instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterVICARImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("VICAR");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct ctl_table_header *register_sysctl_paths(const struct ctl_path *path,
struct ctl_table *table)
{
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: restrict write access to dmesg_restrict
When dmesg_restrict is set to 1 CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to read the kernel
ring buffer. But a root user without CAP_SYS_ADMIN is able to reset
dmesg_restrict to 0.
This is an issue when e.g. LXC (Linux Containers) are used and complete
user space is running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. A unprivileged and jailed
root user can bypass the dmesg_restrict protection.
With this patch writing to dmesg_restrict is only allowed when root has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Acked-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStrip::MoveTab(int from_model_index,
int to_model_index,
TabRendererData data) {
DCHECK_GT(tabs_.view_size(), 0);
const Tab* last_tab = GetLastVisibleTab();
tab_at(from_model_index)->SetData(std::move(data));
const int to_view_index = GetIndexOf(tab_at(to_model_index));
ReorderChildView(tab_at(from_model_index), to_view_index);
if (touch_layout_) {
tabs_.MoveViewOnly(from_model_index, to_model_index);
int pinned_count = 0;
const int start_x = UpdateIdealBoundsForPinnedTabs(&pinned_count);
touch_layout_->MoveTab(from_model_index, to_model_index,
controller_->GetActiveIndex(), start_x,
pinned_count);
} else {
tabs_.Move(from_model_index, to_model_index);
}
selected_tabs_.Move(from_model_index, to_model_index, /*length=*/1);
StartMoveTabAnimation();
if (TabDragController::IsAttachedTo(GetDragContext()) &&
(last_tab != GetLastVisibleTab() || last_tab->dragging())) {
new_tab_button_->SetVisible(false);
}
SwapLayoutIfNecessary();
UpdateAccessibleTabIndices();
for (TabStripObserver& observer : observers_)
observer.OnTabMoved(from_model_index, to_model_index);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LockScreenMediaControlsView::Dismiss() {
media_controller_remote_->Stop();
hide_media_controls_.Run();
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ForSelfAndInstances(SVGElement* element, T callback) {
SVGElement::InstanceUpdateBlocker blocker(element);
callback(element);
for (SVGElement* instance : element->InstancesForElement())
callback(instance);
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 152,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fsmUtime(const char *path, mode_t mode, time_t mtime)
{
int rc = 0;
struct timeval stamps[2] = {
{ .tv_sec = mtime, .tv_usec = 0 },
{ .tv_sec = mtime, .tv_usec = 0 },
};
#if HAVE_LUTIMES
rc = lutimes(path, stamps);
#else
if (!S_ISLNK(mode))
rc = utimes(path, stamps);
#endif
if (_fsm_debug)
rpmlog(RPMLOG_DEBUG, " %8s (%s, 0x%x) %s\n", __func__,
path, (unsigned)mtime, (rc < 0 ? strerror(errno) : ""));
if (rc < 0) rc = RPMERR_UTIME_FAILED;
/* ...but utime error is not critical for directories */
if (rc && S_ISDIR(mode))
rc = 0;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Restrict following symlinks to directories by ownership (CVE-2017-7500)
Only follow directory symlinks owned by target directory owner or root.
This prevents privilege escalation from user-writable directories via
directory symlinks to privileged directories on package upgrade, while
still allowing admin to arrange disk usage with symlinks.
The rationale is that if you can create symlinks owned by user X you *are*
user X (or root), and if you also own directory Y you can do whatever with
it already, including change permissions. So when you create a symlink to
that directory, the link ownership acts as a simple stamp of authority that
you indeed want rpm to treat this symlink as it were the directory that
you own. Such a permission can only be given by you or root, which
is just the way we want it. Plus it's almost ridiculously simple as far
as rules go, compared to trying to calculate something from the
source vs destination directory permissions etc.
In the normal case, the user arranging diskspace with symlinks is indeed
root so nothing changes, the only real change here is to links created by
non-privileged users which should be few and far between in practise.
Unfortunately our test-suite runs as a regular user via fakechroot and
thus the testcase for this fails under the new rules. Adjust the testcase
to get the ownership straight and add a second case for the illegal
behavior, basically the same as the old one but with different expectations.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 96,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_cmap_rgb_alpha_direct(frac r, frac g, frac b, frac alpha, gx_device_color * pdc,
const gs_gstate * pgs, gx_device * dev, gs_color_select_t select)
{
int i, ncomps;
frac cm_comps[GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS];
gx_color_value cv[GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS];
gx_color_index color;
gx_device *trans_device;
/* We may be coming from the clist writer which often forwards us the
target device. If this occurs we actually need to get to the color
space defined by the transparency group and we use the operators
defined by the transparency device to do the job. */
if (pgs->trans_device != NULL){
trans_device = pgs->trans_device;
} else {
trans_device = dev;
}
ncomps = trans_device->color_info.num_components;
/* map to the color model */
dev_proc(trans_device, get_color_mapping_procs)(trans_device)->map_rgb(trans_device, pgs, r, g, b, cm_comps);
/* pre-multiply to account for the alpha weighting */
if (alpha != frac_1) {
#ifdef PREMULTIPLY_TOWARDS_WHITE
frac alpha_bias = frac_1 - alpha;
#else
frac alpha_bias = 0;
#endif
for (i = 0; i < ncomps; i++)
cm_comps[i] = (frac)((long)cm_comps[i] * alpha) / frac_1 + alpha_bias;
}
for (i = 0; i < ncomps; i++)
cv[i] = frac2cv(gx_map_color_frac(pgs, cm_comps[i], effective_transfer[i]));
color = dev_proc(trans_device, encode_color)(trans_device, cv);
/* check if the encoding was successful; we presume failure is rare */
if (color != gx_no_color_index)
color_set_pure(pdc, color);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cvardecs(JF, js_Ast *node)
{
if (node->type == AST_LIST) {
while (node) {
cvardecs(J, F, node->a);
node = node->b;
}
return;
}
if (isfun(node->type))
return; /* stop at inner functions */
if (node->type == EXP_VAR) {
checkfutureword(J, F, node->a);
addlocal(J, F, node->a, 1);
}
if (node->a) cvardecs(J, F, node->a);
if (node->b) cvardecs(J, F, node->b);
if (node->c) cvardecs(J, F, node->c);
if (node->d) cvardecs(J, F, node->d);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700947: Add missing ENDTRY opcode in try/catch/finally byte code.
In one of the code branches in handling exceptions in the catch block
we forgot to call the ENDTRY opcode to pop the inner hidden try.
This leads to an unbalanced exception stack which can cause a crash
due to us jumping to a stack frame that has already been exited.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 90,726 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainCoreDumpWithFormat(virDomainPtr domain, const char *to,
unsigned int dumpformat, unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "to=%s, dumpformat=%u, flags=%x",
to, dumpformat, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(to, error);
if (dumpformat >= VIR_DOMAIN_CORE_DUMP_FORMAT_LAST) {
virReportInvalidArg(flags, _("dumpformat '%d' is not supported"),
dumpformat);
goto error;
}
VIR_EXCLUSIVE_FLAGS_GOTO(VIR_DUMP_CRASH, VIR_DUMP_LIVE, error);
VIR_EXCLUSIVE_FLAGS_GOTO(VIR_DUMP_CRASH, VIR_DUMP_RESET, error);
VIR_EXCLUSIVE_FLAGS_GOTO(VIR_DUMP_LIVE, VIR_DUMP_RESET, error);
if (conn->driver->domainCoreDumpWithFormat) {
int ret;
char *absolute_to;
/* We must absolutize the file path as the save is done out of process */
if (virFileAbsPath(to, &absolute_to) < 0) {
virReportError(VIR_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, "%s",
_("could not build absolute core file path"));
goto error;
}
ret = conn->driver->domainCoreDumpWithFormat(domain, absolute_to,
dumpformat, flags);
VIR_FREE(absolute_to);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::ToolbarSizeChanged(bool is_animating) {
ToolbarSizeChanged(NULL, is_animating);
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteMPCImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
char
buffer[MaxTextExtent],
cache_filename[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*property,
*value;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
scene;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
depth,
one;
/*
Open persistent cache.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
AppendImageFormat("cache",cache_filename);
scene=0;
offset=0;
one=1;
do
{
/*
Write persistent cache meta-information.
*/
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(image->colors > (one << depth)))
image->storage_class=DirectClass;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"id=MagickCache\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"magick-signature=%u\n",
GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"class=%s colors=%.20g matte=%s\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickClassOptions,image->storage_class),(double) image->colors,
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickBooleanOptions,(ssize_t) image->matte));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"columns=%.20g rows=%.20g depth=%.20g\n",(double) image->columns,
(double) image->rows,(double) image->depth);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if (image->type != UndefinedType)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"type=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickTypeOptions,image->type));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->colorspace != UndefinedColorspace)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"colorspace=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickColorspaceOptions,image->colorspace));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->intensity != UndefinedPixelIntensityMethod)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"pixel-intensity=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickPixelIntensityOptions,
image->intensity));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->endian != UndefinedEndian)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"endian=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickEndianOptions,image->endian));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->compression != UndefinedCompression)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"compression=%s quality=%.20g\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickCompressOptions,image->compression),(double) image->quality);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->units != UndefinedResolution)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"units=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickResolutionOptions,image->units));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((image->x_resolution != 0) || (image->y_resolution != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"resolution=%gx%g\n",image->x_resolution,image->y_resolution);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((image->page.width != 0) || (image->page.height != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"page=%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g\n",(double) image->page.width,(double)
image->page.height,(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
if ((image->page.x != 0) || (image->page.y != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"page=%+ld%+ld\n",
(long) image->page.x,(long) image->page.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((image->tile_offset.x != 0) || (image->tile_offset.y != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"tile-offset=%+ld%+ld\n",
(long) image->tile_offset.x,(long) image->tile_offset.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetPreviousImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL))
{
if (image->scene == 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"iterations=%.20g delay=%.20g ticks-per-second=%.20g\n",(double)
image->iterations,(double) image->delay,(double)
image->ticks_per_second);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"scene=%.20g "
"iterations=%.20g delay=%.20g ticks-per-second=%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene,(double) image->iterations,(double)
image->delay,(double) image->ticks_per_second);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
if (image->scene != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"scene=%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->iterations != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"iterations=%.20g\n",
(double) image->iterations);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->delay != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"delay=%.20g\n",
(double) image->delay);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->ticks_per_second != UndefinedTicksPerSecond)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"ticks-per-second=%.20g\n",(double) image->ticks_per_second);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
}
if (image->gravity != UndefinedGravity)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"gravity=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickGravityOptions,image->gravity));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->dispose != UndefinedDispose)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"dispose=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickDisposeOptions,image->dispose));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"rendering-intent=%s\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickIntentOptions,
image->rendering_intent));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->gamma != 0.0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"gamma=%g\n",
image->gamma);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->chromaticity.white_point.x != 0.0)
{
/*
Note chomaticity points.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"red-primary="
"%g,%g green-primary=%g,%g blue-primary=%g,%g\n",
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x,image->chromaticity.red_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x,
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x,
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"white-point=%g,%g\n",image->chromaticity.white_point.x,
image->chromaticity.white_point.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->orientation != UndefinedOrientation)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"orientation=%s\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickOrientationOptions,
image->orientation));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->profiles != (void *) NULL)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
/*
Generic profile.
