instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: epass2003_finish(sc_card_t *card)
{
epass2003_exdata *exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
if (exdata)
free(exdata);
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 78,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs4_open_delegation_recall(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state, const nfs4_stateid *stateid)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_open_delegation_recall(ctx, state, stateid);
switch (err) {
case 0:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESTALE:
goto out;
case -NFS4ERR_BADSESSION:
case -NFS4ERR_BADSLOT:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_HIGH_SLOT:
case -NFS4ERR_CONN_NOT_BOUND_TO_SESSION:
case -NFS4ERR_DEADSESSION:
nfs4_schedule_session_recovery(server->nfs_client->cl_session);
goto out;
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID:
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
/* Don't recall a delegation if it was lost */
nfs4_schedule_lease_recovery(server->nfs_client);
goto out;
case -ERESTARTSYS:
/*
* The show must go on: exit, but mark the
* stateid as needing recovery.
*/
case -NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED:
case -NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
nfs_inode_find_state_and_recover(state->inode,
stateid);
nfs4_schedule_stateid_recovery(server, state);
case -EKEYEXPIRED:
/*
* User RPCSEC_GSS context has expired.
* We cannot recover this stateid now, so
* skip it and allow recovery thread to
* proceed.
*/
case -ENOMEM:
err = 0;
goto out;
}
err = nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
} while (exception.retry);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,944
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderBox::styleWillChange(StyleDifference diff, const RenderStyle& newStyle)
{
RenderStyle* oldStyle = style();
if (oldStyle) {
if (diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint && node() &&
(isHTMLHtmlElement(*node()) || isHTMLBodyElement(*node()))) {
view()->repaint();
if (oldStyle->hasEntirelyFixedBackground() != newStyle.hasEntirelyFixedBackground())
view()->compositor()->setNeedsUpdateFixedBackground();
}
if (diff == StyleDifferenceLayout && parent() && oldStyle->position() != newStyle.position()) {
markContainingBlocksForLayout();
if (oldStyle->position() == StaticPosition)
repaint();
else if (newStyle.hasOutOfFlowPosition())
parent()->setChildNeedsLayout();
if (isFloating() && !isOutOfFlowPositioned() && newStyle.hasOutOfFlowPosition())
removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists();
}
} else if (isBody())
view()->repaint();
RenderBoxModelObject::styleWillChange(diff, newStyle);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rfcomm_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname, char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct bt_security sec;
int err = 0;
size_t len;
u32 opt;
BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);
if (level == SOL_RFCOMM)
return rfcomm_sock_setsockopt_old(sock, optname, optval, optlen);
if (level != SOL_BLUETOOTH)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
lock_sock(sk);
switch (optname) {
case BT_SECURITY:
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_STREAM) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
sec.level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
len = min_t(unsigned int, sizeof(sec), optlen);
if (copy_from_user((char *) &sec, optval, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (sec.level > BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
rfcomm_pi(sk)->sec_level = sec.level;
break;
case BT_DEFER_SETUP:
if (sk->sk_state != BT_BOUND && sk->sk_state != BT_LISTEN) {
err = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (get_user(opt, (u32 __user *) optval)) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (opt)
set_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
else
clear_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(sk)->flags);
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix missing msg_namelen update in rfcomm_sock_recvmsg()
If RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP is set in the flags, rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() returns
early with 0 without updating the possibly set msg_namelen member. This,
in turn, leads to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_stream_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::RestoreCurrentRenderbufferBindings() {
glBindRenderbufferEXT(
GL_RENDERBUFFER,
bound_renderbuffer_ ? bound_renderbuffer_->service_id() : 0);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 99,305
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::RegisterWebSafeScheme(
const std::string& scheme) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
DCHECK_EQ(0U, web_safe_schemes_.count(scheme)) << "Add schemes at most once.";
DCHECK_EQ(0U, pseudo_schemes_.count(scheme))
<< "Web-safe implies not pseudo.";
web_safe_schemes_.insert(scheme);
}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 125,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char **XGetFontPath(
register Display *dpy,
int *npaths) /* RETURN */
{
xGetFontPathReply rep;
unsigned long nbytes = 0;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (GetFontPath, req);
(void) _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse);
if (rep.nPaths) {
flist = Xmalloc(rep.nPaths * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (nbytes + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, nbytes);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + nbytes;
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nPaths; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
flist[i] = NULL;
}
}
*npaths = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (flist);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 164,745
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DictionaryValue* ExtensionSettingSpecificsToValue(
const sync_pb::ExtensionSettingSpecifics& proto) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET_STR(extension_id);
SET_STR(key);
SET_STR(value);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 105,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::RenderViewReady(RenderViewHost* rvh) {
if (rvh != GetRenderViewHost()) {
return;
}
notify_disconnection_ = true;
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_WEB_CONTENTS_CONNECTED,
Source<WebContents>(this),
NotificationService::NoDetails());
bool was_crashed = IsCrashed();
SetIsCrashed(base::TERMINATION_STATUS_STILL_RUNNING, 0);
if (was_crashed && !FocusLocationBarByDefault() &&
(!delegate_ || delegate_->ShouldFocusPageAfterCrash())) {
view_->Focus();
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_, RenderViewReady());
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 110,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_cgroup_attach(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct cgroup_taskset *tset)
{
struct task_struct *task;
cgroup_taskset_for_each(task, cgrp, tset)
task_function_call(task, __perf_cgroup_move, task);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 31,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeExtensionsAPIClient::CreateWebRequestEventRouterDelegate() const {
return base::MakeUnique<ChromeExtensionWebRequestEventRouterDelegate>();
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 146,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void UserCloudPolicyManagerFactoryChromeOS::SetEmptyTestingFactory(
content::BrowserContext* context) {}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 110,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int chmd_extract(struct mschm_decompressor *base,
struct mschmd_file *file, const char *filename)
{
struct mschm_decompressor_p *self = (struct mschm_decompressor_p *) base;
struct mspack_system *sys;
struct mschmd_header *chm;
struct mspack_file *fh;
off_t bytes;
if (!self) return MSPACK_ERR_ARGS;
if (!file || !file->section) return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_ARGS;
sys = self->system;
chm = file->section->chm;
/* create decompression state if it doesn't exist */
if (!self->d) {
self->d = (struct mschmd_decompress_state *) sys->alloc(sys, sizeof(struct mschmd_decompress_state));
if (!self->d) return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_NOMEMORY;
self->d->chm = chm;
self->d->offset = 0;
self->d->state = NULL;
self->d->sys = *sys;
self->d->sys.write = &chmd_sys_write;
self->d->infh = NULL;
self->d->outfh = NULL;
}
/* open input chm file if not open, or the open one is a different chm */
if (!self->d->infh || (self->d->chm != chm)) {
if (self->d->infh) sys->close(self->d->infh);
if (self->d->state) lzxd_free(self->d->state);
self->d->chm = chm;
self->d->offset = 0;
self->d->state = NULL;
self->d->infh = sys->open(sys, chm->filename, MSPACK_SYS_OPEN_READ);
if (!self->d->infh) return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_OPEN;
}
/* open file for output */
if (!(fh = sys->open(sys, filename, MSPACK_SYS_OPEN_WRITE))) {
return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_OPEN;
}
/* if file is empty, simply creating it is enough */
if (!file->length) {
sys->close(fh);
return self->error = MSPACK_ERR_OK;
}
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_OK;
switch (file->section->id) {
case 0: /* Uncompressed section file */
/* simple seek + copy */
if (sys->seek(self->d->infh, file->section->chm->sec0.offset
+ file->offset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START))
{
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
}
else {
unsigned char buf[512];
off_t length = file->length;
while (length > 0) {
int run = sizeof(buf);
if ((off_t)run > length) run = (int)length;
if (sys->read(self->d->infh, &buf[0], run) != run) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_READ;
break;
}
if (sys->write(fh, &buf[0], run) != run) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_WRITE;
break;
}
length -= run;
}
}
break;
case 1: /* MSCompressed section file */
/* (re)initialise compression state if we it is not yet initialised,
* or we have advanced too far and have to backtrack
*/
if (!self->d->state || (file->offset < self->d->offset)) {
if (self->d->state) {
lzxd_free(self->d->state);
self->d->state = NULL;
}
if (chmd_init_decomp(self, file)) break;
}
/* seek to input data */
if (sys->seek(self->d->infh, self->d->inoffset, MSPACK_SYS_SEEK_START)) {
self->error = MSPACK_ERR_SEEK;
break;
}
/* get to correct offset. */
self->d->outfh = NULL;
if ((bytes = file->offset - self->d->offset)) {
self->error = lzxd_decompress(self->d->state, bytes);
}
/* if getting to the correct offset was error free, unpack file */
if (!self->error) {
self->d->outfh = fh;
self->error = lzxd_decompress(self->d->state, file->length);
}
/* save offset in input source stream, in case there is a section 0
* file between now and the next section 1 file extracted */
self->d->inoffset = sys->tell(self->d->infh);
/* if an LZX error occured, the LZX decompressor is now useless */
if (self->error) {
if (self->d->state) lzxd_free(self->d->state);
self->d->state = NULL;
}
break;
}
sys->close(fh);
return self->error;
}
Commit Message: length checks when looking for control files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 86,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Compositor::DidReceiveCompositorFrameAck() {
++activated_frame_count_;
for (auto& observer : observer_list_)
observer.OnCompositingEnded(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs4_open_delegation_recall(struct nfs_open_context *ctx, struct nfs4_state *state, const nfs4_stateid *stateid)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
int err;
do {
err = _nfs4_open_delegation_recall(ctx, state, stateid);
switch (err) {
case 0:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESTALE:
goto out;
case -NFS4ERR_BADSESSION:
case -NFS4ERR_BADSLOT:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_HIGH_SLOT:
case -NFS4ERR_CONN_NOT_BOUND_TO_SESSION:
case -NFS4ERR_DEADSESSION:
nfs4_schedule_session_recovery(server->nfs_client->cl_session, err);
goto out;
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_CLIENTID:
case -NFS4ERR_STALE_STATEID:
case -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED:
/* Don't recall a delegation if it was lost */
nfs4_schedule_lease_recovery(server->nfs_client);
goto out;
case -ERESTARTSYS:
/*
* The show must go on: exit, but mark the
* stateid as needing recovery.
