instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct async *reap_as(struct usb_dev_state *ps)
{
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
struct async *as = NULL;
struct usb_device *dev = ps->dev;
add_wait_queue(&ps->wait, &wait);
for (;;) {
__set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
as = async_getcompleted(ps);
if (as || !connected(ps))
break;
if (signal_pending(current))
break;
usb_unlock_device(dev);
schedule();
usb_lock_device(dev);
}
remove_wait_queue(&ps->wait, &wait);
set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
return as;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,246 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: double NetworkActionPredictor::CalculateConfidence(
const string16& user_text,
const AutocompleteMatch& match,
bool* is_in_db) const {
const DBCacheKey key = { user_text, match.destination_url };
*is_in_db = false;
if (user_text.length() < kMinimumUserTextLength)
return 0.0;
const DBCacheMap::const_iterator iter = db_cache_.find(key);
if (iter == db_cache_.end())
return 0.0;
*is_in_db = true;
return CalculateConfidenceForDbEntry(iter);
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 107,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: BrowserViewLayout* BrowserView::GetBrowserViewLayout() const {
return static_cast<BrowserViewLayout*>(GetLayoutManager());
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::allocate_buffer(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_INOUT OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE** bufferHdr,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 port,
OMX_IN OMX_PTR appData,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 bytes)
{
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone; // OMX return type
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Allocate buffer of size = %u on port %d", (unsigned int)bytes, (int)port);
if (m_state == OMX_StateInvalid) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Allocate Buf in Invalid State");
return OMX_ErrorInvalidState;
}
if (port == PORT_INDEX_IN) {
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
if (meta_mode_enable)
eRet = allocate_input_meta_buffer(hComp,bufferHdr,appData,bytes);
else
#endif
eRet = allocate_input_buffer(hComp,bufferHdr,port,appData,bytes);
} else if (port == PORT_INDEX_OUT) {
eRet = allocate_output_buffer(hComp,bufferHdr,port,appData,bytes);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Invalid Port Index received %d",(int)port);
eRet = OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Checking for Output Allocate buffer Done");
if (eRet == OMX_ErrorNone) {
if (allocate_done()) {
if (BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING)) {
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_IDLE_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandStateSet,OMX_StateIdle,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
}
if (port == PORT_INDEX_IN && m_sInPortDef.bPopulated) {
if (BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_ENABLE_PENDING)) {
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_INPUT_ENABLE_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandPortEnable,
PORT_INDEX_IN,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
}
}
if (port == PORT_INDEX_OUT && m_sOutPortDef.bPopulated) {
if (BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_flags,OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_ENABLE_PENDING)) {
BITMASK_CLEAR((&m_flags),OMX_COMPONENT_OUTPUT_ENABLE_PENDING);
post_event(OMX_CommandPortEnable,
PORT_INDEX_OUT,
OMX_COMPONENT_GENERATE_EVENT);
m_event_port_settings_sent = false;
}
}
}
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Allocate Buffer exit with ret Code %d",eRet);
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,150 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::didMoveToNewDocument(Document& oldDocument) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "didMoveToNewDocument(" << (void*)this << ")";
m_loadTimer.moveToNewTaskRunner(
TaskRunnerHelper::get(TaskType::Unthrottled, &document()));
m_progressEventTimer.moveToNewTaskRunner(
TaskRunnerHelper::get(TaskType::Unthrottled, &document()));
m_playbackProgressTimer.moveToNewTaskRunner(
TaskRunnerHelper::get(TaskType::Unthrottled, &document()));
m_audioTracksTimer.moveToNewTaskRunner(
TaskRunnerHelper::get(TaskType::Unthrottled, &document()));
m_viewportFillDebouncerTimer.moveToNewTaskRunner(
TaskRunnerHelper::get(TaskType::Unthrottled, &document()));
m_checkViewportIntersectionTimer.moveToNewTaskRunner(
TaskRunnerHelper::get(TaskType::Unthrottled, &document()));
m_autoplayUmaHelper->didMoveToNewDocument(oldDocument);
bool oldDocumentRequiresUserGesture =
computeLockedPendingUserGesture(oldDocument);
bool newDocumentRequiresUserGesture =
computeLockedPendingUserGesture(document());
if (newDocumentRequiresUserGesture && !oldDocumentRequiresUserGesture)
m_lockedPendingUserGesture = true;
if (m_shouldDelayLoadEvent) {
document().incrementLoadEventDelayCount();
} else {
oldDocument.incrementLoadEventDelayCount();
}
if (isDocumentCrossOrigin(document()) && !isDocumentCrossOrigin(oldDocument))
m_lockedPendingUserGestureIfCrossOriginExperimentEnabled = true;
removeElementFromDocumentMap(this, &oldDocument);
addElementToDocumentMap(this, &document());
m_ignorePreloadNone = false;
invokeLoadAlgorithm();
oldDocument.decrementLoadEventDelayCount();
SuspendableObject::didMoveToNewExecutionContext(&document());
HTMLElement::didMoveToNewDocument(oldDocument);
}
Commit Message: [Blink>Media] Allow autoplay muted on Android by default
There was a mistake causing autoplay muted is shipped on Android
but it will be disabled if the chromium embedder doesn't specify
content setting for "AllowAutoplay" preference. This CL makes the
AllowAutoplay preference true by default so that it is allowed by
embedders (including AndroidWebView) unless they explicitly
disable it.
Intent to ship:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/Q1cnzNI2GpI/AL_eyUNABgAJ
BUG=689018
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2677173002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#448423}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 128,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void setVerticalScrollPolicy(WebKitWebView* webView, GtkScrollablePolicy policy)
{
webView->priv->verticalScrollingPolicy = policy;
gtk_widget_queue_resize(GTK_WIDGET(webView));
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,509 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CrosMock::~CrosMock() {
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 99,644 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cmd_tasks(void *data, const char *input) {
RCore *core = (RCore*) data;
switch (input[0]) {
case '\0': // "&"
case 'j': // "&j"
r_core_task_list (core, *input);
break;
case 'b': { // "&b"
if (r_sandbox_enable (0)) {
eprintf ("This command is disabled in sandbox mode\n");
return 0;
}
int tid = r_num_math (core->num, input + 1);
if (tid) {
r_core_task_break (core, tid);
}
break;
}
case '&': { // "&&"
if (r_sandbox_enable (0)) {
eprintf ("This command is disabled in sandbox mode\n");
return 0;
}
int tid = r_num_math (core->num, input + 1);
r_core_task_join (core, core->current_task, tid ? tid : -1);
break;
}
case '=': { // "&="
int tid = r_num_math (core->num, input + 1);
if (tid) {
RCoreTask *task = r_core_task_get_incref (core, tid);
if (task) {
if (task->res) {
r_cons_println (task->res);
}
r_core_task_decref (task);
} else {
eprintf ("Cannot find task\n");
}
}
break;
}
case '-': // "&-"
if (r_sandbox_enable (0)) {
eprintf ("This command is disabled in sandbox mode\n");
return 0;
}
if (input[1] == '*') {
r_core_task_del_all_done (core);
} else {
r_core_task_del (core, r_num_math (core->num, input + 1));
}
break;
case '?': // "&?"
default:
helpCmdTasks (core);
break;
case ' ': // "& "
case '_': // "&_"
case 't': { // "&t"
if (r_sandbox_enable (0)) {
eprintf ("This command is disabled in sandbox mode\n");
return 0;
}
RCoreTask *task = r_core_task_new (core, true, input + 1, NULL, core);
if (!task) {
break;
}
task->transient = input[0] == 't';
r_core_task_enqueue (core, task);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix #14990 - multiple quoted command parsing issue ##core
> "?e hello""?e world"
hello
world"
> "?e hello";"?e world"
hello
world
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 87,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hfs_cat_traverse(HFS_INFO * hfs,
TSK_HFS_BTREE_CB a_cb, void *ptr)
{
TSK_FS_INFO *fs = &(hfs->fs_info);
uint32_t cur_node; /* node id of the current node */
char *node;
uint16_t nodesize;
uint8_t is_done = 0;
tsk_error_reset();
nodesize = tsk_getu16(fs->endian, hfs->catalog_header.nodesize);
if ((node = (char *) tsk_malloc(nodesize)) == NULL)
return 1;
/* start at root node */
cur_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, hfs->catalog_header.rootNode);
/* if the root node is zero, then the extents btree is empty */
/* if no files have overflow extents, the Extents B-tree still
exists on disk, but is an empty B-tree containing only
the header node */
if (cur_node == 0) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: "
"empty extents btree\n");
free(node);
return 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: starting at "
"root node %" PRIu32 "; nodesize = %"
PRIu16 "\n", cur_node, nodesize);
/* Recurse down to the needed leaf nodes and then go forward */
is_done = 0;
while (is_done == 0) {
TSK_OFF_T cur_off; /* start address of cur_node */
uint16_t num_rec; /* number of records in this node */
ssize_t cnt;
hfs_btree_node *node_desc;
if (cur_node > tsk_getu32(fs->endian,
hfs->catalog_header.totalNodes)) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: Node %d too large for file", cur_node);
free(node);
return 1;
}
cur_off = cur_node * nodesize;
cnt = tsk_fs_attr_read(hfs->catalog_attr, cur_off,
node, nodesize, 0);
if (cnt != nodesize) {
if (cnt >= 0) {
tsk_error_reset();
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_READ);
}
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Error reading node %d at offset %"
PRIuOFF, cur_node, cur_off);
free(node);
return 1;
}
if (nodesize < sizeof(hfs_btree_node)) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: Node size %d is too small to be valid", nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
node_desc = (hfs_btree_node *) node;
num_rec = tsk_getu16(fs->endian, node_desc->num_rec);
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr, "hfs_cat_traverse: node %" PRIu32
" @ %" PRIu64 " has %" PRIu16 " records\n",
cur_node, cur_off, num_rec);
if (num_rec == 0) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr("hfs_cat_traverse: zero records in node %"
PRIu32, cur_node);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/* With an index node, find the record with the largest key that is smaller
* to or equal to cnid */
if (node_desc->type == HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_IDX) {
uint32_t next_node = 0;
int rec;
for (rec = 0; rec < num_rec; ++rec) {
size_t rec_off;
hfs_btree_key_cat *key;
uint8_t retval;
uint16_t keylen;
rec_off =
tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
&node[nodesize - (rec + 1) * 2]);
if (rec_off > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, (int) rec_off,
nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
key = (hfs_btree_key_cat *) & node[rec_off];
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len);
if ((keylen) > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: length of key %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/*
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: record %" PRIu16
" ; keylen %" PRIu16 " (%" PRIu32 ")\n", rec,
tsk_getu16(fs->endian, key->key_len),
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, key->parent_cnid));
*/
/* save the info from this record unless it is too big */
retval =
a_cb(hfs, HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_IDX, key,
cur_off + rec_off, ptr);
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_ERR) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Callback returned error");
free(node);
return 1;
}
else if ((retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_IDX_LT)
|| (next_node == 0)) {
hfs_btree_index_record *idx_rec;
int keylen =
2 + hfs_get_idxkeylen(hfs, tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
key->key_len), &(hfs->catalog_header));
if (rec_off + keylen > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record and keylength %d in index node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node,
(int) rec_off + keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
idx_rec =
(hfs_btree_index_record *) & node[rec_off +
keylen];
next_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, idx_rec->childNode);
}
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_IDX_EQGT) {
break;
}
}
if (next_node == 0) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: did not find any keys in index node %d",
cur_node);
is_done = 1;
break;
}
if (next_node == cur_node) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: node %d references itself as next node",
cur_node);
is_done = 1;
break;
}
cur_node = next_node;
}
/* With a leaf, we look for the specific record. */
else if (node_desc->type == HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_LEAF) {
int rec;
for (rec = 0; rec < num_rec; ++rec) {
size_t rec_off;
hfs_btree_key_cat *key;
uint8_t retval;
uint16_t keylen;
rec_off =
tsk_getu16(fs->endian,
&node[nodesize - (rec + 1) * 2]);
if (rec_off > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: offset of record %d in leaf node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, (int) rec_off,
nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
key = (hfs_btree_key_cat *) & node[rec_off];
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len);
if ((keylen) > nodesize) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr
("hfs_cat_traverse: length of key %d in leaf node %d too large (%d vs %"
PRIu16 ")", rec, cur_node, keylen, nodesize);
free(node);
return 1;
}
/*
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: record %" PRIu16
"; keylen %" PRIu16 " (%" PRIu32 ")\n", rec,
tsk_getu16(fs->endian, key->key_len),
tsk_getu32(fs->endian, key->parent_cnid));
*/
retval =
a_cb(hfs, HFS_BT_NODE_TYPE_LEAF, key,
cur_off + rec_off, ptr);
if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_LEAF_STOP) {
is_done = 1;
break;
}
else if (retval == HFS_BTREE_CB_ERR) {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr2
("hfs_cat_traverse: Callback returned error");
free(node);
return 1;
}
}
if (is_done == 0) {
cur_node = tsk_getu32(fs->endian, node_desc->flink);
if (cur_node == 0) {
is_done = 1;
}
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"hfs_cat_traverse: moving forward to next leaf");
}
}
else {
tsk_error_set_errno(TSK_ERR_FS_GENFS);
tsk_error_set_errstr("hfs_cat_traverse: btree node %" PRIu32
" (%" PRIu64 ") is neither index nor leaf (%" PRIu8 ")",
cur_node, cur_off, node_desc->type);
free(node);
return 1;
}
}
free(node);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: hfs: fix keylen check in hfs_cat_traverse()
If key->key_len is 65535, calculating "uint16_t keylen' would
cause an overflow:
uint16_t keylen;
...
keylen = 2 + tsk_getu16(hfs->fs_info.endian, key->key_len)
so the code bypasses the sanity check "if (keylen > nodesize)"
which results in crash later:
./toolfs/fstools/fls -b 512 -f hfs <image>
=================================================================
==16==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x6210000256a4 (pc 0x00000054812b bp 0x7ffca548a8f0 sp 0x7ffca548a480 T0)
==16==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x54812a in hfs_dir_open_meta_cb /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs_dent.c:237:20
#1 0x51a96c in hfs_cat_traverse /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs.c:1082:21
#2 0x547785 in hfs_dir_open_meta /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs_dent.c:480:9
#3 0x50f57d in tsk_fs_dir_open_meta /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/fs_dir.c:290:14
#4 0x54af17 in tsk_fs_path2inum /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/ifind_lib.c:237:23
#5 0x522266 in hfs_open /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tsk/fs/hfs.c:6579:9
#6 0x508e89 in main /fuzzing/sleuthkit/tools/fstools/fls.cpp:267:19
#7 0x7f9daf67c2b0 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x202b0)
#8 0x41d679 in _start (/fuzzing/sleuthkit/tools/fstools/fls+0x41d679)
Make 'keylen' int type to prevent the overflow and fix that.
