instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfsd_break_one_deleg(struct nfs4_delegation *dp)
{
/*
* We're assuming the state code never drops its reference
* without first removing the lease. Since we're in this lease
* callback (and since the lease code is serialized by the kernel
* lock) we know the server hasn't removed the lease yet, we know
* it's safe to take a reference.
*/
atomic_inc(&dp->dl_stid.sc_count);
nfsd4_run_cb(&dp->dl_recall);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mwifiex_cmd_uap_sta_deauth(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
struct host_cmd_ds_command *cmd, u8 *mac)
{
struct host_cmd_ds_sta_deauth *sta_deauth = &cmd->params.sta_deauth;
cmd->command = cpu_to_le16(HostCmd_CMD_UAP_STA_DEAUTH);
memcpy(sta_deauth->mac, mac, ETH_ALEN);
sta_deauth->reason = cpu_to_le16(WLAN_REASON_DEAUTH_LEAVING);
cmd->size = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct host_cmd_ds_sta_deauth) +
S_DS_GEN);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mwifiex: Fix three heap overflow at parsing element in cfg80211_ap_settings
mwifiex_update_vs_ie(),mwifiex_set_uap_rates() and
mwifiex_set_wmm_params() call memcpy() without checking
the destination size.Since the source is given from
user-space, this may trigger a heap buffer overflow.
Fix them by putting the length check before performing memcpy().
This fix addresses CVE-2019-14814,CVE-2019-14815,CVE-2019-14816.
Signed-off-by: Wen Huang <huangwenabc@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ganapathi Bhat <gbhat@marvell.comg>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-120 | 0 | 88,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Profile* SyncTest::MakeProfile(const FilePath::StringType name) {
FilePath path;
PathService::Get(chrome::DIR_USER_DATA, &path);
path = path.Append(name);
if (!file_util::PathExists(path))
CHECK(file_util::CreateDirectory(path));
Profile* profile =
Profile::CreateProfile(path, NULL, Profile::CREATE_MODE_SYNCHRONOUS);
g_browser_process->profile_manager()->RegisterTestingProfile(profile, true);
return profile;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,047 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int projid_m_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct user_namespace *ns = seq->private;
struct uid_gid_extent *extent = v;
struct user_namespace *lower_ns;
projid_t lower;
lower_ns = seq_user_ns(seq);
if ((lower_ns == ns) && lower_ns->parent)
lower_ns = lower_ns->parent;
lower = from_kprojid(lower_ns, KPROJIDT_INIT(extent->lower_first));
seq_printf(seq, "%10u %10u %10u\n",
extent->first,
lower,
extent->count);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: userns: unshare_userns(&cred) should not populate cred on failure
unshare_userns(new_cred) does *new_cred = prepare_creds() before
create_user_ns() which can fail. However, the caller expects that
it doesn't need to take care of new_cred if unshare_userns() fails.
