {
line[len] = '\n';
result = Curl_client_write(conn, CLIENTWRITE_BODY, line, len + 1);
line[len] = '\0';
}
if(smtpcode != 1) {
if(smtp->rcpt) {
smtp->rcpt = smtp->rcpt->next;
if(smtp->rcpt) {
/* Send the next command */
result = smtp_perform_command(conn);
}
else
/* End of DO phase */
state(conn, SMTP_STOP);
}
else
/* End of DO phase */
state(conn, SMTP_STOP);
}
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: smtp: use the upload buffer size for scratch buffer malloc
... not the read buffer size, as that can be set smaller and thus cause
a buffer overflow! CVE-2018-0500
Reported-by: Peter Wu
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_2018-70a2.html
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::CreateTileManagerResources() {
CreateResourceAndRasterBufferProvider(&raster_buffer_provider_,
&resource_pool_);
if (use_gpu_rasterization_) {
image_decode_cache_ = base::MakeUnique<GpuImageDecodeCache>(
compositor_frame_sink_->worker_context_provider(),
settings_.renderer_settings.preferred_tile_format,
settings_.gpu_decoded_image_budget_bytes);
} else {
image_decode_cache_ = base::MakeUnique<SoftwareImageDecodeCache>(
settings_.renderer_settings.preferred_tile_format,
settings_.software_decoded_image_budget_bytes);
}
TaskGraphRunner* task_graph_runner = task_graph_runner_;
if (is_synchronous_single_threaded_) {
DCHECK(!single_thread_synchronous_task_graph_runner_);
single_thread_synchronous_task_graph_runner_.reset(
new SynchronousTaskGraphRunner);
task_graph_runner = single_thread_synchronous_task_graph_runner_.get();
}
tile_manager_.SetResources(resource_pool_.get(), image_decode_cache_.get(),
task_graph_runner, raster_buffer_provider_.get(),
is_synchronous_single_threaded_
? std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max()
: settings_.scheduled_raster_task_limit,
use_gpu_rasterization_);
UpdateTileManagerMemoryPolicy(ActualManagedMemoryPolicy());
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned int num_recs)
{
unsigned char *comp;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) {
comp = r[i].comp;
memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r));
r[i].comp = comp;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void TCP_ECN_queue_cwr(struct tcp_sock *tp)
{
if (tp->ecn_flags & TCP_ECN_OK)
tp->ecn_flags |= TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int Reinsert(
Rtree *pRtree,
RtreeNode *pNode,
RtreeCell *pCell,
int iHeight
){
int *aOrder;
int *aSpare;
RtreeCell *aCell;
RtreeDValue *aDistance;
int nCell;
RtreeDValue aCenterCoord[RTREE_MAX_DIMENSIONS];
int iDim;
int ii;
int rc = SQLITE_OK;
int n;
memset(aCenterCoord, 0, sizeof(RtreeDValue)*RTREE_MAX_DIMENSIONS);
nCell = NCELL(pNode)+1;
n = (nCell+1)&(~1);
/* Allocate the buffers used by this operation. The allocation is
** relinquished before this function returns.
*/
aCell = (RtreeCell *)sqlite3_malloc(n * (
sizeof(RtreeCell) + /* aCell array */
sizeof(int) + /* aOrder array */
sizeof(int) + /* aSpare array */
sizeof(RtreeDValue) /* aDistance array */
));
if( !aCell ){
return SQLITE_NOMEM;
}
aOrder = (int *)&aCell[n];
aSpare = (int *)&aOrder[n];
aDistance = (RtreeDValue *)&aSpare[n];
for(ii=0; ii<nCell; ii++){
if( ii==(nCell-1) ){
memcpy(&aCell[ii], pCell, sizeof(RtreeCell));
}else{
nodeGetCell(pRtree, pNode, ii, &aCell[ii]);
}
aOrder[ii] = ii;
for(iDim=0; iDim<pRtree->nDim; iDim++){
aCenterCoord[iDim] += DCOORD(aCell[ii].aCoord[iDim*2]);
aCenterCoord[iDim] += DCOORD(aCell[ii].aCoord[iDim*2+1]);
}
}
for(iDim=0; iDim<pRtree->nDim; iDim++){
aCenterCoord[iDim] = (aCenterCoord[iDim]/(nCell*(RtreeDValue)2));
}
for(ii=0; ii<nCell; ii++){
aDistance[ii] = RTREE_ZERO;
for(iDim=0; iDim<pRtree->nDim; iDim++){
RtreeDValue coord = (DCOORD(aCell[ii].aCoord[iDim*2+1]) -
DCOORD(aCell[ii].aCoord[iDim*2]));
aDistance[ii] += (coord-aCenterCoord[iDim])*(coord-aCenterCoord[iDim]);
}
}
SortByDistance(aOrder, nCell, aDistance, aSpare);
nodeZero(pRtree, pNode);
for(ii=0; rc==SQLITE_OK && ii<(nCell-(RTREE_MINCELLS(pRtree)+1)); ii++){
RtreeCell *p = &aCell[aOrder[ii]];
nodeInsertCell(pRtree, pNode, p);
if( p->iRowid==pCell->iRowid ){
if( iHeight==0 ){
rc = rowidWrite(pRtree, p->iRowid, pNode->iNode);
}else{
rc = parentWrite(pRtree, p->iRowid, pNode->iNode);
}
}
}
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
rc = fixBoundingBox(pRtree, pNode);