Now, I get proper error message instead of crash:
./toolfs/fstools/fls -b 512 -f hfs <image>
General file system error (hfs_cat_traverse: length of key 3 in leaf node 1 too large (65537 vs 4096))
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 169,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t MPEG4Source::parseChunk(off64_t *offset) {
uint32_t hdr[2];
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
uint64_t chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
uint32_t chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
off64_t data_offset = *offset + 8;
if (chunk_size == 1) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset + 8, &chunk_size, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_IO;
}
chunk_size = ntoh64(chunk_size);
data_offset += 8;
if (chunk_size < 16) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
} else if (chunk_size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
char chunk[5];
MakeFourCCString(chunk_type, chunk);
ALOGV("MPEG4Source chunk %s @ %#llx", chunk, (long long)*offset);
off64_t chunk_data_size = *offset + chunk_size - data_offset;
switch(chunk_type) {
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'a', 'f'):
case FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f'): {
off64_t stop_offset = *offset + chunk_size;
*offset = data_offset;
while (*offset < stop_offset) {
status_t err = parseChunk(offset);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
}
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f')) {
while (true) {
if (mDataSource->readAt(*offset, hdr, 8) < 8) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
chunk_size = ntohl(hdr[0]);
chunk_type = ntohl(hdr[1]);
if (chunk_type == FOURCC('m', 'o', 'o', 'f')) {
mNextMoofOffset = *offset;
break;
}
*offset += chunk_size;
}
}
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'f', 'h', 'd'): {
status_t err;
if ((err = parseTrackFragmentHeader(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('t', 'r', 'u', 'n'): {
status_t err;
if (mLastParsedTrackId == mTrackId) {
if ((err = parseTrackFragmentRun(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'i', 'z'): {
status_t err;
if ((err = parseSampleAuxiliaryInformationSizes(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'i', 'o'): {
status_t err;
if ((err = parseSampleAuxiliaryInformationOffsets(data_offset, chunk_data_size)) != OK) {
return err;
}
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
case FOURCC('m', 'd', 'a', 't'): {
ALOGV("MPEG4Source::parseChunk mdat");
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
default: {
*offset += chunk_size;
break;
}
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Check malloc result to avoid NPD
Bug: 28471206
Change-Id: Id5d055d76893d6f53a2e524ff5f282d1ddca3345
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,593 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void irda_destroy_socket(struct irda_sock *self)
{
IRDA_DEBUG(2, "%s(%p)\n", __func__, self);
/* Unregister with IrLMP */
irlmp_unregister_client(self->ckey);
irlmp_unregister_service(self->skey);
/* Unregister with LM-IAS */
if (self->ias_obj) {
irias_delete_object(self->ias_obj);
self->ias_obj = NULL;
}
if (self->iriap) {
iriap_close(self->iriap);
self->iriap = NULL;
}
if (self->tsap) {
irttp_disconnect_request(self->tsap, NULL, P_NORMAL);
irttp_close_tsap(self->tsap);
self->tsap = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IRDA_ULTRA
if (self->lsap) {
irlmp_close_lsap(self->lsap);
self->lsap = NULL;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IRDA_ULTRA */
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix missing msg_namelen update in irda_recvmsg_dgram()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about irda_recvmsg_dgram() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::BindBufferStub(GLenum target, GLuint buffer) {
helper_->BindBuffer(target, buffer);
if (share_group_->bind_generates_resource())
helper_->CommandBufferHelper::OrderingBarrier();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init rtnetlink_init(void)
{
if (register_pernet_subsys(&rtnetlink_net_ops))
panic("rtnetlink_init: cannot initialize rtnetlink\n");
register_netdevice_notifier(&rtnetlink_dev_notifier);
rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_GETLINK, rtnl_getlink,
rtnl_dump_ifinfo, rtnl_calcit);
rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_SETLINK, rtnl_setlink, NULL, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_NEWLINK, rtnl_newlink, NULL, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_DELLINK, rtnl_dellink, NULL, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_GETADDR, NULL, rtnl_dump_all, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_UNSPEC, RTM_GETROUTE, NULL, rtnl_dump_all, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_BRIDGE, RTM_NEWNEIGH, rtnl_fdb_add, NULL, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_BRIDGE, RTM_DELNEIGH, rtnl_fdb_del, NULL, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_BRIDGE, RTM_GETNEIGH, NULL, rtnl_fdb_dump, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_BRIDGE, RTM_GETLINK, NULL, rtnl_bridge_getlink, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_BRIDGE, RTM_DELLINK, rtnl_bridge_dellink, NULL, NULL);
rtnl_register(PF_BRIDGE, RTM_SETLINK, rtnl_bridge_setlink, NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int parseOperand(RAsm *a, const char *str, Operand *op, bool isrepop) {
size_t pos, nextpos = 0;
x86newTokenType last_type;
int size_token = 1;
bool explicit_size = false;
int reg_index = 0;
op->type = 0;
while (size_token) {
pos = nextpos;
last_type = getToken (str, &pos, &nextpos);
if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "ptr", 3)) {
continue;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "byte", 4)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_BYTE;
op->dest_size = OT_BYTE;
explicit_size = true;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "word", 4)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_WORD;
op->dest_size = OT_WORD;
explicit_size = true;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "dword", 5)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_DWORD;
op->dest_size = OT_DWORD;
explicit_size = true;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "qword", 5)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_QWORD;
op->dest_size = OT_QWORD;
explicit_size = true;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "oword", 5)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_OWORD;
op->dest_size = OT_OWORD;
explicit_size = true;
} else if (!r_str_ncasecmp (str + pos, "tbyte", 5)) {
op->type |= OT_MEMORY | OT_TBYTE;
op->dest_size = OT_TBYTE;
explicit_size = true;
} else { // the current token doesn't denote a size
size_token = 0;
}
}
if (str[pos] == '[') {
if (!op->type) {
op->type = OT_MEMORY;
}
op->offset = op->scale[0] = op->scale[1] = 0;
ut64 temp = 1;
Register reg = X86R_UNDEFINED;
bool first_reg = true;
while (str[pos] != ']') {
if (pos > nextpos) {
break;
}
pos = nextpos;
if (!str[pos]) {
break;
}
last_type = getToken (str, &pos, &nextpos);
if (last_type == TT_SPECIAL) {
if (str[pos] == '+' || str[pos] == '-' || str[pos] == ']') {
if (reg != X86R_UNDEFINED) {
op->regs[reg_index] = reg;
op->scale[reg_index] = temp;
++reg_index;
} else {
op->offset += temp;
op->regs[reg_index] = X86R_UNDEFINED;
}
temp = 1;
reg = X86R_UNDEFINED;
} else if (str[pos] == '*') {
}
}
else if (last_type == TT_WORD) {
ut32 reg_type = 0;
if (reg != X86R_UNDEFINED) {
op->type = 0; // Make the result invalid
}
nextpos = pos;
reg = parseReg (a, str, &nextpos, ®_type);
if (first_reg) {
op->extended = false;
if (reg > 8) {
op->extended = true;
op->reg = reg - 9;
}
first_reg = false;
} else if (reg > 8) {
op->reg = reg - 9;
}
if (reg_type & OT_REGTYPE & OT_SEGMENTREG) {
op->reg = reg;
op->type = reg_type;
parse_segment_offset (a, str, &nextpos, op, reg_index);
return nextpos;
}
if (!explicit_size) {
op->type |= reg_type;
}
op->reg_size = reg_type;
op->explicit_size = explicit_size;
if (!(reg_type & OT_GPREG)) {
op->type = 0; // Make the result invalid
}
}
else {
char *p = strchr (str, '+');
op->offset_sign = 1;
if (!p) {
p = strchr (str, '-');
if (p) {
op->offset_sign = -1;
}
}
char * plus = strchr (str, '+');
char * minus = strchr (str, '-');
char * closeB = strchr (str, ']');
if (plus && minus && plus < closeB && minus < closeB) {
op->offset_sign = -1;
}
char *tmp;
tmp = malloc (strlen (str + pos) + 1);
strcpy (tmp, str + pos);
strtok (tmp, "+-");
st64 read = getnum (a, tmp);
free (tmp);
temp *= read;
}
}
} else if (last_type == TT_WORD) { // register
nextpos = pos;
RFlagItem *flag;
if (isrepop) {
op->is_good_flag = false;
strncpy (op->rep_op, str, MAX_REPOP_LENGTH - 1);
op->rep_op[MAX_REPOP_LENGTH - 1] = '\0';
return nextpos;
}
op->reg = parseReg (a, str, &nextpos, &op->type);
op->extended = false;
if (op->reg > 8) {
op->extended = true;
op->reg -= 9;
}
if (op->type & OT_REGTYPE & OT_SEGMENTREG) {
parse_segment_offset (a, str, &nextpos, op, reg_index);
return nextpos;
}
if (op->reg == X86R_UNDEFINED) {
op->is_good_flag = false;
if (a->num && a->num->value == 0) {
return nextpos;
}
op->type = OT_CONSTANT;
RCore *core = a->num? (RCore *)(a->num->userptr): NULL;
if (core && (flag = r_flag_get (core->flags, str))) {
op->is_good_flag = true;
}
char *p = strchr (str, '-');
if (p) {
op->sign = -1;
str = ++p;
}
op->immediate = getnum (a, str);
} else if (op->reg < X86R_UNDEFINED) {
strncpy (op->rep_op, str, MAX_REPOP_LENGTH - 1);
op->rep_op[MAX_REPOP_LENGTH - 1] = '\0';
}
} else { // immediate
op->type = OT_CONSTANT;
op->sign = 1;
char *p = strchr (str, '-');
if (p) {
op->sign = -1;
str = ++p;
}
op->immediate = getnum (a, str);
}
return nextpos;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12242 - Crash in x86.nz assembler (#12266)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 75,620 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void S_AL_SrcSetup(srcHandle_t src, sfxHandle_t sfx, alSrcPriority_t priority,
int entity, int channel, qboolean local)
{
src_t *curSource;
curSource = &srcList[src];
curSource->lastUsedTime = Sys_Milliseconds();
curSource->sfx = sfx;
curSource->priority = priority;
curSource->entity = entity;
curSource->channel = channel;
curSource->isPlaying = qfalse;
curSource->isLocked = qfalse;
curSource->isLooping = qfalse;
curSource->isTracking = qfalse;
curSource->isStream = qfalse;
curSource->curGain = s_alGain->value * s_volume->value;
curSource->scaleGain = curSource->curGain;
curSource->local = local;
if(sfx >= 0)
{
S_AL_BufferUse(sfx);
qalSourcei(curSource->alSource, AL_BUFFER, S_AL_BufferGet(sfx));
}
qalSourcef(curSource->alSource, AL_PITCH, 1.0f);
S_AL_Gain(curSource->alSource, curSource->curGain);
qalSourcefv(curSource->alSource, AL_POSITION, vec3_origin);
qalSourcefv(curSource->alSource, AL_VELOCITY, vec3_origin);
qalSourcei(curSource->alSource, AL_LOOPING, AL_FALSE);
qalSourcef(curSource->alSource, AL_REFERENCE_DISTANCE, s_alMinDistance->value);
if(local)
{
qalSourcei(curSource->alSource, AL_SOURCE_RELATIVE, AL_TRUE);
qalSourcef(curSource->alSource, AL_ROLLOFF_FACTOR, 0.0f);
}
else
{
qalSourcei(curSource->alSource, AL_SOURCE_RELATIVE, AL_FALSE);
qalSourcef(curSource->alSource, AL_ROLLOFF_FACTOR, s_alRolloff->value);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,550 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct inode *ovl_d_select_inode(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned file_flags)
{
int err;
struct path realpath;
enum ovl_path_type type;
if (d_is_dir(dentry))
return d_backing_inode(dentry);
type = ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath);
if (ovl_open_need_copy_up(file_flags, type, realpath.dentry)) {
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
if (file_flags & O_TRUNC)
err = ovl_copy_up_last(dentry, NULL, true);
else
err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
ovl_path_upper(dentry, &realpath);
}
if (realpath.dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_SELECT_INODE)
return realpath.dentry->d_op->d_select_inode(realpath.dentry, file_flags);
return d_backing_inode(realpath.dentry);
}
Commit Message: ovl: fix permission checking for setattr
[Al Viro] The bug is in being too enthusiastic about optimizing ->setattr()
away - instead of "copy verbatim with metadata" + "chmod/chown/utimes"
(with the former being always safe and the latter failing in case of
insufficient permissions) it tries to combine these two. Note that copyup
itself will have to do ->setattr() anyway; _that_ is where the elevated
capabilities are right. Having these two ->setattr() (one to set verbatim
copy of metadata, another to do what overlayfs ->setattr() had been asked
to do in the first place) combined is where it breaks.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 41,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_cert(char *filename, X509 **retcert)
{
X509 *cert = NULL;
BIO *tmp = NULL;
int code;
krb5_error_code retval;
if (filename == NULL || retcert == NULL)
return EINVAL;
*retcert = NULL;
tmp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
if (tmp == NULL)
return ENOMEM;
code = BIO_read_filename(tmp, filename);
if (code == 0) {
retval = errno;
goto cleanup;
}
cert = (X509 *) PEM_read_bio_X509(tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (cert == NULL) {
retval = EIO;
pkiDebug("failed to read certificate from %s\n", filename);
goto cleanup;
}
*retcert = cert;
retval = 0;
cleanup:
if (tmp != NULL)
BIO_free(tmp);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,638 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::ClearUnclearedRenderbuffers(
GLenum target, FramebufferManager::FramebufferInfo* info) {
if (target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
}
GLbitfield clear_bits = 0;
if (info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0)) {
glClearColor(
0, 0, 0,
(GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
info->GetColorAttachmentFormat()) & 0x0008) != 0 ? 0 : 1);
glColorMask(true, true, true, true);
clear_bits |= GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT) ||
info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT)) {
glClearStencil(0);
glStencilMask(-1);
clear_bits |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
}
if (info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT) ||
info->HasUnclearedAttachment(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT)) {
glClearDepth(1.0f);
glDepthMask(true);
clear_bits |= GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT;
}
glDisable(GL_SCISSOR_TEST);
glClear(clear_bits);
info->MarkAttachedRenderbuffersAsCleared();
RestoreClearState();
if (target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: exsltDateDayOfWeekInMonth (const xmlChar *dateTime)
{
exsltDateValPtr dt;
long ret;
if (dateTime == NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_TIME
dt = exsltDateCurrent();
if (dt == NULL)
#endif
return xmlXPathNAN;
} else {
dt = exsltDateParse(dateTime);
if (dt == NULL)
return xmlXPathNAN;
if ((dt->type != XS_DATETIME) && (dt->type != XS_DATE)) {
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return xmlXPathNAN;
}
}
ret = ((dt->value.date.day -1) / 7) + 1;
exsltDateFreeDate(dt);
return (double) ret;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void VRDisplay::cancelAnimationFrame(int id) {
if (!scripted_animation_controller_)
return;
scripted_animation_controller_->CancelCallback(id);
}
Commit Message: WebVR: fix initial vsync
Applications sometimes use window.rAF while not presenting, then switch to
vrDisplay.rAF after presentation starts. Depending on the animation loop's
timing, this can cause a race condition where presentation has been started
but there's no vrDisplay.rAF pending yet. Ensure there's at least vsync
being processed after presentation starts so that a queued window.rAF
can run and schedule a vrDisplay.rAF.
