instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_cmap_gray_direct(frac gray, gx_device_color * pdc, const gs_gstate * pgs,
gx_device * dev, gs_color_select_t select)
{
int i,ncomps;
frac cm_comps[GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS];
gx_color_value cv[GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS];
gx_color_index color;
gx_device *trans_device;
/* If trans device is set, we need to use its procs. */
if (pgs->trans_device != NULL) {
trans_device = pgs->trans_device;
} else {
trans_device = dev;
}
ncomps = trans_device->color_info.num_components;
/* map to the color model */
dev_proc(trans_device, get_color_mapping_procs)(trans_device)->map_gray(trans_device, gray, cm_comps);
/* If we are in a Gray blending color space and have spots then we have
* possibly an issue here with the transfer function */
if (pgs->trans_device != NULL) {
cv[0] = frac2cv(gx_map_color_frac(pgs, cm_comps[0], effective_transfer[0]));
for (i = 1; i < ncomps; i++)
cv[i] = gx_color_value_from_byte(cm_comps[i]);
} else {
/* Not a transparency device. Just use the transfer functions directly */
for (i = 0; i < ncomps; i++)
cv[i] = frac2cv(gx_map_color_frac(pgs, cm_comps[i], effective_transfer[i]));
}
/* if output device supports devn, we need to make sure we send it the
proper color type. We now support Gray + spots as devn colors */
if (dev_proc(trans_device, dev_spec_op)(trans_device, gxdso_supports_devn, NULL, 0)) {
for (i = 0; i < ncomps; i++)
pdc->colors.devn.values[i] = cv[i];
pdc->type = gx_dc_type_devn;
} else {
/* encode as a color index */
color = dev_proc(trans_device, encode_color)(trans_device, cv);
/* check if the encoding was successful; we presume failure is rare */
if (color != gx_no_color_index)
color_set_pure(pdc, color);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void checkListProperties(sqlite3 *db){
sqlite3 *p;
for(p=sqlite3BlockedList; p; p=p->pNextBlocked){
int seen = 0;
sqlite3 *p2;
/* Verify property (1) */
assert( p->pUnlockConnection || p->pBlockingConnection );
/* Verify property (2) */
for(p2=sqlite3BlockedList; p2!=p; p2=p2->pNextBlocked){
if( p2->xUnlockNotify==p->xUnlockNotify ) seen = 1;
assert( p2->xUnlockNotify==p->xUnlockNotify || !seen );
assert( db==0 || p->pUnlockConnection!=db );
assert( db==0 || p->pBlockingConnection!=db );
}
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,
struct posix_acl **pacl, struct posix_acl **dpacl,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct posix_acl_state effective_acl_state, default_acl_state;
struct nfs4_ace *ace;
int ret;
ret = init_state(&effective_acl_state, acl->naces);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = init_state(&default_acl_state, acl->naces);
if (ret)
goto out_estate;
ret = -EINVAL;
for (ace = acl->aces; ace < acl->aces + acl->naces; ace++) {
if (ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE &&
ace->type != NFS4_ACE_ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE)
goto out_dstate;
if (ace->flag & ~NFS4_SUPPORTED_FLAGS)
goto out_dstate;
if ((ace->flag & NFS4_INHERITANCE_FLAGS) == 0) {
process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
continue;
}
if (!(flags & NFS4_ACL_DIR))
goto out_dstate;
/*
* Note that when only one of FILE_INHERIT or DIRECTORY_INHERIT
* is set, we're effectively turning on the other. That's OK,
* according to rfc 3530.
*/
process_one_v4_ace(&default_acl_state, ace);
if (!(ace->flag & NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE))
process_one_v4_ace(&effective_acl_state, ace);
}
*pacl = posix_state_to_acl(&effective_acl_state, flags);
if (IS_ERR(*pacl)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(*pacl);
*pacl = NULL;
goto out_dstate;
}
*dpacl = posix_state_to_acl(&default_acl_state,
flags | NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT);
if (IS_ERR(*dpacl)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(*dpacl);
*dpacl = NULL;
posix_acl_release(*pacl);
*pacl = NULL;
goto out_dstate;
}
sort_pacl(*pacl);
sort_pacl(*dpacl);
ret = 0;
out_dstate:
free_state(&default_acl_state);
out_estate:
free_state(&effective_acl_state);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 55,775 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," orig=("));
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp,
(ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2, map, nmap);
}
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
break;
case ISAKMP_NTYPE_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN:
if (ikev1_sub_print(ndo, ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SA,
(const struct isakmp_gen *)cp, ep, phase, doi, proto,
depth) == NULL)
return NULL;
break;
default:
/* NULL is dummy */
isakmp_print(ndo, cp,
item_len - sizeof(*p) - n.spi_size,
NULL);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12896/ISAKMP: Do bounds checks in isakmp_rfc3948_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 95,109 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PlatformSensorLinux::UpdatePlatformSensorReading(SensorReading reading) {
DCHECK(task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (GetReportingMode() == mojom::ReportingMode::ON_CHANGE &&
!HaveValuesChanged(reading, old_values_)) {
return;
}
old_values_ = reading;
reading.raw.timestamp =
(base::TimeTicks::Now() - base::TimeTicks()).InSecondsF();
UpdateSharedBufferAndNotifyClients(reading);
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 148,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ZSTD_minCLevel(void) { return (int)-ZSTD_TARGETLENGTH_MAX; }
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ManagementAPIDelegate* ChromeExtensionsAPIClient::CreateManagementAPIDelegate()
const {
return new ChromeManagementAPIDelegate;
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,536 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: le4(const unsigned char *p)
{
return ((p[0] << 16) + (((int64_t)p[1]) << 24) + (p[2] << 0) + (p[3] << 8));
}
Commit Message: Reject cpio symlinks that exceed 1MB
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 52,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderThreadImpl::IsElasticOverscrollEnabled() {
return is_elastic_overscroll_enabled_;
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,541 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::VaapiVP9Accelerator::OutputPicture(
const scoped_refptr<VP9Picture>& pic) {
scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface> dec_surface =
VP9PictureToVaapiDecodeSurface(pic);
dec_surface->set_visible_rect(pic->visible_rect);
vaapi_dec_->SurfaceReady(dec_surface);
return true;
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 172,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ImageLoader::dispatchPendingLoadEvents() {
loadEventSender().dispatchPendingEvents();
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mojom::RouteProvider* RenderProcessHostImpl::GetRemoteRouteProvider() {
return remote_route_provider_.get();
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,264 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TRBCCode xhci_alloc_device_streams(XHCIState *xhci, unsigned int slotid,
uint32_t epmask)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctxs[30];
USBEndpoint *eps[30];
int i, r, nr_eps, req_nr_streams, dev_max_streams;
nr_eps = xhci_epmask_to_eps_with_streams(xhci, slotid, epmask, epctxs,
eps);
if (nr_eps == 0) {
return CC_SUCCESS;
}
req_nr_streams = epctxs[0]->nr_pstreams;
dev_max_streams = eps[0]->max_streams;
for (i = 1; i < nr_eps; i++) {
/*
* HdG: I don't expect these to ever trigger, but if they do we need
* to come up with another solution, ie group identical endpoints
* together and make an usb_device_alloc_streams call per group.
*/
if (epctxs[i]->nr_pstreams != req_nr_streams) {
FIXME("guest streams config not identical for all eps");
return CC_RESOURCE_ERROR;
}
if (eps[i]->max_streams != dev_max_streams) {
FIXME("device streams config not identical for all eps");
return CC_RESOURCE_ERROR;
}
}
/*
* max-streams in both the device descriptor and in the controller is a
* power of 2. But stream id 0 is reserved, so if a device can do up to 4
* streams the guest will ask for 5 rounded up to the next power of 2 which
* becomes 8. For emulated devices usb_device_alloc_streams is a nop.
*
* For redirected devices however this is an issue, as there we must ask
* the real xhci controller to alloc streams, and the host driver for the
* real xhci controller will likely disallow allocating more streams then
* the device can handle.
*
* So we limit the requested nr_streams to the maximum number the device
* can handle.
*/
if (req_nr_streams > dev_max_streams) {
req_nr_streams = dev_max_streams;
}
r = usb_device_alloc_streams(eps[0]->dev, eps, nr_eps, req_nr_streams);
if (r != 0) {
DPRINTF("xhci: alloc streams failed\n");
return CC_RESOURCE_ERROR;
}
return CC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaStreamType video_type() const { return video_type_; }
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper::~PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelper() {}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::registerNodeList(const LiveNodeListBase* list)
{
#if ENABLE(OILPAN)
m_nodeLists[list->invalidationType()].add(list);
#else
m_nodeListCounts[list->invalidationType()]++;
#endif
if (list->isRootedAtDocument())
m_listsInvalidatedAtDocument.add(list);
}
Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 125,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool only_dnatted(const struct ip_tunnel *tunnel,
const struct in6_addr *v6dst)
{
int prefix_len;
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD
prefix_len = tunnel->ip6rd.prefixlen + 32
- tunnel->ip6rd.relay_prefixlen;
#else
prefix_len = 48;
#endif
return ipv6_chk_custom_prefix(v6dst, prefix_len, tunnel->dev);
}
Commit Message: net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: des3_encrypt_ecb(const unsigned char *key, int keysize,
const unsigned char *input, int length, unsigned char *output)
{
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH] = { 0 };
unsigned char bKey[24] = { 0 };
if (keysize == 16) {
memcpy(&bKey[0], key, 16);
memcpy(&bKey[16], key, 8);
}
else {
memcpy(&bKey[0], key, 24);
}
return openssl_enc(EVP_des_ede3(), bKey, iv, input, length, output);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,376 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PDFiumEngine::FindTextIndex::FindTextIndex()
: valid_(false), index_(0) {
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int opfsave(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY &&
op->operands[0].type & OT_DWORD ) {
data[l++] = 0x9b;
data[l++] = 0xdd;
data[l++] = 0x30 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ovl_dir_cache *ovl_dir_cache(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct ovl_entry *oe = dentry->d_fsdata;
return oe->cache;
}
Commit Message: fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 74,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::Trace(blink::Visitor* visitor) {
visitor->Trace(input_type_);
visitor->Trace(input_type_view_);
visitor->Trace(list_attribute_target_observer_);
visitor->Trace(image_loader_);
TextControlElement::Trace(visitor);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void inet_sk_rx_dst_set(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
if (dst && dst_hold_safe(dst)) {
sk->sk_rx_dst = dst;
inet_sk(sk)->rx_dst_ifindex = skb->skb_iif;
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 49,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PPResultAndExceptionToNPResult::ThrowException() {
scoped_refptr<StringVar> string(StringVar::FromPPVar(exception_));
if (string) {
WebBindings::setException(object_var_, string->value().c_str());
}
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 100,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ContentSecurityPolicy::shouldSendViolationReport(
const String& report) const {
return !m_violationReportsSent.contains(report.impl()->hash());
}
Commit Message: CSP: Strip the fragment from reported URLs.
We should have been stripping the fragment from the URL we report for
CSP violations, but we weren't. Now we are, by running the URLs through
`stripURLForUseInReport()`, which implements the stripping algorithm
from CSP2: https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#strip-uri-for-reporting
Eventually, we will migrate more completely to the CSP3 world that
doesn't require such detailed stripping, as it exposes less data to the
reports, but we're not there yet.
BUG=678776
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2619783002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#458045}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Document::EnsureIntersectionObserverController() {
if (!intersection_observer_controller_)
intersection_observer_controller_ =
IntersectionObserverController::Create(this);
return *intersection_observer_controller_;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Dispatcher::PopulateSourceMap() {
const std::vector<std::pair<std::string, int> > resources = GetJsResources();
for (std::vector<std::pair<std::string, int> >::const_iterator resource =
resources.begin();
resource != resources.end();
++resource) {
source_map_.RegisterSource(resource->first, resource->second);
}
delegate_->PopulateSourceMap(&source_map_);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,573 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int modbus_get_indication_timeout(modbus_t *ctx, uint32_t *to_sec, uint32_t *to_usec)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
*to_sec = ctx->indication_timeout.tv_sec;
*to_usec = ctx->indication_timeout.tv_usec;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 88,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int gup_huge_pud(pud_t orig, pud_t *pudp, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long end, int write, struct page **pages, int *nr)
{
struct page *head, *page;
int refs;
if (write && !pud_write(orig))
return 0;
refs = 0;
head = pud_page(orig);
page = head + ((addr & ~PUD_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
do {
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(compound_head(page) != head, page);
pages[*nr] = page;
(*nr)++;
page++;
refs++;
} while (addr += PAGE_SIZE, addr != end);
if (!page_cache_add_speculative(head, refs)) {
*nr -= refs;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(pud_val(orig) != pud_val(*pudp))) {
*nr -= refs;
while (refs--)
put_page(head);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: mm: remove gup_flags FOLL_WRITE games from __get_user_pages()
This is an ancient bug that was actually attempted to be fixed once
(badly) by me eleven years ago in commit 4ceb5db9757a ("Fix
get_user_pages() race for write access") but that was then undone due to
problems on s390 by commit f33ea7f404e5 ("fix get_user_pages bug").
In the meantime, the s390 situation has long been fixed, and we can now
fix it by checking the pte_dirty() bit properly (and do it better). The
s390 dirty bit was implemented in abf09bed3cce ("s390/mm: implement
software dirty bits") which made it into v3.9. Earlier kernels will
have to look at the page state itself.
Also, the VM has become more scalable, and what used a purely
theoretical race back then has become easier to trigger.
To fix it, we introduce a new internal FOLL_COW flag to mark the "yes,
we already did a COW" rather than play racy games with FOLL_WRITE that
is very fundamental, and then use the pte dirty flag to validate that
the FOLL_COW flag is still valid.