*/
case -NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED:
case -NFS4ERR_ADMIN_REVOKED:
case -NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID:
nfs_inode_find_state_and_recover(state->inode,
stateid);
nfs4_schedule_stateid_recovery(server, state);
case -EKEYEXPIRED:
/*
* User RPCSEC_GSS context has expired.
* We cannot recover this stateid now, so
* skip it and allow recovery thread to
* proceed.
*/
case -ENOMEM:
err = 0;
goto out;
}
err = nfs4_handle_exception(server, err, &exception);
} while (exception.retry);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init ipc_ns_init(void)
{
shm_init_ns(&init_ipc_ns);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr@hp.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t utf8_length(const char *src)
{
const char *cur = src;
size_t ret = 0;
while (*cur != '\0') {
const char first_char = *cur++;
if ((first_char & 0x80) == 0) { // ASCII
ret += 1;
continue;
}
if ((first_char & 0x40) == 0) {
return -1;
}
int32_t mask, to_ignore_mask;
size_t num_to_read = 0;
char32_t utf32 = 0;
for (num_to_read = 1, mask = 0x40, to_ignore_mask = 0x80;
num_to_read < 5 && (first_char & mask);
num_to_read++, to_ignore_mask |= mask, mask >>= 1) {
if ((*cur & 0xC0) != 0x80) { // must be 10xxxxxx
return -1;
}
utf32 = (utf32 << 6) + (*cur++ & 0x3F);
}
if (num_to_read == 5) {
return -1;
}
to_ignore_mask |= mask;
utf32 |= ((~to_ignore_mask) & first_char) << (6 * (num_to_read - 1));
if (utf32 > kUnicodeMaxCodepoint) {
return -1;
}
ret += num_to_read;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 158,440
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nf_tables_getrule(struct sock *nlsk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
const struct nlattr * const nla[])
{
const struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
const struct nft_af_info *afi;
const struct nft_table *table;
const struct nft_chain *chain;
const struct nft_rule *rule;
struct sk_buff *skb2;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int family = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
int err;
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_DUMP) {
struct netlink_dump_control c = {
.dump = nf_tables_dump_rules,
};
return netlink_dump_start(nlsk, skb, nlh, &c);
}
afi = nf_tables_afinfo_lookup(net, family, false);
if (IS_ERR(afi))
return PTR_ERR(afi);
table = nf_tables_table_lookup(afi, nla[NFTA_RULE_TABLE]);
if (IS_ERR(table))
return PTR_ERR(table);
if (table->flags & NFT_TABLE_INACTIVE)
return -ENOENT;
chain = nf_tables_chain_lookup(table, nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN]);
if (IS_ERR(chain))
return PTR_ERR(chain);
if (chain->flags & NFT_CHAIN_INACTIVE)
return -ENOENT;
rule = nf_tables_rule_lookup(chain, nla[NFTA_RULE_HANDLE]);
if (IS_ERR(rule))
return PTR_ERR(rule);
skb2 = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb2)
return -ENOMEM;
err = nf_tables_fill_rule_info(skb2, net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid,
nlh->nlmsg_seq, NFT_MSG_NEWRULE, 0,
family, table, chain, rule);
if (err < 0)
goto err;
return nlmsg_unicast(nlsk, skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
err:
kfree_skb(skb2);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 57,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::GetTransformFeedbackVaryingsCHROMIUMHelper(
GLuint program,
std::vector<int8_t>* result) {
DCHECK(result);
helper_->SetBucketSize(kResultBucketId, 0);
helper_->GetTransformFeedbackVaryingsCHROMIUM(program, kResultBucketId);
GetBucketContents(kResultBucketId, result);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_vdec::createDivxDrmContext()
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_ErrorNone;
iDivXDrmDecrypt = DivXDrmDecrypt::Create();
if (iDivXDrmDecrypt) {
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = iDivXDrmDecrypt->Init();
if (err!=OMX_ErrorNone) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR :iDivXDrmDecrypt->Init %d", err);
delete iDivXDrmDecrypt;
iDivXDrmDecrypt = NULL;
}
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unable to Create DIVX DRM");
err = OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,255
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static png_uint_32 png_exp(png_uint_32 x)
{
return (png_uint_32)floor(.5 + exp(x * -LN2) * 0xffffffffU);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 160,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rng_backend_finalize(Object *obj)
{
RngBackend *s = RNG_BACKEND(obj);
rng_backend_free_requests(s);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: on_handler_vanished(GDBusConnection *connection,
const gchar *name,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = user_data;
struct dbus_info *info = handler->opaque;
if (info->register_invocation) {
char *reason;
reason = g_strdup_printf("Cannot find handler bus name: "
"org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.%s",
handler->subtype);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(info->register_invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE, reason));
g_free(reason);
}
tcmur_unregister_handler(handler);
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 59,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ImportTIFF_Date ( const TIFF_Manager & tiff, const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & dateInfo,
SXMPMeta * xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp )
{
XMP_Uns16 secID = 0;
switch ( dateInfo.id ) {
case kTIFF_DateTime : secID = kTIFF_SubSecTime; break;
case kTIFF_DateTimeOriginal : secID = kTIFF_SubSecTimeOriginal; break;
case kTIFF_DateTimeDigitized : secID = kTIFF_SubSecTimeDigitized; break;
}
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others.
if ( (dateInfo.type != kTIFF_ASCIIType) || (dateInfo.count != 20) ) return;
const char * dateStr = (const char *) dateInfo.dataPtr;
if ( (dateStr[4] != ':') || (dateStr[7] != ':') ||
(dateStr[10] != ' ') || (dateStr[13] != ':') || (dateStr[16] != ':') ) return;
XMP_DateTime binValue;
binValue.year = GatherInt ( &dateStr[0], 4 );
binValue.month = GatherInt ( &dateStr[5], 2 );
binValue.day = GatherInt ( &dateStr[8], 2 );
if ( (binValue.year != 0) | (binValue.month != 0) | (binValue.day != 0) ) binValue.hasDate = true;
binValue.hour = GatherInt ( &dateStr[11], 2 );
binValue.minute = GatherInt ( &dateStr[14], 2 );
binValue.second = GatherInt ( &dateStr[17], 2 );
binValue.nanoSecond = 0; // Get the fractional seconds later.
if ( (binValue.hour != 0) | (binValue.minute != 0) | (binValue.second != 0) ) binValue.hasTime = true;
binValue.tzSign = 0; // ! Separate assignment, avoid VS integer truncation warning.
binValue.tzHour = binValue.tzMinute = 0;
binValue.hasTimeZone = false; // Exif times have no zone.
TIFF_Manager::TagInfo secInfo;
bool found = tiff.GetTag ( kTIFF_ExifIFD, secID, &secInfo ); // ! Subseconds are all in the Exif IFD.
if ( found && (secInfo.type == kTIFF_ASCIIType) ) {
const char * fracPtr = (const char *) secInfo.dataPtr;
binValue.nanoSecond = GatherInt ( fracPtr, secInfo.dataLen );
size_t digits = 0;
for ( ; (('0' <= *fracPtr) && (*fracPtr <= '9')); ++fracPtr ) ++digits;
for ( ; digits < 9; ++digits ) binValue.nanoSecond *= 10;
if ( binValue.nanoSecond != 0 ) binValue.hasTime = true;
}
xmp->SetProperty_Date ( xmpNS, xmpProp, binValue );
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ImportTIFF_Date
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 15,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool UrlData::Valid() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
base::Time now = base::Time::Now();
if (!range_supported_ && !FullyCached())
return false;
if (valid_until_ > now)
return true;
if (now - last_used_ <
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(kUrlMappingTimeoutSeconds))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct page *balloon_retrieve(bool require_lowmem)
{
struct page *page;
if (list_empty(&ballooned_pages))
return NULL;
page = list_entry(ballooned_pages.next, struct page, lru);
if (require_lowmem && PageHighMem(page))
return NULL;
list_del(&page->lru);
if (PageHighMem(page))
balloon_stats.balloon_high--;
else
balloon_stats.balloon_low--;
return page;
}
Commit Message: xen: let alloc_xenballooned_pages() fail if not enough memory free
commit a1078e821b605813b63bf6bca414a85f804d5c66 upstream.
Instead of trying to allocate pages with GFP_USER in
add_ballooned_pages() check the available free memory via
si_mem_available(). GFP_USER is far less limiting memory exhaustion
than the test via si_mem_available().
This will avoid dom0 running out of memory due to excessive foreign
page mappings especially on ARM and on x86 in PVH mode, as those don't
have a pre-ballooned area which can be used for foreign mappings.
As the normal ballooning suffers from the same problem don't balloon
down more than si_mem_available() pages in one iteration. At the same
time limit the default maximum number of retries.
