instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
X509_ALGOR *cmsalg;
int nid;
int rv = -1;
unsigned char *label = NULL;
int labellen = 0;
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep;
X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
if (!pkctx)
return 0;
if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &cmsalg))
return -1;
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(cmsalg->algorithm);
if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption)
return 1;
if (nid != NID_rsaesOaep) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE);
return -1;
}
/* Decode OAEP parameters */
oaep = rsa_oaep_decode(cmsalg, &maskHash);
if (oaep == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
mgf1md = rsa_mgf1_to_md(oaep->maskGenFunc, maskHash);
if (!mgf1md)
goto err;
md = rsa_algor_to_md(oaep->hashFunc);
if (!md)
goto err;
if (oaep->pSourceFunc) {
X509_ALGOR *plab = oaep->pSourceFunc;
if (OBJ_obj2nid(plab->algorithm) != NID_pSpecified) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE);
goto err;
}
if (plab->parameter->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL);
goto err;
}
label = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data;
/* Stop label being freed when OAEP parameters are freed */
plab->parameter->value.octet_string->data = NULL;
labellen = plab->parameter->value.octet_string->length;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(pkctx, md) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, mgf1md) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(pkctx, label, labellen) <= 0)
goto err;
/* Carry on */
rv = 1;
err:
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep);
if (maskHash)
X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
return rv;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 3,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType ReadUncompressedRGB(Image *image, DDSInfo *dds_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
PixelPacket
*q;
ssize_t
x, y;
unsigned short
color;
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 8)
(void) SetImageType(image,GrayscaleType);
else if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16 && !IsBitMask(
dds_info->pixelformat,0xf800,0x07e0,0x001f,0x0000))
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported",
image->filename);
for (y = 0; y < (ssize_t) dds_info->height; y++)
{
q = QueueAuthenticPixels(image, 0, y, dds_info->width, 1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
return MagickFalse;
for (x = 0; x < (ssize_t) dds_info->width; x++)
{
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 8)
SetPixelGray(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(ReadBlobByte(image)));
else if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 16)
{
color=ReadBlobShort(image);
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
(((color >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 5) >> 10)/63.0)*255)));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
((((unsigned short)(color << 11) >> 11)/31.0)*255)));
}
else
{
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image)));
if (dds_info->pixelformat.rgb_bitcount == 32)
(void) ReadBlobByte(image);
}
SetPixelAlpha(q,QuantumRange);
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
return MagickFalse;
}
return(SkipRGBMipmaps(image,dds_info,3,exception));
}
Commit Message: Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489).
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 65,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_input_colorspace(struct iw_context *ctx, const struct iw_csdescr *csdescr)
{
ctx->img1cs = *csdescr; // struct copy
optimize_csdescr(&ctx->img1cs);
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 64,996 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GetHeaders(base::DictionaryValue* params, std::string* headers) {
if (!params)
return false;
base::ListValue* header_list;
if (!params->GetList("headers", &header_list))
return false;
std::string double_quote_headers;
base::JSONWriter::Write(header_list, &double_quote_headers);
base::ReplaceChars(double_quote_headers, "\"", "'", headers);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u8 rxe_get_key(void)
{
static u32 key = 1;
key = key << 1;
key |= (0 != (key & 0x100)) ^ (0 != (key & 0x10))
^ (0 != (key & 0x80)) ^ (0 != (key & 0x40));
key &= 0xff;
return key;
}
Commit Message: IB/rxe: Fix mem_check_range integer overflow
Update the range check to avoid integer-overflow in edge case.
Resolves CVE 2016-8636.
Signed-off-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 73,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_object_list(int ac, const char **av)
{
struct rev_info revs;
char line[1000];
int flags = 0;
init_revisions(&revs, NULL);
save_commit_buffer = 0;
setup_revisions(ac, av, &revs, NULL);
/* make sure shallows are read */
is_repository_shallow();
while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), stdin) != NULL) {
int len = strlen(line);
if (len && line[len - 1] == '\n')
line[--len] = 0;
if (!len)
break;
if (*line == '-') {
if (!strcmp(line, "--not")) {
flags ^= UNINTERESTING;
write_bitmap_index = 0;
continue;
}
if (starts_with(line, "--shallow ")) {
unsigned char sha1[20];
if (get_sha1_hex(line + 10, sha1))
die("not an SHA-1 '%s'", line + 10);
register_shallow(sha1);
use_bitmap_index = 0;
continue;
}
die("not a rev '%s'", line);
}
if (handle_revision_arg(line, &revs, flags, REVARG_CANNOT_BE_FILENAME))
die("bad revision '%s'", line);
}
if (use_bitmap_index && !get_object_list_from_bitmap(&revs))
return;
if (prepare_revision_walk(&revs))
die("revision walk setup failed");
mark_edges_uninteresting(&revs, show_edge);
traverse_commit_list(&revs, show_commit, show_object, NULL);
if (unpack_unreachable_expiration) {
revs.ignore_missing_links = 1;
if (add_unseen_recent_objects_to_traversal(&revs,
unpack_unreachable_expiration))
die("unable to add recent objects");
if (prepare_revision_walk(&revs))
die("revision walk setup failed");
traverse_commit_list(&revs, record_recent_commit,
record_recent_object, NULL);
}
if (keep_unreachable)
add_objects_in_unpacked_packs(&revs);
if (unpack_unreachable)
loosen_unused_packed_objects(&revs);
sha1_array_clear(&recent_objects);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringStringAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tcp_abort(struct sock *sk, int err)
{
if (!sk_fullsock(sk)) {
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV) {
struct request_sock *req = inet_reqsk(sk);
local_bh_disable();
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put(req->rsk_listener,
req);
local_bh_enable();
return 0;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
/* Don't race with userspace socket closes such as tcp_close. */
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE);
inet_csk_listen_stop(sk);
}
/* Don't race with BH socket closes such as inet_csk_listen_stop. */
local_bh_disable();
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
sk->sk_err = err;
/* This barrier is coupled with smp_rmb() in tcp_poll() */
smp_wmb();
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
if (tcp_need_reset(sk->sk_state))
tcp_send_active_reset(sk, GFP_ATOMIC);
tcp_done(sk);
}
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
local_bh_enable();
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0
When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets
icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0.
This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() =>
__tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue.
So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 61,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fallback_exit_blk(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct s390_aes_ctx *sctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
crypto_free_blkcipher(sctx->fallback.blk);
sctx->fallback.blk = NULL;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int wc_ecc_import_unsigned(ecc_key* key, byte* qx, byte* qy,
byte* d, int curve_id)
{
return wc_ecc_import_raw_private(key, (const char*)qx, (const char*)qy,
(const char*)d, curve_id, ECC_TYPE_UNSIGNED_BIN);
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 81,900 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TabCloseableStateWatcher::TabStripWatcher::~TabStripWatcher() {
browser_->tabstrip_model()->RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,032 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PrintingContext::Result PrintingContextCairo::NewPage() {
if (abort_printing_)
return CANCEL;
DCHECK(in_print_job_);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::paintClippingMask(PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutPoint& paintOffset)
{
if (!paintInfo.shouldPaintWithinRoot(this) || style()->visibility() != VISIBLE || paintInfo.phase != PaintPhaseClippingMask || paintInfo.context->paintingDisabled())
return;
if (!layer() || layer()->compositingState() != PaintsIntoOwnBacking)
return;
ASSERT(layer()->compositingState() != HasOwnBackingButPaintsIntoAncestor);
LayoutRect paintRect = LayoutRect(paintOffset, size());
paintInfo.context->fillRect(pixelSnappedIntRect(paintRect), Color::black);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,569 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dissect_as_if_format_type_body(tvbuff_t *tvb, gint offset, packet_info *pinfo _U_,
proto_tree *tree, usb_conv_info_t *usb_conv_info)
{
audio_conv_info_t *audio_conv_info;
gint offset_start;
guint8 SamFreqType;
guint8 format_type;
/* the caller has already checked that usb_conv_info!=NULL */
audio_conv_info = (audio_conv_info_t *)usb_conv_info->class_data;
if (!audio_conv_info)
return 0;
offset_start = offset;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_formattype, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
format_type = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
offset++;
switch(format_type){
case 1:
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_nrchannels, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_subframesize, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_bitresolution, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 1;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_samfreqtype, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
SamFreqType = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
offset++;
if(SamFreqType == 0){
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_lowersamfreq, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 3;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_uppersamfreq, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 3;
}else {
while(SamFreqType){
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_samfreq, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 3;
SamFreqType--;
}
}
break;
case 2:
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_maxbitrate, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_samplesperframe, tvb, offset, 2, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 2;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_samfreqtype, tvb, offset, 1, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
SamFreqType = tvb_get_guint8(tvb, offset);
offset++;
if(SamFreqType == 0){
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_lowersamfreq, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 3;
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_uppersamfreq, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 3;
}else {
while(SamFreqType){
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_as_if_ft_samfreq, tvb, offset, 3, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 3;
SamFreqType--;
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return offset-offset_start;
}
Commit Message: Make class "type" for USB conversations.
USB dissectors can't assume that only their class type has been passed around in the conversation. Make explicit check that class type expected matches the dissector and stop/prevent dissection if there isn't a match.