Reported-and-tested-by: Phil "not Paul" Oester <kernel@linuxace.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 52,113 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cf2_hintmap_isValid( const CF2_HintMap hintmap )
{
return hintmap->isValid;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CWebServer::StartServer(server_settings & settings, const std::string & serverpath, const bool bIgnoreUsernamePassword)
{
m_server_alias = (settings.is_secure() == true) ? "SSL" : "HTTP";
if (!settings.is_enabled())
return true;
ReloadCustomSwitchIcons();
int tries = 0;
bool exception = false;
do {
try {
exception = false;
m_pWebEm = new http::server::cWebem(settings, serverpath.c_str());
}
catch (std::exception& e) {
exception = true;
switch (tries) {
case 0:
settings.listening_address = "::";
break;
case 1:
settings.listening_address = "0.0.0.0";
break;
case 2:
_log.Log(LOG_ERROR, "WebServer(%s) startup failed on address %s with port: %s: %s", m_server_alias.c_str(), settings.listening_address.c_str(), settings.listening_port.c_str(), e.what());
if (atoi(settings.listening_port.c_str()) < 1024)
_log.Log(LOG_ERROR, "WebServer(%s) check privileges for opening ports below 1024", m_server_alias.c_str());
else
_log.Log(LOG_ERROR, "WebServer(%s) check if no other application is using port: %s", m_server_alias.c_str(), settings.listening_port.c_str());
return false;
}
tries++;
}
} while (exception);
_log.Log(LOG_STATUS, "WebServer(%s) started on address: %s with port %s", m_server_alias.c_str(), settings.listening_address.c_str(), settings.listening_port.c_str());
m_pWebEm->SetDigistRealm("Domoticz.com");
m_pWebEm->SetSessionStore(this);
if (!bIgnoreUsernamePassword)
{
LoadUsers();
std::string WebLocalNetworks;
int nValue;
if (m_sql.GetPreferencesVar("WebLocalNetworks", nValue, WebLocalNetworks))
{
std::vector<std::string> strarray;
StringSplit(WebLocalNetworks, ";", strarray);
for (const auto & itt : strarray)
m_pWebEm->AddLocalNetworks(itt);
m_pWebEm->AddLocalNetworks("");
}
}
std::string WebRemoteProxyIPs;
int nValue;
if (m_sql.GetPreferencesVar("WebRemoteProxyIPs", nValue, WebRemoteProxyIPs))
{
std::vector<std::string> strarray;
StringSplit(WebRemoteProxyIPs, ";", strarray);
for (const auto & itt : strarray)
m_pWebEm->AddRemoteProxyIPs(itt);
}
m_pWebEm->RegisterIncludeCode("switchtypes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::DisplaySwitchTypesCombo, this, _1));
m_pWebEm->RegisterIncludeCode("metertypes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::DisplayMeterTypesCombo, this, _1));
m_pWebEm->RegisterIncludeCode("timertypes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::DisplayTimerTypesCombo, this, _1));
m_pWebEm->RegisterIncludeCode("combolanguage", boost::bind(&CWebServer::DisplayLanguageCombo, this, _1));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/json.htm", boost::bind(&CWebServer::GetJSonPage, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/uploadcustomicon", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Post_UploadCustomIcon, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/html5.appcache", boost::bind(&CWebServer::GetAppCache, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/camsnapshot.jpg", boost::bind(&CWebServer::GetCameraSnapshot, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/backupdatabase.php", boost::bind(&CWebServer::GetDatabaseBackup, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/raspberry.cgi", boost::bind(&CWebServer::GetInternalCameraSnapshot, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/uvccapture.cgi", boost::bind(&CWebServer::GetInternalCameraSnapshot, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/images/floorplans/plan", boost::bind(&CWebServer::GetFloorplanImage, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("storesettings", boost::bind(&CWebServer::PostSettings, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("setrfxcommode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::SetRFXCOMMode, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("rfxupgradefirmware", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RFXComUpgradeFirmware, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("rfxfirmwaregetpercentage", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_RFXComGetFirmwarePercentage, this, _1, _2, _3), true);
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("setrego6xxtype", boost::bind(&CWebServer::SetRego6XXType, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("sets0metertype", boost::bind(&CWebServer::SetS0MeterType, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("setlimitlesstype", boost::bind(&CWebServer::SetLimitlessType, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("uploadfloorplanimage", boost::bind(&CWebServer::UploadFloorplanImage, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("setopenthermsettings", boost::bind(&CWebServer::SetOpenThermSettings, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("sendopenthermcommand", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SendOpenThermCommand, this, _1, _2, _3), true);
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("reloadpiface", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ReloadPiFace, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("setcurrentcostmetertype", boost::bind(&CWebServer::SetCurrentCostUSBType, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("restoredatabase", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RestoreDatabase, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("sbfspotimportolddata", boost::bind(&CWebServer::SBFSpotImportOldData, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterActionCode("event_create", boost::bind(&CWebServer::EventCreate, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getlanguage", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetLanguage, this, _1, _2, _3), true);
RegisterCommandCode("getthemes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetThemes, this, _1, _2, _3), true);
RegisterCommandCode("gettitle", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetTitle, this, _1, _2, _3), true);
RegisterCommandCode("logincheck", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_LoginCheck, this, _1, _2, _3), true);
RegisterCommandCode("getversion", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetVersion, this, _1, _2, _3), true);
RegisterCommandCode("getlog", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetLog, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("clearlog", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ClearLog, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getauth", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetAuth, this, _1, _2, _3), true);
RegisterCommandCode("getuptime", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetUptime, this, _1, _2, _3), true);
RegisterCommandCode("gethardwaretypes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetHardwareTypes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addhardware", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddHardware, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("updatehardware", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateHardware, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletehardware", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteHardware, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addcamera", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddCamera, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("updatecamera", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateCamera, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletecamera", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteCamera, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("wolgetnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_WOLGetNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("woladdnode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_WOLAddNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("wolupdatenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_WOLUpdateNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("wolremovenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_WOLRemoveNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("wolclearnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_WOLClearNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("mysensorsgetnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_MySensorsGetNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("mysensorsgetchilds", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_MySensorsGetChilds, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("mysensorsupdatenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_MySensorsUpdateNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("mysensorsremovenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_MySensorsRemoveNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("mysensorsremovechild", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_MySensorsRemoveChild, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("mysensorsupdatechild", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_MySensorsUpdateChild, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("pingersetmode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PingerSetMode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("pingergetnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PingerGetNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("pingeraddnode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PingerAddNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("pingerupdatenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PingerUpdateNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("pingerremovenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PingerRemoveNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("pingerclearnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PingerClearNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("kodisetmode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_KodiSetMode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("kodigetnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_KodiGetNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("kodiaddnode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_KodiAddNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("kodiupdatenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_KodiUpdateNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("kodiremovenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_KodiRemoveNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("kodiclearnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_KodiClearNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("kodimediacommand", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_KodiMediaCommand, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("panasonicsetmode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PanasonicSetMode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("panasonicgetnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PanasonicGetNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("panasonicaddnode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PanasonicAddNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("panasonicupdatenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PanasonicUpdateNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("panasonicremovenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PanasonicRemoveNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("panasonicclearnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PanasonicClearNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("panasonicmediacommand", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PanasonicMediaCommand, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("heossetmode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_HEOSSetMode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("heosmediacommand", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_HEOSMediaCommand, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("onkyoeiscpcommand", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_OnkyoEiscpCommand, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("bleboxsetmode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_BleBoxSetMode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("bleboxgetnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_BleBoxGetNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("bleboxaddnode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_BleBoxAddNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("bleboxremovenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_BleBoxRemoveNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("bleboxclearnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_BleBoxClearNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("bleboxautosearchingnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_BleBoxAutoSearchingNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("bleboxupdatefirmware", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_BleBoxUpdateFirmware, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("lmssetmode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_LMSSetMode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("lmsgetnodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_LMSGetNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("lmsgetplaylists", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_LMSGetPlaylists, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("lmsmediacommand", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_LMSMediaCommand, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("lmsdeleteunuseddevices", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_LMSDeleteUnusedDevices, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("savefibarolinkconfig", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SaveFibaroLinkConfig, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getfibarolinkconfig", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetFibaroLinkConfig, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getfibarolinks", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetFibaroLinks, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("savefibarolink", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SaveFibaroLink, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletefibarolink", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteFibaroLink, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("saveinfluxlinkconfig", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SaveInfluxLinkConfig, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getinfluxlinkconfig", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetInfluxLinkConfig, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getinfluxlinks", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetInfluxLinks, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("saveinfluxlink", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SaveInfluxLink, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deleteinfluxlink", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteInfluxLink, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("savehttplinkconfig", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SaveHttpLinkConfig, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("gethttplinkconfig", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetHttpLinkConfig, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("gethttplinks", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetHttpLinks, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("savehttplink", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SaveHttpLink, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletehttplink", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteHttpLink, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("savegooglepubsublinkconfig", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SaveGooglePubSubLinkConfig, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getgooglepubsublinkconfig", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetGooglePubSubLinkConfig, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getgooglepubsublinks", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetGooglePubSubLinks, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("savegooglepubsublink", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SaveGooglePubSubLink, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletegooglepubsublink", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteGooglePubSubLink, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getdevicevalueoptions", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetDeviceValueOptions, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getdevicevalueoptionwording", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetDeviceValueOptionWording, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("adduservariable", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddUserVariable, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("updateuservariable", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateUserVariable, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deleteuservariable", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteUserVariable, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getuservariables", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetUserVariables, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getuservariable", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetUserVariable, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("allownewhardware", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AllowNewHardware, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addplan", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddPlan, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("updateplan", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdatePlan, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deleteplan", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeletePlan, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getunusedplandevices", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetUnusedPlanDevices, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addplanactivedevice", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddPlanActiveDevice, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getplandevices", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetPlanDevices, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deleteplandevice", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeletePlanDevice, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("setplandevicecoords", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SetPlanDeviceCoords, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deleteallplandevices", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteAllPlanDevices, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("changeplanorder", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ChangePlanOrder, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("changeplandeviceorder", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ChangePlanDeviceOrder, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("gettimerplans", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetTimerPlans, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addtimerplan", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddTimerPlan, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("updatetimerplan", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateTimerPlan, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletetimerplan", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteTimerPlan, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("duplicatetimerplan", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DuplicateTimerPlan, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getactualhistory", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetActualHistory, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getnewhistory", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetNewHistory, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getconfig", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetConfig, this, _1, _2, _3), true);
RegisterCommandCode("sendnotification", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SendNotification, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("emailcamerasnapshot", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_EmailCameraSnapshot, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("udevice", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateDevice, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("udevices", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateDevices, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("thermostatstate", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SetThermostatState, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("system_shutdown", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SystemShutdown, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("system_reboot", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SystemReboot, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("execute_script", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ExcecuteScript, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getcosts", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetCosts, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("checkforupdate", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_CheckForUpdate, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("downloadupdate", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DownloadUpdate, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("downloadready", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DownloadReady, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletedatapoint", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteDatePoint, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("setactivetimerplan", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SetActiveTimerPlan, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addtimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("updatetimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletetimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("enabletimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_EnableTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("disabletimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DisableTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("cleartimers", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ClearTimers, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addscenetimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddSceneTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("updatescenetimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateSceneTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletescenetimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteSceneTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("enablescenetimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_EnableSceneTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("disablescenetimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DisableSceneTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("clearscenetimers", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ClearSceneTimers, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getsceneactivations", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetSceneActivations, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addscenecode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddSceneCode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("removescenecode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_RemoveSceneCode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("clearscenecodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ClearSceneCodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("renamescene", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_RenameScene, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("setsetpoint", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SetSetpoint, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addsetpointtimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddSetpointTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("updatesetpointtimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateSetpointTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletesetpointtimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteSetpointTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("enablesetpointtimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_EnableSetpointTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("disablesetpointtimer", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DisableSetpointTimer, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("clearsetpointtimers", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ClearSetpointTimers, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("serial_devices", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetSerialDevices, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("devices_list", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetDevicesList, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("devices_list_onoff", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetDevicesListOnOff, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("registerhue", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_PhilipsHueRegister, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("getcustomiconset", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_GetCustomIconSet, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletecustomicon", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteCustomIcon, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("updatecustomicon", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateCustomIcon, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("renamedevice", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_RenameDevice, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("setunused", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_SetUnused, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addlogmessage", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddLogMessage, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("clearshortlog", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ClearShortLog, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("vacuumdatabase", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_VacuumDatabase, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addmobiledevice", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddMobileDevice, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("updatemobiledevice", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_UpdateMobileDevice, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletemobiledevice", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_DeleteMobileDevice, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addyeelight", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddYeeLight, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("addArilux", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_AddArilux, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("graph", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_HandleGraph, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("lightlog", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_LightLog, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("textlog", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_TextLog, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("scenelog", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_SceneLog, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("settings", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Settings, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("events", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Events, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("hardware", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Hardware, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("devices", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Devices, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("deletedevice", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_DeleteDevice, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("cameras", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Cameras, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("cameras_user", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_CamerasUser, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("users", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Users, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("mobiles", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Mobiles, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("timers", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Timers, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("scenetimers", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_SceneTimers, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("setpointtimers", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_SetpointTimers, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("gettransfers", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_GetTransfers, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("transferdevice", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_TransferDevice, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("notifications", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Notifications, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("schedules", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Schedules, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("getshareduserdevices", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_GetSharedUserDevices, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("setshareduserdevices", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_SetSharedUserDevices, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("setused", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_SetUsed, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("scenes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Scenes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("addscene", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_AddScene, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("deletescene", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_DeleteScene, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("updatescene", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_UpdateScene, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("createvirtualsensor", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_CreateMappedSensor, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("createdevice", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_CreateDevice, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("createevohomesensor", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_CreateEvohomeSensor, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("bindevohome", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_BindEvohome, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("createrflinkdevice", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_CreateRFLinkDevice, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("custom_light_icons", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_CustomLightIcons, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("plans", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_Plans, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("floorplans", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_FloorPlans, this, _1, _2, _3));
#ifdef WITH_OPENZWAVE
RegisterCommandCode("updatezwavenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveUpdateNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("deletezwavenode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveDeleteNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwaveinclude", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveInclude, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwaveexclude", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveExclude, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwaveisnodeincluded", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveIsNodeIncluded, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwaveisnodeexcluded", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveIsNodeExcluded, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavesoftreset", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveSoftReset, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavehardreset", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveHardReset, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavenetworkheal", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveNetworkHeal, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavenodeheal", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveNodeHeal, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavenetworkinfo", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveNetworkInfo, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwaveremovegroupnode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveRemoveGroupNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwaveaddgroupnode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveAddGroupNode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavegroupinfo", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveGroupInfo, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavecancel", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveCancel, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("applyzwavenodeconfig", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ApplyZWaveNodeConfig, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("requestzwavenodeconfig", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveRequestNodeConfig, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavestatecheck", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveStateCheck, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavereceiveconfigurationfromothercontroller", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveReceiveConfigurationFromOtherController, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavesendconfigurationtosecondcontroller", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveSendConfigurationToSecondaryController, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavetransferprimaryrole", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveTransferPrimaryRole, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavestartusercodeenrollmentmode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveSetUserCodeEnrollmentMode, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwavegetusercodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveGetNodeUserCodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterCommandCode("zwaveremoveusercode", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_ZWaveRemoveUserCode, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/zwavegetconfig.php", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveGetConfigFile, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/poll.xml", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPPollXml, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/cp.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPIndex, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/confparmpost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPNodeGetConf, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/refreshpost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPNodeGetValues, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/valuepost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPNodeSetValue, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/buttonpost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPNodeSetButton, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/admpost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPAdminCommand, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/nodepost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPNodeChange, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/savepost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPSaveConfig, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/thpost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPTestHeal, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/topopost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPGetTopo, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/statpost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPGetStats, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/grouppost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPSetGroup, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterPageCode("/ozwcp/scenepost.html", boost::bind(&CWebServer::ZWaveCPSceneCommand, this, _1, _2, _3));
RegisterRType("openzwavenodes", boost::bind(&CWebServer::RType_OpenZWaveNodes, this, _1, _2, _3));
#endif
RegisterCommandCode("tellstickApplySettings", boost::bind(&CWebServer::Cmd_TellstickApplySettings, this, _1, _2, _3));
m_pWebEm->RegisterWhitelistURLString("/html5.appcache");
m_pWebEm->RegisterWhitelistURLString("/images/floorplans/plan");
m_bDoStop = false;
m_thread = std::make_shared<std::thread>(&CWebServer::Do_Work, this);
std::string server_name = "WebServer_" + settings.listening_port;
SetThreadName(m_thread->native_handle(), server_name.c_str());
return (m_thread != nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 91,078 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btrfs_update_iflags(struct inode *inode)
{
struct btrfs_inode *ip = BTRFS_I(inode);
inode->i_flags &= ~(S_SYNC|S_APPEND|S_IMMUTABLE|S_NOATIME|S_DIRSYNC);
if (ip->flags & BTRFS_INODE_SYNC)
inode->i_flags |= S_SYNC;
if (ip->flags & BTRFS_INODE_IMMUTABLE)
inode->i_flags |= S_IMMUTABLE;
if (ip->flags & BTRFS_INODE_APPEND)
inode->i_flags |= S_APPEND;
if (ip->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NOATIME)
inode->i_flags |= S_NOATIME;
if (ip->flags & BTRFS_INODE_DIRSYNC)
inode->i_flags |= S_DIRSYNC;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: side_out_cb (GSocket *socket, GIOCondition condition, gpointer user_data)
{
ProxySide *side = user_data;
FlatpakProxyClient *client = side->client;
gboolean retval = G_SOURCE_CONTINUE;
g_object_ref (client);
while (side->buffers)
{
Buffer *buffer = side->buffers->data;
if (buffer_write (side, buffer, socket))
{
if (buffer->pos == buffer->size)
{
side->buffers = g_list_delete_link (side->buffers, side->buffers);
buffer_unref (buffer);
}
}
else
{
break;
}
}
if (side->buffers == NULL)
{
ProxySide *other_side = get_other_side (side);
side->out_source = NULL;
retval = G_SOURCE_REMOVE;
if (other_side->closed)
side_closed (side);
}
g_object_unref (client);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix vulnerability in dbus proxy
During the authentication all client data is directly forwarded
to the dbus daemon as is, until we detect the BEGIN command after
which we start filtering the binary dbus protocol.
