instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_tfra_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
int i;
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size placeholder */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "tfra");
avio_w8(pb, 1); /* version */
avio_wb24(pb, 0);
avio_wb32(pb, track->track_id);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* length of traf/trun/sample num */
avio_wb32(pb, track->nb_frag_info);
for (i = 0; i < track->nb_frag_info; i++) {
avio_wb64(pb, track->frag_info[i].time);
avio_wb64(pb, track->frag_info[i].offset + track->data_offset);
avio_w8(pb, 1); /* traf number */
avio_w8(pb, 1); /* trun number */
avio_w8(pb, 1); /* sample number */
}
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::CommitNavigation(
NavigationRequest* navigation_request,
network::ResourceResponse* response,
network::mojom::URLLoaderClientEndpointsPtr url_loader_client_endpoints,
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const CommitNavigationParams& commit_params,
bool is_view_source,
base::Optional<SubresourceLoaderParams> subresource_loader_params,
base::Optional<std::vector<mojom::TransferrableURLLoaderPtr>>
subresource_overrides,
blink::mojom::ServiceWorkerProviderInfoForWindowPtr provider_info,
const base::UnguessableToken& devtools_navigation_token) {
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::CommitNavigation",
"frame_tree_node", frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(), "url",
common_params.url.possibly_invalid_spec());
DCHECK(!IsRendererDebugURL(common_params.url));
DCHECK(
(response && url_loader_client_endpoints) ||
common_params.url.SchemeIs(url::kDataScheme) ||
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::IsSameDocument(common_params.navigation_type) ||
!IsURLHandledByNetworkStack(common_params.url));
const bool is_first_navigation = !has_committed_any_navigation_;
has_committed_any_navigation_ = true;
UpdatePermissionsForNavigation(common_params, commit_params);
ResetWaitingState();
if (is_view_source && IsCurrent()) {
DCHECK(!GetParent());
render_view_host()->Send(new FrameMsg_EnableViewSourceMode(routing_id_));
}
const network::ResourceResponseHead head =
response ? response->head : network::ResourceResponseHead();
const bool is_same_document =
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::IsSameDocument(common_params.navigation_type);
std::unique_ptr<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>
subresource_loader_factories;
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService) &&
(!is_same_document || is_first_navigation)) {
recreate_default_url_loader_factory_after_network_service_crash_ = false;
subresource_loader_factories =
std::make_unique<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>();
BrowserContext* browser_context = GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext();
if (subresource_loader_params &&
subresource_loader_params->appcache_loader_factory_info.is_valid()) {
subresource_loader_factories->appcache_factory_info() =
std::move(subresource_loader_params->appcache_loader_factory_info);
if (!GetCreateNetworkFactoryCallbackForRenderFrame().is_null()) {
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtrInfo original_factory =
std::move(subresource_loader_factories->appcache_factory_info());
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryRequest new_request = mojo::MakeRequest(
&subresource_loader_factories->appcache_factory_info());
GetCreateNetworkFactoryCallbackForRenderFrame().Run(
std::move(new_request), GetProcess()->GetID(),
std::move(original_factory));
}
}
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtrInfo default_factory_info;
std::string scheme = common_params.url.scheme();
const auto& schemes = URLDataManagerBackend::GetWebUISchemes();
if (base::ContainsValue(schemes, scheme)) {
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtr factory_for_webui =
CreateWebUIURLLoaderBinding(this, scheme);
if ((enabled_bindings_ & kWebUIBindingsPolicyMask) &&
!GetContentClient()->browser()->IsWebUIAllowedToMakeNetworkRequests(
url::Origin::Create(common_params.url.GetOrigin()))) {
default_factory_info = factory_for_webui.PassInterface();
} else {
subresource_loader_factories->scheme_specific_factory_infos().emplace(
scheme, factory_for_webui.PassInterface());
}
}
if (!default_factory_info) {
recreate_default_url_loader_factory_after_network_service_crash_ = true;
bool bypass_redirect_checks =
CreateNetworkServiceDefaultFactoryAndObserve(
GetOriginForURLLoaderFactory(common_params),
mojo::MakeRequest(&default_factory_info));
subresource_loader_factories->set_bypass_redirect_checks(
bypass_redirect_checks);
}
DCHECK(default_factory_info);
subresource_loader_factories->default_factory_info() =
std::move(default_factory_info);
non_network_url_loader_factories_.clear();
if (common_params.url.SchemeIsFile()) {
auto file_factory = std::make_unique<FileURLLoaderFactory>(
browser_context->GetPath(),
browser_context->GetSharedCorsOriginAccessList(),
base::CreateSequencedTaskRunnerWithTraits(
{base::MayBlock(), base::TaskPriority::BEST_EFFORT,
base::TaskShutdownBehavior::SKIP_ON_SHUTDOWN}));
non_network_url_loader_factories_.emplace(url::kFileScheme,
std::move(file_factory));
}
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (common_params.url.SchemeIs(url::kContentScheme)) {
auto content_factory = std::make_unique<ContentURLLoaderFactory>(
base::CreateSequencedTaskRunnerWithTraits(
{base::MayBlock(), base::TaskPriority::BEST_EFFORT,
base::TaskShutdownBehavior::SKIP_ON_SHUTDOWN}));
non_network_url_loader_factories_.emplace(url::kContentScheme,
std::move(content_factory));
}
#endif
StoragePartition* partition =
BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(browser_context, GetSiteInstance());
std::string storage_domain;
if (site_instance_) {
std::string partition_name;
bool in_memory;
GetContentClient()->browser()->GetStoragePartitionConfigForSite(
browser_context, site_instance_->GetSiteURL(), true, &storage_domain,
&partition_name, &in_memory);
}
non_network_url_loader_factories_.emplace(
url::kFileSystemScheme,
content::CreateFileSystemURLLoaderFactory(
this, /*is_navigation=*/false, partition->GetFileSystemContext(),
storage_domain));
GetContentClient()
->browser()
->RegisterNonNetworkSubresourceURLLoaderFactories(
process_->GetID(), routing_id_, &non_network_url_loader_factories_);
for (auto& factory : non_network_url_loader_factories_) {
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtrInfo factory_proxy_info;
auto factory_request = mojo::MakeRequest(&factory_proxy_info);
GetContentClient()->browser()->WillCreateURLLoaderFactory(
browser_context, this, GetProcess()->GetID(),
false /* is_navigation */, false /* is_download */,
GetOriginForURLLoaderFactory(common_params), &factory_request,
nullptr /* header_client */, nullptr /* bypass_redirect_checks */);
devtools_instrumentation::WillCreateURLLoaderFactory(
this, false /* is_navigation */, false /* is_download */,
&factory_request);
factory.second->Clone(std::move(factory_request));
subresource_loader_factories->scheme_specific_factory_infos().emplace(
factory.first, std::move(factory_proxy_info));
}
subresource_loader_factories->initiator_specific_factory_infos() =
CreateInitiatorSpecificURLLoaderFactories(
initiators_requiring_separate_url_loader_factory_);
}
DCHECK(!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService) ||
is_same_document || !is_first_navigation ||
subresource_loader_factories);
if (is_same_document) {
DCHECK(same_document_navigation_request_);
GetNavigationControl()->CommitSameDocumentNavigation(
common_params, commit_params,
base::BindOnce(&RenderFrameHostImpl::OnSameDocumentCommitProcessed,
base::Unretained(this),
same_document_navigation_request_->navigation_handle()
->GetNavigationId(),
common_params.should_replace_current_entry));
} else {
blink::mojom::ControllerServiceWorkerInfoPtr controller;
blink::mojom::ServiceWorkerObjectAssociatedPtrInfo remote_object;
blink::mojom::ServiceWorkerState sent_state;
if (subresource_loader_params &&
subresource_loader_params->controller_service_worker_info) {
controller =
std::move(subresource_loader_params->controller_service_worker_info);
if (controller->object_info) {
controller->object_info->request = mojo::MakeRequest(&remote_object);
sent_state = controller->object_info->state;
}
}
std::unique_ptr<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>
factory_bundle_for_prefetch;
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtr prefetch_loader_factory;
if (subresource_loader_factories) {
auto bundle = base::MakeRefCounted<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundle>(
std::move(subresource_loader_factories));
subresource_loader_factories = CloneFactoryBundle(bundle);
factory_bundle_for_prefetch = CloneFactoryBundle(bundle);
} else if (!is_same_document || is_first_navigation) {
DCHECK(!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService));
factory_bundle_for_prefetch =
std::make_unique<blink::URLLoaderFactoryBundleInfo>();
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryPtrInfo factory_info;
CreateNetworkServiceDefaultFactoryInternal(
url::Origin(), mojo::MakeRequest(&factory_info));
factory_bundle_for_prefetch->default_factory_info() =
std::move(factory_info);
}
if (factory_bundle_for_prefetch) {
auto* storage_partition = static_cast<StoragePartitionImpl*>(
BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(
GetSiteInstance()->GetBrowserContext(), GetSiteInstance()));
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::IO},
base::BindOnce(&PrefetchURLLoaderService::GetFactory,
storage_partition->GetPrefetchURLLoaderService(),
mojo::MakeRequest(&prefetch_loader_factory),
frame_tree_node_->frame_tree_node_id(),
std::move(factory_bundle_for_prefetch)));
}
mojom::NavigationClient* navigation_client = nullptr;
if (IsPerNavigationMojoInterfaceEnabled() && navigation_request)
navigation_client = navigation_request->GetCommitNavigationClient();
SendCommitNavigation(
navigation_client, navigation_request, head, common_params,
commit_params, std::move(url_loader_client_endpoints),
std::move(subresource_loader_factories),
std::move(subresource_overrides), std::move(controller),
std::move(provider_info), std::move(prefetch_loader_factory),
devtools_navigation_token);
if (remote_object.is_valid()) {
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::IO},
base::BindOnce(
&ServiceWorkerObjectHost::AddRemoteObjectPtrAndUpdateState,
subresource_loader_params->controller_service_worker_object_host,
std::move(remote_object), sent_state));
}
if (IsURLHandledByNetworkStack(common_params.url))
last_navigation_previews_state_ = common_params.previews_state;
}
is_loading_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash on FileChooserImpl
If a renderer process is compromised, and it calls both of
FileChooserImpl::OpenFileChooser() and EnumerateChosenDirectory() via
Mojo, the browser process could crash because ResetOwner() for
the first FileChooserImpl::proxy_ instance was not called. We
should check nullness of proxy_ before updating it.
