instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcos_get_serialnr(sc_card_t *card, sc_serial_number_t *serial)
{
int r;
if (!serial)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
/* see if we have cached serial number */
if (card->serialnr.len) {
memcpy(serial, &card->serialnr, sizeof(*serial));
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
card->serialnr.len = sizeof card->serialnr.value;
r = sc_parse_ef_gdo(card, card->serialnr.value, &card->serialnr.len, NULL, 0);
if (r < 0) {
card->serialnr.len = 0;
return r;
}
/* copy and return serial number */
memcpy(serial, &card->serialnr, sizeof(*serial));
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds writes
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting the problems.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 78,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GtkTargetList* webkit_web_view_get_copy_target_list(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
return pasteboardHelperInstance()->targetList();
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(
LoadCommittedDetails* details) {
details->entry = GetActiveEntry();
ssl_manager_.DidCommitProvisionalLoad(*details);
web_contents_->NotifyNavigationStateChanged(kInvalidateAll);
web_contents_->NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(*details);
NotificationDetails notification_details =
Details<LoadCommittedDetails>(details);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_NAV_ENTRY_COMMITTED,
Source<NavigationController>(this),
notification_details);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void emmh32_setseed(emmh32_context *context, u8 *pkey, int keylen,
struct crypto_cipher *tfm)
{
/* take the keying material, expand if necessary, truncate at 16-bytes */
/* run through AES counter mode to generate context->coeff[] */
int i,j;
u32 counter;
u8 *cipher, plain[16];
crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, pkey, 16);
counter = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(context->coeff); ) {
aes_counter[15] = (u8)(counter >> 0);
aes_counter[14] = (u8)(counter >> 8);
aes_counter[13] = (u8)(counter >> 16);
aes_counter[12] = (u8)(counter >> 24);
counter++;
memcpy (plain, aes_counter, 16);
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, plain, plain);
cipher = plain;
for (j = 0; (j < 16) && (i < ARRAY_SIZE(context->coeff)); ) {
context->coeff[i++] = ntohl(*(__be32 *)&cipher[j]);
j += 4;
}
}
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,022 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::dataReceived(CachedResource* resource, const char* data, int length)
{
ASSERT(data);
ASSERT(length);
ASSERT_UNUSED(resource, resource == m_mainResource);
ASSERT(!m_response.isNull());
#if USE(CFNETWORK) || PLATFORM(MAC)
if (m_response.isNull())
m_response = ResourceResponse(KURL(), "text/html", 0, String(), String());
#endif
#if !USE(CF)
ASSERT(!mainResourceLoader() || !mainResourceLoader()->defersLoading());
#endif
#if USE(CONTENT_FILTERING)
bool loadWasBlockedBeforeFinishing = false;
if (m_contentFilter && m_contentFilter->needsMoreData()) {
m_contentFilter->addData(data, length);
if (m_contentFilter->needsMoreData()) {
commitLoad(0, 0);
return;
}
data = m_contentFilter->getReplacementData(length);
loadWasBlockedBeforeFinishing = m_contentFilter->didBlockData();
}
#endif
if (m_identifierForLoadWithoutResourceLoader)
frameLoader()->notifier()->dispatchDidReceiveData(this, m_identifierForLoadWithoutResourceLoader, data, length, -1);
m_applicationCacheHost->mainResourceDataReceived(data, length, -1, false);
m_timeOfLastDataReceived = monotonicallyIncreasingTime();
if (!isMultipartReplacingLoad())
commitLoad(data, length);
#if USE(CONTENT_FILTERING)
if (loadWasBlockedBeforeFinishing)
cancelMainResourceLoad(frameLoader()->cancelledError(m_request));
#endif
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,703 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int init_inodecache(void)
{
sock_inode_cachep = kmem_cache_create("sock_inode_cache",
sizeof(struct socket_alloc),
0,
(SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN |
SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT |
SLAB_MEM_SPREAD | SLAB_ACCOUNT),
init_once);
if (sock_inode_cachep == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix use after free in the recvmmsg exit path
The syzkaller fuzzer hit the following use-after-free:
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8175ea0e>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:295
[<ffffffff851cc31a>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x6fa/0x7f0 net/socket.c:2261
[< inline >] SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2281
[<ffffffff851cc57f>] SyS_recvmmsg+0x16f/0x180 net/socket.c:2270
[<ffffffff86332bb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:185
And, as Dmitry rightly assessed, that is because we can drop the
reference and then touch it when the underlying recvmsg calls return
some packets and then hit an error, which will make recvmmsg to set
sock->sk->sk_err, oops, fix it.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Fixes: a2e2725541fa ("net: Introduce recvmmsg socket syscall")
http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160122211644.GC2470@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 50,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct pdf_object *pdf_find_first_object(struct pdf_doc *pdf,
int type)
{
return pdf->first_objects[type];
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TranslateInfoBarDelegate::AsTranslateInfoBarDelegate() {
return this;
}
Commit Message: Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,035 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int modbus_write_register(modbus_t *ctx, int addr, int value)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
return write_single(ctx, MODBUS_FC_WRITE_SINGLE_REGISTER, addr, value);
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 88,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void caif_read_lock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct caifsock *cf_sk;
cf_sk = container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk);
mutex_lock(&cf_sk->readlock);
}
Commit Message: caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Sjur Braendeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsMus() {
return aura::Env::GetInstance()->mode() == aura::Env::Mode::MUS;
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AdjustNavigateParamsForURL(browser::NavigateParams* params) {
if (!params->target_contents &&
browser::IsURLAllowedInIncognito(params->url)) {
Profile* profile =
params->browser ? params->browser->profile() : params->profile;
if ((profile->IsOffTheRecord() && !Profile::IsGuestSession()) ||
params->disposition == OFF_THE_RECORD) {
profile = profile->GetOriginalProfile();
params->disposition = SINGLETON_TAB;
params->profile = profile;
params->browser = Browser::GetOrCreateTabbedBrowser(profile);
params->window_action = browser::NavigateParams::SHOW_WINDOW;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix memory error in previous CL.
BUG=100315
BUG=99016
TEST=Memory bots go green
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8302001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@105577 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 97,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void filterStrings (RBin *bin, RList *strings) {
RBinString *ptr;
RListIter *iter;
r_list_foreach (strings, iter, ptr) {
char *dec = (char *)r_base64_decode_dyn (ptr->string, -1);
if (dec) {
char *s = ptr->string;
do {
char *dec2 = (char *)r_base64_decode_dyn (s, -1);
if (!dec2) {
break;
}
if (!r_str_is_printable (dec2)) {
free (dec2);
break;
}
free (dec);
s = dec = dec2;
} while (true);
if (r_str_is_printable (dec) && strlen (dec) > 3) {
free (ptr->string);
ptr->string = dec;
ptr->type = R_STRING_TYPE_BASE64;
} else {
free (dec);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 60,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct mschmd_header *chmd_open(struct mschm_decompressor *base,
const char *filename)
{
return chmd_real_open(base, filename, 1);
}
Commit Message: Avoid returning CHM file entries that are "blank" because they have embedded null bytes
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 76,335 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Node* WebPagePrivate::adjustedBlockZoomNodeForZoomAndExpandingRatioLimits(Node* node)
{
Node* initialNode = node;
RenderObject* renderer = node->renderer();
bool acceptableNodeSize = newScaleForBlockZoomRect(rectForNode(node), 1.0, 0) < maxBlockZoomScale();
IntSize actualVisibleSize = this->actualVisibleSize();
while (!renderer || !acceptableNodeSize) {
node = node->parentNode();
IntRect nodeRect = rectForNode(node);
if (!node || static_cast<double>(actualVisibleSize.width() - nodeRect.width()) / actualVisibleSize.width() < minimumExpandingRatio)
return initialNode;
renderer = node->renderer();
acceptableNodeSize = newScaleForBlockZoomRect(rectForNode(node), 1.0, 0) < maxBlockZoomScale();
}
return node;
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_get_cipher_methods)
{
zend_bool aliases = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|b", &aliases) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH,
aliases ? openssl_add_method_or_alias: openssl_add_method,
return_value);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, valid)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_READ_AHEAD)) {
RETURN_BOOL(intern->u.file.current_line || intern->u.file.current_zval);
} else {
RETVAL_BOOL(!php_stream_eof(intern->u.file.stream));
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string SplFileObject::fgets()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebPage::removeOriginAccessWhitelistEntry(const BlackBerry::Platform::String& sourceOrigin, const BlackBerry::Platform::String& destinationOrigin, bool allowDestinationSubdomains)
{
d->removeOriginAccessWhitelistEntry(sourceOrigin, destinationOrigin, allowDestinationSubdomains);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,353 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Splash::blitMask(SplashBitmap *src, int xDest, int yDest,
SplashClipResult clipRes) {
SplashPipe pipe;
Guchar *p;
int w, h, x, y;
w = src->getWidth();
h = src->getHeight();
p = src->getDataPtr();
if (p == NULL) {
error(errInternal, -1, "src->getDataPtr() is NULL in Splash::blitMask");
return;
}
if (vectorAntialias && clipRes != splashClipAllInside) {
pipeInit(&pipe, xDest, yDest, state->fillPattern, NULL,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->fillAlpha * 255), gTrue, gFalse);
drawAAPixelInit();
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
pipe.shape = *p++;
drawAAPixel(&pipe, xDest + x, yDest + y);
}
}
} else {
pipeInit(&pipe, xDest, yDest, state->fillPattern, NULL,
(Guchar)splashRound(state->fillAlpha * 255), gTrue, gFalse);
if (clipRes == splashClipAllInside) {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
pipeSetXY(&pipe, xDest, yDest + y);
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
if (*p) {
pipe.shape = *p;
(this->*pipe.run)(&pipe);
} else {
pipeIncX(&pipe);
}
++p;
}
}
updateModX(xDest);
updateModX(xDest + w - 1);
updateModY(yDest);
updateModY(yDest + h - 1);
} else {
for (y = 0; y < h; ++y) {
pipeSetXY(&pipe, xDest, yDest + y);
for (x = 0; x < w; ++x) {
if (*p && state->clip->test(xDest + x, yDest + y)) {
pipe.shape = *p;
(this->*pipe.run)(&pipe);
updateModX(xDest + x);
updateModY(yDest + y);
} else {
pipeIncX(&pipe);
}
++p;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,165 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void qeth_buffer_reclaim_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct qeth_card *card = container_of(work, struct qeth_card,
buffer_reclaim_work.work);
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(card, 2, "brw:%x", card->reclaim_index);
qeth_queue_input_buffer(card, card->reclaim_index);