Unfortunately the detection of the BEGIN command in the proxy
did not exactly match the detection in the dbus daemon. A BEGIN
followed by a space or tab was considered ok in the daemon but
not by the proxy. This could be exploited to send arbitrary
dbus messages to the host, which can be used to break out of
the sandbox.
This was noticed by Gabriel Campana of The Google Security Team.
This fix makes the detection of the authentication phase end
match the dbus code. In addition we duplicate the authentication
line validation from dbus, which includes ensuring all data is
ASCII, and limiting the size of a line to 16k. In fact, we add
some extra stringent checks, disallowing ASCII control chars and
requiring that auth lines start with a capital letter.
CWE ID: CWE-436 | 0 | 84,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UsbChooserContext::Observer::OnDeviceRemoved(
const device::mojom::UsbDeviceInfo& device_info) {}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,142 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SVGLayoutSupport::isLayoutableTextNode(const LayoutObject* object)
{
ASSERT(object->isText());
return object->isSVGInlineText() && !toLayoutSVGInlineText(object)->hasEmptyText();
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID: | 0 | 121,158 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsPermissionFactoryDefault(HostContentSettingsMap* content_settings,
const PageInfoUI::PermissionInfo& info) {
const ContentSetting factory_default_setting =
content_settings::ContentSettingsRegistry::GetInstance()
->Get(info.type)
->GetInitialDefaultSetting();
return (info.source == content_settings::SETTING_SOURCE_USER &&
factory_default_setting == info.default_setting &&
info.setting == CONTENT_SETTING_DEFAULT);
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 137,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtqueue_map_desc(unsigned int *p_num_sg, hwaddr *addr, struct iovec *iov,
unsigned int max_num_sg, bool is_write,
hwaddr pa, size_t sz)
{
unsigned num_sg = *p_num_sg;
assert(num_sg <= max_num_sg);
while (sz) {
hwaddr len = sz;
iov[num_sg].iov_base = cpu_physical_memory_map(pa, &len, is_write);
iov[num_sg].iov_len = len;
addr[num_sg] = pa;
sz -= len;
pa += len;
num_sg++;
}
*p_num_sg = num_sg;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 164,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::DestroyTransferBuffer(int32 id) {
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return;
TransferBufferMap::iterator it = transfer_buffers_.find(id);
if (it != transfer_buffers_.end()) {
delete it->second.shared_memory;
transfer_buffers_.erase(it);
}
Send(new GpuCommandBufferMsg_DestroyTransferBuffer(route_id_, id));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PDFiumEngine::OnLeftMouseDown(const pp::MouseInputEvent& event) {
SetMouseLeftButtonDown(true);
auto selection_invalidator =
std::make_unique<SelectionChangeInvalidator>(this);
selection_.clear();
int page_index = -1;
int char_index = -1;
int form_type = FPDF_FORMFIELD_UNKNOWN;
PDFiumPage::LinkTarget target;
pp::Point point = event.GetPosition();
PDFiumPage::Area area =
GetCharIndex(point, &page_index, &char_index, &form_type, &target);
DCHECK_GE(form_type, FPDF_FORMFIELD_UNKNOWN);
mouse_down_state_.Set(area, target);
if (IsLinkArea(area))
return true;
if (page_index != -1) {
last_page_mouse_down_ = page_index;
double page_x;
double page_y;
DeviceToPage(page_index, point.x(), point.y(), &page_x, &page_y);
bool is_form_text_area = IsFormTextArea(area, form_type);
FPDF_PAGE page = pages_[page_index]->GetPage();
bool is_editable_form_text_area =
is_form_text_area &&
IsPointInEditableFormTextArea(page, page_x, page_y, form_type);
FORM_OnLButtonDown(form_, page, 0, page_x, page_y);
if (form_type != FPDF_FORMFIELD_UNKNOWN) {
selection_invalidator.reset();
SetInFormTextArea(is_form_text_area);
editable_form_text_area_ = is_editable_form_text_area;
return true; // Return now before we get into the selection code.
}
}
SetInFormTextArea(false);
if (area != PDFiumPage::TEXT_AREA)
return true; // Return true so WebKit doesn't do its own highlighting.
if (event.GetClickCount() == 1)
OnSingleClick(page_index, char_index);
else if (event.GetClickCount() == 2 || event.GetClickCount() == 3)
OnMultipleClick(event.GetClickCount(), page_index, char_index);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,175 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool peers(struct mount *m1, struct mount *m2)
{
return m1->mnt_group_id == m2->mnt_group_id && m1->mnt_group_id;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tpacket_snd(struct packet_sock *po, struct msghdr *msg)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct net_device *dev;
struct virtio_net_hdr *vnet_hdr = NULL;
struct sockcm_cookie sockc;
__be16 proto;
int err, reserve = 0;
void *ph;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_ll *, saddr, msg->msg_name);
bool need_wait = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
int tp_len, size_max;
unsigned char *addr;
void *data;
int len_sum = 0;
int status = TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE;
int hlen, tlen, copylen = 0;
mutex_lock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
if (likely(saddr == NULL)) {
dev = packet_cached_dev_get(po);
proto = po->num;
addr = NULL;
} else {
err = -EINVAL;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll))
goto out;
if (msg->msg_namelen < (saddr->sll_halen
+ offsetof(struct sockaddr_ll,
sll_addr)))
goto out;
proto = saddr->sll_protocol;
addr = saddr->sll_addr;
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(&po->sk), saddr->sll_ifindex);
}
sockc.tsflags = po->sk.sk_tsflags;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
err = sock_cmsg_send(&po->sk, msg, &sockc);
if (unlikely(err))
goto out;
}
err = -ENXIO;
if (unlikely(dev == NULL))
goto out;
err = -ENETDOWN;
if (unlikely(!(dev->flags & IFF_UP)))
goto out_put;
if (po->sk.sk_socket->type == SOCK_RAW)
reserve = dev->hard_header_len;
size_max = po->tx_ring.frame_size
- (po->tp_hdrlen - sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll));
if ((size_max > dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN) && !po->has_vnet_hdr)
size_max = dev->mtu + reserve + VLAN_HLEN;
do {
ph = packet_current_frame(po, &po->tx_ring,
TP_STATUS_SEND_REQUEST);
if (unlikely(ph == NULL)) {
if (need_wait && need_resched())
schedule();
continue;
}
skb = NULL;
tp_len = tpacket_parse_header(po, ph, size_max, &data);
if (tp_len < 0)
goto tpacket_error;
status = TP_STATUS_SEND_REQUEST;
hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev);
tlen = dev->needed_tailroom;
if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
vnet_hdr = data;
data += sizeof(*vnet_hdr);
tp_len -= sizeof(*vnet_hdr);
if (tp_len < 0 ||
__packet_snd_vnet_parse(vnet_hdr, tp_len)) {
tp_len = -EINVAL;
goto tpacket_error;
}
copylen = __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(),
vnet_hdr->hdr_len);
}
copylen = max_t(int, copylen, dev->hard_header_len);
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(&po->sk,
hlen + tlen + sizeof(struct sockaddr_ll) +
(copylen - dev->hard_header_len),
!need_wait, &err);
if (unlikely(skb == NULL)) {
/* we assume the socket was initially writeable ... */
if (likely(len_sum > 0))
err = len_sum;
goto out_status;
}
tp_len = tpacket_fill_skb(po, skb, ph, dev, data, tp_len, proto,
addr, hlen, copylen, &sockc);
if (likely(tp_len >= 0) &&
tp_len > dev->mtu + reserve &&
!po->has_vnet_hdr &&
!packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb))
tp_len = -EMSGSIZE;
if (unlikely(tp_len < 0)) {
tpacket_error:
if (po->tp_loss) {
__packet_set_status(po, ph,
TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE);
packet_increment_head(&po->tx_ring);
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
} else {
status = TP_STATUS_WRONG_FORMAT;
err = tp_len;
goto out_status;
}
}
if (po->has_vnet_hdr && virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(skb, vnet_hdr,
vio_le())) {
tp_len = -EINVAL;
goto tpacket_error;
}
packet_pick_tx_queue(dev, skb);
skb->destructor = tpacket_destruct_skb;
__packet_set_status(po, ph, TP_STATUS_SENDING);
packet_inc_pending(&po->tx_ring);
status = TP_STATUS_SEND_REQUEST;
err = po->xmit(skb);
if (unlikely(err > 0)) {
err = net_xmit_errno(err);
if (err && __packet_get_status(po, ph) ==
TP_STATUS_AVAILABLE) {
/* skb was destructed already */
skb = NULL;
goto out_status;
}
/*
* skb was dropped but not destructed yet;
* let's treat it like congestion or err < 0
*/
err = 0;
}
packet_increment_head(&po->tx_ring);
len_sum += tp_len;
} while (likely((ph != NULL) ||
/* Note: packet_read_pending() might be slow if we have
* to call it as it's per_cpu variable, but in fast-path
* we already short-circuit the loop with the first
* condition, and luckily don't have to go that path
* anyway.