}
for(; rc==SQLITE_OK && ii<nCell; ii++){
/* Find a node to store this cell in. pNode->iNode currently contains
** the height of the sub-tree headed by the cell.
*/
RtreeNode *pInsert;
RtreeCell *p = &aCell[aOrder[ii]];
rc = ChooseLeaf(pRtree, p, iHeight, &pInsert);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
int rc2;
rc = rtreeInsertCell(pRtree, pInsert, p, iHeight);
rc2 = nodeRelease(pRtree, pInsert);
if( rc==SQLITE_OK ){
rc = rc2;
}
}
}
sqlite3_free(aCell);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,259 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AboutInSettingsEnabled() {
return SettingsWindowEnabled() &&
!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kDisableAboutInSettings);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_max_tr(struct trace_array *tr, struct task_struct *tsk, int cpu)
{
if (tr->stop_count)
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
if (!tr->allocated_snapshot) {
/* Only the nop tracer should hit this when disabling */
WARN_ON_ONCE(tr->current_trace != &nop_trace);
return;
}
arch_spin_lock(&tr->max_lock);
/* Inherit the recordable setting from trace_buffer */
if (ring_buffer_record_is_set_on(tr->trace_buffer.buffer))
ring_buffer_record_on(tr->max_buffer.buffer);
else
ring_buffer_record_off(tr->max_buffer.buffer);
swap(tr->trace_buffer.buffer, tr->max_buffer.buffer);
__update_max_tr(tr, tsk, cpu);
arch_spin_unlock(&tr->max_lock);
}
Commit Message: fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 97,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const gfx::Vector2d& RenderWidgetHostImpl::GetLastScrollOffset() const {
return last_scroll_offset_;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,622 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t AudioFlinger::EffectChain::addEffect_l(const sp<EffectModule>& effect)
{
effect_descriptor_t desc = effect->desc();
uint32_t insertPref = desc.flags & EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_MASK;
Mutex::Autolock _l(mLock);
effect->setChain(this);
sp<ThreadBase> thread = mThread.promote();
if (thread == 0) {
return NO_INIT;
}
effect->setThread(thread);
if ((desc.flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK) == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_AUXILIARY) {
mEffects.insertAt(effect, 0);
size_t numSamples = thread->frameCount();
int32_t *buffer = new int32_t[numSamples];
memset(buffer, 0, numSamples * sizeof(int32_t));
effect->setInBuffer((int16_t *)buffer);
effect->setOutBuffer(mInBuffer);
} else {
size_t size = mEffects.size();
size_t idx_insert = size;
ssize_t idx_insert_first = -1;
ssize_t idx_insert_last = -1;
for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
effect_descriptor_t d = mEffects[i]->desc();
uint32_t iMode = d.flags & EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_MASK;
uint32_t iPref = d.flags & EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_MASK;
if (iMode == EFFECT_FLAG_TYPE_INSERT) {
if (insertPref == EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_EXCLUSIVE ||
iPref == EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_EXCLUSIVE) {
ALOGW("addEffect_l() could not insert effect %s: exclusive conflict with %s",
desc.name, d.name);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (idx_insert == size) {
idx_insert = i;
}
if (iPref == EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_FIRST) {
idx_insert_first = i;
}
if (iPref == EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_LAST &&
idx_insert_last == -1) {
idx_insert_last = i;
}
}
}
if (insertPref == EFFECT_FLAG_INSERT_LAST) {
if (idx_insert_last != -1) {
idx_insert = idx_insert_last;
} else {
idx_insert = size;
}
} else {
if (idx_insert_first != -1) {
idx_insert = idx_insert_first + 1;
}
}
effect->setInBuffer(mInBuffer);
if (idx_insert == size) {
if (idx_insert != 0) {
mEffects[idx_insert-1]->setOutBuffer(mInBuffer);
mEffects[idx_insert-1]->configure();
}
effect->setOutBuffer(mOutBuffer);
} else {
effect->setOutBuffer(mInBuffer);
}
mEffects.insertAt(effect, idx_insert);
ALOGV("addEffect_l() effect %p, added in chain %p at rank %zu", effect.get(), this,
idx_insert);
}
effect->configure();
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Add EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM parameter checking
Bug: 30204301
Change-Id: Ib9c3ee1c2f23c96f8f7092dd9e146bc453d7a290
(cherry picked from commit e4a1d91501d47931dbae19c47815952378787ab6)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 157,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: psh_hint_table_record_mask( PSH_Hint_Table table,
PS_Mask hint_mask )
{
FT_Int mask = 0, val = 0;
FT_Byte* cursor = hint_mask->bytes;
FT_UInt idx, limit;
limit = hint_mask->num_bits;
for ( idx = 0; idx < limit; idx++ )
{
if ( mask == 0 )
{
val = *cursor++;
mask = 0x80;
}
if ( val & mask )
psh_hint_table_record( table, idx );
mask >>= 1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 10,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: linux_md_create_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
LinuxMdCreateData *data = user_data;
if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == 0 && !job_was_cancelled)
{
GList *l;
GList *devices;
char *objpath;
/* see if the component appeared already */
objpath = NULL;
devices = daemon_local_get_all_devices (data->daemon);
for (l = devices; l != NULL; l = l->next)
{
Device *device = DEVICE (l->data);
if (device->priv->device_is_linux_md)
{
/* TODO: check properly */
/* yup, return to caller */
objpath = device->priv->object_path;
break;
}
}
g_list_free (devices);
if (objpath != NULL)
{
dbus_g_method_return (context, objpath);
}
else
{
/* sit around and wait for the md array to appear */
/* sit around wait for the cleartext device to appear */
data->device_added_signal_handler_id = g_signal_connect_after (data->daemon,
"device-added",
(GCallback) linux_md_create_device_added_cb,
linux_md_create_data_ref (data));
/* set up timeout for error reporting if waiting failed
*
* (the signal handler and the timeout handler share the ref to data
* as one will cancel the other)
*/
data->device_added_timeout_id = g_timeout_add (10 * 1000, linux_md_create_device_not_seen_cb, data);
}
}
else
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error assembling array: mdadm exited with exit code %d: %s",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EnableSecureTextInput() {
if (IsSecureEventInputEnabled())
return;
EnableSecureEventInput();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::maybeFinishLoadingMultipartContent()
{
if (!isMultipartReplacingLoad())
return;
frameLoader()->setupForReplace();
m_committed = false;
RefPtr<ResourceBuffer> resourceData = mainResourceData();
commitLoad(resourceData->data(), resourceData->size());
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::OnWillRemoveView(views::Widget* widget,
views::View* view) {
if (view != static_cast<views::View*>(login_view_))
return;
login_view_ = nullptr;
widget->RemoveRemovalsObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintMsg_Print_Params_IsEqual(
const PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params& oldParams,
const PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params& newParams) {
return PageLayoutIsEqual(oldParams, newParams) &&
oldParams.params.max_shrink == newParams.params.max_shrink &&
oldParams.params.min_shrink == newParams.params.min_shrink &&
oldParams.params.selection_only == newParams.params.selection_only &&
oldParams.params.supports_alpha_blend ==
newParams.params.supports_alpha_blend &&
oldParams.pages.size() == newParams.pages.size() &&
oldParams.params.print_to_pdf == newParams.params.print_to_pdf &&
oldParams.params.print_scaling_option ==
newParams.params.print_scaling_option &&
oldParams.params.display_header_footer ==
newParams.params.display_header_footer &&
oldParams.params.date == newParams.params.date &&
oldParams.params.title == newParams.params.title &&
oldParams.params.url == newParams.params.url &&
std::equal(oldParams.pages.begin(), oldParams.pages.end(),
newParams.pages.begin());
}
Commit Message: Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GpuChannel::ShouldPreferDiscreteGpu() const {
return num_contexts_preferring_discrete_gpu_ > 0;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DetachOutputGPU(ScreenPtr slave)
{
assert(slave->isGPU);
assert(slave->is_output_slave);
slave->current_master->output_slaves--;
slave->is_output_slave = FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kill_pid_info_as_uid(int sig, struct siginfo *info, struct pid *pid,
uid_t uid, uid_t euid, u32 secid)
{
int ret = -EINVAL;
struct task_struct *p;
const struct cred *pcred;
unsigned long flags;
if (!valid_signal(sig))
return ret;
rcu_read_lock();
p = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (!p) {
ret = -ESRCH;
goto out_unlock;
}
pcred = __task_cred(p);
if (si_fromuser(info) &&
euid != pcred->suid && euid != pcred->uid &&
uid != pcred->suid && uid != pcred->uid) {
ret = -EPERM;
goto out_unlock;
}
ret = security_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
if (ret)
goto out_unlock;
if (sig) {
if (lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) {
ret = __send_signal(sig, info, p, 1, 0);
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
} else
ret = -ESRCH;
}
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 35,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: connection_ap_process_end_not_open(
relay_header_t *rh, cell_t *cell, origin_circuit_t *circ,
entry_connection_t *conn, crypt_path_t *layer_hint)
{
node_t *exitrouter;
int reason = *(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE);
int control_reason;
edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
(void) layer_hint; /* unused */
if (rh->length > 0) {
if (reason == END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL ||
reason == END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY) {
/* Both of these reasons could mean a failed tag
* hit the exit and it complained. Do not probe.
