instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::CreateViewCommandBuffer(
const gfx::GLSurfaceHandle& compositing_surface,
int surface_id,
int client_id,
const GPUCreateCommandBufferConfig& init_params,
const CreateCommandBufferCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
#if defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
linked_ptr<SurfaceRef> surface_ref;
SurfaceRefMap::iterator it = surface_refs_.find(surface_id);
if (it != surface_refs_.end())
surface_ref = (*it).second;
else
surface_ref.reset(new SurfaceRef(compositing_surface.handle));
#endif // defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
if (!compositing_surface.is_null() &&
Send(new GpuMsg_CreateViewCommandBuffer(
compositing_surface, surface_id, client_id, init_params))) {
create_command_buffer_requests_.push(callback);
#if defined(TOOLKIT_GTK)
surface_refs_.insert(std::make_pair(surface_id, surface_ref));
#endif
} else {
CreateCommandBufferError(callback, MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
}
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,695 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_80211n_mac_phy(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree, int offset, int data_len, guint32 *n_mac_flags, guint32 *ampdu_id, struct ieee_802_11_phdr *phdr)
{
proto_tree *ftree;
proto_item *ti;
ptvcursor_t *csr;
guint8 mcs;
guint8 ness;
guint16 ext_frequency;
gchar *chan_str;
ftree = proto_tree_add_subtree(tree, tvb, offset, data_len, ett_dot11n_mac_phy, NULL, "802.11n MAC+PHY");
add_ppi_field_header(tvb, ftree, &offset);
data_len -= 4; /* Subtract field header length */
if (data_len != PPI_80211N_MAC_PHY_LEN) {
proto_tree_add_expert_format(ftree, pinfo, &ei_ppi_invalid_length, tvb, offset, data_len, "Invalid length: %u", data_len);
THROW(ReportedBoundsError);
}
dissect_80211n_mac(tvb, pinfo, ftree, offset, PPI_80211N_MAC_LEN,
FALSE, n_mac_flags, ampdu_id, phdr);
offset += PPI_80211N_MAC_PHY_OFF;
csr = ptvcursor_new(ftree, tvb, offset);
mcs = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, ptvcursor_current_offset(csr));
if (mcs != 255) {
phdr->phy_info.info_11n.presence_flags |= PHDR_802_11N_HAS_MCS_INDEX;
phdr->phy_info.info_11n.mcs_index = mcs;
}
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_mcs, 1, 255);
ness = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, ptvcursor_current_offset(csr));
phdr->phy_info.info_11n.presence_flags |= PHDR_802_11N_HAS_NESS;
phdr->phy_info.info_11n.ness = ness;
ti = ptvcursor_add(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_num_streams, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
if (tvb_get_guint8(tvb, ptvcursor_current_offset(csr) - 1) == 0)
proto_item_append_text(ti, " (unknown)");
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_rssi_combined, 1, 255);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_rssi_ant0_ctl, 1, 255);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_rssi_ant1_ctl, 1, 255);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_rssi_ant2_ctl, 1, 255);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_rssi_ant3_ctl, 1, 255);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_rssi_ant0_ext, 1, 255);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_rssi_ant1_ext, 1, 255);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_rssi_ant2_ext, 1, 255);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_rssi_ant3_ext, 1, 255);
ext_frequency = tvb_get_letohs(ptvcursor_tvbuff(csr), ptvcursor_current_offset(csr));
chan_str = ieee80211_mhz_to_str(ext_frequency);
proto_tree_add_uint_format(ptvcursor_tree(csr), hf_80211n_mac_phy_ext_chan_freq, ptvcursor_tvbuff(csr),
ptvcursor_current_offset(csr), 2, ext_frequency, "Ext. Channel frequency: %s", chan_str);
g_free(chan_str);
ptvcursor_advance(csr, 2);
ptvcursor_add_with_subtree(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_ext_chan_flags, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN,
ett_dot11n_mac_phy_ext_channel_flags);
ptvcursor_add_no_advance(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_ext_chan_flags_turbo, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ptvcursor_add_no_advance(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_ext_chan_flags_cck, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ptvcursor_add_no_advance(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_ext_chan_flags_ofdm, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ptvcursor_add_no_advance(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_ext_chan_flags_2ghz, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ptvcursor_add_no_advance(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_ext_chan_flags_5ghz, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ptvcursor_add_no_advance(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_ext_chan_flags_passive, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ptvcursor_add_no_advance(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_ext_chan_flags_dynamic, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ptvcursor_add(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_ext_chan_flags_gfsk, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
ptvcursor_pop_subtree(csr);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_dbm_ant0signal, 1, 0x80); /* -128 */
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_dbm_ant0noise, 1, 0x80);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_dbm_ant1signal, 1, 0x80);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_dbm_ant1noise, 1, 0x80);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_dbm_ant2signal, 1, 0x80);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_dbm_ant2noise, 1, 0x80);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_dbm_ant3signal, 1, 0x80);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_dbm_ant3noise, 1, 0x80);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_evm0, 4, 0);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_evm1, 4, 0);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_evm2, 4, 0);
ptvcursor_add_invalid_check(csr, hf_80211n_mac_phy_evm3, 4, 0);
ptvcursor_free(csr);
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 51,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void webkitWebViewBaseFinalize(GObject* gobject)
{
WebKitWebViewBase* webkitWebViewBase = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(gobject);
webkitWebViewBase->priv->pageProxy->close();
webkitWebViewBase->priv->~WebKitWebViewBasePrivate();
G_OBJECT_CLASS(webkit_web_view_base_parent_class)->finalize(gobject);
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipv4_confirm_neigh(const struct dst_entry *dst, const void *daddr)
{
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
const __be32 *pkey = daddr;
const struct rtable *rt;
rt = (const struct rtable *)dst;
if (rt->rt_gateway)
pkey = (const __be32 *)&rt->rt_gateway;
else if (!daddr ||
(rt->rt_flags &
(RTCF_MULTICAST | RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_LOCAL)))
return;
__ipv4_confirm_neigh(dev, *(__force u32 *)pkey);
}
Commit Message: net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set
Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on
commit 4.13-rc5..
Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000
RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314
RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8
R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4
FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217
netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397
rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035
__sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069
SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe
R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45
28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03
<0f>
b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44
RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP:
ffff880078117010
---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]---
This patch adds a res->fi NULL check.
example run:
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0
broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo
cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch
RTNETLINK answers: No route to host
Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested")
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 62,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::UpdatePopup() {
const gfx::Range sel = GetSelectedRange();
model()->UpdateInput(!sel.is_empty(), !SelectionAtEnd());
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 142,487 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_extra(const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
int cnt= buf[5]&0x1f;
const uint8_t *p= buf+6;
while(cnt--){
int nalsize= AV_RB16(p) + 2;
if(nalsize > buf_size - (p-buf) || p[2]!=0x67)
return 0;
p += nalsize;
}
cnt = *(p++);
if(!cnt)
return 0;
while(cnt--){
int nalsize= AV_RB16(p) + 2;
if(nalsize > buf_size - (p-buf) || p[2]!=0x68)
return 0;
p += nalsize;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation
Fixes use of freed memory
Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4
Found-by: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | 0 | 43,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void set_interceptor_hook(
content::URLLoaderInterceptor::InterceptCallback callback) {
callback_ = std::move(callback);
}
Commit Message: Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <pastarmovj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_attr (char const *src_path, char const *dst_path)
{
struct error_context ctx =
{
.error = copy_attr_error,
.quote = copy_attr_quote,
.quote_free = copy_attr_free
};
/* FIXME: We are copying between files we know we can safely access by
* pathname. A safe_ version of attr_copy_file() might still be slightly
* more efficient for deep paths. */
return attr_copy_file (src_path, dst_path, copy_attr_check, &ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 2,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetFreeFrameBuffer(size_t min_size, vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
EXPECT_TRUE(fb != NULL);
const int idx = FindFreeBufferIndex();
if (idx == num_buffers_)
return -1;
if (ext_fb_list_[idx].size < min_size) {
delete [] ext_fb_list_[idx].data;
ext_fb_list_[idx].data = new uint8_t[min_size];
ext_fb_list_[idx].size = min_size;
}
SetFrameBuffer(idx, fb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,544 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mov_write_tfhd_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVMuxContext *mov,
MOVTrack *track, int64_t moof_offset)
{
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
uint32_t flags = MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_SIZE | MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_DURATION |
MOV_TFHD_BASE_DATA_OFFSET;
if (!track->entry) {
flags |= MOV_TFHD_DURATION_IS_EMPTY;
} else {
flags |= MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_FLAGS;
}
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_OMIT_TFHD_OFFSET)
flags &= ~MOV_TFHD_BASE_DATA_OFFSET;
if (mov->flags & FF_MOV_FLAG_DEFAULT_BASE_MOOF) {
flags &= ~MOV_TFHD_BASE_DATA_OFFSET;
flags |= MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_BASE_IS_MOOF;
}
/* Don't set a default sample size, the silverlight player refuses
* to play files with that set. Don't set a default sample duration,
* WMP freaks out if it is set. Don't set a base data offset, PIFF
* file format says it MUST NOT be set. */
if (track->mode == MODE_ISM)
flags &= ~(MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_SIZE | MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_DURATION |
MOV_TFHD_BASE_DATA_OFFSET);
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size placeholder */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "tfhd");
avio_w8(pb, 0); /* version */
avio_wb24(pb, flags);
avio_wb32(pb, track->track_id); /* track-id */
if (flags & MOV_TFHD_BASE_DATA_OFFSET)
avio_wb64(pb, moof_offset);
if (flags & MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_DURATION) {
track->default_duration = get_cluster_duration(track, 0);
avio_wb32(pb, track->default_duration);
}
if (flags & MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_SIZE) {
track->default_size = track->entry ? track->cluster[0].size : 1;
avio_wb32(pb, track->default_size);
} else
track->default_size = -1;
if (flags & MOV_TFHD_DEFAULT_FLAGS) {
/* Set the default flags based on the second sample, if available.
* If the first sample is different, that can be signaled via a separate field. */
if (track->entry > 1)
track->default_sample_flags = get_sample_flags(track, &track->cluster[1]);
else
track->default_sample_flags =
track->par->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO ?