We could change the single caller, sys_unshare(), but I think it
would be more clean to avoid the side effects on failure, so with
this patch unshare_userns() does put_cred() itself and initializes
*new_cred only if create_user_ns() succeeeds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 29,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidCommitProvisionalLoad(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const GURL& url,
ui::PageTransition transition_type) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver,
observers_,
DidCommitProvisionalLoadForFrame(
render_frame_host, url, transition_type));
BrowserAccessibilityManager* manager =
render_frame_host->browser_accessibility_manager();
if (manager)
manager->NavigationSucceeded();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,796 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GURL SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::GetURL() {
return instance_->url();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,733 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: polkit_backend_interactive_authority_check_authorization (PolkitBackendAuthority *authority,
PolkitSubject *caller,
PolkitSubject *subject,
const gchar *action_id,
PolkitDetails *details,
PolkitCheckAuthorizationFlags flags,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GAsyncReadyCallback callback,
gpointer user_data)
{
PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthority *interactive_authority;
PolkitBackendInteractiveAuthorityPrivate *priv;
gchar *caller_str;
gchar *subject_str;
PolkitIdentity *user_of_caller;
PolkitIdentity *user_of_subject;
gchar *user_of_caller_str;
gchar *user_of_subject_str;
PolkitAuthorizationResult *result;
GError *error;
GSimpleAsyncResult *simple;
gboolean has_details;
gchar **detail_keys;
interactive_authority = POLKIT_BACKEND_INTERACTIVE_AUTHORITY (authority);
priv = POLKIT_BACKEND_INTERACTIVE_AUTHORITY_GET_PRIVATE (interactive_authority);
error = NULL;
caller_str = NULL;
subject_str = NULL;
user_of_caller = NULL;
user_of_subject = NULL;
user_of_caller_str = NULL;
user_of_subject_str = NULL;
result = NULL;
simple = g_simple_async_result_new (G_OBJECT (authority),
callback,
user_data,
polkit_backend_interactive_authority_check_authorization);
/* handle being called from ourselves */
if (caller == NULL)
{
/* TODO: this is kind of a hack */
GDBusConnection *system_bus;
system_bus = g_bus_get_sync (G_BUS_TYPE_SYSTEM, NULL, NULL);
caller = polkit_system_bus_name_new (g_dbus_connection_get_unique_name (system_bus));
g_object_unref (system_bus);
}
caller_str = polkit_subject_to_string (caller);
subject_str = polkit_subject_to_string (subject);
g_debug ("%s is inquiring whether %s is authorized for %s",
caller_str,
subject_str,
action_id);
action_id);
user_of_caller = polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject (priv->session_monitor,
caller,
&error);
if (error != NULL)
{
g_simple_async_result_complete (simple);
g_object_unref (simple);
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
user_of_caller_str = polkit_identity_to_string (user_of_caller);
g_debug (" user of caller is %s", user_of_caller_str);
g_debug (" user of caller is %s", user_of_caller_str);
user_of_subject = polkit_backend_session_monitor_get_user_for_subject (priv->session_monitor,
subject,
&error);
if (error != NULL)
{
g_simple_async_result_complete (simple);
g_object_unref (simple);
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
user_of_subject_str = polkit_identity_to_string (user_of_subject);
g_debug (" user of subject is %s", user_of_subject_str);
has_details = FALSE;
if (details != NULL)
{
detail_keys = polkit_details_get_keys (details);
if (detail_keys != NULL)
{
if (g_strv_length (detail_keys) > 0)
has_details = TRUE;
g_strfreev (detail_keys);
}
}
/* Not anyone is allowed to check that process XYZ is allowed to do ABC.
* We only allow this if, and only if,
* We only allow this if, and only if,
*
* - processes may check for another process owned by the *same* user but not
* if details are passed (otherwise you'd be able to spoof the dialog)
*
* - processes running as uid 0 may check anything and pass any details
*
if (!polkit_identity_equal (user_of_caller, user_of_subject) || has_details)
* then any uid referenced by that annotation is also allowed to check
* to check anything and pass any details
*/
if (!polkit_identity_equal (user_of_caller, user_of_subject) || has_details)
{