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,481 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: on_register_handler(TCMUService1HandlerManager1 *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation,
gchar *subtype,
gchar *cfg_desc,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler;
struct dbus_info *info;
char *bus_name;
bus_name = g_strdup_printf("org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.%s",
subtype);
handler = g_new0(struct tcmur_handler, 1);
handler->subtype = g_strdup(subtype);
handler->cfg_desc = g_strdup(cfg_desc);
handler->open = dbus_handler_open;
handler->close = dbus_handler_close;
handler->handle_cmd = dbus_handler_handle_cmd;
info = g_new0(struct dbus_info, 1);
info->register_invocation = invocation;
info->watcher_id = g_bus_watch_name(G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM,
bus_name,
G_BUS_NAME_WATCHER_FLAGS_NONE,
on_handler_appeared,
on_handler_vanished,
handler,
NULL);
g_free(bus_name);
handler->opaque = info;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fixed local DoS when UnregisterHandler was called for a not existing handler
Any user with DBUS access could cause a SEGFAULT in tcmu-runner by
running something like this:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:123
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int floppy_request_regions(int fdc)
{
const struct io_region *p;
for (p = io_regions; p < ARRAY_END(io_regions); p++) {
if (!request_region(FDCS->address + p->offset,
p->size, "floppy")) {
DPRINT("Floppy io-port 0x%04lx in use\n",
FDCS->address + p->offset);
floppy_release_allocated_regions(fdc, p);
return -EBUSY;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 39,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OnGetManifest(const GURL& manifest_url, const Manifest& manifest) {
manifest_url_ = manifest_url;
manifest_ = manifest;
message_loop_runner_->Quit();
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID: | 0 | 150,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fast_cmyk_to_rgb(fz_context *ctx, fz_pixmap *dst, fz_pixmap *src, fz_colorspace *prf, const fz_default_colorspaces *default_cs, const fz_color_params *color_params, int copy_spots)
{
unsigned char *s = src->samples;
unsigned char *d = dst->samples;
size_t w = src->w;
int h = src->h;
int sn = src->n;
int ss = src->s;
int sa = src->alpha;
int dn = dst->n;
int ds = dst->s;
int da = dst->alpha;
ptrdiff_t d_line_inc = dst->stride - w * dn;
ptrdiff_t s_line_inc = src->stride - w * sn;
unsigned int C,M,Y,K;
unsigned char r,g,b;
/* Spots must match, and we can never drop alpha (but we can invent it) */
if ((copy_spots && ss != ds) || (!da && sa))
{
assert("This should never happen" == NULL);
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "Cannot convert between incompatible pixmaps");
}
if ((int)w < 0 || h < 0)
return;
C = 0;
M = 0;
Y = 0;
K = 0;
r = 255;
g = 255;
b = 255;
if (d_line_inc == 0 && s_line_inc == 0)
{
w *= h;
h = 1;
}
if (ss == 0 && ds == 0)
{
/* Common, no spots case */
if (da)
{
if (sa)
{
#ifdef ARCH_ARM
if (h == 1)
{
fast_cmyk_to_rgb_ARM(d, s, w);
return;
}
#endif
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
cached_cmyk_conv(&r, &g, &b, &C, &M, &Y, &K, s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
d[0] = r;
d[1] = g;
d[2] = b;
d[3] = s[4];
s += 5;
d += 4;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
else
{
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
cached_cmyk_conv(&r, &g, &b, &C, &M, &Y, &K, s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
d[0] = r;
d[1] = g;
d[2] = b;
d[3] = 255;
s += 4;
d += 4;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
}
else
{
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
cached_cmyk_conv(&r, &g, &b, &C, &M, &Y, &K, s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
d[0] = r;
d[1] = g;
d[2] = b;
s += 4;
d += 3;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
}
else if (copy_spots)
{
/* Slower, spots capable version */
while (h--)
{
int i;
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
cached_cmyk_conv(&r, &g, &b, &C, &M, &Y, &K, s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
d[0] = r;
d[1] = g;
d[2] = b;
s += 4;
d += 3;
for (i=ss; i > 0; i--)
*d++ = *s++;
if (da)
*d++ = sa ? *s++ : 255;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
else
{
/* Slower, spots capable version */
while (h--)
{
size_t ww = w;
while (ww--)
{
cached_cmyk_conv(&r, &g, &b, &C, &M, &Y, &K, s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
d[0] = r;
d[1] = g;
d[2] = b;
s += sn;
d += dn;
if (da)
d[-1] = sa ? s[-1] : 255;
}
d += d_line_inc;
s += s_line_inc;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t ib_ucm_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
size_t len, loff_t *pos)
{
struct ib_ucm_file *file = filp->private_data;
struct ib_ucm_cmd_hdr hdr;
ssize_t result;
if (len < sizeof(hdr))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&hdr, buf, sizeof(hdr)))
return -EFAULT;
if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucm_cmd_table))
return -EINVAL;
if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len)
return -EINVAL;
result = ucm_cmd_table[hdr.cmd](file, buf + sizeof(hdr),
hdr.in, hdr.out);
if (!result)
result = len;
return result;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 167,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DocumentLoader::ProcessDataBuffer() {
const char* segment;
size_t pos = 0;
while (size_t length = data_buffer_->GetSomeData(segment, pos)) {
ProcessData(segment, length);
pos += length;
}
data_buffer_->Clear();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool push_deferred_smb_message(struct smb_request *req,
struct timeval request_time,
struct timeval timeout,
char *private_data, size_t priv_len)
{
struct timeval end_time;
if (req->unread_bytes) {
DEBUG(0,("push_deferred_smb_message: logic error ! "
"unread_bytes = %u\n",
(unsigned int)req->unread_bytes ));
smb_panic("push_deferred_smb_message: "
"logic error unread_bytes != 0" );
}
end_time = timeval_sum(&request_time, &timeout);
DEBUG(10,("push_deferred_open_smb_message: pushing message len %u mid %u "
"timeout time [%u.%06u]\n",
(unsigned int) smb_len(req->inbuf)+4, (unsigned int)req->mid,
(unsigned int)end_time.tv_sec,
(unsigned int)end_time.tv_usec));
return push_queued_message(req, request_time, end_time,
private_data, priv_len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_init(void* obj_in,
dwarf_elf_handle elf,
int* error)
{
dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*obj =
(dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*)obj_in;
char *ehdr_ident = 0;
Dwarf_Half machine = 0;
obj->elf = elf;
if ((ehdr_ident = elf_getident(elf, NULL)) == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_ELF_GETIDENT_ERROR;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
obj->is_64bit = (ehdr_ident[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASS64);
if (ehdr_ident[EI_DATA] == ELFDATA2LSB){
obj->endianness = DW_OBJECT_LSB;
} else if (ehdr_ident[EI_DATA] == ELFDATA2MSB){
obj->endianness = DW_OBJECT_MSB;
}
if (obj->is_64bit) {
#ifdef HAVE_ELF64_GETEHDR
obj->ehdr64 = elf64_getehdr(elf);
if (obj->ehdr64 == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_ELF_GETEHDR_ERROR;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
obj->section_count = obj->ehdr64->e_shnum;
machine = obj->ehdr64->e_machine;
obj->machine = machine;
#else
*error = DW_DLE_NO_ELF64_SUPPORT;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
#endif
} else {
obj->ehdr32 = elf32_getehdr(elf);
if (obj->ehdr32 == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_ELF_GETEHDR_ERROR;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
obj->section_count = obj->ehdr32->e_shnum;
machine = obj->ehdr32->e_machine;
obj->machine = machine;
}
/* The following length_size is Not Too Significant. Only used
one calculation, and an approximate one at that. */
obj->length_size = obj->is_64bit ? 8 : 4;
obj->pointer_size = obj->is_64bit ? 8 : 4;
#ifdef WIN32
if (obj->is_64bit && machine == EM_PPC64) {
/* The SNC compiler generates the EM_PPC64 machine type for the
PS3 platform, but is a 32 bits pointer size in user mode. */
obj->pointer_size = 4;
}
#endif /* WIN32 */
if (obj->is_64bit && machine != EM_MIPS) {
/* MIPS/IRIX makes pointer size and length size 8 for -64.
Other platforms make length 4 always. */
/* 4 here supports 32bit-offset dwarf2, as emitted by cygnus
tools, and the dwarfv2.1 64bit extension setting.
This is not the same as the size-of-an-offset, which
is 4 in 32bit dwarf and 8 in 64bit dwarf. */
obj->length_size = 4;
}
return DW_DLV_OK;
}
Commit Message: A DWARF related section marked SHT_NOBITS (elf section type)
is an error in the elf object. Now detected.
dwarf_elf_access.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 74,062 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NOINLINE void ResetThread_IO(std::unique_ptr<BrowserProcessSubThread> thread) {
volatile int inhibit_comdat = __LINE__;
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(inhibit_comdat);
thread.reset();
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MouseEventWithHitTestResults Document::prepareMouseEvent(const HitTestRequest& request, const LayoutPoint& documentPoint, const PlatformMouseEvent& event)
{
ASSERT(!renderer() || renderer()->isRenderView());
if (!renderer() || !view() || !view()->didFirstLayout())
return MouseEventWithHitTestResults(event, HitTestResult(LayoutPoint()));
HitTestResult result(documentPoint);
renderView()->hitTest(request, result);
if (!request.readOnly())
updateHoverActiveState(request, result.innerElement(), &event);
return MouseEventWithHitTestResults(event, result);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputMethodController::DeleteSurroundingTextInCodePoints(int before,
int after) {
DCHECK_GE(before, 0);
DCHECK_GE(after, 0);
if (!GetEditor().CanEdit())
return;
const PlainTextRange selection_offsets(GetSelectionOffsets());
if (selection_offsets.IsNull())
return;
Element* const root_editable_element =
GetFrame().Selection().RootEditableElementOrDocumentElement();
if (!root_editable_element)
return;
const TextIteratorBehavior& behavior =
TextIteratorBehavior::Builder()
.SetEmitsObjectReplacementCharacter(true)
.Build();
const String& text = PlainText(
EphemeralRange::RangeOfContents(*root_editable_element), behavior);
if (text.Is8Bit())
return DeleteSurroundingText(before, after);
const int selection_start = static_cast<int>(selection_offsets.Start());
const int selection_end = static_cast<int>(selection_offsets.End());
const int before_length =
CalculateBeforeDeletionLengthsInCodePoints(text, before, selection_start);
if (IsInvalidDeletionLength(before_length))
return;
const int after_length =
CalculateAfterDeletionLengthsInCodePoints(text, after, selection_end);
if (IsInvalidDeletionLength(after_length))
return;
return DeleteSurroundingText(before_length, after_length);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 124,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnGpuSwapBuffersCompleted(
const std::vector<ui::LatencyInfo>& latency_info) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < latency_info.size(); i++) {
std::set<RenderWidgetHostImpl*> rwhi_set;
for (const auto& lc : latency_info[i].latency_components()) {
if (lc.first.first == ui::INPUT_EVENT_LATENCY_BEGIN_RWH_COMPONENT ||
lc.first.first == ui::BROWSER_SNAPSHOT_FRAME_NUMBER_COMPONENT ||
lc.first.first == ui::TAB_SHOW_COMPONENT) {
int routing_id = lc.first.second & 0xffffffff;
int process_id = (lc.first.second >> 32) & 0xffffffff;
RenderWidgetHost* rwh =
RenderWidgetHost::FromID(process_id, routing_id);
if (!rwh) {
continue;
}
RenderWidgetHostImpl* rwhi = RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(rwh);
if (rwhi_set.insert(rwhi).second)
rwhi->OnGpuSwapBuffersCompletedInternal(latency_info[i]);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Force a flush of drawing to the widget when a dialog is shown.