Bug: 941008
Change-Id: Ie0c1895ec46ce78d40594b543e49e43b420af675
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1520509
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640580}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 151,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t cdc_ncm_show_tx_max(struct device *d, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct usbnet *dev = netdev_priv(to_net_dev(d));
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
return sprintf(buf, "%u\n", ctx->tx_max);
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char *am_get_config_langstring(apr_hash_t *h, const char *lang)
{
char *string;
if (lang == NULL) {
lang = "";
}
string = (char *)apr_hash_get(h, lang, APR_HASH_KEY_STRING);
return string;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 91,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebRunnerBrowserContext::GetSpecialStoragePolicy() {
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 131,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggedAttrSetter2AttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
V8PerContextData* contextData = V8PerContextData::from(info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext());
if (contextData && contextData->activityLogger()) {
v8::Handle<v8::Value> loggerArg[] = { jsValue };
contextData->activityLogger()->log("TestObject.activityLoggedAttrSetter2", 1, &loggerArg[0], "Setter");
}
TestObjectV8Internal::activityLoggedAttrSetter2AttributeSetterForMainWorld(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,521 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static HB_Error Load_ChainPosRule( HB_ChainPosRule* cpr,
HB_Stream stream )
{
HB_Error error;
HB_UShort n, count;
HB_UShort* b;
HB_UShort* i;
HB_UShort* l;
HB_PosLookupRecord* plr;
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
return error;
cpr->BacktrackGlyphCount = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
cpr->Backtrack = NULL;
count = cpr->BacktrackGlyphCount;
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( cpr->Backtrack, count, HB_UShort ) )
return error;
b = cpr->Backtrack;
if ( ACCESS_Frame( count * 2L ) )
goto Fail4;
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
b[n] = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail4;
cpr->InputGlyphCount = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
cpr->Input = NULL;
count = cpr->InputGlyphCount - 1; /* only InputGlyphCount - 1 elements */
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( cpr->Input, count, HB_UShort ) )
goto Fail4;
i = cpr->Input;
if ( ACCESS_Frame( count * 2L ) )
goto Fail3;
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
i[n] = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail3;
cpr->LookaheadGlyphCount = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
cpr->Lookahead = NULL;
count = cpr->LookaheadGlyphCount;
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( cpr->Lookahead, count, HB_UShort ) )
goto Fail3;
l = cpr->Lookahead;
if ( ACCESS_Frame( count * 2L ) )
goto Fail2;
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
l[n] = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
if ( ACCESS_Frame( 2L ) )
goto Fail2;
cpr->PosCount = GET_UShort();
FORGET_Frame();
cpr->PosLookupRecord = NULL;
count = cpr->PosCount;
if ( ALLOC_ARRAY( cpr->PosLookupRecord, count, HB_PosLookupRecord ) )
goto Fail2;
plr = cpr->PosLookupRecord;
if ( ACCESS_Frame( count * 4L ) )
goto Fail1;
for ( n = 0; n < count; n++ )
{
plr[n].SequenceIndex = GET_UShort();
plr[n].LookupListIndex = GET_UShort();
}
FORGET_Frame();
return HB_Err_Ok;
Fail1:
FREE( plr );
Fail2:
FREE( l );
Fail3:
FREE( i );
Fail4:
FREE( b );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void crash_enable_local_vmclear(int cpu) { }
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void *Type_NamedColor_Read(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number* nItems, cmsUInt32Number SizeOfTag)
{
cmsUInt32Number vendorFlag; // Bottom 16 bits for ICC use
cmsUInt32Number count; // Count of named colors
cmsUInt32Number nDeviceCoords; // Num of device coordinates
char prefix[32]; // Prefix for each color name
char suffix[32]; // Suffix for each color name
cmsNAMEDCOLORLIST* v;
cmsUInt32Number i;
*nItems = 0;
if (!_cmsReadUInt32Number(io, &vendorFlag)) return NULL;
if (!_cmsReadUInt32Number(io, &count)) return NULL;
if (!_cmsReadUInt32Number(io, &nDeviceCoords)) return NULL;
if (io -> Read(io, prefix, 32, 1) != 1) return NULL;
if (io -> Read(io, suffix, 32, 1) != 1) return NULL;
prefix[31] = suffix[31] = 0;
v = cmsAllocNamedColorList(self ->ContextID, count, nDeviceCoords, prefix, suffix);
if (v == NULL) {
cmsSignalError(self->ContextID, cmsERROR_RANGE, "Too many named colors '%d'", count);
return NULL;
}
if (nDeviceCoords > cmsMAXCHANNELS) {
cmsSignalError(self->ContextID, cmsERROR_RANGE, "Too many device coordinates '%d'", nDeviceCoords);
return 0;
}
for (i=0; i < count; i++) {
cmsUInt16Number PCS[3];
cmsUInt16Number Colorant[cmsMAXCHANNELS];
char Root[33];
memset(Colorant, 0, sizeof(Colorant));
if (io -> Read(io, Root, 32, 1) != 1) return NULL;
Root[32] = 0; // To prevent exploits
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Array(io, 3, PCS)) goto Error;
if (!_cmsReadUInt16Array(io, nDeviceCoords, Colorant)) goto Error;
if (!cmsAppendNamedColor(v, Root, PCS, Colorant)) goto Error;
}
*nItems = 1;
return (void*) v ;
Error:
cmsFreeNamedColorList(v);
return NULL;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(SizeOfTag);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionService::CheckForExternalUpdates() {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
external_extension_url_added_ = false;
ProviderCollection::const_iterator i;
for (i = external_extension_providers_.begin();
i != external_extension_providers_.end(); ++i) {
ExternalExtensionProviderInterface* provider = i->get();
provider->VisitRegisteredExtension();
}
if (external_extension_providers_.empty())
OnExternalProviderReady();
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 98,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IsKeyboardDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev)
{
return (dev->type == MASTER_KEYBOARD) ||
((dev->key && dev->kbdfeed) && !IsPointerDevice(dev));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint32_t AddArguments(Handle<JSArray> receiver,
Handle<FixedArrayBase> backing_store,
Arguments* args, uint32_t add_size,
Where add_position) {
uint32_t length = Smi::cast(receiver->length())->value();
DCHECK(0 < add_size);
uint32_t elms_len = backing_store->length();
DCHECK(add_size <= static_cast<uint32_t>(Smi::kMaxValue - length));
uint32_t new_length = length + add_size;
if (new_length > elms_len) {
uint32_t capacity = JSObject::NewElementsCapacity(new_length);
int copy_dst_index = add_position == AT_START ? add_size : 0;
backing_store = Subclass::ConvertElementsWithCapacity(
receiver, backing_store, KindTraits::Kind, capacity, 0,
copy_dst_index, ElementsAccessor::kCopyToEndAndInitializeToHole);
receiver->set_elements(*backing_store);
} else if (add_position == AT_START) {
Isolate* isolate = receiver->GetIsolate();
Subclass::MoveElements(isolate, receiver, backing_store, add_size, 0,
length, 0, 0);
}
int insertion_index = add_position == AT_START ? 0 : length;
Subclass::CopyArguments(args, backing_store, add_size, 1, insertion_index);
receiver->set_length(Smi::FromInt(new_length));
return new_length;
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int br_mdb_parse(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct net_device **pdev, struct br_mdb_entry **pentry)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct br_mdb_entry *entry;
struct br_port_msg *bpm;
struct nlattr *tb[MDBA_SET_ENTRY_MAX+1];
struct net_device *dev;
int err;
err = nlmsg_parse(nlh, sizeof(*bpm), tb, MDBA_SET_ENTRY, NULL);
if (err < 0)
return err;
bpm = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if (bpm->ifindex == 0) {
pr_info("PF_BRIDGE: br_mdb_parse() with invalid ifindex\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
dev = __dev_get_by_index(net, bpm->ifindex);
if (dev == NULL) {
pr_info("PF_BRIDGE: br_mdb_parse() with unknown ifindex\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (!(dev->priv_flags & IFF_EBRIDGE)) {
pr_info("PF_BRIDGE: br_mdb_parse() with non-bridge\n");
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
*pdev = dev;
if (!tb[MDBA_SET_ENTRY] ||
nla_len(tb[MDBA_SET_ENTRY]) != sizeof(struct br_mdb_entry)) {
pr_info("PF_BRIDGE: br_mdb_parse() with invalid attr\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
entry = nla_data(tb[MDBA_SET_ENTRY]);
if (!is_valid_mdb_entry(entry)) {
pr_info("PF_BRIDGE: br_mdb_parse() with invalid entry\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
*pentry = entry;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int GetTitleWidth(const Tab& tab) {
return tab.title_->bounds().width();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: server_response_http(struct client *clt, unsigned int code,
struct media_type *media, off_t size, time_t mtime)
{
struct server_config *srv_conf = clt->clt_srv_conf;
struct http_descriptor *desc = clt->clt_descreq;
struct http_descriptor *resp = clt->clt_descresp;
const char *error;
struct kv *ct, *cl;
char tmbuf[32];
if (desc == NULL || media == NULL ||
(error = server_httperror_byid(code)) == NULL)
return (-1);
if (server_log_http(clt, code, size) == -1)
return (-1);
/* Add error codes */
if (kv_setkey(&resp->http_pathquery, "%u", code) == -1 ||
kv_set(&resp->http_pathquery, "%s", error) == -1)
return (-1);
/* Add headers */
if (kv_add(&resp->http_headers, "Server", HTTPD_SERVERNAME) == NULL)
return (-1);
/* Is it a persistent connection? */
if (clt->clt_persist) {
if (kv_add(&resp->http_headers,
"Connection", "keep-alive") == NULL)
return (-1);
} else if (kv_add(&resp->http_headers, "Connection", "close") == NULL)
return (-1);
/* Set media type */
if ((ct = kv_add(&resp->http_headers, "Content-Type", NULL)) == NULL ||
kv_set(ct, "%s/%s", media->media_type, media->media_subtype) == -1)
return (-1);
/* Set content length, if specified */
if ((cl =
kv_add(&resp->http_headers, "Content-Length", NULL)) == NULL ||
kv_set(cl, "%lld", (long long)size) == -1)
return (-1);
/* Set last modification time */
if (server_http_time(mtime, tmbuf, sizeof(tmbuf)) <= 0 ||
kv_add(&resp->http_headers, "Last-Modified", tmbuf) == NULL)
return (-1);
/* HSTS header */
if (srv_conf->flags & SRVFLAG_SERVER_HSTS) {
if ((cl =
kv_add(&resp->http_headers, "Strict-Transport-Security",
NULL)) == NULL ||
kv_set(cl, "max-age=%d%s%s", srv_conf->hsts_max_age,
srv_conf->hsts_flags & HSTSFLAG_SUBDOMAINS ?
"; includeSubDomains" : "",
srv_conf->hsts_flags & HSTSFLAG_PRELOAD ?
"; preload" : "") == -1)
return (-1);
}
/* Date header is mandatory and should be added as late as possible */
if (server_http_time(time(NULL), tmbuf, sizeof(tmbuf)) <= 0 ||
kv_add(&resp->http_headers, "Date", tmbuf) == NULL)
return (-1);
/* Write completed header */
if (server_writeresponse_http(clt) == -1 ||
server_bufferevent_print(clt, "\r\n") == -1 ||
server_headers(clt, resp, server_writeheader_http, NULL) == -1 ||
server_bufferevent_print(clt, "\r\n") == -1)
return (-1);
if (size == 0 || resp->http_method == HTTP_METHOD_HEAD) {
bufferevent_enable(clt->clt_bev, EV_READ|EV_WRITE);
if (clt->clt_persist)
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_HTTP_HEADER;
else
clt->clt_toread = TOREAD_HTTP_NONE;
clt->clt_done = 0;
return (0);
}
return (1);
}
Commit Message: Reimplement httpd's support for byte ranges.