This is part of XSA-300.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 87,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: writeSelections(TIFF *in, TIFF **out, struct crop_mask *crop,
struct image_data *image, struct dump_opts *dump,
struct buffinfo seg_buffs[], char *mp, char *filename,
unsigned int *page, unsigned int total_pages)
{
int i, page_count;
int autoindex = 0;
unsigned char *crop_buff = NULL;
/* Where we open a new file depends on the export mode */
switch (crop->exp_mode)
{
case ONE_FILE_COMPOSITE: /* Regions combined into single image */
autoindex = 0;
crop_buff = seg_buffs[0].buffer;
if (update_output_file (out, mp, autoindex, filename, page))
return (1);
page_count = total_pages;
if (writeCroppedImage(in, *out, image, dump,
crop->combined_width,
crop->combined_length,
crop_buff, *page, total_pages))
{
TIFFError("writeRegions", "Unable to write new image");
return (-1);
}
break;
case ONE_FILE_SEPARATED: /* Regions as separated images */
autoindex = 0;
if (update_output_file (out, mp, autoindex, filename, page))
return (1);
page_count = crop->selections * total_pages;
for (i = 0; i < crop->selections; i++)
{
crop_buff = seg_buffs[i].buffer;
if (writeCroppedImage(in, *out, image, dump,
crop->regionlist[i].width,
crop->regionlist[i].length,
crop_buff, *page, page_count))
{
TIFFError("writeRegions", "Unable to write new image");
return (-1);
}
}
break;
case FILE_PER_IMAGE_COMPOSITE: /* Regions as composite image */
autoindex = 1;
if (update_output_file (out, mp, autoindex, filename, page))
return (1);
crop_buff = seg_buffs[0].buffer;
if (writeCroppedImage(in, *out, image, dump,
crop->combined_width,
crop->combined_length,
crop_buff, *page, total_pages))
{
TIFFError("writeRegions", "Unable to write new image");
return (-1);
}
break;
case FILE_PER_IMAGE_SEPARATED: /* Regions as separated images */
autoindex = 1;
page_count = crop->selections;
if (update_output_file (out, mp, autoindex, filename, page))
return (1);
for (i = 0; i < crop->selections; i++)
{
crop_buff = seg_buffs[i].buffer;
/* Write the current region to the current file */
if (writeCroppedImage(in, *out, image, dump,
crop->regionlist[i].width,
crop->regionlist[i].length,
crop_buff, *page, page_count))
{
TIFFError("writeRegions", "Unable to write new image");
return (-1);
}
}
break;
case FILE_PER_SELECTION:
autoindex = 1;
page_count = 1;
for (i = 0; i < crop->selections; i++)
{
if (update_output_file (out, mp, autoindex, filename, page))
return (1);
crop_buff = seg_buffs[i].buffer;
/* Write the current region to the current file */
if (writeCroppedImage(in, *out, image, dump,
crop->regionlist[i].width,
crop->regionlist[i].length,
crop_buff, *page, page_count))
{
TIFFError("writeRegions", "Unable to write new image");
return (-1);
}
}
break;
default: return (1);
}
return (0);
} /* end writeRegions */
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix out-of-bound read of up to 3 bytes in
readContigTilesIntoBuffer(). Reported as MSVR 35092 by Axel Souchet
& Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 48,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebviewHandler::WebviewHandler() {
}
Commit Message: <webview>: Update format for local file access in manifest.json
The new format is:
"webview" : {
"partitions" : [
{
"name" : "foo*",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "b.html"]
},
{
"name" : "bar",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "c.html"]
}
]
}
BUG=340291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/151923005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249640 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 112,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: onig_scan(regex_t* reg, const UChar* str, const UChar* end,
OnigRegion* region, OnigOptionType option,
int (*scan_callback)(int, int, OnigRegion*, void*),
void* callback_arg)
{
int r;
int n;
int rs;
const UChar* start;
if (ONIG_IS_OPTION_ON(option, ONIG_OPTION_CHECK_VALIDITY_OF_STRING)) {
if (! ONIGENC_IS_VALID_MBC_STRING(reg->enc, str, end))
return ONIGERR_INVALID_WIDE_CHAR_VALUE;
ONIG_OPTION_OFF(option, ONIG_OPTION_CHECK_VALIDITY_OF_STRING);
}
n = 0;
start = str;
while (1) {
r = onig_search(reg, str, end, start, end, region, option);
if (r >= 0) {
rs = scan_callback(n, r, region, callback_arg);
n++;
if (rs != 0)
return rs;
if (region->end[0] == start - str) {
if (start >= end) break;
start += enclen(reg->enc, start);
}
else
start = str + region->end[0];
if (start > end)
break;
}
else if (r == ONIG_MISMATCH) {
break;
}
else { /* error */
return r;
}
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 64,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a, *b, *c, *d, *e;
int i, j;
a = BN_new();
b = BN_new();
c = BN_new();
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
BN_one(a);
BN_one(b);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_mul with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
return 0;
}
for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 475 + i * 10, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(b, 425 + i * 11, 0, 0);
a->neg = rand_neg();
b->neg = rand_neg();
if (!BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) {
unsigned long l;
while ((l = ERR_get_error()))
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR:%s\n", ERR_error_string(l, NULL));
EXIT(1);
}
if (bp != NULL) {
if (!results) {
BN_print(bp, a);
BIO_puts(bp, " * ");
BN_print(bp, b);
BIO_puts(bp, " % ");
BN_print(bp, c);
if ((a->neg ^ b->neg) && !BN_is_zero(e)) {
/*
* If (a*b) % c is negative, c must be added in order
* to obtain the normalized remainder (new with
* OpenSSL 0.9.7, previous versions of BN_mod_mul
* could generate negative results)
*/
BIO_puts(bp, " + ");
BN_print(bp, c);
}
BIO_puts(bp, " - ");
}
BN_print(bp, e);
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
}
BN_mul(d, a, b, ctx);
BN_sub(d, d, e);
BN_div(a, b, d, c, ctx);
if (!BN_is_zero(b)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Modulo multiply test failed!\n");
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
return 0;
}
}
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(e);
return (1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,664
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mp_encode_lua_string(lua_State *L, mp_buf *buf) {
size_t len;
const char *s;
s = lua_tolstring(L,-1,&len);
mp_encode_bytes(L,buf,(const unsigned char*)s,len);
}
Commit Message: Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy.
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 83,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ModuleSystem::SetNativeLazyField(v8::Local<v8::Object> object,
const std::string& field,
const std::string& module_name,
const std::string& module_field) {
SetLazyField(object,
field,
module_name,
module_field,
&ModuleSystem::NativeLazyFieldGetter);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 133,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t ZSTD_resetCCtx_usingCDict(ZSTD_CCtx* cctx,
const ZSTD_CDict* cdict,
ZSTD_CCtx_params params,
U64 pledgedSrcSize,
ZSTD_buffered_policy_e zbuff)
{
DEBUGLOG(4, "ZSTD_resetCCtx_usingCDict (pledgedSrcSize=%u)", (U32)pledgedSrcSize);
if (ZSTD_shouldAttachDict(cdict, params, pledgedSrcSize)) {
return ZSTD_resetCCtx_byAttachingCDict(
cctx, cdict, params, pledgedSrcSize, zbuff);
} else {
return ZSTD_resetCCtx_byCopyingCDict(
cctx, cdict, params, pledgedSrcSize, zbuff);
}
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 90,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
account_kernel_stack(tsk->stack, -1);
arch_release_thread_info(tsk->stack);
free_thread_info(tsk->stack);
rt_mutex_debug_task_free(tsk);
ftrace_graph_exit_task(tsk);
put_seccomp_filter(tsk);
arch_release_task_struct(tsk);
free_task_struct(tsk);
}
Commit Message: userns: Don't allow CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_FS
Don't allowing sharing the root directory with processes in a
different user namespace. There doesn't seem to be any point, and to
allow it would require the overhead of putting a user namespace
reference in fs_struct (for permission checks) and incrementing that
reference count on practically every call to fork.
So just perform the inexpensive test of forbidding sharing fs_struct
acrosss processes in different user namespaces. We already disallow
other forms of threading when unsharing a user namespace so this
should be no real burden in practice.
This updates setns, clone, and unshare to disallow multiple user
namespaces sharing an fs_struct.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 32,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MetadataProvider* SAML_DLLLOCAL DynamicMetadataProviderFactory(const DOMElement* const & e)
{
return new DynamicMetadataProvider(e);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-347
| 0
| 1,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MojoAudioOutputStream::OnStreamError(int stream_id) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
client_->OnError();
OnError();
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLES2Implementation::DeferErrorCallbacks::~DeferErrorCallbacks() {
DCHECK_EQ(true, gles2_implementation_->deferring_error_callbacks_);
gles2_implementation_->deferring_error_callbacks_ = false;
gles2_implementation_->CallDeferredErrorCallbacks();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 141,166
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ProfileImplIOData::LazyParams::~LazyParams() {}
Commit Message: Give the media context an ftp job factory; prevent a browser crash.
BUG=112983
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121378 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 108,220
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler() {
DCHECK(task_runner_->RunsTasksInCurrentSequence());
Stop();
GetPeerConnectionHandlers()->erase(this);
if (peer_connection_tracker_)
peer_connection_tracker_->UnregisterPeerConnection(this);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_10000(
"WebRTC.NumDataChannelsPerPeerConnection", num_data_channels_created_);
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 153,021
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kill_ioctx(struct mm_struct *mm, struct kioctx *ctx,
struct completion *requests_done)
{
if (!atomic_xchg(&ctx->dead, 1)) {
struct kioctx_table *table;
spin_lock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
table = rcu_dereference(mm->ioctx_table);
WARN_ON(ctx != table->table[ctx->id]);
table->table[ctx->id] = NULL;
rcu_read_unlock();
spin_unlock(&mm->ioctx_lock);
/* percpu_ref_kill() will do the necessary call_rcu() */
wake_up_all(&ctx->wait);
/*
* It'd be more correct to do this in free_ioctx(), after all
* the outstanding kiocbs have finished - but by then io_destroy
* has already returned, so io_setup() could potentially return
* -EAGAIN with no ioctxs actually in use (as far as userspace
* could tell).