* Fail the circuit. */
circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED;
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
} else if (reason == END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL) {
/* We can't infer success or failure, since older Tors report
* ENETUNREACH as END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL. */
} else {
/* Path bias: If we get a valid reason code from the exit,
* it wasn't due to tagging.
*
* We rely on recognized+digest being strong enough to make
* tags unlikely to allow us to get tagged, yet 'recognized'
* reason codes here. */
pathbias_mark_use_success(circ);
}
}
if (rh->length == 0) {
reason = END_STREAM_REASON_MISC;
}
control_reason = reason | END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE;
if (edge_reason_is_retriable(reason) &&
/* avoid retry if rend */
!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_conn)) {
const char *chosen_exit_digest =
circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest;
log_info(LD_APP,"Address '%s' refused due to '%s'. Considering retrying.",
safe_str(conn->socks_request->address),
stream_end_reason_to_string(reason));
exitrouter = node_get_mutable_by_id(chosen_exit_digest);
switch (reason) {
case END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY: {
tor_addr_t addr;
tor_addr_make_unspec(&addr);
if (rh->length >= 5) {
int ttl = -1;
tor_addr_make_unspec(&addr);
if (rh->length == 5 || rh->length == 9) {
tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&addr,
get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+1));
if (rh->length == 9)
ttl = (int)ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+5));
} else if (rh->length == 17 || rh->length == 21) {
tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&addr,
(char*)(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+1));
if (rh->length == 21)
ttl = (int)ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+17));
}
if (tor_addr_is_null(&addr)) {
log_info(LD_APP,"Address '%s' resolved to 0.0.0.0. Closing,",
safe_str(conn->socks_request->address));
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return 0;
}
if ((tor_addr_family(&addr) == AF_INET && !conn->ipv4_traffic_ok) ||
(tor_addr_family(&addr) == AF_INET6 && !conn->ipv6_traffic_ok)) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_APP,
"Got an EXITPOLICY failure on a connection with a "
"mismatched family. Closing.");
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return 0;
}
if (get_options()->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses &&
tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
log_info(LD_APP,"Address '%s' resolved to internal. Closing,",
safe_str(conn->socks_request->address));
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return 0;
}
client_dns_set_addressmap(conn,
conn->socks_request->address, &addr,
conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl);
{
char new_addr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
tor_addr_to_str(new_addr, &addr, sizeof(new_addr), 1);
if (strcmp(conn->socks_request->address, new_addr)) {
strlcpy(conn->socks_request->address, new_addr,
sizeof(conn->socks_request->address));
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_REMAP, 0);
}
}
}
/* check if he *ought* to have allowed it */
adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure(circ,
conn,
exitrouter,
&addr);
if (conn->chosen_exit_optional ||
conn->chosen_exit_retries) {
/* stop wanting a specific exit */
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
/* A non-zero chosen_exit_retries can happen if we set a
* TrackHostExits for this address under a port that the exit
* relay allows, but then try the same address with a different
* port that it doesn't allow to exit. We shouldn't unregister
* the mapping, since it is probably still wanted on the
* original port. But now we give away to the exit relay that
* we probably have a TrackHostExits on it. So be it. */
conn->chosen_exit_retries = 0;
tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name); /* clears it */
}
if (connection_ap_detach_retriable(conn, circ, control_reason) >= 0)
return 0;
/* else, conn will get closed below */
break;
}
case END_STREAM_REASON_CONNECTREFUSED:
if (!conn->chosen_exit_optional)
break; /* break means it'll close, below */
/* Else fall through: expire this circuit, clear the
* chosen_exit_name field, and try again. */
case END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED:
case END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT:
case END_STREAM_REASON_MISC:
case END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE:
if (client_dns_incr_failures(conn->socks_request->address)
< MAX_RESOLVE_FAILURES) {
/* We haven't retried too many times; reattach the connection. */
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP,circ);
/* Mark this circuit "unusable for new streams". */
mark_circuit_unusable_for_new_conns(circ);
if (conn->chosen_exit_optional) {
/* stop wanting a specific exit */
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name); /* clears it */
}
if (connection_ap_detach_retriable(conn, circ, control_reason) >= 0)
return 0;
/* else, conn will get closed below */
} else {
log_notice(LD_APP,
"Have tried resolving or connecting to address '%s' "
"at %d different places. Giving up.",
safe_str(conn->socks_request->address),
MAX_RESOLVE_FAILURES);
/* clear the failures, so it will have a full try next time */
client_dns_clear_failures(conn->socks_request->address);
}
break;
case END_STREAM_REASON_HIBERNATING:
case END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT:
if (exitrouter) {
policies_set_node_exitpolicy_to_reject_all(exitrouter);
}
if (conn->chosen_exit_optional) {
/* stop wanting a specific exit */
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name); /* clears it */
}
if (connection_ap_detach_retriable(conn, circ, control_reason) >= 0)
return 0;
/* else, will close below */
break;
} /* end switch */
log_info(LD_APP,"Giving up on retrying; conn can't be handled.");
}
log_info(LD_APP,
"Edge got end (%s) before we're connected. Marking for close.",
stream_end_reason_to_string(rh->length > 0 ? reason : -1));
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP,circ);
/* need to test because of detach_retriable */
if (!ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close)
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, control_reason);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-005: Fix assertion failure in connection_edge_process_relay_cell
On an hidden service rendezvous circuit, a BEGIN_DIR could be sent
(maliciously) which would trigger a tor_assert() because
connection_edge_process_relay_cell() thought that the circuit is an
or_circuit_t but is an origin circuit in reality.