BUG=823353
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: I5da777068fc29c5638ef02d50e59d5d7b2729260
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/971661
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 155,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppControllerImpl::BindRequest(mojom::AppControllerRequest request) {
bindings_.AddBinding(this, std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,080 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct dm_table *dm_swap_table(struct mapped_device *md, struct dm_table *table)
{
struct dm_table *live_map = NULL, *map = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
struct queue_limits limits;
int r;
mutex_lock(&md->suspend_lock);
/* device must be suspended */
if (!dm_suspended_md(md))
goto out;
/*
* If the new table has no data devices, retain the existing limits.
* This helps multipath with queue_if_no_path if all paths disappear,
* then new I/O is queued based on these limits, and then some paths
* reappear.
*/
if (dm_table_has_no_data_devices(table)) {
live_map = dm_get_live_table_fast(md);
if (live_map)
limits = md->queue->limits;
dm_put_live_table_fast(md);
}
if (!live_map) {
r = dm_calculate_queue_limits(table, &limits);
if (r) {
map = ERR_PTR(r);
goto out;
}
}
map = __bind(md, table, &limits);
dm_issue_global_event();
out:
mutex_unlock(&md->suspend_lock);
return map;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lua_ap_add_input_filter(lua_State *L)
{
request_rec *r;
const char *filterName;
ap_filter_rec_t *filter;
luaL_checktype(L, 1, LUA_TUSERDATA);
luaL_checktype(L, 2, LUA_TSTRING);
r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
filterName = lua_tostring(L, 2);
filter = ap_get_input_filter_handle(filterName);
if (filter) {
ap_add_input_filter_handle(filter, NULL, r, r->connection);
lua_pushboolean(L, 1);
} else
lua_pushboolean(L, 0);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 45,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u8 airo_dbm_to_pct (tdsRssiEntry *rssi_rid, u8 dbm)
{
int i;
if (!rssi_rid)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
if (rssi_rid[i].rssidBm == dbm)
return rssi_rid[i].rssipct;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,945 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: getContext(XML_Parser parser)
{
DTD * const dtd = parser->m_dtd; /* save one level of indirection */
HASH_TABLE_ITER iter;
XML_Bool needSep = XML_FALSE;
if (dtd->defaultPrefix.binding) {
int i;
int len;
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T(ASCII_EQUALS)))
return NULL;
len = dtd->defaultPrefix.binding->uriLen;
if (parser->m_namespaceSeparator)
len--;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, dtd->defaultPrefix.binding->uri[i])) {
/* Because of memory caching, I don't believe this line can be
* executed.
*
* This is part of a loop copying the default prefix binding
* URI into the parser's temporary string pool. Previously,
* that URI was copied into the same string pool, with a
* terminating NUL character, as part of setContext(). When
* the pool was cleared, that leaves a block definitely big
* enough to hold the URI on the free block list of the pool.
* The URI copy in getContext() therefore cannot run out of
* memory.
*
* If the pool is used between the setContext() and
* getContext() calls, the worst it can do is leave a bigger
* block on the front of the free list. Given that this is
* all somewhat inobvious and program logic can be changed, we
* don't delete the line but we do exclude it from the test
* coverage statistics.
*/
return NULL; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
}
needSep = XML_TRUE;
}
hashTableIterInit(&iter, &(dtd->prefixes));
for (;;) {
int i;
int len;
const XML_Char *s;
PREFIX *prefix = (PREFIX *)hashTableIterNext(&iter);
if (!prefix)
break;
if (!prefix->binding) {
/* This test appears to be (justifiable) paranoia. There does
* not seem to be a way of injecting a prefix without a binding
* that doesn't get errored long before this function is called.
* The test should remain for safety's sake, so we instead
* exclude the following line from the coverage statistics.
*/
continue; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
if (needSep && !poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, CONTEXT_SEP))
return NULL;
for (s = prefix->name; *s; s++)
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *s))
return NULL;
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T(ASCII_EQUALS)))
return NULL;
len = prefix->binding->uriLen;
if (parser->m_namespaceSeparator)
len--;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, prefix->binding->uri[i]))
return NULL;
needSep = XML_TRUE;
}
hashTableIterInit(&iter, &(dtd->generalEntities));
for (;;) {
const XML_Char *s;
ENTITY *e = (ENTITY *)hashTableIterNext(&iter);
if (!e)
break;
if (!e->open)
continue;
if (needSep && !poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, CONTEXT_SEP))
return NULL;
for (s = e->name; *s; s++)
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, *s))
return 0;
needSep = XML_TRUE;
}
if (!poolAppendChar(&parser->m_tempPool, XML_T('\0')))
return NULL;
return parser->m_tempPool.start;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Fix extraction of namespace prefix from XML name (#186)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 92,331 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: htmlstartElementDebug(void *ctx ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, const xmlChar *name, const xmlChar **atts)
{
int i;
fprintf(SAXdebug, "SAX.startElement(%s", (char *) name);
if (atts != NULL) {
for (i = 0;(atts[i] != NULL);i++) {
fprintf(SAXdebug, ", %s", atts[i++]);
if (atts[i] != NULL) {
unsigned char output[40];
const unsigned char *att = atts[i];
int outlen, attlen;
fprintf(SAXdebug, "='");
while ((attlen = strlen((char*)att)) > 0) {
outlen = sizeof output - 1;
htmlEncodeEntities(output, &outlen, att, &attlen, '\'');
output[outlen] = 0;
fprintf(SAXdebug, "%s", (char *) output);
att += attlen;
}
fprintf(SAXdebug, "'");
}
}
}
fprintf(SAXdebug, ")\n");
}
Commit Message: Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 59,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int emulator_set_msr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
u32 msr_index, u64 data)
{
struct msr_data msr;
msr.data = data;
msr.index = msr_index;
msr.host_initiated = false;
return kvm_set_msr(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), &msr);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int finish_transfer(const char *fname, const char *fnametmp,
const char *fnamecmp, const char *partialptr,
struct file_struct *file, int ok_to_set_time,
int overwriting_basis)
{
int ret;
const char *temp_copy_name = partialptr && *partialptr != '/' ? partialptr : NULL;
if (inplace) {
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "finishing %s\n", fname);
fnametmp = fname;
goto do_set_file_attrs;
}
if (make_backups > 0 && overwriting_basis) {
int ok = make_backup(fname, False);
if (!ok)
exit_cleanup(RERR_FILEIO);
if (ok == 1 && fnamecmp == fname)
fnamecmp = get_backup_name(fname);
}
/* Change permissions before putting the file into place. */
set_file_attrs(fnametmp, file, NULL, fnamecmp,
ok_to_set_time ? 0 : ATTRS_SKIP_MTIME);
/* move tmp file over real file */
if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
rprintf(FINFO, "renaming %s to %s\n", fnametmp, fname);
ret = robust_rename(fnametmp, fname, temp_copy_name, file->mode);
if (ret < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "%s %s -> \"%s\"",
ret == -2 ? "copy" : "rename",
full_fname(fnametmp), fname);
if (!partialptr || (ret == -2 && temp_copy_name)
|| robust_rename(fnametmp, partialptr, NULL, file->mode) < 0)
do_unlink(fnametmp);
return 0;
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* The file was moved into place (not copied), so it's done. */
return 1;
}
/* The file was copied, so tweak the perms of the copied file. If it
* was copied to partialptr, move it into its final destination. */
fnametmp = temp_copy_name ? temp_copy_name : fname;
do_set_file_attrs:
set_file_attrs(fnametmp, file, NULL, fnamecmp,
ok_to_set_time ? 0 : ATTRS_SKIP_MTIME);
if (temp_copy_name) {
if (do_rename(fnametmp, fname) < 0) {
rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "rename %s -> \"%s\"",
full_fname(fnametmp), fname);
return 0;
}
handle_partial_dir(temp_copy_name, PDIR_DELETE);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hidp_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct sock *sk;
BT_DBG("sock %p", sock);
if (sock->type != SOCK_RAW)
return -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_BLUETOOTH, GFP_ATOMIC, &hidp_proto, kern);
if (!sk)
return -ENOMEM;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sock->ops = &hidp_sock_ops;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
sock_reset_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_state = BT_OPEN;
bt_sock_link(&hidp_sk_list, sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 0 | 90,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QTNFree(QTNode *in)
{
if (!in)
return;
/* since this function recurses, it could be driven to stack overflow. */
check_stack_depth();
if (in->valnode->type == QI_VAL && in->word && (in->flags & QTN_WORDFREE) != 0)
pfree(in->word);
if (in->child)
{
if (in->valnode)
{
if (in->valnode->type == QI_OPR && in->nchild > 0)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < in->nchild; i++)
QTNFree(in->child[i]);
}
if (in->flags & QTN_NEEDFREE)
pfree(in->valnode);
}
pfree(in->child);
}
pfree(in);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 39,040 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InstallablePaymentAppCrawler::InstallablePaymentAppCrawler(
content::WebContents* web_contents,
PaymentManifestDownloader* downloader,
PaymentManifestParser* parser,
PaymentManifestWebDataService* cache)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents),
downloader_(downloader),
parser_(parser),
number_of_payment_method_manifest_to_download_(0),
number_of_payment_method_manifest_to_parse_(0),
number_of_web_app_manifest_to_download_(0),
number_of_web_app_manifest_to_parse_(0),
number_of_web_app_icons_to_download_and_decode_(0),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: [Payments] Restrict just-in-time payment handler to payment method domain and its subdomains
Bug: 853937
Change-Id: I148b3d96950a9d90fa362e580e9593caa6b92a36
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1132116
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ganggui Tang <gogerald@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573911}
CWE ID: | 0 | 145,396 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void hrtick_start(struct rq *rq, u64 delay)
{
struct hrtimer *timer = &rq->hrtick_timer;
ktime_t time = ktime_add_ns(timer->base->get_time(), delay);
hrtimer_set_expires(timer, time);
if (rq == this_rq()) {
__hrtick_restart(rq);
} else if (!rq->hrtick_csd_pending) {
__smp_call_function_single(cpu_of(rq), &rq->hrtick_csd, 0);
rq->hrtick_csd_pending = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __acquires(proto_list_mutex)
{
mutex_lock(&proto_list_mutex);
return seq_list_start_head(&proto_list, *pos);
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 20,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt(WebPage* webPage)
: LayerTreeHost(webPage)
, m_notifyAfterScheduledLayerFlush(false)
, m_isValid(true)
#if USE(TILED_BACKING_STORE)
, m_waitingForUIProcess(false)
, m_isSuspended(false)
, m_contentsScale(1)
#endif
, m_shouldSyncFrame(false)
, m_shouldSyncRootLayer(true)
, m_layerFlushTimer(this, &LayerTreeHostQt::layerFlushTimerFired)
, m_layerFlushSchedulingEnabled(true)
{
m_rootLayer = GraphicsLayer::create(this);
WebGraphicsLayer* webRootLayer = toWebGraphicsLayer(m_rootLayer.get());
webRootLayer->setRootLayer(true);
#ifndef NDEBUG
m_rootLayer->setName("LayerTreeHostQt root layer");
#endif
m_rootLayer->setDrawsContent(false);
m_rootLayer->setSize(m_webPage->size());
m_layerTreeContext.webLayerID = toWebGraphicsLayer(webRootLayer)->id();
m_nonCompositedContentLayer = GraphicsLayer::create(this);
#if USE(TILED_BACKING_STORE)
toWebGraphicsLayer(m_rootLayer.get())->setWebGraphicsLayerClient(this);
#endif
#ifndef NDEBUG
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setName("LayerTreeHostQt non-composited content");
#endif
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setDrawsContent(true);
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setContentsOpaque(m_webPage->drawsBackground() && !m_webPage->drawsTransparentBackground());
m_nonCompositedContentLayer->setSize(m_webPage->size());
m_rootLayer->addChild(m_nonCompositedContentLayer.get());
if (m_webPage->hasPageOverlay())
createPageOverlayLayer();
scheduleLayerFlush();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 1 | 170,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nonce_generate(krb5_context ctx, unsigned int length, krb5_data *nonce_out)
{
krb5_data nonce;
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_timestamp now;
retval = krb5_timeofday(ctx, &now);
if (retval != 0)
return retval;
retval = alloc_data(&nonce, sizeof(now) + length);
if (retval != 0)
return retval;
retval = krb5_c_random_make_octets(ctx, &nonce);
if (retval != 0) {
free(nonce.data);
return retval;
}
store_32_be(now, nonce.data);
*nonce_out = nonce;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Prevent requires_preauth bypass [CVE-2015-2694]
In the OTP kdcpreauth module, don't set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH bit until
the request is successfully verified. In the PKINIT kdcpreauth
module, don't respond with code 0 on empty input or an unconfigured
realm. Together these bugs could cause the KDC preauth framework to
erroneously treat a request as pre-authenticated.