(MOV_FRAG_SAMPLE_FLAG_DEPENDS_YES | MOV_FRAG_SAMPLE_FLAG_IS_NON_SYNC) :
MOV_FRAG_SAMPLE_FLAG_DEPENDS_NO;
avio_wb32(pb, track->default_sample_flags);
}
return update_size(pb, pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xhci_epmask_to_eps_with_streams(XHCIState *xhci,
unsigned int slotid,
uint32_t epmask,
XHCIEPContext **epctxs,
USBEndpoint **eps)
{
XHCISlot *slot;
XHCIEPContext *epctx;
USBEndpoint *ep;
int i, j;
assert(slotid >= 1 && slotid <= xhci->numslots);
slot = &xhci->slots[slotid - 1];
for (i = 2, j = 0; i <= 31; i++) {
if (!(epmask & (1u << i))) {
continue;
}
epctx = slot->eps[i - 1];
ep = xhci_epid_to_usbep(xhci, slotid, i);
if (!epctx || !epctx->nr_pstreams || !ep) {
continue;
}
if (epctxs) {
epctxs[j] = epctx;
}
eps[j++] = ep;
}
return j;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,339 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void rps_unlock(struct softnet_data *sd)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_RPS
spin_unlock(&sd->input_pkt_queue.lock);
#endif
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,301 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_mapped_selector_name(struct mixer_build *state, int unitid,
int index, char *buf, int buflen)
{
const struct usbmix_selector_map *p;
if (!state->selector_map)
return 0;
for (p = state->selector_map; p->id; p++) {
if (p->id == unitid && index < p->count)
return strlcpy(buf, p->names[index], buflen);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,964 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::write(LocalDOMWindow* callingWindow, const Vector<String>& text, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
ASSERT(callingWindow);
StringBuilder builder;
for (const String& string : text)
builder.append(string);
write(builder.toString(), callingWindow->document(), exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int qeth_halt_channels(struct qeth_card *card)
{
int rc1 = 0, rc2 = 0, rc3 = 0;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 3, "haltchs");
rc1 = qeth_halt_channel(&card->read);
rc2 = qeth_halt_channel(&card->write);
rc3 = qeth_halt_channel(&card->data);
if (rc1)
return rc1;
if (rc2)
return rc2;
return rc3;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,572 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcCopyColormapAndFree(ClientPtr client)
{
Colormap mid;
ColormapPtr pSrcMap;
REQUEST(xCopyColormapAndFreeReq);
int rc;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xCopyColormapAndFreeReq);
mid = stuff->mid;
LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(mid, client);
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pSrcMap, stuff->srcCmap,
RT_COLORMAP, client,
DixReadAccess | DixRemoveAccess);
if (rc == Success)
return CopyColormapAndFree(mid, pSrcMap, client->index);
client->errorValue = stuff->srcCmap;
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 14,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_changed_flag(struct Context *ctx, struct Header *h,
int local_changes, int *server_changes, int flag_name,
int old_hd_flag, int new_hd_flag, int h_flag)
{
/* If there are local_changes, we only want to note if the server
* flags have changed, so we can set a reopen flag in
* cmd_parse_fetch(). We don't want to count a local modification
* to the header flag as a "change".
*/
if ((old_hd_flag == new_hd_flag) && local_changes)
return;
if (new_hd_flag == h_flag)
return;
if (server_changes)
*server_changes = 1;
/* Local changes have priority */
if (!local_changes)
mutt_set_flag(ctx, h, flag_name, new_hd_flag);
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow stack buffer in msg_parse_fetch
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 79,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ext4_alloc_flex_bg_array(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t ngroup)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct flex_groups *new_groups;
int size;
if (!sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex)
return 0;
size = ext4_flex_group(sbi, ngroup - 1) + 1;
if (size <= sbi->s_flex_groups_allocated)
return 0;
size = roundup_pow_of_two(size * sizeof(struct flex_groups));
new_groups = ext4_kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_groups) {
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "not enough memory for %d flex groups",
size / (int) sizeof(struct flex_groups));
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (sbi->s_flex_groups) {
memcpy(new_groups, sbi->s_flex_groups,
(sbi->s_flex_groups_allocated *
sizeof(struct flex_groups)));
kvfree(sbi->s_flex_groups);
}
sbi->s_flex_groups = new_groups;
sbi->s_flex_groups_allocated = size / sizeof(struct flex_groups);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 56,648 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __trace_stack(struct trace_array *tr, unsigned long flags, int skip,
int pc)
{
struct ring_buffer *buffer = tr->trace_buffer.buffer;
if (rcu_is_watching()) {
__ftrace_trace_stack(buffer, flags, skip, pc, NULL);
return;
}
/*
* When an NMI triggers, RCU is enabled via rcu_nmi_enter(),
* but if the above rcu_is_watching() failed, then the NMI
* triggered someplace critical, and rcu_irq_enter() should
* not be called from NMI.
*/
if (unlikely(in_nmi()))
return;
rcu_irq_enter_irqson();
__ftrace_trace_stack(buffer, flags, skip, pc, NULL);
rcu_irq_exit_irqson();
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,240 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftVideoDecoderOMXComponent::handlePortSettingsChange(
bool *portWillReset, uint32_t width, uint32_t height,
CropSettingsMode cropSettingsMode, bool fakeStride) {
*portWillReset = false;
bool sizeChanged = (width != mWidth || height != mHeight);
bool updateCrop = (cropSettingsMode == kCropUnSet);
bool cropChanged = (cropSettingsMode == kCropChanged);
bool strideChanged = false;
if (fakeStride) {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(kOutputPortIndex)->mDef;
if (def->format.video.nStride != (OMX_S32)width
|| def->format.video.nSliceHeight != (OMX_U32)height) {
strideChanged = true;
}
}
if (sizeChanged || cropChanged || strideChanged) {
mWidth = width;
mHeight = height;
if ((sizeChanged && !mIsAdaptive)
|| width > mAdaptiveMaxWidth
|| height > mAdaptiveMaxHeight) {
if (mIsAdaptive) {
if (width > mAdaptiveMaxWidth) {
mAdaptiveMaxWidth = width;
}
if (height > mAdaptiveMaxHeight) {
mAdaptiveMaxHeight = height;
}
}
updatePortDefinitions(updateCrop);
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, kOutputPortIndex, 0, NULL);
mOutputPortSettingsChange = AWAITING_DISABLED;
*portWillReset = true;
} else {
updatePortDefinitions(updateCrop);
if (fakeStride) {
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *def = &editPortInfo(kOutputPortIndex)->mDef;
def->format.video.nStride = mWidth;
def->format.video.nSliceHeight = mHeight;
}
notify(OMX_EventPortSettingsChanged, kOutputPortIndex,
OMX_IndexConfigCommonOutputCrop, NULL);
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsDataSource::StartCustomDataRequest(
const GURL& url,
const content::URLDataSource::GotDataCallback& callback) {
if (!url.is_valid()) {
callback.Run(
new base::RefCountedStaticMemory(kHttpNotFound, strlen(kHttpNotFound)));
return;
}
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation("devtools_free_data_source", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Developer Tools Remote Data Request"
description:
"This service fetches Chromium DevTools front-end files from the "
"cloud for the remote debugging scenario. This can only happen if "
"a URL was passed on the commandline via flag "
"'--custom-devtools-frontend'. This URL overrides the default "
"fetching from a Google website, see "
"devtools_hard_coded_data_source."
trigger:
"When command line flag --custom-devtools-frontend is specified "
"and DevTools is opened."
data: "None"
destination: WEBSITE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: YES
cookies_store: "user"
setting: "This feature cannot be disabled by settings."
chrome_policy {
DeveloperToolsDisabled {
policy_options {mode: MANDATORY}
DeveloperToolsDisabled: true
}
}
})");
net::URLFetcher* fetcher = net::URLFetcher::Create(url, net::URLFetcher::GET,
this, traffic_annotation)
.release();
pending_[fetcher] = callback;
fetcher->SetRequestContext(request_context_.get());
fetcher->SetLoadFlags(net::LOAD_DISABLE_CACHE);
fetcher->Start();
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EXPORTED int mboxlist_deleteremote(const char *name, struct txn **in_tid)
{
int r;
struct txn **tid;
struct txn *lcl_tid = NULL;
mbentry_t *mbentry = NULL;
if(in_tid) {
tid = in_tid;
} else {
tid = &lcl_tid;
}
retry:
r = mboxlist_mylookup(name, &mbentry, tid, 1);
switch (r) {
case 0:
break;
case IMAP_MAILBOX_NONEXISTENT:
r = 0;
break;
case IMAP_AGAIN:
goto retry;
break;
default:
goto done;
}
if (mbentry && (mbentry->mbtype & MBTYPE_REMOTE) && !mbentry->server) {
syslog(LOG_ERR,
"mboxlist_deleteremote called on non-remote mailbox: %s",
name);
goto done;
}
r = mboxlist_update_entry(name, NULL, tid);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "DBERROR: error deleting %s: %s",
name, cyrusdb_strerror(r));
r = IMAP_IOERROR;
}
/* commit db operations, but only if we weren't passed a transaction */
if (!in_tid) {
r = cyrusdb_commit(mbdb, *tid);
if (r) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "DBERROR: failed on commit: %s",
cyrusdb_strerror(r));
r = IMAP_IOERROR;
}
tid = NULL;
}
done:
if (r && !in_tid && tid) {
/* Abort the transaction if it is still in progress */
cyrusdb_abort(mbdb, *tid);
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: mboxlist: fix uninitialised memory use where pattern is "Other Users"
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fd_revalidate(FDrive *drv)
{
int nb_heads, max_track, last_sect, ro;
FDriveType drive;
FDriveRate rate;
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("revalidate\n");
if (drv->blk != NULL) {
ro = blk_is_read_only(drv->blk);
pick_geometry(drv->blk, &nb_heads, &max_track,
&last_sect, drv->drive, &drive, &rate);
if (!blk_is_inserted(drv->blk)) {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("No disk in drive\n");
} else {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("Floppy disk (%d h %d t %d s) %s\n", nb_heads,
max_track, last_sect, ro ? "ro" : "rw");
}
if (nb_heads == 1) {
drv->flags &= ~FDISK_DBL_SIDES;
} else {
drv->flags |= FDISK_DBL_SIDES;
}
drv->max_track = max_track;
drv->last_sect = last_sect;
drv->ro = ro;
drv->drive = drive;
drv->media_rate = rate;
} else {
FLOPPY_DPRINTF("No drive connected\n");
drv->last_sect = 0;
drv->max_track = 0;
drv->flags &= ~FDISK_DBL_SIDES;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,298 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_free_ps_font(zend_rsrc_list_entry *rsrc TSRMLS_DC)
{
int *font = (int *) rsrc->ptr;
T1_DeleteFont(*font);
efree(font);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,193 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pfkey_error(const struct sadb_msg *orig, int err, struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_KERNEL);
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
if (!skb)
return -ENOBUFS;
/* Woe be to the platform trying to support PFKEY yet
* having normal errnos outside the 1-255 range, inclusive.
*/
err = -err;
if (err == ERESTARTSYS ||
err == ERESTARTNOHAND ||
err == ERESTARTNOINTR)
err = EINTR;
if (err >= 512)
err = EINVAL;
BUG_ON(err <= 0 || err >= 256);
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
pfkey_hdr_dup(hdr, orig);
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) err;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) /
sizeof(uint64_t));
pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_KERNEL, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, sock_net(sk));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 31,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ref_param_make_string(ref *pe, const void *pvalue, uint i, gs_ref_memory_t *imem)
{
return ref_param_write_string_value(pe,
&((const gs_param_string_array *)pvalue)->data[i],
imem);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 3,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ssd0323_save(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque)
{
SSISlave *ss = SSI_SLAVE(opaque);
ssd0323_state *s = (ssd0323_state *)opaque;
int i;
qemu_put_be32(f, s->cmd_len);
qemu_put_be32(f, s->cmd);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
qemu_put_be32(f, s->cmd_data[i]);
qemu_put_be32(f, s->row);
qemu_put_be32(f, s->row_start);
qemu_put_be32(f, s->row_end);
qemu_put_be32(f, s->col);
qemu_put_be32(f, s->col_start);
qemu_put_be32(f, s->col_end);
qemu_put_be32(f, s->redraw);
qemu_put_be32(f, s->remap);
qemu_put_be32(f, s->mode);
qemu_put_buffer(f, s->framebuffer, sizeof(s->framebuffer));
qemu_put_be32(f, ss->cs);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 15,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nameAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::nameAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TextTrackCue::CueWillChange() {
if (track_)
track_->CueWillChange(this);
}
Commit Message: Support negative timestamps of TextTrackCue
Ensure proper behaviour for negative timestamps of TextTrackCue.