Fixes #22494
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<Range> TextIterator::rangeFromLocationAndLength(ContainerNode* scope, int rangeLocation, int rangeLength, bool forSelectionPreservation)
{
RefPtr<Range> resultRange = scope->document()->createRange();
int docTextPosition = 0;
int rangeEnd = rangeLocation + rangeLength;
bool startRangeFound = false;
RefPtr<Range> textRunRange;
TextIterator it(rangeOfContents(scope).get(), forSelectionPreservation ? TextIteratorEmitsCharactersBetweenAllVisiblePositions : TextIteratorDefaultBehavior);
if (rangeLocation == 0 && rangeLength == 0 && it.atEnd()) {
textRunRange = it.range();
resultRange->setStart(textRunRange->startContainer(), 0, ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
resultRange->setEnd(textRunRange->startContainer(), 0, ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
return resultRange.release();
}
for (; !it.atEnd(); it.advance()) {
int len = it.length();
textRunRange = it.range();
bool foundStart = rangeLocation >= docTextPosition && rangeLocation <= docTextPosition + len;
bool foundEnd = rangeEnd >= docTextPosition && rangeEnd <= docTextPosition + len;
if (foundEnd) {
if (len == 1 && it.characterAt(0) == '\n') {
scope->document()->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
it.advance();
if (!it.atEnd()) {
RefPtr<Range> range = it.range();
textRunRange->setEnd(range->startContainer(), range->startOffset(), ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
} else {
Position runStart = textRunRange->startPosition();
Position runEnd = VisiblePosition(runStart).next().deepEquivalent();
if (runEnd.isNotNull())
textRunRange->setEnd(runEnd.containerNode(), runEnd.computeOffsetInContainerNode(), ASSERT_NO_EXCEPTION);
}
}
}
if (foundStart) {
startRangeFound = true;
int exception = 0;
if (textRunRange->startContainer()->isTextNode()) {
int offset = rangeLocation - docTextPosition;
resultRange->setStart(textRunRange->startContainer(), offset + textRunRange->startOffset(), exception);
} else {
if (rangeLocation == docTextPosition)
resultRange->setStart(textRunRange->startContainer(), textRunRange->startOffset(), exception);
else
resultRange->setStart(textRunRange->endContainer(), textRunRange->endOffset(), exception);
}
}
if (foundEnd) {
int exception = 0;
if (textRunRange->startContainer()->isTextNode()) {
int offset = rangeEnd - docTextPosition;
resultRange->setEnd(textRunRange->startContainer(), offset + textRunRange->startOffset(), exception);
} else {
if (rangeEnd == docTextPosition)
resultRange->setEnd(textRunRange->startContainer(), textRunRange->startOffset(), exception);
else
resultRange->setEnd(textRunRange->endContainer(), textRunRange->endOffset(), exception);
}
docTextPosition += len;
break;
}
docTextPosition += len;
}
if (!startRangeFound)
return 0;
if (rangeLength != 0 && rangeEnd > docTextPosition) { // rangeEnd is out of bounds
int exception = 0;
resultRange->setEnd(textRunRange->endContainer(), textRunRange->endOffset(), exception);
}
return resultRange.release();
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::IsLoadCompleted() const {
return ready_state_ == kComplete;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dx_show_index(char * label, struct dx_entry *entries)
{
int i, n = dx_get_count (entries);
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s index ", label);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
printk("%x->%lu ", i ? dx_get_hash(entries + i) :
0, (unsigned long)dx_get_block(entries + i));
}
printk("\n");
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SyncShareAsDelegate(
SyncScheduler::SyncSessionJob::SyncSessionJobPurpose purpose) {
SyncerStep start;
SyncerStep end;
SyncScheduler::SetSyncerStepsForPurpose(purpose, &start, &end);
session_.reset(MakeSession());
syncer_->SyncShare(session_.get(), start, end);
return session_->HasMoreToSync();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillExternalDelegate::SetCurrentDataListValues(
const std::vector<base::string16>& data_list_values,
const std::vector<base::string16>& data_list_labels) {
data_list_values_ = data_list_values;
data_list_labels_ = data_list_labels;
manager_->client()->UpdateAutofillPopupDataListValues(data_list_values,
data_list_labels);
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool(struct sock *sk)
{
int cpu;
struct tcp_md5sig_pool * __percpu *pool;
pool = alloc_percpu(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *);
if (!pool)
return NULL;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct tcp_md5sig_pool *p;
struct crypto_hash *hash;
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), sk->sk_allocation);
if (!p)
goto out_free;
*per_cpu_ptr(pool, cpu) = p;
hash = crypto_alloc_hash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (!hash || IS_ERR(hash))
goto out_free;
p->md5_desc.tfm = hash;
}
return pool;
out_free:
__tcp_free_md5sig_pool(pool);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ftrace_profile_pages_init(struct ftrace_profile_stat *stat)
{
struct ftrace_profile_page *pg;
int functions;
int pages;
int i;
/* If we already allocated, do nothing */
if (stat->pages)
return 0;
stat->pages = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!stat->pages)
return -ENOMEM;
#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
functions = ftrace_update_tot_cnt;
#else
/*
* We do not know the number of functions that exist because
* dynamic tracing is what counts them. With past experience
* we have around 20K functions. That should be more than enough.
* It is highly unlikely we will execute every function in
* the kernel.
