instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::IsInInvisibleSubframe() const {
if (!LocalOwner())
return false; // this is a local root element
DCHECK(GetFrame());
return GetFrame()->OwnerLayoutItem().IsNull();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Range::selectNodeContents(Node* refNode, ExceptionCode& ec)
{
if (!m_start.container()) {
ec = INVALID_STATE_ERR;
return;
}
if (!refNode) {
ec = NOT_FOUND_ERR;
return;
}
for (Node* n = refNode; n; n = n->parentNode()) {
switch (n->nodeType()) {
case Node::ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
case Node::CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
case Node::COMMENT_NODE:
case Node::DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE:
case Node::DOCUMENT_NODE:
case Node::ELEMENT_NODE:
case Node::ENTITY_REFERENCE_NODE:
case Node::PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION_NODE:
case Node::TEXT_NODE:
case Node::XPATH_NAMESPACE_NODE:
break;
case Node::DOCUMENT_TYPE_NODE:
case Node::ENTITY_NODE:
case Node::NOTATION_NODE:
ec = RangeException::INVALID_NODE_TYPE_ERR;
return;
}
}
if (m_ownerDocument != refNode->document())
setDocument(refNode->document());
m_start.setToStartOfNode(refNode);
m_end.setToEndOfNode(refNode);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FloatSize LocalFrame::ResizePageRectsKeepingRatio(
const FloatSize& original_size,
const FloatSize& expected_size) const {
auto* layout_object = ContentLayoutObject();
if (!layout_object)
return FloatSize();
bool is_horizontal = layout_object->StyleRef().IsHorizontalWritingMode();
float width = original_size.Width();
float height = original_size.Height();
if (!is_horizontal)
std::swap(width, height);
DCHECK_GT(fabs(width), std::numeric_limits<float>::epsilon());
float ratio = height / width;
float result_width =
floorf(is_horizontal ? expected_size.Width() : expected_size.Height());
float result_height = floorf(result_width * ratio);
if (!is_horizontal)
std::swap(result_width, result_height);
return FloatSize(result_width, result_height);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,875 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PluginChannel::OnControlMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& msg) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(PluginChannel, msg)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginMsg_CreateInstance, OnCreateInstance)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER_DELAY_REPLY(PluginMsg_DestroyInstance,
OnDestroyInstance)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginMsg_GenerateRouteID, OnGenerateRouteID)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(PluginMsg_ClearSiteData, OnClearSiteData)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
DCHECK(handled);
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,014 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetSet)
{
char *fname, *cont_str = NULL;
int fname_len, cont_len;
zval *zresource;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Write operations disabled by the php.ini setting phar.readonly");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sr", &fname, &fname_len, &zresource) == FAILURE
&& zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss", &fname, &fname_len, &cont_str, &cont_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot set stub \".phar/stub.php\" directly in phar \"%s\", use setStub", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot set alias \".phar/alias.txt\" directly in phar \"%s\", use setAlias", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot set any files or directories in magic \".phar\" directory", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
phar_add_file(&(phar_obj->arc.archive), fname, fname_len, cont_str, cont_len, zresource TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,395 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::createStyleResolver()
{
bool matchAuthorAndUserStyles = true;
if (Settings* docSettings = settings())
matchAuthorAndUserStyles = docSettings->authorAndUserStylesEnabled();
m_styleResolver = adoptPtr(new StyleResolver(this, matchAuthorAndUserStyles));
m_styleSheetCollection->combineCSSFeatureFlags();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CopyToOMX(const OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header) {
if (!mIsBackup) {
return;
}
memcpy(header->pBuffer + header->nOffset,
(const OMX_U8 *)mMem->pointer() + header->nOffset,
header->nFilledLen);
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ftp_retrieve_glob (struct url *u, ccon *con, int action)
{
struct fileinfo *f, *start;
uerr_t res;
con->cmd |= LEAVE_PENDING;
res = ftp_get_listing (u, con, &start);
if (res != RETROK)
return res;
/* First: weed out that do not conform the global rules given in
opt.accepts and opt.rejects. */
if (opt.accepts || opt.rejects)
{
f = start;
while (f)
{
if (f->type != FT_DIRECTORY && !acceptable (f->name))
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Rejecting %s.\n"),
quote (f->name));
f = delelement (f, &start);
}
else
f = f->next;
}
}
/* Remove all files with possible harmful names or invalid entries. */
f = start;
while (f)
{
if (has_insecure_name_p (f->name) || is_invalid_entry (f))
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Rejecting %s.\n"),
quote (f->name));
f = delelement (f, &start);
}
else
f = f->next;
}
/* Now weed out the files that do not match our globbing pattern.
If we are dealing with a globbing pattern, that is. */
if (*u->file)
{
if (action == GLOB_GLOBALL)
{
int (*matcher) (const char *, const char *, int)
= opt.ignore_case ? fnmatch_nocase : fnmatch;
int matchres = 0;
f = start;
while (f)
{
matchres = matcher (u->file, f->name, 0);
if (matchres == -1)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Error matching %s against %s: %s\n"),
u->file, quotearg_style (escape_quoting_style, f->name),
strerror (errno));
break;
}
if (matchres == FNM_NOMATCH)
f = delelement (f, &start); /* delete the element from the list */
else
f = f->next; /* leave the element in the list */
}
if (matchres == -1)
{
freefileinfo (start);
return RETRBADPATTERN;
}
}
else if (action == GLOB_GETONE)
{
#ifdef __VMS
/* 2009-09-09 SMS.
* Odd-ball compiler ("HP C V7.3-009 on OpenVMS Alpha V7.3-2")
* bug causes spurious %CC-E-BADCONDIT complaint with this
* "?:" statement. (Different linkage attributes for strcmp()
* and strcasecmp().) Converting to "if" changes the
* complaint to %CC-W-PTRMISMATCH on "cmp = strcmp;". Adding
* the senseless type cast clears the complaint, and looks
* harmless.
*/
int (*cmp) (const char *, const char *)
= opt.ignore_case ? strcasecmp : (int (*)())strcmp;
#else /* def __VMS */
int (*cmp) (const char *, const char *)
= opt.ignore_case ? strcasecmp : strcmp;
#endif /* def __VMS [else] */
f = start;
while (f)
{
if (0 != cmp(u->file, f->name))
f = delelement (f, &start);
else
f = f->next;
}
}
}
if (start)
{
/* Just get everything. */
res = ftp_retrieve_list (u, start, con);
}
else
{
if (action == GLOB_GLOBALL)
{
/* No luck. */
/* #### This message SUCKS. We should see what was the
reason that nothing was retrieved. */
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("No matches on pattern %s.\n"),
quote (u->file));
}
else if (action == GLOB_GETONE) /* GLOB_GETONE or GLOB_GETALL */
{
/* Let's try retrieving it anyway. */
con->st |= ON_YOUR_OWN;
res = ftp_loop_internal (u, NULL, con, NULL, false);
return res;
}
/* If action == GLOB_GETALL, and the file list is empty, there's
no point in trying to download anything or in complaining about
it. (An empty directory should not cause complaints.)
*/
}
freefileinfo (start);
if (opt.quota && total_downloaded_bytes > opt.quota)
return QUOTEXC;
else
return res;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 222 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_delete_lt_node(dpb_manager_t *ps_dpb_mgr,
UWORD32 u4_lt_idx,
UWORD8 u1_fld_pic_flag,
struct dpb_info_t *ps_lt_node_to_insert,
WORD32 *pi4_status)
{
*pi4_status = 0;
if(ps_dpb_mgr->u1_num_lt_ref_bufs > 0)
{
WORD32 i;
struct dpb_info_t *ps_next_dpb;
/* ps_unmark_node points to the node to be removed */
/* from long term list. */
struct dpb_info_t *ps_unmark_node;
ps_next_dpb = ps_dpb_mgr->ps_dpb_ht_head;
if(ps_next_dpb->u1_lt_idx == u4_lt_idx)
{
ps_unmark_node = ps_next_dpb;
}
else
{
for(i = 1; i < ps_dpb_mgr->u1_num_lt_ref_bufs; i++)
{
if(ps_next_dpb->ps_prev_long->u1_lt_idx == u4_lt_idx)
break;
ps_next_dpb = ps_next_dpb->ps_prev_long;
}
if(i == ps_dpb_mgr->u1_num_lt_ref_bufs)
*pi4_status = 1;
else
ps_unmark_node = ps_next_dpb->ps_prev_long;
}
if(*pi4_status == 0)
{
if(u1_fld_pic_flag)
{
if(ps_lt_node_to_insert != ps_unmark_node)
{
UWORD8 u1_deleted = 0;
/* for the ps_unmark_node mark the corresponding field */
/* field as unused for reference */
if(ps_unmark_node->s_top_field.u1_long_term_frame_idx
== u4_lt_idx)
{
ps_unmark_node->s_top_field.u1_reference_info =
UNUSED_FOR_REF;
ps_unmark_node->s_top_field.u1_long_term_frame_idx =
MAX_REF_BUFS + 1;
u1_deleted = 1;
}
if(ps_unmark_node->s_bot_field.u1_long_term_frame_idx
== u4_lt_idx)
{
ps_unmark_node->s_bot_field.u1_reference_info =
UNUSED_FOR_REF;
ps_unmark_node->s_bot_field.u1_long_term_frame_idx =
MAX_REF_BUFS + 1;
u1_deleted = 1;
}
if(!u1_deleted)
{
UWORD32 i4_error_code;
i4_error_code = ERROR_DBP_MANAGER_T;
return i4_error_code;
}
}
ps_unmark_node->u1_used_as_ref =
ps_unmark_node->s_top_field.u1_reference_info
| ps_unmark_node->s_bot_field.u1_reference_info;
}
else
ps_unmark_node->u1_used_as_ref = UNUSED_FOR_REF;
if(UNUSED_FOR_REF == ps_unmark_node->u1_used_as_ref)
{
if(ps_unmark_node == ps_dpb_mgr->ps_dpb_ht_head)
ps_dpb_mgr->ps_dpb_ht_head = ps_next_dpb->ps_prev_long;
ps_unmark_node->u1_lt_idx = MAX_REF_BUFS + 1;
ps_unmark_node->s_top_field.u1_reference_info =
UNUSED_FOR_REF;
ps_unmark_node->s_bot_field.u1_reference_info =
UNUSED_FOR_REF;
ih264d_free_ref_pic_mv_bufs(ps_dpb_mgr->pv_codec_handle,
ps_unmark_node->u1_buf_id);
ps_next_dpb->ps_prev_long = ps_unmark_node->ps_prev_long; //update link
ps_unmark_node->ps_prev_long = NULL;
ps_dpb_mgr->u1_num_lt_ref_bufs--; //decrement LT buf count
}
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Return error when there are more mmco params than allocated size
Bug: 25818142
Change-Id: I5c1b23985eeca5192b42703c627ca3d060e4e13d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API int _zend_ts_hash_init(TsHashTable *ht, uint nSize, hash_func_t pHashFunction, dtor_func_t pDestructor, zend_bool persistent ZEND_FILE_LINE_DC)
{
#ifdef ZTS
ht->mx_reader = tsrm_mutex_alloc();
ht->mx_writer = tsrm_mutex_alloc();
ht->reader = 0;
#endif
return _zend_hash_init(TS_HASH(ht), nSize, pHashFunction, pDestructor, persistent ZEND_FILE_LINE_RELAY_CC);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 7,436 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewWin::OnBeforePossibleChange() {
text_before_change_ = GetText();
GetSelection(sel_before_change_);
}
Commit Message: Change omnibox behavior when stripping javascript schema to navigate after stripping the schema on drag drop.
BUG=109245
TEST=N/A
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9116016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Handle<Object> PopImpl(Handle<JSArray> receiver) {
return Subclass::RemoveElement(receiver, AT_END);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadTIFFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
const char
*option;
float
*chromaticity,
x_position,
y_position,
x_resolution,
y_resolution;
Image
*image;
int
tiff_status;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
pad;
ssize_t
y;
TIFF
*tiff;
TIFFMethodType
method;
uint16
compress_tag,
bits_per_sample,
endian,
extra_samples,
interlace,
max_sample_value,
min_sample_value,
orientation,
pages,
photometric,
*sample_info,
sample_format,
samples_per_pixel,
units,
value;
uint32
height,
rows_per_strip,
width;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) SetMagickThreadValue(tiff_exception,exception);
tiff=TIFFClientOpen(image->filename,"rb",(thandle_t) image,TIFFReadBlob,
TIFFWriteBlob,TIFFSeekBlob,TIFFCloseBlob,TIFFGetBlobSize,TIFFMapBlob,
TIFFUnmapBlob);
if (tiff == (TIFF *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
/*
Generate blank images for subimage specification (e.g. image.tif[4].