1. Cues with negative startTime should become active from 0s.
2. Cues with negative startTime and endTime should never be active.
Bug: 314032
Change-Id: Ib53710e58be0be770c933ea8c3c4709a0e5dec0d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863270
Commit-Queue: srirama chandra sekhar <srirama.m@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529012}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void read_transfer_data(struct pipe_resource *res,
struct iovec *iov,
unsigned int num_iovs,
char *data,
uint32_t src_stride,
struct pipe_box *box,
uint64_t offset, bool invert)
{
int blsize = util_format_get_blocksize(res->format);
uint32_t size = vrend_get_iovec_size(iov, num_iovs);
uint32_t send_size = util_format_get_nblocks(res->format, box->width,
box->height) * blsize * box->depth;
uint32_t bwx = util_format_get_nblocksx(res->format, box->width) * blsize;
uint32_t bh = util_format_get_nblocksy(res->format, box->height);
int h;
uint32_t myoffset = offset;
if ((send_size == size || bh == 1) && !invert)
vrend_read_from_iovec(iov, num_iovs, offset, data, send_size);
else {
if (invert) {
for (h = bh - 1; h >= 0; h--) {
void *ptr = data + (h * bwx);
vrend_read_from_iovec(iov, num_iovs, myoffset, ptr, bwx);
myoffset += src_stride;
}
} else {
for (h = 0; h < bh; h++) {
void *ptr = data + (h * bwx);
vrend_read_from_iovec(iov, num_iovs, myoffset, ptr, bwx);
myoffset += src_stride;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 8,808 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WriteFromUrlOperation::OnURLFetchUploadProgress(
const net::URLFetcher* source,
int64_t current,
int64_t total) {
}
Commit Message: Network traffic annotation added to extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
Network traffic annotation is added to network request of extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
BUG=656607
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691963002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#451456}
CWE ID: | 0 | 127,681 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int gfs2_extent_map(struct inode *inode, u64 lblock, int *new, u64 *dblock, unsigned *extlen)
{
struct buffer_head bh = { .b_state = 0, .b_blocknr = 0 };
int ret;
int create = *new;
BUG_ON(!extlen);
BUG_ON(!dblock);
BUG_ON(!new);
bh.b_size = 1 << (inode->i_blkbits + (create ? 0 : 5));
ret = gfs2_block_map(inode, lblock, &bh, create);
*extlen = bh.b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
*dblock = bh.b_blocknr;
if (buffer_new(&bh))
*new = 1;
else
*new = 0;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: GFS2: rewrite fallocate code to write blocks directly
GFS2's fallocate code currently goes through the page cache. Since it's only
writing to the end of the file or to holes in it, it doesn't need to, and it
was causing issues on low memory environments. This patch pulls in some of
Steve's block allocation work, and uses it to simply allocate the blocks for
the file, and zero them out at allocation time. It provides a slight
performance increase, and it dramatically simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Marzinski <bmarzins@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 34,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int evaluate_tpr_instruction(VAPICROMState *s, X86CPU *cpu,
target_ulong *pip, TPRAccess access)
{
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
const TPRInstruction *instr;
target_ulong ip = *pip;
uint8_t opcode[2];
uint32_t real_tpr_addr;
int i;
if ((ip & 0xf0000000ULL) != 0x80000000ULL &&
(ip & 0xf0000000ULL) != 0xe0000000ULL) {
return -1;
}
/*
* Early Windows 2003 SMP initialization contains a
*
* mov imm32, r/m32
*
* instruction that is patched by TPR optimization. The problem is that
* RSP, used by the patched instruction, is zero, so the guest gets a
* double fault and dies.
*/
if (cpu->env.regs[R_ESP] == 0) {
return -1;
}
if (kvm_enabled() && !kvm_irqchip_in_kernel()) {
/*
* KVM without kernel-based TPR access reporting will pass an IP that
* points after the accessing instruction. So we need to look backward
* to find the reason.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpr_instr); i++) {
instr = &tpr_instr[i];
if (instr->access != access) {
continue;
}
if (cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip - instr->length, opcode,
sizeof(opcode), 0) < 0) {
return -1;
}
if (opcode_matches(opcode, instr)) {
ip -= instr->length;
goto instruction_ok;
}
}
return -1;
} else {
if (cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip, opcode, sizeof(opcode), 0) < 0) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tpr_instr); i++) {
instr = &tpr_instr[i];
if (opcode_matches(opcode, instr)) {
goto instruction_ok;
}
}
return -1;
}
instruction_ok:
/*
* Grab the virtual TPR address from the instruction
* and update the cached values.
*/
if (cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, ip + instr->addr_offset,
(void *)&real_tpr_addr,
sizeof(real_tpr_addr), 0) < 0) {
return -1;
}
real_tpr_addr = le32_to_cpu(real_tpr_addr);
if ((real_tpr_addr & 0xfff) != 0x80) {
return -1;
}
s->real_tpr_addr = real_tpr_addr;
update_guest_rom_state(s);
*pip = ip;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: invoke_NPN_PrintData(PluginInstance *plugin, uint32_t platform_print_id, NPPrintData *printData)
{
if (printData == NULL)
return;
npw_return_if_fail(rpc_method_invoke_possible(g_rpc_connection));
int error = rpc_method_invoke(g_rpc_connection,
RPC_METHOD_NPN_PRINT_DATA,
RPC_TYPE_UINT32, platform_print_id,
RPC_TYPE_NP_PRINT_DATA, printData,
RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_PrintData() invoke", error);
return;
}
error = rpc_method_wait_for_reply(g_rpc_connection, RPC_TYPE_INVALID);
if (error != RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR) {
npw_perror("NPN_PrintData() wait for reply", error);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: find_launch_location_for_file (GList *list,
NautilusFile *file)
{
LaunchLocation *location;
GList *l;
for (l = list; l != NULL; l = l->next)
{
location = l->data;
if (location->file == file)
{
return location;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,185 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltStrPaddingFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int number, str_len = 0;
xmlChar *str = NULL, *ret = NULL, *tmp;
if ((nargs < 1) || (nargs > 2)) {
xmlXPathSetArityError(ctxt);
return;
}
if (nargs == 2) {
str = xmlXPathPopString(ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen(str);
}
if (str_len == 0) {
if (str != NULL) xmlFree(str);
str = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) " ");
str_len = 1;
}
number = (int) xmlXPathPopNumber(ctxt);
if (number <= 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString(ctxt);
xmlFree(str);
return;
}
while (number >= str_len) {
ret = xmlStrncat(ret, str, str_len);
number -= str_len;
}
tmp = xmlUTF8Strndup (str, number);
ret = xmlStrcat(ret, tmp);
if (tmp != NULL)
xmlFree (tmp);
xmlXPathReturnString(ctxt, ret);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree(str);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsPipeline* BlackPreservingKPlaneIntents(cmsContext ContextID,
cmsUInt32Number nProfiles,
cmsUInt32Number TheIntents[],
cmsHPROFILE hProfiles[],
cmsBool BPC[],
cmsFloat64Number AdaptationStates[],
cmsUInt32Number dwFlags)
{
PreserveKPlaneParams bp;
cmsPipeline* Result = NULL;
cmsUInt32Number ICCIntents[256];
cmsStage* CLUT;
cmsUInt32Number i, nGridPoints;
cmsHPROFILE hLab;
if (nProfiles < 1 || nProfiles > 255) return NULL;
for (i=0; i < nProfiles; i++)
ICCIntents[i] = TranslateNonICCIntents(TheIntents[i]);
if (cmsGetColorSpace(hProfiles[0]) != cmsSigCmykData ||
!(cmsGetColorSpace(hProfiles[nProfiles-1]) == cmsSigCmykData ||
cmsGetDeviceClass(hProfiles[nProfiles-1]) == cmsSigOutputClass))
return DefaultICCintents(ContextID, nProfiles, ICCIntents, hProfiles, BPC, AdaptationStates, dwFlags);
Result = cmsPipelineAlloc(ContextID, 4, 4);
if (Result == NULL) return NULL;
memset(&bp, 0, sizeof(bp));
bp.LabK2cmyk = _cmsReadInputLUT(hProfiles[nProfiles-1], INTENT_RELATIVE_COLORIMETRIC);
if (bp.LabK2cmyk == NULL) goto Cleanup;
bp.MaxTAC = cmsDetectTAC(hProfiles[nProfiles-1]) / 100.0;
if (bp.MaxTAC <= 0) goto Cleanup;
bp.cmyk2cmyk = DefaultICCintents(ContextID,
nProfiles,
ICCIntents,
hProfiles,
BPC,
AdaptationStates,
dwFlags);
if (bp.cmyk2cmyk == NULL) goto Cleanup;
bp.KTone = _cmsBuildKToneCurve(ContextID, 4096, nProfiles,
ICCIntents,
hProfiles,
BPC,
AdaptationStates,
dwFlags);
if (bp.KTone == NULL) goto Cleanup;
hLab = cmsCreateLab4ProfileTHR(ContextID, NULL);
bp.hProofOutput = cmsCreateTransformTHR(ContextID, hProfiles[nProfiles-1],
CHANNELS_SH(4)|BYTES_SH(2), hLab, TYPE_Lab_DBL,
INTENT_RELATIVE_COLORIMETRIC,
cmsFLAGS_NOCACHE|cmsFLAGS_NOOPTIMIZE);
if ( bp.hProofOutput == NULL) goto Cleanup;
bp.cmyk2Lab = cmsCreateTransformTHR(ContextID, hProfiles[nProfiles-1],
FLOAT_SH(1)|CHANNELS_SH(4)|BYTES_SH(4), hLab,
FLOAT_SH(1)|CHANNELS_SH(3)|BYTES_SH(4),
INTENT_RELATIVE_COLORIMETRIC,
cmsFLAGS_NOCACHE|cmsFLAGS_NOOPTIMIZE);
if (bp.cmyk2Lab == NULL) goto Cleanup;
cmsCloseProfile(hLab);
bp.MaxError = 0;
nGridPoints = _cmsReasonableGridpointsByColorspace(cmsSigCmykData, dwFlags);
CLUT = cmsStageAllocCLut16bit(ContextID, nGridPoints, 4, 4, NULL);
if (CLUT == NULL) goto Cleanup;
if (!cmsPipelineInsertStage(Result, cmsAT_BEGIN, CLUT))
goto Cleanup;
cmsStageSampleCLut16bit(CLUT, BlackPreservingSampler, (void*) &bp, 0);
Cleanup:
if (bp.cmyk2cmyk) cmsPipelineFree(bp.cmyk2cmyk);
if (bp.cmyk2Lab) cmsDeleteTransform(bp.cmyk2Lab);
if (bp.hProofOutput) cmsDeleteTransform(bp.hProofOutput);
if (bp.KTone) cmsFreeToneCurve(bp.KTone);
if (bp.LabK2cmyk) cmsPipelineFree(bp.LabK2cmyk);
return Result;
}
Commit Message: Fix a double free on error recovering
CWE ID: | 0 | 58,420 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaControlsProgressView::SetDuration(const base::string16& duration) {
duration_->SetText(duration);
}
Commit Message: [Lock Screen Media Controls] Tweak UI based on new mocks
This CL rearranges the different components of the CrOS lock screen
media controls based on the newest mocks. This involves resizing most
of the child views and their spacings. The artwork was also resized
and re-positioned. Additionally, the close button was moved from the
main view to the header row child view.