The previous implementation loaded all the output into a single output
buffer and used its size to determine the Content-Length of the body.
The new implementation calculates the body length first and writes the
individual ranges in an async way using the bufferevent mechanism.
This prevents httpd from using too much memory and applies the
watermark and throttling mechanisms to range requests.
Problem reported by Pierre Kim (pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com)
OK benno@ sunil@
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 68,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ContinueSSLRequest(
const GlobalRequestID& id) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
net::URLRequest* request = GetURLRequest(id);
if (!request)
return;
DVLOG(1) << "ContinueSSLRequest() url: " << request->url().spec();
request->ContinueDespiteLastError();
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,874 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderLayerCompositor::addToOverlapMapRecursive(OverlapMap& overlapMap, RenderLayer* layer, RenderLayer* ancestorLayer)
{
if (!canBeComposited(layer) || overlapMap.contains(layer))
return;
if (ancestorLayer)
overlapMap.geometryMap().pushMappingsToAncestor(layer, ancestorLayer);
IntRect bounds;
bool haveComputedBounds = false;
addToOverlapMap(overlapMap, layer, bounds, haveComputedBounds);
#if !ASSERT_DISABLED
LayerListMutationDetector mutationChecker(layer->stackingNode());
#endif
RenderLayerStackingNodeIterator iterator(*layer->stackingNode(), AllChildren);
while (RenderLayerStackingNode* curNode = iterator.next())
addToOverlapMapRecursive(overlapMap, curNode->layer(), layer);
if (ancestorLayer)
overlapMap.geometryMap().popMappingsToAncestor(ancestorLayer);
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Smb4KGlobal::coreIsInitialized()
{
return p->coreInitialized;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,559 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void documentTypeAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::documentTypeAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,284 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_netscreen_rec_hdr(struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr, const char *line, char *cap_int,
gboolean *cap_dir, char *cap_dst, int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
int sec;
int dsec, pkt_len;
char direction[2];
char cap_src[13];
phdr->rec_type = REC_TYPE_PACKET;
phdr->presence_flags = WTAP_HAS_TS|WTAP_HAS_CAP_LEN;
if (sscanf(line, "%9d.%9d: %15[a-z0-9/:.-](%1[io]) len=%9d:%12s->%12s/",
&sec, &dsec, cap_int, direction, &pkt_len, cap_src, cap_dst) < 5) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
*err_info = g_strdup("netscreen: Can't parse packet-header");
return -1;
}
*cap_dir = (direction[0] == 'o' ? NETSCREEN_EGRESS : NETSCREEN_INGRESS);
phdr->ts.secs = sec;
phdr->ts.nsecs = dsec * 100000000;
phdr->len = pkt_len;
return pkt_len;
}
Commit Message: Fix packet length handling.
Treat the packet length as unsigned - it shouldn't be negative in the
file. If it is, that'll probably cause the sscanf to fail, so we'll
report the file as bad.
Check it against WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE to make sure we don't try to
allocate a huge amount of memory, just as we do in other file readers.
Use the now-validated packet size as the length in
ws_buffer_assure_space(), so we are certain to have enough space, and
don't allocate too much space.
Merge the header and packet data parsing routines while we're at it.
Bug: 12396
Change-Id: I7f981f9cdcbea7ecdeb88bfff2f12d875de2244f
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15176
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 167,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int computeOffset(WebCore::RenderObject* renderer, int x, int y)
{
return WebCore::VisiblePosition(renderer->positionForPoint(WebCore::LayoutPoint(x, y))).deepEquivalent().computeOffsetInContainerNode();
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<Attr> Document::createAttributeNS(const String& namespaceURI, const String& qualifiedName, ExceptionCode& ec, bool shouldIgnoreNamespaceChecks)
{
String prefix, localName;
if (!parseQualifiedName(qualifiedName, prefix, localName, ec))
return 0;
QualifiedName qName(prefix, localName, namespaceURI);
if (!shouldIgnoreNamespaceChecks && !hasValidNamespaceForAttributes(qName)) {
ec = NAMESPACE_ERR;
return 0;
}
return Attr::create(this, qName, emptyString());
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,460 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::CheckForCancel() {
bool cancel = false;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_CheckForCancel(
routing_id(),
print_pages_params_->params.preview_ui_addr,
print_pages_params_->params.preview_request_id,
&cancel));
if (cancel)
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false;
return cancel;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 170,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium::addStream(PassRefPtr<MediaStreamDescriptor> mediaStream, PassRefPtr<MediaConstraints> constraints)
{
if (!m_webHandler)
return false;
return m_webHandler->addStream(mediaStream, constraints);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool omx_venc::dev_free_buf(void *buf_addr,unsigned port)
{
return handle->venc_free_buf(buf_addr,port);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aodv_v6_rerr(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
u_int i, dc;
const struct aodv_rerr *ap = (const struct aodv_rerr *)dat;
const struct rerr_unreach6 *dp6;
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
if (length < sizeof(*ap))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rerr %s [items %u] [%u]:",
ap->rerr_flags & RERR_NODELETE ? "[D]" : "",
ap->rerr_dc, length));
dp6 = (const struct rerr_unreach6 *)(const void *)(ap + 1);
i = length - sizeof(*ap);
for (dc = ap->rerr_dc; dc != 0; dc--) {
ND_TCHECK(*dp6);
if (i < sizeof(*dp6))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " {%s}(%ld)", ip6addr_string(ndo, &dp6->u_da),
(unsigned long)EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp6->u_ds)));
dp6++;
i -= sizeof(*dp6);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|rerr]"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13002/AODV: Add some missing bounds checks.
In aodv_extension() do a bounds check on the extension header before we
look at it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, add the RFC number, and check the validity of the
length for the Hello extension.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_abs_path_for_symlink (GFile *file,
GFile *destination)
{
GFile *root, *parent;
char *relative, *abs;
if (g_file_is_native (file) || g_file_is_native (destination))
{
return g_file_get_path (file);
}
root = g_object_ref (file);
while ((parent = g_file_get_parent (root)) != NULL)
{
g_object_unref (root);
root = parent;
}
relative = g_file_get_relative_path (root, file);
g_object_unref (root);
abs = g_strconcat ("/", relative, NULL);
g_free (relative);
return abs;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool get_new_nicname(char **dest, char *br, int pid, char **cnic)
{
char template[IFNAMSIZ];
snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "vethXXXXXX");
*dest = lxc_mkifname(template);
if (!create_nic(*dest, br, pid, cnic)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-5985: Ensure target netns is caller-owned
Before this commit, lxc-user-nic could potentially have been tricked into
operating on a network namespace over which the caller did not hold privilege.
This commit ensures that the caller is privileged over the network namespace by
temporarily dropping privilege.
Launchpad: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/lxc/+bug/1654676
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-862 | 0 | 68,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadDXT1(Image *image,DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DDSColors
colors;
PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
size_t
bits;
ssize_t
j,
y;
unsigned char
code;
unsigned short
c0,
c1;
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y += 4)
{
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x += 4)
{
/* Get 4x4 patch of pixels to write on */
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,x,y,MagickMin(4,image->columns-x),
MagickMin(4,image->rows-y),exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
/* Read 8 bytes of data from the image */
c0 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
c1 = ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
bits = ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
CalculateColors(c0, c1, &colors, MagickFalse);
/* Write the pixels */
for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
{
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
if (((x + i) < (ssize_t) image->columns) &&
((y + j) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
code=(unsigned char) ((bits >> ((j*4+i)*2)) & 0x3);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.r[code]));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.g[code]));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.b[code]));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(colors.a[code]));
if ((colors.a[code] != 0) && (image->matte == MagickFalse))
image->matte=MagickTrue; /* Correct matte */
q++;
}
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
}
return(SkipDXTMipmaps(image,dds_info,8,exception));
}
Commit Message: Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489).
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 65,103 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_cmp(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
emulate_2op_SrcV(ctxt, "cmp");
/* Disable writeback. */
ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,739 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tTcpIpPacketParsingResult ParaNdis_CheckSumVerify(
tCompletePhysicalAddress *pDataPages,
ULONG ulDataLength,
ULONG ulStartOffset,
ULONG flags,
LPCSTR caller)
{
IPHeader *pIpHeader = (IPHeader *) RtlOffsetToPointer(pDataPages[0].Virtual, ulStartOffset);
tTcpIpPacketParsingResult res = QualifyIpPacket(pIpHeader, ulDataLength);
if (res.ipStatus == ppresNotIP || res.ipCheckSum == ppresIPTooShort)
return res;
if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV4)
{
if (flags & pcrIpChecksum)
res = VerifyIpChecksum(&pIpHeader->v4, res, (flags & pcrFixIPChecksum) != 0);
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV4Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV4Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV4Checksum));
}
}
}
}
else if (res.ipStatus == ppresIPV6)
{
if(res.xxpStatus == ppresXxpKnown)
{
if (res.TcpUdp == ppresIsTCP) /* TCP */
{
if(flags & pcrTcpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyTcpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixTcpV6Checksum));
}
}
else /* UDP */
{
if (flags & pcrUdpV6Checksum)
{
res = VerifyUdpChecksum(pDataPages, ulDataLength, ulStartOffset, res, flags & (pcrFixPHChecksum | pcrFixUdpV6Checksum));
}
}
}
}
PrintOutParsingResult(res, 1, caller);
return res;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,143 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init idt_setup_apic_and_irq_gates(void)
{
int i = FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR;
void *entry;
idt_setup_from_table(idt_table, apic_idts, ARRAY_SIZE(apic_idts), true);
for_each_clear_bit_from(i, system_vectors, FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR) {
entry = irq_entries_start + 8 * (i - FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR);
set_intr_gate(i, entry);
}
for_each_clear_bit_from(i, system_vectors, NR_VECTORS) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
set_bit(i, system_vectors);
set_intr_gate(i, spurious_interrupt);
#else
entry = irq_entries_start + 8 * (i - FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR);
set_intr_gate(i, entry);
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
There's nothing IST-worthy about #BP/int3. We don't allow kprobes
in the small handful of places in the kernel that run at CPL0 with
an invalid stack, and 32-bit kernels have used normal interrupt
gates for #BP forever.