*/
(need_wait && packet_read_pending(&po->tx_ring))));
err = len_sum;
goto out_put;
out_status:
__packet_set_status(po, ph, status);
kfree_skb(skb);
out_put:
dev_put(dev);
out:
mutex_unlock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
return err;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix races in fanout_add()
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 68,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual void didStartLoading()
{
m_startLoadingCount++;
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_set_derive_link_key(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p_cb->derive_lk = true;
smp_update_key_mask(p_cb, SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK, false);
smp_key_distribution(p_cb, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,789 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::NotifyTileStateChanged(const Tile* tile) {
TRACE_EVENT0("cc", "LayerTreeHostImpl::NotifyTileStateChanged");
if (active_tree_) {
LayerImpl* layer_impl =
active_tree_->FindActiveTreeLayerById(tile->layer_id());
if (layer_impl)
layer_impl->NotifyTileStateChanged(tile);
}
if (pending_tree_) {
LayerImpl* layer_impl =
pending_tree_->FindPendingTreeLayerById(tile->layer_id());
if (layer_impl)
layer_impl->NotifyTileStateChanged(tile);
}
if (active_tree_ && !client_->IsInsideDraw() && tile->required_for_draw()) {
SetNeedsRedraw();
}
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ClientControlledShellSurface::UpdateFrame() {
if (!widget_)
return;
gfx::Rect work_area =
display::Screen::GetScreen()
->GetDisplayNearestWindow(widget_->GetNativeWindow())
.work_area();
ash::wm::WindowState* window_state = GetWindowState();
bool enable_wide_frame = GetFrameView()->GetVisible() &&
window_state->IsMaximizedOrFullscreenOrPinned() &&
work_area.width() != geometry().width();
if (enable_wide_frame) {
if (!wide_frame_) {
wide_frame_ = std::make_unique<ash::WideFrameView>(widget_);
ash::ImmersiveFullscreenController::EnableForWidget(widget_, false);
wide_frame_->Init(immersive_fullscreen_controller_.get());
wide_frame_->header_view()->GetFrameHeader()->SetFrameTextOverride(
GetFrameView()
->GetHeaderView()
->GetFrameHeader()
->frame_text_override());
wide_frame_->GetWidget()->Show();
InstallCustomWindowTargeter();
UpdateCaptionButtonModel();
}
} else {
if (wide_frame_) {
ash::ImmersiveFullscreenController::EnableForWidget(widget_, false);
wide_frame_.reset();
GetFrameView()->InitImmersiveFullscreenControllerForView(
immersive_fullscreen_controller_.get());
InstallCustomWindowTargeter();
UpdateCaptionButtonModel();
}
UpdateFrameWidth();
}
UpdateAutoHideFrame();
}
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 137,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline bool fm10k_page_is_reserved(struct page *page)
{
return (page_to_nid(page) != numa_mem_id()) || page_is_pfmemalloc(page);
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 87,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> ParsePrintSettings(
int command_id,
const base::DictionaryValue* params,
HeadlessPrintSettings* settings) {
if (const base::Value* landscape_value = params->FindKey("landscape"))
settings->landscape = landscape_value->GetBool();
if (const base::Value* display_header_footer_value =
params->FindKey("displayHeaderFooter")) {
settings->display_header_footer = display_header_footer_value->GetBool();
}
if (const base::Value* should_print_backgrounds_value =
params->FindKey("printBackground")) {
settings->should_print_backgrounds =
should_print_backgrounds_value->GetBool();
}
if (const base::Value* scale_value = params->FindKey("scale"))
settings->scale = scale_value->GetDouble();
if (settings->scale > kScaleMaxVal / 100 ||
settings->scale < kScaleMinVal / 100)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "scale");
if (const base::Value* page_ranges_value = params->FindKey("pageRanges"))
settings->page_ranges = page_ranges_value->GetString();
if (const base::Value* ignore_invalid_page_ranges_value =
params->FindKey("ignoreInvalidPageRanges")) {
settings->ignore_invalid_page_ranges =
ignore_invalid_page_ranges_value->GetBool();
}
double paper_width_in_inch = printing::kLetterWidthInch;
if (const base::Value* paper_width_value = params->FindKey("paperWidth"))
paper_width_in_inch = paper_width_value->GetDouble();
double paper_height_in_inch = printing::kLetterHeightInch;
if (const base::Value* paper_height_value = params->FindKey("paperHeight"))
paper_height_in_inch = paper_height_value->GetDouble();
if (paper_width_in_inch <= 0)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "paperWidth");
if (paper_height_in_inch <= 0)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "paperHeight");
settings->paper_size_in_points =
gfx::Size(paper_width_in_inch * printing::kPointsPerInch,
paper_height_in_inch * printing::kPointsPerInch);
double default_margin_in_inch = 1000.0 / printing::kHundrethsMMPerInch;
double margin_top_in_inch = default_margin_in_inch;
double margin_bottom_in_inch = default_margin_in_inch;
double margin_left_in_inch = default_margin_in_inch;
double margin_right_in_inch = default_margin_in_inch;
if (const base::Value* margin_top_value = params->FindKey("marginTop"))
margin_top_in_inch = margin_top_value->GetDouble();
if (const base::Value* margin_bottom_value = params->FindKey("marginBottom"))
margin_bottom_in_inch = margin_bottom_value->GetDouble();
if (const base::Value* margin_left_value = params->FindKey("marginLeft"))
margin_left_in_inch = margin_left_value->GetDouble();
if (const base::Value* margin_right_value = params->FindKey("marginRight"))
margin_right_in_inch = margin_right_value->GetDouble();
if (margin_top_in_inch < 0)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "marginTop");
if (margin_bottom_in_inch < 0)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "marginBottom");
if (margin_left_in_inch < 0)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "marginLeft");
if (margin_right_in_inch < 0)
return CreateInvalidParamResponse(command_id, "marginRight");
settings->margins_in_points.top =
margin_top_in_inch * printing::kPointsPerInch;
settings->margins_in_points.bottom =
margin_bottom_in_inch * printing::kPointsPerInch;
settings->margins_in_points.left =
margin_left_in_inch * printing::kPointsPerInch;
settings->margins_in_points.right =
margin_right_in_inch * printing::kPointsPerInch;
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 172,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::clearBufferfv(
GLenum buffer,
GLint drawbuffer,
MaybeShared<DOMFloat32Array> value,
GLuint src_offset) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateClearBuffer("clearBufferfv", buffer, value.View()->length(),
src_offset))
return;
ContextGL()->ClearBufferfv(buffer, drawbuffer,
value.View()->DataMaybeShared() + src_offset);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string2xml(const char *input)
{
xmlNode *xml = NULL;
xmlDocPtr output = NULL;
xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt = NULL;
xmlErrorPtr last_error = NULL;
if (input == NULL) {
crm_err("Can't parse NULL input");
return NULL;
}
/* create a parser context */
ctxt = xmlNewParserCtxt();
CRM_CHECK(ctxt != NULL, return NULL);
/* xmlCtxtUseOptions(ctxt, XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS|XML_PARSE_RECOVER); */
xmlCtxtResetLastError(ctxt);
xmlSetGenericErrorFunc(ctxt, crm_xml_err);
/* initGenericErrorDefaultFunc(crm_xml_err); */
output =
xmlCtxtReadDoc(ctxt, (const xmlChar *)input, NULL, NULL,
XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS | XML_PARSE_RECOVER);
if (output) {
xml = xmlDocGetRootElement(output);
}
last_error = xmlCtxtGetLastError(ctxt);
if (last_error && last_error->code != XML_ERR_OK) {
/* crm_abort(__FILE__,__FUNCTION__,__LINE__, "last_error->code != XML_ERR_OK", TRUE, TRUE); */
/*
* http://xmlsoft.org/html/libxml-xmlerror.html#xmlErrorLevel
* http://xmlsoft.org/html/libxml-xmlerror.html#xmlParserErrors
*/
crm_warn("Parsing failed (domain=%d, level=%d, code=%d): %s",
last_error->domain, last_error->level, last_error->code, last_error->message);
if (last_error->code == XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY) {
CRM_LOG_ASSERT("Cannot parse an empty string");
} else if (last_error->code != XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END) {
crm_err("Couldn't%s parse %d chars: %s", xml ? " fully" : "", (int)strlen(input),
input);
if (xml != NULL) {
crm_log_xml_err(xml, "Partial");
}
} else {
int len = strlen(input);
int lpc = 0;
while(lpc < len) {
crm_warn("Parse error[+%.3d]: %.80s", lpc, input+lpc);
lpc += 80;
}
CRM_LOG_ASSERT("String parsing error");
}
}
xmlFreeParserCtxt(ctxt);
return xml;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FakeCrosDisksClient::SetCustomMountPointCallback(
FakeCrosDisksClient::CustomMountPointCallback custom_mount_point_callback) {
custom_mount_point_callback_ = std::move(custom_mount_point_callback);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaControlMuteButtonElement* MediaControlMuteButtonElement::create(
MediaControls& mediaControls) {
MediaControlMuteButtonElement* button =
new MediaControlMuteButtonElement(mediaControls);
button->ensureUserAgentShadowRoot();
button->setType(InputTypeNames::button);
button->setShadowPseudoId(AtomicString("-webkit-media-controls-mute-button"));
return button;
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 126,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncBackendHost::HandleStopSyncingPermanentlyOnFrontendLoop() {
if (!frontend_)
return;
frontend_->OnStopSyncingPermanently();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Com_InitRand(void)
{
unsigned int seed;
if(Sys_RandomBytes((byte *) &seed, sizeof(seed)))
srand(seed);
else
srand(time(NULL));
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct thread_info *alloc_thread_info_node(struct task_struct *tsk,
int node)
{
return kmem_cache_alloc_node(thread_info_cache, THREADINFO_GFP, node);
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 32,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ancestor,
const struct user_namespace *child)
{
const struct user_namespace *ns;
for (ns = child; ns->level > ancestor->level; ns = ns->parent)
;
return (ns == ancestor);
}
Commit Message: userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.
This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.
To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).
This is CVE-2018-18955.
Fixes: 6397fac4915a ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 76,180 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets(
Document::RunPostLayoutTasks run_post_layout_tasks) {
LocalFrameView* local_view = View();
if (local_view)
local_view->WillStartForcedLayout();
UpdateStyleAndLayoutTreeIgnorePendingStylesheets();
UpdateStyleAndLayout();
if (local_view) {
if (run_post_layout_tasks == kRunPostLayoutTasksSynchronously)
local_view->FlushAnyPendingPostLayoutTasks();
local_view->DidFinishForcedLayout();
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: map_engine_set_framerate(int framerate)
{
s_frame_rate = framerate;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
return 0;
if (nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu)) {
nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu);
vmcs12->vm_exit_reason =
EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT;
vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = 0;
/*
* fall through to normal code, but now in L1, not L2
*/
}
}
return (vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS) & X86_EFLAGS_IF) &&
!(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS));
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Chunk* Container::getExifChunk()
{
if (this->chunks[WEBP::WEBP_CHUNK_EXIF].size() == 0) {
return NULL;
}
return this->chunks[WEBP::WEBP_CHUNK_EXIF][0];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nfc_llcp_sock_link(struct llcp_sock_list *l, struct sock *sk)
{
write_lock(&l->lock);
sk_add_node(sk, &l->head);
write_unlock(&l->lock);
}
Commit Message: net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScopedResolvedFrameBufferBinder::ScopedResolvedFrameBufferBinder(
GLES2DecoderImpl* decoder, bool enforce_internal_framebuffer, bool internal)
: decoder_(decoder) {
resolve_and_bind_ = (decoder_->offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get() &&
decoder_->IsOffscreenBufferMultisampled() &&
(!decoder_->bound_read_framebuffer_.get() ||
enforce_internal_framebuffer));
if (!resolve_and_bind_)
return;
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT,
decoder_->offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->id());
GLuint targetid;
if (internal) {
if (!decoder_->offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_.get()) {
decoder_->offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_.reset(
new FrameBuffer(decoder_));
decoder_->offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_->Create();
decoder_->offscreen_resolved_color_texture_.reset(new Texture(decoder_));
decoder_->offscreen_resolved_color_texture_->Create();
DCHECK(decoder_->offscreen_saved_color_format_);
decoder_->offscreen_resolved_color_texture_->AllocateStorage(
decoder_->offscreen_size_, decoder_->offscreen_saved_color_format_);
decoder_->offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderTexture(
decoder_->offscreen_resolved_color_texture_.get());
if (decoder_->offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_->CheckStatus() !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOG(ERROR) << "ScopedResolvedFrameBufferBinder failed "
<< "because offscreen resolved FBO was incomplete.";
return;
}
}
targetid = decoder_->offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_->id();
} else {
targetid = decoder_->offscreen_saved_frame_buffer_->id();
}
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT, targetid);
const int width = decoder_->offscreen_size_.width();
const int height = decoder_->offscreen_size_.height();
glDisable(GL_SCISSOR_TEST);
if (IsAngle()) {
glBlitFramebufferANGLE(0, 0, width, height, 0, 0, width, height,
GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT, GL_NEAREST);
} else {
glBlitFramebufferEXT(0, 0, width, height, 0, 0, width, height,
GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT, GL_NEAREST);
}
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, targetid);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetBlockForJpeg(void* param,
unsigned long pos,
unsigned char* buf,
unsigned long size) {
std::vector<uint8_t>* data_vector = static_cast<std::vector<uint8_t>*>(param);
if (pos + size < pos || pos + size > data_vector->size())
return 0;
memcpy(buf, data_vector->data() + pos, size);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* Track::GetCodecId() const { return m_info.codecId; }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compare_fields(FieldMatchContext *fm, int match1, int match2, int field)
{
int plane, ret;
uint64_t accumPc = 0, accumPm = 0, accumPml = 0;
uint64_t accumNc = 0, accumNm = 0, accumNml = 0;
int norm1, norm2, mtn1, mtn2;
float c1, c2, mr;
const AVFrame *src = fm->src;