Artist and title data about the current session will eventually be
placed to the right of the artwork, but right now this space is empty.
See the bug for before and after pictures.
Bug: 991647
Change-Id: I7b97f31982ccf2912bd2564d5241bfd849d21d92
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1746554
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Becca Hughes <beccahughes@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mia Bergeron <miaber@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#686253}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 136,533 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DownloadResourceHandler::OnRequestRedirected(
const net::RedirectInfo& redirect_info,
network::ResourceResponse* response,
std::unique_ptr<ResourceController> controller) {
url::Origin new_origin(url::Origin::Create(redirect_info.new_url));
if (!follow_cross_origin_redirects_ &&
!first_origin_.IsSameOriginWith(new_origin)) {
base::PostTaskWithTraits(
FROM_HERE, {BrowserThread::UI},
base::BindOnce(
&NavigateOnUIThread, redirect_info.new_url, request()->url_chain(),
Referrer(GURL(redirect_info.new_referrer),
Referrer::NetReferrerPolicyToBlinkReferrerPolicy(
redirect_info.new_referrer_policy)),
GetRequestInfo()->HasUserGesture(),
GetRequestInfo()->GetWebContentsGetterForRequest()));
controller->Cancel();
return;
}
if (core_.OnRequestRedirected()) {
controller->Resume();
} else {
controller->Cancel();
}
}
Commit Message: When turning a download into a navigation, navigate the right frame
Code changes from Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Bug: 926105
Change-Id: I098599394e6ebe7d2fce5af838014297a337d294
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1454962
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629547}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 1 | 173,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::WidgetCreated() {
bool renderer_was_hidden = RendererIsHidden();
widget_count_++;
if (renderer_was_hidden)
OnRendererVisible();
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: horizontalAccumulate12(uint16 *wp, int n, int stride, int16 *op,
float *ToLinearF)
{
register unsigned int cr, cg, cb, ca, mask;
register float t0, t1, t2, t3;
#define SCALE12 2048.0F
#define CLAMP12(t) (((t) < 3071) ? (uint16) (t) : 3071)
if (n >= stride) {
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (stride == 3) {
t0 = ToLinearF[cr = (wp[0] & mask)] * SCALE12;
t1 = ToLinearF[cg = (wp[1] & mask)] * SCALE12;
t2 = ToLinearF[cb = (wp[2] & mask)] * SCALE12;
op[0] = CLAMP12(t0);
op[1] = CLAMP12(t1);
op[2] = CLAMP12(t2);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
wp += 3;
op += 3;
n -= 3;
t0 = ToLinearF[(cr += wp[0]) & mask] * SCALE12;
t1 = ToLinearF[(cg += wp[1]) & mask] * SCALE12;
t2 = ToLinearF[(cb += wp[2]) & mask] * SCALE12;
op[0] = CLAMP12(t0);
op[1] = CLAMP12(t1);
op[2] = CLAMP12(t2);
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
t0 = ToLinearF[cr = (wp[0] & mask)] * SCALE12;
t1 = ToLinearF[cg = (wp[1] & mask)] * SCALE12;
t2 = ToLinearF[cb = (wp[2] & mask)] * SCALE12;
t3 = ToLinearF[ca = (wp[3] & mask)] * SCALE12;
op[0] = CLAMP12(t0);
op[1] = CLAMP12(t1);
op[2] = CLAMP12(t2);
op[3] = CLAMP12(t3);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
wp += 4;
op += 4;
n -= 4;
t0 = ToLinearF[(cr += wp[0]) & mask] * SCALE12;
t1 = ToLinearF[(cg += wp[1]) & mask] * SCALE12;
t2 = ToLinearF[(cb += wp[2]) & mask] * SCALE12;
t3 = ToLinearF[(ca += wp[3]) & mask] * SCALE12;
op[0] = CLAMP12(t0);
op[1] = CLAMP12(t1);
op[2] = CLAMP12(t2);
op[3] = CLAMP12(t3);
}
} else {
REPEAT(stride, t0 = ToLinearF[*wp&mask] * SCALE12;
*op = CLAMP12(t0); wp++; op++)
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride,
wp[stride] += *wp; t0 = ToLinearF[wp[stride]&mask]*SCALE12;
*op = CLAMP12(t0); wp++; op++)
n -= stride;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_layoutget_release(void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp = calldata;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(lgp->args.inode);
size_t max_pages = max_response_pages(server);
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
nfs4_free_pages(lgp->args.layout.pages, max_pages);
put_nfs_open_context(lgp->args.ctx);
kfree(calldata);
dprintk("<-- %s\n", __func__);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodByteArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodByteArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodByteArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WillWaitForFullscreenExit() { waiting_for_ = kFullscreenExit; }
Commit Message: Security drop fullscreen for any nested WebContents level.
This relands 3dcaec6e30feebefc11e with a fix to the test.
BUG=873080
TEST=as in bug
Change-Id: Ie68b197fc6b92447e9633f233354a68fefcf20c7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1175925
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#583335}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 145,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ScrollPaintPropertyNode::State ScrollState1() {
ScrollPaintPropertyNode::State state;
state.container_rect = IntRect(3, 5, 11, 13);
state.contents_rect = IntRect(-3, -5, 27, 31);
state.user_scrollable_horizontal = true;
return state;
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_assoc_choose_alter_transport(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_transport *last_sent_to)
{
/* If this is the first time packet is sent, use the active path,
* else use the retran path. If the last packet was sent over the
* retran path, update the retran path and use it.
*/
if (last_sent_to == NULL) {
return asoc->peer.active_path;
} else {
if (last_sent_to == asoc->peer.retran_path)
sctp_assoc_update_retran_path(asoc);
return asoc->peer.retran_path;
}
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 36,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::createShadowSubtree()
{
ASSERT(element()->shadow());
ASSERT(!element()->attached());
Document* document = element()->document();
ContainerNode* container = element()->userAgentShadowRoot();
container->appendChild(DateTimeEditElement::create(document, *this));
updateInnerTextValue();
container->appendChild(ClearButtonElement::create(document, *this));
container->appendChild(SpinButtonElement::create(document, *this));
bool shouldAddPickerIndicator = false;
if (InputType::themeSupportsDataListUI(this))
shouldAddPickerIndicator = true;
RefPtr<RenderTheme> theme = document->page() ? document->page()->theme() : RenderTheme::defaultTheme();
if (theme->supportsCalendarPicker(formControlType())) {
shouldAddPickerIndicator = true;
m_pickerIndicatorIsAlwaysVisible = true;
}
if (shouldAddPickerIndicator) {
container->appendChild(PickerIndicatorElement::create(document, *this));
m_pickerIndicatorIsVisible = true;
updatePickerIndicatorVisibility();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix reentrance of BaseMultipleFieldsDateAndTimeInputType::destroyShadowSubtree.
destroyShadowSubtree could dispatch 'blur' event unexpectedly because
element()->focused() had incorrect information. We make sure it has
correct information by checking if the UA shadow root contains the
focused element.
BUG=257353
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19067004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154086 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cypress_read_int_callback(struct urb *urb)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
struct cypress_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
struct device *dev = &urb->dev->dev;
struct tty_struct *tty;
unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
unsigned long flags;
char tty_flag = TTY_NORMAL;
int havedata = 0;
int bytes = 0;
int result;
int i = 0;
int status = urb->status;
switch (status) {
case 0: /* success */
break;
case -ECONNRESET:
case -ENOENT:
case -ESHUTDOWN:
/* precursor to disconnect so just go away */
return;
case -EPIPE:
/* Can't call usb_clear_halt while in_interrupt */
/* FALLS THROUGH */
default:
/* something ugly is going on... */
dev_err(dev, "%s - unexpected nonzero read status received: %d\n",
__func__, status);
cypress_set_dead(port);
return;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
if (priv->rx_flags & THROTTLED) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - now throttling\n", __func__);
priv->rx_flags |= ACTUALLY_THROTTLED;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
return;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
tty = tty_port_tty_get(&port->port);
if (!tty) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - bad tty pointer - exiting\n", __func__);
return;
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
result = urb->actual_length;
switch (priv->pkt_fmt) {
default:
case packet_format_1:
/* This is for the CY7C64013... */
priv->current_status = data[0] & 0xF8;
bytes = data[1] + 2;
i = 2;
if (bytes > 2)
havedata = 1;
break;
case packet_format_2:
/* This is for the CY7C63743... */
priv->current_status = data[0] & 0xF8;
bytes = (data[0] & 0x07) + 1;
i = 1;
if (bytes > 1)
havedata = 1;
break;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
if (result < bytes) {
dev_dbg(dev,
"%s - wrong packet size - received %d bytes but packet said %d bytes\n",
__func__, result, bytes);
goto continue_read;
}
usb_serial_debug_data(&port->dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
/* check to see if status has changed */
if (priv->current_status != priv->prev_status) {
u8 delta = priv->current_status ^ priv->prev_status;
if (delta & UART_MSR_MASK) {
if (delta & UART_CTS)
port->icount.cts++;
if (delta & UART_DSR)
port->icount.dsr++;
if (delta & UART_RI)
port->icount.rng++;
if (delta & UART_CD)
port->icount.dcd++;
wake_up_interruptible(&port->port.delta_msr_wait);
}
priv->prev_status = priv->current_status;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
/* hangup, as defined in acm.c... this might be a bad place for it
* though */
if (tty && !C_CLOCAL(tty) && !(priv->current_status & UART_CD)) {
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - calling hangup\n", __func__);
tty_hangup(tty);
goto continue_read;
}
/* There is one error bit... I'm assuming it is a parity error
* indicator as the generic firmware will set this bit to 1 if a
* parity error occurs.
* I can not find reference to any other error events. */
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
if (priv->current_status & CYP_ERROR) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
tty_flag = TTY_PARITY;
dev_dbg(dev, "%s - Parity Error detected\n", __func__);
} else
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
/* process read if there is data other than line status */
if (bytes > i) {
tty_insert_flip_string_fixed_flag(&port->port, data + i,
tty_flag, bytes - i);
tty_flip_buffer_push(&port->port);
}
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
/* control and status byte(s) are also counted */
priv->bytes_in += bytes;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
continue_read:
tty_kref_put(tty);
/* Continue trying to always read */
if (priv->comm_is_ok) {
usb_fill_int_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb, port->serial->dev,
usb_rcvintpipe(port->serial->dev,
port->interrupt_in_endpointAddress),
port->interrupt_in_urb->transfer_buffer,
port->interrupt_in_urb->transfer_buffer_length,
cypress_read_int_callback, port,
priv->read_urb_interval);
result = usb_submit_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (result && result != -EPERM) {
dev_err(dev, "%s - failed resubmitting read urb, error %d\n",
__func__, result);
cypress_set_dead(port);
}
}
} /* cypress_read_int_callback */
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_tv32(struct timeval *o, struct timeval32 __user *i)
{
return (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, i, sizeof(*i)) ||
(__get_user(o->tv_sec, &i->tv_sec) |
__get_user(o->tv_usec, &i->tv_usec)));
}
Commit Message: alpha: fix several security issues
Fix several security issues in Alpha-specific syscalls. Untested, but
mostly trivial.