Furthermore, we don't allow kprobes in places that have usergs while
in kernel mode, so "paranoid" is also unnecessary.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 83,473 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Editor::AppliedEditing(CompositeEditCommand* cmd) {
DCHECK(!cmd->IsCommandGroupWrapper());
EventQueueScope scope;
GetSpellChecker().MarkMisspellingsAfterApplyingCommand(*cmd);
UndoStep* undo_step = cmd->GetUndoStep();
DCHECK(undo_step);
DispatchEditableContentChangedEvents(undo_step->StartingRootEditableElement(),
undo_step->EndingRootEditableElement());
DispatchInputEventEditableContentChanged(
undo_step->StartingRootEditableElement(),
undo_step->EndingRootEditableElement(), cmd->GetInputType(),
cmd->TextDataForInputEvent(), IsComposingFromCommand(cmd));
const SelectionInDOMTree& new_selection = CorrectedSelectionAfterCommand(
cmd->EndingVisibleSelection(), GetFrame().GetDocument());
ChangeSelectionAfterCommand(new_selection, SetSelectionData());
if (!cmd->PreservesTypingStyle())
ClearTypingStyle();
if (last_edit_command_.Get() == cmd) {
DCHECK(cmd->IsTypingCommand());
} else if (last_edit_command_ && last_edit_command_->IsDragAndDropCommand() &&
(cmd->GetInputType() == InputEvent::InputType::kDeleteByDrag ||
cmd->GetInputType() == InputEvent::InputType::kInsertFromDrop)) {
if (!last_edit_command_->GetUndoStep())
undo_stack_->RegisterUndoStep(last_edit_command_->EnsureUndoStep());
last_edit_command_->EnsureUndoStep()->SetEndingSelection(
cmd->EnsureUndoStep()->EndingSelection());
last_edit_command_->AppendCommandToUndoStep(cmd);
} else {
last_edit_command_ = cmd;
undo_stack_->RegisterUndoStep(last_edit_command_->EnsureUndoStep());
}
RespondToChangedContents(new_selection.Base());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Start(const base::FilePath local_path,
linked_ptr<DriveEntryProperties> properties,
Profile* const profile,
const ResultCallback& callback) {
SingleDriveEntryPropertiesGetter* instance =
new SingleDriveEntryPropertiesGetter(
local_path, properties, profile, callback);
instance->StartProcess();
}
Commit Message: Reland r286968: The CL borrows ShareDialog from Files.app and add it to Gallery.
Previous Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/431293002
BUG=374667
TEST=manually
R=yoshiki@chromium.org, mtomasz@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/433733004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286975 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DelayedAutoResized() {
gfx::Size new_size = new_auto_size_;
new_auto_size_.SetSize(0, 0);
if (!should_auto_resize_)
return;
OnRenderAutoResized(new_size);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderTriFan(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderTriFanReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderTriFanReq);
swaps(&stuff->length);
swapl(&stuff->src);
swapl(&stuff->dst);
swapl(&stuff->maskFormat);
swaps(&stuff->xSrc);
swaps(&stuff->ySrc);
SwapRestL(stuff);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContainerNode::postAttachCallbacksAreSuspended()
{
return s_attachDepth;
}
Commit Message: https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=93587
Node::replaceChild() can create bad DOM topology with MutationEvent, Part 2
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
Source/WebCore:
This is a followup of r124156. replaceChild() has yet another hidden
MutationEvent trigger. This change added a guard for it.
Test: fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html
* dom/ContainerNode.cpp:
(WebCore::ContainerNode::replaceChild):
LayoutTests:
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/events/mutation-during-replace-child-2.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@125237 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 98,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void writepng_version_info(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, " Compiled with libpng %s; using libpng %s.\n",
PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING, png_libpng_ver);
fprintf(stderr, " Compiled with zlib %s; using zlib %s.\n",
ZLIB_VERSION, zlib_version);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GamepadProvider::DoRemoveSourceGamepadDataFetcher(GamepadSource source) {
DCHECK(polling_thread_->task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
for (GamepadFetcherVector::iterator it = data_fetchers_.begin();
it != data_fetchers_.end();) {
if ((*it)->source() == source) {
it = data_fetchers_.erase(it);
} else {
++it;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillManager::FillFormField(const AutofillProfile* profile,
AutofillFieldType type,
size_t variant,
webkit_glue::FormField* field) {
DCHECK(profile);
DCHECK_NE(AutofillType::CREDIT_CARD, AutofillType(type).group());
DCHECK(field);
if (AutofillType(type).subgroup() == AutofillType::PHONE_NUMBER) {
FillPhoneNumberField(profile, type, variant, field);
} else {
if (field->form_control_type == ASCIIToUTF16("select-one")) {
autofill::FillSelectControl(*profile, type, field);
} else {
std::vector<string16> values;
profile->GetMultiInfo(type, &values);
NormalizePhoneMultiInfo(type, profile->CountryCode(), &values);
DCHECK(variant < values.size());
field->value = values[variant];
}
}
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SessionStore::WriteBatch::WriteBatch(
std::unique_ptr<ModelTypeStore::WriteBatch> batch,
CommitCallback commit_cb,
syncer::OnceModelErrorHandler error_handler,
SyncedSessionTracker* session_tracker)
: batch_(std::move(batch)),
commit_cb_(std::move(commit_cb)),
error_handler_(std::move(error_handler)),
session_tracker_(session_tracker) {
DCHECK(batch_);
DCHECK(commit_cb_);
DCHECK(error_handler_);
DCHECK(session_tracker_);
}
Commit Message: Add trace event to sync_sessions::OnReadAllMetadata()
It is likely a cause of janks on UI thread on Android.
Add a trace event to get metrics about the duration.
BUG=902203
Change-Id: I4c4e9c2a20790264b982007ea7ee88ddfa7b972c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1319369
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606104}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_mvex_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVMuxContext *mov)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
int i;
avio_wb32(pb, 0x0); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "mvex");
for (i = 0; i < mov->nb_streams; i++)
mov_write_trex_tag(pb, &mov->tracks[i]);
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t curl_read(char *data, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *ctx)
{
php_curl *ch = (php_curl *)ctx;
php_curl_read *t = ch->handlers->read;
int length = 0;
switch (t->method) {
case PHP_CURL_DIRECT:
if (t->fp) {
length = fread(data, size, nmemb, t->fp);
}
break;
case PHP_CURL_USER: {
zval argv[3];
zval retval;
int error;
zend_fcall_info fci;
ZVAL_RES(&argv[0], ch->res);
Z_ADDREF(argv[0]);
if (t->res) {
ZVAL_RES(&argv[1], t->res);
Z_ADDREF(argv[1]);
} else {
ZVAL_NULL(&argv[1]);
}
ZVAL_LONG(&argv[2], (int)size * nmemb);
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = EG(function_table);
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(&fci.function_name, &t->func_name);
fci.object = NULL;
fci.retval = &retval;
fci.param_count = 3;
fci.params = argv;
fci.no_separation = 0;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
ch->in_callback = 1;
error = zend_call_function(&fci, &t->fci_cache);
ch->in_callback = 0;
if (error == FAILURE) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Cannot call the CURLOPT_READFUNCTION");
#if LIBCURL_VERSION_NUM >= 0x070c01 /* 7.12.1 */
length = CURL_READFUNC_ABORT;
#endif
} else if (!Z_ISUNDEF(retval)) {
_php_curl_verify_handlers(ch, 1);
if (Z_TYPE(retval) == IS_STRING) {
length = MIN((int) (size * nmemb), Z_STRLEN(retval));
memcpy(data, Z_STRVAL(retval), length);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[0]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[1]);
zval_ptr_dtor(&argv[2]);
break;
}
}
return length;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xRenderCreateAnimCursorReq);
CursorPtr *cursors;
CARD32 *deltas;
CursorPtr pCursor;
int ncursor;
xAnimCursorElt *elt;
int i;
int ret;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCreateAnimCursorReq);
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->cid, client);
if (client->req_len & 1)
return BadLength;
ncursor = (client->req_len - (bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xRenderCreateAnimCursorReq)))) >> 1;
cursors = malloc(ncursor * (sizeof (CursorPtr) + sizeof (CARD32)));
if (!cursors)
return BadAlloc;
deltas = (CARD32 *) (cursors + ncursor);
elt = (xAnimCursorElt *) (stuff + 1);
for (i = 0; i < ncursor; i++)
{
ret = dixLookupResourceByType((pointer *)(cursors + i), elt->cursor,
RT_CURSOR, client, DixReadAccess);
if (ret != Success)
{
free(cursors);
return ret;
}
deltas[i] = elt->delay;
elt++;
}
ret = AnimCursorCreate (cursors, deltas, ncursor, &pCursor, client,
stuff->cid);
free(cursors);
if (ret != Success)
return ret;
if (AddResource (stuff->cid, RT_CURSOR, (pointer)pCursor))
return Success;
return BadAlloc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,059 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void tracing_record_cmdline(struct task_struct *task)
{
tracing_record_taskinfo(task, TRACE_RECORD_CMDLINE);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,495 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_recv_msg_list(struct list_head *q)
{
struct ipmi_recv_msg *msg, *msg2;
list_for_each_entry_safe(msg, msg2, q, link) {
list_del(&msg->link);
ipmi_free_recv_msg(msg);
}
}
Commit Message: ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_add_and_init_slots(struct nfs4_slot_table *tbl,
struct nfs4_slot *new,
u32 max_slots,
u32 ivalue)
{
struct nfs4_slot *old = NULL;
u32 i;
spin_lock(&tbl->slot_tbl_lock);
if (new) {
old = tbl->slots;
tbl->slots = new;
tbl->max_slots = max_slots;
}
tbl->highest_used_slotid = NFS4_NO_SLOT;
for (i = 0; i < tbl->max_slots; i++)
tbl->slots[i].seq_nr = ivalue;
spin_unlock(&tbl->slot_tbl_lock);
kfree(old);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport void MagickError(const ExceptionType error,const char *reason,
const char *description)
{
if (error_handler != (ErrorHandler) NULL)
(*error_handler)(error,reason,description);
}
Commit Message: Suspend exception processing if there are too many exceptions
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationController::CopyStateFrom(const NavigationController& source) {
DCHECK(entry_count() == 0 && !pending_entry());
if (source.entry_count() == 0)
return; // Nothing new to do.
needs_reload_ = true;
InsertEntriesFrom(source, source.entry_count());
session_storage_namespace_ = source.session_storage_namespace_->Clone();
FinishRestore(source.last_committed_entry_index_, false);
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 99,871 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool FrameView::hasOpaqueBackground() const
{
return !m_isTransparent && !m_baseBackgroundColor.hasAlpha();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_read_support_format_zip_capabilities_streamable(struct archive_read * a)
{
(void)a; /* UNUSED */
return (ARCHIVE_READ_FORMAT_CAPS_ENCRYPT_DATA |
ARCHIVE_READ_FORMAT_CAPS_ENCRYPT_METADATA);
}
Commit Message: Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384
When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
the end of the allocated buffer.
This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
handling this type of entry:
1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
data sizes do not match.
2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
size is larger than 4MB.
3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
entry size.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 55,709 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::GoToIndex(int index) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser,navigation,benchmark",
"NavigationControllerImpl::GoToIndex");
if (index < 0 || index >= static_cast<int>(entries_.size())) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (transient_entry_index_ != -1) {
if (index == transient_entry_index_) {
return;
}
if (index > transient_entry_index_) {
index--;
}
}
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
DCHECK_EQ(nullptr, pending_entry_);
DCHECK_EQ(-1, pending_entry_index_);
pending_entry_ = entries_[index].get();
pending_entry_index_ = index;
pending_entry_->SetTransitionType(ui::PageTransitionFromInt(
pending_entry_->GetTransitionType() | ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_FORWARD_BACK));
NavigateToPendingEntry(ReloadType::NONE);
}
Commit Message: Do not use NavigationEntry to block history navigations.