Bug: 12356
Change-Id: Ib23973a4ebd0fbb51952ffc118daf95e3389a209
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15212
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Reviewed-by: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Petri-Dish: Martin Kaiser <wireshark@kaiser.cx>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 51,803 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aura::Window* CreatePanelWindow(const gfx::Rect& bounds) {
return CreatePanelWindowWithDelegate(nullptr, bounds);
}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,239 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct kwajd_stream *lzh_init(struct mspack_system *sys,
struct mspack_file *in, struct mspack_file *out)
{
struct kwajd_stream *lzh;
if (!sys || !in || !out) return NULL;
if (!(lzh = (struct kwajd_stream *) sys->alloc(sys, sizeof(struct kwajd_stream)))) return NULL;
lzh->sys = sys;
lzh->input = in;
lzh->output = out;
return lzh;
}
Commit Message: kwaj_read_headers(): fix handling of non-terminated strings
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 79,164 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err moof_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_MovieFragmentBox *ptr = (GF_MovieFragmentBox *) s;
if (!s) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
if (ptr->mfhd) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->mfhd, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
return gf_isom_box_array_write(s, ptr->TrackList, bs);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sc_asn1_encode_object_id(u8 **buf, size_t *buflen, const struct sc_object_id *id)
{
u8 temp[SC_MAX_OBJECT_ID_OCTETS*5], *p = temp;
int i;
if (!buflen || !id)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
/* an OID must have at least two components */
if (id->value[0] == -1 || id->value[1] == -1)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
for (i = 0; i < SC_MAX_OBJECT_ID_OCTETS; i++) {
unsigned int k, shift;
if (id->value[i] == -1)
break;
k = id->value[i];
switch (i) {
case 0:
if (k > 2)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
*p = k * 40;
break;
case 1:
if (k > 39)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
*p++ += k;
break;
default:
shift = 28;
while (shift && (k >> shift) == 0)
shift -= 7;
while (shift) {
*p++ = 0x80 | ((k >> shift) & 0x7f);
shift -= 7;
}
*p++ = k & 0x7F;
break;
}
}
*buflen = p - temp;
if (buf) {
*buf = malloc(*buflen);
if (!*buf)
return SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
memcpy(*buf, temp, *buflen);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static long do_msg_fill(void __user *dest, struct msg_msg *msg, size_t bufsz)
{
struct msgbuf __user *msgp = dest;
size_t msgsz;
if (put_user(msg->m_type, &msgp->mtype))
return -EFAULT;
msgsz = (bufsz > msg->m_ts) ? msg->m_ts : bufsz;
if (store_msg(msgp->mtext, msg, msgsz))
return -EFAULT;
return msgsz;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeBrowserMainPartsChromeos::PreProfileInit() {
BootTimesRecorder::Get()->RecordChromeMainStats();
LoginEventRecorder::Get()->SetDelegate(BootTimesRecorder::Get());
DeviceSettingsService::Get()->Load();
g_browser_process->platform_part()->InitializeChromeUserManager();
g_browser_process->platform_part()->InitializeSessionManager();
ScreenLocker::InitClass();
g_browser_process->profile_manager();
input_method::Initialize();
ProfileHelper::Get()->Initialize();
bool immediate_login = parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(switches::kLoginUser);
if (immediate_login) {
logging::RedirectChromeLogging(parsed_command_line());
app_order_loader_.reset(
new default_app_order::ExternalLoader(false /* async */));
}
if (!app_order_loader_) {
app_order_loader_.reset(
new default_app_order::ExternalLoader(true /* async */));
}
media::SoundsManager::Create();
NoteTakingHelper::Initialize();
AccessibilityManager::Initialize();
if (chromeos::GetAshConfig() != ash::Config::MASH) {
MagnificationManager::Initialize();
}
base::PostTaskWithTraitsAndReplyWithResult(
FROM_HERE, {base::MayBlock(), base::TaskPriority::BACKGROUND},
base::Bind(&version_loader::GetVersion, version_loader::VERSION_FULL),
base::Bind(&ChromeOSVersionCallback));
if (parsed_command_line().HasSwitch(::switches::kTestType) ||
ShouldAutoLaunchKioskApp(parsed_command_line())) {
WizardController::SetZeroDelays();
}
arc_kiosk_app_manager_.reset(new ArcKioskAppManager());
if (!base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
::switches::kDisableZeroBrowsersOpenForTests)) {
g_browser_process->platform_part()->RegisterKeepAlive();
}
chromeos::AccelerometerReader::GetInstance()->Initialize(
base::CreateSequencedTaskRunnerWithTraits(
{base::MayBlock(), base::TaskPriority::BACKGROUND,
base::TaskShutdownBehavior::SKIP_ON_SHUTDOWN}));
ChromeBrowserMainPartsLinux::PreProfileInit();
keyboard::InitializeKeyboardResources();
if (lock_screen_apps::StateController::IsEnabled()) {
lock_screen_apps_state_controller_ =
std::make_unique<lock_screen_apps::StateController>();
lock_screen_apps_state_controller_->Initialize();
}
if (immediate_login) {
const std::string cryptohome_id =
parsed_command_line().GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kLoginUser);
const AccountId account_id(
cryptohome::Identification::FromString(cryptohome_id).GetAccountId());
user_manager::UserManager* user_manager = user_manager::UserManager::Get();
if (policy::IsDeviceLocalAccountUser(account_id.GetUserEmail(), nullptr) &&
!user_manager->IsKnownUser(account_id)) {
chrome::AttemptUserExit();
return;
}
std::string user_id_hash =
parsed_command_line().GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kLoginProfile);
session_manager::SessionManager::Get()->CreateSessionForRestart(
account_id, user_id_hash);
VLOG(1) << "Relaunching browser for user: " << account_id.Serialize()
<< " with hash: " << user_id_hash;
}
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ahash_prepare_alg(struct ahash_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_alg *base = &alg->halg.base;
if (alg->halg.digestsize > PAGE_SIZE / 8 ||
alg->halg.statesize > PAGE_SIZE / 8)
return -EINVAL;
base->cra_type = &crypto_ahash_type;
base->cra_flags &= ~CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK;
base->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __init hci_sock_init(void)
{
int err;
err = proto_register(&hci_sk_proto, 0);
if (err < 0)
return err;
err = bt_sock_register(BTPROTO_HCI, &hci_sock_family_ops);
if (err < 0)
goto error;
BT_INFO("HCI socket layer initialized");
return 0;
error:
BT_ERR("HCI socket registration failed");
proto_unregister(&hci_sk_proto);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak in getsockopt(HCI_FILTER)
The HCI code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
hci_ufilter before copying it to userland -- that for leaking two
bytes kernel stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before filling the
structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TabStrip::AnimateToIdealBounds() {
for (int i = 0; i < tab_count(); ++i) {
Tab* tab = tab_at(i);
if (tab->dragging() && !bounds_animator_.IsAnimating(tab))
continue;
const gfx::Rect& target_bounds = ideal_bounds(i);
if (bounds_animator_.GetTargetBounds(tab) == target_bounds)
continue;
bounds_animator_.AnimateViewTo(
tab, target_bounds,
tab->dragging() ? nullptr
: std::make_unique<TabAnimationDelegate>(this, tab));
}
if (bounds_animator_.GetTargetBounds(new_tab_button_) !=
new_tab_button_bounds_)
bounds_animator_.AnimateViewTo(new_tab_button_, new_tab_button_bounds_);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t file_size() const { return file_size_; }
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,388 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebGLTexture* WebGLRenderingContextBase::ValidateTextureBinding(
const char* function_name,
GLenum target) {
WebGLTexture* tex = nullptr;
switch (target) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
tex = texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture2d_binding_.Get();
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP:
tex =
texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture_cube_map_binding_.Get();
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_3D:
if (!IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name,
"invalid texture target");
return nullptr;
}
tex = texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture3d_binding_.Get();
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_2D_ARRAY:
if (!IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name,
"invalid texture target");
return nullptr;
}
tex = texture_units_[active_texture_unit_].texture2d_array_binding_.Get();
break;
case GL_TEXTURE_VIDEO_IMAGE_WEBGL:
if (!ExtensionEnabled(kWebGLVideoTextureName)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name,
"invalid texture target");
return nullptr;
}
tex = texture_units_[active_texture_unit_]
.texture_video_image_binding_.Get();
break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name,
"invalid texture target");
return nullptr;
}
if (!tex)
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"no texture bound to target");
return tex;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform3iv(const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
const FlexibleInt32ArrayView& v) {
if (isContextLost() || !ValidateUniformParameters<WTF::Int32Array>(
"uniform3iv", location, v, 3, 0, v.length()))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform3iv(location->Location(), v.length() / 3,
v.DataMaybeOnStack());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::Resize(
RenderViewHost* embedder_rvh,
const BrowserPluginHostMsg_ResizeGuest_Params& params) {
RenderWidgetHostImpl* render_widget_host =
RenderWidgetHostImpl::From(web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost());
render_widget_host->ResetSizeAndRepaintPendingFlags();
if (!TransportDIB::is_valid_id(params.damage_buffer_id)) {
if (!params.view_size.IsEmpty())
web_contents()->GetView()->SizeContents(params.view_size);
return;
}
TransportDIB* damage_buffer =
GetDamageBufferFromEmbedder(embedder_rvh, params);
SetDamageBuffer(damage_buffer,
#if defined(OS_WIN)
params.damage_buffer_size,
params.damage_buffer_id.handle,
#endif
params.view_size,
params.scale_factor);
web_contents()->GetView()->SizeContents(params.view_size);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,415 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionInstalledBubbleGtk::ShowInternal() {
BrowserWindowGtk* browser_window =
BrowserWindowGtk::GetBrowserWindowForNativeWindow(
browser_->window()->GetNativeHandle());
GtkWidget* reference_widget = NULL;
if (type_ == BROWSER_ACTION) {
BrowserActionsToolbarGtk* toolbar =
browser_window->GetToolbar()->GetBrowserActionsToolbar();
if (toolbar->animating() && animation_wait_retries_-- > 0) {
MessageLoopForUI::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ExtensionInstalledBubbleGtk::ShowInternal, this),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(kAnimationWaitMS));
return;
}
reference_widget = toolbar->GetBrowserActionWidget(extension_);
gtk_container_check_resize(GTK_CONTAINER(
browser_window->GetToolbar()->widget()));
if (reference_widget && !gtk_widget_get_visible(reference_widget)) {
reference_widget = gtk_widget_get_visible(toolbar->chevron()) ?
toolbar->chevron() : NULL;
}
} else if (type_ == PAGE_ACTION) {
LocationBarViewGtk* location_bar_view =
browser_window->GetToolbar()->GetLocationBarView();
location_bar_view->SetPreviewEnabledPageAction(extension_->page_action(),
true); // preview_enabled
reference_widget = location_bar_view->GetPageActionWidget(
extension_->page_action());
gtk_container_check_resize(GTK_CONTAINER(
browser_window->GetToolbar()->widget()));
DCHECK(reference_widget);
} else if (type_ == OMNIBOX_KEYWORD) {
LocationBarViewGtk* location_bar_view =
browser_window->GetToolbar()->GetLocationBarView();
reference_widget = location_bar_view->location_entry_widget();
DCHECK(reference_widget);
}
if (reference_widget == NULL)
reference_widget = browser_window->GetToolbar()->GetAppMenuButton();
GtkThemeService* theme_provider = GtkThemeService::GetFrom(
browser_->profile());
GtkWidget* bubble_content = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, kHorizontalColumnSpacing);
gtk_container_set_border_width(GTK_CONTAINER(bubble_content), kContentBorder);
if (!icon_.isNull()) {
GdkPixbuf* pixbuf = gfx::GdkPixbufFromSkBitmap(&icon_);
gfx::Size size(icon_.width(), icon_.height());
if (size.width() > kIconSize || size.height() > kIconSize) {
if (size.width() > size.height()) {
size.set_height(size.height() * kIconSize / size.width());
size.set_width(kIconSize);
} else {
size.set_width(size.width() * kIconSize / size.height());
size.set_height(kIconSize);
}
GdkPixbuf* old = pixbuf;
pixbuf = gdk_pixbuf_scale_simple(pixbuf, size.width(), size.height(),
GDK_INTERP_BILINEAR);
g_object_unref(old);
}
GtkWidget* icon_column = gtk_vbox_new(FALSE, 0);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(bubble_content), icon_column, FALSE, FALSE,
kIconPadding);
GtkWidget* image = gtk_image_new_from_pixbuf(pixbuf);
g_object_unref(pixbuf);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(icon_column), image, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
}
GtkWidget* text_column = gtk_vbox_new(FALSE, kTextColumnVerticalSpacing);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(bubble_content), text_column, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
GtkWidget* heading_label = gtk_label_new(NULL);
string16 extension_name = UTF8ToUTF16(extension_->name());
base::i18n::AdjustStringForLocaleDirection(&extension_name);
std::string heading_text = l10n_util::GetStringFUTF8(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING, extension_name,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME));
char* markup = g_markup_printf_escaped("<span size=\"larger\">%s</span>",
heading_text.c_str());
gtk_label_set_markup(GTK_LABEL(heading_label), markup);
g_free(markup);
gtk_util::SetLabelWidth(heading_label, kTextColumnWidth);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(text_column), heading_label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
if (type_ == PAGE_ACTION) {
GtkWidget* info_label = gtk_label_new(l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_PAGE_ACTION_INFO).c_str());
gtk_util::SetLabelWidth(info_label, kTextColumnWidth);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(text_column), info_label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
}
if (type_ == OMNIBOX_KEYWORD) {
GtkWidget* info_label = gtk_label_new(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF8(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_OMNIBOX_KEYWORD_INFO,
UTF8ToUTF16(extension_->omnibox_keyword())).c_str());
gtk_util::SetLabelWidth(info_label, kTextColumnWidth);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(text_column), info_label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
}
GtkWidget* manage_label = gtk_label_new(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_MANAGE_INFO).c_str());
gtk_util::SetLabelWidth(manage_label, kTextColumnWidth);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(text_column), manage_label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
GtkWidget* close_column = gtk_vbox_new(FALSE, 0);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(bubble_content), close_column, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
close_button_.reset(CustomDrawButton::CloseButton(theme_provider));
g_signal_connect(close_button_->widget(), "clicked",
G_CALLBACK(OnButtonClick), this);
gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(close_column), close_button_->widget(),
FALSE, FALSE, 0);
BubbleGtk::ArrowLocationGtk arrow_location =
!base::i18n::IsRTL() ?