1. Signedness issue in osf_getdomainname allows copying out-of-bounds
kernel memory to userland.
2. Signedness issue in osf_sysinfo allows copying large amounts of
kernel memory to userland.
3. Typo (?) in osf_getsysinfo bounds minimum instead of maximum copy
size, allowing copying large amounts of kernel memory to userland.
4. Usage of user pointer in osf_wait4 while under KERNEL_DS allows
privilege escalation via writing return value of sys_wait4 to kernel
memory.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init algif_hash_init(void)
{
return af_alg_register_type(&algif_type_hash);
}
Commit Message: crypto: algif - suppress sending source address information in recvmsg
The current code does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local sockaddr_storage variable to userland
-- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory. Fix that.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.38
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sw_perf_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 event_id = event->attr.config;
WARN_ON(event->parent);
static_key_slow_dec(&perf_swevent_enabled[event_id]);
swevent_hlist_put(event);
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 31,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_6_2_sack(struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_DELAY_SACK_EXPIREDS);
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_GEN_SACK, SCTP_FORCE());
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 31,587 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderFrameDevToolsAgentHost::IsChildFrame() {
return frame_tree_node_ && frame_tree_node_->parent();
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
TBR=alexclarke@chromium.org
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void UsbClaimInterfaceFunction::OnComplete(bool success) {
if (success) {
Respond(NoArguments());
} else {
Respond(Error(kErrorCannotClaimInterface));
}
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
c* (toc(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->convert3();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 170,585 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void atl2_write_pci_cfg(struct atl2_hw *hw, u32 reg, u16 *value)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = hw->back;
pci_write_config_word(adapter->pdev, reg, *value);
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reds_update_mouse_mode(void)
{
int allowed = 0;
int qxl_count = red_dispatcher_qxl_count();
if ((agent_mouse && vdagent) || (inputs_has_tablet() && qxl_count == 1)) {
allowed = reds->dispatcher_allows_client_mouse;
}
if (allowed == reds->is_client_mouse_allowed) {
return;
}
reds->is_client_mouse_allowed = allowed;
if (reds->mouse_mode == SPICE_MOUSE_MODE_CLIENT && !allowed) {
reds_set_mouse_mode(SPICE_MOUSE_MODE_SERVER);
return;
}
if (reds->main_channel) {
main_channel_push_mouse_mode(reds->main_channel, reds->mouse_mode,
reds->is_client_mouse_allowed);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,944 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: place_entity(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq, struct sched_entity *se, int initial)
{
u64 vruntime = cfs_rq->min_vruntime;
/*
* The 'current' period is already promised to the current tasks,
* however the extra weight of the new task will slow them down a
* little, place the new task so that it fits in the slot that
* stays open at the end.
*/
if (initial && sched_feat(START_DEBIT))
vruntime += sched_vslice(cfs_rq, se);
/* sleeps up to a single latency don't count. */
if (!initial) {
unsigned long thresh = sysctl_sched_latency;
/*
* Halve their sleep time's effect, to allow
* for a gentler effect of sleepers:
*/
if (sched_feat(GENTLE_FAIR_SLEEPERS))
thresh >>= 1;
vruntime -= thresh;
}
/* ensure we never gain time by being placed backwards. */
se->vruntime = max_vruntime(se->vruntime, vruntime);
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 92,631 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FakeCrosDisksClient::EnumerateDevices(
const EnumerateDevicesCallback& callback,
const base::Closure& error_callback) {}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::RemoveAllCompressedTextureFormats() {
compressed_texture_formats_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,671 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageTiffCtx(gdImagePtr image, gdIOCtx *out)
{
int clipx1P, clipy1P, clipx2P, clipy2P;
int bitDepth = 24;
/* First, switch off clipping, or we'll not get all the image! */
gdImageGetClip(image, &clipx1P, &clipy1P, &clipx2P, &clipy2P);
/* use the appropriate routine depending on the bit depth of the image */
if(image->trueColor) {
bitDepth = 24;
} else if(image->colorsTotal == 2) {
bitDepth = 1;
} else {
bitDepth = 8;
}
tiffWriter(image, out, bitDepth);
/* reset clipping area to the gd image's original values */
gdImageSetClip(image, clipx1P, clipy1P, clipx2P, clipy2P);
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr()
tiff_invalid_read.tiff is corrupt, and causes an invalid read in
gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr(), but not in gdImageCreateFromTiff(). The culprit
is dynamicGetbuf(), which doesn't check for out-of-bound reads. In this case,
dynamicGetbuf() is called with a negative dp->pos, but also positive buffer
overflows have to be handled, in which case 0 has to be returned (cf. commit
75e29a9).
Fixing dynamicGetbuf() exhibits that the corrupt TIFF would still create
the image, because the return value of TIFFReadRGBAImage() is not checked.
We do that, and let createFromTiffRgba() fail if TIFFReadRGBAImage() fails.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6911
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 73,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VideoCaptureController* controller() const { return controller_; }
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_msr_hyperv_pw(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr, u64 *pdata)
{
u64 data = 0;
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
switch (msr) {
case HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID:
data = kvm->arch.hv_guest_os_id;
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL:
data = kvm->arch.hv_hypercall;
break;
case HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT: {
data =
div_u64(get_kernel_ns() + kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset, 100);
break;
}
case HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC:
data = kvm->arch.hv_tsc_page;
break;
default:
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "Hyper-V unhandled rdmsr: 0x%x\n", msr);
return 1;
}
*pdata = data;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Don't report guest userspace emulation error to userspace
Commit fc3a9157d314 ("KVM: X86: Don't report L2 emulation failures to
user-space") disabled the reporting of L2 (nested guest) emulation failures to
userspace due to race-condition between a vmexit and the instruction emulator.
The same rational applies also to userspace applications that are permitted by
the guest OS to access MMIO area or perform PIO.
This patch extends the current behavior - of injecting a #UD instead of
reporting it to userspace - also for guest userspace code.
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 35,767 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle()
{
RenderBoxModelObject::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle();
bool isRootObject = isRoot();
bool isViewObject = isRenderView();
if (isRootObject || isViewObject)
setHasBoxDecorations(true);
setPositioned(style()->position() == AbsolutePosition || style()->position() == FixedPosition);
setFloating(!isPositioned() && style()->isFloating());
if (style()->overflowX() != OVISIBLE && !isRootObject && (isRenderBlock() || isTableRow() || isTableSection())) {
bool boxHasOverflowClip = true;
if (isBody()) {
if (document()->documentElement()->hasTagName(htmlTag) &&
document()->body() == node() &&
document()->documentElement()->renderer()->style()->overflowX() == OVISIBLE)
boxHasOverflowClip = false;
}
if (boxHasOverflowClip) {
if (!s_hadOverflowClip)
repaint();
setHasOverflowClip();
}
}
setHasTransform(style()->hasTransformRelatedProperty());
setHasReflection(style()->boxReflect());
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,651 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::NeedsFullLayoutTreeUpdate() const {
if (!IsActive() || !View())
return false;
if (style_engine_->NeedsActiveStyleUpdate())
return true;
if (!use_elements_needing_update_.IsEmpty())
return true;
if (NeedsStyleRecalc())
return true;
if (NeedsStyleInvalidation())
return true;
if (ChildNeedsDistributionRecalc())
return true;
if (DocumentAnimations::NeedsAnimationTimingUpdate(*this))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,116 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err mdhd_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_MediaHeaderBox *ptr = (GF_MediaHeaderBox *)s;
if (ptr->version == 1) {
ptr->creationTime = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
ptr->modificationTime = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
ptr->timeScale = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->duration = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
} else {
ptr->creationTime = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->modificationTime = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->timeScale = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->duration = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
if (!ptr->timeScale) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Media header timescale is 0 - defaulting to 90000\n" ));
ptr->timeScale = 90000;
}
ptr->original_duration = ptr->duration;
gf_bs_read_int(bs, 1);
ptr->packedLanguage[0] = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptr->packedLanguage[1] = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
ptr->packedLanguage[2] = gf_bs_read_int(bs, 5);
if (ptr->packedLanguage[0] || ptr->packedLanguage[1] || ptr->packedLanguage[2]) {
ptr->packedLanguage[0] += 0x60;
ptr->packedLanguage[1] += 0x60;
ptr->packedLanguage[2] += 0x60;
} else {
ptr->packedLanguage[0] = 'u';
ptr->packedLanguage[1] = 'n';
ptr->packedLanguage[2] = 'd';
}
ptr->reserved = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,214 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BookmarkManagerView::ShowToolsMenu(HWND host, int x, int y) {
views::MenuItemView menu(this);
menu.AppendMenuItemWithLabel(
IDS_BOOKMARK_MANAGER_IMPORT_MENU,
l10n_util::GetString(IDS_BOOKMARK_MANAGER_IMPORT_MENU));
menu.AppendMenuItemWithLabel(
IDS_BOOKMARK_MANAGER_EXPORT_MENU,
l10n_util::GetString(IDS_BOOKMARK_MANAGER_EXPORT_MENU));
views::MenuItemView::AnchorPosition anchor =
UILayoutIsRightToLeft() ? views::MenuItemView::TOPRIGHT :
views::MenuItemView::TOPLEFT;
menu.RunMenuAt(GetWidget()->GetNativeView(), gfx::Rect(x, y, 0, 0), anchor,
true);
}
Commit Message: Relands cl 16982 as it wasn't the cause of the build breakage. Here's
the description for that cl:
Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/115505 for bug
http://crbug.com/4030 for tyoshino.