for (plane = 0; plane < (fm->mchroma ? 3 : 1); plane++) {
int x, y, temp1, temp2, fbase;
const AVFrame *prev, *next;
uint8_t *mapp = fm->map_data[plane];
int map_linesize = fm->map_linesize[plane];
const uint8_t *srcp = src->data[plane];
const int src_linesize = src->linesize[plane];
const int srcf_linesize = src_linesize << 1;
int prv_linesize, nxt_linesize;
int prvf_linesize, nxtf_linesize;
const int width = get_width (fm, src, plane);
const int height = get_height(fm, src, plane);
const int y0a = fm->y0 >> (plane != 0);
const int y1a = fm->y1 >> (plane != 0);
const int startx = (plane == 0 ? 8 : 4);
const int stopx = width - startx;
const uint8_t *srcpf, *srcf, *srcnf;
const uint8_t *prvpf, *prvnf, *nxtpf, *nxtnf;
fill_buf(mapp, width, height, map_linesize, 0);
/* match1 */
fbase = get_field_base(match1, field);
srcf = srcp + (fbase + 1) * src_linesize;
srcpf = srcf - srcf_linesize;
srcnf = srcf + srcf_linesize;
mapp = mapp + fbase * map_linesize;
prev = select_frame(fm, match1);
prv_linesize = prev->linesize[plane];
prvf_linesize = prv_linesize << 1;
prvpf = prev->data[plane] + fbase * prv_linesize; // previous frame, previous field
prvnf = prvpf + prvf_linesize; // previous frame, next field
/* match2 */
fbase = get_field_base(match2, field);
next = select_frame(fm, match2);
nxt_linesize = next->linesize[plane];
nxtf_linesize = nxt_linesize << 1;
nxtpf = next->data[plane] + fbase * nxt_linesize; // next frame, previous field
nxtnf = nxtpf + nxtf_linesize; // next frame, next field
map_linesize <<= 1;
if ((match1 >= 3 && field == 1) || (match1 < 3 && field != 1))
build_diff_map(fm, prvpf, prvf_linesize, nxtpf, nxtf_linesize,
mapp, map_linesize, height, width, plane);
else
build_diff_map(fm, prvnf, prvf_linesize, nxtnf, nxtf_linesize,
mapp + map_linesize, map_linesize, height, width, plane);
for (y = 2; y < height - 2; y += 2) {
if (y0a == y1a || y < y0a || y > y1a) {
for (x = startx; x < stopx; x++) {
if (mapp[x] > 0 || mapp[x + map_linesize] > 0) {
temp1 = srcpf[x] + (srcf[x] << 2) + srcnf[x]; // [1 4 1]
temp2 = abs(3 * (prvpf[x] + prvnf[x]) - temp1);
if (temp2 > 23 && ((mapp[x]&1) || (mapp[x + map_linesize]&1)))
accumPc += temp2;
if (temp2 > 42) {
if ((mapp[x]&2) || (mapp[x + map_linesize]&2))
accumPm += temp2;
if ((mapp[x]&4) || (mapp[x + map_linesize]&4))
accumPml += temp2;
}
temp2 = abs(3 * (nxtpf[x] + nxtnf[x]) - temp1);
if (temp2 > 23 && ((mapp[x]&1) || (mapp[x + map_linesize]&1)))
accumNc += temp2;
if (temp2 > 42) {
if ((mapp[x]&2) || (mapp[x + map_linesize]&2))
accumNm += temp2;
if ((mapp[x]&4) || (mapp[x + map_linesize]&4))
accumNml += temp2;
}
}
}
}
prvpf += prvf_linesize;
prvnf += prvf_linesize;
srcpf += srcf_linesize;
srcf += srcf_linesize;
srcnf += srcf_linesize;
nxtpf += nxtf_linesize;
nxtnf += nxtf_linesize;
mapp += map_linesize;
}
}
if (accumPm < 500 && accumNm < 500 && (accumPml >= 500 || accumNml >= 500) &&
FFMAX(accumPml,accumNml) > 3*FFMIN(accumPml,accumNml)) {
accumPm = accumPml;
accumNm = accumNml;
}
norm1 = (int)((accumPc / 6.0f) + 0.5f);
norm2 = (int)((accumNc / 6.0f) + 0.5f);
mtn1 = (int)((accumPm / 6.0f) + 0.5f);
mtn2 = (int)((accumNm / 6.0f) + 0.5f);
c1 = ((float)FFMAX(norm1,norm2)) / ((float)FFMAX(FFMIN(norm1,norm2),1));
c2 = ((float)FFMAX(mtn1, mtn2)) / ((float)FFMAX(FFMIN(mtn1, mtn2), 1));
mr = ((float)FFMAX(mtn1, mtn2)) / ((float)FFMAX(FFMAX(norm1,norm2),1));
if (((mtn1 >= 500 || mtn2 >= 500) && (mtn1*2 < mtn2*1 || mtn2*2 < mtn1*1)) ||
((mtn1 >= 1000 || mtn2 >= 1000) && (mtn1*3 < mtn2*2 || mtn2*3 < mtn1*2)) ||
((mtn1 >= 2000 || mtn2 >= 2000) && (mtn1*5 < mtn2*4 || mtn2*5 < mtn1*4)) ||
((mtn1 >= 4000 || mtn2 >= 4000) && c2 > c1))
ret = mtn1 > mtn2 ? match2 : match1;
else if (mr > 0.005 && FFMAX(mtn1, mtn2) > 150 && (mtn1*2 < mtn2*1 || mtn2*2 < mtn1*1))
ret = mtn1 > mtn2 ? match2 : match1;
else
ret = norm1 > norm2 ? match2 : match1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void if6_proc_exit(void)
{
unregister_pernet_subsys(&if6_proc_net_ops);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SVGImage::currentFrameHasSingleSecurityOrigin() const
{
if (!m_page)
return true;
LocalFrame* frame = m_page->mainFrame();
RELEASE_ASSERT(frame->document()->loadEventFinished());
SVGSVGElement* rootElement = toSVGDocument(frame->document())->rootElement();
if (!rootElement)
return true;
ComposedTreeWalker walker(rootElement);
while (Node* node = walker.get()) {
if (node->hasTagName(SVGNames::foreignObjectTag))
return false;
if (node->hasTagName(SVGNames::imageTag)) {
if (!toSVGImageElement(node)->currentFrameHasSingleSecurityOrigin())
return false;
} else if (node->hasTagName(SVGNames::feImageTag)) {
if (!toSVGFEImageElement(node)->currentFrameHasSingleSecurityOrigin())
return false;
}
walker.next();
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash when resizing a view destroys the render tree
This is a simple fix for not holding a renderer across FrameView
resizes. Calling view->resize() can destroy renderers so this patch
updates SVGImage::setContainerSize to query the renderer after the
resize is complete. A similar issue does not exist for the dom tree
which is not destroyed.
BUG=344492
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/178043006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@168113 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport Image *ShaveImage(const Image *image,
const RectangleInfo *shave_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*shave_image;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (((2*shave_info->width) >= image->columns) ||
((2*shave_info->height) >= image->rows))
ThrowImageException(OptionWarning,"GeometryDoesNotContainImage");
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
geometry.width-=2*shave_info->width;
geometry.height-=2*shave_info->height;
geometry.x=(ssize_t) shave_info->width+image->page.x;
geometry.y=(ssize_t) shave_info->height+image->page.y;
shave_image=CropImage(image,&geometry,exception);
if (shave_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
shave_image->page.width-=2*shave_info->width;
shave_image->page.height-=2*shave_info->height;
shave_image->page.x-=(ssize_t) shave_info->width;
shave_image->page.y-=(ssize_t) shave_info->height;
return(shave_image);
}
Commit Message: Fixed out of bounds error in SpliceImage.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void slab_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct page *page)
{
void *freelist;
freelist = page->freelist;
slab_destroy_debugcheck(cachep, page);
if (unlikely(cachep->flags & SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU))
call_rcu(&page->rcu_head, kmem_rcu_free);
else
kmem_freepages(cachep, page);
/*
* From now on, we don't use freelist
* although actual page can be freed in rcu context
*/
if (OFF_SLAB(cachep))
kmem_cache_free(cachep->freelist_cache, freelist);
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DeviceOrientationController::didRemoveAllEventListeners(DOMWindow* window)
{
stopUpdating();
m_hasEventListener = false;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(Array, count)
{
long count;
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
spl_array_object_count_elements_helper(intern, &count TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_LONG(count);
} /* }}} */
static void spl_array_method(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, char *fname, int fname_len, int use_arg) /* {{{ */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 12,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int parse_rock_ridge_inode(struct iso_directory_record *de, struct inode *inode)
{
int result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, 0);
/*
* if rockridge flag was reset and we didn't look for attributes
* behind eventual XA attributes, have a look there
*/
if ((ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock_offset == -1)
&& (ISOFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_rock == 2)) {
result = parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal(de, inode, 14);
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: isofs: Fix unbounded recursion when processing relocated directories
We did not check relocated directory in any way when processing Rock
Ridge 'CL' tag. Thus a corrupted isofs image can possibly have a CL
entry pointing to another CL entry leading to possibly unbounded
recursion in kernel code and thus stack overflow or deadlocks (if there
is a loop created from CL entries).
Fix the problem by not allowing CL entry to point to a directory entry
with CL entry (such use makes no good sense anyway) and by checking
whether CL entry doesn't point to itself.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Chris Evans <cevans@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 166,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string16 ConfirmEmailDialogDelegate::GetCancelButtonTitle() {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_ONE_CLICK_SIGNIN_CONFIRM_EMAIL_DIALOG_CANCEL_BUTTON);
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 109,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void netdev_reset_tc(struct net_device *dev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_XPS
netif_reset_xps_queues_gt(dev, 0);
#endif
dev->num_tc = 0;
memset(dev->tc_to_txq, 0, sizeof(dev->tc_to_txq));
memset(dev->prio_tc_map, 0, sizeof(dev->prio_tc_map));
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ExtensionTabUtil::GetWindowIdOfTabStripModel(
const TabStripModel* tab_strip_model) {
for (BrowserList::const_iterator it = BrowserList::begin();
it != BrowserList::end(); ++it) {
if ((*it)->tab_strip_model() == tab_strip_model)
return GetWindowId(*it);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 116,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: interp(i_ctx_t **pi_ctx_p /* context for execution, updated if resched */,
const ref * pref /* object to interpret */,
ref * perror_object)
{
i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
/*
* Note that iref may actually be either a ref * or a ref_packed *.
* Certain DEC compilers assume that a ref * is ref-aligned even if it
* is cast to a short *, and generate code on this assumption, leading
* to "unaligned access" errors. For this reason, we declare
* iref_packed, and use a macro to cast it to the more aligned type
* where necessary (which is almost everywhere it is used). This may
* lead to compiler warnings about "cast increases alignment
* requirements", but this is less harmful than expensive traps at run
* time.
*/
register const ref_packed *iref_packed = (const ref_packed *)pref;
/*
* To make matters worse, some versions of gcc/egcs have a bug that
* leads them to assume that if iref_packed is EVER cast to a ref *,
* it is ALWAYS ref-aligned. We detect this in stdpre.h and provide
* the following workaround:
*/
#ifdef ALIGNMENT_ALIASING_BUG
const ref *iref_temp;
# define IREF (iref_temp = (const ref *)iref_packed, iref_temp)
#else
# define IREF ((const ref *)iref_packed)
#endif
#define SET_IREF(rp) (iref_packed = (const ref_packed *)(rp))
register int icount = 0; /* # of consecutive tokens at iref */
register os_ptr iosp = osp; /* private copy of osp */
register es_ptr iesp = esp; /* private copy of esp */
int code;
ref token; /* token read from file or string, */
/* must be declared in this scope */
ref *pvalue;
ref refnull;
uint opindex; /* needed for oparrays */
os_ptr whichp;
/*
* We have to make the error information into a struct;
* otherwise, the Watcom compiler will assign it to registers
* strictly on the basis of textual frequency.
* We also have to use ref_assign_inline everywhere, and
* avoid direct assignments of refs, so that esi and edi
* will remain available on Intel processors.
*/
struct interp_error_s {
int code;
int line;
const ref *obj;
ref full;
} ierror;
/*
* Get a pointer to the name table so that we can use the
* inline version of name_index_ref.
*/
const name_table *const int_nt = imemory->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table;
#define set_error(ecode)\
{ ierror.code = ecode; ierror.line = __LINE__; }
#define return_with_error(ecode, objp)\
{ set_error(ecode); ierror.obj = objp; goto rwe; }
#define return_with_error_iref(ecode)\
{ set_error(ecode); goto rwei; }
#define return_with_code_iref()\
{ ierror.line = __LINE__; goto rweci; }
#define return_with_stackoverflow(objp)\
{ o_stack.requested = 1; return_with_error(gs_error_stackoverflow, objp); }
#define return_with_stackoverflow_iref()\
{ o_stack.requested = 1; return_with_error_iref(gs_error_stackoverflow); }
/*
* If control reaches the special operators (x_add, etc.) as a result of
* interpreting an executable name, iref points to the name, not the
* operator, so the name rather than the operator becomes the error object,
* which is wrong. We detect and handle this case explicitly when an error
* occurs, so as not to slow down the non-error case.
*/
#define return_with_error_tx_op(err_code)\
{ if (r_has_type(IREF, t_name)) {\
return_with_error(err_code, pvalue);\
} else {\
return_with_error_iref(err_code);\
}\
}
int *ticks_left = &imemory_system->gs_lib_ctx->gcsignal;
#if defined(DEBUG_TRACE_PS_OPERATORS) || defined(DEBUG)
int (*call_operator_fn)(op_proc_t, i_ctx_t *) = do_call_operator;
if (gs_debug_c('!'))
call_operator_fn = do_call_operator_verbose;
#endif
*ticks_left = i_ctx_p->time_slice_ticks;
make_null(&ierror.full);
ierror.obj = &ierror.full;
make_null(&refnull);
pvalue = &refnull;
/*
* If we exceed the VMThreshold, set *ticks_left to -100
* to alert the interpreter that we need to garbage collect.
*/
set_gc_signal(i_ctx_p, -100);
esfile_clear_cache();
/*
* From here on, if icount > 0, iref and icount correspond
* to the top entry on the execution stack: icount is the count
* of sequential entries remaining AFTER the current one.
*/
#define IREF_NEXT(ip)\
((const ref_packed *)((const ref *)(ip) + 1))
#define IREF_NEXT_EITHER(ip)\
( r_is_packed(ip) ? (ip) + 1 : IREF_NEXT(ip) )
#define store_state(ep)\
( icount > 0 ? (ep->value.const_refs = IREF + 1, r_set_size(ep, icount)) : 0 )
#define store_state_short(ep)\
( icount > 0 ? (ep->value.packed = iref_packed + 1, r_set_size(ep, icount)) : 0 )
#define store_state_either(ep)\
( icount > 0 ? (ep->value.packed = IREF_NEXT_EITHER(iref_packed), r_set_size(ep, icount)) : 0 )
#define next()\
if ( --icount > 0 ) { iref_packed = IREF_NEXT(iref_packed); goto top; } else goto out
#define next_short()\
if ( --icount <= 0 ) { if ( icount < 0 ) goto up; iesp--; }\
++iref_packed; goto top
#define next_either()\
if ( --icount <= 0 ) { if ( icount < 0 ) goto up; iesp--; }\
iref_packed = IREF_NEXT_EITHER(iref_packed); goto top
#if !PACKED_SPECIAL_OPS
# undef next_either
# define next_either() next()
# undef store_state_either
# define store_state_either(ep) store_state(ep)
#endif
/* We want to recognize executable arrays here, */
/* so we push the argument on the estack and enter */
/* the loop at the bottom. */
if (iesp >= estop)
return_with_error(gs_error_execstackoverflow, pref);
++iesp;
ref_assign_inline(iesp, pref);
goto bot;
top:
/*
* This is the top of the interpreter loop.