BUG=711789
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2848483003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468167}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *parse_path(struct parse_state *state)
{
size_t mb;
const char *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH_FROM_CTX(state->ts);
/* is there actually a path to parse? */
if (!*state->ptr) {
return state->ptr;
}
tmp = state->ptr;
state->url.path = &state->buffer[state->offset];
do {
switch (*state->ptr) {
case '#':
case '?':
goto done;
case '%':
if (state->ptr[1] != '%' && (state->end - state->ptr <= 2 || !isxdigit(*(state->ptr+1)) || !isxdigit(*(state->ptr+2)))) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING,
"Failed to parse path; invalid percent encoding at pos %u in '%s'",
(unsigned) (state->ptr - tmp), tmp);
return NULL;
}
state->buffer[state->offset++] = *state->ptr++;
state->buffer[state->offset++] = *state->ptr++;
state->buffer[state->offset++] = *state->ptr;
break;
case '/': /* yeah, well */
case '!': case '$': case '&': case '\'': case '(': case ')': case '*':
case '+': case ',': case ';': case '=': /* sub-delims */
case '-': case '.': case '_': case '~': /* unreserved */
case ':': case '@': /* pchar */
case 'A': case 'B': case 'C': case 'D': case 'E': case 'F': case 'G':
case 'H': case 'I': case 'J': case 'K': case 'L': case 'M': case 'N':
case 'O': case 'P': case 'Q': case 'R': case 'S': case 'T': case 'U':
case 'V': case 'W': case 'X': case 'Y': case 'Z':
case 'a': case 'b': case 'c': case 'd': case 'e': case 'f': case 'g':
case 'h': case 'i': case 'j': case 'k': case 'l': case 'm': case 'n':
case 'o': case 'p': case 'q': case 'r': case 's': case 't': case 'u':
case 'v': case 'w': case 'x': case 'y': case 'z':
case '0': case '1': case '2': case '3': case '4': case '5': case '6':
case '7': case '8': case '9':
/* allowed */
state->buffer[state->offset++] = *state->ptr;
break;
default:
if (!(mb = parse_mb(state, PARSE_PATH, state->ptr, state->end, tmp, 0))) {
return NULL;
}
state->ptr += mb - 1;
}
} while (++state->ptr < state->end);
done:
/* did we have any path component ? */
if (tmp != state->ptr) {
state->buffer[state->offset++] = 0;
} else {
state->url.path = NULL;
}
return state->ptr;
}
Commit Message: fix bug #71719 (Buffer overflow in HTTP url parsing functions)
The parser's offset was not reset when we softfail in scheme
parsing and continue to parse a path.
Thanks to hlt99 at blinkenshell dot org for the report.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ib_uverbs_wq_event_handler(struct ib_event *event, void *context_ptr)
{
struct ib_uevent_object *uobj = container_of(event->element.wq->uobject,
struct ib_uevent_object, uobject);
ib_uverbs_async_handler(context_ptr, uobj->uobject.user_handle,
event->event, &uobj->event_list,
&uobj->events_reported);
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PeopleHandler::HandleRequestPinLoginState(const base::ListValue* args) {
AllowJavascript();
chromeos::quick_unlock::PinBackend::GetInstance()->HasLoginSupport(
base::BindOnce(&PeopleHandler::OnPinLoginAvailable,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,198 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderAddGlyphs (ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
register int i;
CARD32 *gids;
void *end;
xGlyphInfo *gi;
REQUEST(xRenderAddGlyphsReq);
swaps(&stuff->length, n);
swapl(&stuff->glyphset, n);
swapl(&stuff->nglyphs, n);
if (stuff->nglyphs & 0xe0000000)
return BadLength;
end = (CARD8 *) stuff + (client->req_len << 2);
gids = (CARD32 *) (stuff + 1);
gi = (xGlyphInfo *) (gids + stuff->nglyphs);
if ((char *) end - (char *) (gids + stuff->nglyphs) < 0)
return BadLength;
if ((char *) end - (char *) (gi + stuff->nglyphs) < 0)
return BadLength;
for (i = 0; i < stuff->nglyphs; i++)
{
swapl (&gids[i], n);
swaps (&gi[i].width, n);
swaps (&gi[i].height, n);
swaps (&gi[i].x, n);
swaps (&gi[i].y, n);
swaps (&gi[i].xOff, n);
swaps (&gi[i].yOff, n);
}
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: flac_buffer_copy (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
{ FLAC_PRIVATE* pflac = (FLAC_PRIVATE*) psf->codec_data ;
const FLAC__Frame *frame = pflac->frame ;
const int32_t* const *buffer = pflac->wbuffer ;
unsigned i = 0, j, offset, channels, len ;
/*
** frame->header.blocksize is variable and we're using a constant blocksize
** of FLAC__MAX_BLOCK_SIZE.
** Check our assumptions here.
*/
if (frame->header.blocksize > FLAC__MAX_BLOCK_SIZE)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "Ooops : frame->header.blocksize (%d) > FLAC__MAX_BLOCK_SIZE (%d)\n", __func__, __LINE__, frame->header.blocksize, FLAC__MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) ;
psf->error = SFE_INTERNAL ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (frame->header.channels > FLAC__MAX_CHANNELS)
psf_log_printf (psf, "Ooops : frame->header.channels (%d) > FLAC__MAX_BLOCK_SIZE (%d)\n", __func__, __LINE__, frame->header.channels, FLAC__MAX_CHANNELS) ;
channels = SF_MIN (frame->header.channels, FLAC__MAX_CHANNELS) ;
if (pflac->ptr == NULL)
{ /*
** Not sure why this code is here and not elsewhere.
** Removing it causes valgrind errors.
*/
pflac->bufferbackup = SF_TRUE ;
for (i = 0 ; i < channels ; i++)
{
if (pflac->rbuffer [i] == NULL)
pflac->rbuffer [i] = calloc (FLAC__MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, sizeof (int32_t)) ;
memcpy (pflac->rbuffer [i], buffer [i], frame->header.blocksize * sizeof (int32_t)) ;
} ;
pflac->wbuffer = (const int32_t* const*) pflac->rbuffer ;
return 0 ;
} ;
len = SF_MIN (pflac->len, frame->header.blocksize) ;
switch (pflac->pcmtype)
{ case PFLAC_PCM_SHORT :
{ short *retpcm = (short*) pflac->ptr ;
int shift = 16 - frame->header.bits_per_sample ;
if (shift < 0)
{ shift = abs (shift) ;
for (i = 0 ; i < len && pflac->remain > 0 ; i++)
{ offset = pflac->pos + i * channels ;
if (pflac->bufferpos >= frame->header.blocksize)
break ;
if (offset + channels > pflac->len)
break ;
for (j = 0 ; j < channels ; j++)
retpcm [offset + j] = buffer [j][pflac->bufferpos] >> shift ;
pflac->remain -= channels ;
pflac->bufferpos++ ;
}
}
else
{ for (i = 0 ; i < len && pflac->remain > 0 ; i++)
{ offset = pflac->pos + i * channels ;
if (pflac->bufferpos >= frame->header.blocksize)
break ;
if (offset + channels > pflac->len)
break ;
for (j = 0 ; j < channels ; j++)
retpcm [offset + j] = ((uint16_t) buffer [j][pflac->bufferpos]) << shift ;
pflac->remain -= channels ;
pflac->bufferpos++ ;
} ;
} ;
} ;
break ;
case PFLAC_PCM_INT :
{ int *retpcm = (int*) pflac->ptr ;
int shift = 32 - frame->header.bits_per_sample ;
for (i = 0 ; i < len && pflac->remain > 0 ; i++)
{ offset = pflac->pos + i * channels ;
if (pflac->bufferpos >= frame->header.blocksize)
break ;
if (offset + channels > pflac->len)
break ;
for (j = 0 ; j < channels ; j++)
retpcm [offset + j] = ((uint32_t) buffer [j][pflac->bufferpos]) << shift ;
pflac->remain -= channels ;
pflac->bufferpos++ ;
} ;
} ;
break ;
case PFLAC_PCM_FLOAT :
{ float *retpcm = (float*) pflac->ptr ;
float norm = (psf->norm_float == SF_TRUE) ? 1.0 / (1 << (frame->header.bits_per_sample - 1)) : 1.0 ;
for (i = 0 ; i < len && pflac->remain > 0 ; i++)
{ offset = pflac->pos + i * channels ;
if (pflac->bufferpos >= frame->header.blocksize)
break ;
if (offset + channels > pflac->len)
break ;
for (j = 0 ; j < channels ; j++)
retpcm [offset + j] = buffer [j][pflac->bufferpos] * norm ;
pflac->remain -= channels ;
pflac->bufferpos++ ;
} ;
} ;
break ;
case PFLAC_PCM_DOUBLE :
{ double *retpcm = (double*) pflac->ptr ;
double norm = (psf->norm_double == SF_TRUE) ? 1.0 / (1 << (frame->header.bits_per_sample - 1)) : 1.0 ;
for (i = 0 ; i < len && pflac->remain > 0 ; i++)
{ offset = pflac->pos + i * channels ;
if (pflac->bufferpos >= frame->header.blocksize)
break ;
if (offset + channels > pflac->len)
break ;
for (j = 0 ; j < channels ; j++)
retpcm [offset + j] = buffer [j][pflac->bufferpos] * norm ;
pflac->remain -= channels ;
pflac->bufferpos++ ;
} ;
} ;
break ;
default :
return 0 ;
} ;
offset = i * channels ;
pflac->pos += i * channels ;
return offset ;
} /* flac_buffer_copy */
Commit Message: src/flac.c: Improve error handling
Especially when dealing with corrupt or malicious files.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,254 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: resp_print_bulk_string(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, int length) {
int length_cur = length, string_len;
/* bp points to the op; skip it */
SKIP_OPCODE(bp, length_cur);
/* <length>\r\n */
GET_LENGTH(ndo, length_cur, bp, string_len);
if (string_len >= 0) {
/* Byte string of length string_len, starting at bp */
if (string_len == 0)
resp_print_empty(ndo);
else {
LCHECK2(length_cur, string_len);
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, string_len);
RESP_PRINT_SEGMENT(ndo, bp, string_len);
bp += string_len;
length_cur -= string_len;
}
/*
* Find the \r\n at the end of the string and skip past it.
* XXX - report an error if the \r\n isn't immediately after
* the item?
*/
FIND_CRLF(bp, length_cur);
CONSUME_CRLF(bp, length_cur);
} else {
/* null, truncated, or invalid for some reason */
switch(string_len) {
case (-1): resp_print_null(ndo); break;
case (-2): goto trunc;
case (-3): resp_print_length_too_large(ndo); break;
case (-4): resp_print_length_negative(ndo); break;
default: resp_print_invalid(ndo); break;
}
}
return (length - length_cur);
trunc:
return (-1);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12989/RESP: Make sure resp_get_length() advances the pointer for invalid lengths.
Make sure that it always sends *endp before returning and that, for
invalid lengths where we don't like a character in the length string,
what it sets *endp to is past the character in question, so we don't
run the risk of infinitely looping (or doing something else random) if a
character in the length is invalid.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 62,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ServerWrapper::Send200(int connection_id,
const std::string& data,
const std::string& mime_type) {
server_->Send200(connection_id, data, mime_type,
kDevtoolsHttpHandlerTrafficAnnotation);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: check Host header for being IP or localhost when connecting over RDP.