CVE-2015-2694:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, when the KDC is configured with PKINIT
support, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the
requires_preauth flag on a client principal and obtain a ciphertext
encrypted in the principal's long-term key. This ciphertext could be
used to conduct an off-line dictionary attack against the user's
password.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8160 (new)
target_version: 1.13.2
tags: pullup
subject: requires_preauth bypass in PKINIT-enabled KDC [CVE-2015-2694]
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t SoftHEVC::resetDecoder() {
ivd_ctl_reset_ip_t s_ctl_ip;
ivd_ctl_reset_op_t s_ctl_op;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
s_ctl_ip.e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_ctl_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVD_CMD_CTL_RESET;
s_ctl_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ivd_ctl_reset_ip_t);
s_ctl_op.u4_size = sizeof(ivd_ctl_reset_op_t);
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_ctl_ip,
(void *)&s_ctl_op);
if (IV_SUCCESS != status) {
ALOGE("Error in reset: 0x%x", s_ctl_op.u4_error_code);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
mSignalledError = false;
/* Set number of cores/threads to be used by the codec */
setNumCores();
mStride = 0;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: SoftHEVC: Exit gracefully in case of decoder errors
Exit for error in allocation and unsupported resolutions
Bug: 28816956
Change-Id: Ieb830bedeb3a7431d1d21a024927df630f7eda1e
CWE ID: CWE-172 | 0 | 159,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool isFullLayout() const { return m_isFullLayout; }
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,366 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLInputElement::HTMLInputElement(Document& document, HTMLFormElement* form, bool createdByParser)
: HTMLTextFormControlElement(inputTag, document, form)
, m_size(defaultSize)
, m_maxLength(maximumLength)
, m_maxResults(-1)
, m_isChecked(false)
, m_reflectsCheckedAttribute(true)
, m_isIndeterminate(false)
, m_hasType(false)
, m_isActivatedSubmit(false)
, m_autocomplete(Uninitialized)
, m_hasNonEmptyList(false)
, m_stateRestored(false)
, m_parsingInProgress(createdByParser)
, m_valueAttributeWasUpdatedAfterParsing(false)
, m_canReceiveDroppedFiles(false)
, m_hasTouchEventHandler(false)
, m_inputType(InputType::createText(*this))
, m_inputTypeView(m_inputType)
{
#if ENABLE(INPUT_MULTIPLE_FIELDS_UI)
setHasCustomStyleCallbacks();
#endif
ScriptWrappable::init(this);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long __sched io_schedule_timeout(long timeout)
{
int old_iowait = current->in_iowait;
struct rq *rq;
long ret;
current->in_iowait = 1;
blk_schedule_flush_plug(current);
delayacct_blkio_start();
rq = raw_rq();
atomic_inc(&rq->nr_iowait);
ret = schedule_timeout(timeout);
current->in_iowait = old_iowait;
atomic_dec(&rq->nr_iowait);
delayacct_blkio_end();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int common_perm_mnt_dentry(int op, struct vfsmount *mnt,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
{
struct path path = { mnt, dentry };
struct path_cond cond = { dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
dentry->d_inode->i_mode
};
return common_perm(op, &path, mask, &cond);
}
Commit Message: AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr
When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.
Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 34,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int del_instruction_bp(struct task_struct *child, int slot)
{
switch (slot) {
case 1:
if ((child->thread.debug.dbcr0 & DBCR0_IAC1) == 0)
return -ENOENT;
if (dbcr_iac_range(child) & DBCR_IAC12MODE) {
/* address range - clear slots 1 & 2 */
child->thread.debug.iac2 = 0;
dbcr_iac_range(child) &= ~DBCR_IAC12MODE;
}
child->thread.debug.iac1 = 0;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IAC1;
break;
case 2:
if ((child->thread.debug.dbcr0 & DBCR0_IAC2) == 0)
return -ENOENT;
if (dbcr_iac_range(child) & DBCR_IAC12MODE)
/* used in a range */
return -EINVAL;
child->thread.debug.iac2 = 0;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IAC2;
break;
#if CONFIG_PPC_ADV_DEBUG_IACS > 2
case 3:
if ((child->thread.debug.dbcr0 & DBCR0_IAC3) == 0)
return -ENOENT;
if (dbcr_iac_range(child) & DBCR_IAC34MODE) {
/* address range - clear slots 3 & 4 */
child->thread.debug.iac4 = 0;
dbcr_iac_range(child) &= ~DBCR_IAC34MODE;
}
child->thread.debug.iac3 = 0;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IAC3;
break;
case 4:
if ((child->thread.debug.dbcr0 & DBCR0_IAC4) == 0)
return -ENOENT;
if (dbcr_iac_range(child) & DBCR_IAC34MODE)
/* Used in a range */
return -EINVAL;
child->thread.debug.iac4 = 0;
child->thread.debug.dbcr0 &= ~DBCR0_IAC4;
break;
#endif
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
int32 surface_id,
uint64 surface_handle,
int32 route_id,
const gfx::Size& size,
int32 gpu_process_host_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer_host",
"RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnCompositorSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
if (!view_) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl::AcknowledgeBufferPresent(route_id,
gpu_process_host_id,
false,
0);
return;
}
GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params gpu_params;
gpu_params.surface_id = surface_id;
gpu_params.surface_handle = surface_handle;
gpu_params.route_id = route_id;
gpu_params.size = size;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
gpu_params.window = gfx::kNullPluginWindow;
#endif
view_->AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(gpu_params,
gpu_process_host_id);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 171,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dbus_service_name_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
FREE_PTR(global_data->dbus_service_name);
global_data->dbus_service_name = set_value(strvec);
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 75,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadResourceHandler::OnReadCompleted(
int bytes_read,
std::unique_ptr<ResourceController> controller) {
DCHECK(!has_controller());
bool defer = false;
if (!core_.OnReadCompleted(bytes_read, &defer)) {
controller->Cancel();
return;
}
if (defer) {
HoldController(std::move(controller));
} else {
controller->Resume();
}
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 151,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<WebContents> WebContentsImpl::GetCreatedWindow(
int process_id,
int main_frame_widget_route_id) {
auto key = GlobalRoutingID(process_id, main_frame_widget_route_id);
auto iter = pending_contents_.find(key);
if (iter == pending_contents_.end())
return nullptr;
std::unique_ptr<WebContents> new_contents = std::move(iter->second);
pending_contents_.erase(key);
WebContentsImpl* raw_new_contents =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(new_contents.get());
RemoveDestructionObserver(raw_new_contents);
if (BrowserPluginGuest::IsGuest(raw_new_contents))
return new_contents;
if (!new_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess()->IsInitializedAndNotDead() ||
!new_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetView()) {
return nullptr;
}
return new_contents;
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::LostCapture(RenderWidgetHostImpl* render_widget_host) {
if (!RenderViewHostImpl::From(render_widget_host))
return;
if (delegate_)
delegate_->LostCapture();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,901 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendTrimInvalidEntry2() {
SetMask(0xf); // 16-entry table.
const int kSize = 0x3000; // 12 kB
SetMaxSize(kSize * 40);
InitCache();
scoped_refptr<net::IOBuffer> buffer(new net::IOBuffer(kSize));
memset(buffer->data(), 0, kSize);
disk_cache::Entry* entry;
for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
std::string key(base::StringPrintf("some key %d", i));
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry(key, &entry), IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(kSize, WriteData(entry, 0, 0, buffer.get(), kSize, false));
entry->Close();
ASSERT_THAT(OpenEntry(key, &entry), IsOk());
}
SimulateCrash();
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry("Something else", &entry), IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(kSize, WriteData(entry, 0, 0, buffer.get(), kSize, false));
FlushQueueForTest();
EXPECT_EQ(33, cache_->GetEntryCount());
SetMaxSize(kSize);
if (new_eviction_) {
EXPECT_THAT(DoomAllEntries(), IsOk());
}
entry->Close(); // Trim the cache.
FlushQueueForTest();
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
FlushQueueForTest();
ANNOTATE_IGNORE_READS_AND_WRITES_BEGIN();
EXPECT_GE(30, cache_->GetEntryCount());
ANNOTATE_IGNORE_READS_AND_WRITES_END();
size_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 147,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void usbip_pack_cmd_submit(struct usbip_header *pdu, struct urb *urb,
int pack)
{
struct usbip_header_cmd_submit *spdu = &pdu->u.cmd_submit;
/*
* Some members are not still implemented in usbip. I hope this issue
* will be discussed when usbip is ported to other operating systems.
*/
if (pack) {
spdu->transfer_flags =
tweak_transfer_flags(urb->transfer_flags);
spdu->transfer_buffer_length = urb->transfer_buffer_length;
spdu->start_frame = urb->start_frame;
spdu->number_of_packets = urb->number_of_packets;
spdu->interval = urb->interval;
} else {
urb->transfer_flags = spdu->transfer_flags;
urb->transfer_buffer_length = spdu->transfer_buffer_length;
urb->start_frame = spdu->start_frame;
urb->number_of_packets = spdu->number_of_packets;
urb->interval = spdu->interval;
}
}
Commit Message: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void init_ring_ptrs(struct atl2_adapter *adapter)
{
/* Read / Write Ptr Initialize: */
adapter->txd_write_ptr = 0;
atomic_set(&adapter->txd_read_ptr, 0);
adapter->rxd_read_ptr = 0;
adapter->rxd_write_ptr = 0;
atomic_set(&adapter->txs_write_ptr, 0);
adapter->txs_next_clear = 0;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_da3_swap_lastblock(
struct xfs_da_args *args,
xfs_dablk_t *dead_blknop,
struct xfs_buf **dead_bufp)
{
struct xfs_da_blkinfo *dead_info;
struct xfs_da_blkinfo *sib_info;
struct xfs_da_intnode *par_node;
struct xfs_da_intnode *dead_node;
struct xfs_dir2_leaf *dead_leaf2;
struct xfs_da_node_entry *btree;
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr par_hdr;
struct xfs_inode *dp;
struct xfs_trans *tp;
struct xfs_mount *mp;
struct xfs_buf *dead_buf;
struct xfs_buf *last_buf;
struct xfs_buf *sib_buf;
struct xfs_buf *par_buf;
xfs_dahash_t dead_hash;
xfs_fileoff_t lastoff;
xfs_dablk_t dead_blkno;
xfs_dablk_t last_blkno;
xfs_dablk_t sib_blkno;
xfs_dablk_t par_blkno;
int error;
int w;
int entno;
int level;
int dead_level;
trace_xfs_da_swap_lastblock(args);
dead_buf = *dead_bufp;
dead_blkno = *dead_blknop;
tp = args->trans;
dp = args->dp;
w = args->whichfork;
ASSERT(w == XFS_DATA_FORK);
mp = dp->i_mount;
lastoff = mp->m_dirfreeblk;
error = xfs_bmap_last_before(tp, dp, &lastoff, w);
if (error)
return error;
if (unlikely(lastoff == 0)) {
XFS_ERROR_REPORT("xfs_da_swap_lastblock(1)", XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW,
mp);
return XFS_ERROR(EFSCORRUPTED);
}
/*
* Read the last block in the btree space.