* iref points to the ref being interpreted.
* Note that this might be an element of a packed array,
* not a real ref: we carefully arranged the first 16 bits of
* a ref and of a packed array element so they could be distinguished
* from each other. (See ghost.h and packed.h for more detail.)
*/
INCR(top);
#ifdef DEBUG
/* Do a little validation on the top o-stack entry. */
if (iosp >= osbot &&
(r_type(iosp) == t__invalid || r_type(iosp) >= tx_next_op)
) {
mlprintf(imemory, "Invalid value on o-stack!\n");
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_Fatal);
}
if (gs_debug['I'] ||
(gs_debug['i'] &&
(r_is_packed(iref_packed) ?
r_packed_is_name(iref_packed) :
r_has_type(IREF, t_name)))
) {
os_ptr save_osp = osp; /* avoid side-effects */
es_ptr save_esp = esp;
osp = iosp;
esp = iesp;
dmlprintf5(imemory, "d%u,e%u<%u>0x%lx(%d): ",
ref_stack_count(&d_stack), ref_stack_count(&e_stack),
ref_stack_count(&o_stack), (ulong)IREF, icount);
debug_print_ref(imemory, IREF);
if (iosp >= osbot) {
dmputs(imemory, " // ");
debug_print_ref(imemory, iosp);
}
dmputc(imemory, '\n');
osp = save_osp;
esp = save_esp;
dmflush(imemory);
}
#endif
/* Objects that have attributes (arrays, dictionaries, files, and strings) */
/* use lit and exec; other objects use plain and plain_exec. */
#define lit(t) type_xe_value(t, a_execute)
#define exec(t) type_xe_value(t, a_execute + a_executable)
#define nox(t) type_xe_value(t, 0)
#define nox_exec(t) type_xe_value(t, a_executable)
#define plain(t) type_xe_value(t, 0)
#define plain_exec(t) type_xe_value(t, a_executable)
/*
* We have to populate enough cases of the switch statement to force
* some compilers to use a dispatch rather than a testing loop.
* What a nuisance!
*/
switch (r_type_xe(iref_packed)) {
/* Access errors. */
#define cases_invalid()\
case plain(t__invalid): case plain_exec(t__invalid)
cases_invalid():
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_Fatal);
#define cases_nox()\
case nox_exec(t_array): case nox_exec(t_dictionary):\
case nox_exec(t_file): case nox_exec(t_string):\
case nox_exec(t_mixedarray): case nox_exec(t_shortarray)
cases_nox():
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_invalidaccess);
/*
* Literal objects. We have to enumerate all the types.
* In fact, we have to include some extra plain_exec entries
* just to populate the switch. We break them up into groups
* to avoid overflowing some preprocessors.
*/
#define cases_lit_1()\
case lit(t_array): case nox(t_array):\
case plain(t_boolean): case plain_exec(t_boolean):\
case lit(t_dictionary): case nox(t_dictionary)
#define cases_lit_2()\
case lit(t_file): case nox(t_file):\
case plain(t_fontID): case plain_exec(t_fontID):\
case plain(t_integer): case plain_exec(t_integer):\
case plain(t_mark): case plain_exec(t_mark)
#define cases_lit_3()\
case plain(t_name):\
case plain(t_null):\
case plain(t_oparray):\
case plain(t_operator)
#define cases_lit_4()\
case plain(t_real): case plain_exec(t_real):\
case plain(t_save): case plain_exec(t_save):\
case lit(t_string): case nox(t_string)
#define cases_lit_5()\
case lit(t_mixedarray): case nox(t_mixedarray):\
case lit(t_shortarray): case nox(t_shortarray):\
case plain(t_device): case plain_exec(t_device):\
case plain(t_struct): case plain_exec(t_struct):\
case plain(t_astruct): case plain_exec(t_astruct)
/* Executable arrays are treated as literals in direct execution. */
#define cases_lit_array()\
case exec(t_array): case exec(t_mixedarray): case exec(t_shortarray)
cases_lit_1():
cases_lit_2():
cases_lit_3():
cases_lit_4():
cases_lit_5():
INCR(lit);
break;
cases_lit_array():
INCR(lit_array);
break;
/* Special operators. */
case plain_exec(tx_op_add):
x_add: INCR(x_add);
osp = iosp; /* sync o_stack */
if ((code = zop_add(i_ctx_p)) < 0)
return_with_error_tx_op(code);
iosp--;
next_either();
case plain_exec(tx_op_def):
x_def: INCR(x_def);
osp = iosp; /* sync o_stack */
if ((code = zop_def(i_ctx_p)) < 0)
return_with_error_tx_op(code);
iosp -= 2;
next_either();
case plain_exec(tx_op_dup):
x_dup: INCR(x_dup);
if (iosp < osbot)
return_with_error_tx_op(gs_error_stackunderflow);
if (iosp >= ostop) {
o_stack.requested = 1;
return_with_error_tx_op(gs_error_stackoverflow);
}
iosp++;
ref_assign_inline(iosp, iosp - 1);
next_either();
case plain_exec(tx_op_exch):
x_exch: INCR(x_exch);
if (iosp <= osbot)
return_with_error_tx_op(gs_error_stackunderflow);
ref_assign_inline(&token, iosp);
ref_assign_inline(iosp, iosp - 1);
ref_assign_inline(iosp - 1, &token);
next_either();
case plain_exec(tx_op_if):
x_if: INCR(x_if);
if (!r_is_proc(iosp))
return_with_error_tx_op(check_proc_failed(iosp));
if (!r_has_type(iosp - 1, t_boolean))
return_with_error_tx_op((iosp <= osbot ?
gs_error_stackunderflow : gs_error_typecheck));
if (!iosp[-1].value.boolval) {
iosp -= 2;
next_either();
}
if (iesp >= estop)
return_with_error_tx_op(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
store_state_either(iesp);
whichp = iosp;
iosp -= 2;
goto ifup;
case plain_exec(tx_op_ifelse):
x_ifelse: INCR(x_ifelse);
if (!r_is_proc(iosp))
return_with_error_tx_op(check_proc_failed(iosp));
if (!r_is_proc(iosp - 1))
return_with_error_tx_op(check_proc_failed(iosp - 1));
if (!r_has_type(iosp - 2, t_boolean))
return_with_error_tx_op((iosp < osbot + 2 ?
gs_error_stackunderflow : gs_error_typecheck));
if (iesp >= estop)
return_with_error_tx_op(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
store_state_either(iesp);
whichp = (iosp[-2].value.boolval ? iosp - 1 : iosp);
iosp -= 3;
/* Open code "up" for the array case(s) */
ifup:if ((icount = r_size(whichp) - 1) <= 0) {
if (icount < 0)
goto up; /* 0-element proc */
SET_IREF(whichp->value.refs); /* 1-element proc */
if (--(*ticks_left) > 0)
goto top;
}
++iesp;
/* Do a ref_assign, but also set iref. */
iesp->tas = whichp->tas;
SET_IREF(iesp->value.refs = whichp->value.refs);
if (--(*ticks_left) > 0)
goto top;
goto slice;
case plain_exec(tx_op_index):
x_index: INCR(x_index);
osp = iosp; /* zindex references o_stack */
if ((code = zindex(i_ctx_p)) < 0)
return_with_error_tx_op(code);
next_either();
case plain_exec(tx_op_pop):
x_pop: INCR(x_pop);
if (iosp < osbot)
return_with_error_tx_op(gs_error_stackunderflow);
iosp--;
next_either();
case plain_exec(tx_op_roll):
x_roll: INCR(x_roll);
osp = iosp; /* zroll references o_stack */
if ((code = zroll(i_ctx_p)) < 0)
return_with_error_tx_op(code);
iosp -= 2;
next_either();
case plain_exec(tx_op_sub):
x_sub: INCR(x_sub);
osp = iosp; /* sync o_stack */
if ((code = zop_sub(i_ctx_p)) < 0)
return_with_error_tx_op(code);
iosp--;
next_either();
/* Executable types. */
case plain_exec(t_null):
goto bot;
case plain_exec(t_oparray):
/* Replace with the definition and go again. */
INCR(exec_array);
opindex = op_index(IREF);
pvalue = (ref *)IREF->value.const_refs;
opst: /* Prepare to call a t_oparray procedure in *pvalue. */
store_state(iesp);
oppr: /* Record the stack depths in case of failure. */
if (iesp >= estop - 4)
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
iesp += 5;
osp = iosp; /* ref_stack_count_inline needs this */
make_mark_estack(iesp - 4, es_other, oparray_cleanup);
make_int(iesp - 3, opindex); /* for .errorexec effect */
make_int(iesp - 2, ref_stack_count_inline(&o_stack));
make_int(iesp - 1, ref_stack_count_inline(&d_stack));
make_op_estack(iesp, oparray_pop);
goto pr;
prst: /* Prepare to call the procedure (array) in *pvalue. */
store_state(iesp);
pr: /* Call the array in *pvalue. State has been stored. */
/* We want to do this check before assigning icount so icount is correct
* in the event of a gs_error_execstackoverflow
*/
if (iesp >= estop) {
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
}
if ((icount = r_size(pvalue) - 1) <= 0) {
if (icount < 0)
goto up; /* 0-element proc */
SET_IREF(pvalue->value.refs); /* 1-element proc */
if (--(*ticks_left) > 0)
goto top;
}
++iesp;
/* Do a ref_assign, but also set iref. */
iesp->tas = pvalue->tas;
SET_IREF(iesp->value.refs = pvalue->value.refs);
if (--(*ticks_left) > 0)
goto top;
goto slice;
case plain_exec(t_operator):
INCR(exec_operator);
if (--(*ticks_left) <= 0) { /* The following doesn't work, */
/* and I can't figure out why. */
/****** goto sst; ******/
}
esp = iesp; /* save for operator */
osp = iosp; /* ditto */
/* Operator routines take osp as an argument. */
/* This is just a convenience, since they adjust */
/* osp themselves to reflect the results. */
/* Operators that (net) push information on the */
/* operand stack must check for overflow: */
/* this normally happens automatically through */
/* the push macro (in oper.h). */
/* Operators that do not typecheck their operands, */
/* or take a variable number of arguments, */
/* must check explicitly for stack underflow. */
/* (See oper.h for more detail.) */
/* Note that each case must set iosp = osp: */
/* this is so we can switch on code without having to */
/* store it and reload it (for dumb compilers). */
switch (code = call_operator(real_opproc(IREF), i_ctx_p)) {
case 0: /* normal case */
case 1: /* alternative success case */
iosp = osp;
next();
case o_push_estack: /* store the state and go to up */
store_state(iesp);
opush:iosp = osp;
iesp = esp;
if (--(*ticks_left) > 0)
goto up;
goto slice;
case o_pop_estack: /* just go to up */
opop:iosp = osp;
if (esp == iesp)
goto bot;
iesp = esp;
goto up;
case o_reschedule:
store_state(iesp);
goto res;
case gs_error_Remap_Color:
oe_remap: store_state(iesp);
remap: if (iesp + 2 >= estop) {
esp = iesp;
code = ref_stack_extend(&e_stack, 2);
if (code < 0)
return_with_error_iref(code);
iesp = esp;
}
packed_get(imemory, iref_packed, iesp + 1);
make_oper(iesp + 2, 0,
r_ptr(&istate->remap_color_info,
int_remap_color_info_t)->proc);
iesp += 2;
goto up;
}
iosp = osp;
iesp = esp;
return_with_code_iref();
case plain_exec(t_name):
INCR(exec_name);
pvalue = IREF->value.pname->pvalue;
if (!pv_valid(pvalue)) {
uint nidx = names_index(int_nt, IREF);
uint htemp;
INCR(find_name);
if ((pvalue = dict_find_name_by_index_inline(nidx, htemp)) == 0)
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_undefined);
}
/* Dispatch on the type of the value. */
/* Again, we have to over-populate the switch. */
switch (r_type_xe(pvalue)) {
cases_invalid():
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_Fatal);
cases_nox(): /* access errors */
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_invalidaccess);
cases_lit_1():
cases_lit_2():
cases_lit_3():
cases_lit_4():
cases_lit_5():
INCR(name_lit);
/* Just push the value */
if (iosp >= ostop)
return_with_stackoverflow(pvalue);
++iosp;
ref_assign_inline(iosp, pvalue);
next();
case exec(t_array):
case exec(t_mixedarray):
case exec(t_shortarray):
INCR(name_proc);
/* This is an executable procedure, execute it. */
goto prst;
case plain_exec(tx_op_add):
goto x_add;
case plain_exec(tx_op_def):
goto x_def;
case plain_exec(tx_op_dup):
goto x_dup;
case plain_exec(tx_op_exch):
goto x_exch;
case plain_exec(tx_op_if):
goto x_if;
case plain_exec(tx_op_ifelse):
goto x_ifelse;
case plain_exec(tx_op_index):
goto x_index;
case plain_exec(tx_op_pop):
goto x_pop;
case plain_exec(tx_op_roll):
goto x_roll;
case plain_exec(tx_op_sub):
goto x_sub;
case plain_exec(t_null):
goto bot;
case plain_exec(t_oparray):
INCR(name_oparray);
opindex = op_index(pvalue);
