instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void _gdImageGd2 (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * out, int cs, int fmt)
{
int ncx, ncy, cx, cy;
int x, y, ylo, yhi, xlo, xhi;
int chunkLen;
int chunkNum = 0;
char *chunkData = NULL; /* So we can gdFree it with impunity. */
char *compData = NULL; /* So we can gdFree it with impunity. */
uLongf compLen;
int idxPos = 0;
int idxSize;
t_chunk_info *chunkIdx = NULL; /* So we can gdFree it with impunity. */
int posSave;
int bytesPerPixel = im->trueColor ? 4 : 1;
int compMax = 0;
/* Force fmt to a valid value since we don't return anything. */
if ((fmt != GD2_FMT_RAW) && (fmt != GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED)) {
fmt = im->trueColor ? GD2_FMT_TRUECOLOR_COMPRESSED : GD2_FMT_COMPRESSED;
}
if (im->trueColor) {
fmt += 2;
}
/* Make sure chunk size is valid. These are arbitrary values; 64 because it seems
* a little silly to expect performance improvements on a 64x64 bit scale, and
* 4096 because we buffer one chunk, and a 16MB buffer seems a little large - it may be
* OK for one user, but for another to read it, they require the buffer.
*/
if (cs == 0) {
cs = GD2_CHUNKSIZE;
} else if (cs < GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN) {
cs = GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MIN;
} else if (cs > GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX) {
cs = GD2_CHUNKSIZE_MAX;
}
/* Work out number of chunks. */
ncx = im->sx / cs + 1;
ncy = im->sy / cs + 1;
/* Write the standard header. */
_gd2PutHeader (im, out, cs, fmt, ncx, ncy);
if (gd2_compressed(fmt)) {
/* Work out size of buffer for compressed data, If CHUNKSIZE is large,
* then these will be large!
*/
/* The zlib notes say output buffer size should be (input size) * 1.01 * 12
* - we'll use 1.02 to be paranoid.
*/
compMax = (int)(cs * bytesPerPixel * cs * 1.02f) + 12;
/* Allocate the buffers. */
chunkData = safe_emalloc(cs * bytesPerPixel, cs, 0);
memset(chunkData, 0, cs * bytesPerPixel * cs);
if (compMax <= 0) {
goto fail;
}
compData = gdCalloc(compMax, 1);
/* Save the file position of chunk index, and allocate enough space for
* each chunk_info block .
*/
idxPos = gdTell(out);
idxSize = ncx * ncy * sizeof(t_chunk_info);
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Index size is %d", idxSize));
gdSeek(out, idxPos + idxSize);
chunkIdx = safe_emalloc(idxSize, sizeof(t_chunk_info), 0);
memset(chunkIdx, 0, idxSize * sizeof(t_chunk_info));
}
_gdPutColors (im, out);
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Size: %dx%d", im->sx, im->sy));
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Chunks: %dx%d", ncx, ncy));
for (cy = 0; (cy < ncy); cy++) {
for (cx = 0; (cx < ncx); cx++) {
ylo = cy * cs;
yhi = ylo + cs;
if (yhi > im->sy) {
yhi = im->sy;
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Processing Chunk (%dx%d), y from %d to %d", cx, cy, ylo, yhi));
chunkLen = 0;
for (y = ylo; (y < yhi); y++) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("y=%d: ",y));
xlo = cx * cs;
xhi = xlo + cs;
if (xhi > im->sx) {
xhi = im->sx;
}
if (gd2_compressed(fmt)) {
for (x = xlo; x < xhi; x++) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d...",x));
if (im->trueColor) {
int p = im->tpixels[y][x];
chunkData[chunkLen++] = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(p);
chunkData[chunkLen++] = gdTrueColorGetRed(p);
chunkData[chunkLen++] = gdTrueColorGetGreen(p);
chunkData[chunkLen++] = gdTrueColorGetBlue(p);
} else {
chunkData[chunkLen++] = im->pixels[y][x];
}
}
} else {
for (x = xlo; x < xhi; x++) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("%d, ",x));
if (im->trueColor) {
gdPutInt(im->tpixels[y][x], out);
} else {
gdPutC((unsigned char) im->pixels[y][x], out);
}
}
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("y=%d done.",y));
}
if (gd2_compressed(fmt)) {
compLen = compMax;
if (compress((unsigned char *) &compData[0], &compLen, (unsigned char *) &chunkData[0], chunkLen) != Z_OK) {
php_gd_error("Error from compressing");
} else {
chunkIdx[chunkNum].offset = gdTell(out);
chunkIdx[chunkNum++].size = compLen;
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Chunk %d size %d offset %d", chunkNum, chunkIdx[chunkNum - 1].size, chunkIdx[chunkNum - 1].offset));
if (gdPutBuf (compData, compLen, out) <= 0) {
/* Any alternate suggestions for handling this? */
php_gd_error_ex(E_WARNING, "Error %d on write", errno);
}
}
}
}
}
if (gd2_compressed(fmt)) {
/* Save the position, write the index, restore position (paranoia). */
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Seeking %d to write index", idxPos));
posSave = gdTell(out);
gdSeek(out, idxPos);
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Writing index"));
for (x = 0; x < chunkNum; x++) {
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Chunk %d size %d offset %d", x, chunkIdx[x].size, chunkIdx[x].offset));
gdPutInt(chunkIdx[x].offset, out);
gdPutInt(chunkIdx[x].size, out);
}
gdSeek(out, posSave);
}
fail:
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Freeing memory"));
if (chunkData) {
gdFree(chunkData);
}
if (compData) {
gdFree(compData);
}
if (chunkIdx) {
gdFree(chunkIdx);
}
GD2_DBG(php_gd_error("Done"));
}
Commit Message: Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned int iucv_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
poll_table *wait)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
unsigned int mask = 0;
sock_poll_wait(file, sk_sleep(sk), wait);
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_LISTEN)
return iucv_accept_poll(sk);
if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue))
mask |= POLLERR;
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
mask |= POLLRDHUP;
if (sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK)
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) ||
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_CLOSED)
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_DISCONN)
mask |= POLLIN;
if (sock_writeable(sk) && iucv_below_msglim(sk))
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND;
else
set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
return mask;
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,624 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLBodyElement* HTMLDocument::htmlBodyElement() const
{
HTMLElement* body = this->body();
return (body && body->hasTagName(bodyTag)) ? toHTMLBodyElement(body) : 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix tracking of the id attribute string if it is shared across elements.
The patch to remove AtomicStringImpl:
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&rev=154790
Exposed a lifetime issue with strings for id attributes. We simply need to use
AtomicString.
BUG=290566
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/33793004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void frag_dump_sample_flags(FILE * trace, u32 flags)
{
fprintf(trace, " SamplePadding=\"%d\" Sync=\"%d\" DegradationPriority=\"%d\" IsLeading=\"%d\" DependsOn=\"%d\" IsDependedOn=\"%d\" HasRedundancy=\"%d\"",
GF_ISOM_GET_FRAG_PAD(flags), GF_ISOM_GET_FRAG_SYNC(flags), GF_ISOM_GET_FRAG_DEG(flags),
GF_ISOM_GET_FRAG_LEAD(flags), GF_ISOM_GET_FRAG_DEPENDS(flags), GF_ISOM_GET_FRAG_DEPENDED(flags), GF_ISOM_GET_FRAG_REDUNDANT(flags));
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8Console::dirCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ConsoleHelper(info).reportCall(ConsoleAPIType::kDir);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Copy objects from debugger context to inspected context properly.
BUG=637594
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2253643002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#412436}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,295 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arcmsr_iop_message_read(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
switch (acb->adapter_type) {
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_A: {
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
writel(ARCMSR_INBOUND_DRIVER_DATA_READ_OK, ®->inbound_doorbell);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_B: {
struct MessageUnit_B *reg = acb->pmuB;
writel(ARCMSR_DRV2IOP_DATA_READ_OK, reg->drv2iop_doorbell);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_C: {
struct MessageUnit_C __iomem *reg = acb->pmuC;
writel(ARCMSR_HBCMU_DRV2IOP_DATA_READ_OK, ®->inbound_doorbell);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_D: {
struct MessageUnit_D *reg = acb->pmuD;
writel(ARCMSR_ARC1214_DRV2IOP_DATA_OUT_READ,
reg->inbound_doorbell);
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AVCodecParser* av_parser_next(AVCodecParser *p){
if(p) return p->next;
else return av_first_parser;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/parser: reset indexes on realloc failure
Fixes Ticket2982
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void sem_lock_and_putref(struct sem_array *sma)
{
ipc_lock_by_ptr(&sma->sem_perm);
ipc_rcu_putref(sma);
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 165,975 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_rtp_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "rtp ");
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
avio_wb16(pb, 0); /* Reserved */
avio_wb16(pb, 1); /* Data-reference index */
avio_wb16(pb, 1); /* Hint track version */
avio_wb16(pb, 1); /* Highest compatible version */
avio_wb32(pb, track->max_packet_size); /* Max packet size */
avio_wb32(pb, 12); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "tims");
avio_wb32(pb, track->timescale);
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_SDS( INS_ARG )
{
CUR.GS.delta_shift = (Int)args[0];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ipgre_tap_validate(struct nlattr *tb[], struct nlattr *data[])
{
__be32 daddr;
if (tb[IFLA_ADDRESS]) {
if (nla_len(tb[IFLA_ADDRESS]) != ETH_ALEN)
return -EINVAL;
if (!is_valid_ether_addr(nla_data(tb[IFLA_ADDRESS])))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
if (!data)
goto out;
if (data[IFLA_GRE_REMOTE]) {
memcpy(&daddr, nla_data(data[IFLA_GRE_REMOTE]), 4);
if (!daddr)
return -EINVAL;
}
out:
return ipgre_tunnel_validate(tb, data);
}
Commit Message: gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,497 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IDNSpoofChecker::SafeToDisplayAsUnicode(base::StringPiece16 label,
bool is_tld_ascii) {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
int32_t result =
uspoof_check(checker_, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()), nullptr, &status);
if (U_FAILURE(status) || (result & USPOOF_ALL_CHECKS))
return false;
icu::UnicodeString label_string(FALSE, label.data(),
base::checked_cast<int32_t>(label.size()));
if (deviation_characters_.containsSome(label_string))
return false;
result &= USPOOF_RESTRICTION_LEVEL_MASK;
if (result == USPOOF_ASCII)
return true;
if (result == USPOOF_SINGLE_SCRIPT_RESTRICTIVE &&
kana_letters_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string) &&
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.containsNone(label_string)) {
return !is_tld_ascii || !IsMadeOfLatinAlikeCyrillic(label_string);
}
if (non_ascii_latin_letters_.containsSome(label_string) &&
!lgc_letters_n_ascii_.containsAll(label_string))
return false;
icu::RegexMatcher* dangerous_pattern =
reinterpret_cast<icu::RegexMatcher*>(DangerousPatternTLS().Get());
if (!dangerous_pattern) {
icu::UnicodeString(
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}])"
R"([\u30ce\u30f3\u30bd\u30be])"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}\p{scx=hani}]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}\p{scx=hira}]\u30fc|^\u30fc|)"
R"([^\p{scx=kana}][\u30fd\u30fe]|^[\u30fd\u30fe]|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=kana}]+[\u3078-\u307a][\p{scx=kana}]+$|)"
R"(^[\p{scx=hira}]+[\u30d8-\u30da][\p{scx=hira}]+$|)"
R"([a-z]\u30fb|\u30fb[a-z]|)"
R"([^\p{scx=latn}\p{scx=grek}\p{scx=cyrl}][\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"(\u0131[\u0300-\u0339]|)"
R"([ijl]\u0307)",
-1, US_INV),
0, status);
DangerousPatternTLS().Set(dangerous_pattern);
}
dangerous_pattern->reset(label_string);
return !dangerous_pattern->find();
}
Commit Message: Add a few more confusability mapping entries
U+0153(œ) => ce
U+00E6(æ), U+04D5 (ӕ) => ae
U+0499(ҙ) => 3
U+0525(ԥ) => n
Bug: 835554, 826019, 836885
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: Ic89211f70359d3d67cc25c1805b426b72cdb16ae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1055894
Commit-Queue: Jungshik Shin <jshin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#558928}
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,157 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t hci_uart_tty_write(struct tty_struct *tty, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *data, size_t count)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()
task A: task B:
hci_uart_set_proto flush_to_ldisc
- p->open(hu) -> h5_open //alloc h5 - receive_buf
- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}
It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is
a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in
hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting
HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev()
return success.