BubbleGtk::ARROW_LOCATION_TOP_RIGHT :
BubbleGtk::ARROW_LOCATION_TOP_LEFT;
gfx::Rect bounds = gtk_util::WidgetBounds(reference_widget);
if (type_ == OMNIBOX_KEYWORD) {
arrow_location =
!base::i18n::IsRTL() ?
BubbleGtk::ARROW_LOCATION_TOP_LEFT :
BubbleGtk::ARROW_LOCATION_TOP_RIGHT;
if (base::i18n::IsRTL())
bounds.Offset(bounds.width(), 0);
bounds.set_width(0);
}
bubble_ = BubbleGtk::Show(reference_widget,
&bounds,
bubble_content,
arrow_location,
true, // match_system_theme
true, // grab_input
theme_provider,
this);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int lock_fs(struct mapped_device *md)
{
int r;
WARN_ON(md->frozen_sb);
md->frozen_sb = freeze_bdev(md->bdev);
if (IS_ERR(md->frozen_sb)) {
r = PTR_ERR(md->frozen_sb);
md->frozen_sb = NULL;
return r;
}
set_bit(DMF_FROZEN, &md->flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,962 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dispatch_discard_io(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring,
struct blkif_request *req)
{
int err = 0;
int status = BLKIF_RSP_OKAY;
struct xen_blkif *blkif = ring->blkif;
struct block_device *bdev = blkif->vbd.bdev;
unsigned long secure;
struct phys_req preq;
xen_blkif_get(blkif);
preq.sector_number = req->u.discard.sector_number;
preq.nr_sects = req->u.discard.nr_sectors;
err = xen_vbd_translate(&preq, blkif, REQ_OP_WRITE);
if (err) {
pr_warn("access denied: DISCARD [%llu->%llu] on dev=%04x\n",
preq.sector_number,
preq.sector_number + preq.nr_sects, blkif->vbd.pdevice);
goto fail_response;
}
ring->st_ds_req++;
secure = (blkif->vbd.discard_secure &&
(req->u.discard.flag & BLKIF_DISCARD_SECURE)) ?
BLKDEV_DISCARD_SECURE : 0;
err = blkdev_issue_discard(bdev, req->u.discard.sector_number,
req->u.discard.nr_sectors,
GFP_KERNEL, secure);
fail_response:
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
pr_debug("discard op failed, not supported\n");
status = BLKIF_RSP_EOPNOTSUPP;
} else if (err)
status = BLKIF_RSP_ERROR;
make_response(ring, req->u.discard.id, req->operation, status);
xen_blkif_put(blkif);
return err;
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 63,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::DidCreateNewDocument() {
if (web_frame_->Client())
web_frame_->Client()->DidCreateNewDocument();
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dct_unquantize_mpeg1_intra_c(MpegEncContext *s,
int16_t *block, int n, int qscale)
{
int i, level, nCoeffs;
const uint16_t *quant_matrix;
nCoeffs= s->block_last_index[n];
block[0] *= n < 4 ? s->y_dc_scale : s->c_dc_scale;
/* XXX: only MPEG-1 */
quant_matrix = s->intra_matrix;
for(i=1;i<=nCoeffs;i++) {
int j= s->intra_scantable.permutated[i];
level = block[j];
if (level) {
if (level < 0) {
level = -level;
level = (int)(level * qscale * quant_matrix[j]) >> 3;
level = (level - 1) | 1;
level = -level;
} else {
level = (int)(level * qscale * quant_matrix[j]) >> 3;
level = (level - 1) | 1;
}
block[j] = level;
}
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 81,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_recreate_device(gs_memory_t *mem, gs_gstate * pgs,
gx_device * dev, const gs_pdf14trans_t * pdf14pct)
{
pdf14_device * pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
gx_device * target = pdev->target;
pdf14_device * dev_proto;
pdf14_device temp_dev_proto;
bool has_tags = dev->graphics_type_tag & GS_DEVICE_ENCODES_TAGS;
int code;
if_debug0m('v', dev->memory, "[v]pdf14_recreate_device\n");
/*
* We will not use the entire prototype device but we will set the
* color related info and the device procs to match the prototype.
*/
code = get_pdf14_device_proto(target, &dev_proto, &temp_dev_proto, pgs,
pdf14pct, false);
if (code < 0)
return code;
pdev->color_info = dev_proto->color_info;
pdev->pad = target->pad;
pdev->log2_align_mod = target->log2_align_mod;
pdev->is_planar = target->is_planar;
pdev->procs = dev_proto->procs;
if (has_tags) {
pdev->procs.encode_color = pdf14_encode_color_tag;
pdev->color_info.depth += 8;
}
dev->static_procs = dev_proto->static_procs;
gx_device_set_procs(dev);
gx_device_fill_in_procs(dev);
check_device_separable(dev);
return dev_proc(pdev, open_device)(dev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DaemonProcessTest::StartDaemonProcess() {
daemon_process_->LaunchNetworkProcess();
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 118,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IntRect Editor::firstRectForRange(const EphemeralRange& range) const {
DCHECK(!frame().document()->needsLayoutTreeUpdate());
DocumentLifecycle::DisallowTransitionScope disallowTransition(
frame().document()->lifecycle());
LayoutUnit extraWidthToEndOfLine;
DCHECK(range.isNotNull());
IntRect startCaretRect =
RenderedPosition(
createVisiblePosition(range.startPosition()).deepEquivalent(),
TextAffinity::Downstream)
.absoluteRect(&extraWidthToEndOfLine);
if (startCaretRect.isEmpty())
return IntRect();
IntRect endCaretRect =
RenderedPosition(
createVisiblePosition(range.endPosition()).deepEquivalent(),
TextAffinity::Upstream)
.absoluteRect();
if (endCaretRect.isEmpty())
return IntRect();
if (startCaretRect.y() == endCaretRect.y()) {
return IntRect(std::min(startCaretRect.x(), endCaretRect.x()),
startCaretRect.y(),
abs(endCaretRect.x() - startCaretRect.x()),
std::max(startCaretRect.height(), endCaretRect.height()));
}
return IntRect(startCaretRect.x(), startCaretRect.y(),
(startCaretRect.width() + extraWidthToEndOfLine).toInt(),
startCaretRect.height());
}
Commit Message: Make TypingCommand::insertText() to take SelectionInDOMTree instead of VisibleSelection
This patch makes |TypingCommand::insertText()| to take |SelectionInDOMTree|
instead of |VisibleSelection| to reduce usage of |VisibleSelection| for
improving code health.
BUG=657237
TEST=n/a
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2733183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455368}
CWE ID: | 0 | 129,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int is_subdir(struct dentry *new_dentry, struct dentry *old_dentry)
{
int result;
unsigned seq;
if (new_dentry == old_dentry)
return 1;
do {
/* for restarting inner loop in case of seq retry */
seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
/*
* Need rcu_readlock to protect against the d_parent trashing
* due to d_move
*/
rcu_read_lock();
if (d_ancestor(old_dentry, new_dentry))
result = 1;
else
result = 0;
rcu_read_unlock();
} while (read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq));
return result;
}
Commit Message: dcache: Handle escaped paths in prepend_path
A rename can result in a dentry that by walking up d_parent
will never reach it's mnt_root. For lack of a better term
I call this an escaped path.
prepend_path is called by four different functions __d_path,
d_absolute_path, d_path, and getcwd.
__d_path only wants to see paths are connected to the root it passes
in. So __d_path needs prepend_path to return an error.
d_absolute_path similarly wants to see paths that are connected to
some root. Escaped paths are not connected to any mnt_root so
d_absolute_path needs prepend_path to return an error greater
than 1. So escaped paths will be treated like paths on lazily
unmounted mounts.
getcwd needs to prepend "(unreachable)" so getcwd also needs
prepend_path to return an error.
d_path is the interesting hold out. d_path just wants to print
something, and does not care about the weird cases. Which raises
the question what should be printed?
Given that <escaped_path>/<anything> should result in -ENOENT I
believe it is desirable for escaped paths to be printed as empty
paths. As there are not really any meaninful path components when
considered from the perspective of a mount tree.
So tweak prepend_path to return an empty path with an new error
code of 3 when it encounters an escaped path.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 94,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void address_space_stw_le(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr, uint32_t val,
MemTxAttrs attrs, MemTxResult *result)
{
address_space_stw_internal(as, addr, val, attrs, result,
DEVICE_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_get_cipher_methods)
{
zend_bool aliases = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "|b", &aliases) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
array_init(return_value);
OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH,
aliases ? openssl_add_method_or_alias: openssl_add_method,
return_value);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserViewRenderer::DetachFunctorFromView() {
client_->DetachFunctorFromView();
}
Commit Message: sync compositor: pass simple gfx types by const ref
See bug for reasoning
BUG=159273
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417893006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356653}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
{
rend_service_t *service;
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
unsigned int expiring_nodes_len, num_ip_circuits, valid_ip_circuits = 0;
int reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
const char *rend_pk_digest;
tor_assert(circuit->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO);
assert_circ_anonymity_ok(circuit, get_options());
tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
/* XXX: This is version 2 specific (only on supported). */
rend_pk_digest = (char *) rend_data_get_pk_digest(circuit->rend_data, NULL);
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unrecognized service ID %s on introduction circuit %u.",
safe_str_client(serviceid), (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NOSUCHSERVICE;
goto err;
}
/* Take the current amount of expiring nodes and the current amount of IP
* circuits and compute how many valid IP circuits we have. */
expiring_nodes_len = (unsigned int) smartlist_len(service->expiring_nodes);
num_ip_circuits = count_intro_point_circuits(service);
/* Let's avoid an underflow. The valid_ip_circuits is initialized to 0 in
* case this condition turns out false because it means that all circuits
* are expiring so we need to keep this circuit. */
if (num_ip_circuits > expiring_nodes_len) {
valid_ip_circuits = num_ip_circuits - expiring_nodes_len;
}
/* If we already have enough introduction circuits for this service,
* redefine this one as a general circuit or close it, depending.