*/
aio_nr_sub(ctx->max_reqs);
if (ctx->mmap_size)
vm_munmap(ctx->mmap_base, ctx->mmap_size);
ctx->requests_done = requests_done;
percpu_ref_kill(&ctx->users);
} else {
if (requests_done)
complete(requests_done);
}
}
Commit Message: AIO: properly check iovec sizes
In Linus's tree, the iovec code has been reworked massively, but in
older kernels the AIO layer should be checking this before passing the
request on to other layers.
Many thanks to Ben Hawkes of Google Project Zero for pointing out the
issue.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Acked-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 56,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PropertyKeyIsBlacklisted(const char* key) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kInputMethodPropertyKeysBlacklist); ++i) {
if (!std::strcmp(key, kInputMethodPropertyKeysBlacklist[i])) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 100,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int js_tointeger(js_State *J, int idx)
{
return jsV_numbertointeger(jsV_tonumber(J, stackidx(J, idx)));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __sctp_connect(struct sock* sk,
struct sockaddr *kaddrs,
int addrs_size)
{
struct sctp_sock *sp;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep;
struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL;
struct sctp_association *asoc2;
struct sctp_transport *transport;
union sctp_addr to;
struct sctp_af *af;
sctp_scope_t scope;
long timeo;
int err = 0;
int addrcnt = 0;
int walk_size = 0;
union sctp_addr *sa_addr;
void *addr_buf;
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
ep = sp->ep;
/* connect() cannot be done on a socket that is already in ESTABLISHED
* state - UDP-style peeled off socket or a TCP-style socket that
* is already connected.
* It cannot be done even on a TCP-style listening socket.
*/
if (sctp_sstate(sk, ESTABLISHED) ||
(sctp_style(sk, TCP) && sctp_sstate(sk, LISTENING))) {
err = -EISCONN;
goto out_free;
}
/* Walk through the addrs buffer and count the number of addresses. */
addr_buf = kaddrs;
while (walk_size < addrs_size) {
sa_addr = (union sctp_addr *)addr_buf;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(sa_addr->sa.sa_family);
/* If the address family is not supported or if this address
* causes the address buffer to overflow return EINVAL.
*/
if (!af || (walk_size + af->sockaddr_len) > addrs_size) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
err = sctp_verify_addr(sk, sa_addr, af->sockaddr_len);
if (err)
goto out_free;
memcpy(&to, sa_addr, af->sockaddr_len);
/* Check if there already is a matching association on the
* endpoint (other than the one created here).
*/
asoc2 = sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc(ep, sa_addr, &transport);
if (asoc2 && asoc2 != asoc) {
if (asoc2->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED)
err = -EISCONN;
else
err = -EALREADY;
goto out_free;
}
/* If we could not find a matching association on the endpoint,
* make sure that there is no peeled-off association matching
* the peer address even on another socket.
*/
if (sctp_endpoint_is_peeled_off(ep, sa_addr)) {
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
goto out_free;
}
if (!asoc) {
/* If a bind() or sctp_bindx() is not called prior to
* an sctp_connectx() call, the system picks an
* ephemeral port and will choose an address set
* equivalent to binding with a wildcard address.
*/
if (!ep->base.bind_addr.port) {
if (sctp_autobind(sk)) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto out_free;
}
} else {
/*
* If an unprivileged user inherits a 1-many
* style socket with open associations on a
* privileged port, it MAY be permitted to
* accept new associations, but it SHOULD NOT
* be permitted to open new associations.
*/
if (ep->base.bind_addr.port < PROT_SOCK &&
!capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE)) {
err = -EACCES;
goto out_free;
}
}
scope = sctp_scope(sa_addr);
asoc = sctp_association_new(ep, sk, scope, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!asoc) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
}
/* Prime the peer's transport structures. */
transport = sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, sa_addr, GFP_KERNEL,
SCTP_UNKNOWN);
if (!transport) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto out_free;
}
addrcnt++;
addr_buf += af->sockaddr_len;
walk_size += af->sockaddr_len;
}
err = sctp_assoc_set_bind_addr_from_ep(asoc, GFP_KERNEL);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_free;
}
err = sctp_primitive_ASSOCIATE(asoc, NULL);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_free;
}
/* Initialize sk's dport and daddr for getpeername() */
inet_sk(sk)->dport = htons(asoc->peer.port);
af = sctp_get_af_specific(to.sa.sa_family);
af->to_sk_daddr(&to, sk);
sk->sk_err = 0;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, sk->sk_socket->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
err = sctp_wait_for_connect(asoc, &timeo);
/* Don't free association on exit. */
asoc = NULL;
out_free:
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("About to exit __sctp_connect() free asoc: %p"
" kaddrs: %p err: %d\n",
asoc, kaddrs, err);
if (asoc)
sctp_association_free(asoc);
return err;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 34,988
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CopyFeatureSwitch(const base::CommandLine& src,
base::CommandLine* dest,
const char* switch_name) {
std::vector<std::string> features = FeaturesFromSwitch(src, switch_name);
if (!features.empty())
dest->AppendSwitchASCII(switch_name, base::JoinString(features, ","));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 149,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool check_same_owner(struct task_struct *p)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *pcred;
bool match;
rcu_read_lock();
pcred = __task_cred(p);
match = (cred->euid == pcred->euid ||
cred->euid == pcred->uid);
rcu_read_unlock();
return match;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 22,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mp_throttle(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct sb_uart_state *state = tty->driver_data;
if (I_IXOFF(tty))
mp_send_xchar(tty, STOP_CHAR(tty));
if (tty->termios.c_cflag & CRTSCTS)
uart_clear_mctrl(state->port, TIOCM_RTS);
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void edge_close(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct edgeport_serial *edge_serial;
struct edgeport_port *edge_port;
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
unsigned long flags;
int port_number;
edge_serial = usb_get_serial_data(port->serial);
edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
if (edge_serial == NULL || edge_port == NULL)
return;
/*
* The bulkreadcompletion routine will check
* this flag and dump add read data
*/
edge_port->close_pending = 1;
usb_kill_urb(port->read_urb);
usb_kill_urb(port->write_urb);
edge_port->ep_write_urb_in_use = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&edge_port->ep_lock, flags);
kfifo_reset_out(&port->write_fifo);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&edge_port->ep_lock, flags);
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - send umpc_close_port\n", __func__);
port_number = port->port_number;
send_cmd(serial->dev, UMPC_CLOSE_PORT,
(__u8)(UMPM_UART1_PORT + port_number), 0, NULL, 0);
mutex_lock(&edge_serial->es_lock);
--edge_port->edge_serial->num_ports_open;
if (edge_port->edge_serial->num_ports_open <= 0) {
/* last port is now closed, let's shut down our interrupt urb */
usb_kill_urb(port->serial->port[0]->interrupt_in_urb);
edge_port->edge_serial->num_ports_open = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&edge_serial->es_lock);
edge_port->close_pending = 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191
| 0
| 66,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int usb_enumerate_device_otg(struct usb_device *udev)
{
int err = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_USB_OTG
/*
* OTG-aware devices on OTG-capable root hubs may be able to use SRP,
* to wake us after we've powered off VBUS; and HNP, switching roles
* "host" to "peripheral". The OTG descriptor helps figure this out.
*/
if (!udev->bus->is_b_host
&& udev->config
&& udev->parent == udev->bus->root_hub) {
struct usb_otg_descriptor *desc = NULL;
struct usb_bus *bus = udev->bus;
unsigned port1 = udev->portnum;
/* descriptor may appear anywhere in config */
err = __usb_get_extra_descriptor(udev->rawdescriptors[0],
le16_to_cpu(udev->config[0].desc.wTotalLength),
USB_DT_OTG, (void **) &desc);
if (err || !(desc->bmAttributes & USB_OTG_HNP))
return 0;
dev_info(&udev->dev, "Dual-Role OTG device on %sHNP port\n",
(port1 == bus->otg_port) ? "" : "non-");
/* enable HNP before suspend, it's simpler */
if (port1 == bus->otg_port) {
bus->b_hnp_enable = 1;
err = usb_control_msg(udev,
usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_FEATURE, 0,
USB_DEVICE_B_HNP_ENABLE,
0, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (err < 0) {
/*
* OTG MESSAGE: report errors here,
* customize to match your product.
*/
dev_err(&udev->dev, "can't set HNP mode: %d\n",
err);
bus->b_hnp_enable = 0;
}
} else if (desc->bLength == sizeof
(struct usb_otg_descriptor)) {
/* Set a_alt_hnp_support for legacy otg device */
err = usb_control_msg(udev,
usb_sndctrlpipe(udev, 0),
USB_REQ_SET_FEATURE, 0,
USB_DEVICE_A_ALT_HNP_SUPPORT,
0, NULL, 0,
USB_CTRL_SET_TIMEOUT);
if (err < 0)
dev_err(&udev->dev,
"set a_alt_hnp_support failed: %d\n",
err);
}
}
#endif
return err;
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 1
| 168,959
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int v4l2_video_std_construct(struct v4l2_standard *vs,
int id, const char *name)
{
vs->id = id;
v4l2_video_std_frame_period(id, &vs->frameperiod);
vs->framelines = (id & V4L2_STD_525_60) ? 525 : 625;
strlcpy(vs->name, name, sizeof(vs->name));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] v4l: Share code between video_usercopy and video_ioctl2
The two functions are mostly identical. They handle the copy_from_user
and copy_to_user operations related with V4L2 ioctls and call the real
ioctl handler.
Create a __video_usercopy function that implements the core of
video_usercopy and video_ioctl2, and call that function from both.