*/
functions = 20000;
#endif
pg = stat->start = stat->pages;
pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(functions, PROFILES_PER_PAGE);
for (i = 0; i < pages; i++) {
pg->next = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pg->next)
goto out_free;
pg = pg->next;
}
return 0;
out_free:
pg = stat->start;
while (pg) {
unsigned long tmp = (unsigned long)pg;
pg = pg->next;
free_page(tmp);
}
stat->pages = NULL;
stat->start = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderMessageFilter::OnDestruct() const {
BrowserThread::DeleteOnIOThread::Destruct(this);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::OnRenderProcessGone(int status, int exit_code) {
base::TerminationStatus termination_status =
static_cast<base::TerminationStatus>(status);
if (frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame()) {
render_view_host_->render_view_termination_status_ = termination_status;
}
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kCrashReporting))
MaybeGenerateCrashReport(termination_status, exit_code);
ResetChildren();
SetRenderFrameCreated(false);
InvalidateMojoConnection();
document_scoped_interface_provider_binding_.Close();
document_interface_broker_content_binding_.Close();
document_interface_broker_blink_binding_.Close();
SetLastCommittedUrl(GURL());
for (auto& iter : ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_)
std::move(iter.second).Run(ui::AXTreeUpdate());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
for (base::IDMap<std::unique_ptr<ExtractSmartClipDataCallback>>::iterator
iter(&smart_clip_callbacks_);
!iter.IsAtEnd(); iter.Advance()) {
std::move(*iter.GetCurrentValue())
.Run(base::string16(), base::string16(), gfx::Rect());
}
smart_clip_callbacks_.Clear();
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
ax_tree_snapshot_callbacks_.clear();
visual_state_callbacks_.clear();
remote_associated_interfaces_.reset();
sudden_termination_disabler_types_enabled_ = 0;
if (unload_state_ != UnloadState::NotRun) {
unload_state_ = UnloadState::Completed;
DCHECK(children_.empty());
PendingDeletionCheckCompleted();
return;
}
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->CancelPendingIfNecessary(this);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual status_t fillBuffer(node_id node, buffer_id buffer) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
remote()->transact(FILL_BUFFER, data, &reply);
return reply.readInt32();
}
Commit Message: Clear allocation to avoid info leak
Bug: 26914474
Change-Id: Ie1a86e86d78058d041149fe599a4996e7f8185cf
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SpoolssSetPrinterDataEx_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
char *key_name, *value_name;
guint32 max_len;
proto_item *hidden_item;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_printerdata, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_nt_policy_hnd(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_hnd, NULL, NULL,
FALSE, FALSE);
offset = dissect_ndr_cvstring(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, sizeof(guint16),
hf_printerdata_key, TRUE, &key_name);
offset = dissect_ndr_cvstring(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, sizeof(guint16),
hf_printerdata_value, TRUE, &value_name);
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", %s/%s",
key_name, value_name);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_printerdata_type, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_setprinterdataex_max_len, &max_len);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint8s(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_setprinterdataex_data, max_len, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_setprinterdataex_real_len, NULL);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 51,988 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::Value RenderFrameImpl::GetJavaScriptExecutionResult(
v8::Local<v8::Value> result) {
if (!result.IsEmpty()) {
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = frame_->MainWorldScriptContext();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
V8ValueConverterImpl converter;
converter.SetDateAllowed(true);
converter.SetRegExpAllowed(true);
std::unique_ptr<base::Value> new_value =
converter.FromV8Value(result, context);
if (new_value)
return std::move(*new_value);
}
return base::Value();
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_mknod(void *opaque)
{
int mode;
gid_t gid;
int32_t fid;
V9fsQID qid;
int err = 0;
int major, minor;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsString name;
struct stat stbuf;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
v9fs_string_init(&name);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dsdddd", &fid, &name, &mode,
&major, &minor, &gid);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_mknod(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, mode, major, minor);
if (name_is_illegal(name.data)) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (!strcmp(".", name.data) || !strcmp("..", name.data)) {
err = -EEXIST;
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out_nofid;
}
err = v9fs_co_mknod(pdu, fidp, &name, fidp->uid, gid,
makedev(major, minor), mode, &stbuf);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
stat_to_qid(&stbuf, &qid);
err = pdu_marshal(pdu, offset, "Q", &qid);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
err += offset;
trace_v9fs_mknod_return(pdu->tag, pdu->id,
qid.type, qid.version, qid.path);
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 7,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: config_tos(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
attr_val *tos;
int item;
item = -1; /* quiet warning */
tos = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->orphan_cmds);
for (; tos != NULL; tos = tos->link) {
switch(tos->attr) {
default:
NTP_INSIST(0);
break;
case T_Ceiling:
item = PROTO_CEILING;
break;
case T_Floor:
item = PROTO_FLOOR;
break;
case T_Cohort:
item = PROTO_COHORT;
break;
case T_Orphan:
item = PROTO_ORPHAN;
break;
case T_Orphanwait:
item = PROTO_ORPHWAIT;
break;
case T_Mindist:
item = PROTO_MINDISP;
break;
case T_Maxdist:
item = PROTO_MAXDIST;
break;
case T_Minclock:
item = PROTO_MINCLOCK;
break;
case T_Maxclock:
item = PROTO_MAXCLOCK;
break;
case T_Minsane:
item = PROTO_MINSANE;
break;
case T_Beacon:
item = PROTO_BEACON;
break;
}
proto_config(item, 0, tos->value.d, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DiscardableSharedMemoryManager::~DiscardableSharedMemoryManager() {
base::MemoryCoordinatorClientRegistry::GetInstance()->Unregister(this);
base::trace_event::MemoryDumpManager::GetInstance()->UnregisterDumpProvider(
this);
if (mojo_thread_message_loop_) {
if (mojo_thread_message_loop_ == base::MessageLoop::current()) {
mojo_thread_message_loop_->RemoveDestructionObserver(this);
mojo_thread_message_loop_ = nullptr;
} else {
base::WaitableEvent event(
base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
bool result = mojo_thread_message_loop_->task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&DiscardableSharedMemoryManager::InvalidateMojoThreadWeakPtrs,