*/
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
for (name=GetNextImageProfile(image); name != (const char *) NULL; )
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,
"profile:%s=%.20g\n",name,(double)
GetStringInfoLength(profile));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
}
}
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"montage=%s\n",
image->montage);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%s=",property);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
value=GetImageProperty(image,property);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
size_t
length;
length=strlen(value);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) value[i])) != 0)
break;
if ((i == (ssize_t) length) && (i != 0))
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,(const unsigned char *) value);
else
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'{');
if (strchr(value,'}') == (char *) NULL)
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,(const unsigned char *) value);
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
if (value[i] == (int) '}')
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\\');
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,value[i]);
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'}');
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 63,385 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int CMS_digest_verify(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *dcont, BIO *out,
unsigned int flags)
{
BIO *cont;
int r;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(CMS_get0_type(cms)) != NID_pkcs7_digest) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_DIGEST_VERIFY, CMS_R_TYPE_NOT_DIGESTED_DATA);
return 0;
}
if (!dcont && !check_content(cms))
return 0;
cont = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont);
if (!cont)
return 0;
r = cms_copy_content(out, cont, flags);
if (r)
r = cms_DigestedData_do_final(cms, cont, 1);
do_free_upto(cont, dcont);
return r;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-311 | 0 | 11,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ToColor_S4444_Raw(SkColor dst[], const void* src, int width,
SkColorTable*) {
SkASSERT(width > 0);
const SkPMColor16* s = (const SkPMColor16*)src;
do {
SkPMColor c = SkPixel4444ToPixel32(*s++);
*dst++ = SkColorSetARGB(SkGetPackedA32(c), SkGetPackedR32(c),
SkGetPackedG32(c), SkGetPackedB32(c));
} while (--width != 0);
}
Commit Message: Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void htmlCollectionAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::htmlCollectionAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int usable(struct qib_pportdata *ppd)
{
struct qib_devdata *dd = ppd->dd;
return dd && (dd->flags & QIB_PRESENT) && dd->kregbase && ppd->lid &&
(ppd->lflags & QIBL_LINKACTIVE);
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static CompositeOperator GIMPBlendModeToCompositeOperator(
size_t blendMode)
{
switch ( blendMode )
{
case GIMP_NORMAL_MODE: return(OverCompositeOp);
case GIMP_DISSOLVE_MODE: return(DissolveCompositeOp);
case GIMP_MULTIPLY_MODE: return(MultiplyCompositeOp);
case GIMP_SCREEN_MODE: return(ScreenCompositeOp);
case GIMP_OVERLAY_MODE: return(OverlayCompositeOp);
case GIMP_DIFFERENCE_MODE: return(DifferenceCompositeOp);
case GIMP_ADDITION_MODE: return(AddCompositeOp);
case GIMP_SUBTRACT_MODE: return(SubtractCompositeOp);
case GIMP_DARKEN_ONLY_MODE: return(DarkenCompositeOp);
case GIMP_LIGHTEN_ONLY_MODE: return(LightenCompositeOp);
case GIMP_HUE_MODE: return(HueCompositeOp);
case GIMP_SATURATION_MODE: return(SaturateCompositeOp);
case GIMP_COLOR_MODE: return(ColorizeCompositeOp);
case GIMP_DODGE_MODE: return(ColorDodgeCompositeOp);
case GIMP_BURN_MODE: return(ColorBurnCompositeOp);
case GIMP_HARDLIGHT_MODE: return(HardLightCompositeOp);
case GIMP_DIVIDE_MODE: return(DivideCompositeOp);
/* these are the ones we don't support...yet */
case GIMP_BEHIND_MODE: return(OverCompositeOp);
case GIMP_VALUE_MODE: return(OverCompositeOp);
default: return(OverCompositeOp);
}
}
Commit Message: Check for image list before we destroy the last image in XCF coder (patch sent privately by Андрей Черный)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 67,997 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DefaultTabHandler::RestoreTab() {
delegate_->AsBrowser()->RestoreTab();
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<NavigationRequest> NavigationRequest::CreateRendererInitiated(
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
NavigationEntryImpl* entry,
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
mojom::BeginNavigationParamsPtr begin_params,
int current_history_list_offset,
int current_history_list_length,
bool override_user_agent,
scoped_refptr<network::SharedURLLoaderFactory> blob_url_loader_factory,
mojom::NavigationClientAssociatedPtrInfo navigation_client,
blink::mojom::NavigationInitiatorPtr navigation_initiator) {
DCHECK(FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::IsReload(common_params.navigation_type) ||
common_params.navigation_type ==
FrameMsg_Navigate_Type::DIFFERENT_DOCUMENT);
CommitNavigationParams commit_params(
base::nullopt, override_user_agent,
std::vector<GURL>(), // redirects
common_params.url, common_params.method,
false, // can_load_local_resources
PageState(), // page_state
0, // nav_entry_id
false, // is_history_navigation_in_new_child
std::map<std::string, bool>(), // subframe_unique_names
false, // intended_as_new_entry
-1, // |pending_history_list_offset| is set to -1 because
current_history_list_offset, current_history_list_length,
false, // is_view_source
false /*should_clear_history_list*/);
std::unique_ptr<NavigationRequest> navigation_request(new NavigationRequest(
frame_tree_node, common_params, std::move(begin_params), commit_params,
false, // browser_initiated
true, // from_begin_navigation
false, // is_for_commit
nullptr, entry,
nullptr, // navigation_ui_data
std::move(navigation_client), std::move(navigation_initiator)));
navigation_request->blob_url_loader_factory_ =
std::move(blob_url_loader_factory);
return navigation_request;
}
Commit Message: Show an error page if a URL redirects to a javascript: URL.
BUG=935175
Change-Id: Id4a9198d5dff823bc3d324b9de9bff2ee86dc499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1488152
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635848}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,345 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void _php_curl_verify_handlers(php_curl *ch, int reporterror) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream *stream;
ZEND_ASSERT(ch && ch->handlers);
if (!Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->std_err)) {
stream = (php_stream *)zend_fetch_resource2_ex(&ch->handlers->std_err, NULL, php_file_le_stream(), php_file_le_pstream());
if (stream == NULL) {
if (reporterror) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "CURLOPT_STDERR resource has gone away, resetting to stderr");
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->std_err);
ZVAL_UNDEF(&ch->handlers->std_err);
curl_easy_setopt(ch->cp, CURLOPT_STDERR, stderr);
}
}
if (ch->handlers->read && !Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->read->stream)) {
stream = (php_stream *)zend_fetch_resource2_ex(&ch->handlers->read->stream, NULL, php_file_le_stream(), php_file_le_pstream());
if (stream == NULL) {
if (reporterror) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "CURLOPT_INFILE resource has gone away, resetting to default");
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->read->stream);
ZVAL_UNDEF(&ch->handlers->read->stream);
ch->handlers->read->res = NULL;
ch->handlers->read->fp = 0;
curl_easy_setopt(ch->cp, CURLOPT_INFILE, (void *) ch);
}
}
if (ch->handlers->write_header && !Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->write_header->stream)) {
stream = (php_stream *)zend_fetch_resource2_ex(&ch->handlers->write_header->stream, NULL, php_file_le_stream(), php_file_le_pstream());
if (stream == NULL) {
if (reporterror) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "CURLOPT_WRITEHEADER resource has gone away, resetting to default");
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->write_header->stream);
ZVAL_UNDEF(&ch->handlers->write_header->stream);
ch->handlers->write_header->fp = 0;
ch->handlers->write_header->method = PHP_CURL_IGNORE;
curl_easy_setopt(ch->cp, CURLOPT_WRITEHEADER, (void *) ch);
}
}
if (ch->handlers->write && !Z_ISUNDEF(ch->handlers->write->stream)) {
stream = (php_stream *)zend_fetch_resource2_ex(&ch->handlers->write->stream, NULL, php_file_le_stream(), php_file_le_pstream());
if (stream == NULL) {
if (reporterror) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "CURLOPT_FILE resource has gone away, resetting to default");
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&ch->handlers->write->stream);
ZVAL_UNDEF(&ch->handlers->write->stream);
ch->handlers->write->fp = 0;
ch->handlers->write->method = PHP_CURL_STDOUT;
curl_easy_setopt(ch->cp, CURLOPT_FILE, (void *) ch);
}
}
return;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 50,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ELFOBJ* Elf_(r_bin_elf_new)(const char* file, bool verbose) {
ut8 *buf;
int size;
ELFOBJ *bin = R_NEW0 (ELFOBJ);
if (!bin) {
return NULL;
}
memset (bin, 0, sizeof (ELFOBJ));
bin->file = file;
if (!(buf = (ut8*)r_file_slurp (file, &size))) {
return Elf_(r_bin_elf_free) (bin);
}
bin->size = size;
bin->verbose = verbose;
bin->b = r_buf_new ();
if (!r_buf_set_bytes (bin->b, buf, bin->size)) {
free (buf);
return Elf_(r_bin_elf_free) (bin);
}
if (!elf_init (bin)) {
free (buf);
return Elf_(r_bin_elf_free) (bin);
}
free (buf);
return bin;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Page* ChromeClientImpl::createWindow(Frame* frame, const FrameLoadRequest& r, const WindowFeatures& features,
NavigationPolicy navigationPolicy, ShouldSendReferrer shouldSendReferrer)
{
if (!m_webView->client())
return 0;
WebNavigationPolicy policy = static_cast<WebNavigationPolicy>(navigationPolicy);
if (policy == WebNavigationPolicyIgnore)
policy = getNavigationPolicy();
DocumentFullscreen::webkitCancelFullScreen(frame->document());
WebViewImpl* newView = toWebViewImpl(
m_webView->client()->createView(WebFrameImpl::fromFrame(frame), WrappedResourceRequest(r.resourceRequest()), features, r.frameName(), policy, shouldSendReferrer == NeverSendReferrer));
if (!newView)
return 0;
return newView->page();
}
Commit Message: Delete apparently unused geolocation declarations and include.