Signed-off-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 74,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UserCloudPolicyManagerFactoryChromeOS::CreateManagerForProfile(
Profile* profile,
bool force_immediate_load,
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> background_task_runner) {
const CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (chromeos::ProfileHelper::IsSigninProfile(profile))
return scoped_ptr<UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS>();
chromeos::User* user =
chromeos::ProfileHelper::Get()->GetUserByProfile(profile);
CHECK(user);
const std::string& username = user->email();
if (user->GetType() != user_manager::USER_TYPE_REGULAR ||
BrowserPolicyConnector::IsNonEnterpriseUser(username)) {
return scoped_ptr<UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS>();
}
policy::BrowserPolicyConnectorChromeOS* connector =
g_browser_process->platform_part()->browser_policy_connector_chromeos();
UserAffiliation affiliation = connector->GetUserAffiliation(username);
const bool is_managed_user = affiliation == USER_AFFILIATION_MANAGED;
const bool is_browser_restart =
command_line->HasSwitch(chromeos::switches::kLoginUser);
const bool wait_for_initial_policy = is_managed_user && !is_browser_restart;
DeviceManagementService* device_management_service =
connector->device_management_service();
if (wait_for_initial_policy)
device_management_service->ScheduleInitialization(0);
base::FilePath profile_dir = profile->GetPath();
const base::FilePath legacy_dir = profile_dir.Append(kDeviceManagementDir);
const base::FilePath policy_cache_file = legacy_dir.Append(kPolicy);
const base::FilePath token_cache_file = legacy_dir.Append(kToken);
const base::FilePath component_policy_cache_dir =
profile_dir.Append(kPolicy).Append(kComponentsDir);
const base::FilePath external_data_dir =
profile_dir.Append(kPolicy).Append(kPolicyExternalDataDir);
base::FilePath policy_key_dir;
CHECK(PathService::Get(chromeos::DIR_USER_POLICY_KEYS, &policy_key_dir));
scoped_ptr<UserCloudPolicyStoreChromeOS> store(
new UserCloudPolicyStoreChromeOS(
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetCryptohomeClient(),
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetSessionManagerClient(),
background_task_runner,
username, policy_key_dir, token_cache_file, policy_cache_file));
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> backend_task_runner =
content::BrowserThread::GetBlockingPool()->GetSequencedTaskRunner(
content::BrowserThread::GetBlockingPool()->GetSequenceToken());
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> io_task_runner =
content::BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(
content::BrowserThread::IO);
scoped_ptr<CloudExternalDataManager> external_data_manager(
new UserCloudExternalDataManager(base::Bind(&GetChromePolicyDetails),
backend_task_runner,
io_task_runner,
external_data_dir,
store.get()));
if (force_immediate_load)
store->LoadImmediately();
scoped_refptr<base::SequencedTaskRunner> file_task_runner =
content::BrowserThread::GetMessageLoopProxyForThread(
content::BrowserThread::FILE);
scoped_ptr<UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS> manager(
new UserCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS(
store.PassAs<CloudPolicyStore>(),
external_data_manager.Pass(),
component_policy_cache_dir,
wait_for_initial_policy,
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(kInitialPolicyFetchTimeoutSeconds),
base::MessageLoopProxy::current(),
file_task_runner,
io_task_runner));
bool wildcard_match = false;
if (connector->IsEnterpriseManaged() &&
chromeos::LoginUtils::IsWhitelisted(username, &wildcard_match) &&
wildcard_match &&
!connector->IsNonEnterpriseUser(username)) {
manager->EnableWildcardLoginCheck(username);
}
manager->Init(
SchemaRegistryServiceFactory::GetForContext(profile)->registry());
manager->Connect(g_browser_process->local_state(),
device_management_service,
g_browser_process->system_request_context(),
affiliation);
DCHECK(managers_.find(profile) == managers_.end());
managers_[profile] = manager.get();
return manager.Pass();
}
Commit Message: Make the policy fetch for first time login blocking
The CL makes policy fetching for first time login blocking for all users, except the ones that are known to be non-enterprise users.
BUG=334584
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/330843002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@282925 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 171,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StreamingProcessor::releaseRecordingFrame(const sp<IMemory>& mem) {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
Mutex::Autolock m(mMutex);
ssize_t offset;
size_t size;
sp<IMemoryHeap> heap = mem->getMemory(&offset, &size);
if (heap->getHeapID() != mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getHeapID()) {
ALOGW("%s: Camera %d: Mismatched heap ID, ignoring release "
"(got %x, expected %x)", __FUNCTION__, mId,
heap->getHeapID(), mRecordingHeap->mHeap->getHeapID());
return;
}
VideoNativeMetadata *payload = reinterpret_cast<VideoNativeMetadata*>(
(uint8_t*)heap->getBase() + offset);
if (payload->eType != kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Recording frame type invalid (got %x, expected %x)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, payload->eType,
kMetadataBufferTypeANWBuffer);
return;
}
size_t itemIndex;
for (itemIndex = 0; itemIndex < mRecordingBuffers.size(); itemIndex++) {
const BufferItem item = mRecordingBuffers[itemIndex];
if (item.mBuf != BufferItemConsumer::INVALID_BUFFER_SLOT &&
item.mGraphicBuffer->getNativeBuffer() == payload->pBuffer) {
break;
}
}
if (itemIndex == mRecordingBuffers.size()) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Can't find returned ANW Buffer %p in list of "
"outstanding buffers", __FUNCTION__, mId,
payload->pBuffer);
return;
}
ALOGVV("%s: Camera %d: Freeing returned ANW buffer %p index %d", __FUNCTION__,
mId, payload->pBuffer, itemIndex);
res = mRecordingConsumer->releaseBuffer(mRecordingBuffers[itemIndex]);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to free recording frame "
"(Returned ANW buffer: %p): %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__,
mId, payload->pBuffer, strerror(-res), res);
return;
}
mRecordingBuffers.replaceAt(itemIndex);
mRecordingHeapFree++;
ALOGV_IF(mRecordingHeapFree == mRecordingHeapCount,
"%s: Camera %d: All %d recording buffers returned",
__FUNCTION__, mId, mRecordingHeapCount);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 173,512
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTMLMediaElement::~HTMLMediaElement() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "~HTMLMediaElement(" << (void*)this << ")";
DCHECK(!m_audioSourceNode);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 128,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_handle_IHDR(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
png_byte buf[13];
png_uint_32 width, height;
int bit_depth, color_type, compression_type, filter_type;
int interlace_type;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_IHDR");
if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR) != 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "out of place");
/* Check the length */
if (length != 13)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "invalid");
png_ptr->mode |= PNG_HAVE_IHDR;
png_crc_read(png_ptr, buf, 13);
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0);
width = png_get_uint_31(png_ptr, buf);
height = png_get_uint_31(png_ptr, buf + 4);
bit_depth = buf[8];
color_type = buf[9];
compression_type = buf[10];
filter_type = buf[11];
interlace_type = buf[12];
/* Set internal variables */
png_ptr->width = width;
png_ptr->height = height;
png_ptr->bit_depth = (png_byte)bit_depth;
png_ptr->interlaced = (png_byte)interlace_type;
png_ptr->color_type = (png_byte)color_type;
#ifdef PNG_MNG_FEATURES_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->filter_type = (png_byte)filter_type;
#endif
png_ptr->compression_type = (png_byte)compression_type;
/* Find number of channels */
switch (png_ptr->color_type)
{
default: /* invalid, png_set_IHDR calls png_error */
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY:
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE:
png_ptr->channels = 1;
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB:
png_ptr->channels = 3;
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA:
png_ptr->channels = 2;
break;
case PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA:
png_ptr->channels = 4;
break;
}
/* Set up other useful info */
png_ptr->pixel_depth = (png_byte)(png_ptr->bit_depth * png_ptr->channels);
png_ptr->rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(png_ptr->pixel_depth, png_ptr->width);
png_debug1(3, "bit_depth = %d", png_ptr->bit_depth);
png_debug1(3, "channels = %d", png_ptr->channels);
png_debug1(3, "rowbytes = %lu", (unsigned long)png_ptr->rowbytes);
png_set_IHDR(png_ptr, info_ptr, width, height, bit_depth,
color_type, interlace_type, compression_type, filter_type);
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 79,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: crypto_adjust_frame_parameters(struct frame *frame,
const struct key_type* kt,
bool cipher_defined,
bool use_iv,
bool packet_id,
bool packet_id_long_form)
{
frame_add_to_extra_frame (frame,
(packet_id ? packet_id_size (packet_id_long_form) : 0) +
((cipher_defined && use_iv) ? cipher_kt_iv_size (kt->cipher) : 0) +
(cipher_defined ? cipher_kt_block_size (kt->cipher) : 0) + /* worst case padding expansion */
kt->hmac_length);
}
Commit Message: Use constant time memcmp when comparing HMACs in openvpn_decrypt.
Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 32,004
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void hci_uart_init_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct hci_uart *hu = container_of(work, struct hci_uart, init_ready);
int err;
struct hci_dev *hdev;
if (!test_and_clear_bit(HCI_UART_INIT_PENDING, &hu->hdev_flags))
return;
err = hci_register_dev(hu->hdev);
if (err < 0) {
BT_ERR("Can't register HCI device");
clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
hu->proto->close(hu);
hdev = hu->hdev;
hu->hdev = NULL;
hci_free_dev(hdev);
return;
}
set_bit(HCI_UART_REGISTERED, &hu->flags);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()
task A: task B:
hci_uart_set_proto flush_to_ldisc
- p->open(hu) -> h5_open //alloc h5 - receive_buf
- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}
It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is
a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in
hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting
HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev()
return success.