Bug: 813540
Change-Id: I9338aa2475c15090b8a60729be25502eb866efb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/952522
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#541547}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,265 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CameraSource::~CameraSource() {
if (mStarted) {
reset();
} else if (mInitCheck == OK) {
releaseCamera();
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,358 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::SendSensitiveInputVisibilityInternal() {
if (!GetFrame())
return;
mojom::blink::InsecureInputServicePtr insecure_input_service_ptr;
GetFrame()->GetInterfaceProvider().GetInterface(
mojo::MakeRequest(&insecure_input_service_ptr));
if (password_count_ > 0) {
insecure_input_service_ptr->PasswordFieldVisibleInInsecureContext();
return;
}
insecure_input_service_ptr->AllPasswordFieldsInInsecureContextInvisible();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setGraphicBuffer(const sp<GraphicBuffer> &graphicBuffer) {
mGraphicBuffer = graphicBuffer;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::SetMarkedText(const WebString& text,
unsigned location,
unsigned length) {
Vector<CompositionUnderline> decorations;
GetFrame()->GetInputMethodController().SetComposition(text, decorations,
location, length);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,410 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CustomElementRegistry* LocalDOMWindow::customElements(
ScriptState* script_state) const {
if (!script_state->World().IsMainWorld())
return nullptr;
return customElements();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int skb_ts_get_next_block(unsigned int offset, const u8 **text,
struct ts_config *conf,
struct ts_state *state)
{
return skb_seq_read(offset, text, TS_SKB_CB(state));
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 39,931 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Skip(cmsIT8* it8, SYMBOL sy)
{
if (it8->sy == sy && it8->sy != SEOF)
InSymbol(it8);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,048 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfsd4_del_conns(struct nfsd4_session *s)
{
struct nfs4_client *clp = s->se_client;
struct nfsd4_conn *c;
spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
while (!list_empty(&s->se_conns)) {
c = list_first_entry(&s->se_conns, struct nfsd4_conn, cn_persession);
list_del_init(&c->cn_persession);
spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
unregister_xpt_user(c->cn_xprt, &c->cn_xpt_user);
free_conn(c);
spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock);
}
spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::PauseInternal() {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "pauseInternal(" << (void*)this << ")";
if (network_state_ == kNetworkEmpty)
InvokeResourceSelectionAlgorithm();
can_autoplay_ = false;
if (!paused_) {
paused_ = true;
ScheduleTimeupdateEvent(false);
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::pause);
SetOfficialPlaybackPosition(CurrentPlaybackPosition());
ScheduleRejectPlayPromises(kAbortError);
}
UpdatePlayState();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 154,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fuse_readpages_fill(void *_data, struct page *page)
{
struct fuse_fill_data *data = _data;
struct fuse_req *req = data->req;
struct inode *inode = data->inode;
struct fuse_conn *fc = get_fuse_conn(inode);
fuse_wait_on_page_writeback(inode, page->index);
if (req->num_pages &&
(req->num_pages == FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ ||
(req->num_pages + 1) * PAGE_CACHE_SIZE > fc->max_read ||
req->pages[req->num_pages - 1]->index + 1 != page->index)) {
int nr_alloc = min_t(unsigned, data->nr_pages,
FUSE_MAX_PAGES_PER_REQ);
fuse_send_readpages(req, data->file);
if (fc->async_read)
req = fuse_get_req_for_background(fc, nr_alloc);
else
req = fuse_get_req(fc, nr_alloc);
data->req = req;
if (IS_ERR(req)) {
unlock_page(page);
return PTR_ERR(req);
}
}
if (WARN_ON(req->num_pages >= req->max_pages)) {
fuse_put_request(fc, req);
return -EIO;
}
page_cache_get(page);
req->pages[req->num_pages] = page;
req->page_descs[req->num_pages].length = PAGE_SIZE;
req->num_pages++;
data->nr_pages--;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fuse: break infinite loop in fuse_fill_write_pages()
I got a report about unkillable task eating CPU. Further
investigation shows, that the problem is in the fuse_fill_write_pages()
function. If iov's first segment has zero length, we get an infinite
loop, because we never reach iov_iter_advance() call.
Fix this by calling iov_iter_advance() before repeating an attempt to
copy data from userspace.
A similar problem is described in 124d3b7041f ("fix writev regression:
pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable"). If zero-length segmend
is followed by segment with invalid address,
iov_iter_fault_in_readable() checks only first segment (zero-length),
iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic() skips it, fails at second and
returns zero -> goto again without skipping zero-length segment.
Patch calls iov_iter_advance() before goto again: we'll skip zero-length
segment at second iteraction and iov_iter_fault_in_readable() will detect
invalid address.
Special thanks to Konstantin Khlebnikov, who helped a lot with the commit
description.
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin <klamm@yandex-team.ru>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Fixes: ea9b9907b82a ("fuse: implement perform_write")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 56,960 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: server_new (void)
{
static int id = 0;
server *serv;
serv = malloc (sizeof (struct server));
memset (serv, 0, sizeof (struct server));
/* use server.c and proto-irc.c functions */
server_fill_her_up (serv);
serv->id = id++;
serv->sok = -1;
strcpy (serv->nick, prefs.hex_irc_nick1);
server_set_defaults (serv);
serv_list = g_slist_prepend (serv_list, serv);
fe_new_server (serv);
return serv;
}
Commit Message: ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 58,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void n_tty_kick_worker(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct n_tty_data *ldata = tty->disc_data;
/* Did the input worker stop? Restart it */
if (unlikely(ldata->no_room)) {
ldata->no_room = 0;
WARN_RATELIMIT(tty->port->itty == NULL,
"scheduling with invalid itty\n");
/* see if ldisc has been killed - if so, this means that
* even though the ldisc has been halted and ->buf.work
* cancelled, ->buf.work is about to be rescheduled
*/
WARN_RATELIMIT(test_bit(TTY_LDISC_HALTED, &tty->flags),
"scheduling buffer work for halted ldisc\n");
tty_buffer_restart_work(tty->port);
}
}
Commit Message: n_tty: fix EXTPROC vs ICANON interaction with TIOCINQ (aka FIONREAD)
We added support for EXTPROC back in 2010 in commit 26df6d13406d ("tty:
Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE") and the intent was to allow it to
override some (all?) ICANON behavior. Quoting from that original commit
message:
There is a new bit in the termios local flag word, EXTPROC.
When this bit is set, several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled. Input line editing, character echo, and mapping
of signals are all disabled. This allows the telnetd to turn
off these functions when in linemode, but still keep track of
what state the user wants the terminal to be in.
but the problem turns out that "several aspects of the terminal driver
are disabled" is a bit ambiguous, and you can really confuse the n_tty
layer by setting EXTPROC and then causing some of the ICANON invariants
to no longer be maintained.
This fixes at least one such case (TIOCINQ) becoming unhappy because of
the confusion over whether ICANON really means ICANON when EXTPROC is set.
This basically makes TIOCINQ match the case of read: if EXTPROC is set,
we ignore ICANON. Also, make sure to reset the ICANON state ie EXTPROC
changes, not just if ICANON changes.
Fixes: 26df6d13406d ("tty: Add EXTPROC support for LINEMODE")
Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 76,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __svc_init_bc(struct svc_serv *serv)
{
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&serv->sv_cb_list);
spin_lock_init(&serv->sv_cb_lock);
init_waitqueue_head(&serv->sv_cb_waitq);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SoundTriggerHwService::CallbackEvent::CallbackEvent(event_type type, sp<IMemory> memory,
wp<Module> module)
: mType(type), mMemory(memory), mModule(module)
{
}
Commit Message: soundtrigger: add size check on sound model and recogntion data
Bug: 30148546
Change-Id: I082f535a853c96571887eeea37c6d41ecee7d8c0
(cherry picked from commit bb00d8f139ff51336ab3c810d35685003949bcf8)
(cherry picked from commit ef0c91518446e65533ca8bab6726a845f27c73fd)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 158,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (!proc_lookup(dir, dentry, nd)) {
return NULL;
}
return proc_pid_lookup(dir, dentry, nd);
}
Commit Message: procfs: fix a vfsmount longterm reference leak
kern_mount() doesn't pair with plain mntput()...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 20,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_bkgd_checkerboard_2(struct iw_context *ctx, int checkersize,
const struct iw_color *clr)
{
ctx->req.bkgd_checkerboard=1;
ctx->bkgd_check_size=checkersize;
ctx->req.bkgd2 = *clr;
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 64,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeURLRequestContextGetter* ChromeURLRequestContextGetter::CreateOriginal(
Profile* profile,
const ProfileIOData* profile_io_data,
content::ProtocolHandlerMap* protocol_handlers) {
DCHECK(!profile->IsOffTheRecord());
return new ChromeURLRequestContextGetter(
new FactoryForMain(profile_io_data, protocol_handlers));
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void get_nicks_same_hash_unique(gpointer key, NICK_REC *nick,
NICKLIST_GET_SAME_UNIQUE_REC *rec)
{
while (nick != NULL) {
if (nick->unique_id == rec->id) {
rec->list = g_slist_append(rec->list, rec->channel);
rec->list = g_slist_append(rec->list, nick);
break;
}
nick = nick->next;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 63,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBuffer::Destroy() {
if (id_ != 0) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(decoder_);
glDeleteRenderbuffersEXT(1, &id_);
id_ = 0;
estimated_size_ = 0;
decoder_->UpdateBackbufferMemoryAccounting();
}
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,953 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void net_ns_barrier(void)
{
down_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
up_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
}
Commit Message: netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 91,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _sched_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
const struct sched_param *param, bool check)
{
struct sched_attr attr = {
.sched_policy = policy,
.sched_priority = param->sched_priority,
.sched_nice = PRIO_TO_NICE(p->static_prio),
};
/*
* Fixup the legacy SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK hack
*/
if (policy & SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK) {
attr.sched_flags |= SCHED_FLAG_RESET_ON_FORK;
policy &= ~SCHED_RESET_ON_FORK;
attr.sched_policy = policy;
}
return __sched_setscheduler(p, &attr, check);
}
Commit Message: sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <raistlin@linux.it>
Cc: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1392585857-10725-1-git-send-email-vegard.nossum@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 58,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id)
{
int r, handle, fd;
struct statvfs st;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)",
id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) {
send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
return;
}
if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0)
send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
else
send_statvfs(id, &st);
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 60,351 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int StreamTcpTest26(void)
{
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
if (unlikely(p == NULL))
return 0;
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
uint8_t payload[4];
TCPHdr tcph;
int ret = 0;
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof (StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_flags = TH_SYN | TH_ECN;
p->tcph = &tcph;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_SYN | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(2);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x41, 3, 4); /*AAA*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(1);
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(6);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_PUSH | TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
StreamTcpCreateTestPacket(payload, 0x42, 3, 4); /*BBB*/
p->payload = payload;
p->payload_len = 3;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1 || (TcpSession *)p->flow->protoctx == NULL)
goto end;
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
ret = 1;
end:
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID: | 0 | 79,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fm10k_reset_msix_capability(struct fm10k_intfc *interface)
{
pci_disable_msix(interface->pdev);
kfree(interface->msix_entries);
interface->msix_entries = NULL;
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 87,940 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nvmet_fc_abort_op(struct nvmet_fc_tgtport *tgtport,
struct nvmet_fc_fcp_iod *fod)
{
struct nvmefc_tgt_fcp_req *fcpreq = fod->fcpreq;
/* data no longer needed */
nvmet_fc_free_tgt_pgs(fod);
/*
* if an ABTS was received or we issued the fcp_abort early
* don't call abort routine again.
*/
/* no need to take lock - lock was taken earlier to get here */
if (!fod->aborted)
tgtport->ops->fcp_abort(&tgtport->fc_target_port, fcpreq);
nvmet_fc_free_fcp_iod(fod->queue, fod);
}
Commit Message: nvmet-fc: ensure target queue id within range.
When searching for queue id's ensure they are within the expected range.
Signed-off-by: James Smart <james.smart@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 93,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pkinit_san_authorize(krb5_context context, krb5_certauth_moddata moddata,
const uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_len,
krb5_const_principal princ, const void *opts,
const struct _krb5_db_entry_new *db_entry,
char ***authinds_out)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
int valid_san;
const struct certauth_req_opts *req_opts = opts;
*authinds_out = NULL;
ret = verify_client_san(context, req_opts->plgctx, req_opts->reqctx,
req_opts->cb, req_opts->rock, princ, &valid_san);
if (ret == ENOENT)
return KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE;
else if (ret)
return ret;
if (!valid_san) {
TRACE_PKINIT_SERVER_SAN_REJECT(context);
return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix certauth built-in module returns
The PKINIT certauth eku module should never authoritatively authorize
a certificate, because an extended key usage does not establish a
relationship between the certificate and any specific user; it only
establishes that the certificate was created for PKINIT client
authentication. Therefore, pkinit_eku_authorize() should return
KRB5_PLUGIN_NO_HANDLE on success, not 0.
The certauth san module should pass if it does not find any SANs of
the types it can match against; the presence of other types of SANs
should not cause it to explicitly deny a certificate. Check for an
empty result from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() in verify_client_san(),
instead of returning ENOENT from crypto_retrieve_cert_sans() when
there are no SANs at all.
ticket: 8561
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 96,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String HTMLInputElement::sanitizeValue(const String& proposedValue) const
{
if (proposedValue.isNull())
return proposedValue;
return m_inputType->sanitizeValue(proposedValue);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,978 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ID3::Iterator::getString(String8 *id, String8 *comment) const {
getstring(id, false);
if (comment != NULL) {
getstring(comment, true);
}
}
Commit Message: better validation lengths of strings in ID3 tags
Validate lengths on strings in ID3 tags, particularly around 0.
Also added code to handle cases when we can't get memory for
copies of strings we want to extract from these tags.
Affects L/M/N/master, same patch for all of them.
Bug: 30744884
Change-Id: I2675a817a39f0927ec1f7e9f9c09f2e61020311e
Test: play mp3 file which caused a <0 length.