Reported-by: syzbot+899a33dc0fa0dbaf06a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jcline@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int index_no_dups(void **old, void *new)
{
const git_index_entry *entry = new;
GIT_UNUSED(old);
giterr_set(GITERR_INDEX, "'%s' appears multiple times at stage %d",
entry->path, GIT_IDXENTRY_STAGE(entry));
return GIT_EEXISTS;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 83,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int WriteFile(const FilePath& filename, const char* data, int size) {
base::ThreadRestrictions::AssertIOAllowed();
int fd = HANDLE_EINTR(creat(filename.value().c_str(), 0666));
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
int bytes_written = WriteFileDescriptor(fd, data, size);
if (int ret = HANDLE_EINTR(close(fd)) < 0)
return ret;
return bytes_written;
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 115,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ocfs2_is_io_unaligned(struct inode *inode, size_t count, loff_t pos)
{
int blockmask = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - 1;
loff_t final_size = pos + count;
if ((pos & blockmask) || (final_size & blockmask))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 85,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int fz_colorspace_is_subtractive(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs)
{
return cs && (cs->type == FZ_COLORSPACE_CMYK || cs->type == FZ_COLORSPACE_SEPARATION);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void acculumateArrayBuffersForAllWorlds(v8::Isolate* isolate, DOMArrayBuffer* object, Vector<v8::Local<v8::ArrayBuffer>, 4>& buffers)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
Vector<RefPtr<DOMWrapperWorld>> worlds;
DOMWrapperWorld::allWorldsInMainThread(worlds);
for (size_t i = 0; i < worlds.size(); i++) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> wrapper = worlds[i]->domDataStore().get(object, isolate);
if (!wrapper.IsEmpty())
buffers.append(v8::Local<v8::ArrayBuffer>::Cast(wrapper));
}
} else {
v8::Local<v8::Object> wrapper = DOMWrapperWorld::current(isolate).domDataStore().get(object, isolate);
if (!wrapper.IsEmpty())
buffers.append(v8::Local<v8::ArrayBuffer>::Cast(wrapper));
}
}
Commit Message: When we can't neuter ArrayBuffers, we can't transfer them
Instead, we need to copy
BUG=603987
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1904913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388719}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rds_ib_xmit(struct rds_connection *conn, struct rds_message *rm,
unsigned int hdr_off, unsigned int sg, unsigned int off)
{
struct rds_ib_connection *ic = conn->c_transport_data;
struct ib_device *dev = ic->i_cm_id->device;
struct rds_ib_send_work *send = NULL;
struct rds_ib_send_work *first;
struct rds_ib_send_work *prev;
struct ib_send_wr *failed_wr;
struct scatterlist *scat;
u32 pos;
u32 i;
u32 work_alloc;
u32 credit_alloc = 0;
u32 posted;
u32 adv_credits = 0;
int send_flags = 0;
int bytes_sent = 0;
int ret;
int flow_controlled = 0;
int nr_sig = 0;
BUG_ON(off % RDS_FRAG_SIZE);
BUG_ON(hdr_off != 0 && hdr_off != sizeof(struct rds_header));
/* Do not send cong updates to IB loopback */
if (conn->c_loopback
&& rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_flags & RDS_FLAG_CONG_BITMAP) {
rds_cong_map_updated(conn->c_fcong, ~(u64) 0);
return sizeof(struct rds_header) + RDS_CONG_MAP_BYTES;
}
/* FIXME we may overallocate here */
if (be32_to_cpu(rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_len) == 0)
i = 1;
else
i = ceil(be32_to_cpu(rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_len), RDS_FRAG_SIZE);
work_alloc = rds_ib_ring_alloc(&ic->i_send_ring, i, &pos);
if (work_alloc == 0) {
set_bit(RDS_LL_SEND_FULL, &conn->c_flags);
rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_tx_ring_full);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
if (ic->i_flowctl) {
credit_alloc = rds_ib_send_grab_credits(ic, work_alloc, &posted, 0, RDS_MAX_ADV_CREDIT);
adv_credits += posted;
if (credit_alloc < work_alloc) {
rds_ib_ring_unalloc(&ic->i_send_ring, work_alloc - credit_alloc);
work_alloc = credit_alloc;
flow_controlled = 1;
}
if (work_alloc == 0) {
set_bit(RDS_LL_SEND_FULL, &conn->c_flags);
rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_tx_throttle);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
}
/* map the message the first time we see it */
if (!ic->i_data_op) {
if (rm->data.op_nents) {
rm->data.op_count = ib_dma_map_sg(dev,
rm->data.op_sg,
rm->data.op_nents,
DMA_TO_DEVICE);
rdsdebug("ic %p mapping rm %p: %d\n", ic, rm, rm->data.op_count);
if (rm->data.op_count == 0) {
rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_tx_sg_mapping_failure);
rds_ib_ring_unalloc(&ic->i_send_ring, work_alloc);
ret = -ENOMEM; /* XXX ? */
goto out;
}
} else {
rm->data.op_count = 0;
}
rds_message_addref(rm);
ic->i_data_op = &rm->data;
/* Finalize the header */
if (test_bit(RDS_MSG_ACK_REQUIRED, &rm->m_flags))
rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_flags |= RDS_FLAG_ACK_REQUIRED;
if (test_bit(RDS_MSG_RETRANSMITTED, &rm->m_flags))
rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_flags |= RDS_FLAG_RETRANSMITTED;
/* If it has a RDMA op, tell the peer we did it. This is
* used by the peer to release use-once RDMA MRs. */
if (rm->rdma.op_active) {
struct rds_ext_header_rdma ext_hdr;
ext_hdr.h_rdma_rkey = cpu_to_be32(rm->rdma.op_rkey);
rds_message_add_extension(&rm->m_inc.i_hdr,
RDS_EXTHDR_RDMA, &ext_hdr, sizeof(ext_hdr));
}
if (rm->m_rdma_cookie) {
rds_message_add_rdma_dest_extension(&rm->m_inc.i_hdr,
rds_rdma_cookie_key(rm->m_rdma_cookie),
rds_rdma_cookie_offset(rm->m_rdma_cookie));
}
/* Note - rds_ib_piggyb_ack clears the ACK_REQUIRED bit, so
* we should not do this unless we have a chance of at least
* sticking the header into the send ring. Which is why we
* should call rds_ib_ring_alloc first. */
rm->m_inc.i_hdr.h_ack = cpu_to_be64(rds_ib_piggyb_ack(ic));
rds_message_make_checksum(&rm->m_inc.i_hdr);
/*
* Update adv_credits since we reset the ACK_REQUIRED bit.
*/
if (ic->i_flowctl) {
rds_ib_send_grab_credits(ic, 0, &posted, 1, RDS_MAX_ADV_CREDIT - adv_credits);
adv_credits += posted;
BUG_ON(adv_credits > 255);
}
}
/* Sometimes you want to put a fence between an RDMA
* READ and the following SEND.
* We could either do this all the time
* or when requested by the user. Right now, we let
* the application choose.
*/
if (rm->rdma.op_active && rm->rdma.op_fence)
send_flags = IB_SEND_FENCE;
/* Each frag gets a header. Msgs may be 0 bytes */
send = &ic->i_sends[pos];
first = send;
prev = NULL;
scat = &ic->i_data_op->op_sg[sg];
i = 0;
do {
unsigned int len = 0;
/* Set up the header */
send->s_wr.send_flags = send_flags;
send->s_wr.opcode = IB_WR_SEND;
send->s_wr.num_sge = 1;
send->s_wr.next = NULL;
send->s_queued = jiffies;
send->s_op = NULL;
send->s_sge[0].addr = ic->i_send_hdrs_dma
+ (pos * sizeof(struct rds_header));
send->s_sge[0].length = sizeof(struct rds_header);
memcpy(&ic->i_send_hdrs[pos], &rm->m_inc.i_hdr, sizeof(struct rds_header));
/* Set up the data, if present */
if (i < work_alloc
&& scat != &rm->data.op_sg[rm->data.op_count]) {
len = min(RDS_FRAG_SIZE, ib_sg_dma_len(dev, scat) - off);
send->s_wr.num_sge = 2;
send->s_sge[1].addr = ib_sg_dma_address(dev, scat) + off;
send->s_sge[1].length = len;
bytes_sent += len;
off += len;
if (off == ib_sg_dma_len(dev, scat)) {
scat++;
off = 0;
}
}
rds_ib_set_wr_signal_state(ic, send, 0);
/*
* Always signal the last one if we're stopping due to flow control.