We need to check the number of directores because it is possible that
the subimage(s) are stored in the photoshop profile.
*/
if (image_info->scene < (size_t) TIFFNumberOfDirectories(tiff))
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
}
}
do
{
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (image_info->verbose != MagickFalse))
TIFFPrintDirectory(tiff,stdout,MagickFalse);
RestoreMSCWarning
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH,&width) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH,&height) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION,&compress_tag) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_FILLORDER,&endian) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG,&interlace) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,&samples_per_pixel) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE,&bits_per_sample) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLEFORMAT,&sample_format) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MINSAMPLEVALUE,&min_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_MAXSAMPLEVALUE,&max_sample_value) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC,&photometric) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"quantum:format","floating-point",
exception);
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-black",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","min-is-white",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","palette",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_RGB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","RGB",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIELAB",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","CIE Log2(L)",
exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","LOGLUV",exception);
break;
}
#if defined(PHOTOMETRIC_MASK)
case PHOTOMETRIC_MASK:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","MASK",exception);
break;
}
#endif
case PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","separated",exception);
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","YCBCR",exception);
break;
}
default:
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric","unknown",exception);
break;
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %ux%u",
(unsigned int) width,(unsigned int) height);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Interlace: %u",
interlace);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Bits per sample: %u",bits_per_sample);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Min sample value: %u",min_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Max sample value: %u",max_sample_value);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Photometric "
"interpretation: %s",GetImageProperty(image,"tiff:photometric",
exception));
}
image->columns=(size_t) width;
image->rows=(size_t) height;
image->depth=(size_t) bits_per_sample;
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Image depth: %.20g",
(double) image->depth);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
if (endian == FILLORDER_LSB2MSB)
image->endian=LSBEndian;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISBIGENDIAN)
if (TIFFIsBigEndian(tiff) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","lsb",exception);
image->endian=LSBEndian;
}
else
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:endian","msb",exception);
image->endian=MSBEndian;
}
#endif
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED)
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
TIFFGetProfiles(tiff,image,image_info->ping,exception);
TIFFGetProperties(tiff,image,exception);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"tiff:exif-properties");
if (IsStringFalse(option) == MagickFalse) /* enabled by default */
TIFFGetEXIFProperties(tiff,image,exception);
(void) TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL,
&samples_per_pixel);
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XRESOLUTION,&x_resolution) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YRESOLUTION,&y_resolution) == 1))
{
image->resolution.x=x_resolution;
image->resolution.y=y_resolution;
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_RESOLUTIONUNIT,&units) == 1)
{
if (units == RESUNIT_INCH)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == RESUNIT_CENTIMETER)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
}
if ((TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_XPOSITION,&x_position) == 1) &&
(TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YPOSITION,&y_position) == 1))
{
image->page.x=(ssize_t) ceil(x_position*image->resolution.x-0.5);
image->page.y=(ssize_t) ceil(y_position*image->resolution.y-0.5);
}
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_ORIENTATION,&orientation) == 1)
image->orientation=(OrientationType) orientation;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_WHITEPOINT,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.white_point.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.white_point.y=chromaticity[1];
}
}
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_PRIMARYCHROMATICITIES,&chromaticity) == 1)
{
if (chromaticity != (float *) NULL)
{
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x=chromaticity[0];
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y=chromaticity[1];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x=chromaticity[2];
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y=chromaticity[3];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x=chromaticity[4];
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y=chromaticity[5];
}
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_TIFFISCODECCONFIGURED) || (TIFFLIB_VERSION > 20040919)
if ((compress_tag != COMPRESSION_NONE) &&
(TIFFIsCODECConfigured(compress_tag) == 0))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"CompressNotSupported");
}
#endif
switch (compress_tag)
{
case COMPRESSION_NONE: image->compression=NoCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX3: image->compression=FaxCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4: image->compression=Group4Compression; break;
case COMPRESSION_JPEG:
{
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#if defined(JPEG_SUPPORT)
{
char
sampling_factor[MagickPathExtent];
int
tiff_status;
uint16
horizontal,
vertical;
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&horizontal,&vertical);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(sampling_factor,MagickPathExtent,
"%dx%d",horizontal,vertical);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:sampling-factor",
sampling_factor,exception);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Sampling Factors: %s",sampling_factor);
}
}
#endif
break;
}
case COMPRESSION_OJPEG: image->compression=JPEGCompression; break;
#if defined(COMPRESSION_LZMA)
case COMPRESSION_LZMA: image->compression=LZMACompression; break;
#endif
case COMPRESSION_LZW: image->compression=LZWCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
case COMPRESSION_ADOBE_DEFLATE: image->compression=ZipCompression; break;
default: image->compression=RLECompression; break;
}
/*
Allocate memory for the image and pixel buffer.
*/
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_UINT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,UnsignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_INT)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,SignedQuantumFormat);
if (sample_format == SAMPLEFORMAT_IEEEFP)
status=SetQuantumFormat(image,quantum_info,FloatingPointQuantumFormat);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
status=MagickTrue;
switch (photometric)
{
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickFalse;
break;
}
case PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE:
{
quantum_info->min_is_white=MagickTrue;
break;
}
default:
break;
}
tiff_status=TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_EXTRASAMPLES,&extra_samples,
&sample_info);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unspecified",exception);
if (extra_samples == 0)
{
if ((samples_per_pixel == 4) && (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_RGB))
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
}
else
for (i=0; i < extra_samples; i++)
{
image->alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_ASSOCALPHA)
{
SetQuantumAlphaType(quantum_info,DisassociatedQuantumAlpha);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","associated",
exception);
}
else
if (sample_info[i] == EXTRASAMPLE_UNASSALPHA)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:alpha","unassociated",
exception);
}
}
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_PALETTE) &&
(pow(2.0,1.0*bits_per_sample) <= MaxColormapSize))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(bits_per_sample)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
value=(unsigned short) image->scene;
if (TIFFGetFieldDefaulted(tiff,TIFFTAG_PAGENUMBER,&value,&pages) == 1)
image->scene=value;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
int
tiff_status;
size_t
range;
uint16
*blue_colormap,
*green_colormap,
*red_colormap;
/*
Initialize colormap.
*/
tiff_status=TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_COLORMAP,&red_colormap,
&green_colormap,&blue_colormap);
if (tiff_status == 1)
{
if ((red_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(green_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL) &&
(blue_colormap != (uint16 *) NULL))
{
range=255; /* might be old style 8-bit colormap */
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
if ((red_colormap[i] >= 256) || (green_colormap[i] >= 256) ||
(blue_colormap[i] >= 256))
{
range=65535;
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*red_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].green=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*green_colormap[i])/range);
image->colormap[i].blue=ClampToQuantum(((double)
QuantumRange*blue_colormap[i])/range);
}
}
}
if (image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait)
image->depth=GetImageDepth(image,exception);
}
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
{
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
break;
}
goto next_tiff_frame;
}
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,&rows_per_strip) == 1)
{
char
value[MagickPathExtent];
method=ReadStripMethod;
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%u",
(unsigned int) rows_per_strip);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"tiff:rows-per-strip",value,exception);
}
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG))
method=ReadRGBAMethod;
if ((samples_per_pixel >= 2) && (interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE))
method=ReadCMYKAMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_RGB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB) &&
(photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
method=ReadSingleSampleMethod;
if ((photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_SEPARATED) &&
(interlace == PLANARCONFIG_SEPARATE) && (bits_per_sample < 64))
method=ReadGenericMethod;
if (image->compression == JPEGCompression)
method=GetJPEGMethod(image,tiff,photometric,bits_per_sample,
samples_per_pixel);
if (compress_tag == COMPRESSION_JBIG)
method=ReadStripMethod;
if (TIFFIsTiled(tiff) != MagickFalse)
method=ReadTileMethod;
quantum_info->endian=LSBEndian;
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
switch (method)
{
case ReadSingleSampleMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to PseudoClass MIFF image.
*/
quantum_type=IndexQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=samples_per_pixel == 1 ? AlphaQuantum :
GrayAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
else
{
quantum_type=IndexAlphaQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-2,0);
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
quantum_type=GrayQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-1,0);
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadRGBAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-3,0);
quantum_type=RGBQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
quantum_type=RGBAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-4,0);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
pad=(size_t) MagickMax((size_t) samples_per_pixel-5,0);
}
}
status=SetQuantumPad(image,quantum_info,pad*((bits_per_sample+7) >> 3));
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadCMYKAMethod:
{
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) samples_per_pixel; i++)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
int
status;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,(tsample_t) i,y,(char *)
pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=RedQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=GreenQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=BlueQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
else
switch (i)
{
case 0: quantum_type=CyanQuantum; break;
case 1: quantum_type=MagentaQuantum; break;
case 2: quantum_type=YellowQuantum; break;
case 3: quantum_type=BlackQuantum; break;
case 4: quantum_type=AlphaQuantum; break;
default: quantum_type=UndefinedQuantum; break;
}
(void) ImportQuantumPixels(image,(CacheView *) NULL,quantum_info,
quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadYCCKMethod:
{
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
int
status;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
unsigned char
*p;
status=TIFFReadPixels(tiff,bits_per_sample,0,y,(char *) pixels);
if (status == -1)
break;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
p=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.402*(double) *(p+2))-179.456)),q);
SetPixelMagenta(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p-
(0.34414*(double) *(p+1))-(0.71414*(double ) *(p+2))+
135.45984)),q);
SetPixelYellow(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(ClampYCC((double) *p+
(1.772*(double) *(p+1))-226.816)),q);
SetPixelBlack(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) *(p+3)),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p+=4;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadStripMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
/*
Convert stripped TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
i=0;
p=(uint32 *) NULL;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (i == 0)
{
if (TIFFReadRGBAStrip(tiff,(tstrip_t) y,(uint32 *) pixels) == 0)
break;
i=(ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) rows_per_strip,(ssize_t)
image->rows-y);
}
i--;
p=((uint32 *) pixels)+image->columns*i;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetR(*p))),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetG(*p))),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetB(*p))),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(TIFFGetA(*p))),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case ReadTileMethod:
{
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*tile_pixels,
columns,
rows;
/*
Convert tiled TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
if ((TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILEWIDTH,&columns) != 1) ||
(TIFFGetField(tiff,TIFFTAG_TILELENGTH,&rows) != 1))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ImageIsNotTiled");
}
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) columns*rows;
if ((number_pixels*sizeof(uint32)) != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t)
(number_pixels*sizeof(uint32))))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,
rows*sizeof(*tile_pixels));
if (tile_pixels == (uint32 *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y+=rows)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q,
*magick_restrict tile;
size_t
columns_remaining,
rows_remaining;
rows_remaining=image->rows-y;
if ((ssize_t) (y+rows) < (ssize_t) image->rows)
rows_remaining=rows;
tile=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,rows_remaining,
exception);
if (tile == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x+=columns)
{
size_t
column,
row;
if (TIFFReadRGBATile(tiff,(uint32) x,(uint32) y,tile_pixels) == 0)
break;
columns_remaining=image->columns-x;
if ((ssize_t) (x+columns) < (ssize_t) image->columns)
columns_remaining=columns;
p=tile_pixels+(rows-rows_remaining)*columns;
q=tile+GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns*(rows_remaining-1)+
x);
for (row=rows_remaining; row > 0; row--)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (column=columns_remaining; column > 0; column--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p+=columns-columns_remaining;
q-=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns+columns_remaining);
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
tile_pixels=(uint32 *) RelinquishMagickMemory(tile_pixels);
break;
}
case ReadGenericMethod:
default:
{
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register uint32
*p;
uint32
*pixels;
/*
Convert TIFF image to DirectClass MIFF image.
*/
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((number_pixels*sizeof(uint32)) != (MagickSizeType) ((size_t)
(number_pixels*sizeof(uint32))))
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->columns,image->rows*
sizeof(uint32));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
TIFFClose(tiff);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
pixels=(uint32 *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) TIFFReadRGBAImage(tiff,(uint32) image->columns,
(uint32) image->rows,(uint32 *) pixels,0);
/*
Convert image to DirectClass pixel packets.
*/
p=pixels+number_pixels-1;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image)*(image->columns-1);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetR(*p)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetG(*p)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetB(*p)),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
TIFFGetA(*p)),q);
p--;
q-=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
next_tiff_frame:
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
if (photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_CIELAB)
DecodeLabImage(image,exception);
if ((photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISBLACK) ||
(photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_MINISWHITE))
{
image->type=GrayscaleType;
if (bits_per_sample == 1)
image->type=BilevelType;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=TIFFReadDirectory(tiff) != 0 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,image->scene-1,
image->scene);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (status != MagickFalse);
TIFFClose(tiff);
TIFFReadPhotoshopLayers(image,image_info,exception);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (image_info->scene >= GetImageListLength(image))
{
/* Subimage was not found in the Photoshop layer */
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *)NULL);
}
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/196
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 71,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendInvalidEntry7() {
const int kSize = 0x3000; // 12 kB.