if (!may_identity_check_authorization (interactive_authority, action_id, user_of_caller))
{
"pass details");
}
else
{
g_simple_async_result_set_error (simple,
POLKIT_ERROR,
POLKIT_ERROR_NOT_AUTHORIZED,
"Only trusted callers (e.g. uid 0 or an action owner) can use CheckAuthorization() for "
"subjects belonging to other identities");
}
g_simple_async_result_complete (simple);
g_object_unref (simple);
goto out;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 165,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ipmr_do_expire_process(struct mr6_table *mrt)
{
unsigned long now = jiffies;
unsigned long expires = 10 * HZ;
struct mfc6_cache *c, *next;
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, next, &mrt->mfc6_unres_queue, list) {
if (time_after(c->mfc_un.unres.expires, now)) {
/* not yet... */
unsigned long interval = c->mfc_un.unres.expires - now;
if (interval < expires)
expires = interval;
continue;
}
list_del(&c->list);
mr6_netlink_event(mrt, c, RTM_DELROUTE);
ip6mr_destroy_unres(mrt, c);
}
if (!list_empty(&mrt->mfc6_unres_queue))
mod_timer(&mrt->ipmr_expire_timer, jiffies + expires);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct iscsi_param *iscsi_find_param_from_key(
char *key,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
{
struct iscsi_param *param;
if (!key || !param_list) {
pr_err("Key or parameter list pointer is NULL.\n");
return NULL;
}
list_for_each_entry(param, ¶m_list->param_list, p_list) {
if (!strcmp(key, param->name))
return param;
}
pr_err("Unable to locate key \"%s\".\n", key);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 30,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: uint32 CSoundFile::SendMIDIData(CHANNELINDEX nChn, bool isSmooth, const unsigned char *macro, uint32 macroLen, PLUGINDEX plugin)
{
if(macroLen < 1)
{
return 0;
}
if(macro[0] == 0xFA || macro[0] == 0xFC || macro[0] == 0xFF)
{
for(CHANNELINDEX chn = 0; chn < GetNumChannels(); chn++)
{
m_PlayState.Chn[chn].nCutOff = 0x7F;
m_PlayState.Chn[chn].nResonance = 0x00;
}
}
ModChannel &chn = m_PlayState.Chn[nChn];
if(macro[0] == 0xF0 && (macro[1] == 0xF0 || macro[1] == 0xF1))
{
if(macroLen < 4)
{
return 0;
}
const bool isExtended = (macro[1] == 0xF1);
const uint8 macroCode = macro[2];
const uint8 param = macro[3];
if(macroCode == 0x00 && !isExtended && param < 0x80)
{
if(!isSmooth)
{
chn.nCutOff = param;
} else
{
chn.nCutOff = Util::Round<uint8>(CalculateSmoothParamChange(chn.nCutOff, param));
}
chn.nRestoreCutoffOnNewNote = 0;
SetupChannelFilter(&chn, !chn.dwFlags[CHN_FILTER]);
return 4;
} else if(macroCode == 0x01 && !isExtended && param < 0x80)
{
if(!isSmooth)
{
chn.nResonance = param;
} else
{
chn.nResonance = (uint8)CalculateSmoothParamChange((float)chn.nResonance, (float)param);
}
chn.nRestoreResonanceOnNewNote = 0;
SetupChannelFilter(&chn, !chn.dwFlags[CHN_FILTER]);
return 4;
} else if(macroCode == 0x02 && !isExtended)
{
if(param < 0x20)
{
chn.nFilterMode = (param >> 4);
SetupChannelFilter(&chn, !chn.dwFlags[CHN_FILTER]);
}
return 4;
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
} else if(macroCode == 0x03 && !isExtended)
{
const PLUGINDEX nPlug = (plugin != 0) ? plugin : GetBestPlugin(nChn, PrioritiseChannel, EvenIfMuted);
if ((nPlug) && (nPlug <= MAX_MIXPLUGINS) && param < 0x80)
{
const float newRatio = (0x7F - (param & 0x7F)) / 127.0f;
if(!isSmooth)
{
m_MixPlugins[nPlug - 1].fDryRatio = newRatio;
} else
{
m_MixPlugins[nPlug - 1].fDryRatio = CalculateSmoothParamChange(m_MixPlugins[nPlug - 1].fDryRatio, newRatio);
}
}
return 4;
} else if((macroCode & 0x80) || isExtended)
{
const PLUGINDEX nPlug = (plugin != 0) ? plugin : GetBestPlugin(nChn, PrioritiseChannel, EvenIfMuted);
const uint32 plugParam = isExtended ? (0x80 + macroCode) : (macroCode & 0x7F);
if((nPlug) && (nPlug <= MAX_MIXPLUGINS))
{
IMixPlugin *pPlugin = m_MixPlugins[nPlug - 1].pMixPlugin;
if(pPlugin && param < 0x80)
{
const float fParam = param / 127.0f;
if(!isSmooth)
{
pPlugin->SetParameter(plugParam, fParam);
} else
{
pPlugin->SetParameter(plugParam, CalculateSmoothParamChange(pPlugin->GetParameter(plugParam), fParam));
}
}
}
return 4;
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
}
} else
{
#ifndef NO_PLUGINS
const CHANNELINDEX plugChannel = (nChn < GetNumChannels()) ? nChn + 1 : chn.nMasterChn;
if(plugChannel > 0 && plugChannel <= GetNumChannels()) // XXX do we need this? I guess it might be relevant for previewing notes in the pattern... Or when using this mechanism for volume/panning!