base::Unretained(this), &event));
LOG_IF(ERROR, !result) << "Invalidate mojo weak ptrs failed!";
if (result)
event.Wait();
}
}
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gst_qtdemux_do_seek (GstQTDemux * qtdemux, GstPad * pad, GstEvent * event)
{
gdouble rate;
GstFormat format;
GstSeekFlags flags;
GstSeekType cur_type, stop_type;
gint64 cur, stop;
gboolean flush;
gboolean res;
gboolean update;
GstSegment seeksegment;
int i;
if (event) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "doing seek with event");
gst_event_parse_seek (event, &rate, &format, &flags,
&cur_type, &cur, &stop_type, &stop);
/* we have to have a format as the segment format. Try to convert
* if not. */
if (format != GST_FORMAT_TIME) {
GstFormat fmt;
fmt = GST_FORMAT_TIME;
res = TRUE;
if (cur_type != GST_SEEK_TYPE_NONE)
res = gst_pad_query_convert (pad, format, cur, &fmt, &cur);
if (res && stop_type != GST_SEEK_TYPE_NONE)
res = gst_pad_query_convert (pad, format, stop, &fmt, &stop);
if (!res)
goto no_format;
format = fmt;
}
} else {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "doing seek without event");
flags = 0;
}
flush = flags & GST_SEEK_FLAG_FLUSH;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "seek format %d", format);
/* stop streaming, either by flushing or by pausing the task */
if (flush) {
/* unlock upstream pull_range */
gst_pad_push_event (qtdemux->sinkpad, gst_event_new_flush_start ());
/* make sure out loop function exits */
gst_qtdemux_push_event (qtdemux, gst_event_new_flush_start ());
} else {
/* non flushing seek, pause the task */
gst_pad_pause_task (qtdemux->sinkpad);
}
/* wait for streaming to finish */
GST_PAD_STREAM_LOCK (qtdemux->sinkpad);
/* copy segment, we need this because we still need the old
* segment when we close the current segment. */
memcpy (&seeksegment, &qtdemux->segment, sizeof (GstSegment));
if (event) {
/* configure the segment with the seek variables */
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "configuring seek");
gst_segment_set_seek (&seeksegment, rate, format, flags,
cur_type, cur, stop_type, stop, &update);
}
/* now do the seek, this actually never returns FALSE */
res = gst_qtdemux_perform_seek (qtdemux, &seeksegment);
/* prepare for streaming again */
if (flush) {
gst_pad_push_event (qtdemux->sinkpad, gst_event_new_flush_stop ());
gst_qtdemux_push_event (qtdemux, gst_event_new_flush_stop ());
} else if (qtdemux->segment_running) {
/* we are running the current segment and doing a non-flushing seek,
* close the segment first based on the last_stop. */
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "closing running segment %" G_GINT64_FORMAT
" to %" G_GINT64_FORMAT, qtdemux->segment.start,
qtdemux->segment.last_stop);
if (qtdemux->segment.rate >= 0) {
/* FIXME, rate is the product of the global rate and the (quicktime)
* segment rate. */
qtdemux->pending_newsegment = gst_event_new_new_segment (TRUE,
qtdemux->segment.rate, qtdemux->segment.format,
qtdemux->segment.start, qtdemux->segment.last_stop,
qtdemux->segment.time);
} else { /* For Reverse Playback */
guint64 stop;
if ((stop = qtdemux->segment.stop) == -1)
stop = qtdemux->segment.duration;
/* for reverse playback, we played from stop to last_stop. */
qtdemux->pending_newsegment = gst_event_new_new_segment (TRUE,
qtdemux->segment.rate, qtdemux->segment.format,
qtdemux->segment.last_stop, stop, qtdemux->segment.last_stop);
}
}
/* commit the new segment */
memcpy (&qtdemux->segment, &seeksegment, sizeof (GstSegment));
if (qtdemux->segment.flags & GST_SEEK_FLAG_SEGMENT) {
gst_element_post_message (GST_ELEMENT_CAST (qtdemux),
gst_message_new_segment_start (GST_OBJECT_CAST (qtdemux),
qtdemux->segment.format, qtdemux->segment.last_stop));
}
/* restart streaming, NEWSEGMENT will be sent from the streaming
* thread. */
qtdemux->segment_running = TRUE;
for (i = 0; i < qtdemux->n_streams; i++)
qtdemux->streams[i]->last_ret = GST_FLOW_OK;
gst_pad_start_task (qtdemux->sinkpad, (GstTaskFunction) gst_qtdemux_loop,
qtdemux->sinkpad);
GST_PAD_STREAM_UNLOCK (qtdemux->sinkpad);
return TRUE;
/* ERRORS */
no_format:
{
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "unsupported format given, seek aborted.");
return FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int intel_pmu_init(void)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GotCookies(const net::CookieList& cookie_list) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
for (const net::CanonicalCookie& cookie : cookie_list) {
std::string key = base::StringPrintf(
"%s::%s::%s::%d", cookie.Name().c_str(), cookie.Domain().c_str(),
cookie.Path().c_str(), cookie.IsSecure());
cookies_[key] = cookie;
}
--callback_count_;
if (callback_count_ == 0)
GotAllCookies();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool testToStringCharsRequiredHelper(const wchar_t * text) {
UriParserStateW state;
UriUriW uri;
state.uri = &uri;
int res = uriParseUriW(&state, text);
if (res != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
int charsRequired;
if (uriToStringCharsRequiredW(&uri, &charsRequired) != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
return false;
}
wchar_t * buffer = new wchar_t[charsRequired + 1];
if (uriToStringW(buffer, &uri, charsRequired + 1, NULL) != 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return false;
}
if (uriToStringW(buffer, &uri, charsRequired, NULL) == 0) {
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return false;
}
uriFreeUriMembersW(&uri);
delete [] buffer;
return true;
}
Commit Message: UriQuery.c: Fix out-of-bounds-write in ComposeQuery and ...Ex
Reported by Google Autofuzz team
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 75,760 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *create_core_dir_config(apr_pool_t *a, char *dir)
{
core_dir_config *conf;
conf = (core_dir_config *)apr_pcalloc(a, sizeof(core_dir_config));
/* conf->r and conf->d[_*] are initialized by dirsection() or left NULL */
conf->opts = dir ? OPT_UNSET : OPT_UNSET|OPT_SYM_LINKS;
conf->opts_add = conf->opts_remove = OPT_NONE;
conf->override = OR_UNSET|OR_NONE;
conf->override_opts = OPT_UNSET | OPT_ALL | OPT_SYM_OWNER | OPT_MULTI;
conf->content_md5 = AP_CONTENT_MD5_UNSET;
conf->accept_path_info = AP_ACCEPT_PATHINFO_UNSET;
conf->use_canonical_name = USE_CANONICAL_NAME_UNSET;
conf->use_canonical_phys_port = USE_CANONICAL_PHYS_PORT_UNSET;
conf->hostname_lookups = HOSTNAME_LOOKUP_UNSET;
/*
* left as NULL (we use apr_pcalloc):
* conf->limit_cpu = NULL;
* conf->limit_mem = NULL;
* conf->limit_nproc = NULL;
* conf->sec_file = NULL;
* conf->sec_if = NULL;
*/
conf->limit_req_body = AP_LIMIT_REQ_BODY_UNSET;
conf->limit_xml_body = AP_LIMIT_UNSET;
conf->server_signature = srv_sig_unset;
conf->add_default_charset = ADD_DEFAULT_CHARSET_UNSET;
conf->add_default_charset_name = DEFAULT_ADD_DEFAULT_CHARSET_NAME;
/* Overriding all negotiation
* Set NULL by apr_pcalloc:
* conf->mime_type = NULL;
* conf->handler = NULL;
* conf->output_filters = NULL;
* conf->input_filters = NULL;
*/
/*
* Flag for use of inodes in ETags.