BUG=336263
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/139743014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165601 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLButtonElement::parseAttribute(const QualifiedName& name, const AtomicString& value)
{
if (name == typeAttr) {
if (equalIgnoringCase(value, "reset"))
m_type = RESET;
else if (equalIgnoringCase(value, "button"))
m_type = BUTTON;
else
m_type = SUBMIT;
setNeedsWillValidateCheck();
} else
HTMLFormControlElement::parseAttribute(name, value);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int skcipher_alloc_sgl(struct sock *sk)
{
struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
struct skcipher_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
struct skcipher_sg_list *sgl;
struct scatterlist *sg = NULL;
sgl = list_entry(ctx->tsgl.prev, struct skcipher_sg_list, list);
if (!list_empty(&ctx->tsgl))
sg = sgl->sg;
if (!sg || sgl->cur >= MAX_SGL_ENTS) {
sgl = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*sgl) +
sizeof(sgl->sg[0]) * (MAX_SGL_ENTS + 1),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sgl)
return -ENOMEM;
sg_init_table(sgl->sg, MAX_SGL_ENTS + 1);
sgl->cur = 0;
if (sg)
sg_chain(sg, MAX_SGL_ENTS + 1, sgl->sg);
list_add_tail(&sgl->list, &ctx->tsgl);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif_skcipher - Require setkey before accept(2)
Some cipher implementations will crash if you try to use them
without calling setkey first. This patch adds a check so that
the accept(2) call will fail with -ENOKEY if setkey hasn't been
done on the socket yet.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 55,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unaccount_freq_event(void)
{
if (tick_nohz_full_enabled())
unaccount_freq_event_nohz();
else
atomic_dec(&nr_freq_events);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int iwl_set_dynamic_key(struct iwl_priv *priv,
struct iwl_rxon_context *ctx,
struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
struct ieee80211_sta *sta)
{
struct ieee80211_key_seq seq;
u16 p1k[5];
int ret;
u8 sta_id = iwlagn_key_sta_id(priv, ctx->vif, sta);
const u8 *addr;
if (sta_id == IWL_INVALID_STATION)
return -EINVAL;
lockdep_assert_held(&priv->shrd->mutex);
keyconf->hw_key_idx = iwl_get_free_ucode_key_offset(priv);
if (keyconf->hw_key_idx == WEP_INVALID_OFFSET)
return -ENOSPC;
ctx->key_mapping_keys++;
switch (keyconf->cipher) {
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
if (sta)
addr = sta->addr;
else /* station mode case only */
addr = ctx->active.bssid_addr;
/* pre-fill phase 1 key into device cache */
ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(keyconf, 0, &seq);
ieee80211_get_tkip_rx_p1k(keyconf, addr, seq.tkip.iv32, p1k);
ret = iwlagn_send_sta_key(priv, keyconf, sta_id,
seq.tkip.iv32, p1k, CMD_SYNC);
break;
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
ret = iwlagn_send_sta_key(priv, keyconf, sta_id,
0, NULL, CMD_SYNC);
break;
default:
IWL_ERR(priv, "Unknown cipher %x\n", keyconf->cipher);
ret = -EINVAL;
}
if (ret) {
ctx->key_mapping_keys--;
clear_bit(keyconf->hw_key_idx, &priv->ucode_key_table);
}
IWL_DEBUG_WEP(priv, "Set dynamic key: cipher=%x len=%d idx=%d sta=%pM ret=%d\n",
keyconf->cipher, keyconf->keylen, keyconf->keyidx,
sta ? sta->addr : NULL, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::CallWithExecutionContextRaisesExceptionVoidMethodLongArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_callWithExecutionContextRaisesExceptionVoidMethodLongArg");
test_object_v8_internal::CallWithExecutionContextRaisesExceptionVoidMethodLongArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,582 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct lxc_lock *lxc_newlock(const char *lxcpath, const char *name)
{
struct lxc_lock *l;
l = malloc(sizeof(*l));
if (!l)
goto out;
if (!name) {
l->type = LXC_LOCK_ANON_SEM;
l->u.sem = lxc_new_unnamed_sem();
if (!l->u.sem) {
free(l);
l = NULL;
}
goto out;
}
l->type = LXC_LOCK_FLOCK;
l->u.f.fname = lxclock_name(lxcpath, name);
if (!l->u.f.fname) {
free(l);
l = NULL;
goto out;
}
l->u.f.fd = -1;
out:
return l;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than /run/lock/lxc
This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file
on the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OneClickSigninSyncStarter::Initialize(Profile* profile, Browser* browser) {
DCHECK(profile);
profile_ = profile;
browser_ = browser;
if (browser)
desktop_type_ = browser->host_desktop_type();
signin_tracker_.reset(new SigninTracker(profile_, this));
ProfileSyncService* profile_sync_service = GetProfileSyncService();
if (profile_sync_service)
profile_sync_service->SetSetupInProgress(true);
browser_sync::SyncPrefs sync_prefs(profile_->GetPrefs());
sync_prefs.SetStartSuppressed(false);
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 112,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: early_console_setup (char *cmdline)
{
int earlycons = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SERIAL_SGI_L1_CONSOLE
{
extern int sn_serial_console_early_setup(void);
if (!sn_serial_console_early_setup())
earlycons++;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_PCDP
if (!efi_setup_pcdp_console(cmdline))
earlycons++;
#endif
if (!simcons_register())
earlycons++;
return (earlycons) ? 0 : -1;
}
Commit Message: [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 74,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Gfx::opSetStrokeGray(Object args[], int numArgs) {
GfxColor color;
state->setStrokePattern(NULL);
state->setStrokeColorSpace(new GfxDeviceGrayColorSpace());
out->updateStrokeColorSpace(state);
color.c[0] = dblToCol(args[0].getNum());
state->setStrokeColor(&color);
out->updateStrokeColor(state);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct object_entry *insert_object(unsigned char *sha1)
{
unsigned int h = sha1[0] << 8 | sha1[1];
struct object_entry *e = object_table[h];
while (e) {
if (!hashcmp(sha1, e->idx.sha1))
return e;
e = e->next;
}
e = new_object(sha1);
e->next = object_table[h];
e->idx.offset = 0;
object_table[h] = e;
return e;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __net_exit ip4_frags_ns_ctl_unregister(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *table;
table = net->ipv4.frags_hdr->ctl_table_arg;
unregister_net_sysctl_table(net->ipv4.frags_hdr);
kfree(table);
}
Commit Message: net: ip_expire() must revalidate route
Commit 4a94445c9a5c (net: Use ip_route_input_noref() in input path)
added a bug in IP defragmentation handling, in case timeout is fired.
When a frame is defragmented, we use last skb dst field when building
final skb. Its dst is valid, since we are in rcu read section.
But if a timeout occurs, we take first queued fragment to build one ICMP
TIME EXCEEDED message. Problem is all queued skb have weak dst pointers,
since we escaped RCU critical section after their queueing. icmp_send()
might dereference a now freed (and possibly reused) part of memory.
Calling skb_dst_drop() and ip_route_input_noref() to revalidate route is
the only possible choice.
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,341 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ohci_attach(USBPort *port1)
{
OHCIState *s = port1->opaque;
OHCIPort *port = &s->rhport[port1->index];
uint32_t old_state = port->ctrl;
/* set connect status */
port->ctrl |= OHCI_PORT_CCS | OHCI_PORT_CSC;
/* update speed */
if (port->port.dev->speed == USB_SPEED_LOW) {
port->ctrl |= OHCI_PORT_LSDA;
} else {
port->ctrl &= ~OHCI_PORT_LSDA;
}
/* notify of remote-wakeup */
if ((s->ctl & OHCI_CTL_HCFS) == OHCI_USB_SUSPEND) {
ohci_set_interrupt(s, OHCI_INTR_RD);
}
trace_usb_ohci_port_attach(port1->index);
if (old_state != port->ctrl) {
ohci_set_interrupt(s, OHCI_INTR_RHSC);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 5,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void caif_check_flow_release(struct sock *sk)
{
struct caifsock *cf_sk = container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk);
if (rx_flow_is_on(cf_sk))
return;
if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk_rcvbuf_lowwater(cf_sk)) {
set_rx_flow_on(cf_sk);
caif_flow_ctrl(sk, CAIF_MODEMCMD_FLOW_ON_REQ);
}
}
Commit Message: caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Sjur Braendeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int inet6_fill_prefix(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_dev *idev,
struct prefix_info *pinfo, u32 portid, u32 seq,
int event, unsigned int flags)
{
struct prefixmsg *pmsg;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct prefix_cacheinfo ci;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, sizeof(*pmsg), flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
pmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
pmsg->prefix_family = AF_INET6;
pmsg->prefix_pad1 = 0;
pmsg->prefix_pad2 = 0;
pmsg->prefix_ifindex = idev->dev->ifindex;
pmsg->prefix_len = pinfo->prefix_len;
pmsg->prefix_type = pinfo->type;
pmsg->prefix_pad3 = 0;
pmsg->prefix_flags = 0;
if (pinfo->onlink)
pmsg->prefix_flags |= IF_PREFIX_ONLINK;
if (pinfo->autoconf)
pmsg->prefix_flags |= IF_PREFIX_AUTOCONF;
if (nla_put(skb, PREFIX_ADDRESS, sizeof(pinfo->prefix), &pinfo->prefix))
goto nla_put_failure;
ci.preferred_time = ntohl(pinfo->prefered);
ci.valid_time = ntohl(pinfo->valid);
if (nla_put(skb, PREFIX_CACHEINFO, sizeof(ci), &ci))
goto nla_put_failure;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void comps_objrtree_values_walk(COMPS_ObjRTree * rt, void* udata,
void (*walk_f)(void*, COMPS_Object*)) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, NULL);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, rt->subnodes, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = (COMPS_HSList*)it->data;
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist,
((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes, 0);
}
if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL) {
walk_f(udata, ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->data);
}
}
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadRequestLimiter::TabDownloadState::DidGetUserInteraction(
const blink::WebInputEvent::Type type) {
if (is_showing_prompt() ||
type == blink::WebInputEvent::kGestureScrollBegin) {
return;
}
bool promptable =
PermissionRequestManager::FromWebContents(web_contents()) != nullptr;
if ((status_ != DownloadRequestLimiter::ALLOW_ALL_DOWNLOADS) &&
(!promptable ||
(status_ != DownloadRequestLimiter::DOWNLOADS_NOT_ALLOWED))) {
host_->Remove(this, web_contents());
}
}
Commit Message: Don't reset TabDownloadState on history back/forward
Currently performing forward/backward on a tab will reset the TabDownloadState.
Which allows javascript code to do trigger multiple downloads.
This CL disables that behavior by not resetting the TabDownloadState on
forward/back.
It is still possible to reset the TabDownloadState through user gesture
or using browser initiated download.