* Substract the amount of expiring nodes here because the circuits are
* still opened. */
if (valid_ip_circuits > service->n_intro_points_wanted) {
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
/* Remove the intro point associated with this circuit, it's being
* repurposed or closed thus cleanup memory. */
rend_intro_point_t *intro = find_intro_point(circuit);
if (intro != NULL) {
smartlist_remove(service->intro_nodes, intro);
rend_intro_point_free(intro);
}
if (options->ExcludeNodes) {
/* XXXX in some future version, we can test whether the transition is
allowed or not given the actual nodes in the circuit. But for now,
this case, we might as well close the thing. */
log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
"circuit, but we already have enough. Closing it.");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_NONE;
goto err;
} else {
tor_assert(circuit->build_state->is_internal);
log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
"circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to "
"general; leaving as internal.");
circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
{
rend_data_free(circuit->rend_data);
circuit->rend_data = NULL;
}
{
crypto_pk_t *intro_key = circuit->intro_key;
circuit->intro_key = NULL;
crypto_pk_free(intro_key);
}
circuit_has_opened(circuit);
goto done;
}
}
log_info(LD_REND,
"Established circuit %u as introduction point for service %s",
(unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id, serviceid);
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO, LD_REND, circuit);
/* Send the ESTABLISH_INTRO cell */
{
ssize_t len;
len = encode_establish_intro_cell_legacy(buf, sizeof(buf),
circuit->intro_key,
circuit->cpath->prev->rend_circ_nonce);
if (len < 0) {
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circuit),
RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO,
buf, len, circuit->cpath->prev)<0) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL,
"Couldn't send introduction request for service %s on circuit %u",
serviceid, (unsigned)circuit->base_.n_circ_id);
goto done;
}
}
/* We've attempted to use this circuit */
pathbias_count_use_attempt(circuit);
goto done;
err:
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circuit), reason);
done:
memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
memwipe(serviceid, 0, sizeof(serviceid));
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 69,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Process_ipfix_template_withdraw(exporter_ipfix_domain_t *exporter, void *DataPtr, uint32_t size_left, FlowSource_t *fs) {
ipfix_template_record_t *ipfix_template_record;
while ( size_left ) {
uint32_t id;
ipfix_template_record = (ipfix_template_record_t *)DataPtr;
size_left -= 4;
id = ntohs(ipfix_template_record->TemplateID);
if ( id == IPFIX_TEMPLATE_FLOWSET_ID ) {
remove_all_translation_tables(exporter);
ReInitExtensionMapList(fs);
} else {
remove_translation_table(fs, exporter, id);
}
DataPtr = DataPtr + 4;
if ( size_left < 4 ) {
dbg_printf("Skip %u bytes padding\n", size_left);
size_left = 0;
}
}
} // End of Process_ipfix_template_withdraw
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 169,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int iucv_sock_in_state(struct sock *sk, int state, int state2)
{
return (sk->sk_state == state || sk->sk_state == state2);
}
Commit Message: iucv: Fix missing msg_namelen update in iucv_sock_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about iucv_sock_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Cc: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cib_diff_notify(int options, const char *client, const char *call_id, const char *op,
xmlNode * update, int result, xmlNode * diff)
{
int add_updates = 0;
int add_epoch = 0;
int add_admin_epoch = 0;
int del_updates = 0;
int del_epoch = 0;
int del_admin_epoch = 0;
int log_level = LOG_DEBUG_2;
if (diff == NULL) {
return;
}
if (result != pcmk_ok) {
log_level = LOG_WARNING;
}
cib_diff_version_details(diff, &add_admin_epoch, &add_epoch, &add_updates,
&del_admin_epoch, &del_epoch, &del_updates);
if (add_updates != del_updates) {
do_crm_log(log_level,
"Update (client: %s%s%s): %d.%d.%d -> %d.%d.%d (%s)",
client, call_id ? ", call:" : "", call_id ? call_id : "",
del_admin_epoch, del_epoch, del_updates,
add_admin_epoch, add_epoch, add_updates, pcmk_strerror(result));
} else if (diff != NULL) {
do_crm_log(log_level,
"Local-only Change (client:%s%s%s): %d.%d.%d (%s)",
client, call_id ? ", call: " : "", call_id ? call_id : "",
add_admin_epoch, add_epoch, add_updates, pcmk_strerror(result));
}
do_cib_notify(options, op, update, result, diff, T_CIB_DIFF_NOTIFY);
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int is_numeric(const char * s)
{
while(*s) {
if(*s < '0' || *s > '9') return 0;
s++;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLMediaElement::NetworkState HTMLMediaElement::getNetworkState() const {
return m_networkState;
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char *FLTGetIsBetweenComparisonExpresssion(FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode,
layerObj *lp)
{
const size_t bufferSize = 1024;
char szBuffer[1024];
char **aszBounds = NULL;
int nBounds = 0;
int bString=0;
char szTmp[256];
szBuffer[0] = '\0';
if (!psFilterNode ||
!(strcasecmp(psFilterNode->pszValue, "PropertyIsBetween") == 0))
return NULL;
if (!psFilterNode->psLeftNode || !psFilterNode->psRightNode )
return NULL;
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Get the bounds value which are stored like boundmin;boundmax */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
aszBounds = msStringSplit(psFilterNode->psRightNode->pszValue, ';', &nBounds);
if (nBounds != 2) {
msFreeCharArray(aszBounds, nBounds);
return NULL;
}
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* check if the value is a numeric value or alphanumeric. If it */
/* is alphanumeric, add quotes around attribute and values. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
bString = 0;
if (aszBounds[0]) {
const char* pszOFGType;
snprintf(szTmp, sizeof(szTmp), "%s_type", psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue);
pszOFGType = msOWSLookupMetadata(&(lp->metadata), "OFG", szTmp);
if (pszOFGType!= NULL && strcasecmp(pszOFGType, "Character") == 0)
bString = 1;
else if (FLTIsNumeric(aszBounds[0]) == MS_FALSE)
bString = 1;
}
if (!bString) {
if (aszBounds[1]) {
if (FLTIsNumeric(aszBounds[1]) == MS_FALSE)
bString = 1;
}
}
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* build expresssion. */
/* -------------------------------------------------------------------- */
if (bString)
strlcat(szBuffer, " (\"[", bufferSize);
else
strlcat(szBuffer, " ([", bufferSize);
/* attribute */
strlcat(szBuffer, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue, bufferSize);
if (bString)
strlcat(szBuffer, "]\" ", bufferSize);
else
strlcat(szBuffer, "] ", bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, " >= ", bufferSize);
if (bString)
strlcat(szBuffer,"\"", bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, aszBounds[0], bufferSize);
if (bString)
strlcat(szBuffer,"\"", bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, " AND ", bufferSize);
if (bString)
strlcat(szBuffer, " \"[", bufferSize);
else
strlcat(szBuffer, " [", bufferSize);
/* attribute */
strlcat(szBuffer, psFilterNode->psLeftNode->pszValue, bufferSize);
if (bString)
strlcat(szBuffer, "]\" ", bufferSize);
else
strlcat(szBuffer, "] ", bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, " <= ", bufferSize);
if (bString)
strlcat(szBuffer,"\"", bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, aszBounds[1], bufferSize);
if (bString)
strlcat(szBuffer,"\"", bufferSize);
strlcat(szBuffer, ")", bufferSize);
msFreeCharArray(aszBounds, nBounds);
return msStrdup(szBuffer);
}
Commit Message: security fix (patch by EvenR)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 68,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: megasas_get_target_prop(struct megasas_instance *instance,
struct scsi_device *sdev)
{
int ret;
struct megasas_cmd *cmd;
struct megasas_dcmd_frame *dcmd;
u16 targetId = (sdev->channel % 2) + sdev->id;
cmd = megasas_get_cmd(instance);
if (!cmd) {
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
"Failed to get cmd %s\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
dcmd = &cmd->frame->dcmd;
memset(instance->tgt_prop, 0, sizeof(*instance->tgt_prop));
memset(dcmd->mbox.b, 0, MFI_MBOX_SIZE);
dcmd->mbox.b[0] = MEGASAS_IS_LOGICAL(sdev);
dcmd->mbox.s[1] = cpu_to_le16(targetId);
dcmd->cmd = MFI_CMD_DCMD;
dcmd->cmd_status = 0xFF;
dcmd->sge_count = 1;
dcmd->flags = MFI_FRAME_DIR_READ;
dcmd->timeout = 0;
dcmd->pad_0 = 0;
dcmd->data_xfer_len =
cpu_to_le32(sizeof(struct MR_TARGET_PROPERTIES));
dcmd->opcode = cpu_to_le32(MR_DCMD_DRV_GET_TARGET_PROP);
megasas_set_dma_settings(instance, dcmd, instance->tgt_prop_h,
sizeof(struct MR_TARGET_PROPERTIES));
if ((instance->adapter_type != MFI_SERIES) &&
!instance->mask_interrupts)
ret = megasas_issue_blocked_cmd(instance,
cmd, MFI_IO_TIMEOUT_SECS);
else
ret = megasas_issue_polled(instance, cmd);
switch (ret) {
case DCMD_TIMEOUT:
switch (dcmd_timeout_ocr_possible(instance)) {
case INITIATE_OCR:
cmd->flags |= DRV_DCMD_SKIP_REFIRE;
megasas_reset_fusion(instance->host,
MFI_IO_TIMEOUT_OCR);
break;
case KILL_ADAPTER:
megaraid_sas_kill_hba(instance);
break;
case IGNORE_TIMEOUT:
dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev,
"Ignore DCMD timeout: %s %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__);
break;
}
break;
default:
megasas_return_cmd(instance, cmd);
}
if (ret != DCMD_SUCCESS)
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
"return from %s %d return value %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,360 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteBMPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
BMPInfo
bmp_info;
BMPSubtype
bmp_subtype;
const char
*option;
const StringInfo
*profile;
MagickBooleanType
have_color_info,
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
MemoryInfo
*pixel_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
imageListLength,
type;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*bmp_data,
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
type=4;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"BMP2") == 0)
type=2;
else
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"BMP3") == 0)
type=3;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"bmp:format");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Format=%s",option);
if (LocaleCompare(option,"bmp2") == 0)
type=2;
if (LocaleCompare(option,"bmp3") == 0)
type=3;
if (LocaleCompare(option,"bmp4") == 0)
type=4;
}
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
/*
Initialize BMP raster file header.
*/
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image->colorspace) == MagickFalse)
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
(void) memset(&bmp_info,0,sizeof(bmp_info));
bmp_info.file_size=14+12;
if (type > 2)
bmp_info.file_size+=28;
bmp_info.offset_bits=bmp_info.file_size;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RGB;
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00ff0000U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x0000ff00U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x000000ffU;
bmp_info.alpha_mask=0xff000000U;
bmp_subtype=UndefinedSubtype;
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) && (image->colors > 256))
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
if (image->storage_class != DirectClass)
{
/*
Colormapped BMP raster.
*/
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if (image->colors <= 2)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=1;
else
if (image->colors <= 16)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=4;
else
if (image->colors <= 256)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
if (image_info->compression == RLECompression)
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=8;
bmp_info.number_colors=1U << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
else
if ((size_t) bmp_info.number_colors < image->colors)
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
else
{
bmp_info.file_size+=3*(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
bmp_info.offset_bits+=3*(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
if (type > 2)
{
bmp_info.file_size+=(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
bmp_info.offset_bits+=(1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
{
/*
Full color BMP raster.