SetMaxSize(kSize * 10);
InitCache();
std::string first("some key");
std::string second("something else");
disk_cache::Entry* entry;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry(first, &entry), IsOk());
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry(second, &entry), IsOk());
disk_cache::EntryImpl* entry_impl =
static_cast<disk_cache::EntryImpl*>(entry);
entry_impl->rankings()->Data()->next = 0;
entry_impl->rankings()->Store();
entry->Close();
FlushQueueForTest();
EXPECT_EQ(2, cache_->GetEntryCount());
EXPECT_NE(net::OK, OpenEntry(second, &entry));
EXPECT_EQ(1, cache_->GetEntryCount());
std::unique_ptr<TestIterator> iter = CreateIterator();
EXPECT_NE(net::OK, iter->OpenNextEntry(&entry));
FlushQueueForTest();
EXPECT_EQ(0, cache_->GetEntryCount());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void doubleSequenceAttrAttrSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.doubleSequenceAttr._set");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
Vector<double> v = toNativeArray<double>(value);
imp->setDoubleSequenceAttr(v);
return;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MemoryPressureHandlingEnabled() {
if (base::FieldTrialList::FindFullName(kMemoryPressureExperimentName) ==
kMemoryPressureHandlingOff) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,075 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniform1iv(
GLint location, GLsizei count, const GLint *value) {
if (!CheckCurrentProgramForUniform(location, "glUniform1iv")) {
return;
}
GLenum type = 0;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(location, "glUniform1iv", &type, &count)) {
return;
}
if (type == GL_SAMPLER_2D || type == GL_SAMPLER_CUBE ||
type == GL_SAMPLER_EXTERNAL_OES) {
current_program_->SetSamplers(location, count, value);
}
glUniform1iv(location, count, value);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext2_unfreeze(struct super_block *sb)
{
/* Just write sb to clear EXT2_VALID_FS flag */
ext2_write_super(sb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 94,972 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void nohz_newidle_balance(struct rq *this_rq) { }
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sta_info_move_state(struct sta_info *sta,
enum ieee80211_sta_state new_state)
{
might_sleep();
if (sta->sta_state == new_state)
return 0;
/* check allowed transitions first */
switch (new_state) {
case IEEE80211_STA_NONE:
if (sta->sta_state != IEEE80211_STA_AUTH)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case IEEE80211_STA_AUTH:
if (sta->sta_state != IEEE80211_STA_NONE &&
sta->sta_state != IEEE80211_STA_ASSOC)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case IEEE80211_STA_ASSOC:
if (sta->sta_state != IEEE80211_STA_AUTH &&
sta->sta_state != IEEE80211_STA_AUTHORIZED)
return -EINVAL;
break;
case IEEE80211_STA_AUTHORIZED:
if (sta->sta_state != IEEE80211_STA_ASSOC)
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
WARN(1, "invalid state %d", new_state);
return -EINVAL;
}
sta_dbg(sta->sdata, "moving STA %pM to state %d\n",
sta->sta.addr, new_state);
/*
* notify the driver before the actual changes so it can
* fail the transition
*/
if (test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_INSERTED)) {
int err = drv_sta_state(sta->local, sta->sdata, sta,
sta->sta_state, new_state);
if (err)
return err;
}
/* reflect the change in all state variables */
switch (new_state) {
case IEEE80211_STA_NONE:
if (sta->sta_state == IEEE80211_STA_AUTH)
clear_bit(WLAN_STA_AUTH, &sta->_flags);
break;
case IEEE80211_STA_AUTH:
if (sta->sta_state == IEEE80211_STA_NONE)
set_bit(WLAN_STA_AUTH, &sta->_flags);
else if (sta->sta_state == IEEE80211_STA_ASSOC)
clear_bit(WLAN_STA_ASSOC, &sta->_flags);
break;
case IEEE80211_STA_ASSOC:
if (sta->sta_state == IEEE80211_STA_AUTH) {
set_bit(WLAN_STA_ASSOC, &sta->_flags);
} else if (sta->sta_state == IEEE80211_STA_AUTHORIZED) {
if (sta->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP ||
(sta->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN &&
!sta->sdata->u.vlan.sta))
atomic_dec(&sta->sdata->bss->num_mcast_sta);
clear_bit(WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED, &sta->_flags);
}
break;
case IEEE80211_STA_AUTHORIZED:
if (sta->sta_state == IEEE80211_STA_ASSOC) {
if (sta->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP ||
(sta->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN &&
!sta->sdata->u.vlan.sta))
atomic_inc(&sta->sdata->bss->num_mcast_sta);
set_bit(WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED, &sta->_flags);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
sta->sta_state = new_state;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mac80211: fix AP powersave TX vs. wakeup race
There is a race between the TX path and the STA wakeup: while
a station is sleeping, mac80211 buffers frames until it wakes
up, then the frames are transmitted. However, the RX and TX
path are concurrent, so the packet indicating wakeup can be
processed while a packet is being transmitted.
This can lead to a situation where the buffered frames list
is emptied on the one side, while a frame is being added on
the other side, as the station is still seen as sleeping in
the TX path.
As a result, the newly added frame will not be send anytime
soon. It might be sent much later (and out of order) when the
station goes to sleep and wakes up the next time.
Additionally, it can lead to the crash below.
Fix all this by synchronising both paths with a new lock.
Both path are not fastpath since they handle PS situations.
In a later patch we'll remove the extra skb queue locks to
reduce locking overhead.
BUG: unable to handle kernel
NULL pointer dereference at 000000b0
IP: [<ff6f1791>] ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
EIP: 0060:[<ff6f1791>] EFLAGS: 00210282 CPU: 1
EIP is at ieee80211_report_used_skb+0x11/0x3e0 [mac80211]
EAX: e5900da0 EBX: 00000000 ECX: 00000001 EDX: 00000000
ESI: e41d00c0 EDI: e5900da0 EBP: ebe458e4 ESP: ebe458b0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: 000000b0 CR3: 25a78000 CR4: 000407d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff0ff0 DR7: 00000400
Process iperf (pid: 3934, ti=ebe44000 task=e757c0b0 task.ti=ebe44000)
iwlwifi 0000:02:00.0: I iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd Sending command LQ_CMD (#4e), seq: 0x0903, 92 bytes at 3[3]:9
Stack:
e403b32c ebe458c4 00200002 00200286 e403b338 ebe458cc c10960bb e5900da0
ff76a6ec ebe458d8 00000000 e41d00c0 e5900da0 ebe458f0 ff6f1b75 e403b210
ebe4598c ff723dc1 00000000 ff76a6ec e597c978 e403b758 00000002 00000002
Call Trace:
[<ff6f1b75>] ieee80211_free_txskb+0x15/0x20 [mac80211]
[<ff723dc1>] invoke_tx_handlers+0x1661/0x1780 [mac80211]
[<ff7248a5>] ieee80211_tx+0x75/0x100 [mac80211]
[<ff7249bf>] ieee80211_xmit+0x8f/0xc0 [mac80211]
[<ff72550e>] ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x4fe/0xe20 [mac80211]
[<c149ef70>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x450/0x950
[<c14b9aa9>] sch_direct_xmit+0xa9/0x250
[<c14b9c9b>] __qdisc_run+0x4b/0x150
[<c149f732>] dev_queue_xmit+0x2c2/0xca0
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Yaara Rozenblum <yaara.rozenblum@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com>
[reword commit log, use a separate lock]
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 38,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gx_dc_pattern_read_raster(gx_color_tile *ptile, const gx_dc_serialized_tile_t *buf,
int64_t offset, const byte *data, uint size, gs_memory_t *mem)
{
const byte *dp = data;
int left = size;
int64_t offset1 = offset;
int size_b, size_c;
if (buf != NULL) {
size_b = buf->size_b;
size_c = buf->size_c;
ptile->tbits.data = gs_alloc_bytes(mem, size_b - sizeof(gx_strip_bitmap), "gx_dc_pattern_read_raster");
if (ptile->tbits.data == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
if (size_c) {
ptile->tmask.data = gs_alloc_bytes(mem, size_c - sizeof(gx_strip_bitmap), "gx_dc_pattern_read_raster");
if (ptile->tmask.data == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
} else
ptile->tmask.data = NULL;
ptile->cdev = NULL;
} else {
size_b = gs_object_size(mem, ptile->tbits.data) + sizeof(gx_strip_bitmap);
size_c = ptile->tmask.data != NULL ? gs_object_size(mem, ptile->tmask.data) + sizeof(gx_strip_bitmap) : 0;
}
/* Read tbits : */
if (offset1 <= sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) + sizeof(gx_strip_bitmap)) {
int l = min(sizeof(gx_strip_bitmap), left);
byte *save = ptile->tbits.data;
memcpy((byte*)&ptile->tbits + (offset1 - sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t)), dp, l);
ptile->tbits.data = save;
left -= l;
offset1 += l;
dp += l;
}
if (left == 0)
return size; /* we've consumed it all */
if (offset1 <= sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) + size_b) {
int l = min(sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) + size_b - offset1, left);
memcpy(ptile->tbits.data +
(offset1 - sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) - sizeof(gx_strip_bitmap)), dp, l);
left -= l;
offset1 += l;
dp += l;
}
if (left == 0 || size_c == 0)
return size - left;
/* Read tmask : */
if (offset1 <= sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) + size_b + sizeof(gx_strip_bitmap)) {
int l = min(sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) + size_b + sizeof(gx_strip_bitmap) - offset1, left);
byte *save = ptile->tmask.data;
memcpy((byte*)&ptile->tmask + (offset1 - sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) - size_b), dp, l);
ptile->tmask.data = save;
left -= l;
offset1 += l;
dp += l;
}
if (left == 0)
return size;
if (offset1 <= sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) + size_b + size_c) {
int l = min(sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) + size_b + size_c - offset1, left);
memcpy(ptile->tmask.data +
(offset1 - sizeof(gx_dc_serialized_tile_t) - size_b - sizeof(gx_strip_bitmap)), dp, l);
left -= l;
}
return size - left;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 1,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Fclose(pointer iop)
{
#ifdef HAS_SAVED_IDS_AND_SETEUID
return fclose(iop);
#else
return Pclose(iop);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 13,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Magick_png_read_raw_profile(png_struct *ping,Image *image,
const ImageInfo *image_info, png_textp text,int ii,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*dp;
register png_charp
sp;
png_uint_32
length,
nibbles;
StringInfo
*profile;
const unsigned char
unhex[103]={0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1, 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,10,11,12,
13,14,15};
sp=text[ii].text+1;
/* look for newline */
while (*sp != '\n')
sp++;
/* look for length */
while (*sp == '\0' || *sp == ' ' || *sp == '\n')
sp++;
length=(png_uint_32) StringToLong(sp);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" length: %lu",(unsigned long) length);
while (*sp != ' ' && *sp != '\n')
sp++;
/* allocate space */
if (length == 0)
{
png_warning(ping,"invalid profile length");
return(MagickFalse);
}
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
png_warning(ping, "unable to copy profile");
return(MagickFalse);
}
/* copy profile, skipping white space and column 1 "=" signs */
dp=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
nibbles=length*2;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) nibbles; i++)
{
while (*sp < '0' || (*sp > '9' && *sp < 'a') || *sp > 'f')
{
if (*sp == '\0')
{
png_warning(ping, "ran out of profile data");
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
return(MagickFalse);
}
sp++;
}
if (i%2 == 0)
*dp=(unsigned char) (16*unhex[(int) *sp++]);
else
(*dp++)+=unhex[(int) *sp++];
}
/*
We have already read "Raw profile type.
*/
(void) SetImageProfile(image,&text[ii].key[17],profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
if (image_info->verbose)
(void) printf(" Found a generic profile, type %s\n",&text[ii].key[17]);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/58
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 63,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::DisableAudioDebugRecordings() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
BrowserThread::PostTaskAndReply(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
base::Bind(&RenderProcessHostImpl::SendDisableAecDumpToRenderer,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
if (audio_input_renderer_host_) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&AudioInputRendererHost::DisableDebugRecording,
audio_input_renderer_host_));
}
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_dch_timing_adjustment(proto_tree *tree, packet_info *pinfo, tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset)
{
guint8 control_cfn;
gint16 toa;
proto_item *toa_ti;
/* CFN control */
control_cfn = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_cfn_control, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset++;
/* ToA */
toa = tvb_get_ntohs(tvb, offset);
toa_ti = proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_fp_toa, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_BIG_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, toa_ti, &ei_fp_timing_adjustmentment_reported, "Timing adjustmentment reported (%f ms)", (float)(toa / 8));
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO,
" CFN = %u, ToA = %d", control_cfn, toa);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: UMTS_FP: fix handling reserved C/T value
The spec puts the reserved value at 0xf but our internal table has 'unknown' at
0; since all the other values seem to be offset-by-one, just take the modulus
0xf to avoid running off the end of the table.