This is no longer necessary after r477371.
BUG=777419
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: I701e4d4853858281b43e3743b12274dbeadfbf18
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/733959
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511942}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 150,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void attach_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p)
{
lockdep_assert_held(&rq->lock);
BUG_ON(task_rq(p) != rq);
activate_task(rq, p, ENQUEUE_NOCLOCK);
p->on_rq = TASK_ON_RQ_QUEUED;
check_preempt_curr(rq, p, 0);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_rdfxml_start_element_handler(void *user_data,
raptor_xml_element* xml_element)
{
raptor_parser* rdf_parser;
raptor_rdfxml_parser* rdf_xml_parser;
raptor_rdfxml_element* element;
int ns_attributes_count = 0;
raptor_qname** named_attrs = NULL;
int i;
int count_bumped = 0;
rdf_parser = (raptor_parser*)user_data;
rdf_xml_parser = (raptor_rdfxml_parser*)rdf_parser->context;
if(rdf_parser->failed)
return;
raptor_rdfxml_update_document_locator(rdf_parser);
/* Create new element structure */
element = RAPTOR_CALLOC(raptor_rdfxml_element*, 1, sizeof(*element));
if(!element) {
raptor_parser_fatal_error(rdf_parser, "Out of memory");
rdf_parser->failed = 1;
return;
}
element->world = rdf_parser->world;
element->xml_element = xml_element;
raptor_rdfxml_element_push(rdf_xml_parser, element);
named_attrs = raptor_xml_element_get_attributes(xml_element);
ns_attributes_count = raptor_xml_element_get_attributes_count(xml_element);
/* RDF-specific processing of attributes */
if(ns_attributes_count) {
raptor_qname** new_named_attrs;
int offset = 0;
raptor_rdfxml_element* parent_element;
parent_element = element->parent;
/* Allocate new array to move namespaced-attributes to if
* rdf processing is performed
*/
new_named_attrs = RAPTOR_CALLOC(raptor_qname**, ns_attributes_count,
sizeof(raptor_qname*));
if(!new_named_attrs) {
raptor_parser_fatal_error(rdf_parser, "Out of memory");
rdf_parser->failed = 1;
return;
}
for(i = 0; i < ns_attributes_count; i++) {
raptor_qname* attr = named_attrs[i];
/* If:
* 1 We are handling RDF content and RDF processing is allowed on
* this element
* OR
* 2 We are not handling RDF content and
* this element is at the top level (top level Desc. / typedNode)
* i.e. we have no parent
* then handle the RDF attributes
*/
if((parent_element &&
rdf_content_type_info[parent_element->child_content_type].rdf_processing) ||
!parent_element) {
/* Save pointers to some RDF M&S attributes */
/* If RDF namespace-prefixed attributes */
if(attr->nspace && attr->nspace->is_rdf_ms) {
const unsigned char *attr_name = attr->local_name;
int j;
for(j = 0; j <= RDF_NS_LAST; j++)
if(!strcmp((const char*)attr_name,
raptor_rdf_ns_terms_info[j].name)) {
element->rdf_attr[j] = attr->value;
element->rdf_attr_count++;
/* Delete it if it was stored elsewhere */
#ifdef RAPTOR_DEBUG_VERBOSE
RAPTOR_DEBUG3("Found RDF namespace attribute '%s' URI %s\n",
(char*)attr_name, attr->value);
#endif
/* make sure value isn't deleted from qname structure */
attr->value = NULL;
raptor_free_qname(attr);
attr = NULL;
break;
}
} /* end if RDF namespaced-prefixed attributes */
if(!attr)
continue;
/* If non namespace-prefixed RDF attributes found on an element */
if(RAPTOR_OPTIONS_GET_NUMERIC(rdf_parser, RAPTOR_OPTION_ALLOW_NON_NS_ATTRIBUTES) &&
!attr->nspace) {
const unsigned char *attr_name = attr->local_name;
int j;
for(j = 0; j <= RDF_NS_LAST; j++)
if(!strcmp((const char*)attr_name,
raptor_rdf_ns_terms_info[j].name)) {
element->rdf_attr[j] = attr->value;
element->rdf_attr_count++;
if(!raptor_rdf_ns_terms_info[j].allowed_unprefixed_on_attribute)
raptor_parser_warning(rdf_parser,
"Using rdf attribute '%s' without the RDF namespace has been deprecated.",
attr_name);
/* Delete it if it was stored elsewhere */
/* make sure value isn't deleted from qname structure */
attr->value = NULL;
raptor_free_qname(attr);
attr = NULL;
break;
}
} /* end if non-namespace prefixed RDF attributes */
if(!attr)
continue;
} /* end if leave literal XML alone */
if(attr)
new_named_attrs[offset++] = attr;
}
/* new attribute count is set from attributes that haven't been skipped */
ns_attributes_count = offset;
if(!ns_attributes_count) {
/* all attributes were deleted so delete the new array */
RAPTOR_FREE(raptor_qname_array, new_named_attrs);
new_named_attrs = NULL;
}
RAPTOR_FREE(raptor_qname_array, named_attrs);
named_attrs = new_named_attrs;
raptor_xml_element_set_attributes(xml_element,
named_attrs, ns_attributes_count);
} /* end if ns_attributes_count */
/* start from unknown; if we have a parent, it may set this */
element->state = RAPTOR_STATE_UNKNOWN;
element->content_type = RAPTOR_RDFXML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if(element->parent &&
element->parent->child_content_type != RAPTOR_RDFXML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
element->content_type = element->parent->child_content_type;
if(element->parent->content_type == RAPTOR_RDFXML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_TYPE_RESOURCE &&
element->content_type != RAPTOR_RDFXML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_TYPE_COLLECTION &&
element->content_type != RAPTOR_RDFXML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_TYPE_DAML_COLLECTION) {
raptor_qname* parent_el_name;
parent_el_name = raptor_xml_element_get_name(element->parent->xml_element);
/* If parent has an rdf:resource, this element should not be here */
raptor_parser_error(rdf_parser,
"property element '%s' has multiple object node elements, skipping.",
parent_el_name->local_name);
element->state = RAPTOR_STATE_SKIPPING;
element->content_type = RAPTOR_RDFXML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_TYPE_PRESERVED;
} else {
if(!element->parent->child_state) {
raptor_parser_fatal_error(rdf_parser,
"%s: Internal error: no parent element child_state set",
__func__);
return;
}
element->state = element->parent->child_state;
element->parent->xml_element->content_element_seen++;
count_bumped++;
/* leave literal XML alone */
if(!rdf_content_type_info[element->content_type].cdata_allowed) {
if(element->parent->xml_element->content_element_seen &&
element->parent->xml_element->content_cdata_seen) {
raptor_qname* parent_el_name;
parent_el_name = raptor_xml_element_get_name(element->parent->xml_element);
/* Uh oh - mixed content, the parent element has cdata too */
raptor_parser_warning(rdf_parser, "element '%s' has mixed content.",
parent_el_name->local_name);
}
/* If there is some existing all-whitespace content cdata
* before this node element, delete it
*/
if(element->parent->content_type == RAPTOR_RDFXML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_TYPE_PROPERTIES &&
element->parent->xml_element->content_element_seen &&
element->parent->content_cdata_all_whitespace &&
element->parent->xml_element->content_cdata_length) {
element->parent->content_type = RAPTOR_RDFXML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_TYPE_RESOURCE;
raptor_free_stringbuffer(element->parent->xml_element->content_cdata_sb);
element->parent->xml_element->content_cdata_sb = NULL;
element->parent->xml_element->content_cdata_length = 0;
}
} /* end if leave literal XML alone */
} /* end if parent has no rdf:resource */
} /* end if element->parent */
#ifdef RAPTOR_DEBUG_VERBOSE
RAPTOR_DEBUG2("Using content type %s\n",
rdf_content_type_info[element->content_type].name);
fprintf(stderr, "raptor_rdfxml_start_element_handler: Start ns-element: ");
raptor_print_xml_element(xml_element, stderr);
#endif
/* Check for non namespaced stuff when not in a parseType literal, other */
if(rdf_content_type_info[element->content_type].rdf_processing) {
const raptor_namespace* ns;
ns = raptor_xml_element_get_name(xml_element)->nspace;
/* The element */
/* If has no namespace or the namespace has no name (xmlns="") */
if((!ns || (ns && !raptor_namespace_get_uri(ns))) && element->parent) {
raptor_qname* parent_el_name;
parent_el_name = raptor_xml_element_get_name(element->parent->xml_element);
raptor_parser_error(rdf_parser,
"Using an element '%s' without a namespace is forbidden.",
parent_el_name->local_name);
element->state = RAPTOR_STATE_SKIPPING;
/* Remove count above so that parent thinks this is empty */
if(count_bumped)
element->parent->xml_element->content_element_seen--;
element->content_type = RAPTOR_RDFXML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_TYPE_PRESERVED;
}
/* Check for any remaining non-namespaced attributes */
if(named_attrs) {
for(i = 0; i < ns_attributes_count; i++) {
raptor_qname *attr = named_attrs[i];
/* Check if any attributes are non-namespaced */
if(!attr->nspace ||
(attr->nspace && !raptor_namespace_get_uri(attr->nspace))) {
raptor_parser_error(rdf_parser,
"Using an attribute '%s' without a namespace is forbidden.",
attr->local_name);
raptor_free_qname(attr);
named_attrs[i] = NULL;
}
}
}
}
if(element->rdf_attr[RDF_NS_aboutEach] ||
element->rdf_attr[RDF_NS_aboutEachPrefix]) {
raptor_parser_warning(rdf_parser,
"element '%s' has aboutEach / aboutEachPrefix, skipping.",
raptor_xml_element_get_name(xml_element)->local_name);
element->state = RAPTOR_STATE_SKIPPING;
/* Remove count above so that parent thinks this is empty */
if(count_bumped)
element->parent->xml_element->content_element_seen--;
element->content_type = RAPTOR_RDFXML_ELEMENT_CONTENT_TYPE_PRESERVED;
}
/* Right, now ready to enter the grammar */
raptor_rdfxml_start_element_grammar(rdf_parser, element);
return;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,024 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadRequestLimiter::TabDownloadState::OnContentSettingChanged(