BUG=848535
Change-Id: I7f9bf6e8fb759b4dcddf5ac0c214e8c6c9f48863
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1108959
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#574437}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObjectCache* Document::axObjectCache() const
{
Settings* settings = this->settings();
if (!settings || !settings->accessibilityEnabled())
return 0;
Document& cacheOwner = this->axObjectCacheOwner();
if (!cacheOwner.layoutView())
return 0;
ASSERT(&cacheOwner == this || !m_axObjectCache);
if (!cacheOwner.m_axObjectCache)
cacheOwner.m_axObjectCache = AXObjectCache::create(cacheOwner);
return cacheOwner.m_axObjectCache.get();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,280 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_real_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
struct btrfs_item *item;
struct btrfs_dir_item *di;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_key found_key;
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct list_head ins_list;
struct list_head del_list;
int ret;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
int slot;
unsigned char d_type;
int over = 0;
u32 di_cur;
u32 di_total;
u32 di_len;
int key_type = BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY;
char tmp_name[32];
char *name_ptr;
int name_len;
int is_curr = 0; /* ctx->pos points to the current index? */
/* FIXME, use a real flag for deciding about the key type */
if (root->fs_info->tree_root == root)
key_type = BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY;
if (!dir_emit_dots(file, ctx))
return 0;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
path->reada = 1;
if (key_type == BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY) {
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ins_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&del_list);
btrfs_get_delayed_items(inode, &ins_list, &del_list);
}
key.type = key_type;
key.offset = ctx->pos;
key.objectid = btrfs_ino(inode);
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
while (1) {
leaf = path->nodes[0];
slot = path->slots[0];
if (slot >= btrfs_header_nritems(leaf)) {
ret = btrfs_next_leaf(root, path);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
else if (ret > 0)
break;
continue;
}
item = btrfs_item_nr(slot);
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &found_key, slot);
if (found_key.objectid != key.objectid)
break;
if (found_key.type != key_type)
break;
if (found_key.offset < ctx->pos)
goto next;
if (key_type == BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY &&
btrfs_should_delete_dir_index(&del_list,
found_key.offset))
goto next;
ctx->pos = found_key.offset;
is_curr = 1;
di = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, slot, struct btrfs_dir_item);
di_cur = 0;
di_total = btrfs_item_size(leaf, item);
while (di_cur < di_total) {
struct btrfs_key location;
if (verify_dir_item(root, leaf, di))
break;
name_len = btrfs_dir_name_len(leaf, di);
if (name_len <= sizeof(tmp_name)) {
name_ptr = tmp_name;
} else {
name_ptr = kmalloc(name_len, GFP_NOFS);
if (!name_ptr) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
}
read_extent_buffer(leaf, name_ptr,
(unsigned long)(di + 1), name_len);
d_type = btrfs_filetype_table[btrfs_dir_type(leaf, di)];
btrfs_dir_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, di, &location);
/* is this a reference to our own snapshot? If so
* skip it.
*
* In contrast to old kernels, we insert the snapshot's
* dir item and dir index after it has been created, so
* we won't find a reference to our own snapshot. We
* still keep the following code for backward
* compatibility.
*/
if (location.type == BTRFS_ROOT_ITEM_KEY &&
location.objectid == root->root_key.objectid) {
over = 0;
goto skip;
}
over = !dir_emit(ctx, name_ptr, name_len,
location.objectid, d_type);
skip:
if (name_ptr != tmp_name)
kfree(name_ptr);
if (over)
goto nopos;
di_len = btrfs_dir_name_len(leaf, di) +
btrfs_dir_data_len(leaf, di) + sizeof(*di);
di_cur += di_len;
di = (struct btrfs_dir_item *)((char *)di + di_len);
}
next:
path->slots[0]++;
}
if (key_type == BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY) {
if (is_curr)
ctx->pos++;
ret = btrfs_readdir_delayed_dir_index(ctx, &ins_list);
if (ret)
goto nopos;
}
/* Reached end of directory/root. Bump pos past the last item. */
ctx->pos++;
/*
* Stop new entries from being returned after we return the last
* entry.
*
* New directory entries are assigned a strictly increasing
* offset. This means that new entries created during readdir
* are *guaranteed* to be seen in the future by that readdir.
* This has broken buggy programs which operate on names as
* they're returned by readdir. Until we re-use freed offsets
* we have this hack to stop new entries from being returned
* under the assumption that they'll never reach this huge
* offset.
*
* This is being careful not to overflow 32bit loff_t unless the
* last entry requires it because doing so has broken 32bit apps
* in the past.
*/
if (key_type == BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY) {
if (ctx->pos >= INT_MAX)
ctx->pos = LLONG_MAX;
else
ctx->pos = INT_MAX;
}
nopos:
ret = 0;
err:
if (key_type == BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY)
btrfs_put_delayed_items(&ins_list, &del_list);
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,666 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_multicast_new_group(struct net_bridge *br,
struct net_bridge_port *port, struct br_ip *group)
{
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
int hash;
int err;
mdb = rcu_dereference_protected(br->mdb, 1);
if (!mdb) {
err = br_mdb_rehash(&br->mdb, BR_HASH_SIZE, 0);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
goto rehash;
}
hash = br_ip_hash(mdb, group);
mp = br_multicast_get_group(br, port, group, hash);
switch (PTR_ERR(mp)) {
case 0:
break;
case -EAGAIN:
rehash:
mdb = rcu_dereference_protected(br->mdb, 1);
hash = br_ip_hash(mdb, group);
break;
default:
goto out;
}
mp = kzalloc(sizeof(*mp), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (unlikely(!mp))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
mp->br = br;
mp->addr = *group;
hlist_add_head_rcu(&mp->hlist[mdb->ver], &mdb->mhash[hash]);
mdb->size++;
out:
return mp;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix some kernel warning in multicast timer
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:
#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292
this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e7cf241fa389733d41b6 (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).
Same for __br_mdb_del().
Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 30,018 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cdrom_get_next_writable(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
long *next_writable)
{
disc_information di;
track_information ti;
__u16 last_track;
int ret, ti_size;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_GENERIC_PACKET))
goto use_last_written;
ret = cdrom_get_disc_info(cdi, &di);
if (ret < 0 || ret < offsetof(typeof(di), last_track_lsb)
+ sizeof(di.last_track_lsb))
goto use_last_written;
/* if unit didn't return msb, it's zeroed by cdrom_get_disc_info */
last_track = (di.last_track_msb << 8) | di.last_track_lsb;
ti_size = cdrom_get_track_info(cdi, last_track, 1, &ti);
if (ti_size < 0 || ti_size < offsetof(typeof(ti), track_start))
goto use_last_written;
/* if this track is blank, try the previous. */
if (ti.blank) {
if (last_track == 1)
goto use_last_written;
last_track--;
ti_size = cdrom_get_track_info(cdi, last_track, 1, &ti);
if (ti_size < 0)
goto use_last_written;
}
/* if next recordable address field is valid, use it. */
if (ti.nwa_v && ti_size >= offsetof(typeof(ti), next_writable)
+ sizeof(ti.next_writable)) {
*next_writable = be32_to_cpu(ti.next_writable);
return 0;
}
use_last_written:
ret = cdrom_get_last_written(cdi, next_writable);
if (ret) {
*next_writable = 0;
return ret;
} else {
*next_writable += 7;
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Splash::scaleImageYdXd(SplashImageSource src, void *srcData,
SplashColorMode srcMode, int nComps,
GBool srcAlpha, int srcWidth, int srcHeight,
int scaledWidth, int scaledHeight,
SplashBitmap *dest) {
Guchar *lineBuf, *alphaLineBuf;
Guint *pixBuf, *alphaPixBuf;
Guint pix0, pix1, pix2;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
Guint pix3;
Guint pix[SPOT_NCOMPS+4], cp;
#endif
Guint alpha;
Guchar *destPtr, *destAlphaPtr;
int yp, yq, xp, xq, yt, y, yStep, xt, x, xStep, xx, xxa, d, d0, d1;
int i, j;
yp = srcHeight / scaledHeight;
yq = srcHeight % scaledHeight;
xp = srcWidth / scaledWidth;
xq = srcWidth % scaledWidth;
lineBuf = (Guchar *)gmallocn(srcWidth, nComps);
pixBuf = (Guint *)gmallocn(srcWidth, nComps * sizeof(int));
if (srcAlpha) {
alphaLineBuf = (Guchar *)gmalloc(srcWidth);
alphaPixBuf = (Guint *)gmallocn(srcWidth, sizeof(int));
} else {
alphaLineBuf = NULL;
alphaPixBuf = NULL;
}
yt = 0;
destPtr = dest->data;
destAlphaPtr = dest->alpha;
for (y = 0; y < scaledHeight; ++y) {
if ((yt += yq) >= scaledHeight) {
yt -= scaledHeight;
yStep = yp + 1;
} else {
yStep = yp;
}
memset(pixBuf, 0, srcWidth * nComps * sizeof(int));
if (srcAlpha) {
memset(alphaPixBuf, 0, srcWidth * sizeof(int));
}
for (i = 0; i < yStep; ++i) {
(*src)(srcData, lineBuf, alphaLineBuf);
for (j = 0; j < srcWidth * nComps; ++j) {
pixBuf[j] += lineBuf[j];
}
if (srcAlpha) {
for (j = 0; j < srcWidth; ++j) {
alphaPixBuf[j] += alphaLineBuf[j];
}
}
}
xt = 0;
d0 = (1 << 23) / (yStep * xp);
d1 = (1 << 23) / (yStep * (xp + 1));
xx = xxa = 0;
for (x = 0; x < scaledWidth; ++x) {
if ((xt += xq) >= scaledWidth) {
xt -= scaledWidth;
xStep = xp + 1;
d = d1;
} else {
xStep = xp;
d = d0;
}
switch (srcMode) {
case splashModeMono8:
pix0 = 0;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
pix0 += pixBuf[xx++];
}
pix0 = (pix0 * d) >> 23;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix0;
break;
case splashModeRGB8:
pix0 = pix1 = pix2 = 0;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
pix0 += pixBuf[xx];
pix1 += pixBuf[xx+1];
pix2 += pixBuf[xx+2];
xx += 3;
}
pix0 = (pix0 * d) >> 23;
pix1 = (pix1 * d) >> 23;
pix2 = (pix2 * d) >> 23;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix0;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix1;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix2;
break;
case splashModeXBGR8:
pix0 = pix1 = pix2 = 0;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
pix0 += pixBuf[xx];
pix1 += pixBuf[xx+1];
pix2 += pixBuf[xx+2];
xx += 4;
}
pix0 = (pix0 * d) >> 23;
pix1 = (pix1 * d) >> 23;
pix2 = (pix2 * d) >> 23;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix2;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix1;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix0;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)255;
break;
case splashModeBGR8:
pix0 = pix1 = pix2 = 0;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
pix0 += pixBuf[xx];
pix1 += pixBuf[xx+1];
pix2 += pixBuf[xx+2];
xx += 3;
}
pix0 = (pix0 * d) >> 23;
pix1 = (pix1 * d) >> 23;
pix2 = (pix2 * d) >> 23;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix2;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix1;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix0;
break;