*/
last_blkno = (xfs_dablk_t)lastoff - mp->m_dirblkfsbs;
error = xfs_da3_node_read(tp, dp, last_blkno, -1, &last_buf, w);
if (error)
return error;
/*
* Copy the last block into the dead buffer and log it.
*/
memcpy(dead_buf->b_addr, last_buf->b_addr, mp->m_dirblksize);
xfs_trans_log_buf(tp, dead_buf, 0, mp->m_dirblksize - 1);
dead_info = dead_buf->b_addr;
/*
* Get values from the moved block.
*/
if (dead_info->magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DIR2_LEAFN_MAGIC) ||
dead_info->magic == cpu_to_be16(XFS_DIR3_LEAFN_MAGIC)) {
struct xfs_dir3_icleaf_hdr leafhdr;
struct xfs_dir2_leaf_entry *ents;
dead_leaf2 = (xfs_dir2_leaf_t *)dead_info;
dp->d_ops->leaf_hdr_from_disk(&leafhdr, dead_leaf2);
ents = dp->d_ops->leaf_ents_p(dead_leaf2);
dead_level = 0;
dead_hash = be32_to_cpu(ents[leafhdr.count - 1].hashval);
} else {
struct xfs_da3_icnode_hdr deadhdr;
dead_node = (xfs_da_intnode_t *)dead_info;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&deadhdr, dead_node);
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(dead_node);
dead_level = deadhdr.level;
dead_hash = be32_to_cpu(btree[deadhdr.count - 1].hashval);
}
sib_buf = par_buf = NULL;
/*
* If the moved block has a left sibling, fix up the pointers.
*/
if ((sib_blkno = be32_to_cpu(dead_info->back))) {
error = xfs_da3_node_read(tp, dp, sib_blkno, -1, &sib_buf, w);
if (error)
goto done;
sib_info = sib_buf->b_addr;
if (unlikely(
be32_to_cpu(sib_info->forw) != last_blkno ||
sib_info->magic != dead_info->magic)) {
XFS_ERROR_REPORT("xfs_da_swap_lastblock(2)",
XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW, mp);
error = XFS_ERROR(EFSCORRUPTED);
goto done;
}
sib_info->forw = cpu_to_be32(dead_blkno);
xfs_trans_log_buf(tp, sib_buf,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(sib_info, &sib_info->forw,
sizeof(sib_info->forw)));
sib_buf = NULL;
}
/*
* If the moved block has a right sibling, fix up the pointers.
*/
if ((sib_blkno = be32_to_cpu(dead_info->forw))) {
error = xfs_da3_node_read(tp, dp, sib_blkno, -1, &sib_buf, w);
if (error)
goto done;
sib_info = sib_buf->b_addr;
if (unlikely(
be32_to_cpu(sib_info->back) != last_blkno ||
sib_info->magic != dead_info->magic)) {
XFS_ERROR_REPORT("xfs_da_swap_lastblock(3)",
XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW, mp);
error = XFS_ERROR(EFSCORRUPTED);
goto done;
}
sib_info->back = cpu_to_be32(dead_blkno);
xfs_trans_log_buf(tp, sib_buf,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(sib_info, &sib_info->back,
sizeof(sib_info->back)));
sib_buf = NULL;
}
par_blkno = mp->m_dirleafblk;
level = -1;
/*
* Walk down the tree looking for the parent of the moved block.
*/
for (;;) {
error = xfs_da3_node_read(tp, dp, par_blkno, -1, &par_buf, w);
if (error)
goto done;
par_node = par_buf->b_addr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&par_hdr, par_node);
if (level >= 0 && level != par_hdr.level + 1) {
XFS_ERROR_REPORT("xfs_da_swap_lastblock(4)",
XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW, mp);
error = XFS_ERROR(EFSCORRUPTED);
goto done;
}
level = par_hdr.level;
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(par_node);
for (entno = 0;
entno < par_hdr.count &&
be32_to_cpu(btree[entno].hashval) < dead_hash;
entno++)
continue;
if (entno == par_hdr.count) {
XFS_ERROR_REPORT("xfs_da_swap_lastblock(5)",
XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW, mp);
error = XFS_ERROR(EFSCORRUPTED);
goto done;
}
par_blkno = be32_to_cpu(btree[entno].before);
if (level == dead_level + 1)
break;
xfs_trans_brelse(tp, par_buf);
par_buf = NULL;
}
/*
* We're in the right parent block.
* Look for the right entry.
*/
for (;;) {
for (;
entno < par_hdr.count &&
be32_to_cpu(btree[entno].before) != last_blkno;
entno++)
continue;
if (entno < par_hdr.count)
break;
par_blkno = par_hdr.forw;
xfs_trans_brelse(tp, par_buf);
par_buf = NULL;
if (unlikely(par_blkno == 0)) {
XFS_ERROR_REPORT("xfs_da_swap_lastblock(6)",
XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW, mp);
error = XFS_ERROR(EFSCORRUPTED);
goto done;
}
error = xfs_da3_node_read(tp, dp, par_blkno, -1, &par_buf, w);
if (error)
goto done;
par_node = par_buf->b_addr;
dp->d_ops->node_hdr_from_disk(&par_hdr, par_node);
if (par_hdr.level != level) {
XFS_ERROR_REPORT("xfs_da_swap_lastblock(7)",
XFS_ERRLEVEL_LOW, mp);
error = XFS_ERROR(EFSCORRUPTED);
goto done;
}
btree = dp->d_ops->node_tree_p(par_node);
entno = 0;
}
/*
* Update the parent entry pointing to the moved block.
*/
btree[entno].before = cpu_to_be32(dead_blkno);
xfs_trans_log_buf(tp, par_buf,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(par_node, &btree[entno].before,
sizeof(btree[entno].before)));
*dead_blknop = last_blkno;
*dead_bufp = last_buf;
return 0;
done:
if (par_buf)
xfs_trans_brelse(tp, par_buf);
if (sib_buf)
xfs_trans_brelse(tp, sib_buf);
xfs_trans_brelse(tp, last_buf);
return error;
}
Commit Message: xfs: fix directory hash ordering bug
Commit f5ea1100 ("xfs: add CRCs to dir2/da node blocks") introduced
in 3.10 incorrectly converted the btree hash index array pointer in
xfs_da3_fixhashpath(). It resulted in the the current hash always
being compared against the first entry in the btree rather than the
current block index into the btree block's hash entry array. As a
result, it was comparing the wrong hashes, and so could misorder the
entries in the btree.
For most cases, this doesn't cause any problems as it requires hash
collisions to expose the ordering problem. However, when there are
hash collisions within a directory there is a very good probability
that the entries will be ordered incorrectly and that actually
matters when duplicate hashes are placed into or removed from the
btree block hash entry array.
This bug results in an on-disk directory corruption and that results
in directory verifier functions throwing corruption warnings into
the logs. While no data or directory entries are lost, access to
them may be compromised, and attempts to remove entries from a
directory that has suffered from this corruption may result in a
filesystem shutdown. xfs_repair will fix the directory hash
ordering without data loss occuring.
[dchinner: wrote useful a commit message]
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Mark Tinguely <tinguely@sgi.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t hung_up_tty_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
return -EIO;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TraceEventTestFixture::OnTraceDataCollected(
WaitableEvent* flush_complete_event,
const scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedString>& events_str,
bool has_more_events) {
num_flush_callbacks_++;
if (num_flush_callbacks_ > 1) {
EXPECT_FALSE(events_str->data().empty());
}
AutoLock lock(lock_);
json_output_.json_output.clear();
trace_buffer_.Start();
trace_buffer_.AddFragment(events_str->data());
trace_buffer_.Finish();
scoped_ptr<Value> root = base::JSONReader::Read(
json_output_.json_output, JSON_PARSE_RFC | JSON_DETACHABLE_CHILDREN);
if (!root.get()) {
LOG(ERROR) << json_output_.json_output;
}
ListValue* root_list = NULL;
ASSERT_TRUE(root.get());
ASSERT_TRUE(root->GetAsList(&root_list));
while (root_list->GetSize()) {
scoped_ptr<Value> item;
root_list->Remove(0, &item);
trace_parsed_.Append(item.release());
}
if (!has_more_events)
flush_complete_event->Signal();
}
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Browser::GetWebContentsModalDialogHost() {
return window_->GetWebContentsModalDialogHost();
}
Commit Message: Don't focus the location bar for NTP navigations in non-selected tabs.
BUG=677716
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2624373002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#443338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 139,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestMarkDirty(
const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
base::PlatformFileError expected_error,
int expected_cache_state,
GDataRootDirectory::CacheSubDirectoryType expected_sub_dir_type) {
expected_error_ = expected_error;
expected_cache_state_ = expected_cache_state;
expected_sub_dir_type_ = expected_sub_dir_type;
expect_outgoing_symlink_ = false;
file_system_->MarkDirtyInCache(resource_id, md5,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystemTest::VerifyMarkDirty,
base::Unretained(this)));
RunAllPendingForIO();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: box_eq(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
BOX *box1 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(0);
BOX *box2 = PG_GETARG_BOX_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPeq(box_ar(box1), box_ar(box2)));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tty_paranoia_check(struct tty_struct *tty, struct inode *inode,
const char *routine)
{
#ifdef TTY_PARANOIA_CHECK
if (!tty) {
pr_warn("(%d:%d): %s: NULL tty\n",
imajor(inode), iminor(inode), routine);
return 1;
}
if (tty->magic != TTY_MAGIC) {
pr_warn("(%d:%d): %s: bad magic number\n",
imajor(inode), iminor(inode), routine);
return 1;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,933 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForOverflowScrolling(const RenderLayer* layer) const
{
return layer->needsCompositedScrolling();
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 113,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey)
{
return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EC_KEY,EC_KEY_new,d2i_EC_PUBKEY,fp,eckey);
}
Commit Message: Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 94,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const URI_TYPE(TextRange) * b) {
int diff;
/* NOTE: Both NULL means equal! */
if ((a == NULL) || (b == NULL)) {
return ((a == NULL) ? 0 : 1) - ((b == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
}
/* NOTE: Both NULL means equal! */
if ((a->first == NULL) || (b->first == NULL)) {
return ((a->first == NULL) ? 0 : 1) - ((b->first == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
}
diff = ((int)(a->afterLast - a->first) - (int)(b->afterLast - b->first));
if (diff > 0) {
return 1;
} else if (diff < 0) {
return -1;
}
diff = URI_STRNCMP(a->first, b->first, (a->afterLast - a->first));
if (diff > 0) {
return 1;
} else if (diff < 0) {
return -1;
}
return diff;
}
Commit Message: ResetUri: Protect against NULL
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 75,715 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void machine_power_off(void)
{
machine_shutdown();
if (pm_power_off)
pm_power_off();
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,342 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void iwpvt_default_free(void *userdata, void *mem)
{
free(mem);
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682 | 0 | 66,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ConfirmInfoBarDelegate::GetInfoBarAutomationType() const {
return CONFIRM_INFOBAR;
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,212 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dm_init_md_queue(struct mapped_device *md)
{
/*
* Request-based dm devices cannot be stacked on top of bio-based dm
* devices. The type of this dm device may not have been decided yet.