Bug: 12191
Change-Id: I83c8fb66797bbdee52a2246fb1eea6e37cbc7eb0
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15722
Reviewed-by: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Petri-Dish: Evan Huus <eapache@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool bd_may_claim(struct block_device *bdev, struct block_device *whole,
void *holder)
{
if (bdev->bd_holder == holder)
return true; /* already a holder */
else if (bdev->bd_holder != NULL)
return false; /* held by someone else */
else if (bdev->bd_contains == bdev)
return true; /* is a whole device which isn't held */
else if (whole->bd_holder == bd_may_claim)
return true; /* is a partition of a device that is being partitioned */
else if (whole->bd_holder != NULL)
return false; /* is a partition of a held device */
else
return true; /* is a partition of an un-held device */
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::ForceLostContext(
LostContextMode mode,
AutoRecoveryMethod auto_recovery_method) {
if (isContextLost()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "loseContext",
"context already lost");
return;
}
context_group_->LoseContextGroup(mode, auto_recovery_method);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t vfill(uint8_t *data, size_t size, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
size_t ofs;
PackValue val;
const char *p;
ofs = 0;
p = fmt;
while (*p) {
memset(&val, 0, sizeof(val));
switch (*p) {
case '*':
p++;
break;
case 'b':
case 'w':
case 'l':
val.ll = va_arg(ap, int);
break;
case 'q':
val.ll = va_arg(ap, int64_t);
break;
case 's':
val.str = va_arg(ap, void *);
break;
}
switch (*p++) {
case 'b':
if (data) {
stb_p(data + ofs, val.ll);
}
ofs++;
break;
case 'w':
if (data) {
stw_le_p(data + ofs, val.ll);
}
ofs += 2;
break;
case 'l':
if (data) {
stl_le_p(data + ofs, val.ll);
}
ofs += 4;
break;
case 'q':
if (data) {
stq_le_p(data + ofs, val.ll);
}
ofs += 8;
break;
case 's':
{
int cnt = atoi(p);
if (data) {
if (val.str) {
strncpy((void *)data + ofs, val.str, cnt);
} else {
memset((void *)data + ofs, 0, cnt);
}
}
ofs += cnt;
break;
}
}
}
return ofs;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ikev2_vid_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
const u_char *vid;
int i, len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d vid=", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
vid = (const u_char *)(ext+1);
len = ntohs(e.len) - 4;
ND_TCHECK2(*vid, len);
for(i=0; i<len; i++) {
if(ND_ISPRINT(vid[i])) ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c", vid[i]));
else ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
}
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init dev_proc_init(void)
{
return register_pernet_subsys(&dev_proc_ops);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 32,133 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool do_notify_parent(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig)
{
struct siginfo info;
unsigned long flags;
struct sighand_struct *psig;
bool autoreap = false;
cputime_t utime, stime;
BUG_ON(sig == -1);
/* do_notify_parent_cldstop should have been called instead. */
BUG_ON(task_is_stopped_or_traced(tsk));
BUG_ON(!tsk->ptrace &&
(tsk->group_leader != tsk || !thread_group_empty(tsk)));
if (sig != SIGCHLD) {
/*
* This is only possible if parent == real_parent.
* Check if it has changed security domain.
*/
if (tsk->parent_exec_id != tsk->parent->self_exec_id)
sig = SIGCHLD;
}
info.si_signo = sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
/*
* We are under tasklist_lock here so our parent is tied to
* us and cannot change.
*
* task_active_pid_ns will always return the same pid namespace
* until a task passes through release_task.
*
* write_lock() currently calls preempt_disable() which is the
* same as rcu_read_lock(), but according to Oleg, this is not
* correct to rely on this
*/
rcu_read_lock();
info.si_pid = task_pid_nr_ns(tsk, task_active_pid_ns(tsk->parent));
info.si_uid = from_kuid_munged(task_cred_xxx(tsk->parent, user_ns),
task_uid(tsk));
rcu_read_unlock();
task_cputime(tsk, &utime, &stime);
info.si_utime = cputime_to_clock_t(utime + tsk->signal->utime);
info.si_stime = cputime_to_clock_t(stime + tsk->signal->stime);
info.si_status = tsk->exit_code & 0x7f;
if (tsk->exit_code & 0x80)
info.si_code = CLD_DUMPED;
else if (tsk->exit_code & 0x7f)
info.si_code = CLD_KILLED;
else {
info.si_code = CLD_EXITED;
info.si_status = tsk->exit_code >> 8;
}
psig = tsk->parent->sighand;
spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
if (!tsk->ptrace && sig == SIGCHLD &&
(psig->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN ||
(psig->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_flags & SA_NOCLDWAIT))) {
/*
* We are exiting and our parent doesn't care. POSIX.1
* defines special semantics for setting SIGCHLD to SIG_IGN
* or setting the SA_NOCLDWAIT flag: we should be reaped
* automatically and not left for our parent's wait4 call.
* Rather than having the parent do it as a magic kind of
* signal handler, we just set this to tell do_exit that we
* can be cleaned up without becoming a zombie. Note that
* we still call __wake_up_parent in this case, because a
* blocked sys_wait4 might now return -ECHILD.
*
* Whether we send SIGCHLD or not for SA_NOCLDWAIT
* is implementation-defined: we do (if you don't want
* it, just use SIG_IGN instead).
*/
autoreap = true;
if (psig->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN)
sig = 0;
}
if (valid_signal(sig) && sig)
__group_send_sig_info(sig, &info, tsk->parent);
__wake_up_parent(tsk, tsk->parent);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
return autoreap;
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: stop info leak via the tkill and the tgkill syscalls
This fixes a kernel memory contents leak via the tkill and tgkill syscalls
for compat processes.
This is visible in the siginfo_t->_sifields._rt.si_sigval.sival_ptr field
when handling signals delivered from tkill.
The place of the infoleak:
int copy_siginfo_to_user32(compat_siginfo_t __user *to, siginfo_t *from)
{
...
put_user_ex(ptr_to_compat(from->si_ptr), &to->si_ptr);
...
}
Signed-off-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 31,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rfc4106_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct cryptd_aead *cryptd_tfm;
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = (struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *)
PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), AESNI_ALIGN);
struct crypto_aead *cryptd_child;
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *child_ctx;
cryptd_tfm = cryptd_alloc_aead("__driver-gcm-aes-aesni", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(cryptd_tfm))
return PTR_ERR(cryptd_tfm);
cryptd_child = cryptd_aead_child(cryptd_tfm);
child_ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(cryptd_child);
memcpy(child_ctx, ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->cryptd_tfm = cryptd_tfm;
tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct aead_request)
+ crypto_aead_reqsize(&cryptd_tfm->base);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 43,490 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit megasas_exit(void)
{
driver_remove_file(&megasas_pci_driver.driver,
&driver_attr_dbg_lvl);
driver_remove_file(&megasas_pci_driver.driver,
&driver_attr_support_poll_for_event);
driver_remove_file(&megasas_pci_driver.driver,
&driver_attr_support_device_change);
driver_remove_file(&megasas_pci_driver.driver,
&driver_attr_release_date);
driver_remove_file(&megasas_pci_driver.driver, &driver_attr_version);
driver_remove_file(&megasas_pci_driver.driver,
&driver_attr_support_nvme_encapsulation);
pci_unregister_driver(&megasas_pci_driver);
unregister_chrdev(megasas_mgmt_majorno, "megaraid_sas_ioctl");
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FrameBuffer::Clear(GLbitfield buffers) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
ScopedFrameBufferBinder binder(decoder_, id_);
glClear(buffers);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> addEventListenerCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.addEventListener()");
RefPtr<EventListener> listener = V8DOMWrapper::getEventListener(args[1], false, ListenerFindOrCreate);
if (listener) {
V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder())->addEventListener(v8ValueToAtomicWebCoreString(args[0]), listener, args[2]->BooleanValue());
createHiddenDependency(args.Holder(), args[1], V8TestObj::eventListenerCacheIndex);
}
return v8::Undefined();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool MessageLoopForIO::WatchFileDescriptor(int fd,
bool persistent,
Mode mode,
FileDescriptorWatcher* controller,
Watcher* delegate) {
return ToPumpIO(pump_.get())->WatchFileDescriptor(
fd,
persistent,
mode,
controller,
delegate);
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lodepng_color_mode_equal(const LodePNGColorMode* a, const LodePNGColorMode* b)
{
size_t i;
if(a->colortype != b->colortype) return 0;
if(a->bitdepth != b->bitdepth) return 0;
if(a->key_defined != b->key_defined) return 0;
if(a->key_defined)
{
if(a->key_r != b->key_r) return 0;
if(a->key_g != b->key_g) return 0;
if(a->key_b != b->key_b) return 0;
}
if(a->palettesize != b->palettesize) return 0;
for(i = 0; i < a->palettesize * 4; i++)
{
if(a->palette[i] != b->palette[i]) return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,522 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t eager_reader_read(eager_reader_t *reader, uint8_t *buffer, size_t max_size, bool block) {
assert(reader != NULL);
assert(buffer != NULL);
if (!block && !has_byte(reader))
return 0;
eventfd_t bytes_available;
if (eventfd_read(reader->bytes_available_fd, &bytes_available) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to read semaphore for output data.", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (max_size > bytes_available)
max_size = bytes_available;
size_t bytes_consumed = 0;
while (bytes_consumed < max_size) {
if (!reader->current_buffer)
reader->current_buffer = fixed_queue_dequeue(reader->buffers);
size_t bytes_to_copy = reader->current_buffer->length - reader->current_buffer->offset;
if (bytes_to_copy > (max_size - bytes_consumed))
bytes_to_copy = max_size - bytes_consumed;
memcpy(&buffer[bytes_consumed], &reader->current_buffer->data[reader->current_buffer->offset], bytes_to_copy);
bytes_consumed += bytes_to_copy;
reader->current_buffer->offset += bytes_to_copy;
if (reader->current_buffer->offset >= reader->current_buffer->length) {
reader->allocator->free(reader->current_buffer);
reader->current_buffer = NULL;
}
}
bytes_available -= bytes_consumed;
if (eventfd_write(reader->bytes_available_fd, bytes_available) == -1) {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to write back bytes available for output data.", __func__);
}
return bytes_consumed;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 159,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltElementComp(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemElementPtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
/*
* <xsl:element
* name = { qname }
* namespace = { uri-reference }
* use-attribute-sets = qnames>
* <!-- Content: template -->
* </xsl:element>
*/
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp = (xsltStyleItemElementPtr) xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ELEMENT);
#else
comp = xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_ELEMENT);
#endif
if (comp == NULL)
return;
inst->psvi = comp;
comp->inst = inst;
/*
* Attribute "name".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->name = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"name", NULL, &comp->has_name);
if (! comp->has_name) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The attribute 'name' is missing.\n");
style->errors++;
goto error;
}
/*
* Attribute "namespace".
*/
/*
* TODO: Precompile the AVT. See bug #344894.
*/
comp->ns = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"namespace", NULL, &comp->has_ns);
if (comp->name != NULL) {
if (xmlValidateQName(comp->name, 0)) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The value '%s' of the attribute 'name' is "
"not a valid QName.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
} else {
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL, *name;
name = xsltSplitQName(style->dict, comp->name, &prefix);
if (comp->has_ns == 0) {
xmlNsPtr ns;
/*
* SPEC XSLT 1.0:
* "If the namespace attribute is not present, then the QName is
* expanded into an expanded-name using the namespace declarations
* in effect for the xsl:element element, including any default
* namespace declaration.
*/
ns = xmlSearchNs(inst->doc, inst, prefix);
if (ns != NULL) {
comp->ns = xmlDictLookup(style->dict, ns->href, -1);
comp->has_ns = 1;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp->nsPrefix = prefix;
comp->name = name;
#endif
} else if (prefix != NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:element: The prefixed QName '%s' "
"has no namespace binding in scope in the "
"stylesheet; this is an error, since the namespace was "
"not specified by the instruction itself.\n", comp->name);
style->errors++;
}
}
if ((prefix != NULL) &&
(!xmlStrncasecmp(prefix, (xmlChar *)"xml", 3)))
{
/*
* Mark is to be skipped.