#if SPLASH_CMYK
case splashModeCMYK8:
pix0 = pix1 = pix2 = pix3 = 0;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
pix0 += pixBuf[xx];
pix1 += pixBuf[xx+1];
pix2 += pixBuf[xx+2];
pix3 += pixBuf[xx+3];
xx += 4;
}
pix0 = (pix0 * d) >> 23;
pix1 = (pix1 * d) >> 23;
pix2 = (pix2 * d) >> 23;
pix3 = (pix3 * d) >> 23;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix0;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix1;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix2;
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix3;
break;
case splashModeDeviceN8:
for (cp = 0; cp < SPOT_NCOMPS+4; cp++)
pix[cp] = 0;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i) {
for (cp = 0; cp < SPOT_NCOMPS+4; cp++) {
pix[cp] += pixBuf[xx + cp];
}
xx += (SPOT_NCOMPS+4);
}
for (cp = 0; cp < SPOT_NCOMPS+4; cp++)
pix[cp] = (pix[cp] * d) >> 23;
for (cp = 0; cp < SPOT_NCOMPS+4; cp++)
*destPtr++ = (Guchar)pix[cp];
break;
#endif
case splashModeMono1: // mono1 is not allowed
default:
break;
}
if (srcAlpha) {
alpha = 0;
for (i = 0; i < xStep; ++i, ++xxa) {
alpha += alphaPixBuf[xxa];
}
alpha = (alpha * d) >> 23;
*destAlphaPtr++ = (Guchar)alpha;
}
}
}
gfree(alphaPixBuf);
gfree(alphaLineBuf);
gfree(pixBuf);
gfree(lineBuf);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 4,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lacks_mount (NautilusFile *file)
{
return (!file->details->mount_is_up_to_date &&
(
/* Unix mountpoint, could be a GMount */
file->details->is_mountpoint ||
/* The toplevel directory of something */
(file->details->type == G_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY &&
nautilus_file_is_self_owned (file)) ||
/* Mountable, could be a mountpoint */
(file->details->type == G_FILE_TYPE_MOUNTABLE)
)
);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,929 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ACodec::ExecutingState::submitRegularOutputBuffers() {
bool failed = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mCodec->mBuffers[kPortIndexOutput].size(); ++i) {
BufferInfo *info = &mCodec->mBuffers[kPortIndexOutput].editItemAt(i);
if (mCodec->mNativeWindow != NULL) {
if (info->mStatus != BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_US
&& info->mStatus != BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_NATIVE_WINDOW) {
ALOGE("buffers should be owned by us or the surface");
failed = true;
break;
}
if (info->mStatus == BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_NATIVE_WINDOW) {
continue;
}
} else {
if (info->mStatus != BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_US) {
ALOGE("buffers should be owned by us");
failed = true;
break;
}
}
ALOGV("[%s] calling fillBuffer %u", mCodec->mComponentName.c_str(), info->mBufferID);
info->checkWriteFence("submitRegularOutputBuffers");
status_t err = mCodec->mOMX->fillBuffer(mCodec->mNode, info->mBufferID, info->mFenceFd);
info->mFenceFd = -1;
if (err != OK) {
failed = true;
break;
}
info->mStatus = BufferInfo::OWNED_BY_COMPONENT;
}
if (failed) {
mCodec->signalError(OMX_ErrorUndefined, FAILED_TRANSACTION);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,174 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(dom_document_create_cdatasection)
{
zval *id;
xmlNode *node;
xmlDocPtr docp;
int ret, value_len;
dom_object *intern;
char *value;
if (zend_parse_method_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, getThis(), "Os", &id, dom_document_class_entry, &value, &value_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
DOM_GET_OBJ(docp, id, xmlDocPtr, intern);
node = xmlNewCDataBlock(docp, (xmlChar *) value, value_len);
if (!node) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
DOM_RET_OBJ(node, &ret, intern);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillDialogViews::ContentsPreferredSizeChanged() {
if (updates_scope_ != 0) {
needs_update_ = true;
return;
}
preferred_size_ = gfx::Size();
if (GetWidget() && delegate_ && delegate_->GetWebContents()) {
constrained_window::UpdateWebContentsModalDialogPosition(
GetWidget(),
web_modal::WebContentsModalDialogManager::FromWebContents(
delegate_->GetWebContents())->delegate()->
GetWebContentsModalDialogHost());
SetBoundsRect(bounds());
}
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 109,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: string_from_portable(int pflags)
{
static char ret[128];
*ret = '\0';
#define PAPPEND(str) { \
if (*ret != '\0') \
strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret)); \
strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret)); \
}
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ)
PAPPEND("READ")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)
PAPPEND("WRITE")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND)
PAPPEND("APPEND")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
PAPPEND("CREATE")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
PAPPEND("TRUNCATE")
if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
PAPPEND("EXCL")
return ret;
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 60,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_page_get_size (PopplerPage *page,
double *width,
double *height)
{
double page_width, page_height;
int rotate;
g_return_if_fail (POPPLER_IS_PAGE (page));
rotate = page->page->getRotate ();
if (rotate == 90 || rotate == 270) {
page_height = page->page->getCropWidth ();
page_width = page->page->getCropHeight ();
} else {
page_width = page->page->getCropWidth ();
page_height = page->page->getCropHeight ();
}
if (width != NULL)
*width = page_width;
if (height != NULL)
*height = page_height;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetShouldAddDataReductionProxyData(bool add_data) {
dispatcher_host_delegate_->set_should_add_data_reduction_proxy_data(
add_data);
}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API const char *zend_get_executed_filename(void) /* {{{ */
{
zend_execute_data *ex = EG(current_execute_data);
while (ex && (!ex->func || !ZEND_USER_CODE(ex->func->type))) {
ex = ex->prev_execute_data;
}
if (ex) {
return ZSTR_VAL(ex->func->op_array.filename);
} else {
return "[no active file]";
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Use format string
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 57,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_METHOD(PDOStatement, rowCount)
{
PHP_STMT_GET_OBJ;
RETURN_LONG(stmt->row_count);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 72,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void uas_sense(struct urb *urb, struct scsi_cmnd *cmnd)
{
struct sense_iu *sense_iu = urb->transfer_buffer;
struct scsi_device *sdev = cmnd->device;
if (urb->actual_length > 16) {
unsigned len = be16_to_cpup(&sense_iu->len);
if (len + 16 != urb->actual_length) {
int newlen = min(len + 16, urb->actual_length) - 16;
if (newlen < 0)
newlen = 0;
sdev_printk(KERN_INFO, sdev, "%s: urb length %d "
"disagrees with IU sense data length %d, "
"using %d bytes of sense data\n", __func__,
urb->actual_length, len, newlen);
len = newlen;
}
memcpy(cmnd->sense_buffer, sense_iu->sense, len);
}
cmnd->result = sense_iu->status;
}
Commit Message: USB: uas: fix bug in handling of alternate settings
The uas driver has a subtle bug in the way it handles alternate
settings. The uas_find_uas_alt_setting() routine returns an
altsetting value (the bAlternateSetting number in the descriptor), but
uas_use_uas_driver() then treats that value as an index to the
intf->altsetting array, which it isn't.
Normally this doesn't cause any problems because the various
alternate settings have bAlternateSetting values 0, 1, 2, ..., so the
value is equal to the index in the array. But this is not guaranteed,
and Andrey Konovalov used the syzkaller fuzzer with KASAN to get a
slab-out-of-bounds error by violating this assumption.
This patch fixes the bug by making uas_find_uas_alt_setting() return a
pointer to the altsetting entry rather than either the value or the
index. Pointers are less subject to misinterpretation.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
CC: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 59,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uiserver_set_fd (engine_uiserver_t uiserver, fd_type_t fd_type, const char *opt)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
char line[COMMANDLINELEN];
char *which;
iocb_data_t *iocb_data;
int dir;
switch (fd_type)
{
case INPUT_FD:
which = "INPUT";
iocb_data = &uiserver->input_cb;
break;
case OUTPUT_FD:
which = "OUTPUT";
iocb_data = &uiserver->output_cb;
break;
case MESSAGE_FD:
which = "MESSAGE";
iocb_data = &uiserver->message_cb;
break;
default:
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
}
dir = iocb_data->dir;
/* We try to short-cut the communication by giving UISERVER direct
access to the file descriptor, rather than using a pipe. */
iocb_data->server_fd = _gpgme_data_get_fd (iocb_data->data);
if (iocb_data->server_fd < 0)
{
int fds[2];
if (_gpgme_io_pipe (fds, 0) < 0)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
iocb_data->fd = dir ? fds[0] : fds[1];
iocb_data->server_fd = dir ? fds[1] : fds[0];
if (_gpgme_io_set_close_notify (iocb_data->fd,
close_notify_handler, uiserver))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
goto leave_set_fd;
}
}
err = assuan_sendfd (uiserver->assuan_ctx, iocb_data->server_fd);
if (err)
goto leave_set_fd;
_gpgme_io_close (iocb_data->server_fd);
iocb_data->server_fd = -1;
if (opt)
snprintf (line, COMMANDLINELEN, "%s FD %s", which, opt);
else
snprintf (line, COMMANDLINELEN, "%s FD", which);
err = uiserver_assuan_simple_command (uiserver->assuan_ctx, line, NULL, NULL);
leave_set_fd:
if (err)
{
_gpgme_io_close (iocb_data->fd);
iocb_data->fd = -1;
if (iocb_data->server_fd != -1)
{
_gpgme_io_close (iocb_data->server_fd);
iocb_data->server_fd = -1;
}
}
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,308 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, const char *ipasc)
{
unsigned char ipout[16];
size_t iplen;
iplen = (size_t)a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc);
if (iplen == 0)
return 0;
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, ipout, iplen);
}
Commit Message: Call strlen() if name length provided is 0, like OpenSSL does.
Issue notice by Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
ok deraadt@ jsing@
CWE ID: CWE-295 | 0 | 83,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ShouldActivate() const {
aura::WindowTreeHost* host = window_->GetHost();
if (!host)
return true;
const ui::Event* event = host->dispatcher()->current_event();
if (!event)
return true;
return is_fullscreen_;
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t release_date_show(struct device_driver *dd, char *buf)
{
return snprintf(buf, strlen(MEGASAS_RELDATE) + 2, "%s\n",
MEGASAS_RELDATE);
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_inode_buf_readahead_verify(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
xfs_inode_buf_verify(bp, true);
}
Commit Message: xfs: More robust inode extent count validation
When the inode is in extent format, it can't have more extents that
fit in the inode fork. We don't currenty check this, and so this
corruption goes unnoticed by the inode verifiers. This can lead to
crashes operating on invalid in-memory structures.