(cherry picked from commit d23c01546c4f82840a01a380def76ab6cae5d43f)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 157,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindFramebuffer(GLenum target, GLuint client_id) {
Framebuffer* framebuffer = NULL;
GLuint service_id = 0;
if (client_id != 0) {
framebuffer = GetFramebuffer(client_id);
if (!framebuffer) {
if (!group_->bind_generates_resource()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glBindFramebuffer",
"id not generated by glGenFramebuffers");
return;
}
glGenFramebuffersEXT(1, &service_id);
CreateFramebuffer(client_id, service_id);
framebuffer = GetFramebuffer(client_id);
IdAllocatorInterface* id_allocator =
group_->GetIdAllocator(id_namespaces::kFramebuffers);
id_allocator->MarkAsUsed(client_id);
} else {
service_id = framebuffer->service_id();
}
framebuffer->MarkAsValid();
}
LogClientServiceForInfo(framebuffer, client_id, "glBindFramebuffer");
if (target == GL_FRAMEBUFFER || target == GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
framebuffer_state_.bound_draw_framebuffer = framebuffer;
}
if (target == GL_FRAMEBUFFER || target == GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT) {
framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer = framebuffer;
}
framebuffer_state_.clear_state_dirty = true;
if (framebuffer == NULL) {
service_id = GetBackbufferServiceId();
}
glBindFramebufferEXT(target, service_id);
OnFboChanged();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 120,783 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct tty_driver *__tty_alloc_driver(unsigned int lines, struct module *owner,
unsigned long flags)
{
struct tty_driver *driver;
unsigned int cdevs = 1;
int err;
if (!lines || (flags & TTY_DRIVER_UNNUMBERED_NODE && lines > 1))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
driver = kzalloc(sizeof(struct tty_driver), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!driver)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
kref_init(&driver->kref);
driver->magic = TTY_DRIVER_MAGIC;
driver->num = lines;
driver->owner = owner;
driver->flags = flags;
if (!(flags & TTY_DRIVER_DEVPTS_MEM)) {
driver->ttys = kcalloc(lines, sizeof(*driver->ttys),
GFP_KERNEL);
driver->termios = kcalloc(lines, sizeof(*driver->termios),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!driver->ttys || !driver->termios) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_all;
}
}
if (!(flags & TTY_DRIVER_DYNAMIC_ALLOC)) {
driver->ports = kcalloc(lines, sizeof(*driver->ports),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!driver->ports) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_all;
}
cdevs = lines;
}
driver->cdevs = kcalloc(cdevs, sizeof(*driver->cdevs), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!driver->cdevs) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_all;
}
return driver;
err_free_all:
kfree(driver->ports);
kfree(driver->ttys);
kfree(driver->termios);
kfree(driver->cdevs);
kfree(driver);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void AppendParams(const std::vector<string16>& additional_names,
const std::vector<string16>& additional_values,
WebVector<WebString>* existing_names,
WebVector<WebString>* existing_values) {
DCHECK(additional_names.size() == additional_values.size());
DCHECK(existing_names->size() == existing_values->size());
size_t existing_size = existing_names->size();
size_t total_size = existing_size + additional_names.size();
WebVector<WebString> names(total_size);
WebVector<WebString> values(total_size);
for (size_t i = 0; i < existing_size; ++i) {
names[i] = (*existing_names)[i];
values[i] = (*existing_values)[i];
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_names.size(); ++i) {
names[existing_size + i] = additional_names[i];
values[existing_size + i] = additional_values[i];
}
existing_names->swap(names);
existing_values->swap(values);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_to_unconfirmed(struct nfs4_client *clp)
{
unsigned int idhashval;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(clp->net, nfsd_net_id);
lockdep_assert_held(&nn->client_lock);
clear_bit(NFSD4_CLIENT_CONFIRMED, &clp->cl_flags);
add_clp_to_name_tree(clp, &nn->unconf_name_tree);
idhashval = clientid_hashval(clp->cl_clientid.cl_id);
list_add(&clp->cl_idhash, &nn->unconf_id_hashtbl[idhashval]);
renew_client_locked(clp);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MostVisitedSitesBridge::SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& j_observer,
jint num_sites) {
java_observer_.reset(new JavaObserver(env, j_observer));
most_visited_->SetMostVisitedURLsObserver(java_observer_.get(), num_sites);
}
Commit Message: Rename MostVisitedSites.MostVisitedURLsObserver to Observer.
BUG=677672
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2697543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#449958}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 1 | 172,036 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_free_filter(struct perf_event *event)
{
ftrace_profile_free_filter(event);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObject* AXLayoutObject::computeParent() const {
ASSERT(!isDetached());
if (!m_layoutObject)
return 0;
if (ariaRoleAttribute() == MenuBarRole)
return axObjectCache().getOrCreate(m_layoutObject->parent());
if (ariaRoleAttribute() == MenuRole) {
AXObject* parent = menuButtonForMenu();
if (parent)
return parent;
}
LayoutObject* parentObj = layoutParentObject();
if (parentObj)
return axObjectCache().getOrCreate(parentObj);
if (isWebArea()) {
LocalFrame* frame = m_layoutObject->frame();
return axObjectCache().getOrCreate(frame->pagePopupOwner());
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,025 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned_relts_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
uint32_t secs)
{
static const char *lengths[] = {"y", "w", "d", "h", "m", "s"};
static const u_int seconds[] = {31536000, 604800, 86400, 3600, 60, 1};
const char **l = lengths;
const u_int *s = seconds;
if (secs == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0s"));
return;
}
while (secs > 0) {
if (secs >= *s) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%d%s", secs / *s, *l));
secs -= (secs / *s) * *s;
}
s++;
l++;
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13011/Properly check for buffer overflow in bittok2str_internal().
Also, make the buffer bigger.
This fixes a buffer overflow discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 62,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXObjectCacheImpl::postNotification(LayoutObject* layoutObject,
AXNotification notification) {
if (!layoutObject)
return;
postNotification(get(layoutObject), notification);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int x509_profile_check_pk_alg( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg )
{
if( ( profile->allowed_pks & MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( pk_alg ) ) != 0 )
return( 0 );
return( -1 );
}
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 61,946 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::AddConsoleMessage(ConsoleMessage* console_message) {
if (!IsContextThread()) {
PostCrossThreadTask(
*GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalInspector), FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBind(&RunAddConsoleMessageTask, console_message->Source(),
console_message->Level(), console_message->Message(),
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(this)));
return;
}
if (!frame_)
return;
if (console_message->Location()->IsUnknown()) {
unsigned line_number = 0;
if (!IsInDocumentWrite() && GetScriptableDocumentParser()) {
ScriptableDocumentParser* parser = GetScriptableDocumentParser();
if (parser->IsParsingAtLineNumber())
line_number = parser->LineNumber().OneBasedInt();
}
Vector<DOMNodeId> nodes(console_message->Nodes());
console_message = ConsoleMessage::Create(
console_message->Source(), console_message->Level(),
console_message->Message(),
SourceLocation::Create(Url().GetString(), line_number, 0, nullptr));
console_message->SetNodes(frame_, std::move(nodes));
}
frame_->Console().AddMessage(console_message);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HasTabsPermission(const scoped_refptr<const Extension>& extension) {
return HasTabsPermission(extension, tab_id());
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 151,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool CheckNTLMServerAuth(const AuthChallengeInfo* auth_challenge) {
if (!auth_challenge)
return false;
EXPECT_FALSE(auth_challenge->is_proxy);
EXPECT_EQ("172.22.68.17:80", auth_challenge->challenger.ToString());
EXPECT_EQ(std::string(), auth_challenge->realm);
EXPECT_EQ("ntlm", auth_challenge->scheme);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 129,261 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::PerWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethodMethodCallbackForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_perWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::PerWorldBindingsRuntimeEnabledVoidMethodMethodForMainWorld(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,015 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: FakePacketTransport* packet_transport() { return packet_transport_.get(); }
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 132,762 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PluginServiceImpl::GetPluginsInternal(
base::MessageLoopProxy* target_loop,
const PluginService::GetPluginsCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::GetBlockingPool()->IsRunningSequenceOnCurrentThread(
plugin_list_token_));
std::vector<webkit::WebPluginInfo> plugins;
plugin_list_->GetPlugins(&plugins);
target_loop->PostTask(FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(callback, plugins));
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 116,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSObject* JSFloat64ArrayPrototype::self(ExecState* exec, JSGlobalObject* globalObject)
{
return getDOMPrototype<JSFloat64Array>(exec, globalObject);
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,051 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PageVisibilityState Document::visibilityState() const
{
if (!m_frame || !m_frame->page())
return PageVisibilityStateHidden;
return m_frame->page()->visibilityState();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, getBasename)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *suffix = 0, *fname;
int slen = 0;
size_t flen;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|s", &suffix, &slen) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
php_basename(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, strlen(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name), suffix, slen, &fname, &flen TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(fname, flen, 0);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 167,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SPICE_GNUC_VISIBLE int spice_server_set_playback_compression(SpiceServer *s, int enable)
{
spice_assert(reds == s);
snd_set_playback_compression(enable);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 1,984 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ext4_fsblk_t descriptor_loc(struct super_block *sb,
ext4_fsblk_t logical_sb_block, int nr)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
ext4_group_t bg, first_meta_bg;
int has_super = 0;
first_meta_bg = le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_first_meta_bg);
if (!EXT4_HAS_INCOMPAT_FEATURE(sb, EXT4_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_META_BG) ||
nr < first_meta_bg)
return logical_sb_block + nr + 1;
bg = sbi->s_desc_per_block * nr;
if (ext4_bg_has_super(sb, bg))
has_super = 1;
return (has_super + ext4_group_first_block_no(sb, bg));
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,435 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: format_interval(const uint16_t i)
{
static char buf[sizeof("000.00s")];
if (i == 0)
return "0.0s (bogus)";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u.%02us", i / 100, i % 100);
return buf;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14470/Babel: fix an existing length check
In babel_print_v2() the non-verbose branch for an Update TLV compared
the TLV Length against 1 instead of 10 (probably a typo), put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,225 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *get_template_name(mychan_t *mc, unsigned int level)
{
metadata_t *md;
const char *p, *q, *r;
char *s;
char ss[40];
static char flagname[400];
template_iter_t iter;
md = metadata_find(mc, "private:templates");
if (md != NULL)
{
p = md->value;
while (p != NULL)
{
while (*p == ' ')
p++;
q = strchr(p, '=');
if (q == NULL)
break;
r = strchr(q, ' ');
if (r != NULL && r < q)
break;
mowgli_strlcpy(ss, q, sizeof ss);
if (r != NULL && r - q < (int)(sizeof ss - 1))
{
ss[r - q] = '\0';
}
if (level == flags_to_bitmask(ss, 0))
{
mowgli_strlcpy(flagname, p, sizeof flagname);
s = strchr(flagname, '=');
if (s != NULL)
*s = '\0';
return flagname;
}
p = r;
}
}
iter.res = NULL;
iter.level = level;
mowgli_patricia_foreach(global_template_dict, global_template_search, &iter);
return iter.res;
}
Commit Message: chanserv/flags: make Anope FLAGS compatibility an option
Previously, ChanServ FLAGS behavior could be modified by registering or
dropping the keyword nicks "LIST", "CLEAR", and "MODIFY".
Now, a configuration option is available that when turned on (default),
disables registration of these keyword nicks and enables this
compatibility feature. When turned off, registration of these keyword
nicks is possible, and compatibility to Anope's FLAGS command is
disabled.
Fixes atheme/atheme#397
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 58,399 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::WillSendData(int child_id,
int request_id) {
PendingRequestList::iterator i = pending_requests_.find(
GlobalRequestID(child_id, request_id));
if (i == pending_requests_.end()) {
NOTREACHED() << "WillSendData for invalid request";
return false;
}
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* info =
ResourceRequestInfoImpl::ForRequest(i->second);
info->IncrementPendingDataCount();
if (info->pending_data_count() > kMaxPendingDataMessages) {
PauseRequest(child_id, request_id, true);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 107,914 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HeadlessWebContents* HeadlessWebContents::Builder::Build() {
return browser_context_->CreateWebContents(this);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,838 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_givcipher_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 31,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PropertyDetails GetDetailsImpl(JSObject* holder, uint32_t entry) {
uint32_t length = static_cast<uint32_t>(GetString(holder)->length());
if (entry < length) {
PropertyAttributes attributes =
static_cast<PropertyAttributes>(READ_ONLY | DONT_DELETE);
return PropertyDetails(kData, attributes, 0, PropertyCellType::kNoCell);
}
return BackingStoreAccessor::GetDetailsImpl(holder, entry - length);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 163,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vmxnet3_set_variable_mac(VMXNET3State *s, uint32_t h, uint32_t l)
{
s->conf.macaddr.a[0] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 0);
s->conf.macaddr.a[1] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 1);
s->conf.macaddr.a[2] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 2);
s->conf.macaddr.a[3] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(l, 3);
s->conf.macaddr.a[4] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(h, 0);
s->conf.macaddr.a[5] = VMXNET3_GET_BYTE(h, 1);
VMW_CFPRN("Variable MAC: " VMXNET_MF, VMXNET_MA(s->conf.macaddr.a));
qemu_format_nic_info_str(qemu_get_queue(s->nic), s->conf.macaddr.a);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_getsockopt_local_addrs(struct sock *sk, int len,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
int cnt = 0;
struct sctp_getaddrs getaddrs;
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *addr;
void __user *to;
union sctp_addr temp;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
int addrlen;
int err = 0;
size_t space_left;
int bytes_copied = 0;
void *addrs;
void *buf;
if (len < sizeof(struct sctp_getaddrs))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&getaddrs, optval, sizeof(struct sctp_getaddrs)))
return -EFAULT;
/*
* For UDP-style sockets, id specifies the association to query.
* If the id field is set to the value '0' then the locally bound
* addresses are returned without regard to any particular
* association.
*/
if (0 == getaddrs.assoc_id) {
bp = &sctp_sk(sk)->ep->base.bind_addr;
} else {
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, getaddrs.assoc_id);
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
bp = &asoc->base.bind_addr;
}
to = optval + offsetof(struct sctp_getaddrs, addrs);
space_left = len - offsetof(struct sctp_getaddrs, addrs);
addrs = kmalloc(space_left, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!addrs)
return -ENOMEM;
/* If the endpoint is bound to 0.0.0.0 or ::0, get the valid
* addresses from the global local address list.
*/
if (sctp_list_single_entry(&bp->address_list)) {
addr = list_entry(bp->address_list.next,
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry, list);
if (sctp_is_any(sk, &addr->a)) {
cnt = sctp_copy_laddrs(sk, bp->port, addrs,
space_left, &bytes_copied);
if (cnt < 0) {
err = cnt;
goto out;
}
goto copy_getaddrs;
}
}
buf = addrs;
/* Protection on the bound address list is not needed since
* in the socket option context we hold a socket lock and
* thus the bound address list can't change.
*/
list_for_each_entry(addr, &bp->address_list, list) {
memcpy(&temp, &addr->a, sizeof(temp));
addrlen = sctp_get_pf_specific(sk->sk_family)
->addr_to_user(sp, &temp);
if (space_left < addrlen) {
err = -ENOMEM; /*fixme: right error?*/
goto out;
}
memcpy(buf, &temp, addrlen);
buf += addrlen;
bytes_copied += addrlen;
cnt++;
space_left -= addrlen;
}
copy_getaddrs:
if (copy_to_user(to, addrs, bytes_copied)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (put_user(cnt, &((struct sctp_getaddrs __user *)optval)->addr_num)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (put_user(bytes_copied, optlen))
err = -EFAULT;
out:
kfree(addrs);
return err;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix ASCONF list handling
->auto_asconf_splist is per namespace and mangled by functions like
sctp_setsockopt_auto_asconf() which doesn't guarantee any serialization.