*/
if (ic->i_flowctl && flow_controlled && i == (work_alloc-1))
send->s_wr.send_flags |= IB_SEND_SIGNALED | IB_SEND_SOLICITED;
if (send->s_wr.send_flags & IB_SEND_SIGNALED)
nr_sig++;
rdsdebug("send %p wr %p num_sge %u next %p\n", send,
&send->s_wr, send->s_wr.num_sge, send->s_wr.next);
if (ic->i_flowctl && adv_credits) {
struct rds_header *hdr = &ic->i_send_hdrs[pos];
/* add credit and redo the header checksum */
hdr->h_credit = adv_credits;
rds_message_make_checksum(hdr);
adv_credits = 0;
rds_ib_stats_inc(s_ib_tx_credit_updates);
}
if (prev)
prev->s_wr.next = &send->s_wr;
prev = send;
pos = (pos + 1) % ic->i_send_ring.w_nr;
send = &ic->i_sends[pos];
i++;
} while (i < work_alloc
&& scat != &rm->data.op_sg[rm->data.op_count]);
/* Account the RDS header in the number of bytes we sent, but just once.
* The caller has no concept of fragmentation. */
if (hdr_off == 0)
bytes_sent += sizeof(struct rds_header);
/* if we finished the message then send completion owns it */
if (scat == &rm->data.op_sg[rm->data.op_count]) {
prev->s_op = ic->i_data_op;
prev->s_wr.send_flags |= IB_SEND_SOLICITED;
ic->i_data_op = NULL;
}
/* Put back wrs & credits we didn't use */
if (i < work_alloc) {
rds_ib_ring_unalloc(&ic->i_send_ring, work_alloc - i);
work_alloc = i;
}
if (ic->i_flowctl && i < credit_alloc)
rds_ib_send_add_credits(conn, credit_alloc - i);
if (nr_sig)
atomic_add(nr_sig, &ic->i_signaled_sends);
/* XXX need to worry about failed_wr and partial sends. */
failed_wr = &first->s_wr;
ret = ib_post_send(ic->i_cm_id->qp, &first->s_wr, &failed_wr);
rdsdebug("ic %p first %p (wr %p) ret %d wr %p\n", ic,
first, &first->s_wr, ret, failed_wr);
BUG_ON(failed_wr != &first->s_wr);
if (ret) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "RDS/IB: ib_post_send to %pI4 "
"returned %d\n", &conn->c_faddr, ret);
rds_ib_ring_unalloc(&ic->i_send_ring, work_alloc);
rds_ib_sub_signaled(ic, nr_sig);
if (prev->s_op) {
ic->i_data_op = prev->s_op;
prev->s_op = NULL;
}
rds_ib_conn_error(ic->conn, "ib_post_send failed\n");
goto out;
}
ret = bytes_sent;
out:
BUG_ON(adv_credits);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: rds: prevent BUG_ON triggering on congestion map updates
Recently had this bug halt reported to me:
kernel BUG at net/rds/send.c:329!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
SMP NR_CPUS=1024 NUMA pSeries
Modules linked in: rds sunrpc ipv6 dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log ibmveth sg
ext4 jbd2 mbcache sd_mod crc_t10dif ibmvscsic scsi_transport_srp scsi_tgt
dm_mod [last unloaded: scsi_wait_scan]
NIP: d000000003ca68f4 LR: d000000003ca67fc CTR: d000000003ca8770
REGS: c000000175cab980 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (2.6.32-118.el6.ppc64)
MSR: 8000000000029032 <EE,ME,CE,IR,DR> CR: 44000022 XER: 00000000
TASK = c00000017586ec90[1896] 'krdsd' THREAD: c000000175ca8000 CPU: 0
GPR00: 0000000000000150 c000000175cabc00 d000000003cb7340 0000000000002030
GPR04: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000030 0000000000000000 0000000000000030
GPR08: 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 c0000001756b1e30 0000000000010000
GPR12: d000000003caac90 c000000000fa2500 c0000001742b2858 c0000001742b2a00
GPR16: c0000001742b2a08 c0000001742b2820 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
GPR20: 0000000000000040 c0000001742b2814 c000000175cabc70 0800000000000000
GPR24: 0000000000000004 0200000000000000 0000000000000000 c0000001742b2860
GPR28: 0000000000000000 c0000001756b1c80 d000000003cb68e8 c0000001742b27b8
NIP [d000000003ca68f4] .rds_send_xmit+0x4c4/0x8a0 [rds]
LR [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
Call Trace:
[c000000175cabc00] [d000000003ca67fc] .rds_send_xmit+0x3cc/0x8a0 [rds]
(unreliable)
[c000000175cabd30] [d000000003ca7e64] .rds_send_worker+0x54/0x100 [rds]
[c000000175cabdb0] [c0000000000b475c] .worker_thread+0x1dc/0x3c0
[c000000175cabed0] [c0000000000baa9c] .kthread+0xbc/0xd0
[c000000175cabf90] [c000000000032114] .kernel_thread+0x54/0x70
Instruction dump:
4bfffd50 60000000 60000000 39080001 935f004c f91f0040 41820024 813d017c
7d094a78 7d290074 7929d182 394a0020 <0b090000> 40e2ff68 4bffffa4 39200000
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Call Trace:
[c000000175cab560] [c000000000012e04] .show_stack+0x74/0x1c0 (unreliable)
[c000000175cab610] [c0000000005a365c] .panic+0x80/0x1b4
[c000000175cab6a0] [c00000000002fbcc] .die+0x21c/0x2a0
[c000000175cab750] [c000000000030000] ._exception+0x110/0x220
[c000000175cab910] [c000000000004b9c] program_check_common+0x11c/0x180
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 1 | 165,899 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::vertexAttrib4fv(
GLuint index,
MaybeShared<const DOMFloat32Array> v) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!v.View() || v.View()->length() < 4) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "vertexAttrib4fv", "invalid array");
return;
}
ContextGL()->VertexAttrib4fv(index, v.View()->DataMaybeShared());
SetVertexAttribType(index, kFloat32ArrayType);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __blk_end_request_all(struct request *rq, blk_status_t error)
{
bool pending;
unsigned int bidi_bytes = 0;
lockdep_assert_held(rq->q->queue_lock);
WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->q->mq_ops);
if (unlikely(blk_bidi_rq(rq)))
bidi_bytes = blk_rq_bytes(rq->next_rq);
pending = __blk_end_bidi_request(rq, error, blk_rq_bytes(rq), bidi_bytes);
BUG_ON(pending);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _gnutls_send_handshake (gnutls_session_t session, void *i_data,
uint32_t i_datasize,
gnutls_handshake_description_t type)
{
int ret;
uint8_t *data;
uint32_t datasize;
int pos = 0;
if (i_data == NULL && i_datasize == 0)
{
/* we are resuming a previously interrupted
* send.
*/
ret = _gnutls_handshake_io_write_flush (session);
return ret;
}
if (i_data == NULL && i_datasize > 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST;
}
/* first run */
datasize = i_datasize + HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE;
data = gnutls_malloc (datasize);
if (data == NULL)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR;
}
data[pos++] = (uint8_t) type;
_gnutls_write_uint24 (i_datasize, &data[pos]);
pos += 3;
if (i_datasize > 0)
memcpy (&data[pos], i_data, i_datasize);
_gnutls_handshake_log ("HSK[%x]: %s was send [%ld bytes]\n",
session, _gnutls_handshake2str (type), datasize);
/* Here we keep the handshake messages in order to hash them...
*/
if (type != GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE_HELLO_REQUEST)
if ((ret =
_gnutls_handshake_hash_add_sent (session, type, data, datasize)) < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
gnutls_free (data);
return ret;
}
session->internals.last_handshake_out = type;
ret =
_gnutls_handshake_io_send_int (session, GNUTLS_HANDSHAKE, type,
data, datasize);
gnutls_free (data);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_kmem_cache_nodes(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
int node;
for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) {
struct kmem_cache_node *n = s->node[node];
if (n && n != &s->local_node)
kmem_cache_free(kmalloc_caches, n);
s->node[node] = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,798 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fm_mgr_commong_cfg_query
(
IN p_fm_config_conx_hdlt hdl,
IN fm_mgr_type_t mgr,
IN fm_mgr_action_t action,
OUT fm_config_common_t *info,
OUT fm_msg_ret_code_t *ret_code
)
{
p_hsm_com_client_hdl_t client_hdl;
if ( (client_hdl = get_mgr_hdl(hdl,mgr)) != NULL )
{
return fm_mgr_general_query(client_hdl,action,FM_DT_COMMON,sizeof(fm_config_common_t),info,ret_code);
}
return FM_CONF_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Fix scripts and code that use well-known tmp files.