Attempts to access such a inode will now error out in the verifier
rather than allowing modification operations to proceed.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix a typedef, add some braces and breaks to shut up compiler warnings]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void callOnMainThreadFunction(WTF::MainThreadFunction function, void* context)
{
Platform::current()->mainThread()->postTask(FROM_HERE, new MainThreadTaskRunner(function, context));
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,636 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e,
const char *hookname, const char **chainname,
const char **comment, unsigned int *rulenum)
{
const struct xt_standard_target *t = (void *)ipt_get_target_c(s);
if (strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name, XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0) {
/* Head of user chain: ERROR target with chainname */
*chainname = t->target.data;
(*rulenum) = 0;
} else if (s == e) {
(*rulenum)++;
if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
t->verdict < 0 &&
unconditional(&s->ip)) {
/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
*comment = *chainname == hookname
? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
: comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_RETURN];
}
return 1;
} else
(*rulenum)++;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 167,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int g2m_load_cursor(AVCodecContext *avctx, G2MContext *c,
GetByteContext *gb)
{
int i, j, k;
uint8_t *dst;
uint32_t bits;
uint32_t cur_size, cursor_w, cursor_h, cursor_stride;
uint32_t cursor_hot_x, cursor_hot_y;
int cursor_fmt;
uint8_t *tmp;
cur_size = bytestream2_get_be32(gb);
cursor_w = bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
cursor_h = bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
cursor_hot_x = bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
cursor_hot_y = bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
cursor_fmt = bytestream2_get_byte(gb);
cursor_stride = cursor_w * 4;
if (cursor_w < 1 || cursor_w > 256 ||
cursor_h < 1 || cursor_h > 256) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid cursor dimensions %dx%d\n",
cursor_w, cursor_h);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (cursor_hot_x > cursor_w || cursor_hot_y > cursor_h) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Invalid hotspot position %d,%d\n",
cursor_hot_x, cursor_hot_y);
cursor_hot_x = FFMIN(cursor_hot_x, cursor_w - 1);
cursor_hot_y = FFMIN(cursor_hot_y, cursor_h - 1);
}
if (cur_size - 9 > bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb) ||
c->cursor_w * c->cursor_h / 4 > cur_size) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Invalid cursor data size %d/%d\n",
cur_size, bytestream2_get_bytes_left(gb));
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (cursor_fmt != 1 && cursor_fmt != 32) {
avpriv_report_missing_feature(avctx, "Cursor format %d",
cursor_fmt);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (cursor_fmt == 1 && cursor_w % 32) {
avpriv_report_missing_feature(avctx, "odd monochrome cursor width %d", cursor_w);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
tmp = av_realloc(c->cursor, cursor_stride * cursor_h);
if (!tmp) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Cannot allocate cursor buffer\n");
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
c->cursor = tmp;
c->cursor_w = cursor_w;
c->cursor_h = cursor_h;
c->cursor_hot_x = cursor_hot_x;
c->cursor_hot_y = cursor_hot_y;
c->cursor_fmt = cursor_fmt;
c->cursor_stride = cursor_stride;
dst = c->cursor;
switch (c->cursor_fmt) {
case 1: // old monochrome
for (j = 0; j < c->cursor_h; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < c->cursor_w; i += 32) {
bits = bytestream2_get_be32(gb);
for (k = 0; k < 32; k++) {
dst[0] = !!(bits & 0x80000000);
dst += 4;
bits <<= 1;
}
}
}
dst = c->cursor;
for (j = 0; j < c->cursor_h; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < c->cursor_w; i += 32) {
bits = bytestream2_get_be32(gb);
for (k = 0; k < 32; k++) {
int mask_bit = !!(bits & 0x80000000);
switch (dst[0] * 2 + mask_bit) {
case 0:
dst[0] = 0xFF; dst[1] = 0x00;
dst[2] = 0x00; dst[3] = 0x00;
break;
case 1:
dst[0] = 0xFF; dst[1] = 0xFF;
dst[2] = 0xFF; dst[3] = 0xFF;
break;
default:
dst[0] = 0x00; dst[1] = 0x00;
dst[2] = 0x00; dst[3] = 0x00;
}
dst += 4;
bits <<= 1;
}
}
}
break;
case 32: // full colour
/* skip monochrome version of the cursor and decode RGBA instead */
bytestream2_skip(gb, c->cursor_h * (FFALIGN(c->cursor_w, 32) >> 3));
for (j = 0; j < c->cursor_h; j++) {
for (i = 0; i < c->cursor_w; i++) {
int val = bytestream2_get_be32(gb);
*dst++ = val >> 0;
*dst++ = val >> 8;
*dst++ = val >> 16;
*dst++ = val >> 24;
}
}
break;
default:
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/g2meet: fix src pointer checks in kempf_decode_tile()
Fixes Ticket2842
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int do_proc_dointvec_jiffies_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
int *valp,
int write, void *data)
{
if (write) {
if (*lvalp > LONG_MAX / HZ)
return 1;
*valp = *negp ? -(*lvalp*HZ) : (*lvalp*HZ);
} else {
int val = *valp;
unsigned long lval;
if (val < 0) {
*negp = true;
lval = -(unsigned long)val;
} else {
*negp = false;
lval = (unsigned long)val;
}
*lvalp = lval / HZ;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(int) iw_write_bmp_file(struct iw_context *ctx, struct iw_iodescr *iodescr)
{
struct iwbmpwcontext wctx;
int retval=0;
struct iw_image img1;
iw_zeromem(&img1,sizeof(struct iw_image));
iw_zeromem(&wctx,sizeof(struct iwbmpwcontext));
wctx.ctx = ctx;
wctx.include_file_header = 1;
wctx.iodescr=iodescr;
iw_get_output_image(ctx,&img1);
wctx.img = &img1;
if(wctx.img->imgtype==IW_IMGTYPE_PALETTE) {
wctx.pal = iw_get_output_palette(ctx);
if(!wctx.pal) goto done;
}
iw_get_output_colorspace(ctx,&wctx.csdescr);
if(!iwbmp_write_main(&wctx)) {
iw_set_error(ctx,"BMP write failed");
goto done;
}
retval=1;
done:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CommandsIssuedQuery::CommandsIssuedQuery(
QueryManager* manager, GLenum target, int32 shm_id, uint32 shm_offset)
: Query(manager, target, shm_id, shm_offset) {
}
Commit Message: Add bounds validation to AsyncPixelTransfersCompletedQuery::End
BUG=351852
R=jbauman@chromium.org, jorgelo@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/198253002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256723 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(copy)
{
char *source, *target;
int source_len, target_len;
zval *zcontext = NULL;
php_stream_context *context;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "pp|r", &source, &source_len, &target, &target_len, &zcontext) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(source TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
context = php_stream_context_from_zval(zcontext, 0);
if (php_copy_file_ctx(source, target, 0, context TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72114 - int/size_t confusion in fread
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 52,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: crm_attr_value(xmlAttr * attr)
{
if (attr == NULL || attr->children == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return (const char *)attr->children->content;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bt_status_t btsock_l2cap_init(int handle)
{
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("btsock_l2cap_init...");
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
pth = handle;
socks = NULL;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjCONST_VALUE_1(ExecState* exec, JSValue, const Identifier&)
{
UNUSED_PARAM(exec);
return jsNumber(static_cast<int>(1));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_comm_event(struct perf_comm_event *comm_event)
{
char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
unsigned int size;
memset(comm, 0, sizeof(comm));
strlcpy(comm, comm_event->task->comm, sizeof(comm));
size = ALIGN(strlen(comm)+1, sizeof(u64));
comm_event->comm = comm;
comm_event->comm_size = size;
comm_event->event_id.header.size = sizeof(comm_event->event_id) + size;
perf_iterate_sb(perf_event_comm_output,
comm_event,
NULL);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 68,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct rtable *rt_dst_alloc(struct net_device *dev,
unsigned int flags, u16 type,
bool nopolicy, bool noxfrm, bool will_cache)
{
struct rtable *rt;
rt = dst_alloc(&ipv4_dst_ops, dev, 1, DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK,
(will_cache ? 0 : DST_HOST) |
(nopolicy ? DST_NOPOLICY : 0) |
(noxfrm ? DST_NOXFRM : 0));
if (rt) {
rt->rt_genid = rt_genid_ipv4(dev_net(dev));
rt->rt_flags = flags;
rt->rt_type = type;
rt->rt_is_input = 0;
rt->rt_iif = 0;
rt->rt_pmtu = 0;
rt->rt_gateway = 0;
rt->rt_uses_gateway = 0;
rt->rt_table_id = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rt->rt_uncached);
rt->dst.output = ip_output;
if (flags & RTCF_LOCAL)
rt->dst.input = ip_local_deliver;
}
return rt;
}
Commit Message: net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set
Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on
commit 4.13-rc5..
Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000
RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314
RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8
R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4
FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217
netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397
rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035
__sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069
SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe
R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45
28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03
<0f>
b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44
RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP:
ffff880078117010
---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]---
This patch adds a res->fi NULL check.
example run:
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0
broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo
cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch
RTNETLINK answers: No route to host
Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested")
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 62,076 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int msPostGISLayerWhichShapes(layerObj *layer, rectObj rect, int isQuery)
{
#ifdef USE_POSTGIS
msPostGISLayerInfo *layerinfo = NULL;
char *strSQL = NULL;
PGresult *pgresult = NULL;
char** layer_bind_values = (char**)msSmallMalloc(sizeof(char*) * 1000);
char* bind_value;
char* bind_key = (char*)msSmallMalloc(3);
int num_bind_values = 0;
/* try to get the first bind value */
bind_value = msLookupHashTable(&layer->bindvals, "1");
while(bind_value != NULL) {
/* put the bind value on the stack */
layer_bind_values[num_bind_values] = bind_value;
/* increment the counter */
num_bind_values++;
/* create a new lookup key */
sprintf(bind_key, "%d", num_bind_values+1);
/* get the bind_value */
bind_value = msLookupHashTable(&layer->bindvals, bind_key);
}
assert(layer != NULL);
assert(layer->layerinfo != NULL);
if (layer->debug) {
msDebug("msPostGISLayerWhichShapes called.\n");
}
/* Fill out layerinfo with our current DATA state. */
if ( msPostGISParseData(layer) != MS_SUCCESS) {
return MS_FAILURE;