*/
comp->has_name = 0;
}
}
}
/*
* Attribute "use-attribute-sets",
*/
comp->use = xsltEvalStaticAttrValueTemplate(style, inst,
(const xmlChar *)"use-attribute-sets",
NULL, &comp->has_use);
error:
return;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ldp_pdu_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *pptr)
{
const struct ldp_common_header *ldp_com_header;
const struct ldp_msg_header *ldp_msg_header;
const u_char *tptr,*msg_tptr;
u_short tlen;
u_short pdu_len,msg_len,msg_type,msg_tlen;
int hexdump,processed;
ldp_com_header = (const struct ldp_common_header *)pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*ldp_com_header);
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->version) != LDP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sLDP version %u packet not supported",
(ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) ? "" : "\n\t",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->version)));
return 0;
}
pdu_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->pdu_length);
if (pdu_len < sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header)-4) {
/* length too short */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sLDP, pdu-length: %u (too short, < %u)",
(ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) ? "" : "\n\t",
pdu_len,
(u_int)(sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header)-4)));
return 0;
}
/* print the LSR-ID, label-space & length */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sLDP, Label-Space-ID: %s:%u, pdu-length: %u",
(ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) ? "" : "\n\t",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ldp_com_header->lsr_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_com_header->label_space),
pdu_len));
/* bail out if non-verbose */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1)
return 0;
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
tptr = pptr + sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header);
tlen = pdu_len - (sizeof(const struct ldp_common_header)-4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
while(tlen>0) {
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the msg header ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header));
ldp_msg_header = (const struct ldp_msg_header *)tptr;
msg_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_msg_header->length);
msg_type=LDP_MASK_MSG_TYPE(EXTRACT_16BITS(ldp_msg_header->type));
if (msg_len < sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header)-4) {
/* length too short */
/* FIXME vendor private / experimental check */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Message (0x%04x), length: %u (too short, < %u)",
tok2str(ldp_msg_values,
"Unknown",
msg_type),
msg_type,
msg_len,
(u_int)(sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header)-4)));
return 0;
}
/* FIXME vendor private / experimental check */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Message (0x%04x), length: %u, Message ID: 0x%08x, Flags: [%s if unknown]",
tok2str(ldp_msg_values,
"Unknown",
msg_type),
msg_type,
msg_len,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ldp_msg_header->id),
LDP_MASK_U_BIT(EXTRACT_16BITS(&ldp_msg_header->type)) ? "continue processing" : "ignore"));
msg_tptr=tptr+sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header);
msg_tlen=msg_len-(sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header)-4); /* Type & Length fields not included */
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the message ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, msg_len);
hexdump=FALSE;
switch(msg_type) {
case LDP_MSG_NOTIF:
case LDP_MSG_HELLO:
case LDP_MSG_INIT:
case LDP_MSG_KEEPALIVE:
case LDP_MSG_ADDRESS:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_MAPPING:
case LDP_MSG_ADDRESS_WITHDRAW:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_WITHDRAW:
while(msg_tlen >= 4) {
processed = ldp_tlv_print(ndo, msg_tptr, msg_tlen);
if (processed == 0)
break;
msg_tlen-=processed;
msg_tptr+=processed;
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined messages that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_REQUEST:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_RELEASE:
case LDP_MSG_LABEL_ABORT_REQUEST:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, msg_tptr, "\n\t ", msg_tlen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 || hexdump==TRUE)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr+sizeof(struct ldp_msg_header), "\n\t ",
msg_len);
tptr += msg_len+4;
tlen -= msg_len+4;
}
return pdu_len+4;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14461/LDP: Fix a bounds check
In ldp_tlv_print(), the FT Session TLV length must be 12, not 8 (RFC3479)
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Konrad Rieck and
Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
Moreover:
Add and use tstr[].
Add a comment.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,852 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fixed_power_int(unsigned long x, unsigned int frac_bits, unsigned int n)
{
unsigned long result = 1UL << frac_bits;
if (n) for (;;) {
if (n & 1) {
result *= x;
result += 1UL << (frac_bits - 1);
result >>= frac_bits;
}
n >>= 1;
if (!n)
break;
x *= x;
x += 1UL << (frac_bits - 1);
x >>= frac_bits;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void blk_queue_bypass_start(struct request_queue *q)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(q->mq_ops);
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
q->bypass_depth++;
queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_BYPASS, q);
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
/*
* Queues start drained. Skip actual draining till init is
* complete. This avoids lenghty delays during queue init which
* can happen many times during boot.
*/
if (blk_queue_init_done(q)) {
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
__blk_drain_queue(q, false);
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
/* ensure blk_queue_bypass() is %true inside RCU read lock */
synchronize_rcu();
}
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 92,010 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct task_struct *first_tid(struct pid *pid, int tid, loff_t f_pos,
struct pid_namespace *ns)
{
struct task_struct *pos, *task;
unsigned long nr = f_pos;
if (nr != f_pos) /* 32bit overflow? */
return NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
task = pid_task(pid, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (!task)
goto fail;
/* Attempt to start with the tid of a thread */
if (tid && nr) {
pos = find_task_by_pid_ns(tid, ns);
if (pos && same_thread_group(pos, task))
goto found;
}
/* If nr exceeds the number of threads there is nothing todo */
if (nr >= get_nr_threads(task))
goto fail;
/* If we haven't found our starting place yet start
* with the leader and walk nr threads forward.
*/
pos = task = task->group_leader;
do {
if (!nr--)
goto found;
} while_each_thread(task, pos);
fail:
pos = NULL;
goto out;
found:
get_task_struct(pos);
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return pos;
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 49,390 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationRequest::OnRequestRedirected(
const net::RedirectInfo& redirect_info,
const scoped_refptr<network::ResourceResponse>& response) {
response_ = response;
ssl_info_ = response->head.ssl_info;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
base::WeakPtr<NavigationRequest> this_ptr(weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
bool should_override_url_loading = false;
if (!GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldOverrideUrlLoading(
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(), browser_initiated_,
redirect_info.new_url, redirect_info.new_method,
false, true, frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame(),
common_params_.transition, &should_override_url_loading)) {
return;
}
if (!this_ptr)
return;
if (should_override_url_loading) {
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_ABORTED);
common_params_.url = redirect_info.new_url;
common_params_.method = redirect_info.new_method;
navigation_handle_->UpdateStateFollowingRedirect(
GURL(redirect_info.new_referrer),
base::Bind(&NavigationRequest::OnRedirectChecksComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
#endif
if (!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->CanRedirectToURL(
redirect_info.new_url)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Denied redirect for "
<< redirect_info.new_url.possibly_invalid_spec();
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_UNSAFE_REDIRECT);
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
if (!browser_initiated_ && source_site_instance() &&
!ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->CanRequestURL(
source_site_instance()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
redirect_info.new_url)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Denied unauthorized redirect for "
<< redirect_info.new_url.possibly_invalid_spec();
navigation_handle_->set_net_error_code(net::ERR_UNSAFE_REDIRECT);
frame_tree_node_->ResetNavigationRequest(false, true);
return;
}
if (redirect_info.new_method != "POST")
common_params_.post_data = nullptr;
if (commit_params_.navigation_timing.redirect_start.is_null()) {
commit_params_.navigation_timing.redirect_start =
commit_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start;
}
commit_params_.navigation_timing.redirect_end = base::TimeTicks::Now();
commit_params_.navigation_timing.fetch_start = base::TimeTicks::Now();
commit_params_.redirect_response.push_back(response->head);
commit_params_.redirect_infos.push_back(redirect_info);
if (commit_params_.origin_to_commit)
commit_params_.origin_to_commit.reset();
commit_params_.redirects.push_back(common_params_.url);
common_params_.url = redirect_info.new_url;
common_params_.method = redirect_info.new_method;
common_params_.referrer.url = GURL(redirect_info.new_referrer);
common_params_.referrer =
Referrer::SanitizeForRequest(common_params_.url, common_params_.referrer);
net::Error net_error =
CheckContentSecurityPolicy(true /* has_followed_redirect */,
redirect_info.insecure_scheme_was_upgraded,
false /* is_response_check */);
if (net_error != net::OK) {
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(net_error), false /*skip_throttles*/,
base::nullopt /*error_page_content*/, false /*collapse_frame*/);
return;
}
if (CheckCredentialedSubresource() ==
CredentialedSubresourceCheckResult::BLOCK_REQUEST ||
CheckLegacyProtocolInSubresource() ==
LegacyProtocolInSubresourceCheckResult::BLOCK_REQUEST) {
OnRequestFailedInternal(
network::URLLoaderCompletionStatus(net::ERR_ABORTED),
false /*skip_throttles*/, base::nullopt /*error_page_content*/,
false /*collapse_frame*/);
return;
}
scoped_refptr<SiteInstance> site_instance =
frame_tree_node_->render_manager()->GetSiteInstanceForNavigationRequest(
*this);
speculative_site_instance_ =
site_instance->HasProcess() ? site_instance : nullptr;
if (!site_instance->HasProcess()) {
RenderProcessHostImpl::NotifySpareManagerAboutRecentlyUsedBrowserContext(
site_instance->GetBrowserContext());
}
common_params_.previews_state =
GetContentClient()->browser()->DetermineAllowedPreviews(
common_params_.previews_state, navigation_handle_.get(),
common_params_.url);
RenderProcessHost* expected_process =
site_instance->HasProcess() ? site_instance->GetProcess() : nullptr;
navigation_handle_->WillRedirectRequest(
common_params_.referrer.url, expected_process,
base::Bind(&NavigationRequest::OnRedirectChecksComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::Init() {
set_controller(this);
SetTextInputType(ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_URL);
GetRenderText()->SetElideBehavior(gfx::ELIDE_TAIL);
GetRenderText()->set_symmetric_selection_visual_bounds(true);
if (popup_window_mode_)
SetReadOnly(true);
if (location_bar_view_) {
InstallPlaceholderText();
scoped_template_url_service_observer_.Add(
model()->client()->GetTemplateURLService());
popup_view_.reset(
new OmniboxPopupContentsView(this, model(), location_bar_view_));
}
constexpr gfx::Insets kTextfieldInsets(3);
SetBorder(views::CreateEmptyBorder(kTextfieldInsets));
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
chromeos::input_method::InputMethodManager::Get()->
AddCandidateWindowObserver(this);
#endif
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 142,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Compositor::SetDisplayColorSpace(const gfx::ColorSpace& color_space,
float sdr_white_level) {
gfx::ColorSpace output_color_space = color_space;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (color_space.IsHDR()) {
bool transparent = SkColorGetA(host_->background_color()) != SK_AlphaOPAQUE;
output_color_space = transparent ? gfx::ColorSpace::CreateSCRGBLinear()
: gfx::ColorSpace::CreateHDR10();
output_color_space = output_color_space.GetScaledColorSpace(
gfx::ColorSpace::kDefaultSDRWhiteLevel / sdr_white_level);
}
#endif // OS_WIN
if (output_color_space_ == output_color_space &&
sdr_white_level_ == sdr_white_level) {
return;
}
output_color_space_ = output_color_space;
blending_color_space_ = output_color_space_.GetBlendingColorSpace();
sdr_white_level_ = sdr_white_level;
host_->SetRasterColorSpace(gfx::ColorSpace::CreateSRGB());
host_->SetNeedsDisplayOnAllLayers();
if (context_factory_private_) {
context_factory_private_->SetDisplayColorSpace(this, blending_color_space_,
output_color_space_);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool try_fill_recv(struct virtnet_info *vi, struct receive_queue *rq,
gfp_t gfp)
{
int err;
bool oom;
gfp |= __GFP_COLD;
do {
if (vi->mergeable_rx_bufs)
err = add_recvbuf_mergeable(rq, gfp);
else if (vi->big_packets)
err = add_recvbuf_big(vi, rq, gfp);
else
err = add_recvbuf_small(vi, rq, gfp);
oom = err == -ENOMEM;
if (err)
break;
} while (rq->vq->num_free);
virtqueue_kick(rq->vq);
return !oom;
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WaitForAcceptedConnections(size_t num_connections) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
DCHECK(!num_accepted_connections_loop_);
DCHECK_GT(num_connections, 0u);
base::RunLoop run_loop;
EXPECT_GE(num_connections, sockets_.size());
num_accepted_connections_loop_ = &run_loop;
num_accepted_connections_needed_ = num_connections;
CheckAccepted();
run_loop.Run();
EXPECT_EQ(num_connections, sockets_.size());
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 136,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int qemu_fdt_setprop(void *fdt, const char *node_path,
const char *property, const void *val, int size)
{
int r;
r = fdt_setprop(fdt, findnode_nofail(fdt, node_path), property, val, size);
if (r < 0) {
error_report("%s: Couldn't set %s/%s: %s", __func__, node_path,
property, fdt_strerror(r));
exit(1);
}
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *frag;
if (!skb->data_len)
goto done;
/* Don't forget the fragments. */
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag)
sctp_skb_set_owner_r_frag(frag, sk);
done:
sctp_skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 33,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HasPendingUncleanExit(Profile* profile) {
return profile->GetLastSessionExitType() == Profile::EXIT_CRASHED &&
!profile_launch_observer.Get().HasBeenLaunched(profile);
}
Commit Message: Prevent regular mode session startup pref type turning to default.