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 96,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AddResourceSizeValueByResource(void *ptr, XID id, RESTYPE type, void *cdata)
{
ConstructResourceBytesCtx *ctx = cdata;
xXResResourceIdSpec *spec = ctx->curSpec;
if ((!spec->type || spec->type == type) &&
(!spec->resource || spec->resource == id)) {
AddResourceSizeValue(ptr, id, type, ctx);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,429 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int readStatusRid(struct airo_info *ai, StatusRid *statr, int lock)
{
return PC4500_readrid(ai, RID_STATUS, statr, sizeof(*statr), lock);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys)
{
if (newkeys == NULL)
return;
if (newkeys->enc.key) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len);
free(newkeys->enc.key);
newkeys->enc.key = NULL;
}
if (newkeys->enc.iv) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
free(newkeys->enc.iv);
newkeys->enc.iv = NULL;
}
free(newkeys->enc.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc));
free(newkeys->comp.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
if (newkeys->mac.key) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len);
free(newkeys->mac.key);
newkeys->mac.key = NULL;
}
free(newkeys->mac.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac));
explicit_bzero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys));
free(newkeys);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 17,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionGlobalError::AddOrphanedExtension(const std::string& id) {
orphaned_extension_ids_->insert(id);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zval *zend_read_property(zend_class_entry *scope, zval *object, const char *name, int name_length, zend_bool silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval *property, *value;
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = scope;
if (!Z_OBJ_HT_P(object)->read_property) {
const char *class_name;
zend_uint class_name_len;
zend_get_object_classname(object, &class_name, &class_name_len TSRMLS_CC);
zend_error(E_CORE_ERROR, "Property %s of class %s cannot be read", name, class_name);
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(property);
ZVAL_STRINGL(property, name, name_length, 1);
value = Z_OBJ_HT_P(object)->read_property(object, property, silent?BP_VAR_IS:BP_VAR_R, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&property);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
return value;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,823 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_eff_addr_modrm(struct insn *insn, struct pt_regs *regs,
int *regoff, long *eff_addr)
{
long tmp;
if (insn->addr_bytes != 8 && insn->addr_bytes != 4)
return -EINVAL;
insn_get_modrm(insn);
if (!insn->modrm.nbytes)
return -EINVAL;
if (X86_MODRM_MOD(insn->modrm.value) > 2)
return -EINVAL;
*regoff = get_reg_offset(insn, regs, REG_TYPE_RM);
/*
* -EDOM means that we must ignore the address_offset. In such a case,
* in 64-bit mode the effective address relative to the rIP of the
* following instruction.
*/
if (*regoff == -EDOM) {
if (user_64bit_mode(regs))
tmp = regs->ip + insn->length;
else
tmp = 0;
} else if (*regoff < 0) {
return -EINVAL;
} else {
tmp = regs_get_register(regs, *regoff);
}
if (insn->addr_bytes == 4) {
int addr32 = (int)(tmp & 0xffffffff) + insn->displacement.value;
*eff_addr = addr32 & 0xffffffff;
} else {
*eff_addr = tmp + insn->displacement.value;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 89,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int compat_sock_ioctl_trans(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = compat_ptr(arg);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
if (cmd >= SIOCDEVPRIVATE && cmd <= (SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 15))
return compat_ifr_data_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCSIFBR:
case SIOCGIFBR:
return old_bridge_ioctl(argp);
case SIOCGIFCONF:
return compat_dev_ifconf(net, argp);
case SIOCETHTOOL:
return ethtool_ioctl(net, argp);
case SIOCWANDEV:
return compat_siocwandev(net, argp);
case SIOCGIFMAP:
case SIOCSIFMAP:
return compat_sioc_ifmap(net, cmd, argp);
case SIOCADDRT:
case SIOCDELRT:
return routing_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, argp);
case SIOCGSTAMP:
return do_siocgstamp(net, sock, cmd, argp);
case SIOCGSTAMPNS:
return do_siocgstampns(net, sock, cmd, argp);
case SIOCBONDSLAVEINFOQUERY:
case SIOCBONDINFOQUERY:
case SIOCSHWTSTAMP:
case SIOCGHWTSTAMP:
return compat_ifr_data_ioctl(net, cmd, argp);
case FIOSETOWN:
case SIOCSPGRP:
case FIOGETOWN:
case SIOCGPGRP:
case SIOCBRADDBR:
case SIOCBRDELBR:
case SIOCGIFVLAN:
case SIOCSIFVLAN:
case SIOCADDDLCI:
case SIOCDELDLCI:
case SIOCGSKNS:
return sock_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
case SIOCGIFFLAGS:
case SIOCSIFFLAGS:
case SIOCGIFMETRIC:
case SIOCSIFMETRIC:
case SIOCGIFMTU:
case SIOCSIFMTU:
case SIOCGIFMEM:
case SIOCSIFMEM:
case SIOCGIFHWADDR:
case SIOCSIFHWADDR:
case SIOCADDMULTI:
case SIOCDELMULTI:
case SIOCGIFINDEX:
case SIOCGIFADDR:
case SIOCSIFADDR:
case SIOCSIFHWBROADCAST:
case SIOCDIFADDR:
case SIOCGIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCSIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCGIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR:
case SIOCGIFNETMASK:
case SIOCSIFNETMASK:
case SIOCSIFPFLAGS:
case SIOCGIFPFLAGS:
case SIOCGIFTXQLEN:
case SIOCSIFTXQLEN:
case SIOCBRADDIF:
case SIOCBRDELIF:
case SIOCSIFNAME:
case SIOCGMIIPHY:
case SIOCGMIIREG:
case SIOCSMIIREG:
case SIOCSARP:
case SIOCGARP:
case SIOCDARP:
case SIOCATMARK:
case SIOCBONDENSLAVE:
case SIOCBONDRELEASE:
case SIOCBONDSETHWADDR:
case SIOCBONDCHANGEACTIVE:
case SIOCGIFNAME:
return sock_do_ioctl(net, sock, cmd, arg);
}
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
Commit Message: socket: close race condition between sock_close() and sockfs_setattr()
fchownat() doesn't even hold refcnt of fd until it figures out
fd is really needed (otherwise is ignored) and releases it after
it resolves the path. This means sock_close() could race with
sockfs_setattr(), which leads to a NULL pointer dereference
since typically we set sock->sk to NULL in ->release().
As pointed out by Al, this is unique to sockfs. So we can fix this
in socket layer by acquiring inode_lock in sock_close() and
checking against NULL in sockfs_setattr().
sock_release() is called in many places, only the sock_close()
path matters here. And fortunately, this should not affect normal
sock_close() as it is only called when the last fd refcnt is gone.
It only affects sock_close() with a parallel sockfs_setattr() in
progress, which is not common.
Fixes: 86741ec25462 ("net: core: Add a UID field to struct sock.")
Reported-by: shankarapailoor <shankarapailoor@gmail.com>
Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 82,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data(struct address_space *mapping,
struct inode *inode, loff_t pos,
unsigned len, struct page *mmap_page,
struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc)
{
int ret, written = 0;
loff_t end = pos + len;
struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
struct ocfs2_dinode *di = NULL;
trace_ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data((unsigned long long)oi->ip_blkno,
len, (unsigned long long)pos,
oi->ip_dyn_features);
/*
* Handle inodes which already have inline data 1st.
*/
if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL) {
if (mmap_page == NULL &&
ocfs2_size_fits_inline_data(wc->w_di_bh, end))
goto do_inline_write;
/*
* The write won't fit - we have to give this inode an
* inline extent list now.
*/
ret = ocfs2_convert_inline_data_to_extents(inode, wc->w_di_bh);
if (ret)
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
/*
* Check whether the inode can accept inline data.
*/
if (oi->ip_clusters != 0 || i_size_read(inode) != 0)
return 0;
/*
* Check whether the write can fit.
*/
di = (struct ocfs2_dinode *)wc->w_di_bh->b_data;
if (mmap_page ||
end > ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(inode->i_sb, di))
return 0;
do_inline_write:
ret = ocfs2_write_begin_inline(mapping, inode, wc);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
/*
* This signals to the caller that the data can be written
* inline.