*/
bmp_info.number_colors=0;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"bmp:subtype");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"ARGB4444",8) == 0)
{
bmp_subtype=ARGB4444;
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00000f00U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x000000f0U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x0000000fU;
bmp_info.alpha_mask=0x0000f000U;
}
else if (LocaleNCompare(option,"ARGB1555",8) == 0)
{
bmp_subtype=ARGB1555;
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00007c00U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x000003e0U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x0000001fU;
bmp_info.alpha_mask=0x00008000U;
}
}
else
{
if (LocaleNCompare(option,"RGB555",6) == 0)
{
bmp_subtype=RGB555;
bmp_info.red_mask=0x00007c00U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x000003e0U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x0000001fU;
bmp_info.alpha_mask=0U;
}
else if (LocaleNCompare(option,"RGB565",6) == 0)
{
bmp_subtype=RGB565;
bmp_info.red_mask=0x0000f800U;
bmp_info.green_mask=0x000007e0U;
bmp_info.blue_mask=0x0000001fU;
bmp_info.alpha_mask=0U;
}
}
}
if (bmp_subtype != UndefinedSubtype)
{
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=16;
bmp_info.compression=BI_BITFIELDS;
}
else
{
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=(unsigned short) ((type > 3) &&
(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait) ? 32 : 24);
bmp_info.compression=(unsigned int) ((type > 3) &&
(image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait) ? BI_BITFIELDS : BI_RGB);
if ((type == 3) && (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait))
{
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"bmp3:alpha");
if (IsStringTrue(option))
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel=32;
}
}
}
bytes_per_line=4*((image->columns*bmp_info.bits_per_pixel+31)/32);
bmp_info.ba_offset=0;
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
have_color_info=(image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent) ||
(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL) || (image->gamma != 0.0) ? MagickTrue :
MagickFalse;
if (type == 2)
bmp_info.size=12;
else
if ((type == 3) || ((image->alpha_trait == UndefinedPixelTrait) &&
(have_color_info == MagickFalse)))
{
type=3;
bmp_info.size=40;
}
else
{
int
extra_size;
bmp_info.size=108;
extra_size=68;
if ((image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent) ||
(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL))
{
bmp_info.size=124;
extra_size+=16;
}
bmp_info.file_size+=extra_size;
bmp_info.offset_bits+=extra_size;
}
if (((ssize_t) image->columns != (ssize_t) ((signed int) image->columns)) ||
((ssize_t) image->rows != (ssize_t) ((signed int) image->rows)))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
bmp_info.width=(ssize_t) image->columns;
bmp_info.height=(ssize_t) image->rows;
bmp_info.planes=1;
bmp_info.image_size=(unsigned int) (bytes_per_line*image->rows);
bmp_info.file_size+=bmp_info.image_size;
bmp_info.x_pixels=75*39;
bmp_info.y_pixels=75*39;
switch (image->units)
{
case UndefinedResolution:
case PixelsPerInchResolution:
{
bmp_info.x_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->resolution.x/2.54);
bmp_info.y_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->resolution.y/2.54);
break;
}
case PixelsPerCentimeterResolution:
{
bmp_info.x_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->resolution.x);
bmp_info.y_pixels=(unsigned int) (100.0*image->resolution.y);
break;
}
}
bmp_info.colors_important=bmp_info.number_colors;
/*
Convert MIFF to BMP raster pixels.
*/
pixel_info=AcquireVirtualMemory(image->rows,
MagickMax(bytes_per_line,image->columns+256UL)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixel_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(pixel_info);
(void) memset(pixels,0,(size_t) bmp_info.image_size);
switch (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)
{
case 1:
{
size_t
bit,
byte;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a BMP monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
ssize_t
offset;
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
byte|=GetPixelIndex(image,p) != 0 ? 0x01 : 0x00;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) byte;
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (bit != 0)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (byte << (8-bit));
x++;
}
offset=(ssize_t) (image->columns+7)/8;
for (x=offset; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
unsigned int
byte,
nibble;
ssize_t
offset;
/*
Convert PseudoClass image to a BMP monochrome image.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
nibble=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=4;
byte|=((unsigned int) GetPixelIndex(image,p) & 0x0f);
nibble++;
if (nibble == 2)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) byte;
nibble=0;
byte=0;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (nibble != 0)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) (byte << 4);
x++;
}
offset=(ssize_t) (image->columns+1)/2;
for (x=offset; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 8:
{
/*
Convert PseudoClass packet to BMP pixel.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) GetPixelIndex(image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for ( ; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 16:
{
/*
Convert DirectClass packet to BMP BGR888.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
unsigned short
pixel;
pixel=0;
if (bmp_subtype == ARGB4444)
{
pixel=(unsigned short) (ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelAlpha(image,p),15) << 12);
pixel|=(unsigned short) (ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelRed(image,p),15) << 8);
pixel|=(unsigned short) (ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelGreen(image,p),15) << 4);
pixel|=(unsigned short) (ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelBlue(image,p),15));
}
else if (bmp_subtype == RGB565)
{
pixel=(unsigned short) (ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelRed(image,p),31) << 11);
pixel|=(unsigned short) (ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelGreen(image,p),63) << 5);
pixel|=(unsigned short) (ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelBlue(image,p),31));
}
else
{
if (bmp_subtype == ARGB1555)
pixel=(unsigned short) (ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelAlpha(image,p),1) << 15);
pixel|=(unsigned short) (ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelRed(image,p),31) << 10);
pixel|=(unsigned short) (ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelGreen(image,p),31) << 5);
pixel|=(unsigned short) (ScaleQuantumToAny(
GetPixelBlue(image,p),31));
}
*((unsigned short *) q)=pixel;
q+=2;
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for (x=2L*(ssize_t) image->columns; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 24:
{
/*
Convert DirectClass packet to BMP BGR888.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
for (x=3L*(ssize_t) image->columns; x < (ssize_t) bytes_per_line; x++)
*q++=0x00;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case 32:
{
/*
Convert DirectClass packet to ARGB8888 pixel.
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels+(image->rows-y-1)*bytes_per_line;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(image,p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelAlpha(image,p));
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
if ((type > 2) && (bmp_info.bits_per_pixel == 8))
if (image_info->compression != NoCompression)
{
MemoryInfo
*rle_info;
/*
Convert run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
rle_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) (2*(bytes_per_line+2)+2),
(image->rows+2)*sizeof(*pixels));
if (rle_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
bmp_data=(unsigned char *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(rle_info);
bmp_info.file_size-=bmp_info.image_size;
bmp_info.image_size=(unsigned int) EncodeImage(image,bytes_per_line,
pixels,bmp_data);
bmp_info.file_size+=bmp_info.image_size;
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
pixel_info=rle_info;
pixels=bmp_data;
bmp_info.compression=BI_RLE8;
}
/*
Write BMP for Windows, all versions, 14-byte header.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Writing BMP version %.20g datastream",(double) type);
if (image->storage_class == DirectClass)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Storage class=DirectClass");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Storage class=PseudoClass");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Image depth=%.20g",(double) image->depth);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Matte=True");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Matte=MagickFalse");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" BMP bits_per_pixel=%.20g",(double) bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
switch ((int) bmp_info.compression)
{
case BI_RGB:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=BI_RGB");
break;
}
case BI_RLE8:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=BI_RLE8");
break;
}
case BI_BITFIELDS:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=BI_BITFIELDS");
break;
}
default:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Compression=UNKNOWN (%u)",bmp_info.compression);
break;
}
}
if (bmp_info.number_colors == 0)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number_colors=unspecified");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Number_colors=%u",bmp_info.number_colors);
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,2,(unsigned char *) "BM");
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.file_size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.ba_offset); /* always 0 */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.offset_bits);
if (type == 2)
{
/*
Write 12-byte version 2 bitmap header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBSignedShort(image,(signed short) bmp_info.width);
(void) WriteBlobLSBSignedShort(image,(signed short) bmp_info.height);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
}
else
{
/*
Write 40-byte version 3+ bitmap header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBSignedLong(image,(signed int) bmp_info.width);
(void) WriteBlobLSBSignedLong(image,(signed int) bmp_info.height);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.planes);
(void) WriteBlobLSBShort(image,bmp_info.bits_per_pixel);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.compression);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.image_size);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.x_pixels);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.y_pixels);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.number_colors);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.colors_important);
}
if ((type > 3) && ((image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait) ||
(have_color_info != MagickFalse)))
{
/*
Write the rest of the 108-byte BMP Version 4 header.
*/
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.red_mask);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.green_mask);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.blue_mask);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,bmp_info.alpha_mask);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x73524742U); /* sRGB */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.red_primary.y*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
((1.000f-(image->chromaticity.red_primary.x+
image->chromaticity.red_primary.y))*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.green_primary.x*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.green_primary.y*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
((1.000f-(image->chromaticity.green_primary.x+
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y))*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
((1.000f-(image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x+
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y))*0x40000000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(bmp_info.gamma_scale.x*0x10000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(bmp_info.gamma_scale.y*0x10000));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int)
(bmp_info.gamma_scale.z*0x10000));
if ((image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent) ||
(profile != (StringInfo *) NULL))
{
ssize_t
intent;
switch ((int) image->rendering_intent)
{
case SaturationIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_BUSINESS;
break;
}
case RelativeIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_GRAPHICS;
break;
}
case PerceptualIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_IMAGES;
break;
}
case AbsoluteIntent:
{
intent=LCS_GM_ABS_COLORIMETRIC;
break;
}
default:
{
intent=0;
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) intent);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00); /* dummy profile data */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00); /* dummy profile length */
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00); /* reserved */
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
unsigned char
*bmp_colormap;
/*
Dump colormap to file.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Colormap: %.20g entries",(double) image->colors);
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) (1UL <<
bmp_info.bits_per_pixel),4*sizeof(*bmp_colormap));
if (bmp_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
q=bmp_colormap;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) MagickMin((ssize_t) image->colors,(ssize_t) bmp_info.number_colors); i++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].blue));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].green));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].red));
if (type > 2)
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x0;
}
for ( ; i < (ssize_t) (1UL << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel); i++)
{
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
if (type > 2)
*q++=(unsigned char) 0x00;
}
if (type <= 2)
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (3*(1L << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)),
bmp_colormap);
else
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (4*(1L << bmp_info.bits_per_pixel)),
bmp_colormap);
bmp_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(bmp_colormap);
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Pixels: %u bytes",bmp_info.image_size);
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) bmp_info.image_size,pixels);
pixel_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(pixel_info);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Prevent infinite loop
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 75,362 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nfs4_write_stateid_changed(struct rpc_task *task,
struct nfs_pgio_args *args)
{
if (!nfs4_error_stateid_expired(task->tk_status) ||
nfs4_stateid_is_current(&args->stateid,
args->context,
args->lock_context,
FMODE_WRITE))
return false;
rpc_restart_call_prepare(task);
return true;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmd_str_r(const notify_script_t *script, char *buf, size_t len)
{
char *str_p;
int i;
size_t str_len;
str_p = buf;
for (i = 0; i < script->num_args; i++) {
/* Check there is enough room for the next word */
str_len = strlen(script->args[i]);
if (str_p + str_len + 2 + (i ? 1 : 0) >= buf + len)
return NULL;
if (i)
*str_p++ = ' ';
*str_p++ = '\'';
strcpy(str_p, script->args[i]);
str_p += str_len;
*str_p++ = '\'';
}
*str_p = '\0';
return buf;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _server_handle_Hc(libgdbr_t *g, int (*cmd_cb) (void*, const char*, char*, size_t), void *core_ptr) {
char cmd[32];
int tid;
if (send_ack (g) < 0) {
return -1;
}
if (g->data_len <= 2 || isalpha (g->data[2])) {
return send_msg (g, "E01");
}
if (g->data[2] == '0' || !strncmp (g->data + 2, "-1", 2)) {
return send_msg (g, "OK");
}
sscanf (g->data + 2, "%x", &tid);
snprintf (cmd, sizeof (cmd) - 1, "dpt=%d", tid);
if (cmd_cb (core_ptr, cmd, NULL, 0) < 0) {
send_msg (g, "E01");
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "OK");
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: blink::WebMediaPlayer* RenderFrameImpl::CreateMediaPlayer(
const blink::WebMediaPlayerSource& source,
WebMediaPlayerClient* client,
WebMediaPlayerEncryptedMediaClient* encrypted_client,
WebContentDecryptionModule* initial_cdm,
const blink::WebString& sink_id,
blink::WebLayerTreeView* layer_tree_view) {
const cc::LayerTreeSettings& settings =
GetRenderWidget()->compositor()->GetLayerTreeSettings();
return media_factory_.CreateMediaPlayer(source, client, encrypted_client,
initial_cdm, sink_id, layer_tree_view,
settings);
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __put_cred(struct cred *cred)
{
kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred,
atomic_read(&cred->usage),
read_cred_subscribers(cred));
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0);
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0);
cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD;
cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0);
#endif
BUG_ON(cred == current->cred);
BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred);
call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu);
}
Commit Message: cred: copy_process() should clear child->replacement_session_keyring
keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().