pvalue = (ref *)pvalue->value.const_refs;
goto opst;
case plain_exec(t_operator):
INCR(name_operator);
{ /* Shortcut for operators. */
/* See above for the logic. */
if (--(*ticks_left) <= 0) { /* The following doesn't work, */
/* and I can't figure out why. */
/****** goto sst; ******/
}
esp = iesp;
osp = iosp;
switch (code = call_operator(real_opproc(pvalue),
i_ctx_p)
) {
case 0: /* normal case */
case 1: /* alternative success case */
iosp = osp;
next();
case o_push_estack:
store_state(iesp);
goto opush;
case o_pop_estack:
goto opop;
case o_reschedule:
store_state(iesp);
goto res;
case gs_error_Remap_Color:
goto oe_remap;
}
iosp = osp;
iesp = esp;
return_with_error(code, pvalue);
}
case plain_exec(t_name):
case exec(t_file):
case exec(t_string):
default:
/* Not a procedure, reinterpret it. */
store_state(iesp);
icount = 0;
SET_IREF(pvalue);
goto top;
}
case exec(t_file):
{ /* Executable file. Read the next token and interpret it. */
stream *s;
scanner_state sstate;
check_read_known_file(i_ctx_p, s, IREF, return_with_error_iref);
rt:
if (iosp >= ostop) /* check early */
return_with_stackoverflow_iref();
osp = iosp; /* gs_scan_token uses ostack */
gs_scanner_init_options(&sstate, IREF, i_ctx_p->scanner_options);
again:
code = gs_scan_token(i_ctx_p, &token, &sstate);
iosp = osp; /* ditto */
switch (code) {
case 0: /* read a token */
/* It's worth checking for literals, which make up */
/* the majority of input tokens, before storing the */
/* state on the e-stack. Note that because of //, */
/* the token may have *any* type and attributes. */
/* Note also that executable arrays aren't executed */
/* at the top level -- they're treated as literals. */
if (!r_has_attr(&token, a_executable) ||
r_is_array(&token)
) { /* If gs_scan_token used the o-stack, */
/* we know we can do a push now; if not, */
/* the pre-check is still valid. */
iosp++;
ref_assign_inline(iosp, &token);
goto rt;
}
store_state(iesp);
/* Push the file on the e-stack */
if (iesp >= estop)
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
esfile_set_cache(++iesp);
ref_assign_inline(iesp, IREF);
SET_IREF(&token);
icount = 0;
goto top;
case gs_error_undefined: /* //name undefined */
gs_scanner_error_object(i_ctx_p, &sstate, &token);
return_with_error(code, &token);
case scan_EOF: /* end of file */
esfile_clear_cache();
goto bot;
case scan_BOS:
/* Binary object sequences */
/* ARE executed at the top level. */
store_state(iesp);
/* Push the file on the e-stack */
if (iesp >= estop)
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
esfile_set_cache(++iesp);
ref_assign_inline(iesp, IREF);
pvalue = &token;
goto pr;
case scan_Refill:
store_state(iesp);
/* iref may point into the exec stack; */
/* save its referent now. */
ref_assign_inline(&token, IREF);
/* Push the file on the e-stack */
if (iesp >= estop)
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
++iesp;
ref_assign_inline(iesp, &token);
esp = iesp;
osp = iosp;
code = gs_scan_handle_refill(i_ctx_p, &sstate, true,
ztokenexec_continue);
scan_cont:
iosp = osp;
iesp = esp;
switch (code) {
case 0:
iesp--; /* don't push the file */
goto again; /* stacks are unchanged */
case o_push_estack:
esfile_clear_cache();
if (--(*ticks_left) > 0)
goto up;
goto slice;
}
/* must be an error */
iesp--; /* don't push the file */
return_with_code_iref();
case scan_Comment:
case scan_DSC_Comment: {
/* See scan_Refill above for comments. */
ref file_token;
store_state(iesp);
ref_assign_inline(&file_token, IREF);
if (iesp >= estop)
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
++iesp;
ref_assign_inline(iesp, &file_token);
esp = iesp;
osp = iosp;
code = ztoken_handle_comment(i_ctx_p,
&sstate, &token,
code, true, true,
ztokenexec_continue);
}
goto scan_cont;
default: /* error */
ref_assign_inline(&token, IREF);
gs_scanner_error_object(i_ctx_p, &sstate, &token);
return_with_error(code, &token);
}
}
case exec(t_string):
{ /* Executable string. Read a token and interpret it. */
stream ss;
scanner_state sstate;
s_init(&ss, NULL);
sread_string(&ss, IREF->value.bytes, r_size(IREF));
gs_scanner_init_stream_options(&sstate, &ss, SCAN_FROM_STRING);
osp = iosp; /* gs_scan_token uses ostack */
code = gs_scan_token(i_ctx_p, &token, &sstate);
iosp = osp; /* ditto */
switch (code) {
case 0: /* read a token */
case scan_BOS: /* binary object sequence */
store_state(iesp);
/* If the updated string isn't empty, push it back */
/* on the e-stack. */
{
uint size = sbufavailable(&ss);
if (size) {
if (iesp >= estop)
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
++iesp;
iesp->tas.type_attrs = IREF->tas.type_attrs;
iesp->value.const_bytes = sbufptr(&ss);
r_set_size(iesp, size);
}
}
if (code == 0) {
SET_IREF(&token);
icount = 0;
goto top;
}
/* Handle BOS specially */
pvalue = &token;
goto pr;
case scan_EOF: /* end of string */
goto bot;
case scan_Refill: /* error */
code = gs_note_error(gs_error_syntaxerror);
/* fall through */
default: /* error */
ref_assign_inline(&token, IREF);
gs_scanner_error_object(i_ctx_p, &sstate, &token);
return_with_error(code, &token);
}
}
/* Handle packed arrays here by re-dispatching. */
/* This also picks up some anomalous cases of non-packed arrays. */
default:
{
uint index;
switch (*iref_packed >> r_packed_type_shift) {
case pt_full_ref:
case pt_full_ref + 1:
INCR(p_full);
if (iosp >= ostop)
return_with_stackoverflow_iref();
/* We know this can't be an executable object */
/* requiring special handling, so we just push it. */
++iosp;
/* We know that refs are properly aligned: */
/* see packed.h for details. */
ref_assign_inline(iosp, IREF);
next();
case pt_executable_operator:
index = *iref_packed & packed_value_mask;
if (--(*ticks_left) <= 0) { /* The following doesn't work, */
/* and I can't figure out why. */
/****** goto sst_short; ******/
}
if (!op_index_is_operator(index)) {
INCR(p_exec_oparray);
store_state_short(iesp);
opindex = index;
/* Call the operator procedure. */
index -= op_def_count;
pvalue = (ref *)
(index < r_size(&i_ctx_p->op_array_table_global.table) ?
i_ctx_p->op_array_table_global.table.value.const_refs +
index :
i_ctx_p->op_array_table_local.table.value.const_refs +
(index - r_size(&i_ctx_p->op_array_table_global.table)));
goto oppr;
}
INCR(p_exec_operator);
/* See the main plain_exec(t_operator) case */
/* for details of what happens here. */
#if PACKED_SPECIAL_OPS
/*
* We arranged in iinit.c that the special ops
* have operator indices starting at 1.
*
* The (int) cast in the next line is required
* because some compilers don't allow arithmetic
* involving two different enumerated types.
*/
# define case_xop(xop) case xop - (int)tx_op + 1
switch (index) {
case_xop(tx_op_add):goto x_add;
case_xop(tx_op_def):goto x_def;
case_xop(tx_op_dup):goto x_dup;
case_xop(tx_op_exch):goto x_exch;
case_xop(tx_op_if):goto x_if;
case_xop(tx_op_ifelse):goto x_ifelse;
case_xop(tx_op_index):goto x_index;
case_xop(tx_op_pop):goto x_pop;
case_xop(tx_op_roll):goto x_roll;
case_xop(tx_op_sub):goto x_sub;
case 0: /* for dumb compilers */
default:
;
}
# undef case_xop
#endif
INCR(p_exec_non_x_operator);
esp = iesp;
osp = iosp;
switch (code = call_operator(op_index_proc(index), i_ctx_p)) {
case 0:
case 1:
iosp = osp;
next_short();
case o_push_estack:
store_state_short(iesp);
goto opush;
case o_pop_estack:
iosp = osp;
if (esp == iesp) {
next_short();
}
iesp = esp;
goto up;
case o_reschedule:
store_state_short(iesp);
goto res;
case gs_error_Remap_Color:
store_state_short(iesp);
goto remap;
}
iosp = osp;
iesp = esp;
return_with_code_iref();
case pt_integer:
INCR(p_integer);
if (iosp >= ostop)
return_with_stackoverflow_iref();
++iosp;
make_int(iosp,
((int)*iref_packed & packed_int_mask) +
packed_min_intval);
next_short();
case pt_literal_name:
INCR(p_lit_name);
{
uint nidx = *iref_packed & packed_value_mask;
if (iosp >= ostop)
return_with_stackoverflow_iref();
++iosp;
name_index_ref_inline(int_nt, nidx, iosp);
next_short();
}
case pt_executable_name:
INCR(p_exec_name);
{
uint nidx = *iref_packed & packed_value_mask;
pvalue = name_index_ptr_inline(int_nt, nidx)->pvalue;
if (!pv_valid(pvalue)) {
uint htemp;
INCR(p_find_name);
if ((pvalue = dict_find_name_by_index_inline(nidx, htemp)) == 0) {
names_index_ref(int_nt, nidx, &token);
return_with_error(gs_error_undefined, &token);
}
}
if (r_has_masked_attrs(pvalue, a_execute, a_execute + a_executable)) { /* Literal, push it. */
INCR(p_name_lit);
if (iosp >= ostop)
return_with_stackoverflow_iref();
++iosp;
ref_assign_inline(iosp, pvalue);
next_short();
}
if (r_is_proc(pvalue)) { /* This is an executable procedure, */
/* execute it. */
INCR(p_name_proc);
store_state_short(iesp);
goto pr;
}
/* Not a literal or procedure, reinterpret it. */
store_state_short(iesp);
icount = 0;
SET_IREF(pvalue);
goto top;
}
/* default can't happen here */
}
}
}
/* Literal type, just push it. */
if (iosp >= ostop)
return_with_stackoverflow_iref();
++iosp;
ref_assign_inline(iosp, IREF);
bot:next();
out: /* At most 1 more token in the current procedure. */
/* (We already decremented icount.) */
if (!icount) {
/* Pop the execution stack for tail recursion. */
iesp--;
iref_packed = IREF_NEXT(iref_packed);
goto top;
}
up:if (--(*ticks_left) < 0)
goto slice;
/* See if there is anything left on the execution stack. */
if (!r_is_proc(iesp)) {
SET_IREF(iesp--);
icount = 0;
goto top;
}
SET_IREF(iesp->value.refs); /* next element of array */
icount = r_size(iesp) - 1;
if (icount <= 0) { /* <= 1 more elements */
iesp--; /* pop, or tail recursion */
if (icount < 0)
goto up;
}
goto top;
res:
/* Some operator has asked for context rescheduling. */
/* We've done a store_state. */
*pi_ctx_p = i_ctx_p;
code = (*i_ctx_p->reschedule_proc)(pi_ctx_p);
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
sched: /* We've just called a scheduling procedure. */
/* The interpreter state is in memory; iref is not current. */
if (code < 0) {
set_error(code);
/*
* We need a real object to return as the error object.
* (It only has to last long enough to store in
* *perror_object.)
*/
make_null_proc(&ierror.full);
SET_IREF(ierror.obj = &ierror.full);
goto error_exit;
}
/* Reload state information from memory. */
iosp = osp;
iesp = esp;
goto up;
#if 0 /****** ****** ***** */
sst: /* Time-slice, but push the current object first. */
store_state(iesp);
if (iesp >= estop)
return_with_error_iref(gs_error_execstackoverflow);
iesp++;
ref_assign_inline(iesp, iref);
#endif /****** ****** ***** */
slice: /* It's time to time-slice or garbage collect. */
/* iref is not live, so we don't need to do a store_state. */
osp = iosp;
esp = iesp;
/* If *ticks_left <= -100, we need to GC now. */
if ((*ticks_left) <= -100) { /* We need to garbage collect now. */
*pi_ctx_p = i_ctx_p;
code = interp_reclaim(pi_ctx_p, -1);
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
} else if (i_ctx_p->time_slice_proc != NULL) {
*pi_ctx_p = i_ctx_p;
code = (*i_ctx_p->time_slice_proc)(pi_ctx_p);
i_ctx_p = *pi_ctx_p;
} else
code = 0;
*ticks_left = i_ctx_p->time_slice_ticks;
set_code_on_interrupt(imemory, &code);
goto sched;
/* Error exits. */
rweci:
ierror.code = code;
rwei:
ierror.obj = IREF;
rwe:
if (!r_is_packed(iref_packed))
store_state(iesp);
else {
/*
* We need a real object to return as the error object.
* (It only has to last long enough to store in *perror_object.)