*/
written = 1;
out:
return written ? written : ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init blowfish_mod_init(void)
{
return crypto_register_alg(&alg);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::ReflectLongAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_reflectLongAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::ReflectLongAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int decode_getacl(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct rpc_rqst *req,
size_t *acl_len)
{
__be32 *savep;
uint32_t attrlen,
bitmap[3] = {0};
struct kvec *iov = req->rq_rcv_buf.head;
int status;
*acl_len = 0;
if ((status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_GETATTR)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_bitmap(xdr, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((status = decode_attr_length(xdr, &attrlen, &savep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(bitmap[0] & (FATTR4_WORD0_ACL - 1U)))
return -EIO;
if (likely(bitmap[0] & FATTR4_WORD0_ACL)) {
size_t hdrlen;
u32 recvd;
/* We ignore &savep and don't do consistency checks on
* the attr length. Let userspace figure it out.... */
hdrlen = (u8 *)xdr->p - (u8 *)iov->iov_base;
recvd = req->rq_rcv_buf.len - hdrlen;
if (attrlen > recvd) {
dprintk("NFS: server cheating in getattr"
" acl reply: attrlen %u > recvd %u\n",
attrlen, recvd);
return -EINVAL;
}
xdr_read_pages(xdr, attrlen);
*acl_len = attrlen;
} else
status = -EOPNOTSUPP;
out:
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 165,719 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, int *len, int *al)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
size_t enclen;
unsigned char *pms = NULL;
size_t pmslen = 0;
if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
/*
* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
if (pms == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
q = *p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
*p += 2;
pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
|| EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, *p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
*len = enclen;
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
pctx = NULL;
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
(*p)[1]++;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
tmp_buf[0] = 0x70;
# endif
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
s2n(*len, q);
*len += 2;
}
s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
return 0;
#else
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fix missing NULL checks in CKE processing
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BitStack::push(bool bit)
{
unsigned index = m_size / bitsInWord;
unsigned shift = m_size & bitInWordMask;
if (!shift && index == m_words.size()) {
m_words.grow(index + 1);
m_words[index] = 0;
}
unsigned& word = m_words[index];
unsigned mask = 1U << shift;
if (bit)
word |= mask;
else
word &= ~mask;
++m_size;
}
Commit Message: Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
R=inferno@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_ROLL( FT_Long* args )
{
FT_Long A, B, C;
A = args[2];
B = args[1];
C = args[0];
args[2] = C;
args[1] = A;
args[0] = B;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,649 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::SetCachedBackgroundColor(SkColor color) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void md4_transform(u32 *hash, u32 const *in)
{
u32 a, b, c, d;
a = hash[0];
b = hash[1];
c = hash[2];
d = hash[3];
ROUND1(a, b, c, d, in[0], 3);
ROUND1(d, a, b, c, in[1], 7);
ROUND1(c, d, a, b, in[2], 11);
ROUND1(b, c, d, a, in[3], 19);
ROUND1(a, b, c, d, in[4], 3);
ROUND1(d, a, b, c, in[5], 7);
ROUND1(c, d, a, b, in[6], 11);
ROUND1(b, c, d, a, in[7], 19);
ROUND1(a, b, c, d, in[8], 3);
ROUND1(d, a, b, c, in[9], 7);
ROUND1(c, d, a, b, in[10], 11);
ROUND1(b, c, d, a, in[11], 19);
ROUND1(a, b, c, d, in[12], 3);
ROUND1(d, a, b, c, in[13], 7);
ROUND1(c, d, a, b, in[14], 11);
ROUND1(b, c, d, a, in[15], 19);
ROUND2(a, b, c, d,in[ 0], 3);
ROUND2(d, a, b, c, in[4], 5);
ROUND2(c, d, a, b, in[8], 9);
ROUND2(b, c, d, a, in[12], 13);
ROUND2(a, b, c, d, in[1], 3);
ROUND2(d, a, b, c, in[5], 5);
ROUND2(c, d, a, b, in[9], 9);
ROUND2(b, c, d, a, in[13], 13);
ROUND2(a, b, c, d, in[2], 3);
ROUND2(d, a, b, c, in[6], 5);
ROUND2(c, d, a, b, in[10], 9);
ROUND2(b, c, d, a, in[14], 13);
ROUND2(a, b, c, d, in[3], 3);
ROUND2(d, a, b, c, in[7], 5);
ROUND2(c, d, a, b, in[11], 9);
ROUND2(b, c, d, a, in[15], 13);
ROUND3(a, b, c, d,in[ 0], 3);
ROUND3(d, a, b, c, in[8], 9);
ROUND3(c, d, a, b, in[4], 11);
ROUND3(b, c, d, a, in[12], 15);
ROUND3(a, b, c, d, in[2], 3);
ROUND3(d, a, b, c, in[10], 9);
ROUND3(c, d, a, b, in[6], 11);
ROUND3(b, c, d, a, in[14], 15);
ROUND3(a, b, c, d, in[1], 3);
ROUND3(d, a, b, c, in[9], 9);
ROUND3(c, d, a, b, in[5], 11);
ROUND3(b, c, d, a, in[13], 15);
ROUND3(a, b, c, d, in[3], 3);
ROUND3(d, a, b, c, in[11], 9);
ROUND3(c, d, a, b, in[7], 11);
ROUND3(b, c, d, a, in[15], 15);
hash[0] += a;
hash[1] += b;
hash[2] += c;
hash[3] += d;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: getname_kernel(const char * filename)
{
struct filename *result;
char *kname;
int len;
len = strlen(filename);
if (len >= EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX)
return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
result = __getname();
if (unlikely(!result))
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
kname = (char *)result + sizeof(*result);
result->name = kname;
result->uptr = NULL;
result->aname = NULL;
result->separate = false;
strlcpy(kname, filename, EMBEDDED_NAME_MAX);
return result;
}
Commit Message: fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 36,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OomInterventionImpl::Check(TimerBase*) {
DCHECK(host_);
OomInterventionMetrics current_memory = GetCurrentMemoryMetrics();
bool oom_detected = false;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->blink_workload_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_blink_usage_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->blink_workload_threshold;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->private_footprint_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_private_footprint_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->private_footprint_threshold;
oom_detected |=
detection_args_->swap_threshold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_swap_kb * 1024 > detection_args_->swap_threshold;
oom_detected |= detection_args_->virtual_memory_thresold > 0 &&
current_memory.current_vm_size_kb * 1024 >
detection_args_->virtual_memory_thresold;
ReportMemoryStats(current_memory);
if (oom_detected) {
if (navigate_ads_enabled_) {
for (const auto& page : Page::OrdinaryPages()) {
if (page->MainFrame()->IsLocalFrame()) {
ToLocalFrame(page->MainFrame())
->GetDocument()
->NavigateLocalAdsFrames();
}
}
}
if (renderer_pause_enabled_) {
pauser_.reset(new ScopedPagePauser);
}
host_->OnHighMemoryUsage();
timer_.Stop();
V8GCForContextDispose::Instance().SetForcePageNavigationGC();
}
}
Commit Message: OomIntervention opt-out should work properly with 'show original'
OomIntervention should not be re-triggered on the same page if the user declines the intervention once.
This CL fixes the bug.
Bug: 889131, 887119
Change-Id: Idb9eebb2bb9f79756b63f0e010fe018ba5c490e8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245019
Commit-Queue: Yuzu Saijo <yuzus@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594574}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 172,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hardware_enable_all(void)
{
int r = 0;
raw_spin_lock(&kvm_count_lock);
kvm_usage_count++;
if (kvm_usage_count == 1) {
atomic_set(&hardware_enable_failed, 0);
on_each_cpu(hardware_enable_nolock, NULL, 1);
if (atomic_read(&hardware_enable_failed)) {
hardware_disable_all_nolock();
r = -EBUSY;
}
}
raw_spin_unlock(&kvm_count_lock);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 29,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CL_startMultiplayer_f( void ) {
char binName[MAX_OSPATH];
#if defined(_WIN64) || defined(__WIN64__)
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "ioWolfMP." ARCH_STRING ".exe");
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#elif defined(_WIN32) || defined(__WIN32__)
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "ioWolfMP." ARCH_STRING ".exe");
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#elif defined(__i386__) && (!defined(_WIN32) || !defined(__WIN32__))
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "./iowolfmp." BIN_STRING );
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#else
Com_sprintf(binName, sizeof(binName), "./iowolfmp." ARCH_STRING );
Sys_StartProcess( binName, qtrue );
#endif
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String Resource::ReasonNotDeletable() const {
StringBuilder builder;
if (HasClientsOrObservers()) {
builder.Append("hasClients(");
builder.AppendNumber(clients_.size());
if (!clients_awaiting_callback_.IsEmpty()) {
builder.Append(", AwaitingCallback=");
builder.AppendNumber(clients_awaiting_callback_.size());
}
if (!finished_clients_.IsEmpty()) {
builder.Append(", Finished=");
builder.AppendNumber(finished_clients_.size());
}
builder.Append(')');
}
if (loader_) {
if (!builder.IsEmpty())
builder.Append(' ');
builder.Append("loader_");
}
if (IsMainThread() && GetMemoryCache()->Contains(this)) {
if (!builder.IsEmpty())
builder.Append(' ');
builder.Append("in_memory_cache");
}
return builder.ToString();
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 149,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::CallModuleMethod(
const std::string& module_name,
const std::string& method_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Value> no_args;
return handle_scope.Escape(
CallModuleMethod(module_name, method_name, 0, &no_args));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 133,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GraphicsContext::setAlpha(float alpha)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
platformContext()->setAlpha(alpha);
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 107,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DeleteFont(struct _FPDF_SYSFONTINFO*, void* font_id) {
long res_id = reinterpret_cast<long>(font_id);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->ReleaseResource(res_id);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int loosened_object_can_be_discarded(const unsigned char *sha1,
unsigned long mtime)
{
if (!unpack_unreachable_expiration)
return 0;
if (mtime > unpack_unreachable_expiration)
return 0;
if (sha1_array_lookup(&recent_objects, sha1) >= 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: handle_pap(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
u_int code, len;
int peerid_len, passwd_len, msg_len;
const u_char *p0;
int i;
p0 = p;
if (length < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pap]"));
return;
} else if (length < 4) {
ND_TCHECK(*p);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pap 0x%02x]", *p));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK(*p);
code = *p;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "PAP, %s (0x%02x)",
tok2str(papcode_values, "unknown", code),
code));
p++;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", id %u", *p)); /* ID */
p++;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, 2);
len = EXTRACT_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
if ((int)len > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u > packet size", len));
return;
}
length = len;
if (length < (p - p0)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u < PAP header length", length));
return;
}
switch (code) {
case PAP_AREQ:
if (length - (p - p0) < 1)
return;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
peerid_len = *p; /* Peer-ID Length */
p++;
if (length - (p - p0) < peerid_len)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Peer "));
for (i = 0; i < peerid_len; i++) {
ND_TCHECK(*p);
safeputchar(ndo, *p++);
}
if (length - (p - p0) < 1)
return;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
passwd_len = *p; /* Password Length */
p++;
if (length - (p - p0) < passwd_len)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Name "));
for (i = 0; i < passwd_len; i++) {
ND_TCHECK(*p);
safeputchar(ndo, *p++);
}
break;
case PAP_AACK:
case PAP_ANAK:
if (length - (p - p0) < 1)
return;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
msg_len = *p; /* Msg-Length */
p++;
if (length - (p - p0) < msg_len)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Msg "));
for (i = 0; i< msg_len; i++) {
ND_TCHECK(*p);
safeputchar(ndo, *p++);
}
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pap]"));
}
Commit Message: Do bounds checking when unescaping PPP.
Clean up a const issue while we're at it.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 35,433 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ext4_blkdev_put(struct block_device *bdev)
{
blkdev_put(bdev, FMODE_READ|FMODE_WRITE|FMODE_EXCL);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ReflectLongAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
V8SetReturnValueInt(info, impl->GetIntegralAttribute(html_names::kReflectlongattributeAttr));
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void hb_waiters_inc(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
atomic_inc(&hb->waiters);
/*
* Full barrier (A), see the ordering comment above.