* The type is decided at the first table loading time.
* To prevent problematic device stacking, clear the queue flag
* for request stacking support until then.
*
* This queue is new, so no concurrency on the queue_flags.
*/
queue_flag_clear_unlocked(QUEUE_FLAG_STACKABLE, md->queue);
/*
* Initialize data that will only be used by a non-blk-mq DM queue
* - must do so here (in alloc_dev callchain) before queue is used
*/
md->queue->queuedata = md;
md->queue->backing_dev_info->congested_data = md;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,904 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: u16 skb_tx_hash(const struct net_device *dev, const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u32 hash;
if (skb_rx_queue_recorded(skb)) {
hash = skb_get_rx_queue(skb);
while (unlikely(hash >= dev->real_num_tx_queues))
hash -= dev->real_num_tx_queues;
return hash;
}
if (skb->sk && skb->sk->sk_hash)
hash = skb->sk->sk_hash;
else
hash = (__force u16) skb->protocol;
hash = jhash_1word(hash, hashrnd);
return (u16) (((u64) hash * dev->real_num_tx_queues) >> 32);
}
Commit Message: netdevice.h net/core/dev.c: Convert netdev_<level> logging macros to functions
Reduces an x86 defconfig text and data ~2k.
text is smaller, data is larger.
$ size vmlinux*
text data bss dec hex filename
7198862 720112 1366288 9285262 8dae8e vmlinux
7205273 716016 1366288 9287577 8db799 vmlinux.device_h
Uses %pV and struct va_format
Format arguments are verified before printk
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,012 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GetWebRTCSessionDescriptionFromSessionDescriptionCallback(
base::OnceCallback<const webrtc::SessionDescriptionInterface*()>
description_callback,
blink::WebRTCSessionDescription* web_description) {
const webrtc::SessionDescriptionInterface* description =
std::move(description_callback).Run();
if (description) {
std::string sdp;
description->ToString(&sdp);
web_description->Initialize(blink::WebString::FromUTF8(description->type()),
blink::WebString::FromUTF8(sdp));
}
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,954 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t StreamingProcessor::updatePreviewRequest(const Parameters ¶ms) {
ATRACE_CALL();
status_t res;
sp<CameraDeviceBase> device = mDevice.promote();
if (device == 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Device does not exist", __FUNCTION__, mId);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
Mutex::Autolock m(mMutex);
if (mPreviewRequest.entryCount() == 0) {
sp<Camera2Client> client = mClient.promote();
if (client == 0) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Client does not exist", __FUNCTION__, mId);
return INVALID_OPERATION;
}
if (client->getCameraDeviceVersion() >= CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_0) {
if (params.zslMode && !params.recordingHint) {
res = device->createDefaultRequest(CAMERA3_TEMPLATE_ZERO_SHUTTER_LAG,
&mPreviewRequest);
} else {
res = device->createDefaultRequest(CAMERA3_TEMPLATE_PREVIEW,
&mPreviewRequest);
}
} else {
res = device->createDefaultRequest(CAMERA2_TEMPLATE_PREVIEW,
&mPreviewRequest);
}
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to create default preview request: "
"%s (%d)", __FUNCTION__, mId, strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
}
res = params.updateRequest(&mPreviewRequest);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to update common entries of preview "
"request: %s (%d)", __FUNCTION__, mId,
strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
res = mPreviewRequest.update(ANDROID_REQUEST_ID,
&mPreviewRequestId, 1);
if (res != OK) {
ALOGE("%s: Camera %d: Unable to update request id for preview: %s (%d)",
__FUNCTION__, mId, strerror(-res), res);
return res;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,378 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: content::WebContents* web_contents() {
return WebContentsObserver::web_contents();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sas_ata_end_eh(struct ata_port *ap)
{
struct domain_device *dev = ap->private_data;
struct sas_ha_struct *ha = dev->port->ha;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ha->lock, flags);
if (test_and_clear_bit(SAS_DEV_EH_PENDING, &dev->state))
ha->eh_active--;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ha->lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 85,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_rx_bufs_multiplier_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
unsigned rx_buf_mult;
if (!strvec)
return;
if (vector_size(strvec) != 2) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Invalid vrrp_rx_bufs_multiplier");
return;
}
if (!read_unsigned_strvec(strvec, 1, &rx_buf_mult, 1, UINT_MAX, false))
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "Invalid vrrp_rx_bufs_multiplier %s", FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
else
global_data->vrrp_rx_bufs_multiples = rx_buf_mult;
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 75,886 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebWindowFeatures GetWindowFeaturesFromString(const String& feature_string) {
WebWindowFeatures window_features;
if (feature_string.IsEmpty())
return window_features;
window_features.menu_bar_visible = false;
window_features.status_bar_visible = false;
window_features.tool_bar_visible = false;
window_features.scrollbars_visible = false;
unsigned key_begin, key_end;
unsigned value_begin, value_end;
String buffer = feature_string.DeprecatedLower();
unsigned length = buffer.length();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length;) {
while (i < length && IsWindowFeaturesSeparator(buffer[i]))
i++;
key_begin = i;
while (i < length && !IsWindowFeaturesSeparator(buffer[i]))
i++;
key_end = i;
SECURITY_DCHECK(i <= length);
while (i < length && buffer[i] != '=') {
if (buffer[i] == ',')
break;
i++;
}
SECURITY_DCHECK(i <= length);
while (i < length && IsWindowFeaturesSeparator(buffer[i])) {
if (buffer[i] == ',')
break;
i++;
}
value_begin = i;
SECURITY_DCHECK(i <= length);
while (i < length && !IsWindowFeaturesSeparator(buffer[i]))
i++;
value_end = i;
SECURITY_DCHECK(i <= length);
String key_string(buffer.Substring(key_begin, key_end - key_begin));
String value_string(buffer.Substring(value_begin, value_end - value_begin));
int value;
if (value_string.IsEmpty() || value_string == "yes")
value = 1;
else
value = value_string.ToInt();
if (key_string == "left" || key_string == "screenx") {
window_features.x_set = true;
window_features.x = value;
} else if (key_string == "top" || key_string == "screeny") {
window_features.y_set = true;
window_features.y = value;
} else if (key_string == "width" || key_string == "innerwidth") {
window_features.width_set = true;
window_features.width = value;
} else if (key_string == "height" || key_string == "innerheight") {
window_features.height_set = true;
window_features.height = value;
} else if (key_string == "menubar") {
window_features.menu_bar_visible = value;
} else if (key_string == "toolbar" || key_string == "location") {
window_features.tool_bar_visible |= static_cast<bool>(value);
} else if (key_string == "status") {
window_features.status_bar_visible = value;
} else if (key_string == "scrollbars") {
window_features.scrollbars_visible = value;
} else if (key_string == "resizable") {
window_features.resizable = value;
} else if (key_string == "noopener") {
window_features.noopener = true;
} else if (key_string == "background") {
window_features.background = true;
} else if (key_string == "persistent") {
window_features.persistent = true;
}
}
return window_features;
}
Commit Message: CSP now prevents opening javascript url windows when they're not allowed
spec: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate
which leads to: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#should-block-navigation-request
Bug: 756040
Change-Id: I5fd62ebfb6fe1d767694b0ed6cf427c8ea95994a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/632580
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#497338}
CWE ID: | 0 | 150,938 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void compute_string_bbox(TextInfo *text, DBBox *bbox)
{
int i;
if (text->length > 0) {
bbox->xMin = 32000;
bbox->xMax = -32000;
bbox->yMin = -1 * text->lines[0].asc + d6_to_double(text->glyphs[0].pos.y);
bbox->yMax = text->height - text->lines[0].asc +
d6_to_double(text->glyphs[0].pos.y);
for (i = 0; i < text->length; ++i) {
GlyphInfo *info = text->glyphs + i;
if (info->skip) continue;
double s = d6_to_double(info->pos.x);
double e = s + d6_to_double(info->cluster_advance.x);
bbox->xMin = FFMIN(bbox->xMin, s);
bbox->xMax = FFMAX(bbox->xMax, e);
}
} else
bbox->xMin = bbox->xMax = bbox->yMin = bbox->yMax = 0.;
}
Commit Message: Fix line wrapping mode 0/3 bugs
This fixes two separate bugs:
a) Don't move a linebreak into the first symbol. This results in a empty
line at the front, which does not help to equalize line lengths at all.
b) When moving a linebreak into a symbol that already is a break, the
number of lines must be decremented. Otherwise, uninitialized memory
is possibly used for later layout operations.
Found by fuzzer test case
id:000085,sig:11,src:003377+003350,op:splice,rep:8.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tpacket_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
struct packet_type *pt, struct net_device *orig_dev)
{
struct sock *sk;
struct packet_sock *po;
struct sockaddr_ll *sll;
union tpacket_uhdr h;
u8 *skb_head = skb->data;
int skb_len = skb->len;
unsigned int snaplen, res;
unsigned long status = TP_STATUS_USER;
unsigned short macoff, netoff, hdrlen;
struct sk_buff *copy_skb = NULL;
struct timespec ts;
__u32 ts_status;
bool is_drop_n_account = false;
/* struct tpacket{2,3}_hdr is aligned to a multiple of TPACKET_ALIGNMENT.
* We may add members to them until current aligned size without forcing
* userspace to call getsockopt(..., PACKET_HDRLEN, ...).