Reported-by: syzbot+899a33dc0fa0dbaf06a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 88,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void get_checksum2(char *buf, int32 len, char *sum)
{
md_context m;
switch (xfersum_type) {
case CSUM_MD5: {
uchar seedbuf[4];
md5_begin(&m);
if (proper_seed_order) {
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
md5_update(&m, seedbuf, 4);
}
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)buf, len);
} else {
md5_update(&m, (uchar *)buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVALu(seedbuf, 0, checksum_seed);
md5_update(&m, seedbuf, 4);
}
}
md5_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
break;
}
case CSUM_MD4:
case CSUM_MD4_OLD:
case CSUM_MD4_BUSTED: {
int32 i;
static char *buf1;
static int32 len1;
mdfour_begin(&m);
if (len > len1) {
if (buf1)
free(buf1);
buf1 = new_array(char, len+4);
len1 = len;
if (!buf1)
out_of_memory("get_checksum2");
}
memcpy(buf1, buf, len);
if (checksum_seed) {
SIVAL(buf1,len,checksum_seed);
len += 4;
}
for (i = 0; i + CSUM_CHUNK <= len; i += CSUM_CHUNK)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), CSUM_CHUNK);
/*
* Prior to version 27 an incorrect MD4 checksum was computed
* by failing to call mdfour_tail() for block sizes that
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* are multiples of 64. This is fixed by calling mdfour_update()
* even when there are no more bytes.
*/
if (len - i > 0 || xfersum_type != CSUM_MD4_BUSTED)
mdfour_update(&m, (uchar *)(buf1+i), len-i);
mdfour_result(&m, (uchar *)sum);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-354
| 1
| 164,644
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char* get_cwd(pid_t pid)
{
char buf[sizeof("/proc/%lu/cwd") + sizeof(long)*3];
sprintf(buf, "/proc/%lu/cwd", (long)pid);
return malloc_readlink(buf);
}
Commit Message: ccpp: stop reading hs_error.log from /tmp
The file might contain anything and there is no way to verify its
contents.
Related: #1211835
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 74,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::CreateVideoDecodeStatsReporter() {
if (!HasVideo())
return;
if (!pipeline_metadata_.video_decoder_config.IsValidConfig())
return;
if (is_encrypted_)
return;
mojom::VideoDecodeStatsRecorderPtr recorder;
media_metrics_provider_->AcquireVideoDecodeStatsRecorder(
mojo::MakeRequest(&recorder));
video_decode_stats_reporter_.reset(new VideoDecodeStatsReporter(
std::move(recorder),
base::Bind(&WebMediaPlayerImpl::GetPipelineStatistics,
base::Unretained(this)),
pipeline_metadata_.video_decoder_config,
frame_->GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kInternalMedia)));
if (delegate_->IsFrameHidden())
video_decode_stats_reporter_->OnHidden();
else
video_decode_stats_reporter_->OnShown();
if (paused_)
video_decode_stats_reporter_->OnPaused();
else
video_decode_stats_reporter_->OnPlaying();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 144,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int is_intra_more_likely(ERContext *s)
{
int is_intra_likely, i, j, undamaged_count, skip_amount, mb_x, mb_y;
if (!s->last_pic.f || !s->last_pic.f->data[0])
return 1; // no previous frame available -> use spatial prediction
if (s->avctx->error_concealment & FF_EC_FAVOR_INTER)
return 0;
undamaged_count = 0;
for (i = 0; i < s->mb_num; i++) {
const int mb_xy = s->mb_index2xy[i];
const int error = s->error_status_table[mb_xy];
if (!((error & ER_DC_ERROR) && (error & ER_MV_ERROR)))
undamaged_count++;
}
if (undamaged_count < 5)
return 0; // almost all MBs damaged -> use temporal prediction
if (CONFIG_XVMC &&
s->avctx->hwaccel && s->avctx->hwaccel->decode_mb &&
s->cur_pic.f->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I)
return 1;
skip_amount = FFMAX(undamaged_count / 50, 1); // check only up to 50 MBs
is_intra_likely = 0;
j = 0;
for (mb_y = 0; mb_y < s->mb_height - 1; mb_y++) {
for (mb_x = 0; mb_x < s->mb_width; mb_x++) {
int error;
const int mb_xy = mb_x + mb_y * s->mb_stride;
error = s->error_status_table[mb_xy];
if ((error & ER_DC_ERROR) && (error & ER_MV_ERROR))
continue; // skip damaged
j++;
if ((j % skip_amount) != 0)
continue;
if (s->cur_pic.f->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) {
int *linesize = s->cur_pic.f->linesize;
uint8_t *mb_ptr = s->cur_pic.f->data[0] +
mb_x * 16 + mb_y * 16 * linesize[0];
uint8_t *last_mb_ptr = s->last_pic.f->data[0] +
mb_x * 16 + mb_y * 16 * linesize[0];
if (s->avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264) {
} else {
ff_thread_await_progress(s->last_pic.tf, mb_y, 0);
}
is_intra_likely += s->mecc.sad[0](NULL, last_mb_ptr, mb_ptr,
linesize[0], 16);
is_intra_likely -= s->mecc.sad[0](NULL, last_mb_ptr,
last_mb_ptr + linesize[0] * 16,
linesize[0], 16);
} else {
if (IS_INTRA(s->cur_pic.mb_type[mb_xy]))
is_intra_likely++;
else
is_intra_likely--;
}
}
}
return is_intra_likely > 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Remove use of FF_PROFILE_MPEG4_SIMPLE_STUDIO as indicator of studio profile
The profile field is changed by code inside and outside the decoder,
its not a reliable indicator of the internal codec state.
Maintaining it consistency with studio_profile is messy.
Its easier to just avoid it and use only studio_profile
Fixes: assertion failure
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_9.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 79,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t ScrollHitTestLayerCount() {
return paint_artifact_compositor()
->GetExtraDataForTesting()
->scroll_hit_test_layers.size();
}
Commit Message: [BGPT] Add a fast-path for transform-origin changes.
This patch adds a fast-path for updating composited transform-origin
changes without requiring a PaintArtifactCompositor update. This
closely follows the approach of https://crrev.com/651338.
Bug: 952473
Change-Id: I8b82909c1761a7aa16705813207739d29596b0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580260
Commit-Queue: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: vmpstr <vmpstr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653749}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: on_download_request(void *user_data, Evas_Object *webview, void *event_info)
{
Ewk_Download_Job *download = (Ewk_Download_Job *)event_info;
Eina_Strbuf *destination_path = eina_strbuf_new();
const char *suggested_name = ewk_download_job_suggested_filename_get(download);
if (suggested_name && *suggested_name)
eina_strbuf_append_printf(destination_path, "/tmp/%s", suggested_name);
else {
char unique_path[] = "/tmp/downloaded-file.XXXXXX";
eina_strbuf_append(destination_path, mktemp(unique_path));
}
ewk_download_job_destination_set(download, eina_strbuf_string_get(destination_path));
info("Downloading: %s\n", eina_strbuf_string_get(destination_path));
eina_strbuf_free(destination_path);
}
Commit Message: [EFL][WK2] Add --window-size command line option to EFL MiniBrowser
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=100942
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-11-05
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Added window-size (-s) command line option to EFL MiniBrowser.
* MiniBrowser/efl/main.c:
(window_create):
(parse_window_size):
(elm_main):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@133450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 106,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void load_xref_entries(FILE *fp, xref_t *xref)
{
if (xref->is_stream)
load_xref_from_stream(fp, xref);
else
load_xref_from_plaintext(fp, xref);
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 88,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool cli_dfs_check_error(struct cli_state *cli, NTSTATUS expected,
NTSTATUS status)
{
/* only deal with DS when we negotiated NT_STATUS codes and UNICODE */
if (!(smbXcli_conn_use_unicode(cli->conn))) {
return false;
}
if (!(smb1cli_conn_capabilities(cli->conn) & CAP_STATUS32)) {
return false;
}
if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, expected)) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int efx_init_port(struct efx_nic *efx)
{
int rc;
netif_dbg(efx, drv, efx->net_dev, "init port\n");
mutex_lock(&efx->mac_lock);
rc = efx->phy_op->init(efx);
if (rc)
goto fail1;
efx->port_initialized = true;
/* Reconfigure the MAC before creating dma queues (required for
* Falcon/A1 where RX_INGR_EN/TX_DRAIN_EN isn't supported) */
efx->mac_op->reconfigure(efx);
/* Ensure the PHY advertises the correct flow control settings */
rc = efx->phy_op->reconfigure(efx);
if (rc)
goto fail2;
mutex_unlock(&efx->mac_lock);
return 0;
fail2:
efx->phy_op->fini(efx);
fail1:
mutex_unlock(&efx->mac_lock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void srand(unsigned int seed) {
rand_m_w = (seed&0xFFFF) | (seed<<16);
rand_m_z = (seed&0xFFFF0000) | (seed>>16);
}
Commit Message: Fix stack size detection on Linux (fix #1427)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 82,619
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetAutofillClient(WebAutofillClient* autofill_client) {
autofill_client_ = autofill_client;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 134,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::UpdateCursor(const WebCursor& cursor) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 115,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAndroid::UpdateCursor(const WebCursor& cursor) {
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 114,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Result Perform(const ArgumentTuple& args) const {
callback_.Run();
}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 132,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int MemBackendImpl::CalculateSizeOfAllEntries(
const CompletionCallback& callback) {
return current_size_;
}
Commit Message: [MemCache] Fix bug while iterating LRU list in eviction
It was possible to reanalyze a previously doomed entry.