Also, the call to inet_sk_copy_descendant() was backuping
->auto_asconf_list through the copy but was not honoring
->do_auto_asconf, which could lead to list corruption if it was
different between both sockets.
This commit thus fixes the list handling by using ->addr_wq_lock
spinlock to protect the list. A special handling is done upon socket
creation and destruction for that. Error handlig on sctp_init_sock()
will never return an error after having initialized asconf, so
sctp_destroy_sock() can be called without addrq_wq_lock. The lock now
will be take on sctp_close_sock(), before locking the socket, so we
don't do it in inverse order compared to sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler().
Instead of taking the lock on sctp_sock_migrate() for copying and
restoring the list values, it's preferred to avoid rewritting it by
implementing sctp_copy_descendant().
Issue was found with a test application that kept flipping sysctl
default_auto_asconf on and off, but one could trigger it by issuing
simultaneous setsockopt() calls on multiple sockets or by
creating/destroying sockets fast enough. This is only triggerable
locally.
Fixes: 9f7d653b67ae ("sctp: Add Auto-ASCONF support (core).")
Reported-by: Ji Jianwen <jiji@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 43,540 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLLinkElement::Async() const {
return FastHasAttribute(HTMLNames::asyncAttr);
}
Commit Message: Avoid crash when setting rel=stylesheet on <link> in shadow root.
Link elements in shadow roots without rel=stylesheet are currently not
added as stylesheet candidates upon insertion. This causes a crash if
rel=stylesheet is set (and then loaded) later.
R=futhark@chromium.org
Bug: 886753
Change-Id: Ia0de2c1edf43407950f973982ee1c262a909d220
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1242463
Commit-Queue: Anders Ruud <andruud@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#593907}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 143,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit crypto_ccm_module_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_rfc4309_tmpl);
crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_ccm_tmpl);
crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_ccm_base_tmpl);
crypto_unregister_template(&crypto_cbcmac_tmpl);
}
Commit Message: crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violates the
SG constraints when the stack is virtually mapped.
So move idata/odata back to the request ctx struct, of which we can
reasonably expect that it has been allocated using kmalloc() et al.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,662 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FeatureInfo::InitializeFeatures() {
std::string extensions_string(gl::GetGLExtensionsFromCurrentContext());
gfx::ExtensionSet extensions(gfx::MakeExtensionSet(extensions_string));
const char* version_str =
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(glGetString(GL_VERSION));
const char* renderer_str =
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(glGetString(GL_RENDERER));
gl_version_info_.reset(
new gl::GLVersionInfo(version_str, renderer_str, extensions));
bool enable_es3 = IsWebGL2OrES3OrHigherContext();
bool has_pixel_buffers =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_pixel_buffer_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_pixel_buffer_object");
ScopedPixelUnpackBufferOverride scoped_pbo_override(has_pixel_buffers, 0);
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_translated_shader_source");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_async_pixel_transfers");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_bind_uniform_location");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_color_space_metadata");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_command_buffer_query");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_command_buffer_latency_query");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_copy_texture");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_deschedule");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_get_error_query");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_lose_context");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_pixel_transfer_buffer_object");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_rate_limit_offscreen_context");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_resize");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_resource_safe");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_strict_attribs");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_texture_mailbox");
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_trace_marker");
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_debug_marker");
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_unpack_subimage");
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_vertex_array_object");
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_translated_shader_source")) {
feature_flags_.angle_translated_shader_source = true;
}
bool enable_dxt1 = false;
bool enable_dxt3 = false;
bool enable_dxt5 = false;
bool have_s3tc =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc");
bool have_dxt3 =
have_s3tc ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt3");
bool have_dxt5 =
have_s3tc ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt5");
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_dxt1") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt1") ||
have_s3tc) {
enable_dxt1 = true;
}
if (have_dxt3) {
enable_dxt3 = true;
}
if (have_dxt5) {
enable_dxt5 = true;
}
if (enable_dxt1) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_dxt1 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt1");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
}
if (enable_dxt3) {
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt3");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
}
if (enable_dxt5) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_dxt5 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_compression_dxt5");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
}
bool have_astc =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_texture_compression_astc_ldr");
if (have_astc) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_astc = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_texture_compression_astc_ldr");
GLint astc_format_it = GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_ASTC_4x4_KHR;
GLint astc_format_max = GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_ASTC_12x12_KHR;
for (; astc_format_it <= astc_format_max; astc_format_it++) {
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(astc_format_it);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(astc_format_it);
}
astc_format_it = GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB8_ALPHA8_ASTC_4x4_KHR;
astc_format_max = GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB8_ALPHA8_ASTC_12x12_KHR;
for (; astc_format_it <= astc_format_max; astc_format_it++) {
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(astc_format_it);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(astc_format_it);
}
}
bool have_atc =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ATI_texture_compression_atitc");
if (have_atc) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_atc = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_filter_anisotropic");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_TEXTURE_MAX_ANISOTROPY_EXT);
}
bool enable_depth_texture = false;
GLenum depth_texture_format = GL_NONE;
if (!workarounds_.disable_depth_texture &&
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_depth_texture") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_depth_texture") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_depth_texture") ||
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile)) {
enable_depth_texture = true;
depth_texture_format = GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT;
feature_flags_.angle_depth_texture =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_depth_texture");
}
if (enable_depth_texture) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_depth_texture");
AddExtensionString("GL_GOOGLE_depth_texture");
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT);
validators_.texture_depth_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT);
}
GLenum depth_stencil_texture_format = GL_NONE;
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_packed_depth_stencil") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil") ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_packed_depth_stencil");
feature_flags_.packed_depth24_stencil8 = true;
if (enable_depth_texture) {
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3) {
depth_stencil_texture_format = GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8;
} else {
depth_stencil_texture_format = GL_DEPTH_STENCIL;
}
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT_24_8);
validators_.texture_depth_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
validators_.texture_stencil_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_DEPTH_STENCIL);
}
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8);
if (context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL1) {
validators_.attachment.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT);
validators_.attachment_query.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT);
}
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_vertex_array_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_vertex_array_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_APPLE_vertex_array_object")) {
feature_flags_.native_vertex_array_object = true;
}
if (workarounds_.use_client_side_arrays_for_stream_buffers) {
feature_flags_.native_vertex_array_object = false;
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_element_index_uint") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_element_index_uint");
validators_.index_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT);
}
bool has_srgb_framebuffer_support = false;
if (gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(2, 0) &&
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_framebuffer_sRGB") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_framebuffer_sRGB")))) {
feature_flags_.desktop_srgb_support = true;
has_srgb_framebuffer_support = true;
}
if ((((gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8")) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_sRGB")) ||
feature_flags_.desktop_srgb_support) &&
IsWebGL1OrES2Context()) {
feature_flags_.ext_srgb = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_sRGB");
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB8_ALPHA8_EXT);
validators_.framebuffer_attachment_parameter.AddValue(
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_COLOR_ENCODING_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_SRGB_ALPHA_EXT);
has_srgb_framebuffer_support = true;
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3)
has_srgb_framebuffer_support = true;
if (has_srgb_framebuffer_support && !IsWebGLContext()) {
if (feature_flags_.desktop_srgb_support ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_sRGB_write_control")) {
feature_flags_.ext_srgb_write_control = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_sRGB_write_control");
validators_.capability.AddValue(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_SRGB_EXT);
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_sRGB_decode") &&
!IsWebGLContext()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_sRGB_decode");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_SRGB_DECODE_EXT);
}
bool have_s3tc_srgb = false;
if (gl_version_info_->is_es) {
have_s3tc_srgb =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_sRGB_formats") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc_srgb");
} else {
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_sRGB") ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 1)) {
have_s3tc_srgb =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc");
}
}
if (have_s3tc_srgb) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_compression_s3tc_srgb");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT1_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT3_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_SRGB_ALPHA_S3TC_DXT5_EXT);
}
bool has_apple_bgra =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_APPLE_texture_format_BGRA8888");
bool has_ext_bgra =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_format_BGRA8888");
bool enable_texture_format_bgra8888 =
has_ext_bgra || has_apple_bgra || !gl_version_info_->is_es;
bool has_ext_texture_storage =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_storage");
bool has_arb_texture_storage =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_storage");
bool has_texture_storage =
!workarounds_.disable_texture_storage &&
(has_ext_texture_storage || has_arb_texture_storage ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 2));
bool enable_texture_storage = has_texture_storage;
bool texture_storage_incompatible_with_bgra =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 && !has_ext_texture_storage && !has_apple_bgra;
if (texture_storage_incompatible_with_bgra &&
enable_texture_format_bgra8888 && enable_texture_storage) {
switch (context_type_) {
case CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES2:
enable_texture_storage = false;
break;
case CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES3:
enable_texture_format_bgra8888 = false;
break;
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL1:
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL2:
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL2_COMPUTE:
case CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGPU:
break;
}
}
if (enable_texture_storage) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_storage = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_storage");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_IMMUTABLE_FORMAT_EXT);
}
if (enable_texture_format_bgra8888) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_format_bgra8888 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_format_BGRA8888");
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_BGRA8_EXT);
validators_.texture_sized_color_renderable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_BGRA8_EXT);
validators_.texture_sized_texture_filterable_internal_format.AddValue(
GL_BGRA8_EXT);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::BGRA_8888);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::BGRX_8888);
}
bool enable_render_buffer_bgra =
gl_version_info_->is_angle || !gl_version_info_->is_es;
if (enable_render_buffer_bgra) {
feature_flags_.ext_render_buffer_format_bgra8888 = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_renderbuffer_format_BGRA8888");
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA8_EXT);
}
bool enable_read_format_bgra =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_read_format_bgra") ||
!gl_version_info_->is_es;
if (enable_read_format_bgra) {
feature_flags_.ext_read_format_bgra = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_read_format_bgra");
validators_.read_pixel_format.AddValue(GL_BGRA_EXT);
}
feature_flags_.arb_es3_compatibility =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_ES3_compatibility") &&
!gl_version_info_->is_es;
feature_flags_.ext_disjoint_timer_query =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_disjoint_timer_query");
if (feature_flags_.ext_disjoint_timer_query ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_timer_query") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_timer_query")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_disjoint_timer_query");
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RGB8_OES);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RGBA8_OES);
}
if (!disallowed_features_.npot_support &&
(gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_non_power_of_two") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_texture_npot"))) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_texture_npot");
feature_flags_.npot_ok = true;
}
InitializeFloatAndHalfFloatFeatures(extensions);
if (!workarounds_.disable_chromium_framebuffer_multisample) {
bool ext_has_multisample =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_framebuffer_object") ||
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_framebuffer_multisample") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_framebuffer_blit")) ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile;
if (gl_version_info_->is_angle || gl_version_info_->is_swiftshader) {
ext_has_multisample |=
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_framebuffer_multisample");
}
if (ext_has_multisample) {
feature_flags_.chromium_framebuffer_multisample = true;
validators_.framebuffer_target.AddValue(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
validators_.framebuffer_target.AddValue(GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_BINDING_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_SAMPLES_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_parameter.AddValue(GL_RENDERBUFFER_SAMPLES_EXT);
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_multisample");
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture")) {
feature_flags_.multisampled_render_to_texture = true;
} else if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_IMG_multisampled_render_to_texture")) {
feature_flags_.multisampled_render_to_texture = true;
feature_flags_.use_img_for_multisampled_render_to_texture = true;
}
if (feature_flags_.multisampled_render_to_texture) {
validators_.render_buffer_parameter.AddValue(GL_RENDERBUFFER_SAMPLES_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_SAMPLES_EXT);
validators_.framebuffer_attachment_parameter.AddValue(
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_ATTACHMENT_TEXTURE_SAMPLES_EXT);
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_multisampled_render_to_texture");
}
if (!gl_version_info_->is_es ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_multisample_compatibility")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_multisample_compatibility");
feature_flags_.ext_multisample_compatibility = true;
validators_.capability.AddValue(GL_MULTISAMPLE_EXT);
validators_.capability.AddValue(GL_SAMPLE_ALPHA_TO_ONE_EXT);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_INTEL_framebuffer_CMAA")) {
feature_flags_.chromium_screen_space_antialiasing = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_screen_space_antialiasing");
} else if (gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 1) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 0) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_shading_language_420pack") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_storage") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_gather") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_explicit_uniform_location") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_explicit_attrib_location") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_ARB_shader_image_load_store"))) {
feature_flags_.chromium_screen_space_antialiasing = true;
feature_flags_.use_chromium_screen_space_antialiasing_via_shaders = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_screen_space_antialiasing");
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_depth24") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures() || gl_version_info_->is_es3) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_depth24");
feature_flags_.oes_depth24 = true;
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT24);
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_standard_derivatives") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_standard_derivatives");
feature_flags_.oes_standard_derivatives = true;
validators_.hint_target.AddValue(GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER_DERIVATIVE_HINT_OES);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER_DERIVATIVE_HINT_OES);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_texture_filtering_hint")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_texture_filtering_hint");
feature_flags_.chromium_texture_filtering_hint = true;
validators_.hint_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_FILTERING_HINT_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_FILTERING_HINT_CHROMIUM);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_EGL_image_external")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_EGL_image_external");
feature_flags_.oes_egl_image_external = true;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_EGL_stream_consumer_external")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_NV_EGL_stream_consumer_external");
feature_flags_.nv_egl_stream_consumer_external = true;
}
if (feature_flags_.oes_egl_image_external ||
feature_flags_.nv_egl_stream_consumer_external) {
validators_.texture_bind_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES);
validators_.get_tex_param_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_EXTERNAL_OES);