const ContentSettingsPattern& primary_pattern,
const ContentSettingsPattern& secondary_pattern,
ContentSettingsType content_type,
const std::string& resource_identifier) {
if (content_type != CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_AUTOMATIC_DOWNLOADS)
return;
const ContentSettingsDetails details(primary_pattern, secondary_pattern,
content_type, resource_identifier);
const NavigationController& controller = web_contents()->GetController();
NavigationEntry* entry = controller.GetVisibleEntry();
GURL entry_url;
if (entry)
entry_url = entry->GetURL();
if (!details.update_all() && !details.primary_pattern().Matches(entry_url))
return;
HostContentSettingsMap* content_settings = GetContentSettings(web_contents());
if (!content_settings)
return;
ContentSetting setting = content_settings->GetContentSetting(
web_contents()->GetURL(), web_contents()->GetURL(),
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_AUTOMATIC_DOWNLOADS, std::string());
SetDownloadStatusAndNotifyImpl(GetDownloadStatusFromSetting(setting),
setting);
}
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::PlayInternal() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "playInternal(" << (void*)this << ")";
if (network_state_ == kNetworkEmpty)
InvokeResourceSelectionAlgorithm();
if (EndedPlayback(LoopCondition::kIgnored))
Seek(0);
if (paused_) {
paused_ = false;
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::play);
if (ready_state_ <= kHaveCurrentData)
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::waiting);
else if (ready_state_ >= kHaveFutureData)
ScheduleNotifyPlaying();
} else if (ready_state_ >= kHaveFutureData) {
ScheduleResolvePlayPromises();
}
can_autoplay_ = false;
SetIgnorePreloadNone();
UpdatePlayState();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnChannelConnected");
while (!queued_messages_.empty()) {
Send(queued_messages_.front());
queued_messages_.pop();
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
TBR=posciak@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalSetPortParams(
const OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE* port) {
if (port->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) {
mWidth = port->format.video.nFrameWidth;
mHeight = port->format.video.nFrameHeight;
mFramerate = port->format.video.xFramerate;
if (port->format.video.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar ||
port->format.video.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar ||
port->format.video.eColorFormat == OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque) {
mColorFormat = port->format.video.eColorFormat;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(kInputPortIndex)->mDef;
def->format.video.nFrameWidth = mWidth;
def->format.video.nFrameHeight = mHeight;
def->format.video.xFramerate = mFramerate;
def->format.video.eColorFormat = mColorFormat;
def = &editPortInfo(kOutputPortIndex)->mDef;
def->format.video.nFrameWidth = mWidth;
def->format.video.nFrameHeight = mHeight;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
} else if (port->nPortIndex == kOutputPortIndex) {
mBitrate = port->format.video.nBitrate;
mWidth = port->format.video.nFrameWidth;
mHeight = port->format.video.nFrameHeight;
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(kOutputPortIndex)->mDef;
def->format.video.nFrameWidth = mWidth;
def->format.video.nFrameHeight = mHeight;
def->format.video.nBitrate = mBitrate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,489 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_bmpcache(STREAM s)
{
RD_HBITMAP bitmap;
uint16 cache_idx, size;
uint8 cache_id, width, height, bpp, Bpp;
uint8 *data, *bmpdata;
uint16 bufsize, pad2, row_size, final_size;
uint8 pad1;
pad2 = row_size = final_size = 0xffff; /* Shut the compiler up */
in_uint8(s, cache_id);
in_uint8(s, pad1); /* pad */
in_uint8(s, width);
in_uint8(s, height);
in_uint8(s, bpp);
Bpp = (bpp + 7) / 8;
in_uint16_le(s, bufsize); /* bufsize */
in_uint16_le(s, cache_idx);
if (g_rdp_version >= RDP_V5)
{
size = bufsize;
}
else
{
/* Begin compressedBitmapData */
in_uint16_le(s, pad2); /* pad */
in_uint16_le(s, size);
/* in_uint8s(s, 4); *//* row_size, final_size */
in_uint16_le(s, row_size);
in_uint16_le(s, final_size);
}
in_uint8p(s, data, size);
logger(Graphics, Debug,
"process_bmpcache(), cx=%d, cy=%d, id=%d, idx=%d, bpp=%d, size=%d, pad1=%d, bufsize=%d, pad2=%d, rs=%d, fs=%d",
width, height, cache_id, cache_idx, bpp, size, pad1, bufsize, pad2, row_size,
final_size);
bmpdata = (uint8 *) xmalloc(width * height * Bpp);
if (bitmap_decompress(bmpdata, width, height, data, size, Bpp))
{
bitmap = ui_create_bitmap(width, height, bmpdata);
cache_put_bitmap(cache_id, cache_idx, bitmap);
}
else
{
logger(Graphics, Error, "process_bmpcache(), Failed to decompress bitmap data");
}
xfree(bmpdata);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cpuacct_percpu_seq_read(struct cgroup *cgroup, struct cftype *cft,
struct seq_file *m)
{
struct cpuacct *ca = cgroup_ca(cgroup);
u64 percpu;
int i;
for_each_present_cpu(i) {
percpu = cpuacct_cpuusage_read(ca, i);
seq_printf(m, "%llu ", (unsigned long long) percpu);
}
seq_printf(m, "\n");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rfcomm_sock_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
if (!sk)
return 0;
lock_sock(sk);
if (!sk->sk_shutdown) {
sk->sk_shutdown = SHUTDOWN_MASK;
__rfcomm_sock_close(sk);
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_LINGER) && sk->sk_lingertime)
err = bt_sock_wait_state(sk, BT_CLOSED, sk->sk_lingertime);
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix missing msg_namelen update in rfcomm_sock_recvmsg()
If RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP is set in the flags, rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() returns
early with 0 without updating the possibly set msg_namelen member. This,
in turn, leads to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_stream_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int register_blkdev(unsigned int major, const char *name)
{
struct blk_major_name **n, *p;
int index, ret = 0;
mutex_lock(&block_class_lock);
/* temporary */
if (major == 0) {
for (index = ARRAY_SIZE(major_names)-1; index > 0; index--) {
if (major_names[index] == NULL)
break;
}
if (index == 0) {
printk("register_blkdev: failed to get major for %s\n",
name);
ret = -EBUSY;
goto out;
}
major = index;
ret = major;
}
p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct blk_major_name), GFP_KERNEL);
if (p == NULL) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
p->major = major;
strlcpy(p->name, name, sizeof(p->name));
p->next = NULL;
index = major_to_index(major);
for (n = &major_names[index]; *n; n = &(*n)->next) {
if ((*n)->major == major)
break;
}
if (!*n)
*n = p;
else
ret = -EBUSY;
if (ret < 0) {
printk("register_blkdev: cannot get major %d for %s\n",
major, name);
kfree(p);
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&block_class_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: block: fix use-after-free in seq file
I got a KASAN report of use-after-free:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70 at addr ffff8800b6581508
Read of size 8 by task trinity-c1/315
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-32 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
INFO: Allocated in disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110 age=144 cpu=1 pid=315
___slab_alloc+0x4f1/0x520
__slab_alloc.isra.58+0x56/0x80
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x260/0x2a0
disk_seqf_start+0x66/0x110
traverse+0x176/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
INFO: Freed in disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50 age=160 cpu=1 pid=315
__slab_free+0x17a/0x2c0
kfree+0x20a/0x220
disk_seqf_stop+0x42/0x50
traverse+0x3b5/0x860
seq_read+0x7e3/0x11a0
proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
do_preadv+0x126/0x170
SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x1a1/0x460
return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
CPU: 1 PID: 315 Comm: trinity-c1 Tainted: G B 4.7.0+ #62
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
ffffea0002d96000 ffff880119b9f918 ffffffff81d6ce81 ffff88011a804480
ffff8800b6581500 ffff880119b9f948 ffffffff8146c7bd ffff88011a804480
ffffea0002d96000 ffff8800b6581500 fffffffffffffff4 ffff880119b9f970
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81d6ce81>] dump_stack+0x65/0x84
[<ffffffff8146c7bd>] print_trailer+0x10d/0x1a0
[<ffffffff814704ff>] object_err+0x2f/0x40
[<ffffffff814754d1>] kasan_report_error+0x221/0x520
[<ffffffff8147590e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40
[<ffffffff83888161>] klist_iter_exit+0x61/0x70
[<ffffffff82404389>] class_dev_iter_exit+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff81d2e8ea>] disk_seqf_stop+0x3a/0x50
[<ffffffff8151f812>] seq_read+0x4b2/0x11a0
[<ffffffff815f8fdc>] proc_reg_read+0xbc/0x180
[<ffffffff814b24e4>] do_loop_readv_writev+0x134/0x210
[<ffffffff814b4c45>] do_readv_writev+0x565/0x660
[<ffffffff814b8a17>] vfs_readv+0x67/0xa0
[<ffffffff814b8de6>] do_preadv+0x126/0x170
[<ffffffff814b92ec>] SyS_preadv+0xc/0x10
This problem can occur in the following situation:
open()
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // succeeds
- seqf->private = iter
- .seq_stop()
- kfree(seqf->private)
- pread()
- .seq_start()
- iter = kmalloc() // fails
- .seq_stop()
- class_dev_iter_exit(seqf->private) // boom! old pointer
As the comment in disk_seqf_stop() says, stop is called even if start
failed, so we need to reinitialise the private pointer to NULL when seq
iteration stops.