*/
smp_mb__after_atomic();
#endif
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 84,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: person_get_visible(const person_t* person)
{
return person->is_visible;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int set_user_trap(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long trap)
{
task->thread.regs->trap = trap & 0xfff0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline ssize_t WritePSDOffset(const PSDInfo *psd_info,Image *image,
const MagickSizeType size,const MagickOffsetType offset)
{
MagickOffsetType
current_offset;
ssize_t
result;
current_offset=TellBlob(image);
(void) SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
if (psd_info->version == 1)
result=WriteBlobMSBShort(image,(unsigned short) size);
else
result=WriteBlobMSBLong(image,(unsigned int) size);
(void) SeekBlob(image,current_offset,SEEK_SET);
return(result);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 91,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool OneClickSigninHelper::OnMessageReceived(const IPC::Message& message) {
bool handled = true;
IPC_BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(OneClickSigninHelper, message)
IPC_MESSAGE_HANDLER(OneClickSigninHostMsg_FormSubmitted, OnFormSubmitted)
IPC_MESSAGE_UNHANDLED(handled = false)
IPC_END_MESSAGE_MAP()
return handled;
}
Commit Message: Display confirmation dialog for untrusted signins
BUG=252062
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17482002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@208520 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 112,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebUI* WebContentsImpl::GetWebUI() const {
WebUI* commited_web_ui = GetCommittedWebUI();
return commited_web_ui ? commited_web_ui
: GetRenderManager()->GetNavigatingWebUI();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadUncompressedRGB(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
x, y;
unsigned short
color;
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 8)
(void) SetImageType(image,GrayscaleType);
else if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16 && !IsBitMask(
dds_info->pixelformat,0xf800,0x07e0,0x001f,0x0000))
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported",
image->filename);
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y++)
{
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, 0, y, dds_info->width, 1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x++)
{
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 8)
SetPixelGray(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ReadBlobByte(image)));
else if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16)
{
color=ReadBlobShort(image);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(((color >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 5) >> 10)/63.0)*255)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 11) >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
}
else
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 32)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
SetPixelAlpha(q,QuantumRange);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
SkipRGBMipmaps(image, dds_info, 3);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 168,902 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void handle_rc_metamsg_rsp(tBTA_AV_META_MSG *pmeta_msg)
{
tAVRC_RESPONSE avrc_response = {0};
UINT8 scratch_buf[512] = {0};
tAVRC_STS status = BT_STATUS_UNSUPPORTED;
if(AVRC_OP_VENDOR==pmeta_msg->p_msg->hdr.opcode &&(AVRC_RSP_CHANGED==pmeta_msg->code
|| AVRC_RSP_INTERIM==pmeta_msg->code || AVRC_RSP_ACCEPT==pmeta_msg->code
|| AVRC_RSP_REJ==pmeta_msg->code || AVRC_RSP_NOT_IMPL==pmeta_msg->code))
{
status=AVRC_ParsResponse(pmeta_msg->p_msg, &avrc_response, scratch_buf, sizeof(scratch_buf));
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: code %d,event ID %d,PDU %x,parsing status %d, label:%d",
__FUNCTION__,pmeta_msg->code,avrc_response.reg_notif.event_id,avrc_response.reg_notif.pdu,
status, pmeta_msg->label);
if (status != AVRC_STS_NO_ERROR)
{
if(AVRC_PDU_REGISTER_NOTIFICATION==avrc_response.rsp.pdu
&& AVRC_EVT_VOLUME_CHANGE==avrc_response.reg_notif.event_id
&& btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label==pmeta_msg->label)
{
btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label=MAX_LABEL;
release_transaction(btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label);
}
else if(AVRC_PDU_SET_ABSOLUTE_VOLUME==avrc_response.rsp.pdu)
{
release_transaction(pmeta_msg->label);
}
return;
}
else if(AVRC_PDU_REGISTER_NOTIFICATION==avrc_response.rsp.pdu
&& AVRC_EVT_VOLUME_CHANGE==avrc_response.reg_notif.event_id
&& btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label!=pmeta_msg->label)
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s:Discarding register notfn in rsp.code: %d and label %d",
__FUNCTION__, pmeta_msg->code, pmeta_msg->label);
return;
}
}
else
{
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s:Received vendor dependent in adv ctrl rsp. code: %d len: %d. Not processing it.",
__FUNCTION__, pmeta_msg->code, pmeta_msg->len);
return;
}
if(AVRC_PDU_REGISTER_NOTIFICATION==avrc_response.rsp.pdu
&& AVRC_EVT_VOLUME_CHANGE==avrc_response.reg_notif.event_id
&& AVRC_RSP_CHANGED==pmeta_msg->code)
{
/* re-register for volume change notification */
register_volumechange(btif_rc_cb.rc_vol_label);
}
else if(AVRC_PDU_SET_ABSOLUTE_VOLUME==avrc_response.rsp.pdu)
{
/* free up the label here */
release_transaction(pmeta_msg->label);
}
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s: Passing received metamsg response to app. pdu: %s",
__FUNCTION__, dump_rc_pdu(avrc_response.pdu));
btif_rc_upstreams_rsp_evt((uint16_t)avrc_response.rsp.pdu, &avrc_response, pmeta_msg->code,
pmeta_msg->label);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UnmuteIfMutedByExtension(content::WebContents* contents,
const std::string& extension_id) {
LastMuteMetadata::CreateForWebContents(contents); // Ensures metadata exists.
LastMuteMetadata* const metadata =
LastMuteMetadata::FromWebContents(contents);
if (metadata->reason == TabMutedReason::EXTENSION &&
metadata->extension_id == extension_id) {
SetTabAudioMuted(contents, false, TabMutedReason::EXTENSION, extension_id);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix nullptr crash in IsSiteMuted
This CL adds a nullptr check in IsSiteMuted to prevent a crash on Mac.
Bug: 797647
Change-Id: Ic36f0fb39f2dbdf49d2bec9e548a4a6e339dc9a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/848245
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuri Wiitala <miu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tommy Steimel <steimel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526825}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,911 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WorkerThread::didLeaveNestedLoop()
{
InspectorInstrumentation::didLeaveNestedRunLoop(m_workerGlobalScope.get());
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,601 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mailimf_cparenth_parse(const char * message, size_t length,
size_t * indx)
{
return mailimf_char_parse(message, length, indx, ')');
}
Commit Message: Fixed crash #274
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 66,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoRequestExtensionCHROMIUM(
const char* extension) {
api()->glRequestExtensionANGLEFn(extension);
FlushErrors();
context_->ReinitializeDynamicBindings();
feature_info_->Initialize(
feature_info_->context_type(), true /* is_passthrough_cmd_decoder */,
feature_info_->disallowed_features(), true /* force_reinitialize */);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: perf_lock_task_context(struct task_struct *task, int ctxn, unsigned long *flags)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx;
retry:
/*
* One of the few rules of preemptible RCU is that one cannot do
* rcu_read_unlock() while holding a scheduler (or nested) lock when
* part of the read side critical section was irqs-enabled -- see
* rcu_read_unlock_special().
*
* Since ctx->lock nests under rq->lock we must ensure the entire read
* side critical section has interrupts disabled.
*/
local_irq_save(*flags);
rcu_read_lock();
ctx = rcu_dereference(task->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn]);
if (ctx) {
/*
* If this context is a clone of another, it might
* get swapped for another underneath us by
* perf_event_task_sched_out, though the
* rcu_read_lock() protects us from any context
* getting freed. Lock the context and check if it
* got swapped before we could get the lock, and retry
* if so. If we locked the right context, then it
* can't get swapped on us any more.
*/
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
if (ctx != rcu_dereference(task->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn])) {
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
local_irq_restore(*flags);
goto retry;
}
if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&ctx->refcount)) {
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
ctx = NULL;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!ctx)
local_irq_restore(*flags);
return ctx;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,114 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void swapcache_free(swp_entry_t entry, struct page *page)
{
struct swap_info_struct *p;
unsigned char count;
p = swap_info_get(entry);
if (p) {
count = swap_entry_free(p, entry, SWAP_HAS_CACHE);
if (page)
mem_cgroup_uncharge_swapcache(page, entry, count != 0);
spin_unlock(&swap_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 21,414 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PanelSettingsMenuModel::PanelSettingsMenuModel(Panel* panel)
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(ui::SimpleMenuModel(this)),
panel_(panel) {
const Extension* extension = panel_->GetExtension();
DCHECK(extension);
AddItem(COMMAND_NAME, UTF8ToUTF16(extension->name()));
AddSeparator();
AddItem(COMMAND_CONFIGURE, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_OPTIONS));
AddItem(COMMAND_DISABLE, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_DISABLE));
AddItem(COMMAND_UNINSTALL,
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME)));
AddSeparator();
AddItem(COMMAND_MANAGE, l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_MANAGE_EXTENSIONS));
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport Image *AppendImages(const Image *images,
const MagickBooleanType stack,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define AppendImageTag "Append/Image"
CacheView
*append_view;
Image
*append_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
n;
PixelTrait
alpha_trait;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
register const Image
*next;
size_t
depth,
height,
number_images,
width;
ssize_t
x_offset,
y,
y_offset;
/*
Compute maximum area of appended area.
*/
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
alpha_trait=images->alpha_trait;
number_images=1;
width=images->columns;
height=images->rows;
depth=images->depth;
next=GetNextImageInList(images);
for ( ; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
if (next->depth > depth)
depth=next->depth;
if (next->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
alpha_trait=BlendPixelTrait;
number_images++;
if (stack != MagickFalse)
{
if (next->columns > width)
width=next->columns;
height+=next->rows;
continue;
}
width+=next->columns;
if (next->rows > height)
height=next->rows;
}
/*
Append images.