*/
packed_get(imemory, (const ref_packed *)ierror.obj, &ierror.full);
store_state_short(iesp);
if (IREF == ierror.obj)
SET_IREF(&ierror.full);
ierror.obj = &ierror.full;
}
error_exit:
if (GS_ERROR_IS_INTERRUPT(ierror.code)) { /* We must push the current object being interpreted */
/* back on the e-stack so it will be re-executed. */
/* Currently, this is always an executable operator, */
/* but it might be something else someday if we check */
/* for interrupts in the interpreter loop itself. */
if (iesp >= estop)
ierror.code = gs_error_execstackoverflow;
else {
iesp++;
ref_assign_inline(iesp, IREF);
}
}
esp = iesp;
osp = iosp;
ref_assign_inline(perror_object, ierror.obj);
#ifdef DEBUG
if (ierror.code == gs_error_InterpreterExit) {
/* Do not call gs_log_error to reduce the noise. */
return gs_error_InterpreterExit;
}
#endif
return gs_log_error(ierror.code, __FILE__, ierror.line);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 2,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadItemImpl::OnContentCheckCompleted(
content::DownloadDangerType danger_type) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(AllDataSaved());
SetDangerType(danger_type);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,138 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GetHeaders(base::DictionaryValue* params, std::string* headers) {
if (!params)
return false;
base::ListValue* header_list;
if (!params->GetList("headers", &header_list))
return false;
std::string double_quote_headers;
base::JSONWriter::Write(*header_list, &double_quote_headers);
base::ReplaceChars(double_quote_headers, "\"", "'", headers);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileTransfer::setSecuritySession(char const *session_id) {
free(m_sec_session_id);
m_sec_session_id = NULL;
m_sec_session_id = session_id ? strdup(session_id) : NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
switch (st->hand_state) {
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
/*
* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
* practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
* to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
*/
return s->max_cert_list;
case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
return 3;
return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
default:
/* Shouldn't happen */
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API void PE_(bin_pe_parse_resource)(struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t) *bin) {
int index = 0;
ut64 off = 0, rsrc_base = bin->resource_directory_offset;
Pe_image_resource_directory *rs_directory = bin->resource_directory;
ut32 curRes = 0;
int totalRes = 0;
SdbHash *dirs = sdb_ht_new (); //to avoid infinite loops
if (!dirs) {
return;
}
if (!rs_directory) {
sdb_ht_free (dirs);
return;
}
curRes = rs_directory->NumberOfNamedEntries;
totalRes = curRes + rs_directory->NumberOfIdEntries;
if (totalRes > R_PE_MAX_RESOURCES) {
eprintf ("Error parsing resource directory\n");
sdb_ht_free (dirs);
return;
}
for (index = 0; index < totalRes; index++) {
Pe_image_resource_directory_entry typeEntry;
off = rsrc_base + sizeof (*rs_directory) + index * sizeof (typeEntry);
sdb_ht_insert (dirs, sdb_fmt ("0x%08"PFMT64x, off), "1");
if (off > bin->size || off + sizeof(typeEntry) > bin->size) {
break;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, (ut8*)&typeEntry, sizeof(typeEntry)) < 1) {
eprintf ("Warning: read resource directory entry\n");
break;
}
if (typeEntry.u2.s.DataIsDirectory) {
Pe_image_resource_directory identEntry;
off = rsrc_base + typeEntry.u2.s.OffsetToDirectory;
int len = r_buf_read_at (bin->b, off, (ut8*)&identEntry, sizeof(identEntry));
if (len < 1 || len != sizeof (identEntry)) {
eprintf ("Warning: parsing resource directory\n");
}
_parse_resource_directory (bin, &identEntry, typeEntry.u2.s.OffsetToDirectory, typeEntry.u1.Id, 0, dirs);
}
}
sdb_ht_free (dirs);
_store_resource_sdb (bin);
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in pe
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,888 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void QuotaManager::GetCachedOrigins(
StorageType type, std::set<GURL>* origins) {
DCHECK(origins);
LazyInitialize();
DCHECK(GetUsageTracker(type));
GetUsageTracker(type)->GetCachedOrigins(origins);
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_NPUSHB( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_UShort L, K;
L = (FT_UShort)exc->code[exc->IP + 1];
if ( BOUNDS( L, exc->stackSize + 1 - exc->top ) )
{
exc->error = FT_THROW( Stack_Overflow );
return;
}
for ( K = 1; K <= L; K++ )
args[K - 1] = exc->code[exc->IP + K + 1];
exc->new_top += L;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Point RenderFrameHostImpl::AccessibilityOriginInScreen(
const gfx::Rect& bounds) const {
RenderWidgetHostViewBase* view = static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(
render_view_host_->GetWidget()->GetView());
if (view)
return view->AccessibilityOriginInScreen(bounds);
return gfx::Point();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,730 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int racl_cb(void *rock,
const char *key, size_t keylen,
const char *data __attribute__((unused)),
size_t datalen __attribute__((unused)))
{
struct raclrock *raclrock = (struct raclrock *)rock;
strarray_appendm(raclrock->list, xstrndup(key + raclrock->prefixlen, keylen - raclrock->prefixlen));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8DOMWindow::locationAttrSetterCustom(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
DOMWindow* imp = V8DOMWindow::toNative(info.Holder());
DOMWindow* active = activeDOMWindow();
if (!active)
return;
DOMWindow* first = firstDOMWindow();
if (!first)
return;
if (Location* location = imp->location())
location->setHref(toWebCoreString(value), active, first);
}
Commit Message: Named access checks on DOMWindow miss navigator
The design of the named access check is very fragile. Instead of doing the
access check at the same time as the access, we need to check access in a
separate operation using different parameters. Worse, we need to implement a
part of the access check as a blacklist of dangerous properties.
This CL expands the blacklist slightly by adding in the real named properties
from the DOMWindow instance to the current list (which included the real named
properties of the shadow object).
In the longer term, we should investigate whether we can change the V8 API to
let us do the access check in the same callback as the property access itself.
BUG=237022
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15346002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150616 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 113,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int test_gf2m_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a, *b[2], *c, *d, *e, *f, *g, *h;
int i, j, ret = 0;
int p0[] = { 163, 7, 6, 3, 0, -1 };
int p1[] = { 193, 15, 0, -1 };
a = BN_new();
b[0] = BN_new();
b[1] = BN_new();
c = BN_new();
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
f = BN_new();
g = BN_new();
h = BN_new();
BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p0, b[0]);
BN_GF2m_arr2poly(p1, b[1]);
for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 1024, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(d, 1024, 0, 0);
for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
BN_GF2m_mod_mul(e, a, c, b[j], ctx);
# if 0 /* make test uses ouput in bc but bc can't
* handle GF(2^m) arithmetic */
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
BN_print(bp, c);
BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
BN_print(bp, b[j]);
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
BN_print(bp, e);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
}
# endif
BN_GF2m_add(f, a, d);
BN_GF2m_mod_mul(g, f, c, b[j], ctx);
BN_GF2m_mod_mul(h, d, c, b[j], ctx);
BN_GF2m_add(f, e, g);
BN_GF2m_add(f, f, h);
/* Test that (a+d)*c = a*c + d*c. */
if (!BN_is_zero(f)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"GF(2^m) modular multiplication test failed!\n");
goto err;
}
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b[0]);
BN_free(b[1]);
BN_free(c);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(e);
BN_free(f);
BN_free(g);
BN_free(h);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,655 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int out_close_pcm_devices(struct stream_out *out)
{
struct pcm_device *pcm_device;
struct listnode *node;
struct audio_device *adev = out->dev;
list_for_each(node, &out->pcm_dev_list) {
pcm_device = node_to_item(node, struct pcm_device, stream_list_node);
if (pcm_device->sound_trigger_handle > 0) {
adev->sound_trigger_close_for_streaming(
pcm_device->sound_trigger_handle);
pcm_device->sound_trigger_handle = 0;
}
if (pcm_device->pcm) {
pcm_close(pcm_device->pcm);
pcm_device->pcm = NULL;
}
if (pcm_device->resampler) {
release_resampler(pcm_device->resampler);
pcm_device->resampler = NULL;
}
if (pcm_device->res_buffer) {
free(pcm_device->res_buffer);
pcm_device->res_buffer = NULL;
}
if (pcm_device->dsp_context) {
cras_dsp_context_free(pcm_device->dsp_context);
pcm_device->dsp_context = NULL;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_sched_groups_power(int cpu, struct sched_domain *sd)
{
struct sched_group *sg = sd->groups;
WARN_ON(!sg);
do {
sg->group_weight = cpumask_weight(sched_group_cpus(sg));
sg = sg->next;
} while (sg != sd->groups);
if (cpu != group_balance_cpu(sg))
return;
update_group_power(sd, cpu);
atomic_set(&sg->sgp->nr_busy_cpus, sg->group_weight);
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_sot_putparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jpc_sot_t *sot = &ms->parms.sot;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_putuint16(out, sot->tileno) ||
jpc_putuint32(out, sot->len) ||
jpc_putuint8(out, sot->partno) ||
jpc_putuint8(out, sot->numparts)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MessageFilter() : channel_(NULL) { }
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_symlink(u_int32_t id)
{
char *oldpath, *newpath;
int r, status;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: symlink", id);
logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
/* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */
r = symlink(oldpath, newpath);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(oldpath);
free(newpath);
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 60,371 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Plugin::LoadNaClModule(nacl::DescWrapper* wrapper,
ErrorInfo* error_info,
pp::CompletionCallback init_done_cb,
pp::CompletionCallback crash_cb) {
ShutDownSubprocesses();
if (!LoadNaClModuleCommon(wrapper, &main_subprocess_, manifest_.get(),
true, error_info, init_done_cb, crash_cb)) {
return false;
}
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::LoadNaClModule (%s)\n",
main_subprocess_.detailed_description().c_str()));
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iucv_callback_connreq(struct iucv_path *path,
u8 ipvmid[8], u8 ipuser[16])
{
unsigned char user_data[16];
unsigned char nuser_data[16];
unsigned char src_name[8];
struct sock *sk, *nsk;
struct iucv_sock *iucv, *niucv;
int err;
memcpy(src_name, ipuser, 8);
EBCASC(src_name, 8);
/* Find out if this path belongs to af_iucv. */
read_lock(&iucv_sk_list.lock);
iucv = NULL;
sk = NULL;
sk_for_each(sk, &iucv_sk_list.head)
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_LISTEN &&
!memcmp(&iucv_sk(sk)->src_name, src_name, 8)) {
/*
* Found a listening socket with
* src_name == ipuser[0-7].
*/
iucv = iucv_sk(sk);
break;
}
read_unlock(&iucv_sk_list.lock);
if (!iucv)
/* No socket found, not one of our paths. */
return -EINVAL;
bh_lock_sock(sk);
/* Check if parent socket is listening */
low_nmcpy(user_data, iucv->src_name);
high_nmcpy(user_data, iucv->dst_name);
ASCEBC(user_data, sizeof(user_data));
if (sk->sk_state != IUCV_LISTEN) {
err = pr_iucv->path_sever(path, user_data);
iucv_path_free(path);
goto fail;
}
/* Check for backlog size */
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk)) {
err = pr_iucv->path_sever(path, user_data);
iucv_path_free(path);
goto fail;
}
/* Create the new socket */
nsk = iucv_sock_alloc(NULL, sk->sk_type, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!nsk) {
err = pr_iucv->path_sever(path, user_data);
iucv_path_free(path);
goto fail;
}
niucv = iucv_sk(nsk);
iucv_sock_init(nsk, sk);
/* Set the new iucv_sock */
memcpy(niucv->dst_name, ipuser + 8, 8);
EBCASC(niucv->dst_name, 8);
memcpy(niucv->dst_user_id, ipvmid, 8);
memcpy(niucv->src_name, iucv->src_name, 8);
memcpy(niucv->src_user_id, iucv->src_user_id, 8);
niucv->path = path;
/* Call iucv_accept */
high_nmcpy(nuser_data, ipuser + 8);
memcpy(nuser_data + 8, niucv->src_name, 8);
ASCEBC(nuser_data + 8, 8);
/* set message limit for path based on msglimit of accepting socket */
niucv->msglimit = iucv->msglimit;
path->msglim = iucv->msglimit;
err = pr_iucv->path_accept(path, &af_iucv_handler, nuser_data, nsk);
if (err) {
iucv_sever_path(nsk, 1);
iucv_sock_kill(nsk);
goto fail;
}
iucv_accept_enqueue(sk, nsk);
/* Wake up accept */
nsk->sk_state = IUCV_CONNECTED;
sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 1);
err = 0;
fail:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::WillCreateURLLoaderFactory(
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh,
bool is_navigation,
bool is_download,
network::mojom::URLLoaderFactoryRequest* target_factory_request) {
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node = rfh->frame_tree_node();
base::UnguessableToken frame_token = frame_tree_node->devtools_frame_token();
frame_tree_node = GetFrameTreeNodeAncestor(frame_tree_node);
RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost* agent_host = FindAgentHost(frame_tree_node);
if (!agent_host)
return false;
int process_id = is_navigation ? 0 : rfh->GetProcess()->GetID();
DCHECK(!is_download || is_navigation);
for (auto* network : protocol::NetworkHandler::ForAgentHost(agent_host)) {
if (network->MaybeCreateProxyForInterception(
frame_token, process_id, is_download, target_factory_request)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow Page.setDownloadBehavior for extensions
Bug: 866426
Change-Id: I71b672978e1a8ec779ede49da16b21198567d3a4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1270007
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598004}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u64 rfc3390_initial_rate(struct sock *sk)
{
const struct ccid3_hc_tx_sock *hc = ccid3_hc_tx_sk(sk);
const __u32 w_init = clamp_t(__u32, 4380U, 2 * hc->tx_s, 4 * hc->tx_s);
return scaled_div(w_init << 6, hc->tx_rtt);
}
Commit Message: dccp: fix info leak via getsockopt(DCCP_SOCKOPT_CCID_TX_INFO)
The CCID3 code fails to initialize the trailing padding bytes of struct
tfrc_tx_info added for alignment on 64 bit architectures. It that for
potentially leaks four bytes kernel stack via the getsockopt() syscall.
Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,170 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_xdr_dec_statfs(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, struct nfs_fsstat *fsstat)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
xdr_init_decode(&xdr, &req->rq_rcv_buf, p);
status = decode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
if (!status)
status = decode_putfh(&xdr);
if (!status)
status = decode_statfs(&xdr, fsstat);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 23,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HTMLFormControlElement::tabIndex() const {
return Element::tabIndex();
}
Commit Message: autofocus: Fix a crash with an autofocus element in a document without browsing context.
ShouldAutofocus() should check existence of the browsing context.
Otherwise, doc.TopFrameOrigin() returns null.
Before crrev.com/695830, ShouldAutofocus() was called only for
rendered elements. That is to say, the document always had
browsing context.
Bug: 1003228
Change-Id: I2a941c34e9707d44869a6d7585dc7fb9f06e3bf4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1800902
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#696291}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 136,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool xmp_files_close(XmpFilePtr xf, XmpCloseFileOptions options)
{
CHECK_PTR(xf, false);
RESET_ERROR;
try {
auto txf = reinterpret_cast<SXMPFiles *>(xf);
txf->CloseFile(options);
}
catch (const XMP_Error &e) {
set_error(e);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 16,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Browser* BrowserInit::LaunchWithProfile::OpenURLsInBrowser(
Browser* browser,
bool process_startup,
const std::vector<GURL>& urls) {
std::vector<Tab> tabs;
UrlsToTabs(urls, &tabs);
return OpenTabsInBrowser(browser, process_startup, tabs);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: float RenderFrameHostImpl::AccessibilityGetDeviceScaleFactor() const {
RenderWidgetHostView* view = render_view_host_->GetWidget()->GetView();
if (view)
return GetScaleFactorForView(view);
return 1.0f;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,727 |
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