An alternative would be to set the private pointer to NULL when the
kmalloc() in disk_seqf_start() fails.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,714 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::RemoveObserver(RenderThreadObserver* observer) {
observer->UnregisterMojoInterfaces(&associated_interfaces_);
observers_.RemoveObserver(observer);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btm_sec_mkey_comp_event (UINT16 handle, UINT8 status, UINT8 key_flg)
{
tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC *p_dev_rec = btm_find_dev_by_handle (handle);
UINT8 bd_addr[BD_ADDR_LEN] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff} ;
BTM_TRACE_EVENT ("Security Manager: mkey comp status:%d State:%d",
status, (p_dev_rec) ? p_dev_rec->sec_state : 0);
/* If encryption setup failed, notify the waiting layer */
/* There is no next procedure or start of procedure failed, notify the waiting layer */
if (btm_cb.mkey_cback)
{
if (!p_dev_rec)
(btm_cb.mkey_cback)(bd_addr, status, key_flg );
else
(btm_cb.mkey_cback)(p_dev_rec->bd_addr, status, key_flg );
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Remove Porsche car-kit pairing workaround
Bug: 26551752
Change-Id: I14c5e3fcda0849874c8a94e48aeb7d09585617e1
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBlockFlow::moveAllChildrenIncludingFloatsTo(RenderBlock* toBlock, bool fullRemoveInsert)
{
RenderBlockFlow* toBlockFlow = toRenderBlockFlow(toBlock);
moveAllChildrenTo(toBlockFlow, fullRemoveInsert);
if (m_floatingObjects) {
if (!toBlockFlow->m_floatingObjects)
toBlockFlow->createFloatingObjects();
const FloatingObjectSet& fromFloatingObjectSet = m_floatingObjects->set();
FloatingObjectSetIterator end = fromFloatingObjectSet.end();
for (FloatingObjectSetIterator it = fromFloatingObjectSet.begin(); it != end; ++it) {
FloatingObject* floatingObject = *it;
if (toBlockFlow->containsFloat(floatingObject->renderer()))
continue;
toBlockFlow->m_floatingObjects->add(floatingObject->unsafeClone());
}
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ext4_ext_in_cache(struct inode *inode, ext4_lblk_t block,
struct ext4_extent *ex)
{
struct ext4_ext_cache *cex;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
int ret = 0;
/*
* We borrow i_block_reservation_lock to protect i_cached_extent
*/
spin_lock(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_block_reservation_lock);
cex = &EXT4_I(inode)->i_cached_extent;
sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
/* has cache valid data? */
if (cex->ec_len == 0)
goto errout;
if (in_range(block, cex->ec_block, cex->ec_len)) {
ex->ee_block = cpu_to_le32(cex->ec_block);
ext4_ext_store_pblock(ex, cex->ec_start);
ex->ee_len = cpu_to_le16(cex->ec_len);
ext_debug("%u cached by %u:%u:%llu\n",
block,
cex->ec_block, cex->ec_len, cex->ec_start);
ret = 1;
}
errout:
trace_ext4_ext_in_cache(inode, block, ret);
spin_unlock(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_block_reservation_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_get_address_string (DBusString *out, const char *basestring, const char *scope)
{
_dbus_string_init(out);
_dbus_string_append(out,basestring);
if (!scope)
{
return TRUE;
}
else if (strcmp(scope,"*install-path") == 0
|| strcmp(scope,"install-path") == 0)
{
DBusString temp;
if (!_dbus_get_install_root_as_hash(&temp))
{
_dbus_string_free(out);
return FALSE;
}
_dbus_string_append(out,"-");
_dbus_string_append(out,_dbus_string_get_const_data(&temp));
_dbus_string_free(&temp);
}
else if (strcmp(scope,"*user") == 0)
{
_dbus_string_append(out,"-");
if (!_dbus_append_user_from_current_process(out))
{
_dbus_string_free(out);
return FALSE;
}
}
else if (strlen(scope) > 0)
{
_dbus_string_append(out,"-");
_dbus_string_append(out,scope);
return TRUE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CommonNavigationParams MakeCommonNavigationParams(
const WebSecurityOrigin& current_origin,
std::unique_ptr<blink::WebNavigationInfo> info,
int load_flags,
bool prevent_sandboxed_download) {
DCHECK(!info->url_request.RequestorOrigin().IsNull());
Referrer referrer(
GURL(info->url_request.HttpHeaderField(WebString::FromUTF8("Referer"))
.Latin1()),
info->url_request.GetReferrerPolicy());
DCHECK(info->navigation_type != blink::kWebNavigationTypeBackForward);
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::Value navigation_type =
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::DIFFERENT_DOCUMENT;
if (info->navigation_type == blink::kWebNavigationTypeReload) {
if (load_flags & net::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE)
navigation_type = FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_BYPASSING_CACHE;
else
navigation_type = FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD;
}
base::Optional<SourceLocation> source_location;
if (!info->source_location.url.IsNull()) {
source_location = SourceLocation(info->source_location.url.Latin1(),
info->source_location.line_number,
info->source_location.column_number);
}
CSPDisposition should_check_main_world_csp =
info->should_check_main_world_content_security_policy ==
blink::kWebContentSecurityPolicyDispositionCheck
? CSPDisposition::CHECK
: CSPDisposition::DO_NOT_CHECK;
const RequestExtraData* extra_data =
static_cast<RequestExtraData*>(info->url_request.GetExtraData());
DCHECK(extra_data);
NavigationDownloadPolicy download_policy =
GetDownloadPolicy(prevent_sandboxed_download, info->is_opener_navigation,
info->url_request, current_origin);
return CommonNavigationParams(
info->url_request.Url(), info->url_request.RequestorOrigin(), referrer,
extra_data->transition_type(), navigation_type, download_policy,
info->frame_load_type == WebFrameLoadType::kReplaceCurrentItem, GURL(),
GURL(), static_cast<PreviewsState>(info->url_request.GetPreviewsState()),
base::TimeTicks::Now(), info->url_request.HttpMethod().Latin1(),
GetRequestBodyForWebURLRequest(info->url_request), source_location,
false /* started_from_context_menu */, info->url_request.HasUserGesture(),
InitiatorCSPInfo(
should_check_main_world_csp,
BuildContentSecurityPolicyList(info->url_request.GetInitiatorCSP()),
info->url_request.GetInitiatorCSP().self_source.has_value()
? base::Optional<CSPSource>(BuildCSPSource(
info->url_request.GetInitiatorCSP().self_source.value()))
: base::nullopt),
info->href_translate.Latin1(), info->input_start);
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void SetPSDPixel(Image *image,const size_t channels,
const ssize_t type,const size_t packet_size,const Quantum pixel,Quantum *q,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
PixelInfo
*color;
if (type == 0)
{
if (packet_size == 1)
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToChar(pixel),q);
else
SetPixelIndex(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(pixel),q);
}
color=image->colormap+(ssize_t) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,
GetPixelIndex(image,q),exception);
if ((type == 0) && (channels > 1))
return;
else
color->alpha=(MagickRealType) pixel;
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,color,q);
return;
}
switch (type)
{
case -1:
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case -2:
case 0:
{
SetPixelRed(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 1:
{
SetPixelGreen(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 2:
{
SetPixelBlue(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 3:
{
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
SetPixelBlack(image,pixel,q);
else
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
case 4:
{
if ((IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) != MagickFalse) &&
(channels > 3))
break;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,pixel,q);
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Slightly different fix for #714
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 95,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_release_lockowner_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs_release_lockowner_data *data = calldata;
struct nfs_server *server = data->server;
nfs40_sequence_done(task, &data->res.seq_res);
switch (task->tk_status) {
case 0:
renew_lease(server, data->timestamp);
break;
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
nfs4_schedule_lease_recovery(server->nfs_client);
break;
case -NFS4ERR_LEASE_MOVED:
case -NFS4ERR_DELAY:
if (nfs4_async_handle_error(task, server,
NULL, NULL) == -EAGAIN)
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
}
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,232 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebGLRenderingContext::getBufferParameterCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebGLRenderingContext.getBufferParameter()");
return getObjectParameter(args, kBuffer);
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAVC::setDeblockParams() {
IV_STATUS_T status;
ive_ctl_set_deblock_params_ip_t s_deblock_params_ip;
ive_ctl_set_deblock_params_op_t s_deblock_params_op;
s_deblock_params_ip.e_cmd = IVE_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_deblock_params_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVE_CMD_CTL_SET_DEBLOCK_PARAMS;
s_deblock_params_ip.u4_disable_deblock_level = mDisableDeblkLevel;
s_deblock_params_ip.u4_timestamp_high = -1;
s_deblock_params_ip.u4_timestamp_low = -1;
s_deblock_params_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_deblock_params_ip_t);
s_deblock_params_op.u4_size = sizeof(ive_ctl_set_deblock_params_op_t);
status = ive_api_function(mCodecCtx, &s_deblock_params_ip, &s_deblock_params_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Unable to enable/disable deblock params = 0x%x\n",
s_deblock_params_op.u4_error_code);
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 163,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int slave_enable_netpoll(struct slave *slave)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_all_descbuffers(struct b43_dmaring *ring)
{
struct b43_dmadesc_generic *desc;
struct b43_dmadesc_meta *meta;
int i;
if (!ring->used_slots)
return;
for (i = 0; i < ring->nr_slots; i++) {
desc = ring->ops->idx2desc(ring, i, &meta);
if (!meta->skb || b43_dma_ptr_is_poisoned(meta->skb)) {
B43_WARN_ON(!ring->tx);
continue;
}
if (ring->tx) {
unmap_descbuffer(ring, meta->dmaaddr,
meta->skb->len, 1);
} else {
unmap_descbuffer(ring, meta->dmaaddr,
ring->rx_buffersize, 0);
}
free_descriptor_buffer(ring, meta);
}
}
Commit Message: b43: allocate receive buffers big enough for max frame len + offset
Otherwise, skb_put inside of dma_rx can fail...
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32042
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_config (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *option,
t_hook_callback_config *callback, void *callback_data)
{
struct t_hook *new_hook;
struct t_hook_config *new_hook_config;
int priority;
const char *ptr_option;
if (!callback)
return NULL;
new_hook = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook));
if (!new_hook)
return NULL;
new_hook_config = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook_config));
if (!new_hook_config)
{
free (new_hook);
return NULL;
}
hook_get_priority_and_name (option, &priority, &ptr_option);
hook_init_data (new_hook, plugin, HOOK_TYPE_CONFIG, priority,
callback_data);
new_hook->hook_data = new_hook_config;
new_hook_config->callback = callback;
new_hook_config->option = strdup ((ptr_option) ? ptr_option :
((option) ? option : ""));
hook_add_to_list (new_hook);
return new_hook;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int AutoFillQueryXmlParser::GetIntValue(buzz::XmlParseContext* context,
const char* attribute) {
char* attr_end = NULL;
int value = strtol(attribute, &attr_end, 10);
if (attr_end != NULL && attr_end == attribute) {
context->RaiseError(XML_ERROR_SYNTAX);
return 0;
}
return value;
}
Commit Message: Add support for autofill server experiments
BUG=none
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutoFillMetricsTest.QualityMetricsWithExperimentId:AutoFillQueryXmlParserTest.ParseExperimentId
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6260027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@73216 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,932 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool MagicMaskCmp(const char* magic_entry,
const char* content,
size_t len,
const char* mask) {
while (len) {
if ((*magic_entry != '.') && (*magic_entry != (*mask & *content)))
return false;
++magic_entry;
++content;
++mask;
--len;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol"
This reverts commit 3519e867dc606437f804561f889d7ed95b95876a.
Reason for revert: crbug.com/786150. Application compatibility for Android WebView applications means we need to allow sniffing on that platform.
Original change's description:
> Don't sniff HTML from documents delivered via the file protocol
>
> To reduce attack surface, Chrome should not MIME-sniff to text/html for
> any document delivered via the file protocol. This change only impacts
> the file protocol (documents served via HTTP/HTTPS/etc are unaffected).
>
> Bug: 777737
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
> Change-Id: I7086454356b8d2d092be9e1bca0f5ff6dd3b62c0
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/751402
> Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Achuith Bhandarkar <achuith@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Asanka Herath <asanka@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#514372}
TBR=achuith@chromium.org,benwells@chromium.org,mmenke@chromium.org,sdefresne@chromium.org,asanka@chromium.org,elawrence@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 777737
Change-Id: I864ae060ce3277d41ea257ae75e0b80c51f3ea98
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/790790
Reviewed-by: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#519347}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,398 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_encode_test_stateid(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_test_stateid *test_stateid)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
struct nfsd4_test_stateid_id *stateid, *next;
__be32 *p;
if (nfserr)
return nfserr;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4 + (4 * test_stateid->ts_num_ids));
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
*p++ = htonl(test_stateid->ts_num_ids);
list_for_each_entry_safe(stateid, next, &test_stateid->ts_stateid_list, ts_id_list) {
*p++ = stateid->ts_id_status;
}
return nfserr;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,839 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void driver_disconnect(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct usb_dev_state *ps = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
unsigned int ifnum = intf->altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber;
if (!ps)
return;
/* NOTE: this relies on usbcore having canceled and completed
* all pending I/O requests; 2.6 does that.