*/
conf->etag_bits = ETAG_UNSET;
conf->etag_add = ETAG_UNSET;
conf->etag_remove = ETAG_UNSET;
conf->enable_mmap = ENABLE_MMAP_UNSET;
conf->enable_sendfile = ENABLE_SENDFILE_UNSET;
conf->allow_encoded_slashes = 0;
conf->decode_encoded_slashes = 0;
conf->max_ranges = AP_MAXRANGES_UNSET;
conf->max_overlaps = AP_MAXRANGES_UNSET;
conf->max_reversals = AP_MAXRANGES_UNSET;
conf->cgi_pass_auth = AP_CGI_PASS_AUTH_UNSET;
conf->qualify_redirect_url = AP_CORE_CONFIG_UNSET;
return (void *)conf;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,235 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_cairo_surface_to_pixbuf (cairo_surface_t *surface,
unsigned char *data,
GdkPixbuf *pixbuf)
{
int cairo_width, cairo_height, cairo_rowstride;
unsigned char *pixbuf_data, *dst, *cairo_data;
int pixbuf_rowstride, pixbuf_n_channels;
unsigned int *src;
int x, y;
cairo_width = cairo_image_surface_get_width (surface);
cairo_height = cairo_image_surface_get_height (surface);
cairo_rowstride = cairo_width * 4;
cairo_data = data;
pixbuf_data = gdk_pixbuf_get_pixels (pixbuf);
pixbuf_rowstride = gdk_pixbuf_get_rowstride (pixbuf);
pixbuf_n_channels = gdk_pixbuf_get_n_channels (pixbuf);
if (cairo_width > gdk_pixbuf_get_width (pixbuf))
cairo_width = gdk_pixbuf_get_width (pixbuf);
if (cairo_height > gdk_pixbuf_get_height (pixbuf))
cairo_height = gdk_pixbuf_get_height (pixbuf);
for (y = 0; y < cairo_height; y++)
{
src = (unsigned int *) (cairo_data + y * cairo_rowstride);
dst = pixbuf_data + y * pixbuf_rowstride;
for (x = 0; x < cairo_width; x++)
{
dst[0] = (*src >> 16) & 0xff;
dst[1] = (*src >> 8) & 0xff;
dst[2] = (*src >> 0) & 0xff;
if (pixbuf_n_channels == 4)
dst[3] = (*src >> 24) & 0xff;
dst += pixbuf_n_channels;
src++;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~Trans16x16TestBase() {}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_ctx_unlock(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx,
struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
if (ctx)
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
raw_spin_unlock(&cpuctx->ctx.lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int omninet_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct omninet_data *od;
od = kzalloc(sizeof(*od), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!od)
return -ENOMEM;
usb_set_serial_port_data(port, od);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: omninet: fix reference leaks at open
This driver needlessly took another reference to the tty on open, a
reference which was then never released on close. This lead to not just
a leak of the tty, but also a driver reference leak that prevented the
driver from being unloaded after a port had once been opened.
Fixes: 4a90f09b20f4 ("tty: usb-serial krefs")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.28
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 66,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BROTLI_INLINE int SafeReadDistance(BrotliState* s, BrotliBitReader* br) {
return ReadDistanceInternal(1, s, br);
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crc32_pclmul_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
return __crc32_pclmul_finup(crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm), data, len,
out);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsNonSwitchArgument(const base::CommandLine::StringType& s) {
return s.empty() || s[0] != '-';
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InspectorResourceAgent::fetchResourceContent(LocalFrame* frame, const KURL& url, String* content, bool* base64Encoded)
{
Resource* cachedResource = frame->document()->fetcher()->cachedResource(url);
if (!cachedResource)
cachedResource = memoryCache()->resourceForURL(url);
if (cachedResource && InspectorPageAgent::cachedResourceContent(cachedResource, content, base64Encoded))
return true;
Vector<NetworkResourcesData::ResourceData*> resources = m_resourcesData->resources();
for (Vector<NetworkResourcesData::ResourceData*>::iterator it = resources.begin(); it != resources.end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->url() == url) {
*content = (*it)->content();
*base64Encoded = (*it)->base64Encoded();
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __sctp_connect(struct sock *sk,
struct sockaddr *kaddrs,
int addrs_size,
sctp_assoc_t *assoc_id)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_sock *sp;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL;
struct sctp_association *asoc2;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
union sctp_addr to;
sctp_scope_t scope;
long timeo;
int err = 0;
int addrcnt = 0;
int walk_size = 0;
union sctp_addr *sa_addr = NULL;
void *addr_buf;
unsigned short port;
unsigned int f_flags = 0;
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
ep = sp->ep;
/* connect() cannot be done on a socket that is already in ESTABLISHED
* state - UDP-style peeled off socket or a TCP-style socket that
* is already connected.
* It cannot be done even on a TCP-style listening socket.
*/
if (sctp_sstate(sk, ESTABLISHED) ||
(sctp_style(sk, TCP) && sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING))) {
err = -EISCONN;
goto out_free;
}
/* Walk through the addrs buffer and count the number of addresses. */
addr_buf = kaddrs;
while (walk_size < addrs_size) {
struct sctp_af *af;
if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrs_size) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
sa_addr = addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(sa_addr->sa.sa_family);
/* If the address family is not supported or if this address
* causes the address buffer to overflow return EINVAL.
*/
if (!af || (walk_size + af->sockaddr_len) > addrs_size) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
port = ntohs(sa_addr->v4.sin_port);
/* Save current address so we can work with it */
memcpy(&to, sa_addr, af->sockaddr_len);
err = sctp_verify_addr(sk, &to, af->sockaddr_len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
/* Make sure the destination port is correctly set
* in all addresses.
*/
if (asoc && asoc->peer.port && asoc->peer.port != port) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
/* Check if there already is a matching association on the
* endpoint (other than the one created here).
*/
asoc2 = sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(ep, &to, &transport);
if (asoc2 && asoc2 != asoc) {
if (asoc2->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED)
err = -EISCONN;
else
err = -EALREADY;
goto out_free;
}
/* If we could not find a matching association on the endpoint,
* make sure that there is no peeled-off association matching
* the peer address even on another socket.
*/
if (sctp_endpoint_is_peeled_off(ep, &to)) {
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
goto out_free;
}
if (!asoc) {
/* If a bind() or sctp_bindx() is not called prior to
* an sctp_connectx() call, the system picks an
* ephemeral port and will choose an address set
* equivalent to binding with a wildcard address.
*/
if (!ep->base.bind_addr.port) {
if (sctp_autobind(sk)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out_free;
}
} else {
/*
* If an unprivileged user inherits a 1-many
* style socket with open associations on a
* privileged port, it MAY be permitted to
* accept new associations, but it SHOULD NOT
* be permitted to open new associations.
*/
if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
err = -EACCES;
goto out_free;
}
}
scope = sctp_scope(&to);
asoc = sctp_association_new(ep, sk, scope, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!asoc) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
err = sctp_assoc_set_bind_addr_from_ep(asoc, scope,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_free;
}
}
/* Prime the peer's transport structures. */
transport = sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &to, GFP_KERNEL,
SCTP_UNKNOWN);
if (!transport) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
addrcnt++;
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
walk_size += af->sockaddr_len;
}
/* In case the user of sctp_connectx() wants an association
* id back, assign one now.
*/
if (assoc_id) {
err = sctp_assoc_set_id(asoc, GFP_KERNEL);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
}
err = sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE(net, asoc, NULL);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_free;
}
/* Initialize sk's dport and daddr for getpeername() */
inet_sk(sk)->inet_dport = htons(asoc->peer.port);
sp->pf->to_sk_daddr(sa_addr, sk);
sk->sk_err = 0;
/* in-kernel sockets don't generally have a file allocated to them
* if all they do is call sock_create_kern().