BUG=http://crbug.com/4030
TEST=make sure control-w dismisses bookmark manager.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/113902
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@16987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err audio_sample_entry_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_MPEGAudioSampleEntryBox *ptr;
char *data;
u32 i, size;
GF_Err e;
u64 pos;
e = gf_isom_audio_sample_entry_read((GF_AudioSampleEntryBox*)s, bs);
if (e) return e;
pos = gf_bs_get_position(bs);
size = (u32) s->size;
e = gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, audio_sample_entry_AddBox);
if (!e) return GF_OK;
if (size<8) return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
/*hack for some weird files (possibly recorded with live.com tools, needs further investigations)*/
ptr = (GF_MPEGAudioSampleEntryBox *)s;
gf_bs_seek(bs, pos);
data = (char*)gf_malloc(sizeof(char) * size);
gf_bs_read_data(bs, data, size);
for (i=0; i<size-8; i++) {
if (GF_4CC(data[i+4], data[i+5], data[i+6], data[i+7]) == GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_ESDS) {
GF_BitStream *mybs = gf_bs_new(data + i, size - i, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
e = gf_isom_box_parse((GF_Box **)&ptr->esd, mybs);
gf_bs_del(mybs);
break;
}
}
gf_free(data);
return e;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 79,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::RectF GM2TabStyle::ScaleAndAlignBounds(const gfx::Rect& bounds,
float scale,
int stroke_thickness) {
gfx::RectF aligned_bounds(bounds);
const int corner_radius = GetCornerRadius();
gfx::InsetsF layout_insets(stroke_thickness, corner_radius, stroke_thickness,
corner_radius + GetSeparatorSize().width());
aligned_bounds.Inset(layout_insets);
aligned_bounds.Scale(scale);
const float x = std::round(aligned_bounds.x());
const float y = std::round(aligned_bounds.y());
const float right = std::round(aligned_bounds.right());
const float bottom = std::round(aligned_bounds.bottom());
aligned_bounds = gfx::RectF(x, y, right - x, bottom - y);
aligned_bounds.Inset(-layout_insets.Scale(scale));
return aligned_bounds;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pvscsi_ring_flush_msg(PVSCSIRingInfo *mgr)
{
/* Flush descriptor changes */
smp_wmb();
trace_pvscsi_ring_flush_msg(mgr->filled_msg_ptr);
RS_SET_FIELD(mgr, msgProdIdx, mgr->filled_msg_ptr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cm_process_send_error(struct ib_mad_send_buf *msg,
enum ib_wc_status wc_status)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
struct ib_cm_event cm_event;
enum ib_cm_state state;
int ret;
memset(&cm_event, 0, sizeof cm_event);
cm_id_priv = msg->context[0];
/* Discard old sends or ones without a response. */
spin_lock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
state = (enum ib_cm_state) (unsigned long) msg->context[1];
if (msg != cm_id_priv->msg || state != cm_id_priv->id.state)
goto discard;
switch (state) {
case IB_CM_REQ_SENT:
case IB_CM_MRA_REQ_RCVD:
cm_reset_to_idle(cm_id_priv);
cm_event.event = IB_CM_REQ_ERROR;
break;
case IB_CM_REP_SENT:
case IB_CM_MRA_REP_RCVD:
cm_reset_to_idle(cm_id_priv);
cm_event.event = IB_CM_REP_ERROR;
break;
case IB_CM_DREQ_SENT:
cm_enter_timewait(cm_id_priv);
cm_event.event = IB_CM_DREQ_ERROR;
break;
case IB_CM_SIDR_REQ_SENT:
cm_id_priv->id.state = IB_CM_IDLE;
cm_event.event = IB_CM_SIDR_REQ_ERROR;
break;
default:
goto discard;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
cm_event.param.send_status = wc_status;
/* No other events can occur on the cm_id at this point. */
ret = cm_id_priv->id.cm_handler(&cm_id_priv->id, &cm_event);
cm_free_msg(msg);
if (ret)
ib_destroy_cm_id(&cm_id_priv->id);
return;
discard:
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
cm_free_msg(msg);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,409 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Np_valueOf(js_State *J)
{
js_Object *self = js_toobject(J, 0);
if (self->type != JS_CNUMBER) js_typeerror(J, "not a number");
js_pushnumber(J, self->u.number);
}
Commit Message: Bug 700938: Fix stack overflow in numtostr as used by Number#toFixed().
32 is not enough to fit sprintf("%.20f", 1e20).
We need at least 43 bytes to fit that format.
Bump the static buffer size.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 90,741 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tcm_loop_device_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *sc)
{
struct se_cmd *se_cmd = NULL;
struct se_portal_group *se_tpg;
struct se_session *se_sess;
struct tcm_loop_cmd *tl_cmd = NULL;
struct tcm_loop_hba *tl_hba;
struct tcm_loop_nexus *tl_nexus;
struct tcm_loop_tmr *tl_tmr = NULL;
struct tcm_loop_tpg *tl_tpg;
int ret = FAILED;
/*
* Locate the tcm_loop_hba_t pointer
*/
tl_hba = *(struct tcm_loop_hba **)shost_priv(sc->device->host);
/*
* Locate the tl_nexus and se_sess pointers
*/
tl_nexus = tl_hba->tl_nexus;
if (!tl_nexus) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to perform device reset without"
" active I_T Nexus\n");
return FAILED;
}
se_sess = tl_nexus->se_sess;
/*
* Locate the tl_tpg and se_tpg pointers from TargetID in sc->device->id
*/
tl_tpg = &tl_hba->tl_hba_tpgs[sc->device->id];
se_tpg = &tl_tpg->tl_se_tpg;
tl_cmd = kmem_cache_zalloc(tcm_loop_cmd_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tl_cmd) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate memory for tl_cmd\n");
return FAILED;
}
tl_tmr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tcm_loop_tmr), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tl_tmr) {
printk(KERN_ERR "Unable to allocate memory for tl_tmr\n");
goto release;
}
init_waitqueue_head(&tl_tmr->tl_tmr_wait);
se_cmd = &tl_cmd->tl_se_cmd;
/*
* Initialize struct se_cmd descriptor from target_core_mod infrastructure
*/
transport_init_se_cmd(se_cmd, se_tpg->se_tpg_tfo, se_sess, 0,
DMA_NONE, MSG_SIMPLE_TAG,
&tl_cmd->tl_sense_buf[0]);
/*
* Allocate the LUN_RESET TMR
*/
se_cmd->se_tmr_req = core_tmr_alloc_req(se_cmd, tl_tmr,
TMR_LUN_RESET);
if (IS_ERR(se_cmd->se_tmr_req))
goto release;
/*
* Locate the underlying TCM struct se_lun from sc->device->lun
*/
if (transport_lookup_tmr_lun(se_cmd, sc->device->lun) < 0)
goto release;
/*
* Queue the TMR to TCM Core and sleep waiting for tcm_loop_queue_tm_rsp()
* to wake us up.
*/
transport_generic_handle_tmr(se_cmd);
wait_event(tl_tmr->tl_tmr_wait, atomic_read(&tl_tmr->tmr_complete));
/*
* The TMR LUN_RESET has completed, check the response status and
* then release allocations.
*/
ret = (se_cmd->se_tmr_req->response == TMR_FUNCTION_COMPLETE) ?
SUCCESS : FAILED;
release:
if (se_cmd)
transport_generic_free_cmd(se_cmd, 1, 0);
else
kmem_cache_free(tcm_loop_cmd_cache, tl_cmd);
kfree(tl_tmr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,120 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WallpaperManager::UserChangedChildStatus(user_manager::User* user) {
SetUserWallpaperNow(user->GetAccountId());
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 128,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cmd_authenticate(char *tag, char *authtype, char *resp)
{
int sasl_result;
const void *val;
const char *ssfmsg = NULL;
char replybuf[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER];
const char *reply = NULL;
const char *canon_user;
int r;
int failedloginpause;
if (imapd_tls_required) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s NO Authenticate only available under a layer\r\n", tag);
return;
}
r = saslserver(imapd_saslconn, authtype, resp, "", "+ ", "",
imapd_in, imapd_out, &sasl_result, NULL);
if (r) {
const char *errorstring = NULL;
switch (r) {
case IMAP_SASL_CANCEL:
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s BAD Client canceled authentication\r\n", tag);
break;
case IMAP_SASL_PROTERR:
errorstring = prot_error(imapd_in);
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s NO Error reading client response: %s\r\n",
tag, errorstring ? errorstring : "");
break;
default:
/* failed authentication */
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "badlogin: %s %s [%s]",
imapd_clienthost, authtype, sasl_errdetail(imapd_saslconn));
snmp_increment_args(AUTHENTICATION_NO, 1,
VARIABLE_AUTH, 0, /* hash_simple(authtype) */
VARIABLE_LISTEND);
failedloginpause = config_getint(IMAPOPT_FAILEDLOGINPAUSE);
if (failedloginpause != 0) {
sleep(failedloginpause);
}
/* Don't allow user probing */
if (sasl_result == SASL_NOUSER) sasl_result = SASL_BADAUTH;
errorstring = sasl_errstring(sasl_result, NULL, NULL);
if (errorstring) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO %s\r\n", tag, errorstring);
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO Error authenticating\r\n", tag);
}
}
reset_saslconn(&imapd_saslconn);
return;
}
/* successful authentication */
/* get the userid from SASL --- already canonicalized from
* mysasl_proxy_policy()
*/
sasl_result = sasl_getprop(imapd_saslconn, SASL_USERNAME, &val);
if (sasl_result != SASL_OK) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s NO weird SASL error %d SASL_USERNAME\r\n",
tag, sasl_result);
syslog(LOG_ERR, "weird SASL error %d getting SASL_USERNAME",
sasl_result);
reset_saslconn(&imapd_saslconn);
return;
}
canon_user = (const char *) val;
/* If we're proxying, the authzid may contain a magic plus,
so re-canonify it */
if (config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_IMAPMAGICPLUS) && strchr(canon_user, '+')) {
char userbuf[MAX_MAILBOX_BUFFER];
unsigned userlen;
sasl_result = imapd_canon_user(imapd_saslconn, NULL, canon_user, 0,
SASL_CU_AUTHID | SASL_CU_AUTHZID,
NULL, userbuf, sizeof(userbuf), &userlen);
if (sasl_result != SASL_OK) {
prot_printf(imapd_out,
"%s NO SASL canonification error %d\r\n",
tag, sasl_result);
reset_saslconn(&imapd_saslconn);
return;
}
imapd_userid = xstrdup(userbuf);
} else {
imapd_userid = xstrdup(canon_user);
}
snprintf(replybuf, sizeof(replybuf),
"User logged in SESSIONID=<%s>", session_id());
reply = replybuf;
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "login: %s %s%s %s%s %s", imapd_clienthost,
imapd_userid, imapd_magicplus ? imapd_magicplus : "",
authtype, imapd_starttls_done ? "+TLS" : "", reply);
sasl_getprop(imapd_saslconn, SASL_SSF, &val);
saslprops.ssf = *((sasl_ssf_t *) val);
/* really, we should be doing a sasl_getprop on SASL_SSF_EXTERNAL,
but the current libsasl doesn't allow that. */
if (imapd_starttls_done) {
switch(saslprops.ssf) {
case 0: ssfmsg = "tls protection"; break;
case 1: ssfmsg = "tls plus integrity protection"; break;
default: ssfmsg = "tls plus privacy protection"; break;
}
} else {
switch(saslprops.ssf) {
case 0: ssfmsg = "no protection"; break;
case 1: ssfmsg = "integrity protection"; break;
default: ssfmsg = "privacy protection"; break;
}
}
snmp_increment_args(AUTHENTICATION_YES, 1,
VARIABLE_AUTH, 0, /* hash_simple(authtype) */
VARIABLE_LISTEND);
if (checklimits(tag)) {
reset_saslconn(&imapd_saslconn);
return;
}
if (!saslprops.ssf) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK [CAPABILITY ", tag);
capa_response(CAPA_PREAUTH|CAPA_POSTAUTH);
prot_printf(imapd_out, "] Success (%s) SESSIONID=<%s>\r\n",
ssfmsg, session_id());
} else {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "%s OK Success (%s) SESSIONID=<%s>\r\n",
tag, ssfmsg, session_id());
}
prot_setsasl(imapd_in, imapd_saslconn);
prot_setsasl(imapd_out, imapd_saslconn);
authentication_success();
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcAllowEvents(ClientPtr client)
{
TimeStamp time;
DeviceIntPtr mouse = NULL;
DeviceIntPtr keybd = NULL;
REQUEST(xAllowEventsReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xAllowEventsReq);
UpdateCurrentTime();
time = ClientTimeToServerTime(stuff->time);
mouse = PickPointer(client);
keybd = PickKeyboard(client);
switch (stuff->mode) {
case ReplayPointer:
AllowSome(client, time, mouse, NOT_GRABBED);
break;
case SyncPointer:
AllowSome(client, time, mouse, FREEZE_NEXT_EVENT);
break;
case AsyncPointer:
AllowSome(client, time, mouse, THAWED);
break;
case ReplayKeyboard:
AllowSome(client, time, keybd, NOT_GRABBED);
break;
case SyncKeyboard:
AllowSome(client, time, keybd, FREEZE_NEXT_EVENT);
break;
case AsyncKeyboard:
AllowSome(client, time, keybd, THAWED);
break;
case SyncBoth:
AllowSome(client, time, keybd, FREEZE_BOTH_NEXT_EVENT);
break;
case AsyncBoth:
AllowSome(client, time, keybd, THAWED_BOTH);
break;
default:
client->errorValue = stuff->mode;
return BadValue;
}
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 4,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ahash_update(struct ahash_request *req)
{
int ret = 0;
struct hash_req_ctx *req_ctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
if (hash_mode != HASH_MODE_DMA || !req_ctx->dma_mode)
ret = hash_hw_update(req);
/* Skip update for DMA, all data will be passed to DMA in final */
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s: hash_hw_update() failed!\n", __func__);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void hidp_process_intr_transmit(struct hidp_session *session)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
BT_DBG("session %p", session);
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&session->intr_transmit))) {
if (hidp_send_frame(session->intr_sock, skb->data, skb->len) < 0) {
skb_queue_head(&session->intr_transmit, skb);
break;
}
hidp_set_timer(session);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 33,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::GetAttachedShaders(GLuint program,
GLsizei maxcount,
GLsizei* count,
GLuint* shaders) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetAttachedShaders(" << program
<< ", " << maxcount << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(count) << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(shaders) << ", ");
if (maxcount < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetAttachedShaders", "maxcount < 0");
return;
}
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetAttachedShaders");
typedef cmds::GetAttachedShaders::Result Result;
uint32_t checked_size = 0;
if (!Result::ComputeSize(maxcount).AssignIfValid(&checked_size)) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "glGetAttachedShaders",
"allocation too large");
return;
}
Result* result = static_cast<Result*>(transfer_buffer_->Alloc(checked_size));
if (!result) {
return;
}
result->SetNumResults(0);
helper_->GetAttachedShaders(program, transfer_buffer_->GetShmId(),
transfer_buffer_->GetOffset(result),
checked_size);
int32_t token = helper_->InsertToken();
WaitForCmd();
if (count) {
*count = result->GetNumResults();
}
result->CopyResult(shaders);
GPU_CLIENT_LOG_CODE_BLOCK({
for (int32_t i = 0; i < result->GetNumResults(); ++i) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" " << i << ": " << result->GetData()[i]);
}
});
transfer_buffer_->FreePendingToken(result, token);
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int allocate_trace_buffers(struct trace_array *tr, int size)
{
int ret;
ret = allocate_trace_buffer(tr, &tr->trace_buffer, size);
if (ret)
return ret;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE
ret = allocate_trace_buffer(tr, &tr->max_buffer,
allocate_snapshot ? size : 1);
if (WARN_ON(ret)) {
ring_buffer_free(tr->trace_buffer.buffer);
tr->trace_buffer.buffer = NULL;
free_percpu(tr->trace_buffer.data);
tr->trace_buffer.data = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
}
tr->allocated_snapshot = allocate_snapshot;
/*
* Only the top level trace array gets its snapshot allocated
* from the kernel command line.
*/
allocate_snapshot = false;
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,252 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jboolean setDevicePropertyNative(JNIEnv *env, jobject obj, jbyteArray address,
jint type, jbyteArray value) {
ALOGV("%s:",__FUNCTION__);
jbyte *val, *addr;
jboolean result = JNI_FALSE;
if (!sBluetoothInterface) return result;
val = env->GetByteArrayElements(value, NULL);
if (val == NULL) {
jniThrowIOException(env, EINVAL);
return result;
}
addr = env->GetByteArrayElements(address, NULL);
if (addr == NULL) {
env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(value, val, 0);
jniThrowIOException(env, EINVAL);
return result;
}
bt_property_t prop;
prop.type = (bt_property_type_t) type;
prop.len = env->GetArrayLength(value);
prop.val = val;
int ret = sBluetoothInterface->set_remote_device_property((bt_bdaddr_t *)addr, &prop);
env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(value, val, 0);
env->ReleaseByteArrayElements(address, addr, 0);
result = (ret == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) ? JNI_TRUE : JNI_FALSE;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RAND_DRBG_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
if (drbg->meth == NULL) {
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_UNINSTANTIATE,
RAND_R_NO_DRBG_IMPLEMENTATION_SELECTED);
return 0;
}
/* Clear the entire drbg->ctr struct, then reset some important
* members of the drbg->ctr struct (e.g. keysize, df_ks) to their
* initial values.
*/
drbg->meth->uninstantiate(drbg);
return RAND_DRBG_set(drbg, drbg->type, drbg->flags);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 12,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothSocketConnectFunction::ConnectToService(
device::BluetoothDevice* device,
const device::BluetoothUUID& uuid) {
device->ConnectToService(
uuid,
base::Bind(&BluetoothSocketConnectFunction::OnConnect, this),
base::Bind(&BluetoothSocketConnectFunction::OnConnectError, this));
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 154,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int XMLRPC_VectorSize(XMLRPC_VALUE value) {
int size = 0;
if(value && value->type == xmlrpc_vector && value->v) {
size = Q_Size(value->v->q);
}
return size;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init default_banner(void)
{
printk(KERN_INFO "Booting paravirtualized kernel on %s\n",
pv_info.name);
}
Commit Message: x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests
Nadav reported that on guests we're failing to rewrite the indirect
calls to CALLEE_SAVE paravirt functions. In particular the
pv_queued_spin_unlock() call is left unpatched and that is all over the
place. This obviously wrecks Spectre-v2 mitigation (for paravirt
guests) which relies on not actually having indirect calls around.
The reason is an incorrect clobber test in paravirt_patch_call(); this
function rewrites an indirect call with a direct call to the _SAME_
function, there is no possible way the clobbers can be different
because of this.
Therefore remove this clobber check. Also put WARNs on the other patch
failure case (not enough room for the instruction) which I've not seen
trigger in my (limited) testing.
Three live kernel image disassemblies for lock_sock_nested (as a small
function that illustrates the problem nicely). PRE is the current
situation for guests, POST is with this patch applied and NATIVE is with
or without the patch for !guests.
PRE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq *0xffffffff822299e8
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
POST:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: callq 0xffffffff810a0c20 <__raw_callee_save___pv_queued_spin_unlock>
0xffffffff817be9a5 <+53>: xchg %ax,%ax
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063aa0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
NATIVE:
(gdb) disassemble lock_sock_nested
Dump of assembler code for function lock_sock_nested:
0xffffffff817be970 <+0>: push %rbp
0xffffffff817be971 <+1>: mov %rdi,%rbp
0xffffffff817be974 <+4>: push %rbx
0xffffffff817be975 <+5>: lea 0x88(%rbp),%rbx
0xffffffff817be97c <+12>: callq 0xffffffff819f7160 <_cond_resched>
0xffffffff817be981 <+17>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be984 <+20>: callq 0xffffffff819fbb00 <_raw_spin_lock_bh>
0xffffffff817be989 <+25>: mov 0x8c(%rbp),%eax
0xffffffff817be98f <+31>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff817be991 <+33>: jne 0xffffffff817be9ba <lock_sock_nested+74>
0xffffffff817be993 <+35>: movl $0x1,0x8c(%rbp)
0xffffffff817be99d <+45>: mov %rbx,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9a0 <+48>: movb $0x0,(%rdi)
0xffffffff817be9a3 <+51>: nopl 0x0(%rax)
0xffffffff817be9a7 <+55>: pop %rbx
0xffffffff817be9a8 <+56>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff817be9a9 <+57>: mov $0x200,%esi
0xffffffff817be9ae <+62>: mov $0xffffffff817be993,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9b5 <+69>: jmpq 0xffffffff81063ae0 <__local_bh_enable_ip>
0xffffffff817be9ba <+74>: mov %rbp,%rdi
0xffffffff817be9bd <+77>: callq 0xffffffff817be8c0 <__lock_sock>
0xffffffff817be9c2 <+82>: jmp 0xffffffff817be993 <lock_sock_nested+35>
End of assembler dump.
Fixes: 63f70270ccd9 ("[PATCH] i386: PARAVIRT: add common patching machinery")
Fixes: 3010a0663fd9 ("x86/paravirt, objtool: Annotate indirect calls")
Reported-by: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 79,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CommandBufferProxyImpl::Send(IPC::Message* msg) {
DCHECK(last_state_.error == gpu::error::kNoError);
if (channel_) {
if (channel_->Send(msg)) {
return true;
} else {
last_state_.error = gpu::error::kLostContext;
return false;
}
}
delete msg;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewHostImpl::OnAddMessageToConsole(
int32 level,
const string16& message,
int32 line_no,
const string16& source_id) {
if (delegate_->AddMessageToConsole(level, message, line_no, source_id))
return;
int32 resolved_level =
(enabled_bindings_ & BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI) ? level : 0;
if (resolved_level >= ::logging::GetMinLogLevel()) {
logging::LogMessage("CONSOLE", line_no, resolved_level).stream() << "\"" <<
message << "\", source: " << source_id << " (" << line_no << ")";
}
}
Commit Message: Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool push_queued_message(struct smb_request *req,
struct timeval request_time,
struct timeval end_time,
char *private_data, size_t private_len)
{
int msg_len = smb_len(req->inbuf) + 4;
struct pending_message_list *msg;
msg = TALLOC_ZERO_P(NULL, struct pending_message_list);
if(msg == NULL) {
DEBUG(0,("push_message: malloc fail (1)\n"));
return False;
}
msg->buf = data_blob_talloc(msg, req->inbuf, msg_len);
if(msg->buf.data == NULL) {
DEBUG(0,("push_message: malloc fail (2)\n"));
TALLOC_FREE(msg);
return False;
}
msg->request_time = request_time;
msg->seqnum = req->seqnum;
msg->encrypted = req->encrypted;
msg->processed = false;
SMB_PERFCOUNT_DEFER_OP(&req->pcd, &msg->pcd);
if (private_data) {
msg->private_data = data_blob_talloc(msg, private_data,
private_len);
if (msg->private_data.data == NULL) {
DEBUG(0,("push_message: malloc fail (3)\n"));
TALLOC_FREE(msg);
return False;
}
}
msg->te = event_add_timed(smbd_event_context(),
msg,
end_time,
smbd_deferred_open_timer,
msg);
if (!msg->te) {
DEBUG(0,("push_message: event_add_timed failed\n"));
TALLOC_FREE(msg);
return false;
}
DLIST_ADD_END(deferred_open_queue, msg, struct pending_message_list *);
DEBUG(10,("push_message: pushed message length %u on "
"deferred_open_queue\n", (unsigned int)msg_len));
return True;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 11,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nested_vmx_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool launch)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
int cpu;
struct loaded_vmcs *vmcs02;
bool ia32e;
u32 msr_entry_idx;
if (!nested_vmx_check_permission(vcpu) ||
!nested_vmx_check_vmcs12(vcpu))
return 1;
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
if (enable_shadow_vmcs)
copy_shadow_to_vmcs12(vmx);
/*
* The nested entry process starts with enforcing various prerequisites
* on vmcs12 as required by the Intel SDM, and act appropriately when
* they fail: As the SDM explains, some conditions should cause the
* instruction to fail, while others will cause the instruction to seem
* to succeed, but return an EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE.