*/
if (likely(ifnum < 8*sizeof(ps->ifclaimed)))
clear_bit(ifnum, &ps->ifclaimed);
else
dev_warn(&intf->dev, "interface number %u out of range\n",
ifnum);
usb_set_intfdata(intf, NULL);
/* force async requests to complete */
destroy_async_on_interface(ps, ifnum);
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::ForceRestoreContext() {
if (!isContextLost()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "restoreContext",
"context not lost");
return;
}
if (!restore_allowed_) {
if (context_lost_mode_ == kWebGLLoseContextLostContext)
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "restoreContext",
"context restoration not allowed");
return;
}
if (!restore_timer_.IsActive())
restore_timer_.StartOneShot(TimeDelta(), BLINK_FROM_HERE);
}
Commit Message: Tighten about IntRect use in WebGL with overflow detection
BUG=784183
TEST=test case in the bug in ASAN build
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ie25ca328af99de7828e28e6a6e3d775f1bebc43f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/811826
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522213}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 146,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit FrameNavigateParamsCapturer(FrameTreeNode* node)
: WebContentsObserver(
node->current_frame_host()->delegate()->GetAsWebContents()),
frame_tree_node_id_(node->frame_tree_node_id()),
navigations_remaining_(1),
wait_for_load_(true),
message_loop_runner_(new MessageLoopRunner) {}
Commit Message: Abort navigations on 304 responses.
A recent change (https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1161479)
accidentally resulted in treating 304 responses as downloads. This CL
treats them as ERR_ABORTED instead. This doesn't exactly match old
behavior, which passed them on to the renderer, which then aborted them.
The new code results in correctly restoring the original URL in the
omnibox, and has a shiny new test to prevent future regressions.
Bug: 882270
Change-Id: Ic73dcce9e9596d43327b13acde03b4ed9bd0c82e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1252684
Commit-Queue: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#595641}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ikev1_vid_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_VID)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_VID)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14469/ISAKMP: Add a missing bounds check
In ikev1_n_print() check bounds before trying to fetch the replay detection
status.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void snd_msnd_mpu401_close(struct snd_mpu401 *mpu)
{
snd_msnd_send_dsp_cmd(mpu->private_data, HDEX_MIDI_IN_STOP);
snd_msnd_disable_irq(mpu->private_data);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: msnd: Optimize / harden DSP and MIDI loops
The ISA msnd drivers have loops fetching the ring-buffer head, tail
and size values inside the loops. Such codes are inefficient and
fragile.
This patch optimizes it, and also adds the sanity check to avoid the
endless loops.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196131
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196133
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 64,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProfileNameIdleTimeMap* ScriptProfiler::currentProfileNameIdleTimeMap()
{
AtomicallyInitializedStatic(WTF::ThreadSpecific<ProfileNameIdleTimeMap>*, map = new WTF::ThreadSpecific<ProfileNameIdleTimeMap>);
return *map;
}
Commit Message: Fix clobbered build issue.
TBR=jochen@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
BUG=269698
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22425005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155711 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SafeBrowsingBlockingPageV1::PopulateMalwareStringDictionary(
DictionaryValue* strings) {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: Check for a negative integer properly.
BUG=169966
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11892002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176879 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 115,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_sched_group(struct task_group *tg)
{
free_fair_sched_group(tg);
free_rt_sched_group(tg);
kfree(tg);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,434 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ut64 java_get_method_start () {
return METHOD_START;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10296 - Heap out of bounds read in java_switch_op()
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,019 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_add_renderer(SpiceServer *s, const char *name)
{
spice_assert(reds == s);
if (!red_dispatcher_add_renderer(name)) {
return -1;
}
default_renderer = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,951 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExecutableAllocator::initializeAllocator()
{
ASSERT(!allocator);
allocator = new FixedVMPoolExecutableAllocator();
CodeProfiling::notifyAllocator(allocator);
}
Commit Message: Add missing sys/mman.h include on Mac
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=98089
Patch by Jonathan Liu <net147@gmail.com> on 2013-01-16
Reviewed by Darin Adler.
The madvise function and MADV_FREE constant require sys/mman.h.
* jit/ExecutableAllocatorFixedVMPool.cpp:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@139926 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,928 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::SendReturnedDelegatedResources(
uint32 output_surface_id) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* host = client_->GetHost();
cc::CompositorFrameAck ack;
if (!surface_returned_resources_.empty()) {
ack.resources.swap(surface_returned_resources_);
} else {
DCHECK(resource_collection_);
resource_collection_->TakeUnusedResourcesForChildCompositor(&ack.resources);
}
DCHECK(!ack.resources.empty());
RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendReclaimCompositorResources(
host->GetRoutingID(),
output_surface_id,
host->GetProcess()->GetID(),
ack);
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RuntimeCustomBindings::GetManifest(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
CHECK(context()->extension());
scoped_ptr<V8ValueConverter> converter(V8ValueConverter::create());
args.GetReturnValue().Set(converter->ToV8Value(
context()->extension()->manifest()->value(), context()->v8_context()));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,633 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ctrl_alt_del(void)
{
static DECLARE_WORK(cad_work, deferred_cad);
if (C_A_D)
schedule_work(&cad_work);
else
kill_cad_pid(SIGINT, 1);
}
Commit Message: kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-16 | 0 | 21,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PermissionsData::PermissionsData(const Extension* extension)
: extension_id_(extension->id()), manifest_type_(extension->GetType()) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(runtime_lock_);
scoped_refptr<const PermissionSet> required_permissions =
PermissionsParser::GetRequiredPermissions(extension);
active_permissions_unsafe_ =
new PermissionSet(required_permissions->apis(),
required_permissions->manifest_permissions(),
required_permissions->explicit_hosts(),
required_permissions->scriptable_hosts());
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 120,656 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<BlobDataHandle> BlobStorageContext::BuildPreregisteredBlob(
const BlobDataBuilder& content,
const TransportAllowedCallback& transport_allowed_callback) {
BlobEntry* entry = registry_.GetEntry(content.uuid());
DCHECK(entry);
DCHECK_EQ(BlobStatus::PENDING_CONSTRUCTION, entry->status());
entry->set_size(0);
return BuildBlobInternal(entry, content, transport_allowed_callback);
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 150,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SafeSock::put_bytes(const void *data, int sz)
{
int bytesPut, l_out;
unsigned char * dta = 0;
if (get_encryption()) {
if (!wrap((unsigned char *)data, sz, dta , l_out)) {
dprintf(D_SECURITY, "Encryption failed\n");
return -1; // encryption failed!
}
}
else {
dta = (unsigned char *) malloc(sz);
memcpy(dta, data, sz);
}
if (mdChecker_) {
mdChecker_->addMD(dta, sz);
}
bytesPut = _outMsg.putn((char *)dta, sz);
free(dta);
return bytesPut;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,291 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gchar* webkit_web_view_get_selected_text(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), 0);
Frame* frame = core(webView)->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame();
return g_strdup(frame->editor()->selectedText().utf8().data());
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_inflate_read(png_structrp png_ptr, png_bytep read_buffer, uInt read_size,
png_uint_32p chunk_bytes, png_bytep next_out, png_alloc_size_t *out_size,
int finish)
{
if (png_ptr->zowner == png_ptr->chunk_name)
{
int ret;
/* next_in and avail_in must have been initialized by the caller. */
png_ptr->zstream.next_out = next_out;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = 0; /* set in the loop */
do
{
if (png_ptr->zstream.avail_in == 0)
{
if (read_size > *chunk_bytes)
read_size = (uInt)*chunk_bytes;
*chunk_bytes -= read_size;
if (read_size > 0)
png_crc_read(png_ptr, read_buffer, read_size);
png_ptr->zstream.next_in = read_buffer;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = read_size;
}
if (png_ptr->zstream.avail_out == 0)
{
uInt avail = ZLIB_IO_MAX;
if (avail > *out_size)
avail = (uInt)*out_size;
*out_size -= avail;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = avail;
}
/* Use Z_SYNC_FLUSH when there is no more chunk data to ensure that all
* the available output is produced; this allows reading of truncated
* streams.
*/
ret = PNG_INFLATE(png_ptr, *chunk_bytes > 0 ?
Z_NO_FLUSH : (finish ? Z_FINISH : Z_SYNC_FLUSH));
}
while (ret == Z_OK && (*out_size > 0 || png_ptr->zstream.avail_out > 0));
*out_size += png_ptr->zstream.avail_out;
png_ptr->zstream.avail_out = 0; /* Should not be required, but is safe */
/* Ensure the error message pointer is always set: */
png_zstream_error(png_ptr, ret);
return ret;
}
else
{
png_ptr->zstream.msg = PNGZ_MSG_CAST("zstream unclaimed");
return Z_STREAM_ERROR;
}
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 79,752 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _tiffCloseProc(thandle_t fd)
{
return (close((int) fd));
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 86,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostViewAura::RenderWidgetHostViewAura(RenderWidgetHost* host)
: host_(RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(host)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(window_(new aura::Window(this))),
in_shutdown_(false),
is_fullscreen_(false),
popup_parent_host_view_(NULL),
popup_child_host_view_(NULL),
is_loading_(false),
text_input_type_(ui::TEXT_INPUT_TYPE_NONE),
can_compose_inline_(true),
has_composition_text_(false),
device_scale_factor_(1.0f),
current_surface_(0),
current_surface_is_protected_(true),
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_(true),
protection_state_id_(0),
surface_route_id_(0),
paint_canvas_(NULL),
synthetic_move_sent_(false),
accelerated_compositing_state_changed_(false),
can_lock_compositor_(YES) {
host_->SetView(this);
window_observer_.reset(new WindowObserver(this));
window_->AddObserver(window_observer_.get());
aura::client::SetTooltipText(window_, &tooltip_);
aura::client::SetActivationDelegate(window_, this);
gfx::Screen::GetScreenFor(window_)->AddObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dequeue_task_fair(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int flags)
{
struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq;
struct sched_entity *se = &p->se;
int task_sleep = flags & DEQUEUE_SLEEP;
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
dequeue_entity(cfs_rq, se, flags);
/*
* end evaluation on encountering a throttled cfs_rq
*
* note: in the case of encountering a throttled cfs_rq we will
* post the final h_nr_running decrement below.
*/
if (cfs_rq_throttled(cfs_rq))
break;
cfs_rq->h_nr_running--;
/* Don't dequeue parent if it has other entities besides us */
if (cfs_rq->load.weight) {
/* Avoid re-evaluating load for this entity: */
se = parent_entity(se);
/*
* Bias pick_next to pick a task from this cfs_rq, as
* p is sleeping when it is within its sched_slice.
*/
if (task_sleep && se && !throttled_hierarchy(cfs_rq))
set_next_buddy(se);
break;
}
flags |= DEQUEUE_SLEEP;
}
for_each_sched_entity(se) {
cfs_rq = cfs_rq_of(se);
cfs_rq->h_nr_running--;
if (cfs_rq_throttled(cfs_rq))
break;
update_load_avg(cfs_rq, se, UPDATE_TG);
update_cfs_group(se);
}
if (!se)
sub_nr_running(rq, 1);
util_est_dequeue(&rq->cfs, p, task_sleep);
hrtick_update(rq);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,526 |
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