*/
if (sk->sk_socket->file)
f_flags = sk->sk_socket->file->f_flags;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
err = sctp_wait_for_connect(asoc, &timeo);
if ((err == 0 || err == -EINPROGRESS) && assoc_id)
*assoc_id = asoc->assoc_id;
/* Don't free association on exit. */
asoc = NULL;
out_free:
pr_debug("%s: took out_free path with asoc:%p kaddrs:%p err:%d\n",
__func__, asoc, kaddrs, err);
if (asoc) {
/* sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE may have added this association
* To the hash table, try to unhash it, just in case, its a noop
* if it wasn't hashed so we're safe
*/
sctp_unhash_established(asoc);
sctp_association_free(asoc);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 43,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceSuspend(int32 surface_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer",
"GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceSuspend");
gfx::GLSurfaceHandle handle = GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceHandle(
surface_id);
if (!handle.handle)
return;
scoped_refptr<AcceleratedPresenter> presenter(
AcceleratedPresenter::GetForWindow(handle.handle));
if (!presenter)
return;
presenter->Suspend();
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: saml2md::MetadataProvider* SHIBSP_DLLLOCAL DynamicMetadataProviderFactory(const DOMElement* const & e)
{
return new DynamicMetadataProvider(e);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-347 | 0 | 1,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: logger_start_buffer_all (int write_info_line)
{
struct t_infolist *ptr_infolist;
ptr_infolist = weechat_infolist_get ("buffer", NULL, NULL);
if (ptr_infolist)
{
while (weechat_infolist_next (ptr_infolist))
{
logger_start_buffer (weechat_infolist_pointer (ptr_infolist,
"pointer"),
write_info_line);
}
weechat_infolist_free (ptr_infolist);
}
}
Commit Message: logger: call strftime before replacing buffer local variables
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 60,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int afpClose(sqlite3_file *id) {
int rc = SQLITE_OK;
unixFile *pFile = (unixFile*)id;
assert( id!=0 );
afpUnlock(id, NO_LOCK);
assert( unixFileMutexNotheld(pFile) );
unixEnterMutex();
if( pFile->pInode ){
unixInodeInfo *pInode = pFile->pInode;
sqlite3_mutex_enter(pInode->pLockMutex);
if( pInode->nLock ){
/* If there are outstanding locks, do not actually close the file just
** yet because that would clear those locks. Instead, add the file
** descriptor to pInode->aPending. It will be automatically closed when
** the last lock is cleared.
*/
setPendingFd(pFile);
}
sqlite3_mutex_leave(pInode->pLockMutex);
}
releaseInodeInfo(pFile);
sqlite3_free(pFile->lockingContext);
rc = closeUnixFile(id);
unixLeaveMutex();
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 151,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ptrace_put_reg(struct task_struct *task, int regno, unsigned long data)
{
if (task->thread.regs == NULL)
return -EIO;
if (regno == PT_MSR)
return set_user_msr(task, data);
if (regno == PT_TRAP)
return set_user_trap(task, data);
if (regno == PT_DSCR)
return set_user_dscr(task, data);
if (regno <= PT_MAX_PUT_REG) {
((unsigned long *)task->thread.regs)[regno] = data;
return 0;
}
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_proc_sl_key(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
uint8_t key_type = p_data->key.key_type;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
if (key_type == SMP_KEY_TYPE_TK) {
smp_generate_srand_mrand_confirm(p_cb, NULL);
} else if (key_type == SMP_KEY_TYPE_CFM) {
smp_set_state(SMP_STATE_WAIT_CONFIRM);
if (p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_CMD_CONFIRM)
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_CONFIRM_EVT, NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,765 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> descriptionAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.description._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return v8::Integer::New(imp->description());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ShellSurface::ShellSurface(Surface* surface)
: ShellSurface(surface,
nullptr,
gfx::Rect(),
true,
ash::kShellWindowId_DefaultContainer) {}
Commit Message: exo: Reduce side-effects of dynamic activation code.
This code exists for clients that need to managed their own system
modal dialogs. Since the addition of the remote surface API we
can limit the impact of this to surfaces created for system modal
container.
BUG=29528396
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2084023003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#401115}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 120,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void out_flush_route_queue(s2s_t s2s, char *rkey, int rkeylen) {
jqueue_t q;
pkt_t pkt;
int npkt, i, ret;
q = xhash_getx(s2s->outq, rkey, rkeylen);
if(q == NULL)
return;
npkt = jqueue_size(q);
log_debug(ZONE, "flushing %d packets for '%.*s' to out_packet", npkt, rkeylen, rkey);
for(i = 0; i < npkt; i++) {
pkt = jqueue_pull(q);
if(pkt) {
ret = out_packet(s2s, pkt);
if (ret) {
/* uh-oh. the queue was deleted...
q and pkt have been freed
if q->key == rkey, rkey has also been freed */
return;
}
}
}
/* delete queue for route and remove route from queue hash */
if (jqueue_size(q) == 0) {
log_debug(ZONE, "deleting out packet queue for '%.*s'", rkeylen, rkey);
rkey = q->key;
jqueue_free(q);
xhash_zap(s2s->outq, rkey);
free(rkey);
} else {
log_debug(ZONE, "emptied queue gained more packets...");
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possibility of Unsolicited Dialback Attacks
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 19,195 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser", "RenderWidgetHostViewAura::OnGestureEvent");
if ((event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_PINCH_BEGIN ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_PINCH_UPDATE ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_PINCH_END) && !ShouldSendPinchGesture()) {
event->SetHandled();
return;
}
RenderViewHostDelegate* delegate = NULL;
if (popup_type_ == WebKit::WebPopupTypeNone && !is_fullscreen_)
delegate = RenderViewHost::From(host_)->GetDelegate();
if (delegate && event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_BEGIN &&
event->details().touch_points() == 1) {
delegate->HandleGestureBegin();
}
WebKit::WebGestureEvent gesture = MakeWebGestureEvent(event);
if (event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP_DOWN) {
WebKit::WebGestureEvent fling_cancel = gesture;
fling_cancel.type = WebKit::WebInputEvent::GestureFlingCancel;
host_->ForwardGestureEvent(fling_cancel);
}
if (gesture.type != WebKit::WebInputEvent::Undefined) {
host_->ForwardGestureEvent(gesture);
if (event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_BEGIN ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_UPDATE ||
event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_SCROLL_END) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("TouchscreenScroll"));
} else if (event->type() == ui::ET_SCROLL_FLING_START) {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("TouchscreenScrollFling"));
}
}
if (delegate && event->type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_END &&
event->details().touch_points() == 1) {
delegate->HandleGestureEnd();
}
event->SetHandled();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int zend_update_static_property_null(zend_class_entry *scope, const char *name, int name_length TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *tmp;
ALLOC_ZVAL(tmp);
Z_UNSET_ISREF_P(tmp);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(tmp, 0);
ZVAL_NULL(tmp);
return zend_update_static_property(scope, name, name_length, tmp TSRMLS_CC);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,852 |
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