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_REQUIRED_TEXTURE_IMAGE_UNITS_OES);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_BINDING_EXTERNAL_OES);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_compressed_ETC1_RGB8_texture") &&
!gl_version_info_->is_angle) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_compressed_ETC1_RGB8_texture");
feature_flags_.oes_compressed_etc1_rgb8_texture = true;
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(GL_ETC1_RGB8_OES);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_ETC1_RGB8_OES);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_compressed_texture_etc") ||
(gl_version_info_->is_es3 && !gl_version_info_->is_angle)) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_compressed_texture_etc");
validators_.UpdateETCCompressedTextureFormats();
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_AMD_compressed_ATC_texture");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_EXPLICIT_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_ATC_RGB_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_EXPLICIT_ALPHA_AMD);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_ATC_RGBA_INTERPOLATED_ALPHA_AMD);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_IMG_texture_compression_pvrtc")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_IMG_texture_compression_pvrtc");
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.compressed_texture_format.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGB_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_4BPPV1_IMG);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(
GL_COMPRESSED_RGBA_PVRTC_2BPPV1_IMG);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_rectangle") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_rectangle") ||
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
AddExtensionString("GL_ARB_texture_rectangle");
feature_flags_.arb_texture_rectangle = true;
validators_.texture_bind_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB);
validators_.texture_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB);
validators_.get_tex_param_target.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_BINDING_RECTANGLE_ARB);
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_ycbcr_420v_image");
feature_flags_.chromium_image_ycbcr_420v = true;
#endif
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_ycbcr_420v) {
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(
gfx::BufferFormat::YUV_420_BIPLANAR);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_APPLE_ycbcr_422")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_ycbcr_422_image");
feature_flags_.chromium_image_ycbcr_422 = true;
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::UYVY_422);
}
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
feature_flags_.chromium_image_xr30 = base::mac::IsAtLeastOS10_13();
#elif !defined(OS_WIN)
feature_flags_.chromium_image_xb30 =
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3) ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 0) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_type_2_10_10_10_REV");
#endif
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_xr30 ||
feature_flags_.chromium_image_xb30) {
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RGB10_A2_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RGB10_A2_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_RGB10_A2_EXT);
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_INT_2_10_10_10_REV);
}
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_xr30) {
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(
gfx::BufferFormat::BGRX_1010102);
}
if (feature_flags_.chromium_image_xb30) {
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(
gfx::BufferFormat::RGBX_1010102);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_texture_usage")) {
feature_flags_.angle_texture_usage = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_texture_usage");
validators_.texture_parameter.AddValue(GL_TEXTURE_USAGE_ANGLE);
}
bool have_occlusion_query = gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 0) ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3);
bool have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_occlusion_query_boolean");
bool have_arb_occlusion_query2 =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_occlusion_query2");
bool have_arb_occlusion_query =
(gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile &&
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(1, 5)) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_occlusion_query");
if (have_occlusion_query || have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean ||
have_arb_occlusion_query2 || have_arb_occlusion_query) {
feature_flags_.occlusion_query = have_arb_occlusion_query;
if (context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES2) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_occlusion_query_boolean");
}
feature_flags_.occlusion_query_boolean = true;
feature_flags_.use_arb_occlusion_query2_for_occlusion_query_boolean =
!have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean &&
(have_arb_occlusion_query2 || (gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3) &&
gl_version_info_->IsLowerThanGL(4, 3)));
feature_flags_.use_arb_occlusion_query_for_occlusion_query_boolean =
!have_ext_occlusion_query_boolean && have_arb_occlusion_query &&
!have_arb_occlusion_query2;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_instanced_arrays") ||
(gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_instanced_arrays") &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_draw_instanced")) ||
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
AddExtensionString("GL_ANGLE_instanced_arrays");
feature_flags_.angle_instanced_arrays = true;
validators_.vertex_attribute.AddValue(GL_VERTEX_ATTRIB_ARRAY_DIVISOR_ANGLE);
}
bool have_es2_draw_buffers_vendor_agnostic =
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_draw_buffers") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_draw_buffers");
bool can_emulate_es2_draw_buffers_on_es3_nv =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_draw_buffers");
bool is_webgl_compatibility_context =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_webgl_compatibility");
bool have_es2_draw_buffers =
!workarounds_.disable_ext_draw_buffers &&
(have_es2_draw_buffers_vendor_agnostic ||
can_emulate_es2_draw_buffers_on_es3_nv) &&
(context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_OPENGLES2 ||
(context_type_ == CONTEXT_TYPE_WEBGL1 &&
IsWebGLDrawBuffersSupported(is_webgl_compatibility_context,
depth_texture_format,
depth_stencil_texture_format)));
if (have_es2_draw_buffers) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_draw_buffers");
feature_flags_.ext_draw_buffers = true;
feature_flags_.nv_draw_buffers = can_emulate_es2_draw_buffers_on_es3_nv &&
!have_es2_draw_buffers_vendor_agnostic;
}
if (IsWebGL2OrES3OrHigherContext() || have_es2_draw_buffers) {
GLint max_color_attachments = 0;
glGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_COLOR_ATTACHMENTS_EXT, &max_color_attachments);
for (GLenum i = GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT1_EXT;
i < static_cast<GLenum>(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0 + max_color_attachments);
++i) {
validators_.attachment.AddValue(i);
validators_.attachment_query.AddValue(i);
}
static_assert(GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0_EXT == GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0,
"GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0_EXT should equal GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0");
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_COLOR_ATTACHMENTS_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_DRAW_BUFFERS_ARB);
GLint max_draw_buffers = 0;
glGetIntegerv(GL_MAX_DRAW_BUFFERS_ARB, &max_draw_buffers);
for (GLenum i = GL_DRAW_BUFFER0_ARB;
i < static_cast<GLenum>(GL_DRAW_BUFFER0_ARB + max_draw_buffers); ++i) {
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(i);
}
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_blend_minmax") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_blend_minmax");
validators_.equation.AddValue(GL_MIN_EXT);
validators_.equation.AddValue(GL_MAX_EXT);
static_assert(GL_MIN_EXT == GL_MIN && GL_MAX_EXT == GL_MAX,
"min & max variations must match");
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_frag_depth") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_frag_depth");
feature_flags_.ext_frag_depth = true;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_shader_texture_lod") ||
gl::HasDesktopGLFeatures()) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_shader_texture_lod");
feature_flags_.ext_shader_texture_lod = true;
}
bool ui_gl_fence_works = gl::GLFence::IsSupported();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.FenceSupport", ui_gl_fence_works);
feature_flags_.map_buffer_range =
gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_map_buffer_range") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_map_buffer_range");
if (has_pixel_buffers && ui_gl_fence_works &&
!workarounds_.disable_async_readpixels) {
feature_flags_.use_async_readpixels = true;
}
if (gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_sampler_objects")) {
feature_flags_.enable_samplers = true;
}
if ((gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer")) &&
!workarounds_.disable_discard_framebuffer) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_discard_framebuffer");
feature_flags_.ext_discard_framebuffer = true;
}
if (ui_gl_fence_works) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_sync_query");
feature_flags_.chromium_sync_query = true;
}
if (!workarounds_.disable_blend_equation_advanced) {
bool blend_equation_advanced_coherent =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_NV_blend_equation_advanced_coherent") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced_coherent");
if (blend_equation_advanced_coherent ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_blend_equation_advanced") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced")) {
const GLenum equations[] = {
GL_MULTIPLY_KHR, GL_SCREEN_KHR, GL_OVERLAY_KHR,
GL_DARKEN_KHR, GL_LIGHTEN_KHR, GL_COLORDODGE_KHR,
GL_COLORBURN_KHR, GL_HARDLIGHT_KHR, GL_SOFTLIGHT_KHR,
GL_DIFFERENCE_KHR, GL_EXCLUSION_KHR, GL_HSL_HUE_KHR,
GL_HSL_SATURATION_KHR, GL_HSL_COLOR_KHR, GL_HSL_LUMINOSITY_KHR};
for (GLenum equation : equations)
validators_.equation.AddValue(equation);
if (blend_equation_advanced_coherent)
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced_coherent");
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_blend_equation_advanced");
feature_flags_.blend_equation_advanced = true;
feature_flags_.blend_equation_advanced_coherent =
blend_equation_advanced_coherent;
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_framebuffer_mixed_samples")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_framebuffer_mixed_samples");
feature_flags_.chromium_framebuffer_mixed_samples = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_COVERAGE_MODULATION_CHROMIUM);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_path_rendering")) {
bool has_dsa = gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 5) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_direct_state_access");
bool has_piq =
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 3) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_program_interface_query");
bool has_fms = feature_flags_.chromium_framebuffer_mixed_samples;
if ((gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 1) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) && has_dsa && has_piq)) &&
has_fms) {
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_path_rendering");
feature_flags_.chromium_path_rendering = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_MODELVIEW_MATRIX_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_PROJECTION_MATRIX_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_STENCIL_FUNC_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_STENCIL_REF_CHROMIUM);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_PATH_STENCIL_VALUE_MASK_CHROMIUM);
}
}
if ((gl_version_info_->is_es3 || gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_rg") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_rg")) &&
IsGL_REDSupportedOnFBOs()) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_rg = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_texture_rg");
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_R8_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RG8_EXT);
validators_.read_pixel_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.read_pixel_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_R8_EXT);
validators_.render_buffer_format.AddValue(GL_RG8_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RG_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_R8_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_RG8_EXT);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::R_8);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::RG_88);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN("GPU.TextureRG", feature_flags_.ext_texture_rg);
if (gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(2, 1) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_texture_rg")) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_texture_norm16")) {
feature_flags_.ext_texture_norm16 = true;
g_r16_is_present = true;
validators_.pixel_type.AddValue(GL_UNSIGNED_SHORT);
validators_.texture_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_R16_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_unsized_internal_format.AddValue(GL_RED_EXT);
validators_.texture_internal_format_storage.AddValue(GL_R16_EXT);
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::R_16);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
"GPU.TextureR16Ext_LuminanceF16", GpuTextureUMAHelper(),
static_cast<int>(GpuTextureResultR16_L16::kMax) + 1);
if (enable_es3 && gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_window_rectangles")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_window_rectangles");
feature_flags_.ext_window_rectangles = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_WINDOW_RECTANGLE_MODE_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_WINDOW_RECTANGLES_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_NUM_WINDOW_RECTANGLES_EXT);
validators_.indexed_g_l_state.AddValue(GL_WINDOW_RECTANGLE_EXT);
}
bool has_opengl_dual_source_blending =
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 3) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_blend_func_extended"));
if (!disable_shader_translator_ && !workarounds_.get_frag_data_info_bug &&
((gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(3, 2) &&
has_opengl_dual_source_blending) ||
(gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 0) &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_blend_func_extended")))) {
feature_flags_.ext_blend_func_extended = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_EXT_blend_func_extended");
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC_ALPHA_SATURATE_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_COLOR_EXT);
validators_.src_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.dst_blend_factor.AddValue(GL_ONE_MINUS_SRC1_ALPHA_EXT);
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_DUAL_SOURCE_DRAW_BUFFERS_EXT);
}
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
if (workarounds_.ignore_egl_sync_failures) {
gl::GLFenceEGL::SetIgnoreFailures();
}
#endif
if (workarounds_.avoid_egl_image_target_texture_reuse) {
TextureDefinition::AvoidEGLTargetTextureReuse();
}
if (gl_version_info_->IsLowerThanGL(4, 3)) {
feature_flags_.emulate_primitive_restart_fixed_index = true;
}
feature_flags_.angle_robust_client_memory =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_robust_client_memory");
feature_flags_.khr_debug = gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGL(4, 3) ||
gl_version_info_->IsAtLeastGLES(3, 2) ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_debug");
feature_flags_.chromium_gpu_fence = gl::GLFence::IsGpuFenceSupported();
if (feature_flags_.chromium_gpu_fence)
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_gpu_fence");
feature_flags_.chromium_bind_generates_resource =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_bind_generates_resource");
feature_flags_.angle_webgl_compatibility = is_webgl_compatibility_context;
feature_flags_.chromium_copy_texture =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_copy_texture");
feature_flags_.chromium_copy_compressed_texture =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_CHROMIUM_copy_compressed_texture");
feature_flags_.angle_client_arrays =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_client_arrays");
feature_flags_.angle_request_extension =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_request_extension");
feature_flags_.ext_debug_marker =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_debug_marker");
feature_flags_.arb_robustness =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_robustness");
feature_flags_.khr_robustness =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_robustness");
feature_flags_.ext_robustness =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_robustness");
feature_flags_.ext_pixel_buffer_object =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ARB_pixel_buffer_object") ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_pixel_buffer_object");
feature_flags_.ext_unpack_subimage =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_EXT_unpack_subimage");
feature_flags_.oes_rgb8_rgba8 =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OES_rgb8_rgba8");
feature_flags_.angle_robust_resource_initialization =
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_robust_resource_initialization");
feature_flags_.nv_fence = gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_fence");
feature_flags_.unpremultiply_and_dither_copy = !is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_;
if (feature_flags_.unpremultiply_and_dither_copy)
AddExtensionString("GL_CHROMIUM_unpremultiply_and_dither_copy");
feature_flags_.separate_stencil_ref_mask_writemask =
!(gl_version_info_->is_d3d) && !IsWebGLContext();
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_MESA_framebuffer_flip_y")) {
feature_flags_.mesa_framebuffer_flip_y = true;
validators_.framebuffer_parameter.AddValue(GL_FRAMEBUFFER_FLIP_Y_MESA);
AddExtensionString("GL_MESA_framebuffer_flip_y");
}
if (is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_ &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_OVR_multiview2")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_OVR_multiview2");
feature_flags_.ovr_multiview2 = true;
}
if (is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_ &&
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_parallel_shader_compile")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_parallel_shader_compile");
feature_flags_.khr_parallel_shader_compile = true;
validators_.g_l_state.AddValue(GL_MAX_SHADER_COMPILER_THREADS_KHR);
validators_.shader_parameter.AddValue(GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR);
validators_.program_parameter.AddValue(GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR);
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_KHR_robust_buffer_access_behavior")) {
AddExtensionString("GL_KHR_robust_buffer_access_behavior");
feature_flags_.khr_robust_buffer_access_behavior = true;
}
if (!is_passthrough_cmd_decoder_ ||
gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_multi_draw")) {
feature_flags_.webgl_multi_draw = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_WEBGL_multi_draw");
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_ANGLE_instanced_arrays") ||
feature_flags_.angle_instanced_arrays || gl_version_info_->is_es3 ||
gl_version_info_->is_desktop_core_profile) {
feature_flags_.webgl_multi_draw_instanced = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_WEBGL_multi_draw_instanced");
}
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions, "GL_NV_internalformat_sample_query")) {
feature_flags_.nv_internalformat_sample_query = true;
}
if (gfx::HasExtension(extensions,
"GL_AMD_framebuffer_multisample_advanced")) {
feature_flags_.amd_framebuffer_multisample_advanced = true;
AddExtensionString("GL_AMD_framebuffer_multisample_advanced");
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 1 | 172,528 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u16 brcmf_map_fw_linkdown_reason(const struct brcmf_event_msg *e)
{
u16 reason;
switch (e->event_code) {
case BRCMF_E_DEAUTH:
case BRCMF_E_DEAUTH_IND:
case BRCMF_E_DISASSOC_IND:
reason = e->reason;
break;
case BRCMF_E_LINK:
default:
reason = 0;
break;
}
return reason;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,093 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void validate_direct_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
unsigned direct_access)
{
if (is_shadow_present_pte(*sptep) && !is_large_pte(*sptep)) {
struct kvm_mmu_page *child;
/*
* For the direct sp, if the guest pte's dirty bit
* changed form clean to dirty, it will corrupt the
* sp's access: allow writable in the read-only sp,
* so we should update the spte at this point to get
* a new sp with the correct access.