}
/*
** This comes *after* parsedata, because parsedata fills in
** layer->layerinfo.
*/
layerinfo = (msPostGISLayerInfo*) layer->layerinfo;
/* Build a SQL query based on our current state. */
strSQL = msPostGISBuildSQL(layer, &rect, NULL);
if ( ! strSQL ) {
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR, "Failed to build query SQL.", "msPostGISLayerWhichShapes()");
return MS_FAILURE;
}
if (layer->debug) {
msDebug("msPostGISLayerWhichShapes query: %s\n", strSQL);
}
if(num_bind_values > 0) {
pgresult = PQexecParams(layerinfo->pgconn, strSQL, num_bind_values, NULL, (const char**)layer_bind_values, NULL, NULL, 1);
} else {
pgresult = PQexecParams(layerinfo->pgconn, strSQL,0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
/* free bind values */
free(bind_key);
free(layer_bind_values);
if ( layer->debug > 1 ) {
msDebug("msPostGISLayerWhichShapes query status: %s (%d)\n", PQresStatus(PQresultStatus(pgresult)), PQresultStatus(pgresult));
}
/* Something went wrong. */
if (!pgresult || PQresultStatus(pgresult) != PGRES_TUPLES_OK) {
if ( layer->debug ) {
msDebug("Error (%s) executing query: %s", "msPostGISLayerWhichShapes()\n", PQerrorMessage(layerinfo->pgconn), strSQL);
}
msSetError(MS_QUERYERR, "Error executing query: %s ", "msPostGISLayerWhichShapes()", PQerrorMessage(layerinfo->pgconn));
free(strSQL);
if (pgresult) {
PQclear(pgresult);
}
return MS_FAILURE;
}
if ( layer->debug ) {
msDebug("msPostGISLayerWhichShapes got %d records in result.\n", PQntuples(pgresult));
}
/* Clean any existing pgresult before storing current one. */
if(layerinfo->pgresult) PQclear(layerinfo->pgresult);
layerinfo->pgresult = pgresult;
/* Clean any existing SQL before storing current. */
if(layerinfo->sql) free(layerinfo->sql);
layerinfo->sql = strSQL;
layerinfo->rownum = 0;
return MS_SUCCESS;
#else
msSetError( MS_MISCERR,
"PostGIS support is not available.",
"msPostGISLayerWhichShapes()");
return MS_FAILURE;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
CWE ID: CWE-89 | 0 | 40,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NodeIDWrapper(AutomationInternalCustomBindings* automation_bindings,
NodeIDFunction function)
: automation_bindings_(automation_bindings), function_(function) {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MediaRecorder::MediaRecorder(ExecutionContext* context,
MediaStream* stream,
const MediaRecorderOptions* options,
ExceptionState& exception_state)
: PausableObject(context),
stream_(stream),
mime_type_(options->hasMimeType() ? options->mimeType()
: kDefaultMimeType),
stopped_(true),
audio_bits_per_second_(0),
video_bits_per_second_(0),
state_(State::kInactive),
dispatch_scheduled_event_runner_(AsyncMethodRunner<MediaRecorder>::Create(
this,
&MediaRecorder::DispatchScheduledEvent,
context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kDOMManipulation))) {
DCHECK(stream_->getTracks().size());
recorder_handler_ = Platform::Current()->CreateMediaRecorderHandler(
context->GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalMediaRealTime));
DCHECK(recorder_handler_);
if (!recorder_handler_) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"No MediaRecorder handler can be created.");
return;
}
AllocateVideoAndAudioBitrates(exception_state, context, options, stream,
&audio_bits_per_second_,
&video_bits_per_second_);
const ContentType content_type(mime_type_);
if (!recorder_handler_->Initialize(
this, stream->Descriptor(), content_type.GetType(),
content_type.Parameter("codecs"), audio_bits_per_second_,
video_bits_per_second_)) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"Failed to initialize native MediaRecorder the type provided (" +
mime_type_ + ") is not supported.");
return;
}
if (options->mimeType().IsEmpty()) {
const String actual_mime_type = recorder_handler_->ActualMimeType();
if (!actual_mime_type.IsEmpty())
mime_type_ = actual_mime_type;
}
stopped_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Check context is attached before creating MediaRecorder
Bug: 896736
Change-Id: I3ccfd2188fb15704af14c8af050e0a5667855d34
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324231
Commit-Queue: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606242}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 172,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PageCaptureSaveAsMHTMLFunction::ReturnSuccess(int64_t file_size) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
WebContents* web_contents = GetWebContents();
if (!web_contents || !render_frame_host()) {
ReturnFailure(kTabClosedError);
return;
}
int child_id = render_frame_host()->GetProcess()->GetID();
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::GetInstance()->GrantReadFile(
child_id, mhtml_path_);
std::unique_ptr<base::DictionaryValue> dict(new base::DictionaryValue());
dict->SetString("mhtmlFilePath", mhtml_path_.value());
dict->SetInteger("mhtmlFileLength", file_size);
SetResult(std::move(dict));
SendResponse(true);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int icmp_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct icmphdr *icmph;
struct rtable *rt = skb_rtable(skb);
struct net *net = dev_net(rt->dst.dev);
if (!xfrm4_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) {
struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
int nh;
if (!(sp && sp->xvec[sp->len - 1]->props.flags &
XFRM_STATE_ICMP))
goto drop;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(*icmph) + sizeof(struct iphdr)))
goto drop;
nh = skb_network_offset(skb);
skb_set_network_header(skb, sizeof(*icmph));
if (!xfrm4_policy_check_reverse(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb))
goto drop;
skb_set_network_header(skb, nh);
}
ICMP_INC_STATS_BH(net, ICMP_MIB_INMSGS);
switch (skb->ip_summed) {
case CHECKSUM_COMPLETE:
if (!csum_fold(skb->csum))
break;
/* fall through */
case CHECKSUM_NONE:
skb->csum = 0;
if (__skb_checksum_complete(skb))
goto error;
}
if (!pskb_pull(skb, sizeof(*icmph)))
goto error;
icmph = icmp_hdr(skb);
ICMPMSGIN_INC_STATS_BH(net, icmph->type);
/*
* 18 is the highest 'known' ICMP type. Anything else is a mystery
*
* RFC 1122: 3.2.2 Unknown ICMP messages types MUST be silently
* discarded.
*/
if (icmph->type > NR_ICMP_TYPES)
goto error;
/*
* Parse the ICMP message
*/
if (rt->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST)) {
/*
* RFC 1122: 3.2.2.6 An ICMP_ECHO to broadcast MAY be
* silently ignored (we let user decide with a sysctl).
* RFC 1122: 3.2.2.8 An ICMP_TIMESTAMP MAY be silently
* discarded if to broadcast/multicast.
*/
if ((icmph->type == ICMP_ECHO ||
icmph->type == ICMP_TIMESTAMP) &&
net->ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts) {
goto error;
}
if (icmph->type != ICMP_ECHO &&
icmph->type != ICMP_TIMESTAMP &&
icmph->type != ICMP_ADDRESS &&
icmph->type != ICMP_ADDRESSREPLY) {
goto error;
}
}
icmp_pointers[icmph->type].handler(skb);
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
error:
ICMP_INC_STATS_BH(net, ICMP_MIB_INERRORS);
goto drop;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: call_ready_callbacks (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
gboolean found_any;
GList *node, *next;
ReadyCallback *callback;
found_any = FALSE;
/* Check if any callbacks are satisifed and mark them for call them if they are. */
for (node = directory->details->call_when_ready_list;
node != NULL; node = next)
{
next = node->next;
callback = node->data;
if (callback->active &&
request_is_satisfied (directory, callback->file, callback->request))
{
callback->active = FALSE;
found_any = TRUE;
}
}
if (found_any)
{
schedule_call_ready_callbacks (directory);
}
return found_any;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err fecr_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
u32 i;
char *box_name;
FECReservoirBox *ptr = (FECReservoirBox *) a;
if (a->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_FIRE) {
box_name = "FILEReservoirBox";
} else {
box_name = "FECReservoirBox";
}
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, box_name, trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
for (i=0; i<ptr->nb_entries; i++) {
fprintf(trace, "<%sEntry itemID=\"%d\" symbol_count=\"%d\"/>\n", box_name, ptr->entries[i].item_id, ptr->entries[i].symbol_count);
}
if (!ptr->size) {
fprintf(trace, "<%sEntry itemID=\"\" symbol_count=\"\"/>\n", box_name);
}
gf_isom_box_dump_done(box_name, a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LiveSyncTest::ServerSupportsErrorTriggering() {
EXPECT_TRUE(server_type_ != SERVER_TYPE_UNDECIDED);
return server_type_ == LOCAL_PYTHON_SERVER;
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,184 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: INST_HANDLER (lsr) { // LSR Rd
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 1) << 4);
ESIL_A ("1,r%d,>>,", d); // 0: R=(Rd >> 1)
ESIL_A ("r%d,0x1,&,!,!,cf,=,", d); // C = Rd0
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,!,zf,=,"); // Z
ESIL_A ("0,nf,=,"); // N
ESIL_A ("nf,cf,^,vf,=,"); // V
ESIL_A ("nf,vf,^,sf,=,"); // S
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d); // Rd = R
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 82,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::handleLoadComplete(Document* document) {
postNotification(getOrCreate(document), AXObjectCache::AXLoadComplete);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OutOfProcessProxy() {}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFReadDirEntryCheckRangeSlongLong(uint32 value)
{
if (value > 0x7FFFFFFFUL)
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrRange);
else
return(TIFFReadDirEntryErrOk);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VRDisplay::OnDisconnected() {
navigator_vr_->EnqueueVREvent(VRDisplayEvent::Create(
EventTypeNames::vrdisplaydisconnect, true, false, this, "disconnect"));
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,361 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SpeechRecognitionManagerImpl::GetDelegateListener() const {
return delegate_.get() ? delegate_->GetEventListener() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct node* acquire_or_create_child_locked(
struct fuse* fuse, struct node* parent,
const char* name, const char* actual_name)
{
struct node* child = lookup_child_by_name_locked(parent, name);
if (child) {
acquire_node_locked(child);
} else {
child = create_node_locked(fuse, parent, name, actual_name);
}
return child;
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,548 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int build_assignment_string(PGconn *pg_link, smart_str *querystr, HashTable *ht, int where_cond, const char *pad, int pad_len, zend_ulong opt) /* {{{ */
{
char *tmp;
char buf[256];
zend_ulong num_idx;
zend_string *fld;
zval *val;
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_KEY_VAL(ht, num_idx, fld, val) {
if (fld == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Expects associative array for values to be inserted");
return -1;
}
if (opt & PGSQL_DML_ESCAPE) {
tmp = PGSQLescapeIdentifier(pg_link, fld->val, fld->len + 1);
smart_str_appends(querystr, tmp);
PGSQLfree(tmp);
} else {
smart_str_appendl(querystr, fld->val, fld->len);
}
if (where_cond && (Z_TYPE_P(val) == IS_TRUE || Z_TYPE_P(val) == IS_FALSE || (Z_TYPE_P(val) == IS_STRING && !strcmp(Z_STRVAL_P(val), "NULL")))) {
smart_str_appends(querystr, " IS ");
} else {
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '=');
}
switch (Z_TYPE_P(val)) {
case IS_STRING:
if (opt & PGSQL_DML_ESCAPE) {
size_t new_len;
tmp = (char *)safe_emalloc(Z_STRLEN_P(val), 2, 1);
new_len = PQescapeStringConn(pg_link, tmp, Z_STRVAL_P(val), Z_STRLEN_P(val), NULL);
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '\'');
smart_str_appendl(querystr, tmp, new_len);
smart_str_appendc(querystr, '\'');
efree(tmp);
} else {
smart_str_appendl(querystr, Z_STRVAL_P(val), Z_STRLEN_P(val));
}
break;
case IS_LONG:
smart_str_append_long(querystr, Z_LVAL_P(val));
break;
case IS_DOUBLE:
smart_str_appendl(querystr, buf, MIN(snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%F", Z_DVAL_P(val)), sizeof(buf)-1));
break;
case IS_NULL:
smart_str_appendl(querystr, "NULL", sizeof("NULL")-1);
break;
default:
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Expects scaler values. type=%d", Z_TYPE_P(val));
return -1;
}
smart_str_appendl(querystr, pad, pad_len);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
if (querystr->s) {
querystr->s->len -= pad_len;
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 5,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ndisc_send_na(struct net_device *dev, struct neighbour *neigh,
const struct in6_addr *daddr,
const struct in6_addr *solicited_addr,
bool router, bool solicited, bool override, bool inc_opt)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct in6_addr tmpaddr;
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp;
const struct in6_addr *src_addr;
struct nd_msg *msg;
int optlen = 0;
/* for anycast or proxy, solicited_addr != src_addr */
ifp = ipv6_get_ifaddr(dev_net(dev), solicited_addr, dev, 1);
if (ifp) {
src_addr = solicited_addr;
if (ifp->flags & IFA_F_OPTIMISTIC)
override = false;
inc_opt |= ifp->idev->cnf.force_tllao;
in6_ifa_put(ifp);
} else {
if (ipv6_dev_get_saddr(dev_net(dev), dev, daddr,
inet6_sk(dev_net(dev)->ipv6.ndisc_sk)->srcprefs,
&tmpaddr))
return;
src_addr = &tmpaddr;
}
if (!dev->addr_len)
inc_opt = 0;
if (inc_opt)
optlen += ndisc_opt_addr_space(dev);
skb = ndisc_alloc_skb(dev, sizeof(*msg) + optlen);
if (!skb)
return;
msg = (struct nd_msg *)skb_put(skb, sizeof(*msg));
*msg = (struct nd_msg) {
.icmph = {
.icmp6_type = NDISC_NEIGHBOUR_ADVERTISEMENT,
.icmp6_router = router,
.icmp6_solicited = solicited,
.icmp6_override = override,
},
.target = *solicited_addr,
};
if (inc_opt)
ndisc_fill_addr_option(skb, ND_OPT_TARGET_LL_ADDR,
dev->dev_addr);
ndisc_send_skb(skb, daddr, src_addr);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 43,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadItemImplDelegate::DownloadItemImplDelegate()
: count_(0) {}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderViewHostDelegate* RenderViewHostImpl::GetDelegate() const {
return delegate_;
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,201 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s)
{
struct timeval timeleft;
/* Get time left until timeout, return false if no timer running */
if (dtls1_get_timeout(s, &timeleft) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
/* Return false if timer is not expired yet */
if (timeleft.tv_sec > 0 || timeleft.tv_usec > 0) {
return 0;
}
/* Timer expired, so return true */
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int build_i2c_fw_hdr(u8 *header, const struct firmware *fw)
{
__u8 *buffer;
int buffer_size;
int i;
__u8 cs = 0;
struct ti_i2c_desc *i2c_header;
struct ti_i2c_image_header *img_header;
struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec *firmware_rec;
struct edgeport_fw_hdr *fw_hdr = (struct edgeport_fw_hdr *)fw->data;
/*
* In order to update the I2C firmware we must change the type 2 record
* to type 0xF2. This will force the UMP to come up in Boot Mode.