*/
BUILD_BUG_ON(TPACKET_ALIGN(sizeof(*h.h2)) != 32);
BUILD_BUG_ON(TPACKET_ALIGN(sizeof(*h.h3)) != 48);
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK)
goto drop;
sk = pt->af_packet_priv;
po = pkt_sk(sk);
if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), sock_net(sk)))
goto drop;
if (dev->header_ops) {
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_DGRAM)
skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb));
else if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OUTGOING) {
/* Special case: outgoing packets have ll header at head */
skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb));
}
}
snaplen = skb->len;
res = run_filter(skb, sk, snaplen);
if (!res)
goto drop_n_restore;
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
status |= TP_STATUS_CSUMNOTREADY;
else if (skb->pkt_type != PACKET_OUTGOING &&
(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE ||
skb_csum_unnecessary(skb)))
status |= TP_STATUS_CSUM_VALID;
if (snaplen > res)
snaplen = res;
if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) {
macoff = netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen) + 16 +
po->tp_reserve;
} else {
unsigned int maclen = skb_network_offset(skb);
netoff = TPACKET_ALIGN(po->tp_hdrlen +
(maclen < 16 ? 16 : maclen)) +
po->tp_reserve;
if (po->has_vnet_hdr)
netoff += sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
macoff = netoff - maclen;
}
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
if (macoff + snaplen > po->rx_ring.frame_size) {
if (po->copy_thresh &&
atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) < sk->sk_rcvbuf) {
if (skb_shared(skb)) {
copy_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
} else {
copy_skb = skb_get(skb);
skb_head = skb->data;
}
if (copy_skb)
skb_set_owner_r(copy_skb, sk);
}
snaplen = po->rx_ring.frame_size - macoff;
if ((int)snaplen < 0)
snaplen = 0;
}
} else if (unlikely(macoff + snaplen >
GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len)) {
u32 nval;
nval = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len - macoff;
pr_err_once("tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from %u to %u. macoff=%u\n",
snaplen, nval, macoff);
snaplen = nval;
if (unlikely((int)snaplen < 0)) {
snaplen = 0;
macoff = GET_PBDQC_FROM_RB(&po->rx_ring)->max_frame_len;
}
}
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
h.raw = packet_current_rx_frame(po, skb,
TP_STATUS_KERNEL, (macoff+snaplen));
if (!h.raw)
goto drop_n_account;
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
packet_increment_rx_head(po, &po->rx_ring);
/*
* LOSING will be reported till you read the stats,
* because it's COR - Clear On Read.
* Anyways, moving it for V1/V2 only as V3 doesn't need this
* at packet level.
*/
if (po->stats.stats1.tp_drops)
status |= TP_STATUS_LOSING;
}
po->stats.stats1.tp_packets++;
if (copy_skb) {
status |= TP_STATUS_COPY;
__skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, copy_skb);
}
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
if (po->has_vnet_hdr) {
if (__packet_rcv_vnet(skb, h.raw + macoff -
sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr))) {
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
goto drop_n_account;
}
}
skb_copy_bits(skb, 0, h.raw + macoff, snaplen);
if (!(ts_status = tpacket_get_timestamp(skb, &ts, po->tp_tstamp)))
getnstimeofday(&ts);
status |= ts_status;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
h.h1->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h1->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h1->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h1->tp_net = netoff;
h.h1->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h1->tp_usec = ts.tv_nsec / NSEC_PER_USEC;
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h1);
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
h.h2->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h2->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h2->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h2->tp_net = netoff;
h.h2->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h2->tp_nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
if (skb_vlan_tag_present(skb)) {
h.h2->tp_vlan_tci = skb_vlan_tag_get(skb);
h.h2->tp_vlan_tpid = ntohs(skb->vlan_proto);
status |= TP_STATUS_VLAN_VALID | TP_STATUS_VLAN_TPID_VALID;
} else {
h.h2->tp_vlan_tci = 0;
h.h2->tp_vlan_tpid = 0;
}
memset(h.h2->tp_padding, 0, sizeof(h.h2->tp_padding));
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h2);
break;
case TPACKET_V3:
/* tp_nxt_offset,vlan are already populated above.
* So DONT clear those fields here
*/
h.h3->tp_status |= status;
h.h3->tp_len = skb->len;
h.h3->tp_snaplen = snaplen;
h.h3->tp_mac = macoff;
h.h3->tp_net = netoff;
h.h3->tp_sec = ts.tv_sec;
h.h3->tp_nsec = ts.tv_nsec;
memset(h.h3->tp_padding, 0, sizeof(h.h3->tp_padding));
hdrlen = sizeof(*h.h3);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
sll = h.raw + TPACKET_ALIGN(hdrlen);
sll->sll_halen = dev_parse_header(skb, sll->sll_addr);
sll->sll_family = AF_PACKET;
sll->sll_hatype = dev->type;
sll->sll_protocol = skb->protocol;
sll->sll_pkttype = skb->pkt_type;
if (unlikely(po->origdev))
sll->sll_ifindex = orig_dev->ifindex;
else
sll->sll_ifindex = dev->ifindex;
smp_mb();
#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE == 1
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
u8 *start, *end;
end = (u8 *) PAGE_ALIGN((unsigned long) h.raw +
macoff + snaplen);
for (start = h.raw; start < end; start += PAGE_SIZE)
flush_dcache_page(pgv_to_page(start));
}
smp_wmb();
#endif
if (po->tp_version <= TPACKET_V2) {
__packet_set_status(po, h.raw, status);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
} else {
prb_clear_blk_fill_status(&po->rx_ring);
}
drop_n_restore:
if (skb_head != skb->data && skb_shared(skb)) {
skb->data = skb_head;
skb->len = skb_len;
}
drop:
if (!is_drop_n_account)
consume_skb(skb);
else
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
drop_n_account:
is_drop_n_account = true;
po->stats.stats1.tp_drops++;
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock);
sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
kfree_skb(copy_skb);
goto drop_n_restore;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix race condition in packet_set_ring
When packet_set_ring creates a ring buffer it will initialize a
struct timer_list if the packet version is TPACKET_V3. This value
can then be raced by a different thread calling setsockopt to
set the version to TPACKET_V1 before packet_set_ring has finished.
This leads to a use-after-free on a function pointer in the
struct timer_list when the socket is closed as the previously
initialized timer will not be deleted.
The bug is fixed by taking lock_sock(sk) in packet_setsockopt when
changing the packet version while also taking the lock at the start
of packet_set_ring.
Fixes: f6fb8f100b80 ("af-packet: TPACKET_V3 flexible buffer implementation.")
Signed-off-by: Philip Pettersson <philip.pettersson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 49,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::FlushHelper() {
helper_->CommandBufferHelper::Flush();
if (aggressively_free_resources_)
FreeEverything();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long sched_group_rt_period(struct task_group *tg)
{
u64 rt_period_us;
rt_period_us = ktime_to_ns(tg->rt_bandwidth.rt_period);
do_div(rt_period_us, NSEC_PER_USEC);
return rt_period_us;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int exception_type(int vector)
{
unsigned int mask;
if (WARN_ON(vector > 31 || vector == NMI_VECTOR))
return EXCPT_INTERRUPT;
mask = 1 << vector;
/* #DB is trap, as instruction watchpoints are handled elsewhere */
if (mask & ((1 << DB_VECTOR) | (1 << BP_VECTOR) | (1 << OF_VECTOR)))
return EXCPT_TRAP;
if (mask & ((1 << DF_VECTOR) | (1 << MC_VECTOR)))
return EXCPT_ABORT;
/* Reserved exceptions will result in fault */
return EXCPT_FAULT;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 35,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeContentUtilityClient::PreSandboxStartup() {
#if defined(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
extensions::ExtensionsHandler::PreSandboxStartup();
#endif
#if defined(ENABLE_MDNS)
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kUtilityProcessEnableMDns)) {
local_discovery::ServiceDiscoveryMessageHandler::PreSandboxStartup();
}
#endif // ENABLE_MDNS
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit l2cap_exit(void)
{
class_remove_file(bt_class, &class_attr_l2cap);
if (bt_sock_unregister(BTPROTO_L2CAP) < 0)
BT_ERR("L2CAP socket unregistration failed");
if (hci_unregister_proto(&l2cap_hci_proto) < 0)
BT_ERR("L2CAP protocol unregistration failed");
proto_unregister(&l2cap_proto);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <gustavo@las.ic.unicamp.br>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 58,943 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QList<Smb4KShare *> Smb4KGlobal::findShareByUNC(const QString &unc)
{
QList<Smb4KShare *> shares;
mutex.lock();
if (!unc.isEmpty() && !p->mountedSharesList.isEmpty())
{
for (Smb4KShare *s : p->mountedSharesList)
{
if (QString::compare(s->unc(), unc, Qt::CaseInsensitive) == 0)
{
shares += s;
}
else
{
}
}
}
else
{
}
mutex.unlock();
return shares;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 6,603 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TextureDefinition* TextureManager::Save(TextureInfo* info) {
DCHECK(info->owned_);
if (info->IsAttachedToFramebuffer())
return NULL;
if (info->IsImmutable())
return NULL;
TextureDefinition::LevelInfos level_infos(info->level_infos_.size());
for (size_t face = 0; face < level_infos.size(); ++face) {
GLenum target = info->target() == GL_TEXTURE_2D ?
GL_TEXTURE_2D : FaceIndexToGLTarget(face);
for (size_t level = 0; level < info->level_infos_[face].size(); ++level) {
const TextureInfo::LevelInfo& level_info =
info->level_infos_[face][level];
level_infos[face].push_back(
TextureDefinition::LevelInfo(target,
level_info.internal_format,
level_info.width,
level_info.height,
level_info.depth,
level_info.border,
level_info.format,
level_info.type,
level_info.cleared));
SetLevelInfo(info,
target,
level,
GL_RGBA,
0,
0,
0,
0,
GL_RGBA,
GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE,
true);
}
}
GLuint old_service_id = info->service_id();
GLuint new_service_id = 0;
glGenTextures(1, &new_service_id);
info->SetServiceId(new_service_id);
return new TextureDefinition(info->target(),
old_service_id,
level_infos);
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int FS_ReturnPath( const char *zname, char *zpath, int *depth ) {
int len, at, newdep;
newdep = 0;
zpath[0] = 0;
len = 0;
at = 0;
while ( zname[at] != 0 )
{
if ( zname[at] == '/' || zname[at] == '\\' ) {
len = at;
newdep++;
}
at++;
}
strcpy( zpath, zname );
zpath[len] = 0;
*depth = newdep;
return len;
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int vb2_streamoff(struct vb2_queue *q, enum v4l2_buf_type type)
{
if (vb2_fileio_is_active(q)) {
dprintk(1, "file io in progress\n");
return -EBUSY;
}
return vb2_core_streamoff(q, type);
}
Commit Message: [media] videobuf2-v4l2: Verify planes array in buffer dequeueing
When a buffer is being dequeued using VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL, the exact buffer
which will be dequeued is not known until the buffer has been removed from
the queue. The number of planes is specific to a buffer, not to the queue.
This does lead to the situation where multi-plane buffers may be requested
and queued with n planes, but VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL may be passed an argument
struct with fewer planes.
__fill_v4l2_buffer() however uses the number of planes from the dequeued
videobuf2 buffer, overwriting kernel memory (the m.planes array allocated
in video_usercopy() in v4l2-ioctl.c) if the user provided fewer
planes than the dequeued buffer had. Oops!