However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).
change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 19,598 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void TracePoint(PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,
const PointInfo point)
{
primitive_info->coordinates=1;
primitive_info->point=point;
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 53,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnInvalidPrinterSettings(int document_cookie) {
StopWorker(document_cookie);
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
print_preview_ui->OnInvalidPrinterSettings();
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mm_need_new_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
{
/*
* If there are other users of the mm and the owner (us) is exiting
* we need to find a new owner to take on the responsibility.
*/
if (atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) <= 1)
return 0;
if (mm->owner != p)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,119 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: size_t ZSTD_freeCStream(ZSTD_CStream* zcs)
{
return ZSTD_freeCCtx(zcs); /* same object */
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,070 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void slabs_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct list_head *list)
{
struct page *page, *n;
list_for_each_entry_safe(page, n, list, lru) {
list_del(&page->lru);
slab_destroy(cachep, page);
}
}
Commit Message: mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes: c7ce4f60ac19 ("mm: SLAB freelist randomization")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170103181908.143178-1-thgarnie@google.com
Signed-off-by: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 68,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: tt_cmap13_char_index( TT_CMap cmap,
FT_UInt32 char_code )
{
return tt_cmap13_char_map_binary( cmap, &char_code, 0 );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool CMSEXPORT cmsDictAddEntry(cmsHANDLE hDict, const wchar_t* Name, const wchar_t* Value, const cmsMLU *DisplayName, const cmsMLU *DisplayValue)
{
_cmsDICT* dict = (_cmsDICT*) hDict;
cmsDICTentry *entry;
_cmsAssert(dict != NULL);
_cmsAssert(Name != NULL);
entry = (cmsDICTentry*) _cmsMallocZero(dict ->ContextID, sizeof(cmsDICTentry));
if (entry == NULL) return FALSE;
entry ->DisplayName = cmsMLUdup(DisplayName);
entry ->DisplayValue = cmsMLUdup(DisplayValue);
entry ->Name = DupWcs(dict ->ContextID, Name);
entry ->Value = DupWcs(dict ->ContextID, Value);
entry ->Next = dict ->head;
dict ->head = entry;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Non happy-path fixes
CWE ID: | 0 | 40,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int PC4500_accessrid(struct airo_info *ai, u16 rid, u16 accmd)
{
Cmd cmd; /* for issuing commands */
Resp rsp; /* response from commands */
u16 status;
memset(&cmd, 0, sizeof(cmd));
cmd.cmd = accmd;
cmd.parm0 = rid;
status = issuecommand(ai, &cmd, &rsp);
if (status != 0) return status;
if ( (rsp.status & 0x7F00) != 0) {
return (accmd << 8) + (rsp.rsp0 & 0xFF);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,935 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_qsign_data_sha256(struct sc_context *ctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
struct iasecc_qsign_data *out)
{
SHA256_CTX sha256;
SHA_LONG pre_hash_Nl;
int jj, ii;
int hh_size = sizeof(SHA_LONG), hh_num = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(SHA_LONG);
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
if (!in || !in_len || !out)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
sc_log(ctx,
"sc_pkcs15_get_qsign_data() input data length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
in_len);
memset(out, 0, sizeof(struct iasecc_qsign_data));
SHA256_Init(&sha256);
SHA256_Update(&sha256, in, in_len);
for (jj=0; jj<hh_num; jj++)
for(ii=0; ii<hh_size; ii++)
out->pre_hash[jj*hh_size + ii] = ((sha256.h[jj] >> 8*(hh_size-1-ii)) & 0xFF);
out->pre_hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
sc_log(ctx, "Pre hash:%s", sc_dump_hex(out->pre_hash, out->pre_hash_size));
pre_hash_Nl = sha256.Nl - (sha256.Nl % (sizeof(sha256.data) * 8));
for (ii=0; ii<hh_size; ii++) {
out->counter[ii] = (sha256.Nh >> 8*(hh_size-1-ii)) &0xFF;
out->counter[hh_size+ii] = (pre_hash_Nl >> 8*(hh_size-1-ii)) &0xFF;
}
for (ii=0, out->counter_long=0; ii<(int)sizeof(out->counter); ii++)
out->counter_long = out->counter_long*0x100 + out->counter[ii];
sc_log(ctx, "Pre counter(%li):%s", out->counter_long, sc_dump_hex(out->counter, sizeof(out->counter)));
if (sha256.num) {
memcpy(out->last_block, in + in_len - sha256.num, sha256.num);
out->last_block_size = sha256.num;
sc_log(ctx, "Last block(%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u):%s",
out->last_block_size,
sc_dump_hex(out->last_block, out->last_block_size));
}
SHA256_Final(out->hash, &sha256);
out->hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
sc_log(ctx, "Expected digest %s\n", sc_dump_hex(out->hash, out->hash_size));
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::WasResized() {
if (resize_ack_pending_ || !process_->HasConnection() || !view_ ||
!renderer_initialized_ || should_auto_resize_) {
return;
}
gfx::Rect view_bounds = view_->GetViewBounds();
gfx::Size new_size(view_bounds.size());
bool was_fullscreen = is_fullscreen_;
is_fullscreen_ = IsFullscreen();
bool fullscreen_changed = was_fullscreen != is_fullscreen_;
bool size_changed = new_size != current_size_;
if (!size_changed && !fullscreen_changed)
return;
if (in_flight_size_ != gfx::Size() && new_size == in_flight_size_ &&
!fullscreen_changed)
return;
if (!new_size.IsEmpty() && size_changed)
resize_ack_pending_ = true;
if (!Send(new ViewMsg_Resize(routing_id_, new_size,
GetRootWindowResizerRect(), is_fullscreen_))) {
resize_ack_pending_ = false;
} else {
in_flight_size_ = new_size;
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,728 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_turtle_writer_bnodeid(raptor_turtle_writer* turtle_writer,
const unsigned char *bnodeid, size_t len)
{
raptor_bnodeid_ntriples_write(bnodeid, len,
turtle_writer->iostr);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,058 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imageinterlace)
{
zval *IM;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
long INT = 0;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(argc TSRMLS_CC, "r|l", &IM, &INT) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (argc > 1) {
gdImageInterlace(im, INT);
}
RETURN_LONG(gdImageGetInterlaced(im));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Block::GetFrameCount() const
{
return m_frame_count;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 174,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigatorImpl::OnBeforeUnloadACK(FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
bool proceed) {
CHECK(IsBrowserSideNavigationEnabled());
DCHECK(frame_tree_node);
NavigationRequest* navigation_request = frame_tree_node->navigation_request();
if (!navigation_request)
return;
DCHECK_EQ(NavigationRequest::WAITING_FOR_RENDERER_RESPONSE,
navigation_request->state());
if (proceed)
navigation_request->BeginNavigation();
else
CancelNavigation(frame_tree_node);
}
Commit Message: Drop navigations to NavigationEntry with invalid virtual URLs.
BUG=657720
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2452443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#428056}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 142,504 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arcmsr_hbaA_start_bgrb(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
acb->acb_flags |= ACB_F_MSG_START_BGRB;
writel(ARCMSR_INBOUND_MESG0_START_BGRB, ®->inbound_msgaddr0);
if (!arcmsr_hbaA_wait_msgint_ready(acb)) {
printk(KERN_NOTICE "arcmsr%d: wait 'start adapter background \
rebulid' timeout \n", acb->host->host_no);
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PaintLayerScrollableArea::ScrollbarManager::SetHasHorizontalScrollbar(
bool has_scrollbar) {
if (has_scrollbar) {
DisableCompositingQueryAsserts disabler;
if (!h_bar_) {
h_bar_ = CreateScrollbar(kHorizontalScrollbar);
h_bar_is_attached_ = 1;
if (!h_bar_->IsCustomScrollbar())
ScrollableArea()->DidAddScrollbar(*h_bar_, kHorizontalScrollbar);
} else {
h_bar_is_attached_ = 1;
}
} else {
h_bar_is_attached_ = 0;
if (!DelayScrollOffsetClampScope::ClampingIsDelayed())
DestroyScrollbar(kHorizontalScrollbar);
}
}
Commit Message: Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <masonfreed@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,126 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserView::HandleKeyboardEvent(const NativeWebKeyboardEvent& event) {
unhandled_keyboard_event_handler_.HandleKeyboardEvent(event,
GetFocusManager());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::isInInvisibleSubframe() const
{
if (!ownerElement())
return false; // this is the root element
ASSERT(frame());
return !frame()->ownerLayoutObject();
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGenRenderbuffers(
GLsizei n,
volatile GLuint* renderbuffers) {
return GenHelper(n, renderbuffers, &resources_->renderbuffer_id_map,
[this](GLsizei n, GLuint* renderbuffers) {
api()->glGenRenderbuffersEXTFn(n, renderbuffers);
});
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void RecordLoadReasonToHistogram(WouldLoadReason reason) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(EnumerationHistogram, unseen_frame_histogram,
("Navigation.DeferredDocumentLoading.StatesV4",
static_cast<int>(WouldLoadReason::kCount)));
unseen_frame_histogram.Count(static_cast<int>(reason));
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sha1_neon_export(struct shash_desc *desc, void *out)
{
struct sha1_state *sctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
memcpy(out, sctx, sizeof(*sctx));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
{
char *p;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int option;
if (!options)
return 1;
while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
int token;
if (!*p)
continue;
args[0].to = args[0].from = NULL;
token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case Opt_gid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
pid->pid_gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), option);
break;
case Opt_hidepid:
if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
return 0;
if (option < 0 || option > 2) {
pr_err("proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
return 0;
}
pid->hide_pid = option;
break;
default:
pr_err("proc: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" "
"or missing value\n", p);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,440 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int icmp_glue_bits(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct icmp_bxm *icmp_param = (struct icmp_bxm *)from;
__wsum csum;
csum = skb_copy_and_csum_bits(icmp_param->skb,
icmp_param->offset + offset,
to, len, 0);
skb->csum = csum_block_add(skb->csum, csum, odd);
if (icmp_pointers[icmp_param->data.icmph.type].error)
nf_ct_attach(skb, icmp_param->skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLInputElement::setValue(const String& value,
TextFieldEventBehavior event_behavior,
TextControlSetValueSelection selection) {
input_type_->WarnIfValueIsInvalidAndElementIsVisible(value);
if (!input_type_->CanSetValue(value))
return;
TextControlElement::SetSuggestedValue(String());
EventQueueScope scope;
String sanitized_value = SanitizeValue(value);
bool value_changed = sanitized_value != this->value();
SetLastChangeWasNotUserEdit();
needs_to_update_view_value_ = true;
input_type_->SetValue(sanitized_value, value_changed, event_behavior,
selection);
input_type_view_->DidSetValue(sanitized_value, value_changed);
if (value_changed)
NotifyFormStateChanged();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,161 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbFetchPixel_b1g2r1 (const FbBits *bits, int offset, miIndexedPtr indexed)
{
CARD32 pixel = Fetch4(bits, offset);
CARD32 r,g,b;
b = ((pixel & 0x8) * 0xff) >> 3;
g = ((pixel & 0x6) * 0x55) << 7;
r = ((pixel & 0x1) * 0xff) << 16;
return 0xff000000|r|g|b;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int arch_check_elf(struct elfhdr *ehdr, bool has_interp,
struct arch_elf_state *state)
{
/* Dummy implementation, always proceed */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on
64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow.
The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file
"fs/binfmt_elf.c":
static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
{
unsigned int random_variable = 0;
if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable;
return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable;
}
Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int".
Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which
is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64):
random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the
"random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold
the (22+12) result.
These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack.
Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to
2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy).
This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved
in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and
stack_maxrandom_size().
The successful fix can be tested with:
$ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done
7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
...
Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff,
rather than always being 7fff.
Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>
Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es>
[ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Fixes: CVE-2015-1593
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 44,277 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int HttpStreamParser::DoReadBody() {
io_state_ = STATE_READ_BODY_COMPLETE;
if (read_buf_->offset()) {
int available = read_buf_->offset() - read_buf_unused_offset_;
if (available) {
CHECK_GT(available, 0);
int bytes_from_buffer = std::min(available, user_read_buf_len_);
memcpy(user_read_buf_->data(),
read_buf_->StartOfBuffer() + read_buf_unused_offset_,
bytes_from_buffer);
read_buf_unused_offset_ += bytes_from_buffer;
if (bytes_from_buffer == available) {
read_buf_->SetCapacity(0);
read_buf_unused_offset_ = 0;
}
return bytes_from_buffer;
} else {
read_buf_->SetCapacity(0);
read_buf_unused_offset_ = 0;
}
}
if (IsResponseBodyComplete())
return 0;
DCHECK_EQ(0, read_buf_->offset());
return connection_->socket()->Read(user_read_buf_, user_read_buf_len_,
io_callback_);
}
Commit Message: net: don't process truncated headers on HTTPS connections.
This change causes us to not process any headers unless they are correctly
terminated with a \r\n\r\n sequence.
BUG=244260
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15688012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@202927 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 112,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool HasName(const HTMLToken& token, const QualifiedName& name) {
return ThreadSafeMatch(token.GetName(), name);
}
Commit Message: Restrict the xss audit report URL to same origin
BUG=441275
R=tsepez@chromium.org,mkwst@chromium.org
Change-Id: I27bc8e251b9ad962c3b4fdebf084a2b9152f915d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768367
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516666}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 147,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: R_API ut16 calculate_access_value(const char *access_flags_str, RBinJavaAccessFlags *access_flags) {
ut16 result = 0;
ut16 size = strlen (access_flags_str) + 1;
char *p_flags, *my_flags = malloc (size);
RBinJavaAccessFlags *iter = NULL;
if (size < 5 || !my_flags) {
free (my_flags);
return result;
}
memcpy (my_flags, access_flags_str, size);
p_flags = strtok (my_flags, " ");
while (p_flags && access_flags) {
int idx = 0;
do {
iter = &access_flags[idx];
if (!iter || !iter->str) {
continue;
}
if (iter->len > 0 && iter->len != 16) {
if (!strncmp (iter->str, p_flags, iter->len)) {
result |= iter->value;
}
}
idx++;
} while (access_flags[idx].str != NULL);
p_flags = strtok (NULL, " ");
}
free (my_flags);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 79,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_process_missing_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
sctp_param_t paramtype,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
struct __sctp_missing report;
__u16 len;
len = WORD_ROUND(sizeof(report));
/* Make an ERROR chunk, preparing enough room for
* returning multiple unknown parameters.
*/
if (!*errp)
*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, len);
if (*errp) {
report.num_missing = htonl(1);
report.type = paramtype;
sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_MISS_PARAM,
sizeof(report));
sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(report), &report);
}
/* Stop processing this chunk. */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void lsi_do_command(LSIState *s)
{
SCSIDevice *dev;
uint8_t buf[16];
uint32_t id;
int n;
trace_lsi_do_command(s->dbc);
if (s->dbc > 16)
s->dbc = 16;
pci_dma_read(PCI_DEVICE(s), s->dnad, buf, s->dbc);
s->sfbr = buf[0];
s->command_complete = 0;
id = (s->select_tag >> 8) & 0xf;
dev = scsi_device_find(&s->bus, 0, id, s->current_lun);
if (!dev) {
lsi_bad_selection(s, id);
return;
}
assert(s->current == NULL);
s->current = g_new0(lsi_request, 1);
s->current->tag = s->select_tag;
s->current->req = scsi_req_new(dev, s->current->tag, s->current_lun, buf,
s->current);
n = scsi_req_enqueue(s->current->req);
if (n) {
if (n > 0) {
lsi_set_phase(s, PHASE_DI);
} else if (n < 0) {
lsi_set_phase(s, PHASE_DO);
}
scsi_req_continue(s->current->req);
}
if (!s->command_complete) {
if (n) {
/* Command did not complete immediately so disconnect. */
lsi_add_msg_byte(s, 2); /* SAVE DATA POINTER */
lsi_add_msg_byte(s, 4); /* DISCONNECT */
/* wait data */
lsi_set_phase(s, PHASE_MI);
s->msg_action = LSI_MSG_ACTION_DISCONNECT;
lsi_queue_command(s);
} else {
/* wait command complete */
lsi_set_phase(s, PHASE_DI);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 3,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScriptValue Document::registerElement(ScriptState* script_state,
const AtomicString& name,
const ElementRegistrationOptions& options,
ExceptionState& exception_state,
V0CustomElement::NameSet valid_names) {
HostsUsingFeatures::CountMainWorldOnly(
script_state, *this,
HostsUsingFeatures::Feature::kDocumentRegisterElement);
if (!RegistrationContext()) {
exception_state.ThrowDOMException(
DOMExceptionCode::kNotSupportedError,
"No element registration context is available.");
return ScriptValue();
}
if (name == "dom-module")
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kPolymerV1Detected);
V0CustomElementConstructorBuilder constructor_builder(script_state, options);
RegistrationContext()->RegisterElement(this, &constructor_builder, name,
valid_names, exception_state);
return constructor_builder.BindingsReturnValue();
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,812 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlNodePtr get_node_recurisve_ex(xmlNodePtr node, char *name, char *ns)
{
while (node != NULL) {
if (node_is_equal_ex(node, name, ns)) {
return node;
} else if (node->children != NULL) {
xmlNodePtr tmp = get_node_recurisve_ex(node->children, name, ns);
if (tmp) {
return tmp;
}
}
node = node->next;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 3,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void comps_objrtree_set_nx(COMPS_ObjRTree *rt, char *key, size_t len,
COMPS_Object *data) {
__comps_objrtree_set(rt, key, len, comps_object_incref(data));
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,807 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::TimeTicks WebContentsImpl::GetLastActiveTime() const {
return last_active_time_;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadPWPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
filename[MagickPathExtent];
FILE
*file;
Image
*image,
*next_image,
*pwp_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
unique_file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register Image
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
filesize,
length;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
magick[MagickPathExtent];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
pwp_image=image;
memset(magick,0,sizeof(magick));
count=ReadBlob(pwp_image,5,magick);
if ((count != 5) || (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"SFW95",5) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) SetImageInfoProgressMonitor(read_info,(MagickProgressMonitor) NULL,
(void *) NULL);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(filename);
(void) FormatLocaleString(read_info->filename,MagickPathExtent,"sfw:%s",
filename);
for ( ; ; )
{
(void) memset(magick,0,sizeof(magick));
for (c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image); c != EOF; c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image))
{
for (i=0; i < 17; i++)
magick[i]=magick[i+1];
magick[17]=(unsigned char) c;
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) (magick+12),"SFW94A",6) == 0)
break;
}
if (c == EOF)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) (magick+12),"SFW94A",6) != 0)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Dump SFW image to a temporary file.
*/
file=(FILE *) NULL;
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToWriteFile",
image->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=fwrite("SFW94A",1,6,file);
(void) length;
filesize=65535UL*magick[2]+256L*magick[1]+magick[0];
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) filesize; i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
(void) fputc(c,file);
}
(void) fclose(file);
if (c == EOF)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
}
next_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleString(next_image->filename,MagickPathExtent,
"slide_%02ld.sfw",(long) next_image->scene);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
image=next_image;
else
{
/*
Link image into image list.
*/
for (p=image; p->next != (Image *) NULL; p=GetNextImageInList(p)) ;
next_image->previous=p;
next_image->scene=p->scene+1;
p->next=next_image;
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (next_image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(pwp_image),
GetBlobSize(pwp_image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (unique_file != -1)
(void) close(unique_file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
char
*message;
message=GetExceptionMessage(errno);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile","`%s': %s",image->filename,
message);
message=DestroyString(message);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1199
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 169,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct fuse_file *fuse_file_alloc(struct fuse_conn *fc)
{
struct fuse_file *ff;
ff = kmalloc(sizeof(struct fuse_file), GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!ff))
return NULL;
ff->fc = fc;
ff->reserved_req = fuse_request_alloc(0);
if (unlikely(!ff->reserved_req)) {
kfree(ff);
return NULL;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ff->write_entry);
atomic_set(&ff->count, 0);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&ff->polled_node);
init_waitqueue_head(&ff->poll_wait);
spin_lock(&fc->lock);
ff->kh = ++fc->khctr;
spin_unlock(&fc->lock);
return ff;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,927 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const AtomicString& Document::linkColor() const {
return BodyAttributeValue(linkAttr);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,041 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PinholeVerification(struct upnphttp * h, char * int_ip, unsigned short int_port)
{
int n;
char senderAddr[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]="";
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *p;
struct in6_addr result_ip;
/* Pinhole InternalClient address must correspond to the action sender */
syslog(LOG_INFO, "Checking internal IP@ and port (Security policy purpose)");
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
/* if ip not valid assume hostname and convert */
if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, int_ip, &result_ip) <= 0)
{
n = getaddrinfo(int_ip, NULL, &hints, &ai);
if(!n && ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
{
for(p = ai; p; p = p->ai_next)
{
inet_ntop(AF_INET6, (struct in6_addr *) p, int_ip, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
result_ip = *((struct in6_addr *) p);
/* TODO : deal with more than one ip per hostname */
break;
}
}
else
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, "Failed to convert hostname '%s' to ip address", int_ip);
SoapError(h, 402, "Invalid Args");
return -1;
}
freeaddrinfo(p);
}
if(inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &(h->clientaddr_v6), senderAddr, INET6_ADDRSTRLEN) == NULL)
{
syslog(LOG_ERR, "inet_ntop: %m");
}
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("\tPinholeVerification:\n\t\tCompare sender @: %s\n\t\t to intClient @: %s\n", senderAddr, int_ip);
#endif
if(strcmp(senderAddr, int_ip) != 0)
if(h->clientaddr_v6.s6_addr != result_ip.s6_addr)
{
syslog(LOG_INFO, "Client %s tried to access pinhole for internal %s and is not authorized to do it",
senderAddr, int_ip);
SoapError(h, 606, "Action not authorized");
return 0;
}
/* Pinhole InternalPort must be greater than or equal to 1024 */
if (int_port < 1024)
{
syslog(LOG_INFO, "Client %s tried to access pinhole with port < 1024 and is not authorized to do it",
senderAddr);
SoapError(h, 606, "Action not authorized");
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 89,873 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_key_string(gchar* input_string, guint8 key_type)
{
gchar *key, *tmp_str;
gchar *ssid;
GString *key_string = NULL;
GByteArray *ssid_ba = NULL, *key_ba;
gboolean res;
gchar **tokens;
guint n = 0;
decryption_key_t *dk;
if(input_string == NULL)
return NULL;
/*
* Parse the input_string. WEP and WPA will be just a string
* of hexadecimal characters (if key is wrong, null will be
* returned...).