* To speed up the normal (success) code path, we should avoid checking
* for misconfigurations which will anyway be caught by the processor
* when using the merged vmcs02.
*/
if (vmcs12->launch_state == launch) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
launch ? VMXERR_VMLAUNCH_NONCLEAR_VMCS
: VMXERR_VMRESUME_NONLAUNCHED_VMCS);
return 1;
}
if (vmcs12->guest_activity_state != GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE &&
vmcs12->guest_activity_state != GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
return 1;
}
if (!nested_get_vmcs12_pages(vcpu, vmcs12)) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
return 1;
}
if (nested_vmx_check_msr_bitmap_controls(vcpu, vmcs12)) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
return 1;
}
if (nested_vmx_check_apicv_controls(vcpu, vmcs12)) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
return 1;
}
if (nested_vmx_check_msr_switch_controls(vcpu, vmcs12)) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
return 1;
}
if (!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_true_procbased_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_procbased_ctls_high) ||
!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->secondary_vm_exec_control,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high) ||
!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_pinbased_ctls_high) ||
!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->vm_exit_controls,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_true_exit_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_exit_ctls_high) ||
!vmx_control_verify(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_true_entry_ctls_low,
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_entry_ctls_high))
{
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu, VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_CONTROL_FIELD);
return 1;
}
if (((vmcs12->host_cr0 & VMXON_CR0_ALWAYSON) != VMXON_CR0_ALWAYSON) ||
((vmcs12->host_cr4 & VMXON_CR4_ALWAYSON) != VMXON_CR4_ALWAYSON)) {
nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
VMXERR_ENTRY_INVALID_HOST_STATE_FIELD);
return 1;
}
if (!nested_cr0_valid(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_cr0) ||
((vmcs12->guest_cr4 & VMXON_CR4_ALWAYSON) != VMXON_CR4_ALWAYSON)) {
nested_vmx_entry_failure(vcpu, vmcs12,
EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE, ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT);
return 1;
}
if (vmcs12->vmcs_link_pointer != -1ull) {
nested_vmx_entry_failure(vcpu, vmcs12,
EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE, ENTRY_FAIL_VMCS_LINK_PTR);
return 1;
}
/*
* If the load IA32_EFER VM-entry control is 1, the following checks
* are performed on the field for the IA32_EFER MSR:
* - Bits reserved in the IA32_EFER MSR must be 0.
* - Bit 10 (corresponding to IA32_EFER.LMA) must equal the value of
* the IA-32e mode guest VM-exit control. It must also be identical
* to bit 8 (LME) if bit 31 in the CR0 field (corresponding to
* CR0.PG) is 1.
*/
if (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER) {
ia32e = (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) != 0;
if (!kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer) ||
ia32e != !!(vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer & EFER_LMA) ||
((vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) &&
ia32e != !!(vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer & EFER_LME))) {
nested_vmx_entry_failure(vcpu, vmcs12,
EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE, ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT);
return 1;
}
}
/*
* If the load IA32_EFER VM-exit control is 1, bits reserved in the
* IA32_EFER MSR must be 0 in the field for that register. In addition,
* the values of the LMA and LME bits in the field must each be that of
* the host address-space size VM-exit control.
*/
if (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER) {
ia32e = (vmcs12->vm_exit_controls &
VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE) != 0;
if (!kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, vmcs12->host_ia32_efer) ||
ia32e != !!(vmcs12->host_ia32_efer & EFER_LMA) ||
ia32e != !!(vmcs12->host_ia32_efer & EFER_LME)) {
nested_vmx_entry_failure(vcpu, vmcs12,
EXIT_REASON_INVALID_STATE, ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT);
return 1;
}
}
/*
* We're finally done with prerequisite checking, and can start with
* the nested entry.
*/
vmcs02 = nested_get_current_vmcs02(vmx);
if (!vmcs02)
return -ENOMEM;
enter_guest_mode(vcpu);
vmx->nested.vmcs01_tsc_offset = vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET);
if (!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS))
vmx->nested.vmcs01_debugctl = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
cpu = get_cpu();
vmx->loaded_vmcs = vmcs02;
vmx_vcpu_put(vcpu);
vmx_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
vcpu->cpu = cpu;
put_cpu();
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
prepare_vmcs02(vcpu, vmcs12);
msr_entry_idx = nested_vmx_load_msr(vcpu,
vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_addr,
vmcs12->vm_entry_msr_load_count);
if (msr_entry_idx) {
leave_guest_mode(vcpu);
vmx_load_vmcs01(vcpu);
nested_vmx_entry_failure(vcpu, vmcs12,
EXIT_REASON_MSR_LOAD_FAIL, msr_entry_idx);
return 1;
}
vmcs12->launch_state = 1;
if (vmcs12->guest_activity_state == GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT)
return kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 1;
/*
* Note no nested_vmx_succeed or nested_vmx_fail here. At this point
* we are no longer running L1, and VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME has not yet
* returned as far as L1 is concerned. It will only return (and set
* the success flag) when L2 exits (see nested_vmx_vmexit()).
*/
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int qib_file_vma_fault(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct vm_fault *vmf)
{
struct page *page;
page = vmalloc_to_page((void *)(vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT));
if (!page)
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
get_page(page);
vmf->page = page;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static scoped_refptr<SiteInstanceImpl> CreateSiteInstance(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) {
return SiteInstanceImpl::CreateForURL(browser_context, url);
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: num_reachable_filtered_guards(guard_selection_t *gs,
const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst)
{
int n_reachable_filtered_guards = 0;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) {
entry_guard_consider_retry(guard);
if (! entry_guard_obeys_restriction(guard, rst))
continue;
if (guard->is_usable_filtered_guard)
++n_reachable_filtered_guards;
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
return n_reachable_filtered_guards;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wake_up_process(struct task_struct *p)
{
WARN_ON(task_is_stopped_or_traced(p));
return try_to_wake_up(p, TASK_NORMAL, 0);
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserInit::LaunchWithProfile::AddUniqueURLs(
const std::vector<GURL>& urls,
std::vector<Tab>* tabs) {
size_t num_existing_tabs = tabs->size();
for (size_t i = 0; i < urls.size(); ++i) {
bool in_tabs = false;
for (size_t j = 0; j < num_existing_tabs; ++j) {
if (urls[i] == (*tabs)[j].url) {
in_tabs = true;
break;
}
}
if (!in_tabs) {
BrowserInit::LaunchWithProfile::Tab tab;
tab.is_pinned = false;
tab.url = urls[i];
tabs->push_back(tab);
}
}
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void VoidMethodDefaultIntegerArgsMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "voidMethodDefaultIntegerArgs");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t default_long_arg;
int64_t default_long_long_arg;
uint32_t default_unsigned_arg;
if (!info[0]->IsUndefined()) {
default_long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
} else {
default_long_arg = 10;
}
if (!info[1]->IsUndefined()) {
default_long_long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLongLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[1], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
} else {
default_long_long_arg = -10;
}
if (!info[2]->IsUndefined()) {
default_unsigned_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLUnsignedLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[2], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
} else {
default_unsigned_arg = 4294967295u;
}
impl->voidMethodDefaultIntegerArgs(default_long_arg, default_long_long_arg, default_unsigned_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,377 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::unique_ptr<BlobDataHandle> BlobStorageContext::GetBlobDataFromUUID(
const std::string& uuid) {
BlobEntry* entry = registry_.GetEntry(uuid);
if (!entry)
return nullptr;
return CreateHandle(uuid, entry);
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 150,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double Histogram::GetPeakBucketSize(const SampleVector& samples) const {
double max = 0;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < bucket_count() ; ++i) {
double current_size = GetBucketSize(samples.GetCountAtIndex(i), i);
if (current_size > max)
max = current_size;
}
return max;
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 140,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int WebContext::BrowserContextDelegate::OnBeforeURLRequest(
net::URLRequest* request,
const net::CompletionCallback& callback,
GURL* new_url) {
QSharedPointer<WebContextProxyClient::IOClient> io_client = GetIOClient();
if (!io_client) {
return net::OK;
}
const content::ResourceRequestInfo* info =
content::ResourceRequestInfo::ForRequest(request);
if (!info) {
return net::OK;
}
OxideQBeforeURLRequestEvent event(
QUrl(QString::fromStdString(request->url().spec())),
QString::fromStdString(request->method()),
QString::fromStdString(request->referrer()),
info->IsMainFrame());
io_client->OnBeforeURLRequest(&event);
OxideQBeforeURLRequestEventPrivate* eventp =
OxideQBeforeURLRequestEventPrivate::get(&event);
*new_url = GURL(eventp->new_url.toString().toStdString());
return eventp->request_cancelled ? net::ERR_ABORTED : net::OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 16,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __inet6_csk_dst_store(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
const struct in6_addr *daddr,
const struct in6_addr *saddr)
{
__ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, daddr, saddr);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 53,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DefragTracker *DefragLookupTrackerFromHash (Packet *p)
{
DefragTracker *dt = NULL;
/* get the key to our bucket */
uint32_t key = DefragHashGetKey(p);
/* get our hash bucket and lock it */
DefragTrackerHashRow *hb = &defragtracker_hash[key];
DRLOCK_LOCK(hb);
/* see if the bucket already has a tracker */
if (hb->head == NULL) {
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
return dt;
}
/* ok, we have a tracker in the bucket. Let's find out if it is our tracker */
dt = hb->head;
/* see if this is the tracker we are looking for */
if (DefragTrackerCompare(dt, p) == 0) {
while (dt) {
dt = dt->hnext;
if (dt == NULL) {
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
return dt;
}
if (DefragTrackerCompare(dt, p) != 0) {
/* we found our tracker, lets put it on top of the
* hash list -- this rewards active tracker */
if (dt->hnext) {
dt->hnext->hprev = dt->hprev;
}
if (dt->hprev) {
dt->hprev->hnext = dt->hnext;
}
if (dt == hb->tail) {
hb->tail = dt->hprev;
}
dt->hnext = hb->head;
dt->hprev = NULL;
hb->head->hprev = dt;
hb->head = dt;
/* found our tracker, lock & return */
SCMutexLock(&dt->lock);
(void) DefragTrackerIncrUsecnt(dt);
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
return dt;
}
}
}
/* lock & return */
SCMutexLock(&dt->lock);
(void) DefragTrackerIncrUsecnt(dt);
DRLOCK_UNLOCK(hb);
return dt;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | 0 | 67,824 |
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