*/
append_image=CloneImage(images,width,height,MagickTrue,exception);
if (append_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(append_image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
append_image=DestroyImage(append_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
append_image->depth=depth;
append_image->alpha_trait=alpha_trait;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(append_image,exception);
status=MagickTrue;
x_offset=0;
y_offset=0;
next=images;
append_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(append_image,exception);
for (n=0; n < (MagickOffsetType) number_images; n++)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
SetGeometry(append_image,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(next->columns,next->rows,next->gravity,&geometry);
if (stack != MagickFalse)
x_offset-=geometry.x;
else
y_offset-=geometry.y;
image_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(next,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(next,next,next->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next->rows; y++)
{
MagickBooleanType
sync;
PixelInfo
pixel;
register const Quantum
*magick_restrict p;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
p=GetCacheViewVirtualPixels(image_view,0,y,next->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueCacheViewAuthenticPixels(append_view,x_offset,y+y_offset,
next->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const Quantum *) NULL) || (q == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
GetPixelInfo(next,&pixel);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) next->columns; x++)
{
if (GetPixelReadMask(next,p) == 0)
{
SetPixelBackgoundColor(append_image,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(next);
q+=GetPixelChannels(append_image);
continue;
}
GetPixelInfoPixel(next,p,&pixel);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(append_image,&pixel,q);
p+=GetPixelChannels(next);
q+=GetPixelChannels(append_image);
}
sync=SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(append_view,exception);
if (sync == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (stack == MagickFalse)
{
x_offset+=(ssize_t) next->columns;
y_offset=0;
}
else
{
x_offset=0;
y_offset+=(ssize_t) next->rows;
}
proceed=SetImageProgress(append_image,AppendImageTag,n,number_images);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
next=GetNextImageInList(next);
}
append_view=DestroyCacheView(append_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
append_image=DestroyImage(append_image);
return(append_image);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void menu_cache_file_dir_unref(MenuCacheFileDir *file_dir)
{
if (file_dir && g_atomic_int_dec_and_test(&file_dir->n_ref))
{
g_free(file_dir->dir);
g_free(file_dir);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnIgnoredUIEvent() {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_, DidGetIgnoredUIEvent());
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rpc_sleep_on(struct rpc_wait_queue *q, struct rpc_task *task,
rpc_action action)
{
/* We shouldn't ever put an inactive task to sleep */
BUG_ON(!RPC_IS_ACTIVATED(task));
/*
* Protect the queue operations.
*/
spin_lock_bh(&q->lock);
__rpc_sleep_on(q, task, action);
spin_unlock_bh(&q->lock);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LayerTreeHostImpl::IsInitialScrollHitTestReliable(
LayerImpl* layer_impl,
const gfx::PointF& device_viewport_point) {
LayerImpl* first_scrolling_layer_or_drawn_scrollbar =
active_tree_->FindFirstScrollingLayerOrDrawnScrollbarThatIsHitByPoint(
device_viewport_point);
if (!first_scrolling_layer_or_drawn_scrollbar)
return true;
ScrollNode* closest_scroll_node = nullptr;
auto& scroll_tree = active_tree_->property_trees()->scroll_tree;
ScrollNode* scroll_node = scroll_tree.Node(layer_impl->scroll_tree_index());
for (; scroll_tree.parent(scroll_node);
scroll_node = scroll_tree.parent(scroll_node)) {
if (scroll_node->scrollable) {
closest_scroll_node = scroll_node;
break;
}
}
if (!closest_scroll_node)
return false;
if (first_scrolling_layer_or_drawn_scrollbar->scrollable()) {
return closest_scroll_node->id ==
first_scrolling_layer_or_drawn_scrollbar->scroll_tree_index();
}
DCHECK(first_scrolling_layer_or_drawn_scrollbar->IsDrawnScrollbar());
return false;
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 137,286 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *tsro_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_TimeOffHintEntryBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TSRO);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void seq_startplay(void)
{
int this_one, action;
unsigned long flags;
while (qlen > 0)
{
spin_lock_irqsave(&lock,flags);
qhead = ((this_one = qhead) + 1) % SEQ_MAX_QUEUE;
qlen--;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock,flags);
seq_playing = 1;
if ((action = play_event(&queue[this_one * EV_SZ])))
{ /* Suspend playback. Next timer routine invokes this routine again */
if (action == 2)
{
qlen++;
qhead = this_one;
}
return;
}
}
seq_playing = 0;
if ((SEQ_MAX_QUEUE - qlen) >= output_threshold)
wake_up(&seq_sleeper);
}
Commit Message: sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks
Was: [PATCH] sound/oss/midi_synth: prevent underflow, use of
uninitialized value, and signedness issue
The offset passed to midi_synth_load_patch() can be essentially
arbitrary. If it's greater than the header length, this will result in
a copy_from_user(dst, src, negative_val). While this will just return
-EFAULT on x86, on other architectures this may cause memory corruption.
Additionally, the length field of the sysex_info structure may not be
initialized prior to its use. Finally, a signed comparison may result
in an unintentionally large loop.
On suggestion by Takashi Iwai, version two removes the offset argument
from the load_patch callbacks entirely, which also resolves similar
issues in opl3. Compile tested only.
v3 adjusts comments and hopefully gets copy offsets right.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 27,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::syncDisplayState()
{
#if ENABLE(REQUEST_ANIMATION_FRAME) && !USE(REQUEST_ANIMATION_FRAME_TIMER) && !USE(REQUEST_ANIMATION_FRAME_DISPLAY_MONITOR)
m_webPage->corePage()->mainFrame()->view()->serviceScriptedAnimations(convertSecondsToDOMTimeStamp(currentTime()));
#endif
m_webPage->layoutIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 97,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ring_buffer_attach(struct perf_event *event,
struct ring_buffer *rb)
{
struct ring_buffer *old_rb = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
if (event->rb) {
/*
* Should be impossible, we set this when removing
* event->rb_entry and wait/clear when adding event->rb_entry.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(event->rcu_pending);
old_rb = event->rb;
spin_lock_irqsave(&old_rb->event_lock, flags);
list_del_rcu(&event->rb_entry);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&old_rb->event_lock, flags);
event->rcu_batches = get_state_synchronize_rcu();
event->rcu_pending = 1;
}
if (rb) {
if (event->rcu_pending) {
cond_synchronize_rcu(event->rcu_batches);
event->rcu_pending = 0;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&rb->event_lock, flags);
list_add_rcu(&event->rb_entry, &rb->event_list);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rb->event_lock, flags);
}
rcu_assign_pointer(event->rb, rb);
if (old_rb) {
ring_buffer_put(old_rb);
/*
* Since we detached before setting the new rb, so that we
* could attach the new rb, we could have missed a wakeup.
* Provide it now.
*/
wake_up_all(&event->waitq);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::CreateInstantIfNecessary() {
if (is_type_tabbed() && InstantController::IsEnabled(profile()) &&
!profile()->IsOffTheRecord()) {
instant_.reset(new InstantController(profile_, this));
instant_unload_handler_.reset(new InstantUnloadHandler(this));
}
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 97,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassOwnPtr<RTCPeerConnectionHandler> RTCPeerConnectionHandler::create(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerClient* client)
{
return adoptPtr(new RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy(client));
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int i8042_remove_filter(bool (*filter)(unsigned char data, unsigned char str,
struct serio *port))
{
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
spin_lock_irqsave(&i8042_lock, flags);
if (i8042_platform_filter != filter) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
i8042_platform_filter = NULL;
out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&i8042_lock, flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Input: i8042 - fix crash at boot time
The driver checks port->exists twice in i8042_interrupt(), first when
trying to assign temporary "serio" variable, and second time when deciding
whether it should call serio_interrupt(). The value of port->exists may
change between the 2 checks, and we may end up calling serio_interrupt()
with a NULL pointer:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050
IP: [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
PGD 0
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file:
CPU 0
Modules linked in:
Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-358.el6.x86_64 #1 QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8150feaf>] [<ffffffff8150feaf>] _spin_lock_irqsave+0x1f/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffff880028203cc0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000282 RSI: 0000000000000098 RDI: 0000000000000050
RBP: ffff880028203cc0 R08: ffff88013e79c000 R09: ffff880028203ee0
R10: 0000000000000298 R11: 0000000000000282 R12: 0000000000000050
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000098
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000001407f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 1, threadinfo ffff88013e79c000, task ffff88013e79b500)
Stack:
ffff880028203d00 ffffffff813de186 ffffffffffffff02 0000000000000000
<d> 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000098
<d> ffff880028203d70 ffffffff813e0162 ffff880028203d20 ffffffff8103b8ac
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffff813de186>] serio_interrupt+0x36/0xa0
[<ffffffff813e0162>] i8042_interrupt+0x132/0x3a0
[<ffffffff8103b8ac>] ? kvm_clock_read+0x1c/0x20
[<ffffffff8103b8b9>] ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x9/0x10
[<ffffffff810e1640>] handle_IRQ_event+0x60/0x170
[<ffffffff8103b154>] ? kvm_guest_apic_eoi_write+0x44/0x50
[<ffffffff810e3d8e>] handle_edge_irq+0xde/0x180
[<ffffffff8100de89>] handle_irq+0x49/0xa0
[<ffffffff81516c8c>] do_IRQ+0x6c/0xf0
[<ffffffff8100b9d3>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x11
[<ffffffff81076f63>] ? __do_softirq+0x73/0x1e0
[<ffffffff8109b75b>] ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x14b/0x260
[<ffffffff8100c1cc>] ? call_softirq+0x1c/0x30
[<ffffffff8100de05>] ? do_softirq+0x65/0xa0
[<ffffffff81076d95>] ? irq_exit+0x85/0x90
[<ffffffff81516d80>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x9b
[<ffffffff8100bb93>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x13/0x20
To avoid the issue let's change the second check to test whether serio is
NULL or not.
Also, let's take i8042_lock in i8042_start() and i8042_stop() instead of
trying to be overly smart and using memory barriers.