* WPA-PWD should be in the form
* <key data>[:<ssid>]
*/
switch(key_type)
{
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP:
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_40:
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP_104:
key_ba = g_byte_array_new();
res = hex_str_to_bytes(input_string, key_ba, FALSE);
if (res && key_ba->len > 0) {
/* Key is correct! It was probably an 'old style' WEP key */
/* Create the decryption_key_t structure, fill it and return it*/
dk = (decryption_key_t *)g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));
dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WEP;
/* XXX - The current key handling code in the GUI requires
* no separators and lower case */
tmp_str = bytes_to_str(NULL, key_ba->data, key_ba->len);
dk->key = g_string_new(tmp_str);
g_string_ascii_down(dk->key);
dk->bits = key_ba->len * 8;
dk->ssid = NULL;
wmem_free(NULL, tmp_str);
g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
return dk;
}
/* Key doesn't work */
g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
return NULL;
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD:
tokens = g_strsplit(input_string,":",0);
/* Tokens is a null termiated array of strings ... */
while(tokens[n] != NULL)
n++;
if(n < 1)
{
/* Free the array of strings */
g_strfreev(tokens);
return NULL;
}
/*
* The first token is the key
*/
key = g_strdup(tokens[0]);
ssid = NULL;
/* Maybe there is a second token (an ssid, if everything else is ok) */
if(n >= 2)
{
ssid = g_strdup(tokens[1]);
}
/* Create a new string */
key_string = g_string_new(key);
ssid_ba = NULL;
/* Two (or more) tokens mean that the user entered a WPA-PWD key ... */
if( ((key_string->len) > WPA_KEY_MAX_CHAR_SIZE) || ((key_string->len) < WPA_KEY_MIN_CHAR_SIZE))
{
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
g_free(key);
g_free(ssid);
/* Free the array of strings */
g_strfreev(tokens);
return NULL;
}
if(ssid != NULL) /* more than two tokens found, means that the user specified the ssid */
{
ssid_ba = g_byte_array_new();
if (! uri_str_to_bytes(ssid, ssid_ba)) {
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
g_free(key);
g_free(ssid);
/* Free the array of strings */
g_strfreev(tokens);
return NULL;
}
if(ssid_ba->len > WPA_SSID_MAX_CHAR_SIZE)
{
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
g_free(key);
g_free(ssid);
/* Free the array of strings */
g_strfreev(tokens);
return NULL;
}
}
/* Key was correct!!! Create the new decryption_key_t ... */
dk = (decryption_key_t*)g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));
dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PWD;
dk->key = g_string_new(key);
dk->bits = 256; /* This is the length of the array pf bytes that will be generated using key+ssid ...*/
dk->ssid = byte_array_dup(ssid_ba); /* NULL if ssid_ba is NULL */
g_string_free(key_string, TRUE);
if (ssid_ba != NULL)
g_byte_array_free(ssid_ba, TRUE);
g_free(key);
if(ssid != NULL)
g_free(ssid);
/* Free the array of strings */
g_strfreev(tokens);
return dk;
case AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK:
key_ba = g_byte_array_new();
res = hex_str_to_bytes(input_string, key_ba, FALSE);
/* Two tokens means that the user should have entered a WPA-BIN key ... */
if(!res || ((key_ba->len) != WPA_PSK_KEY_SIZE))
{
g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
/* No ssid has been created ... */
return NULL;
}
/* Key was correct!!! Create the new decryption_key_t ... */
dk = (decryption_key_t*)g_malloc(sizeof(decryption_key_t));
dk->type = AIRPDCAP_KEY_TYPE_WPA_PSK;
dk->key = g_string_new(input_string);
dk->bits = (guint) dk->key->len * 4;
dk->ssid = NULL;
g_byte_array_free(key_ba, TRUE);
return dk;
}
/* Type not supported */
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Sanity check eapol_len in AirPDcapDecryptWPABroadcastKey
Bug: 12175
Change-Id: Iaf977ba48f8668bf8095800a115ff9a3472dd893
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15326
Petri-Dish: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexis La Goutte <alexis.lagoutte@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
Tested-by: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 51,922 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *unset_define(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dummy,
const char *name)
{
int i;
const char **defines;
if (cmd->parent && ap_cstr_casecmp(cmd->parent->directive, "<VirtualHost")) {
return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, cmd->cmd->name, " is not valid in ",
cmd->parent->directive, " context", NULL);
}
if (ap_strchr_c(name, ':') != NULL) {
return "Variable name must not contain ':'";
}
if (!saved_server_config_defines) {
init_config_defines(cmd->pool);
}
defines = (const char **)ap_server_config_defines->elts;
for (i = 0; i < ap_server_config_defines->nelts; i++) {
if (strcmp(defines[i], name) == 0) {
defines[i] = *(const char **)apr_array_pop(ap_server_config_defines);
break;
}
}
if (server_config_defined_vars) {
apr_table_unset(server_config_defined_vars, name);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 64,329 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltNumberFormatGetMultipleLevel(xsltTransformContextPtr context,
xmlNodePtr node,
xsltCompMatchPtr countPat,
xsltCompMatchPtr fromPat,
double *array,
int max,
xmlDocPtr doc,
xmlNodePtr elem)
{
int amount = 0;
int cnt;
xmlNodePtr ancestor;
xmlNodePtr preceding;
xmlXPathParserContextPtr parser;
context->xpathCtxt->node = node;
parser = xmlXPathNewParserContext(NULL, context->xpathCtxt);
if (parser) {
/* ancestor-or-self::*[count] */
for (ancestor = node;
(ancestor != NULL) && (ancestor->type != XML_DOCUMENT_NODE);
ancestor = xmlXPathNextAncestor(parser, ancestor)) {
if ((fromPat != NULL) &&
xsltTestCompMatchList(context, ancestor, fromPat))
break; /* for */
if ((countPat == NULL && node->type == ancestor->type &&
xmlStrEqual(node->name, ancestor->name)) ||
xsltTestCompMatchList(context, ancestor, countPat)) {
/* count(preceding-sibling::*) */
cnt = 0;
for (preceding = ancestor;
preceding != NULL;
preceding =
xmlXPathNextPrecedingSibling(parser, preceding)) {
if (countPat == NULL) {
if ((preceding->type == ancestor->type) &&
xmlStrEqual(preceding->name, ancestor->name)){
if ((preceding->ns == ancestor->ns) ||
((preceding->ns != NULL) &&
(ancestor->ns != NULL) &&
(xmlStrEqual(preceding->ns->href,
ancestor->ns->href) )))
cnt++;
}
} else {
if (xsltTestCompMatchList(context, preceding,
countPat))
cnt++;
}
}
array[amount++] = (double)cnt;
if (amount >= max)
break; /* for */
}
}
xmlXPathFreeParserContext(parser);
}
return amount;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BluetoothAdapter::StartOrStopDiscoveryCallback::StartOrStopDiscoveryCallback(
base::Closure stop_callback,
DiscoverySessionErrorCallback stop_error_callback) {
this->stop_callback = stop_callback;
this->stop_error_callback = std::move(stop_error_callback);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 138,210 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkey_get_details)
{
zval *key;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
BIO *out;
unsigned int pbio_len;
char *pbio;
zend_long ktype;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "r", &key) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((pkey = (EVP_PKEY *)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(key), "OpenSSL key", le_key)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (!PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey)) {
BIO_free(out);
php_openssl_store_errors();
RETURN_FALSE;
}
pbio_len = BIO_get_mem_data(out, &pbio);
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "bits", EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey));
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, "key", pbio, pbio_len);
/*TODO: Use the real values once the openssl constants are used
* See the enum at the top of this file
*/
switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA2:
{
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_RSA;
if (rsa != NULL) {
zval z_rsa;
const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *p, *q, *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, &d);
RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
array_init(&z_rsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, n);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, e);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, d);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, dmp1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, dmq1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_rsa, iqmp);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "rsa", &z_rsa);
}
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA2:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA3:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA4:
{
DSA *dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DSA;
if (dsa != NULL) {
zval z_dsa;
const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *priv_key, *pub_key;
DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, &priv_key);
array_init(&z_dsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dsa, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dsa", &z_dsa);
}
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
{
DH *dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey);
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DH;
if (dh != NULL) {
zval z_dh;
const BIGNUM *p, *q, *g, *priv_key, *pub_key;
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g);
DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, &priv_key);
array_init(&z_dh);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(z_dh, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dh", &z_dh);
}
}
break;
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_EC;
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey) != NULL) {
zval ec;
const EC_GROUP *ec_group;
const EC_POINT *pub;
int nid;
char *crv_sn;
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
char oir_buf[80];
const EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
BIGNUM *x = BN_new();
BIGNUM *y = BN_new();
const BIGNUM *d;
ec_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key);
nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(ec_group);
if (nid == NID_undef) {
break;
}
array_init(&ec);
crv_sn = (char*) OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (crv_sn != NULL) {
add_assoc_string(&ec, "curve_name", crv_sn);
}
obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
if (obj != NULL) {
int oir_len = OBJ_obj2txt(oir_buf, sizeof(oir_buf), obj, 1);
add_assoc_stringl(&ec, "curve_oid", (char*) oir_buf, oir_len);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
}
pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec_key);
if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(ec_group, pub, x, y, NULL)) {
OPENSSL_GET_BN(ec, x, x);
OPENSSL_GET_BN(ec, y, y);
} else {
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
if ((d = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey))) != NULL) {
OPENSSL_GET_BN(ec, d, d);
}
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "ec", &ec);
BN_free(x);
BN_free(y);
}
break;
#endif
default:
ktype = -1;
break;
}
add_assoc_long(return_value, "type", ktype);
BIO_free(out);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kdc_process_s4u2proxy_req(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
const krb5_enc_tkt_part *t2enc,
const krb5_db_entry *server,
krb5_const_principal server_princ,
krb5_const_principal proxy_princ,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code errcode;
/*
* Constrained delegation is mutually exclusive with renew/forward/etc.
* We can assert from this check that the header ticket was a TGT, as
* that is validated previously in validate_tgs_request().
*/
if (request->kdc_options & (NON_TGT_OPTION | KDC_OPT_ENC_TKT_IN_SKEY)) {
return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
}
/* Ensure that evidence ticket server matches TGT client */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(kdc_context,
server->princ, /* after canon */
server_princ)) {
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVER_NOMATCH;
}
if (!isflagset(t2enc->flags, TKT_FLG_FORWARDABLE)) {
*status = "EVIDENCE_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE";
return KRB5_TKT_NOT_FORWARDABLE;
}
/* Backend policy check */
errcode = check_allowed_to_delegate_to(kdc_context,
t2enc->client,
server,
proxy_princ);
if (errcode) {
*status = "NOT_ALLOWED_TO_DELEGATE";
return errcode;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 1 | 168,042 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_read_support_format_zip(struct archive *a)
{
int r;
r = archive_read_support_format_zip_streamable(a);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK)
return r;
return (archive_read_support_format_zip_seekable(a));
}
Commit Message: Issue #656: Fix CVE-2016-1541, VU#862384
When reading OS X metadata entries in Zip archives that were stored
without compression, libarchive would use the uncompressed entry size
to allocate a buffer but would use the compressed entry size to limit
the amount of data copied into that buffer. Since the compressed
and uncompressed sizes are provided by data in the archive itself,
an attacker could manipulate these values to write data beyond
the end of the allocated buffer.
This fix provides three new checks to guard against such
manipulation and to make libarchive generally more robust when
handling this type of entry:
1. If an OS X metadata entry is stored without compression,
abort the entire archive if the compressed and uncompressed
data sizes do not match.
2. When sanity-checking the size of an OS X metadata entry,
abort this entry if either the compressed or uncompressed
size is larger than 4MB.
3. When copying data into the allocated buffer, check the copy
size against both the compressed entry size and uncompressed
entry size.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 55,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t sanity_checks_show(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf)
{
return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !!(s->flags & SLAB_DEBUG_FREE));
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 24,882 |
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