Bug: 827492
Change-Id: I5d34d2ae87c96e0d2099e926e6eb2c1b30b01d63
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/987919
Commit-Queue: Josh Karlin <jkarlin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547236}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 147,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void overloadedStaticMethod1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "overloadedStaticMethod", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, longArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
TestObjectPython::overloadedStaticMethod(longArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 122,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __init create_segment_manager_caches(void)
{
discard_entry_slab = f2fs_kmem_cache_create("discard_entry",
sizeof(struct discard_entry));
if (!discard_entry_slab)
goto fail;
discard_cmd_slab = f2fs_kmem_cache_create("discard_cmd",
sizeof(struct discard_cmd));
if (!discard_cmd_slab)
goto destroy_discard_entry;
sit_entry_set_slab = f2fs_kmem_cache_create("sit_entry_set",
sizeof(struct sit_entry_set));
if (!sit_entry_set_slab)
goto destroy_discard_cmd;
inmem_entry_slab = f2fs_kmem_cache_create("inmem_page_entry",
sizeof(struct inmem_pages));
if (!inmem_entry_slab)
goto destroy_sit_entry_set;
return 0;
destroy_sit_entry_set:
kmem_cache_destroy(sit_entry_set_slab);
destroy_discard_cmd:
kmem_cache_destroy(discard_cmd_slab);
destroy_discard_entry:
kmem_cache_destroy(discard_entry_slab);
fail:
return -ENOMEM;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 85,371
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void unaccount_freq_event_nohz(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL
spin_lock(&nr_freq_lock);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&nr_freq_events))
tick_nohz_dep_clear(TICK_DEP_BIT_PERF_EVENTS);
spin_unlock(&nr_freq_lock);
#endif
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 68,432
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int proc_task_readdir(struct file * filp, void * dirent, filldir_t filldir)
{
struct dentry *dentry = filp->f_path.dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
struct task_struct *leader = NULL;
struct task_struct *task;
int retval = -ENOENT;
ino_t ino;
int tid;
struct pid_namespace *ns;
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
rcu_read_lock();
if (pid_alive(task)) {
leader = task->group_leader;
get_task_struct(leader);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
put_task_struct(task);
if (!leader)
goto out_no_task;
retval = 0;
switch ((unsigned long)filp->f_pos) {
case 0:
ino = inode->i_ino;
if (filldir(dirent, ".", 1, filp->f_pos, ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
goto out;
filp->f_pos++;
/* fall through */
case 1:
ino = parent_ino(dentry);
if (filldir(dirent, "..", 2, filp->f_pos, ino, DT_DIR) < 0)
goto out;
filp->f_pos++;
/* fall through */
}
/* f_version caches the tgid value that the last readdir call couldn't
* return. lseek aka telldir automagically resets f_version to 0.
*/
ns = filp->f_dentry->d_sb->s_fs_info;
tid = (int)filp->f_version;
filp->f_version = 0;
for (task = first_tid(leader, tid, filp->f_pos - 2, ns);
task;
task = next_tid(task), filp->f_pos++) {
tid = task_pid_nr_ns(task, ns);
if (proc_task_fill_cache(filp, dirent, filldir, task, tid) < 0) {
/* returning this tgid failed, save it as the first
* pid for the next readir call */
filp->f_version = (u64)tid;
put_task_struct(task);
break;
}
}
out:
put_task_struct(leader);
out_no_task:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: proc: restrict access to /proc/PID/io
/proc/PID/io may be used for gathering private information. E.g. for
openssh and vsftpd daemons wchars/rchars may be used to learn the
precise password length. Restrict it to processes being able to ptrace
the target process.
ptrace_may_access() is needed to prevent keeping open file descriptor of
"io" file, executing setuid binary and gathering io information of the
setuid'ed process.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int oppop(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
int offset = 0;
int mod = 0;
if (op->operands[0].type & OT_GPREG) {
if (op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY) {
return -1;
}
if (op->operands[0].type & OT_REGTYPE & OT_SEGMENTREG) {
ut8 base;
if (op->operands[0].reg & X86R_FS) {
data[l++] = 0x0f;
base = 0x81;
} else {
base = 0x7;
}
data[l++] = base + (8 * op->operands[0].reg);
} else {
ut8 base = 0x58;
data[l++] = base + op->operands[0].reg;
}
} else if (op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY) {
data[l++] = 0x8f;
offset = op->operands[0].offset * op->operands[0].offset_sign;
if (offset != 0 || op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_EBP) {
mod = 1;
if (offset >= 128 || offset < -128) {
mod = 2;
}
data[l++] = mod << 6 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_ESP) {
data[l++] = 0x24;
}
data[l++] = offset;
if (mod == 2) {
data[l++] = offset >> 8;
data[l++] = offset >> 16;
data[l++] = offset >> 24;
}
} else {
data[l++] = op->operands[0].regs[0];
if (op->operands[0].regs[0] == X86R_ESP) {
data[l++] = 0x24;
}
}
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 75,444
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SharedMemory::Lock(uint32 timeout_ms, SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES* sec_attr) {
if (lock_ == NULL) {
std::wstring name = name_;
name.append(L"lock");
lock_ = CreateMutex(sec_attr, FALSE, name.c_str());
if (lock_ == NULL) {
DPLOG(ERROR) << "Could not create mutex.";
return false; // there is nothing good we can do here.
}
}
DWORD result = WaitForSingleObject(lock_, timeout_ms);
return (result == WAIT_OBJECT_0);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in Windows shared memory handling.
BUG=164490
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11450016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171369 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 118,706
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mboxlist_update_entry(const char *name, const mbentry_t *mbentry, struct txn **txn)
{
mbentry_t *old = NULL;
int r = 0;
mboxlist_mylookup(name, &old, txn, 0); // ignore errors, it will be NULL
if (!cyrusdb_fetch(mbdb, "$RACL", 5, NULL, NULL, txn)) {
r = mboxlist_update_racl(name, old, mbentry, txn);
/* XXX return value here is discarded? */
}
if (mbentry) {
char *mboxent = mboxlist_entry_cstring(mbentry);
r = cyrusdb_store(mbdb, name, strlen(name), mboxent, strlen(mboxent), txn);
free(mboxent);
if (!r && config_auditlog) {
/* XXX is there a difference between "" and NULL? */
if (old && strcmpsafe(old->acl, mbentry->acl)) {
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "auditlog: acl sessionid=<%s> "
"mailbox=<%s> uniqueid=<%s> "
"oldacl=<%s> acl=<%s>",
session_id(),
name, mbentry->uniqueid,
old->acl, mbentry->acl);
}
}
}
else {
r = cyrusdb_delete(mbdb, name, strlen(name), txn, /*force*/1);
}
mboxlist_entry_free(&old);
return r;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 61,302
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ff_amf_get_field_value(const uint8_t *data, const uint8_t *data_end,
const uint8_t *name, uint8_t *dst, int dst_size)
{
int namelen = strlen(name);
int len;
while (*data != AMF_DATA_TYPE_OBJECT && data < data_end) {
len = ff_amf_tag_size(data, data_end);
if (len < 0)
len = data_end - data;
data += len;
}
if (data_end - data < 3)
return -1;
data++;
for (;;) {
int size = bytestream_get_be16(&data);
if (!size)
break;
if (size < 0 || size >= data_end - data)
return -1;
data += size;
if (size == namelen && !memcmp(data-size, name, namelen)) {
switch (*data++) {
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_NUMBER:
snprintf(dst, dst_size, "%g", av_int2double(AV_RB64(data)));
break;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_BOOL:
snprintf(dst, dst_size, "%s", *data ? "true" : "false");
break;
case AMF_DATA_TYPE_STRING:
len = bytestream_get_be16(&data);
av_strlcpy(dst, data, FFMIN(len+1, dst_size));
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
len = ff_amf_tag_size(data, data_end);
if (len < 0 || len >= data_end - data)
return -1;
data += len;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rtmppkt: Convert ff_amf_get_field_value() to bytestream2
Fixes: out of array accesses
Found-by: JunDong Xie of Ant-financial Light-Year Security Lab
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 168,001
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jas_iccgettime(jas_stream_t *in, jas_icctime_t *time)
{
if (jas_iccgetuint16(in, &time->year) ||
jas_iccgetuint16(in, &time->month) ||
jas_iccgetuint16(in, &time->day) ||
jas_iccgetuint16(in, &time->hour) ||
jas_iccgetuint16(in, &time->min) ||
jas_iccgetuint16(in, &time->sec)) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 72,696
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunSetMountedStateCallback(const SetMountedStateCallback& callback,
base::PlatformFileError* error,
FilePath* cache_file_path) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(error);
DCHECK(cache_file_path);
if (!callback.is_null())
callback.Run(*error, *cache_file_path);
}
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 105,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MaybeStartDrag(Tab* tab,
int model_index,
const ui::LocatedEvent& event,
const ui::ListSelectionModel& original_selection) {
Tabs tabs;
int x = tab->GetMirroredXInView(event.x());
int y = event.y();
for (int i = 0; i < GetTabCount(); ++i) {
Tab* other_tab = GetTabAt(i);
if (tab_strip_->IsTabSelected(other_tab)) {
tabs.push_back(other_tab);
if (other_tab == tab)
x += GetSizeNeededForTabs(tabs) - tab->width();
}
}
DCHECK(!tabs.empty());
DCHECK(base::ContainsValue(tabs, tab));
ui::ListSelectionModel selection_model;
if (!original_selection.IsSelected(model_index))
selection_model = original_selection;
drag_controller_.reset();
TabDragController::MoveBehavior move_behavior = TabDragController::REORDER;
DCHECK(event.type() == ui::ET_MOUSE_PRESSED ||
event.type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP_DOWN);
if (tab_strip_->touch_layout_ &&
((event.type() == ui::ET_MOUSE_PRESSED &&
(((event.flags() & ui::EF_FROM_TOUCH) &&
static_cast<const ui::MouseEvent&>(event).IsLeftMouseButton()) ||
(!(event.flags() & ui::EF_FROM_TOUCH) &&
static_cast<const ui::MouseEvent&>(event).IsControlDown()))) ||
(event.type() == ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP_DOWN && !event.IsControlDown()))) {
move_behavior = TabDragController::MOVE_VISIBLE_TABS;
}
drag_controller_.reset(new TabDragController);
drag_controller_->Init(this, tab, tabs, gfx::Point(x, y), event.x(),
std::move(selection_model), move_behavior,
EventSourceFromEvent(event));
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 140,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: circle_draw( FT_F26Dot6 center_x,
FT_F26Dot6 center_y,
FT_F26Dot6 radius,
FTDemo_Handle* handle,
FTDemo_Display* display,
grColor color )
{
FT_Outline outline;
ft_outline_new_circle( &outline, radius, handle );
FT_Outline_Translate( &outline, center_x & 63, center_y & 63 );
ft_outline_draw( &outline, 1., (center_x >> 6), (center_y >> 6), handle, display, color );
FT_Outline_Done( handle->library, &outline );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType InsertRow(Image *image,ssize_t bpp,unsigned char *p,
ssize_t y,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
int
bit;
Quantum
index;
register Quantum
*q;
ssize_t
x;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
switch (bpp)
{
case 1: /* Convert bitmap scanline. */
{
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
break;
}
case 2: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-3); x+=4)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 4) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
if ((image->columns % 4) > 1)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
if ((image->columns % 4) > 2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t)
index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
p++;
}
break;
}
case 4: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x0f,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
case 8: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
if (index < image->colors)
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
break;
case 24: /* Convert DirectColor scanline. */
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
break;
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1599
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 89,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QObject* OxideQQuickWebViewPrivate::contextHandle() const {
if (!proxy_) {
return construct_props_->context;
}
return proxy_->context();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int bta_co_rfc_data_outgoing_size(void *user_data, int *size) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&slot_lock);
uint32_t id = (uintptr_t)user_data;
int ret = false;
*size = 0;
rfc_slot_t *slot = find_rfc_slot_by_id(id);
if (!slot)
goto out;
if (ioctl(slot->fd, FIONREAD, size) == 0) {
ret = true;
} else {
LOG_ERROR("%s unable to determine bytes remaining to be read on fd %d: %s", __func__, slot->fd, strerror(errno));
cleanup_rfc_slot(slot);
}
out:;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&slot_lock);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 1
| 173,456
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: eq_cached_sock_errs(const struct cached_sock_errs_entry *a,
const struct cached_sock_errs_entry *b)
{
return a->code == b->code;
}
Commit Message: evutil_parse_sockaddr_port(): fix buffer overflow
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"Length between '[' and ']' is cast to signed 32 bit integer on line 1815. Is
the length is more than 2<<31 (INT_MAX), len will hold a negative value.