Signed-off-by: Chen Hong <chenhong3@huawei.com>
[dtor: take lock in i8042_start()/i8042_stop()]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 86,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hash_walk_new_entry(struct crypto_hash_walk *walk)
{
struct scatterlist *sg;
sg = walk->sg;
walk->pg = sg_page(sg);
walk->offset = sg->offset;
walk->entrylen = sg->length;
if (walk->entrylen > walk->total)
walk->entrylen = walk->total;
walk->total -= walk->entrylen;
return hash_walk_next(walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_ed_script (char const *inname, char const *outname,
bool *outname_needs_removal, FILE *ofp)
{
static char const editor_program[] = EDITOR_PROGRAM;
file_offset beginning_of_this_line;
size_t chars_read;
FILE *tmpfp = 0;
char const *tmpname;
int tmpfd;
pid_t pid;
if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch)
{
/* Write ed script to a temporary file. This causes ed to abort on
invalid commands such as when line numbers or ranges exceed the
number of available lines. When ed reads from a pipe, it rejects
invalid commands and treats the next line as a new command, which
can lead to arbitrary command execution. */
tmpfd = make_tempfile (&tmpname, 'e', NULL, O_RDWR | O_BINARY, 0);
if (tmpfd == -1)
pfatal ("Can't create temporary file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
tmpfp = fdopen (tmpfd, "w+b");
if (! tmpfp)
pfatal ("Can't open stream for file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
}
for (;;) {
char ed_command_letter;
beginning_of_this_line = file_tell (pfp);
chars_read = get_line ();
if (! chars_read) {
next_intuit_at(beginning_of_this_line,p_input_line);
break;
}
ed_command_letter = get_ed_command_letter (buf);
if (ed_command_letter) {
if (tmpfp)
if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, tmpfp))
write_fatal ();
if (ed_command_letter != 'd' && ed_command_letter != 's') {
p_pass_comments_through = true;
while ((chars_read = get_line ()) != 0) {
if (tmpfp)
if (! fwrite (buf, sizeof *buf, chars_read, tmpfp))
write_fatal ();
if (chars_read == 2 && strEQ (buf, ".\n"))
break;
}
p_pass_comments_through = false;
}
}
else {
next_intuit_at(beginning_of_this_line,p_input_line);
break;
}
}
if (!tmpfp)
return;
if (fwrite ("w\nq\n", sizeof (char), (size_t) 4, tmpfp) == 0
|| fflush (tmpfp) != 0)
write_fatal ();
if (lseek (tmpfd, 0, SEEK_SET) == -1)
pfatal ("Can't rewind to the beginning of file %s", quotearg (tmpname));
if (! dry_run && ! skip_rest_of_patch) {
int exclusive = *outname_needs_removal ? 0 : O_EXCL;
*outname_needs_removal = true;
if (inerrno != ENOENT)
{
*outname_needs_removal = true;
copy_file (inname, outname, 0, exclusive, instat.st_mode, true);
}
sprintf (buf, "%s %s%s", editor_program,
verbosity == VERBOSE ? "" : "- ",
outname);
fflush (stdout);
pid = fork();
fflush (stdout);
else if (pid == 0)
{
dup2 (tmpfd, 0);
execl ("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", buf, (char *) 0);
_exit (2);
}
else
}
else
{
int wstatus;
if (waitpid (pid, &wstatus, 0) == -1
|| ! WIFEXITED (wstatus)
|| WEXITSTATUS (wstatus) != 0)
fatal ("%s FAILED", editor_program);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 1 | 164,684 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::RemoveTaskTimeObserver(
TaskTimeObserver* task_time_observer) {
helper_.RemoveTaskTimeObserver(task_time_observer);
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 143,458 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetDevToolsBackgroundServiceExpirations(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
DCHECK(profile);
auto* pref_service = profile->GetPrefs();
DCHECK(pref_service);
auto* expiration_dict = pref_service->GetDictionary(
prefs::kDevToolsBackgroundServicesExpirationDict);
DCHECK(expiration_dict);
base::flat_map<int, base::Time> expiration_times;
for (const auto& it : *expiration_dict) {
int service = 0;
bool did_convert = base::StringToInt(it.first, &service);
DCHECK(did_convert);
DCHECK(it.second->is_int());
base::TimeDelta delta = base::TimeDelta::FromMinutes(it.second->GetInt());
base::Time expiration_time = base::Time::FromDeltaSinceWindowsEpoch(delta);
expiration_times[service] = expiration_time;
}
return expiration_times;
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,645 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: card_id_store_attr(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct snd_card *card = container_of(dev, struct snd_card, card_dev);
char buf1[sizeof(card->id)];
size_t copy = count > sizeof(card->id) - 1 ?
sizeof(card->id) - 1 : count;
size_t idx;
int c;
for (idx = 0; idx < copy; idx++) {
c = buf[idx];
if (!isalnum(c) && c != '_' && c != '-')
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(buf1, buf, copy);
buf1[copy] = '\0';
mutex_lock(&snd_card_mutex);
if (!card_id_ok(NULL, buf1)) {
mutex_unlock(&snd_card_mutex);
return -EEXIST;
}
strcpy(card->id, buf1);
snd_info_card_id_change(card);
mutex_unlock(&snd_card_mutex);
return count;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 36,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jas_iccattrtab_resize(jas_iccattrtab_t *tab, int maxents)
{
jas_iccattr_t *newattrs;
assert(maxents >= tab->numattrs);
newattrs = tab->attrs ? jas_realloc2(tab->attrs, maxents,
sizeof(jas_iccattr_t)) : jas_alloc2(maxents, sizeof(jas_iccattr_t));
if (!newattrs) {
return -1;
}
tab->attrs = newattrs;
tab->maxattrs = maxents;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,682 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::CreatePreviewDocument(
PrintMsg_Print_Params* print_params,
const std::vector<int>& pages) {
DCHECK(IsReadyToRender());
state_ = RENDERING;
print_params_.reset(new PrintMsg_Print_Params(*print_params));
metafile_.reset(new printing::PreviewMetafile);
if (!metafile_->Init()) {
set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_METAFILE_INIT_FAILED);
LOG(ERROR) << "PreviewMetafile Init failed";
return false;
}
prep_frame_view_.reset(new PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint(*print_params, frame(),
node()));
UpdatePrintableSizeInPrintParameters(frame_, node_.get(),
prep_frame_view_.get(), print_params);
total_page_count_ = prep_frame_view_->GetExpectedPageCount();
if (total_page_count_ == 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "CreatePreviewDocument got 0 page count";
set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_ZERO_PAGES);
return false;
}
int selected_page_count = pages.size();
current_page_index_ = 0;
print_ready_metafile_page_count_ = selected_page_count;
pages_to_render_ = pages;
if (selected_page_count == 0) {
print_ready_metafile_page_count_ = total_page_count_;
for (int i = 0; i < total_page_count_; ++i)
pages_to_render_.push_back(i);
} else if (generate_draft_pages_) {
int pages_index = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < total_page_count_; ++i) {
if (pages_index < selected_page_count && i == pages[pages_index]) {
pages_index++;
continue;
}
pages_to_render_.push_back(i);
}
}
document_render_time_ = base::TimeDelta();
begin_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromePluginServiceFilter::UnrestrictPlugin(
const FilePath& plugin_path) {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
restricted_plugins_.erase(plugin_path);
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_arch_sync_events(struct kvm *kvm)
{
kvm_free_all_assigned_devices(kvm);
kvm_free_pit(kvm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MetadataRetrieverClient::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& /*args*/)
{
const size_t SIZE = 256;
char buffer[SIZE];
String8 result;
result.append(" MetadataRetrieverClient\n");
snprintf(buffer, 255, " pid(%d)\n", mPid);
result.append(buffer);
write(fd, result.string(), result.size());
write(fd, "\n", 1);
return NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Clear unused pointer field when sending across binder
Bug: 28377502
Change-Id: Iad5ebfb0a9ef89f09755bb332579dbd3534f9c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int TagNameToValue(const char* tagName)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < TAG_TABLE_SIZE; i++) {
if (strcmp(TagTable[i].Desc, tagName) == 0) {
printf("found tag %s val %d", TagTable[i].Desc, TagTable[i].Tag);
return TagTable[i].Tag;
}
}
printf("tag %s NOT FOUND", tagName);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible out of bounds access
Bug: 28868315
Change-Id: I2b416c662f9ad7f9b3c6cf973a39c6693c66775a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,464 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext::~ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext() {
}
Commit Message: Don't retain reference to ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext
ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext owns
GeolocationInfoBarQueueController, so make sure that the callback
passed to GeolocationInfoBarQueueController doesn't increase the
reference count on ChromeGeolocationPermissionContext (which
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11072012 accidentally does).
TBR=bulach
BUG=152921
TEST=unittest:chrome_geolocation_permission_context on memory.fyi bot
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11087030
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@160881 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 119,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: content::WebContents* HeadlessWebContentsImpl::web_contents() const {
return web_contents_.get();
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLFormControlElement* HTMLFormElement::defaultButton() const
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < m_associatedElements.size(); ++i) {
if (!m_associatedElements[i]->isFormControlElement())
continue;
HTMLFormControlElement* control = toHTMLFormControlElement(m_associatedElements[i]);
if (control->isSuccessfulSubmitButton())
return control;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TT_F26Dot6 Round_Up_To_Grid( EXEC_OPS TT_F26Dot6 distance,
TT_F26Dot6 compensation )
{
TT_F26Dot6 val;
(void)exc;
if ( distance >= 0 )
{
val = (distance + compensation + 63) & (-64);
if ( val < 0 )
val = 0;
}
else
{
val = -( (compensation - distance + 63) & (-64) );
if ( val > 0 )
val = 0;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,496 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~TestAutofillExternalDelegate() {}
Commit Message: Fix OS_MACOS typos. Should be OS_MACOSX.
BUG=163208
TEST=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12829005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@189130 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 118,740 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ClearCompositionText() {
if (host_ && has_composition_text_)
host_->ImeCancelComposition();
has_composition_text_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,806 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *bd_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
{
return mount_pseudo(fs_type, "bdev:", &bdev_sops, NULL, BDEVFS_MAGIC);
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MockNetworkTransaction::StopCaching() {
if (transaction_factory_.get())
transaction_factory_->TransactionStopCaching();
}
Commit Message: Replace fixed string uses of AddHeaderFromString
Uses of AddHeaderFromString() with a static string may as well be
replaced with SetHeader(). Do so.
BUG=None
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2236933005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#418161}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 119,354 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: wifi_error wifi_get_concurrency_matrix(wifi_interface_handle handle, int set_size_max,
feature_set set[], int *set_size)
{
GetFeatureSetCommand command(handle, FEATURE_SET_MATRIX, NULL, set, set_size, set_size_max);
return (wifi_error) command.requestResponse();
}
Commit Message: Fix use-after-free in wifi_cleanup()
Release reference to cmd only after possibly calling getType().
BUG: 25753768
Change-Id: Id2156ce51acec04e8364706cf7eafc7d4adae9eb
(cherry picked from commit d7f3cb9915d9ac514393d0ad7767662958054b8f https://googleplex-android-review.git.corp.google.com/#/c/815223)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtqueue_map(VirtQueueElement *elem)
{
virtqueue_map_iovec(elem->in_sg, elem->in_addr, &elem->in_num,
VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE, 1);
virtqueue_map_iovec(elem->out_sg, elem->out_addr, &elem->out_num,
VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,257 |
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