Fixes: b0e0e1f83de3 ("[media] media: videobuf2: Prepare to divide videobuf2")
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v4.4 and later
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool readCryptoKey(v8::Handle<v8::Value>* value)
{
uint32_t rawKeyType;
if (!doReadUint32(&rawKeyType))
return false;
blink::WebCryptoKeyAlgorithm algorithm;
blink::WebCryptoKeyType type = blink::WebCryptoKeyTypeSecret;
switch (static_cast<CryptoKeySubTag>(rawKeyType)) {
case AesKeyTag:
if (!doReadAesKey(algorithm, type))
return false;
break;
case HmacKeyTag:
if (!doReadHmacKey(algorithm, type))
return false;
break;
case RsaHashedKeyTag:
if (!doReadRsaHashedKey(algorithm, type))
return false;
break;
default:
return false;
}
blink::WebCryptoKeyUsageMask usages;
bool extractable;
if (!doReadKeyUsages(usages, extractable))
return false;
uint32_t keyDataLength;
if (!doReadUint32(&keyDataLength))
return false;
if (m_position + keyDataLength > m_length)
return false;
const uint8_t* keyData = m_buffer + m_position;
m_position += keyDataLength;
blink::WebCryptoKey key = blink::WebCryptoKey::createNull();
if (!blink::Platform::current()->crypto()->deserializeKeyForClone(
algorithm, type, extractable, usages, keyData, keyDataLength, key)) {
return false;
}
*value = toV8(CryptoKey::create(key), m_scriptState->context()->Global(), isolate());
return true;
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hub_power_on(struct usb_hub *hub, bool do_delay)
{
int port1;
/* Enable power on each port. Some hubs have reserved values
* of LPSM (> 2) in their descriptors, even though they are
* USB 2.0 hubs. Some hubs do not implement port-power switching
* but only emulate it. In all cases, the ports won't work
* unless we send these messages to the hub.
*/
if (hub_is_port_power_switchable(hub))
dev_dbg(hub->intfdev, "enabling power on all ports\n");
else
dev_dbg(hub->intfdev, "trying to enable port power on "
"non-switchable hub\n");
for (port1 = 1; port1 <= hub->hdev->maxchild; port1++)
if (test_bit(port1, hub->power_bits))
set_port_feature(hub->hdev, port1, USB_PORT_FEAT_POWER);
else
usb_clear_port_feature(hub->hdev, port1,
USB_PORT_FEAT_POWER);
if (do_delay)
msleep(hub_power_on_good_delay(hub));
}
Commit Message: USB: fix invalid memory access in hub_activate()
Commit 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to
delayed_work") changed the hub_activate() routine to make part of it
run in a workqueue. However, the commit failed to take a reference to
the usb_hub structure or to lock the hub interface while doing so. As
a result, if a hub is plugged in and quickly unplugged before the work
routine can run, the routine will try to access memory that has been
deallocated. Or, if the hub is unplugged while the routine is
running, the memory may be deallocated while it is in active use.
This patch fixes the problem by taking a reference to the usb_hub at
the start of hub_activate() and releasing it at the end (when the work
is finished), and by locking the hub interface while the work routine
is running. It also adds a check at the start of the routine to see
if the hub has already been disconnected, in which nothing should be
done.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Tested-by: Alexandru Cornea <alexandru.cornea@intel.com>
Fixes: 8520f38099cc ("USB: change hub initialization sleeps to delayed_work")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 56,763 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Sdb *store_versioninfo(ELFOBJ *bin) {
Sdb *sdb_versioninfo = NULL;
int num_verdef = 0;
int num_verneed = 0;
int num_versym = 0;
int i;
if (!bin || !bin->shdr) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(sdb_versioninfo = sdb_new0 ())) {
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < bin->ehdr.e_shnum; i++) {
Sdb *sdb = NULL;
char key[32] = {0};
int size = bin->shdr[i].sh_size;
if (size - (i*sizeof(Elf_(Shdr)) > bin->size)) {
size = bin->size - (i*sizeof(Elf_(Shdr)));
}
int left = size - (i * sizeof (Elf_(Shdr)));
left = R_MIN (left, bin->shdr[i].sh_size);
if (left < 0) {
break;
}
switch (bin->shdr[i].sh_type) {
case SHT_GNU_verdef:
sdb = store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef (bin, &bin->shdr[i], left);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "verdef%d", num_verdef++);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_versioninfo, key, sdb);
break;
case SHT_GNU_verneed:
sdb = store_versioninfo_gnu_verneed (bin, &bin->shdr[i], left);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "verneed%d", num_verneed++);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_versioninfo, key, sdb);
break;
case SHT_GNU_versym:
sdb = store_versioninfo_gnu_versym (bin, &bin->shdr[i], left);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "versym%d", num_versym++);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_versioninfo, key, sdb);
break;
}
}
return sdb_versioninfo;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8764 - huge vd_aux caused pointer wraparound
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 60,084 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zend_uint zend_objects_store_get_refcount(zval *object TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(object);
return EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].bucket.obj.refcount;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response NetworkHandler::SetExtraHTTPHeaders(
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Headers> headers) {
std::vector<std::pair<std::string, std::string>> new_headers;
std::unique_ptr<protocol::DictionaryValue> object = headers->toValue();
for (size_t i = 0; i < object->size(); ++i) {
auto entry = object->at(i);
std::string value;
if (!entry.second->asString(&value))
return Response::InvalidParams("Invalid header value, string expected");
if (!net::HttpUtil::IsValidHeaderName(entry.first))
return Response::InvalidParams("Invalid header name");
if (!net::HttpUtil::IsValidHeaderValue(value))
return Response::InvalidParams("Invalid header value");
new_headers.emplace_back(entry.first, value);
}
extra_headers_.swap(new_headers);
return Response::FallThrough();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sk_buff *create_monitor_event(struct hci_dev *hdev, int event)
{
struct hci_mon_hdr *hdr;
struct hci_mon_new_index *ni;
struct sk_buff *skb;
__le16 opcode;
switch (event) {
case HCI_DEV_REG:
skb = bt_skb_alloc(HCI_MON_NEW_INDEX_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
ni = (void *) skb_put(skb, HCI_MON_NEW_INDEX_SIZE);
ni->type = hdev->dev_type;
ni->bus = hdev->bus;
bacpy(&ni->bdaddr, &hdev->bdaddr);
memcpy(ni->name, hdev->name, 8);
opcode = __constant_cpu_to_le16(HCI_MON_NEW_INDEX);
break;
case HCI_DEV_UNREG:
skb = bt_skb_alloc(0, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
opcode = __constant_cpu_to_le16(HCI_MON_DEL_INDEX);
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
__net_timestamp(skb);
hdr = (void *) skb_push(skb, HCI_MON_HDR_SIZE);
hdr->opcode = opcode;
hdr->index = cpu_to_le16(hdev->id);
hdr->len = cpu_to_le16(skb->len - HCI_MON_HDR_SIZE);
return skb;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,117 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_send_app_cback(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
tSMP_EVT_DATA cb_data;
tSMP_STATUS callback_rc;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->cb_evt=%d", __func__, p_cb->cb_evt);
if (p_cb->p_callback && p_cb->cb_evt != 0) {
switch (p_cb->cb_evt) {
case SMP_IO_CAP_REQ_EVT:
cb_data.io_req.auth_req = p_cb->peer_auth_req;
cb_data.io_req.oob_data = SMP_OOB_NONE;
cb_data.io_req.io_cap = SMP_DEFAULT_IO_CAPS;
cb_data.io_req.max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
cb_data.io_req.init_keys = p_cb->local_i_key;
cb_data.io_req.resp_keys = p_cb->local_r_key;
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("io_cap = %d", cb_data.io_req.io_cap);
break;
case SMP_NC_REQ_EVT:
cb_data.passkey = p_data->passkey;
break;
case SMP_SC_OOB_REQ_EVT:
cb_data.req_oob_type = p_data->req_oob_type;
break;
case SMP_SC_LOC_OOB_DATA_UP_EVT:
cb_data.loc_oob_data = p_cb->sc_oob_data.loc_oob_data;
break;
case SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT:
cb_data.io_req.auth_req = 0;
cb_data.io_req.oob_data = SMP_OOB_NONE;
cb_data.io_req.io_cap = 0;
cb_data.io_req.max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
cb_data.io_req.init_keys = SMP_BR_SEC_DEFAULT_KEY;
cb_data.io_req.resp_keys = SMP_BR_SEC_DEFAULT_KEY;
break;
default:
break;
}
callback_rc =
(*p_cb->p_callback)(p_cb->cb_evt, p_cb->pairing_bda, &cb_data);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: callback_rc=%d p_cb->cb_evt=%d", __func__,
callback_rc, p_cb->cb_evt);
if (callback_rc == SMP_SUCCESS) {
switch (p_cb->cb_evt) {
case SMP_IO_CAP_REQ_EVT:
p_cb->loc_auth_req = cb_data.io_req.auth_req;
p_cb->local_io_capability = cb_data.io_req.io_cap;
p_cb->loc_oob_flag = cb_data.io_req.oob_data;
p_cb->loc_enc_size = cb_data.io_req.max_key_size;
p_cb->local_i_key = cb_data.io_req.init_keys;
p_cb->local_r_key = cb_data.io_req.resp_keys;
if (!(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) {
SMP_TRACE_WARNING("Non bonding: No keys will be exchanged");
p_cb->local_i_key = 0;
p_cb->local_r_key = 0;
}
SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
"rcvd auth_req: 0x%02x, io_cap: %d "
"loc_oob_flag: %d loc_enc_size: %d, "
"local_i_key: 0x%02x, local_r_key: 0x%02x",
p_cb->loc_auth_req, p_cb->local_io_capability, p_cb->loc_oob_flag,
p_cb->loc_enc_size, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required =
(btm_cb.security_mode == BTM_SEC_MODE_SC) ? true : false;
if (p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required) {
p_cb->loc_auth_req |= SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT;
}
if (!(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) ||
lmp_version_below(p_cb->pairing_bda, HCI_PROTO_VERSION_4_2) ||
interop_match_addr(INTEROP_DISABLE_LE_SECURE_CONNECTIONS,
(const RawAddress*)&p_cb->pairing_bda)) {
p_cb->loc_auth_req &= ~SMP_KP_SUPPORT_BIT;
p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
}
if (lmp_version_below(p_cb->pairing_bda, HCI_PROTO_VERSION_5_0)) {
p_cb->loc_auth_req &= ~SMP_H7_SUPPORT_BIT;
}
SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
"set auth_req: 0x%02x, local_i_key: 0x%02x, local_r_key: 0x%02x",
p_cb->loc_auth_req, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_IO_RSP_EVT, NULL);
break;
case SMP_BR_KEYS_REQ_EVT:
p_cb->loc_enc_size = cb_data.io_req.max_key_size;
p_cb->local_i_key = cb_data.io_req.init_keys;
p_cb->local_r_key = cb_data.io_req.resp_keys;
p_cb->loc_auth_req |= SMP_H7_SUPPORT_BIT;
p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
SMP_TRACE_WARNING(
"for SMP over BR max_key_size: 0x%02x, local_i_key: 0x%02x, "
"local_r_key: 0x%02x, p_cb->loc_auth_req: 0x%02x",
p_cb->loc_enc_size, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key,
p_cb->loc_auth_req);
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_KEYS_RSP_EVT, NULL);
break;
}
}
}
if (!p_cb->cb_evt && p_cb->discard_sec_req) {
p_cb->discard_sec_req = false;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_DISCARD_SEC_REQ_EVT, NULL);
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: return", __func__);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix OOB read before buffer length check
Bug: 111936834
Test: manual
Change-Id: Ib98528fb62db0d724ebd9112d071e367f78e369d
(cherry picked from commit 4548f34c90803c6544f6bed03399f2eabeab2a8e)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 162,829 |
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