Consequently, it will pass the check at line 1816. Segfault happens at line
1819.
Generate a resolv.conf with generate-resolv.conf, then compile and run
poc.c. See entry-functions.txt for functions in tor that might be
vulnerable.
Please credit 'Guido Vranken' for this discovery through the Tor bug bounty
program."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/be2b0d5e9417ba0dfe2c):
start
p (1ULL<<31)+1ULL
# $1 = 2147483649
p malloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr))
# $2 = (void *) 0x646010
p malloc(sizeof(int))
# $3 = (void *) 0x646030
p malloc($1)
# $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
p memset($4, 1, $1)
# $5 = 1990369296
p (char *)$4
# $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
set $6[0]='['
set $6[$1]=']'
p evutil_parse_sockaddr_port($4, $2, $3)
# $7 = -1
Before:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb)
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:36
After:
$ gdb bin/http-connect < gdb
(gdb) $1 = 2147483649
(gdb) (gdb) $2 = (void *) 0x646010
(gdb) (gdb) $3 = (void *) 0x646030
(gdb) (gdb) $4 = (void *) 0x7fff76a2a010
(gdb) (gdb) $5 = 1990369296
(gdb) (gdb) $6 = 0x7fff76a2a010 '\001' <repeats 200 times>...
(gdb) (gdb) (gdb) (gdb) $7 = -1
(gdb) (gdb) quit
Fixes: #318
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 70,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: menu_remove_edit(WebKitWebView *page, GArray *argv, GString *result) {
(void) page;
(void) result;
remove_from_menu(argv, WEBKIT_HIT_TEST_RESULT_CONTEXT_EDITABLE);
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void list_modules(GF_ModuleManager *modules)
{
u32 i;
fprintf(stderr, "\rAvailable modules:\n");
for (i=0; i<gf_modules_get_count(modules); i++) {
char *str = (char *) gf_modules_get_file_name(modules, i);
if (str) fprintf(stderr, "\t%s\n", str);
}
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
Commit Message: add some boundary checks on gf_text_get_utf8_line (#1188)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 92,822
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::ResetWindowRegion() {
if (custom_window_shape_) {
XShapeCombineRegion(xdisplay_, xwindow_, ShapeBounding, 0, 0,
window_shape_.get(), false);
return;
}
window_shape_.reset();
if (!IsMaximized() && !IsFullscreen()) {
SkPath window_mask;
Widget* widget = native_widget_delegate_->AsWidget();
if (widget->non_client_view()) {
widget->non_client_view()->GetWindowMask(bounds_in_pixels_.size(),
&window_mask);
if (window_mask.countPoints() > 0) {
window_shape_.reset(gfx::CreateRegionFromSkPath(window_mask));
XShapeCombineRegion(xdisplay_, xwindow_, ShapeBounding, 0, 0,
window_shape_.get(), false);
return;
}
}
}
if (ShouldUseNativeFrame()) {
XShapeCombineMask(xdisplay_, xwindow_, ShapeBounding, 0, 0, x11::None,
ShapeSet);
} else {
XRectangle r = {0,
0,
static_cast<unsigned short>(bounds_in_pixels_.width()),
static_cast<unsigned short>(bounds_in_pixels_.height())};
XShapeCombineRectangles(
xdisplay_, xwindow_, ShapeBounding, 0, 0, &r, 1, ShapeSet, YXBanded);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 140,581
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: convert(void)
{
int ch;
char* mode = "w";
if (!checksignature())
return (-1);
readscreen();
while ((ch = getc(infile)) != ';' && ch != EOF) {
switch (ch) {
case '\0': break; /* this kludge for non-standard files */
case ',': if (!readgifimage(mode))
return (-1);
mode = "a"; /* subsequent images append */
break;
case '!': readextension();
break;
default: fprintf(stderr, "illegal GIF block type\n");
return (-1);
}
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: fix possible OOB write in gif2tiff.c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftrace_set_early_filter(struct ftrace_ops *ops, char *buf, int enable)
{
char *func;
while (buf) {
func = strsep(&buf, ",");
ftrace_set_regex(ops, func, strlen(func), 0, enable);
}
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 30,221
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static FontViewBase *FVAny(void) { return (FontViewBase *) fv_list; }
Commit Message: Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts (#3852)
* Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts
This closes #3846.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 88,321
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> testObjAttrAttrGetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.testObjAttr._get");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
return toV8(imp->testObjAttr(), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 109,623
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_caller_loginuid (GDBusMethodInvocation *context, gchar *loginuid, gint size)
{
PolkitSubject *subject;
gchar *cmdline;
gint pid;
gint uid;
gchar *path;
gchar *buf;
subject = polkit_system_bus_name_new (g_dbus_method_invocation_get_sender (context));
cmdline = _polkit_subject_get_cmdline (subject, &pid, &uid);
g_free (cmdline);
g_object_unref (subject);
path = g_strdup_printf ("/proc/%d/loginuid", pid);
if (g_file_get_contents (path, &buf, NULL, NULL)) {
strncpy (loginuid, buf, size);
g_free (buf);
}
else {
g_snprintf (loginuid, size, "%d", uid);
}
g_free (path);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 10,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofpacts_check_consistency(struct ofpact ofpacts[], size_t ofpacts_len,
struct flow *flow, ofp_port_t max_ports,
uint8_t table_id, uint8_t n_tables,
enum ofputil_protocol usable_protocols)
{
enum ofputil_protocol p = usable_protocols;
enum ofperr error;
error = ofpacts_check(ofpacts, ofpacts_len, flow, max_ports,
table_id, n_tables, &p);
return (error ? error
: p != usable_protocols ? OFPERR_OFPBAC_MATCH_INCONSISTENT
: 0);
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 77,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned int bt_accept_poll(struct sock *parent)
{
struct list_head *p, *n;
struct sock *sk;
list_for_each_safe(p, n, &bt_sk(parent)->accept_q) {
sk = (struct sock *) list_entry(p, struct bt_sock, accept_q);
if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED ||
(test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags) &&
sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2))
return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: fix possible info leak in bt_sock_recvmsg()
In case the socket is already shutting down, bt_sock_recvmsg() returns
with 0 without updating msg_namelen leading to net/socket.c leaking the
local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable to userland -- 128 bytes
of kernel stack memory.
Fix this by moving the msg_namelen assignment in front of the shutdown
test.
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 30,751
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Instance::GetToolbarRightOffset() {
int scrollbar_thickness = GetScrollbarThickness();
return GetScaled(kToolbarFadingOffsetRight) + 2 * scrollbar_thickness;
}
Commit Message: Let PDFium handle event when there is not yet a visible page.
Speculative fix for 415307. CF will confirm.
The stack trace for that bug indicates an attempt to index by -1, which is consistent with no visible page.
BUG=415307
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/560133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#295421}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 120,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringURLAttrAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueString(info, imp->getURLAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectedtreatnullasnullstringtreatundefinedasnullstringurlattrAttr), info.GetIsolate());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 121,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_rw_iunlock(
struct xfs_inode *ip,
int type)
{
xfs_iunlock(ip, type);
if (type & XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL)
mutex_unlock(&VFS_I(ip)->i_mutex);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 46,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DidRead(File::Error error,
const char* data,
int bytes_read) {
error_ = error;
buffer_.resize(bytes_read);
memcpy(&buffer_[0], data, bytes_read);
MessageLoop::current()->QuitWhenIdle();
}
Commit Message: Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
R=thestig@chromium.org
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 110,856
|
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