* Then while in boot mode, the driver will download the latest
* firmware (padded to 15.5k) into the UMP ram. And finally when the
* device comes back up in download mode the driver will cause the new
* firmware to be copied from the UMP Ram to I2C and the firmware will
* update the record type from 0xf2 to 0x02.
*/
/*
* Allocate a 15.5k buffer + 2 bytes for version number (Firmware
* Record)
*/
buffer_size = (((1024 * 16) - 512 ) +
sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec));
buffer = kmalloc(buffer_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buffer)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Set entire image of 0xffs */
memset(buffer, 0xff, buffer_size);
/* Copy version number into firmware record */
firmware_rec = (struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec *)buffer;
firmware_rec->Ver_Major = fw_hdr->major_version;
firmware_rec->Ver_Minor = fw_hdr->minor_version;
/* Pointer to fw_down memory image */
img_header = (struct ti_i2c_image_header *)&fw->data[4];
memcpy(buffer + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec),
&fw->data[4 + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_image_header)],
le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length));
for (i=0; i < buffer_size; i++) {
cs = (__u8)(cs + buffer[i]);
}
kfree(buffer);
/* Build new header */
i2c_header = (struct ti_i2c_desc *)header;
firmware_rec = (struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec*)i2c_header->Data;
i2c_header->Type = I2C_DESC_TYPE_FIRMWARE_BLANK;
i2c_header->Size = cpu_to_le16(buffer_size);
i2c_header->CheckSum = cs;
firmware_rec->Ver_Major = fw_hdr->major_version;
firmware_rec->Ver_Minor = fw_hdr->minor_version;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 0 | 66,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long GetUIntLength(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long long total, available;
int status = pReader->Length(&total, &available);
if (status < 0 || (total >= 0 && available > total))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
len = 1;
if (pos >= available)
return pos; // too few bytes available
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status != 0)
return status;
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
return 0; // success
}
Commit Message: Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 164,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void irda_discovery_timeout(u_long priv)
{
struct irda_sock *self;
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s()\n", __func__);
self = (struct irda_sock *) priv;
BUG_ON(self == NULL);
/* Nothing for the caller */
self->cachelog = NULL;
self->cachedaddr = 0;
self->errno = -ETIME;
/* Wake up process if its still waiting... */
wake_up_interruptible(&self->query_wait);
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: connection_ap_make_link(connection_t *partner,
char *address, uint16_t port,
const char *digest,
int session_group, int isolation_flags,
int use_begindir, int want_onehop)
{
entry_connection_t *conn;
connection_t *base_conn;
log_info(LD_APP,"Making internal %s tunnel to %s:%d ...",
want_onehop ? "direct" : "anonymized",
safe_str_client(address), port);
conn = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, tor_addr_family(&partner->addr));
base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
base_conn->linked = 1; /* so that we can add it safely below. */
/* populate conn->socks_request */
/* leave version at zero, so the socks_reply is empty */
conn->socks_request->socks_version = 0;
conn->socks_request->has_finished = 0; /* waiting for 'connected' */
strlcpy(conn->socks_request->address, address,
sizeof(conn->socks_request->address));
conn->socks_request->port = port;
conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT;
conn->want_onehop = want_onehop;
conn->use_begindir = use_begindir;
if (use_begindir) {
conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
conn->chosen_exit_name[0] = '$';
tor_assert(digest);
base16_encode(conn->chosen_exit_name+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
digest, DIGEST_LEN);
}
/* Populate isolation fields. */
conn->socks_request->listener_type = CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER;
conn->original_dest_address = tor_strdup(address);
conn->entry_cfg.session_group = session_group;
conn->entry_cfg.isolation_flags = isolation_flags;
base_conn->address = tor_strdup("(Tor_internal)");
tor_addr_make_unspec(&base_conn->addr);
base_conn->port = 0;
connection_link_connections(partner, base_conn);
if (connection_add(base_conn) < 0) { /* no space, forget it */
connection_free(base_conn);
return NULL;
}
base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
control_event_stream_status(conn, STREAM_EVENT_NEW, 0);
/* attaching to a dirty circuit is fine */
connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(conn);
log_info(LD_APP,"... application connection created and linked.");
return conn;
}
Commit Message: TROVE-2017-004: Fix assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_
This fixes an assertion failure in relay_send_end_cell_from_edge_() when an
origin circuit and a cpath_layer = NULL were passed.
A service rendezvous circuit could do such a thing when a malformed BEGIN cell
is received but shouldn't in the first place because the service needs to send
an END cell on the circuit for which it can not do without a cpath_layer.
Fixes #22493
Reported-by: Roger Dingledine <arma@torproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 69,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_msr_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)
{
u64 data;
u64 mcg_cap = vcpu->arch.mcg_cap;
unsigned bank_num = mcg_cap & 0xff;
switch (msr) {
case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR:
case MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE:
data = 0;
break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP:
data = vcpu->arch.mcg_cap;
break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL:
if (!(mcg_cap & MCG_CTL_P))
return 1;
data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ctl;
break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS:
data = vcpu->arch.mcg_status;
break;
default:
if (msr >= MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL &&
msr < MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL + 4 * bank_num) {
u32 offset = msr - MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL;
data = vcpu->arch.mce_banks[offset];
break;
}
return 1;
}
*pdata = data;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const MockTransaction* FindMockTransaction(const GURL& url) {
MockTransactionMap::const_iterator it = mock_transactions.find(url.spec());
if (it != mock_transactions.end())
return it->second;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arraysize(kBuiltinMockTransactions); ++i) {
if (url == GURL(kBuiltinMockTransactions[i]->url))
return kBuiltinMockTransactions[i];
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 119,320 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl* ExtensionTtsController::GetPlatformImpl() {
if (!platform_impl_)
platform_impl_ = ExtensionTtsPlatformImpl::GetInstance();
return platform_impl_;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ib_ucm_notify(struct ib_ucm_file *file,
const char __user *inbuf,
int in_len, int out_len)
{
struct ib_ucm_notify cmd;
struct ib_ucm_context *ctx;
int result;
if (copy_from_user(&cmd, inbuf, sizeof(cmd)))
return -EFAULT;
ctx = ib_ucm_ctx_get(file, cmd.id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
result = ib_cm_notify(ctx->cm_id, (enum ib_event_type) cmd.event);
ib_ucm_ctx_put(ctx);
return result;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,801 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppCacheHost* AppCacheHost::GetParentAppCacheHost() const {
DCHECK(is_for_dedicated_worker());
AppCacheBackendImpl* backend = service_->GetBackend(parent_process_id_);
return backend ? backend->GetHost(parent_host_id_) : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext4_ext_grow_indepth(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *neh;
struct buffer_head *bh;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock, goal = 0;
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es;
int err = 0;
/* Try to prepend new index to old one */
if (ext_depth(inode))
goal = ext4_idx_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(ext_inode_hdr(inode)));
if (goal > le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block)) {
flags |= EXT4_MB_HINT_TRY_GOAL;
goal--;
} else
goal = ext4_inode_to_goal_block(inode);
newblock = ext4_new_meta_blocks(handle, inode, goal, flags,
NULL, &err);
if (newblock == 0)
return err;
bh = sb_getblk_gfp(inode->i_sb, newblock, __GFP_MOVABLE | GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(!bh))
return -ENOMEM;
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err) {
unlock_buffer(bh);
goto out;
}
/* move top-level index/leaf into new block */
memmove(bh->b_data, EXT4_I(inode)->i_data,
sizeof(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data));
/* set size of new block */
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
/* old root could have indexes or leaves
* so calculate e_max right way */
if (ext_depth(inode))
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block_idx(inode, 0));
else
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block(inode, 0));
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Update top-level index: num,max,pointer */
neh = ext_inode_hdr(inode);
neh->eh_entries = cpu_to_le16(1);
ext4_idx_store_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh), newblock);
if (neh->eh_depth == 0) {
/* Root extent block becomes index block */
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_root_idx(inode, 0));
EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)->ei_block =
EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(neh)->ee_block;
}
ext_debug("new root: num %d(%d), lblock %d, ptr %llu\n",
le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_entries), le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_max),
le32_to_cpu(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)->ei_block),
ext4_idx_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)));
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out:
brelse(bh);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 169,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netif_receive_skb_internal(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int ret;
net_timestamp_check(netdev_tstamp_prequeue, skb);
if (skb_defer_rx_timestamp(skb))
return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
rcu_read_lock();
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
if (static_key_false(&rps_needed)) {
struct rps_dev_flow voidflow, *rflow = &voidflow;
int cpu = get_rps_cpu(skb->dev, skb, &rflow);
if (cpu >= 0) {
ret = enqueue_to_backlog(skb, cpu, &rflow->last_qtail);
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
}
#endif
ret = __netif_receive_skb(skb);
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,911 |
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