When user loses past session tabs of regular mode after
invoking a new window from the incognito mode.
This was happening because the SessionStartUpPref type was being set
to default, from last, for regular user mode. This was happening in
the RestoreIfNecessary method where the restoration was taking place
for users whose SessionStartUpPref type was set to last.
The fix was to make the protocol of changing the pref type to
default more explicit to incognito users and not regular users
of pref type last.
Bug: 481373
Change-Id: I96efb4cf196949312181c83c6dcd45986ddded13
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1774441
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Rohit Agarwal <roagarwal@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#691726}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 137,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btreeRead(struct READER *reader, struct BTREE *btree) {
char buf[4];
/* read signature */
if (fread(buf, 1, 4, reader->fhd) != 4 || strncmp(buf, "BTHD", 4)) {
log("cannot read signature of BTHD\n");
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
} log("%08lX %.4s\n", (uint64_t )ftell(reader->fhd) - 4, buf);
if (fgetc(reader->fhd) != 0) {
log("object BTHD must have version 0\n");
return MYSOFA_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
btree->type = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
btree->node_size = (uint32_t)readValue(reader, 4);
btree->record_size = (uint16_t)readValue(reader, 2);
btree->depth = (uint16_t)readValue(reader, 2);
btree->split_percent = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
btree->merge_percent = (uint8_t)fgetc(reader->fhd);
btree->root_node_address = (uint64_t)readValue(reader,
reader->superblock.size_of_offsets);
btree->number_of_records = (uint16_t)readValue(reader, 2);
if(btree->number_of_records>0x1000)
return MYSOFA_UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT;
btree->total_number = (uint64_t)readValue(reader, reader->superblock.size_of_lengths);
/* fseek(reader->fhd, 4, SEEK_CUR); skip checksum */
if(btree->total_number > 0x10000000)
return MYSOFA_NO_MEMORY;
btree->records = malloc(sizeof(btree->records[0]) * btree->total_number);
if (!btree->records)
return MYSOFA_NO_MEMORY;
memset(btree->records, 0, sizeof(btree->records[0]) * btree->total_number);
/* read records */
if(fseek(reader->fhd, btree->root_node_address, SEEK_SET)<0)
return errno;
return readBTLF(reader, btree, btree->number_of_records, btree->records);
}
Commit Message: Fixed security issue 1
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 90,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SocketStream::DidEstablishConnection() {
if (!socket_.get() || !socket_->IsConnected()) {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return ERR_CONNECTION_FAILED;
}
next_state_ = STATE_READ_WRITE;
metrics_->OnConnected();
net_log_.EndEvent(NetLog::TYPE_SOCKET_STREAM_CONNECT);
if (delegate_)
delegate_->OnConnected(this, max_pending_send_allowed_);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ssl_transform_free( ssl_transform *transform )
{
#if defined(POLARSSL_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
deflateEnd( &transform->ctx_deflate );
inflateEnd( &transform->ctx_inflate );
#endif
memset( transform, 0, sizeof( ssl_transform ) );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::CancelLoadAfterCSPDenied(
const ResourceResponse& response) {
probe::CanceledAfterReceivedResourceResponse(
frame_, this, MainResourceIdentifier(), response, GetResource());
SetWasBlockedAfterCSP();
ClearResource();
content_security_policy_.Clear();
KURL blocked_url = SecurityOrigin::UrlWithUniqueSecurityOrigin();
original_request_.SetURL(blocked_url);
request_.SetURL(blocked_url);
redirect_chain_.pop_back();
AppendRedirect(blocked_url);
response_ = ResourceResponse(blocked_url, "text/html");
FinishedLoading(CurrentTimeTicks());
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 125,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedRGBEmulationForBlitFramebuffer(DrawingBuffer* drawing_buffer)
: drawing_buffer_(drawing_buffer) {
doing_work_ = drawing_buffer->SetupRGBEmulationForBlitFramebuffer();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __setscheduler_params(struct task_struct *p,
const struct sched_attr *attr)
{
int policy = attr->sched_policy;
if (policy == SETPARAM_POLICY)
policy = p->policy;
p->policy = policy;
if (dl_policy(policy))
__setparam_dl(p, attr);
else if (fair_policy(policy))
p->static_prio = NICE_TO_PRIO(attr->sched_nice);
/*
* __sched_setscheduler() ensures attr->sched_priority == 0 when
* !rt_policy. Always setting this ensures that things like
* getparam()/getattr() don't report silly values for !rt tasks.
*/
p->rt_priority = attr->sched_priority;
p->normal_prio = normal_prio(p);
set_load_weight(p);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,480 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ocfs2_iop_set_acl(struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *acl, int type)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
int status = 0;
status = ocfs2_inode_lock(inode, &bh, 1);
if (status < 0) {
if (status != -ENOENT)
mlog_errno(status);
return status;
}
status = ocfs2_set_acl(NULL, inode, bh, type, acl, NULL, NULL);
ocfs2_inode_unlock(inode, 1);
brelse(bh);
return status;
}
Commit Message: posix_acl: Clear SGID bit when setting file permissions
When file permissions are modified via chmod(2) and the user is not in
the owning group or capable of CAP_FSETID, the setgid bit is cleared in
inode_change_ok(). Setting a POSIX ACL via setxattr(2) sets the file
permissions as well as the new ACL, but doesn't clear the setgid bit in
a similar way; this allows to bypass the check in chmod(2). Fix that.
References: CVE-2016-7097
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 50,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void megasas_slave_destroy(struct scsi_device *sdev)
{
kfree(sdev->hostdata);
sdev->hostdata = NULL;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ecryptfs_add_new_key_tfm(struct ecryptfs_key_tfm **key_tfm, char *cipher_name,
size_t key_size)
{
struct ecryptfs_key_tfm *tmp_tfm;
int rc = 0;
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&key_tfm_list_mutex));
tmp_tfm = kmem_cache_alloc(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (key_tfm != NULL)
(*key_tfm) = tmp_tfm;
if (!tmp_tfm) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to allocate from "
"ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache\n");
goto out;
}
mutex_init(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm_mutex);
strncpy(tmp_tfm->cipher_name, cipher_name,
ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE);
tmp_tfm->cipher_name[ECRYPTFS_MAX_CIPHER_NAME_SIZE] = '\0';
tmp_tfm->key_size = key_size;
rc = ecryptfs_process_key_cipher(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm,
tmp_tfm->cipher_name,
&tmp_tfm->key_size);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to initialize key TFM "
"cipher with name = [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
tmp_tfm->cipher_name, rc);
kmem_cache_free(ecryptfs_key_tfm_cache, tmp_tfm);
if (key_tfm != NULL)
(*key_tfm) = NULL;
goto out;
}
list_add(&tmp_tfm->key_tfm_list, &key_tfm_list);
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: eCryptfs: Remove buggy and unnecessary write in file name decode routine
Dmitry Chernenkov used KASAN to discover that eCryptfs writes past the
end of the allocated buffer during encrypted filename decoding. This
fix corrects the issue by getting rid of the unnecessary 0 write when
the current bit offset is 2.
Signed-off-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Chernenkov <dmitryc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.29+: 51ca58d eCryptfs: Filename Encryption: Encoding and encryption functions
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 45,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void usage()
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNM2PNG\n");
fprintf (stderr, " by Willem van Schaik, 1999\n");
#ifdef __TURBOC__
fprintf (stderr, " for Turbo-C and Borland-C compilers\n");
#else
fprintf (stderr, " for Linux (and Unix) compilers\n");
#endif
fprintf (stderr, "Usage: pnm2png [options] <file>.<pnm> [<file>.png]\n");
fprintf (stderr, " or: ... | pnm2png [options]\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Options:\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -i[nterlace] write png-file with interlacing on\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -a[lpha] <file>.pgm read PNG alpha channel as pgm-file\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -h | -? print this help-information\n");
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcp_time_to_recover(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
__u32 packets_out;
/* Do not perform any recovery during F-RTO algorithm */
if (tp->frto_counter)
return 0;
/* Trick#1: The loss is proven. */
if (tp->lost_out)
return 1;
/* Not-A-Trick#2 : Classic rule... */
if (tcp_dupack_heuristics(tp) > tp->reordering)
return 1;
/* Trick#3 : when we use RFC2988 timer restart, fast
* retransmit can be triggered by timeout of queue head.
*/
if (tcp_is_fack(tp) && tcp_head_timedout(sk))
return 1;
/* Trick#4: It is still not OK... But will it be useful to delay
* recovery more?
*/
packets_out = tp->packets_out;
if (packets_out <= tp->reordering &&
tp->sacked_out >= max_t(__u32, packets_out/2, sysctl_tcp_reordering) &&
!tcp_may_send_now(sk)) {
/* We have nothing to send. This connection is limited
* either by receiver window or by application.
*/
return 1;
}
/* If a thin stream is detected, retransmit after first
* received dupack. Employ only if SACK is supported in order
* to avoid possible corner-case series of spurious retransmissions
* Use only if there are no unsent data.
*/
if ((tp->thin_dupack || sysctl_tcp_thin_dupack) &&
tcp_stream_is_thin(tp) && tcp_dupack_heuristics(tp) > 1 &&
tcp_is_sack(tp) && !tcp_send_head(sk))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: drop SYN+FIN messages
Denys Fedoryshchenko reported that SYN+FIN attacks were bringing his
linux machines to their limits.
Dont call conn_request() if the TCP flags includes SYN flag
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 41,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int semctl_setval(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid, int semnum,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct sem_undo *un;
struct sem_array *sma;
struct sem* curr;
int err;
int nsems;
struct list_head tasks;
int val;
#if defined(CONFIG_64BIT) && defined(__BIG_ENDIAN)
/* big-endian 64bit */
val = arg >> 32;
#else
/* 32bit or little-endian 64bit */
val = arg;
#endif
sma = sem_lock_check(ns, semid);
if (IS_ERR(sma))
return PTR_ERR(sma);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tasks);
nsems = sma->sem_nsems;
err = -EACCES;
if (ipcperms(ns, &sma->sem_perm, S_IWUGO))
goto out_unlock;
err = security_sem_semctl(sma, SETVAL);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
err = -EINVAL;
if(semnum < 0 || semnum >= nsems)
goto out_unlock;
curr = &sma->sem_base[semnum];
err = -ERANGE;
if (val > SEMVMX || val < 0)
goto out_unlock;
assert_spin_locked(&sma->sem_perm.lock);
list_for_each_entry(un, &sma->list_id, list_id)
un->semadj[semnum] = 0;
curr->semval = val;
curr->sempid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
sma->sem_ctime = get_seconds();
/* maybe some queued-up processes were waiting for this */
do_smart_update(sma, NULL, 0, 0, &tasks);
err = 0;
out_unlock:
sem_unlock(sma);
wake_up_sem_queue_do(&tasks);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 165,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IOHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_host_ = process_host;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SyncTest::IsEncrypted(int index, syncable::ModelType type) {
return GetClient(index)->IsTypeEncrypted(type);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs4_xdr_enc_getacl(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p,
struct nfs_getaclargs *args)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct rpc_auth *auth = req->rq_task->tk_msg.rpc_cred->cr_auth;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 2,
};
int replen, status;
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
status = encode_putfh(&xdr, args->fh);
if (status)
goto out;
status = encode_getattr_two(&xdr, FATTR4_WORD0_ACL, 0);
/* set up reply buffer: */
replen = (RPC_REPHDRSIZE + auth->au_rslack + NFS4_dec_getacl_sz) << 2;
xdr_inline_pages(&req->rq_rcv_buf, replen,
args->acl_pages, args->acl_pgbase, args->acl_len);
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int btrfs_write_and_wait_transaction(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_root *root)
{
if (!trans || !trans->transaction) {
struct inode *btree_inode;
btree_inode = root->fs_info->btree_inode;
return filemap_write_and_wait(btree_inode->i_mapping);
}
return btrfs_write_and_wait_marked_extents(root,
&trans->transaction->dirty_pages,
EXTENT_DIRTY);
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,483 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 tg3_nvram_phys_addr(struct tg3 *tp, u32 addr)
{
if (tg3_flag(tp, NVRAM) &&
tg3_flag(tp, NVRAM_BUFFERED) &&
tg3_flag(tp, FLASH) &&
!tg3_flag(tp, NO_NVRAM_ADDR_TRANS) &&
(tp->nvram_jedecnum == JEDEC_ATMEL))
addr = ((addr / tp->nvram_pagesize) <<
ATMEL_AT45DB0X1B_PAGE_POS) +
(addr % tp->nvram_pagesize);
return addr;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_keylockstates()
{
return btif_hh_keylockstates;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage::Create(PaintImage image) {
return base::AdoptRef(new UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage(std::move(image)));
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int regulator_is_supported_voltage(struct regulator *regulator,
int min_uV, int max_uV)
{
struct regulator_dev *rdev = regulator->rdev;
int i, voltages, ret;
/* If we can't change voltage check the current voltage */
if (!(rdev->constraints->valid_ops_mask & REGULATOR_CHANGE_VOLTAGE)) {
ret = regulator_get_voltage(regulator);
if (ret >= 0)
return min_uV <= ret && ret <= max_uV;
else
return ret;
}
/* Any voltage within constrains range is fine? */
if (rdev->desc->continuous_voltage_range)
return min_uV >= rdev->constraints->min_uV &&
max_uV <= rdev->constraints->max_uV;
ret = regulator_count_voltages(regulator);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
voltages = ret;
for (i = 0; i < voltages; i++) {
ret = regulator_list_voltage(regulator, i);
if (ret >= min_uV && ret <= max_uV)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::Optional<base::TimeDelta> DataReductionProxyConfig::GetHttpRttEstimate()
const {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
return http_rtt_;
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 137,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjReflectedStringAttr(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(slotBase));
UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
JSValue result = jsString(exec, impl->getAttribute(WebCore::HTMLNames::reflectedstringattrAttr));
return result;
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long sys_rt_sigreturn(int r3, int r4, int r5, int r6, int r7, int r8,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct rt_sigframe __user *rt_sf;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
struct ucontext __user *uc_transact;
unsigned long msr_hi;
unsigned long tmp;
int tm_restore = 0;
#endif
/* Always make any pending restarted system calls return -EINTR */
current->restart_block.fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
rt_sf = (struct rt_sigframe __user *)
(regs->gpr[1] + __SIGNAL_FRAMESIZE + 16);
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, rt_sf, sizeof(*rt_sf)))
goto bad;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM
if (__get_user(tmp, &rt_sf->uc.uc_link))
goto bad;
uc_transact = (struct ucontext __user *)(uintptr_t)tmp;
if (uc_transact) {
u32 cmcp;
struct mcontext __user *mcp;
if (__get_user(cmcp, &uc_transact->uc_regs))
return -EFAULT;
mcp = (struct mcontext __user *)(u64)cmcp;
/* The top 32 bits of the MSR are stashed in the transactional
* ucontext. */
if (__get_user(msr_hi, &mcp->mc_gregs[PT_MSR]))
goto bad;
if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(msr_hi<<32)) {
/* We only recheckpoint on return if we're
* transaction.