*/
child = page_header(*sptep & PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK);
if (child->role.access == direct_access)
return;
drop_parent_pte(child, sptep);
kvm_flush_remote_tlbs(vcpu->kvm);
}
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,602 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
const char *kid = asymmetric_key_id(key);
size_t n;
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (subtype) {
seq_puts(m, ": ");
subtype->describe(key, m);
if (kid) {
seq_putc(m, ' ');
n = strlen(kid);
if (n <= 8)
seq_puts(m, kid);
else
seq_puts(m, kid + n - 8);
}
seq_puts(m, " [");
/* put something here to indicate the key's capabilities */
seq_putc(m, ']');
}
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,402 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gdImageString16 (gdImagePtr im, gdFontPtr f, int x, int y, unsigned short *s, int color)
{
int i;
int l;
l = strlen16(s);
for (i = 0; (i < l); i++) {
gdImageChar(im, f, x, y, s[i], color);
x += f->w;
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void TestSubObjMeasuredConstructorGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String> property, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
UseCounter::count(callingExecutionContext(info.GetIsolate()), UseCounter::TestFeature);
TestObjectV8Internal::TestObjectConstructorGetter(property, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nlmclnt_next_cookie(struct nlm_cookie *c)
{
u32 cookie = atomic_inc_return(&nlm_cookie);
memcpy(c->data, &cookie, 4);
c->len=4;
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void dump_orphan_list(struct super_block *sb, struct ext4_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct list_head *l;
ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "sb orphan head is %d",
le32_to_cpu(sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan));
printk(KERN_ERR "sb_info orphan list:\n");
list_for_each(l, &sbi->s_orphan) {
struct inode *inode = orphan_list_entry(l);
printk(KERN_ERR " "
"inode %s:%lu at %p: mode %o, nlink %d, next %d\n",
inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, inode,
inode->i_mode, inode->i_nlink,
NEXT_ORPHAN(inode));
}
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 20,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!enable_vnmi ||
vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI) {
enable_irq_window(vcpu);
return;
}
vmcs_set_bits(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
CPU_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMI_PENDING);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 80,920 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gimp_assert_mainimage (GimpImage *image,
gboolean with_unusual_stuff,
gboolean compat_paths,
gboolean use_gimp_2_8_features)
{
const GimpParasite *parasite = NULL;
GimpLayer *layer = NULL;
GList *iter = NULL;
GimpGuide *guide = NULL;
GimpSamplePoint *sample_point = NULL;
gint sample_point_x = 0;
gint sample_point_y = 0;
gdouble xres = 0.0;
gdouble yres = 0.0;
GimpGrid *grid = NULL;
gdouble xspacing = 0.0;
gdouble yspacing = 0.0;
GimpChannel *channel = NULL;
GimpRGB expected_channel_color = GIMP_MAINIMAGE_CHANNEL1_COLOR;
GimpRGB actual_channel_color = { 0, };
GimpChannel *selection = NULL;
gint x = -1;
gint y = -1;
gint w = -1;
gint h = -1;
GimpCoords vectors1_coords[] = GIMP_MAINIMAGE_VECTORS1_COORDS;
GimpCoords vectors2_coords[] = GIMP_MAINIMAGE_VECTORS2_COORDS;
/* Image size and type */
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_image_get_width (image),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_WIDTH);
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_image_get_height (image),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_HEIGHT);
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_image_get_base_type (image),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_TYPE);
/* Layers */
layer = gimp_image_get_layer_by_name (image,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER1_NAME);
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_item_get_width (GIMP_ITEM (layer)),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER1_WIDTH);
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_item_get_height (GIMP_ITEM (layer)),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER1_HEIGHT);
g_assert_cmpstr (babl_get_name (gimp_drawable_get_format (GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer))),
==,
babl_get_name (GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER1_FORMAT));
g_assert_cmpstr (gimp_object_get_name (GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer)),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER1_NAME);
g_assert_cmpfloat (gimp_layer_get_opacity (layer),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER1_OPACITY);
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_layer_get_mode (layer),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER1_MODE);
layer = gimp_image_get_layer_by_name (image,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER2_NAME);
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_item_get_width (GIMP_ITEM (layer)),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER2_WIDTH);
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_item_get_height (GIMP_ITEM (layer)),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER2_HEIGHT);
g_assert_cmpstr (babl_get_name (gimp_drawable_get_format (GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer))),
==,
babl_get_name (GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER2_FORMAT));
g_assert_cmpstr (gimp_object_get_name (GIMP_DRAWABLE (layer)),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER2_NAME);
g_assert_cmpfloat (gimp_layer_get_opacity (layer),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER2_OPACITY);
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_layer_get_mode (layer),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER2_MODE);
/* Guides, note that we rely on internal ordering */
iter = gimp_image_get_guides (image);
g_assert (iter != NULL);
guide = iter->data;
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_guide_get_position (guide),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_VGUIDE1_POS);
iter = g_list_next (iter);
g_assert (iter != NULL);
guide = iter->data;
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_guide_get_position (guide),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_VGUIDE2_POS);
iter = g_list_next (iter);
g_assert (iter != NULL);
guide = iter->data;
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_guide_get_position (guide),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_HGUIDE1_POS);
iter = g_list_next (iter);
g_assert (iter != NULL);
guide = iter->data;
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_guide_get_position (guide),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_HGUIDE2_POS);
iter = g_list_next (iter);
g_assert (iter == NULL);
/* Sample points, we rely on the same ordering as when we added
* them, although this ordering is not a necessity
*/
iter = gimp_image_get_sample_points (image);
g_assert (iter != NULL);
sample_point = iter->data;
gimp_sample_point_get_position (sample_point,
&sample_point_x, &sample_point_y);
g_assert_cmpint (sample_point_x,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_SAMPLEPOINT1_X);
g_assert_cmpint (sample_point_y,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_SAMPLEPOINT1_Y);
iter = g_list_next (iter);
g_assert (iter != NULL);
sample_point = iter->data;
gimp_sample_point_get_position (sample_point,
&sample_point_x, &sample_point_y);
g_assert_cmpint (sample_point_x,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_SAMPLEPOINT2_X);
g_assert_cmpint (sample_point_y,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_SAMPLEPOINT2_Y);
iter = g_list_next (iter);
g_assert (iter == NULL);
/* Resolution */
gimp_image_get_resolution (image, &xres, &yres);
g_assert_cmpint (xres,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_RESOLUTIONX);
g_assert_cmpint (yres,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_RESOLUTIONY);
/* Parasites */
parasite = gimp_image_parasite_find (image,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_PARASITE_NAME);
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_parasite_data_size (parasite),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_PARASITE_SIZE);
g_assert_cmpstr (gimp_parasite_data (parasite),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_PARASITE_DATA);
parasite = gimp_image_parasite_find (image,
"gimp-comment");
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_parasite_data_size (parasite),
==,
strlen (GIMP_MAINIMAGE_COMMENT) + 1);
g_assert_cmpstr (gimp_parasite_data (parasite),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_COMMENT);
/* Unit */
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_image_get_unit (image),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_UNIT);
/* Grid */
grid = gimp_image_get_grid (image);
g_object_get (grid,
"xspacing", &xspacing,
"yspacing", &yspacing,
NULL);
g_assert_cmpint (xspacing,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_GRIDXSPACING);
g_assert_cmpint (yspacing,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_GRIDYSPACING);
/* Channel */
channel = gimp_image_get_channel_by_name (image,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_CHANNEL1_NAME);
gimp_channel_get_color (channel, &actual_channel_color);
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_item_get_width (GIMP_ITEM (channel)),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_CHANNEL1_WIDTH);
g_assert_cmpint (gimp_item_get_height (GIMP_ITEM (channel)),
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_CHANNEL1_HEIGHT);
g_assert (memcmp (&expected_channel_color,
&actual_channel_color,
sizeof (GimpRGB)) == 0);
/* Selection, if the image contains unusual stuff it contains a
* floating select, and when floating a selection, the selection
* mask is cleared, so don't test for the presence of the selection
* mask in that case
*/
if (! with_unusual_stuff)
{
selection = gimp_image_get_mask (image);
gimp_item_bounds (GIMP_ITEM (selection), &x, &y, &w, &h);
g_assert_cmpint (x,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_SELECTION_X);
g_assert_cmpint (y,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_SELECTION_Y);
g_assert_cmpint (w,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_SELECTION_W);
g_assert_cmpint (h,
==,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_SELECTION_H);
}
/* Vectors 1 */
gimp_assert_vectors (image,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_VECTORS1_NAME,
vectors1_coords,
G_N_ELEMENTS (vectors1_coords),
! compat_paths /*visible*/);
/* Vectors 2 (always visible FALSE) */
gimp_assert_vectors (image,
GIMP_MAINIMAGE_VECTORS2_NAME,
vectors2_coords,
G_N_ELEMENTS (vectors2_coords),
FALSE /*visible*/);
if (with_unusual_stuff)
g_assert (gimp_image_get_floating_selection (image) != NULL);
else /* if (! with_unusual_stuff) */
g_assert (gimp_image_get_floating_selection (image) == NULL);
if (use_gimp_2_8_features)
{
/* Only verify the parent relationships, the layer attributes
* are tested above
*/
GimpItem *group1 = GIMP_ITEM (gimp_image_get_layer_by_name (image, GIMP_MAINIMAGE_GROUP1_NAME));
GimpItem *layer3 = GIMP_ITEM (gimp_image_get_layer_by_name (image, GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER3_NAME));
GimpItem *layer4 = GIMP_ITEM (gimp_image_get_layer_by_name (image, GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER4_NAME));
GimpItem *group2 = GIMP_ITEM (gimp_image_get_layer_by_name (image, GIMP_MAINIMAGE_GROUP2_NAME));
GimpItem *layer5 = GIMP_ITEM (gimp_image_get_layer_by_name (image, GIMP_MAINIMAGE_LAYER5_NAME));
g_assert (gimp_item_get_parent (group1) == NULL);
g_assert (gimp_item_get_parent (layer3) == group1);
g_assert (gimp_item_get_parent (layer4) == group1);
g_assert (gimp_item_get_parent (group2) == group1);
g_assert (gimp_item_get_parent (layer5) == group2);
}
}
Commit Message: Issue #1689: create unique temporary file with g_file_open_tmp().
Not sure this is really solving the issue reported, which is that
`g_get_tmp_dir()` uses environment variables (yet as g_file_open_tmp()
uses g_get_tmp_dir()…). But at least g_file_open_tmp() should create
unique temporary files, which prevents overriding existing files (which
is most likely the only real attack possible here, or at least the only
one I can think of unless some weird vulnerabilities exist in glib).
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 81,608 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void futex_wait_queue_me(struct futex_hash_bucket *hb, struct futex_q *q,
struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout)
{
/*
* The task state is guaranteed to be set before another task can
* wake it. set_current_state() is implemented using set_mb() and
* queue_me() calls spin_unlock() upon completion, both serializing
* access to the hash list and forcing another memory barrier.
*/
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
queue_me(q, hb);
/* Arm the timer */
if (timeout) {
hrtimer_start_expires(&timeout->timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
if (!hrtimer_active(&timeout->timer))
timeout->task = NULL;
}
/*
* If we have been removed from the hash list, then another task
* has tried to wake us, and we can skip the call to schedule().
*/
if (likely(!plist_node_empty(&q->list))) {
/*
* If the timer has already expired, current will already be
* flagged for rescheduling. Only call schedule if there
* is no timeout, or if it has yet to expire.
*/
if (!timeout || timeout->task)
schedule();
}
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 39,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_event_task_output(struct perf_event *event,
void *data)
{
struct perf_task_event *task_event = data;
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_sample_data sample;
struct task_struct *task = task_event->task;
int ret, size = task_event->event_id.header.size;
if (!perf_event_task_match(event))
return;
perf_event_header__init_id(&task_event->event_id.header, &sample, event);
ret = perf_output_begin(&handle, event,
task_event->event_id.header.size);
if (ret)
goto out;
task_event->event_id.pid = perf_event_pid(event, task);
task_event->event_id.ppid = perf_event_pid(event, current);
task_event->event_id.tid = perf_event_tid(event, task);
task_event->event_id.ptid = perf_event_tid(event, current);
task_event->event_id.time = perf_event_clock(event);
perf_output_put(&handle, task_event->event_id);
perf_event__output_id_sample(event, &handle, &sample);
perf_output_end(&handle);
out:
task_event->event_id.header.size = size;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: linux_md_check_completed_cb (DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
Device *device,
gboolean job_was_cancelled,
int status,
const char *stderr,
const char *stdout,
gpointer user_data)
{
if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == 0 && !job_was_cancelled)
{
guint64 num_errors;
num_errors = sysfs_get_uint64 (device->priv->native_path, "md/mismatch_cnt");
dbus_g_method_return (context, num_errors);
}
else
{
if (job_was_cancelled)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_CANCELLED, "Job was cancelled");
}
else
{
throw_error (context,
ERROR_FAILED,
"Error checking array: helper exited with exit code %d: %s",
WEXITSTATUS (status),
stderr);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,744 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::HandleKeyboardEventOnTextField(
HTMLInputElement& input_element,
KeyboardEvent& event) {
if (auto* fill_client =
AutofillClientFromFrame(input_element.GetDocument().GetFrame())) {
fill_client->TextFieldDidReceiveKeyDown(WebInputElement(&input_element),
WebKeyboardEventBuilder(event));
}
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,153 |
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