*/
tm_restore = 1;
if (do_setcontext_tm(&rt_sf->uc, uc_transact, regs))
goto bad;
}
}
if (!tm_restore)
/* Fall through, for non-TM restore */
#endif
if (do_setcontext(&rt_sf->uc, regs, 1))
goto bad;
/*
* It's not clear whether or why it is desirable to save the
* sigaltstack setting on signal delivery and restore it on
* signal return. But other architectures do this and we have
* always done it up until now so it is probably better not to
* change it. -- paulus
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
if (compat_restore_altstack(&rt_sf->uc.uc_stack))
goto bad;
#else
if (restore_altstack(&rt_sf->uc.uc_stack))
goto bad;
#endif
set_thread_flag(TIF_RESTOREALL);
return 0;
bad:
if (show_unhandled_signals)
printk_ratelimited(KERN_INFO
"%s[%d]: bad frame in sys_rt_sigreturn: "
"%p nip %08lx lr %08lx\n",
current->comm, current->pid,
rt_sf, regs->nip, regs->link);
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Block signal return setting invalid MSR state
Currently we allow both the MSR T and S bits to be set by userspace on
a signal return. Unfortunately this is a reserved configuration and
will cause a TM Bad Thing exception if attempted (via rfid).
This patch checks for this case in both the 32 and 64 bit signals
code. If both T and S are set, we mark the context as invalid.
Found using a syscall fuzzer.
Fixes: 2b0a576d15e0 ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 56,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int analyze_baud_rate(struct usb_serial_port *port, speed_t new_rate)
{
struct cypress_private *priv;
priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
if (unstable_bauds)
return new_rate;
/* FRWD Dongle uses 115200 bps */
if (is_frwd(port->serial->dev))
return new_rate;
/*
* The general purpose firmware for the Cypress M8 allows for
* a maximum speed of 57600bps (I have no idea whether DeLorme
* chose to use the general purpose firmware or not), if you
* need to modify this speed setting for your own project
* please add your own chiptype and modify the code likewise.
* The Cypress HID->COM device will work successfully up to
* 115200bps (but the actual throughput is around 3kBps).
*/
if (port->serial->dev->speed == USB_SPEED_LOW) {
/*
* Mike Isely <isely@pobox.com> 2-Feb-2008: The
* Cypress app note that describes this mechanism
* states the the low-speed part can't handle more
* than 800 bytes/sec, in which case 4800 baud is the
* safest speed for a part like that.
*/
if (new_rate > 4800) {
dev_dbg(&port->dev,
"%s - failed setting baud rate, device incapable speed %d\n",
__func__, new_rate);
return -1;
}
}
switch (priv->chiptype) {
case CT_EARTHMATE:
if (new_rate <= 600) {
/* 300 and 600 baud rates are supported under
* the generic firmware, but are not used with
* NMEA and SiRF protocols */
dev_dbg(&port->dev,
"%s - failed setting baud rate, unsupported speed of %d on Earthmate GPS\n",
__func__, new_rate);
return -1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return new_rate;
}
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,233 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: COMPS_Object* __comps_objrtree_get(COMPS_ObjRTree * rt, const char * key) {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem * it = NULL;
COMPS_ObjRTreeData * rtdata;
unsigned int offset, len, x;
char found, ended;
len = strlen(key);
offset = 0;
subnodes = rt->subnodes;
while (offset != len) {
found = 0;
for (it = subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key[0] == key[offset]) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
return NULL;
}
rtdata = (COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data;
for (x=1; ;x++) {
ended=0;
if (x == strlen(rtdata->key)) ended += 1;
if (x == len-offset) ended += 2;
if (ended != 0) break;
if (key[offset+x] != rtdata->key[x]) break;
}
if (ended == 3) {
return rtdata->data;
}
else if (ended == 1) offset+=x;
else {
return NULL;
}
subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
}
if (it != NULL) {
return ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->data;
}
else {
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enqueue_goaway(h2o_http2_conn_t *conn, int errnum, h2o_iovec_t additional_data)
{
if (conn->state < H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_IS_CLOSING) {
/* http2 spec allows sending GOAWAY more than once (for one reason since errors may arise after sending the first one) */
h2o_http2_encode_goaway_frame(&conn->_write.buf, conn->pull_stream_ids.max_open, errnum, additional_data);
h2o_http2_conn_request_write(conn);
conn->state = H2O_HTTP2_CONN_STATE_HALF_CLOSED;
}
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::DomContentLoadedEventFired(LocalFrame* frame) {
double timestamp = MonotonicallyIncreasingTime();
if (frame == inspected_frames_->Root())
GetFrontend()->domContentEventFired(timestamp);
GetFrontend()->lifecycleEvent(IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(frame),
"DOMContentLoaded", timestamp);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init init_inodecache(void)
{
isofs_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("isofs_inode_cache",
sizeof(struct iso_inode_info),
0, (SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|
SLAB_MEM_SPREAD),
init_once);
if (isofs_inode_cachep == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rpc_req(int rpc_prog, int rpc_proc, uint32_t *data, int datalen)
{
struct rpc_call pkt;
unsigned long id;
int sport;
int ret;
unsigned char *payload = net_udp_get_payload(nfs_con);
id = ++rpc_id;
pkt.id = htonl(id);
pkt.type = htonl(MSG_CALL);
pkt.rpcvers = htonl(2); /* use RPC version 2 */
pkt.prog = htonl(rpc_prog);
pkt.vers = htonl(2); /* portmapper is version 2 */
pkt.proc = htonl(rpc_proc);
memcpy(payload, &pkt, sizeof(pkt));
memcpy(payload + sizeof(pkt), data, datalen * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (rpc_prog == PROG_PORTMAP)
sport = SUNRPC_PORT;
else if (rpc_prog == PROG_MOUNT)
sport = nfs_server_mount_port;
else
sport = nfs_server_nfs_port;
nfs_con->udp->uh_dport = htons(sport);
ret = net_udp_send(nfs_con, sizeof(pkt) + datalen * sizeof(uint32_t));
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LocalFrameClientImpl::CreateServiceWorkerProvider() {
if (!web_frame_->Client())
return nullptr;
return web_frame_->Client()->CreateServiceWorkerProvider();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Splash::scaleImageYdXu(SplashImageSource src, void *srcData,
SplashColorMode srcMode, int nComps,
GBool srcAlpha, int srcWidth, int srcHeight,
int scaledWidth, int scaledHeight,
SplashBitmap *dest) {
Guchar *lineBuf, *alphaLineBuf;
Guint *pixBuf, *alphaPixBuf;
Guint pix[splashMaxColorComps];
Guint alpha;
Guchar *destPtr, *destAlphaPtr;
int yp, yq, xp, xq, yt, y, yStep, xt, x, xStep, d;
int i, j;
yp = srcHeight / scaledHeight;
yq = srcHeight % scaledHeight;
xp = scaledWidth / srcWidth;
xq = scaledWidth % srcWidth;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmallocn(srcWidth, nComps);
pixBuf = (Guint *)gmallocn(srcWidth, nComps * sizeof(int));
if (srcAlpha) {
alphaLineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(srcWidth);
alphaPixBuf = (Guint *)gmallocn(srcWidth, sizeof(int));
} else {
alphaLineBuf = NULL;
alphaPixBuf = NULL;
}
yt = 0;
destPtr = dest->data;
destAlphaPtr = dest->alpha;
for (y = 0; y < scaledHeight; ++y) {
if ((yt += yq) >= scaledHeight) {
yt -= scaledHeight;
yStep = yp + 1;
} else {
yStep = yp;
}
memset(pixBuf, 0, srcWidth * nComps * sizeof(int));
if (srcAlpha) {
memset(alphaPixBuf, 0, srcWidth * sizeof(int));
}
for (i = 0; i < yStep; ++i) {
(*src)(srcData, lineBuf, alphaLineBuf);
for (j = 0; j < srcWidth * nComps; ++j) {
pixBuf[j] += lineBuf[j];
}
if (srcAlpha) {
for (j = 0; j < srcWidth; ++j) {
alphaPixBuf[j] += alphaLineBuf[j];
}
}
}
xt = 0;
d = (1 << 23) / yStep;
for (x = 0; x < srcWidth; ++x) {
if ((xt += xq) >= srcWidth) {
xt -= srcWidth;
xStep = xp + 1;
} else {
xStep = xp;
}
for (i = 0; i < nComps; ++i) {
pix[i] = (pixBuf[x * nComps + i] * d) >> 23;
}
switch (srcMode) {
case splashModeMono1: // mono1 is not allowed
break;
case splashModeMono8:
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[0];
}
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[0];
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[1];
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[2];
}
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[2];
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[1];
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[0];
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)255;
}
break;
case splashModeBGR8:
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[2];
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[1];
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[0];
}
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[0];
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[1];
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[2];
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[3];
}
break;
case splashModeDeviceN8:
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
for (int cp = 0; cp < SPOT_NCOMPS+4; cp++)
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[cp];
}
break;
#endif
}
if (srcAlpha) {
alpha = (alphaPixBuf[x] * d) >> 23;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
*destAlphaPtr++ = (Guchar)alpha;
}
}
}
}
gfree(alphaPixBuf);
gfree(alphaLineBuf);
gfree(pixBuf);
gfree(lineBuf);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _recursive_rmdir(char *dirname, dev_t pdev,
const char *exclude, int level, bool onedev)
{
struct dirent dirent, *direntp;
DIR *dir;
int ret, failed=0;
char pathname[MAXPATHLEN];
bool hadexclude = false;
dir = opendir(dirname);
if (!dir) {
ERROR("%s: failed to open %s", __func__, dirname);
return -1;
}
while (!readdir_r(dir, &dirent, &direntp)) {
struct stat mystat;
int rc;
if (!direntp)
break;
if (!strcmp(direntp->d_name, ".") ||
!strcmp(direntp->d_name, ".."))
continue;
rc = snprintf(pathname, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", dirname, direntp->d_name);
if (rc < 0 || rc >= MAXPATHLEN) {
ERROR("pathname too long");
failed=1;
continue;
}
if (!level && exclude && !strcmp(direntp->d_name, exclude)) {
ret = rmdir(pathname);
if (ret < 0) {
switch(errno) {
case ENOTEMPTY:
INFO("Not deleting snapshot %s", pathname);
hadexclude = true;
break;
case ENOTDIR:
ret = unlink(pathname);
if (ret)
INFO("%s: failed to remove %s", __func__, pathname);
break;
default:
SYSERROR("%s: failed to rmdir %s", __func__, pathname);
failed = 1;
break;
}
}
continue;
}
ret = lstat(pathname, &mystat);
if (ret) {
ERROR("%s: failed to stat %s", __func__, pathname);
failed = 1;
continue;
}
if (onedev && mystat.st_dev != pdev) {
/* TODO should we be checking /proc/self/mountinfo for
* pathname and not doing this if found? */
if (btrfs_try_remove_subvol(pathname))
INFO("Removed btrfs subvolume at %s\n", pathname);
continue;
}
if (S_ISDIR(mystat.st_mode)) {
if (_recursive_rmdir(pathname, pdev, exclude, level+1, onedev) < 0)
failed=1;
} else {
if (unlink(pathname) < 0) {
SYSERROR("%s: failed to delete %s", __func__, pathname);
failed=1;
}
}
}
if (rmdir(dirname) < 0 && !btrfs_try_remove_subvol(dirname) && !hadexclude) {
ERROR("%s: failed to delete %s", __func__, dirname);
failed=1;
}
ret = closedir(dir);
if (ret) {
ERROR("%s: failed to close directory %s", __func__, dirname);
failed=1;
}
return failed ? -1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Sys_UnloadDll( void *dllHandle )
{
if( !dllHandle )
{
Com_Printf("Sys_UnloadDll(NULL)\n");
return;
}
Sys_UnloadLibrary(dllHandle);
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_setstat(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
name, (unsigned long long)a.size);
r = truncate(name, a.size);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
char buf[64];
time_t t = a.mtime;
strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
localtime(&t));
logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a));
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
(u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid);
if (r == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 60,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DefragTracker *DefragGetTrackerFromHash (Packet *p)
{
DefragTracker *dt = NULL;
/* get the key to our bucket */
uint32_t key = DefragHashGetKey(p);
/* get our hash bucket and lock it */
DefragTrackerHashRow *hb = &defragtracker_hash[key];
DRLOCK_LOCK(hb);
/* see if the bucket already has a tracker */
if (hb->head == NULL) {
dt = DefragTrackerGetNew(p);
if (dt == NULL) {
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
return NULL;
}
/* tracker is locked */
hb->head = dt;
hb->tail = dt;
/* got one, now lock, initialize and return */
DefragTrackerInit(dt,p);
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
return dt;
}
/* ok, we have a tracker in the bucket. Let's find out if it is our tracker */
dt = hb->head;
/* see if this is the tracker we are looking for */
if (dt->remove || DefragTrackerCompare(dt, p) == 0) {
DefragTracker *pdt = NULL; /* previous tracker */
while (dt) {
pdt = dt;
dt = dt->hnext;
if (dt == NULL) {
dt = pdt->hnext = DefragTrackerGetNew(p);
if (dt == NULL) {
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
return NULL;
}
hb->tail = dt;
/* tracker is locked */
dt->hprev = pdt;
/* initialize and return */
DefragTrackerInit(dt,p);
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
return dt;
}
if (DefragTrackerCompare(dt, p) != 0) {
/* we found our tracker, lets put it on top of the
* hash list -- this rewards active trackers */
if (dt->hnext) {
dt->hnext->hprev = dt->hprev;
}
if (dt->hprev) {
dt->hprev->hnext = dt->hnext;
}
if (dt == hb->tail) {
hb->tail = dt->hprev;
}
dt->hnext = hb->head;
dt->hprev = NULL;
hb->head->hprev = dt;
hb->head = dt;
/* found our tracker, lock & return */
SCMutexLock(&dt->lock);
(void) DefragTrackerIncrUsecnt(dt);
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
return dt;
}
}
}
/* lock & return */
SCMutexLock(&dt->lock);
(void) DefragTrackerIncrUsecnt(dt);
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
return dt;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 0 | 67,819 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_digest_create(BIO *in, const EVP_MD *md,
unsigned int flags)
{
CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
if (!md)
md = EVP_sha1();
cms = cms_DigestedData_create(md);
if (!cms)
return NULL;
if(!(flags & CMS_DETACHED))
CMS_set_detached(cms, 0);
if ((flags & CMS_STREAM) || CMS_final(cms, in, NULL, flags))
return cms;
CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Canonicalise input in CMS_verify.
If content is detached and not binary mode translate the input to
CRLF format. Before this change the input was verified verbatim
which lead to a discrepancy between sign and verify.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 44,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u64 __calc_delta(u64 delta_exec, unsigned long weight, struct load_weight *lw)
{
u64 fact = scale_load_down(weight);
int shift = WMULT_SHIFT;
__update_inv_weight(lw);
if (unlikely(fact >> 32)) {
while (fact >> 32) {
fact >>= 1;
shift--;
}
}
/* hint to use a 32x32->64 mul */
fact = (u64)(u32)fact * lw->inv_weight;
while (fact >> 32) {
fact >>= 1;
shift--;
}
return mul_u64_u32_shr(delta_exec, fact, shift);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_xdr_dec_release_lockowner(struct rpc_rqst *rqstp,
struct xdr_stream *xdr, void *dummy)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
status = decode_compound_hdr(xdr, &hdr);
if (!status)
status = decode_release_lockowner(xdr);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 23,437 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_apprentice(struct magic_set *ms, const char *fn, int action)
{
char *p, *mfn;
int file_err, errs = -1;
size_t i;
if (ms->mlist[0] != NULL)
file_reset(ms);
if ((fn = magic_getpath(fn, action)) == NULL)
return -1;
init_file_tables();
if ((mfn = strdup(fn)) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, strlen(fn));
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++) {
mlist_free(ms->mlist[i]);
if ((ms->mlist[i] = mlist_alloc()) == NULL) {
file_oomem(ms, sizeof(*ms->mlist[i]));
while (i-- > 0) {
mlist_free(ms->mlist[i]);
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
}
free(mfn);
return -1;
}
}
fn = mfn;
while (fn) {
p = strchr(fn, PATHSEP);
if (p)
*p++ = '\0';
if (*fn == '\0')
break;
file_err = apprentice_1(ms, fn, action);
errs = MAX(errs, file_err);
fn = p;
}
free(mfn);
if (errs == -1) {
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++) {
mlist_free(ms->mlist[i]);
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
}
file_error(ms, 0, "could not find any valid magic files!");
return -1;
}
#if 0
/*
* Always leave the database loaded
*/
if (action == FILE_LOAD)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAGIC_SETS; i++) {
mlist_free(ms->mlist[i]);
ms->mlist[i] = NULL;
}
#endif
switch (action) {
case FILE_LOAD:
case FILE_COMPILE:
case FILE_CHECK:
case FILE_LIST:
return 0;
default:
file_error(ms, 0, "Invalid action %d", action);
return -1;
}
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 45,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Size CardUnmaskPromptViews::GetPreferredSize() const {
const int kWidth = 375;
return gfx::Size(kWidth, GetHeightForWidth(kWidth));
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 171,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ReadableStreamReader* ReadableStream::getReader(ExecutionContext* executionContext, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (m_reader) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError("already locked to a ReadableStreamReader");
return nullptr;
}
return new ReadableStreamReader(executionContext, this);
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Undo(undo_lists_t *lists)
{
undo_type_t type;
block_dns_data_t *interface_data;
for (type = 0; type < _undo_type_max; type++)
{
list_item_t **pnext = &(*lists)[type];
while (*pnext)
{
list_item_t *item = *pnext;
switch (type)
{
case address:
DeleteAddress(item->data);
break;
case route:
DeleteRoute(item->data);
break;
case undo_dns4:
DeleteDNS(AF_INET, item->data);
break;
case undo_dns6:
DeleteDNS(AF_INET6, item->data);
break;
case block_dns:
interface_data = (block_dns_data_t*)(item->data);
delete_block_dns_filters(interface_data->engine);
if (interface_data->metric_v4 >= 0)
{
set_interface_metric(interface_data->index, AF_INET,
interface_data->metric_v4);
}
if (interface_data->metric_v6 >= 0)
{
set_interface_metric(interface_data->index, AF_INET6,
interface_data->metric_v6);
}
break;
}
/* Remove from the list and free memory */
*pnext = item->next;
free(item->data);
free(item);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix potential double-free() in Interactive Service (CVE-2018-9336)
Malformed input data on the service pipe towards the OpenVPN interactive
service (normally used by the OpenVPN GUI to request openvpn instances
from the service) can result in a double free() in the error handling code.
This usually only leads to a process crash (DoS by an unprivileged local
account) but since it could possibly lead to memory corruption if
happening while multiple other threads are active at the same time,
CVE-2018-9336 has been assigned to acknowledge this risk.
Fix by ensuring that sud->directory is set to NULL in GetStartUpData()
for all error cases (thus not being free()ed in FreeStartupData()).
Rewrite control flow to use explicit error label for error exit.
Discovered and reported by Jacob Baines <jbaines@tenable.com>.
CVE: 2018-9336
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Acked-by: Selva Nair <selva.nair@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/search?l=mid&q=20180414072617.25075-1-gert@greenie.muc.de
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AudioRendererHost::OnSetVolume(int stream_id, double volume) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
AudioEntry* entry = LookupById(stream_id);
if (!entry) {
SendErrorMessage(stream_id);
return;
}
if (volume < 0 || volume > 1.0)
return;
entry->controller->SetVolume(volume);
if (media_observer_)
media_observer_->OnSetAudioStreamVolume(this, stream_id, volume);
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 118,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickOffsetType TIFFTellCustomStream(void *user_data)
{
PhotoshopProfile
*profile;
profile=(PhotoshopProfile *) user_data;
return(profile->offset);
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible memory leak reported in #1206
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 77,990 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ATSParser::Program::switchPIDs(const Vector<StreamInfo> &infos) {
bool success = false;
if (mStreams.size() == infos.size()) {
size_t i;
KeyedVector<int32_t, Vector<int32_t> > oldType2PIDs, newType2PIDs;
for (i = 0; i < mStreams.size(); ++i) {
ssize_t index = oldType2PIDs.indexOfKey(mStreams[i]->type());
if (index < 0) {
oldType2PIDs.add(mStreams[i]->type(), Vector<int32_t>());
}
oldType2PIDs.editValueFor(mStreams[i]->type()).push_back(mStreams[i]->pid());
}
for (i = 0; i < infos.size(); ++i) {
ssize_t index = newType2PIDs.indexOfKey(infos[i].mType);
if (index < 0) {
newType2PIDs.add(infos[i].mType, Vector<int32_t>());
}
newType2PIDs.editValueFor(infos[i].mType).push_back(infos[i].mPID);
}
if (oldType2PIDs.size() == newType2PIDs.size()) {
success = true;
for (i = 0; i < oldType2PIDs.size(); ++i) {
if (oldType2PIDs.keyAt(i) != newType2PIDs.keyAt(i)
|| oldType2PIDs[i].size() != newType2PIDs[i].size()) {
success = false;
break;
}
}
}
if (success) {
KeyedVector<int32_t, sp<Stream> > temp;
for (i = 0; i < mStreams.size(); ++i) {
temp.add(mStreams.keyAt(i), mStreams.editValueAt(i));
}
mStreams.clear();
for (i = 0; i < temp.size(); ++i) {
ssize_t index = newType2PIDs.indexOfKey(temp[i]->type());
if (index < 0) {
return false;
}
Vector<int32_t> &newPIDs = newType2PIDs.editValueAt(index);
if (newPIDs.isEmpty()) {
return false;
}
Vector<int32_t>::iterator it = newPIDs.begin();
temp.editValueAt(i)->setPID(*it);
mStreams.add(temp[i]->pid(), temp.editValueAt(i));
newPIDs.erase(it);
}
}
}
return success;
}
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,517 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::flowAwarePaddingAfter() const
{
switch (transformedWritingMode()) {
case TopToBottomWritingMode:
return paddingBottom();
case BottomToTopWritingMode:
return paddingTop();
case LeftToRightWritingMode:
return paddingRight();
case RightToLeftWritingMode:
return paddingLeft();
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return paddingTop();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,669 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CapturingProxyResolver() : ProxyResolver(false /* expects_pac_bytes */) {}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: KURL Document::CompleteURL(const String& url) const {
return CompleteURLWithOverride(url, base_url_);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(getsid, pid_t, pid)
{
struct task_struct *p;
struct pid *sid;
int retval;
rcu_read_lock();
if (!pid)
sid = task_session(current);
else {
retval = -ESRCH;
p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!p)
goto out;
sid = task_session(p);
if (!sid)
goto out;
retval = security_task_getsid(p);
if (retval)
goto out;
}
retval = pid_vnr(sid);
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return retval;
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 162,021 |
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