{
PLUGINDEX nPlug = 0;
if(!chn.dwFlags[CHN_NOFX])
{
nPlug = (plugin != 0) ? plugin : GetBestPlugin(nChn, PrioritiseChannel, EvenIfMuted);
}
if(nPlug > 0 && nPlug <= MAX_MIXPLUGINS)
{
IMixPlugin *pPlugin = m_MixPlugins[nPlug - 1].pMixPlugin;
if (pPlugin != nullptr)
{
if(macro[0] == 0xF0)
{
pPlugin->MidiSysexSend(macro, macroLen);
} else
{
uint32 len = std::min<uint32>(MIDIEvents::GetEventLength(macro[0]), macroLen);
uint32 curData = 0;
memcpy(&curData, macro, len);
pPlugin->MidiSend(curData);
}
}
}
}
#else
MPT_UNREFERENCED_PARAMETER(plugin);
#endif // NO_PLUGINS
return macroLen;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [Fix] Possible out-of-bounds read when computing length of some IT files with pattern loops (OpenMPT: formats that are converted to IT, libopenmpt: IT/ITP/MO3), caught with afl-fuzz.
git-svn-id: https://source.openmpt.org/svn/openmpt/trunk/OpenMPT@10027 56274372-70c3-4bfc-bfc3-4c3a0b034d27
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_rss_add_container(raptor_rss_parser *rss_parser, const char *name)
{
raptor_rss_type type = RAPTOR_RSS_NONE;
if(!strcmp(name, "rss") || !strcmp(name, "rdf") || !strcmp(name, "RDF")) {
/* rss */
} else if(!raptor_strcasecmp(name, "channel")) {
/* rss or atom 0.3 channel */
type = RAPTOR_RSS_CHANNEL;
} else if(!strcmp(name, "feed")) {
/* atom 1.0 feed */
type = RAPTOR_RSS_CHANNEL;
rss_parser->is_atom = 1;
} else if(!strcmp(name, "item")) {
type = RAPTOR_RSS_ITEM;
} else if(!strcmp(name, "entry")) {
type = RAPTOR_RSS_ITEM;
rss_parser->is_atom = 1;
} else {
int i;
for(i = 0; i < RAPTOR_RSS_COMMON_SIZE; i++) {
if(!(raptor_rss_items_info[i].flags & RAPTOR_RSS_ITEM_CONTAINER))
continue;
if(!strcmp(name, raptor_rss_items_info[i].name)) {
/* rss and atom clash on the author name field (rss) or type (atom) */
if(i != RAPTOR_ATOM_AUTHOR ||
(i == RAPTOR_ATOM_AUTHOR && rss_parser->is_atom)) {
type = (raptor_rss_type)i;
break;
}
}
}
}
if(type != RAPTOR_RSS_NONE) {
if(type == RAPTOR_RSS_ITEM)
raptor_rss_model_add_item(&rss_parser->model);
else
raptor_rss_model_add_common(&rss_parser->model, type);
/* Inner container - push the current type onto a 1-place stack */
if(rss_parser->current_type != RAPTOR_RSS_NONE)
rss_parser->prev_type = rss_parser->current_type;
rss_parser->current_type = type;
}
return (type == RAPTOR_RSS_NONE);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 22,028 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void virtio_vmstate_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = opaque;
BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev));
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
bool backend_run = running && (vdev->status & VIRTIO_CONFIG_S_DRIVER_OK);
vdev->vm_running = running;
if (backend_run) {
virtio_set_status(vdev, vdev->status);
}
if (k->vmstate_change) {
k->vmstate_change(qbus->parent, backend_run);
}
if (!backend_run) {
virtio_set_status(vdev, vdev->status);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,253 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> Document::adoptNode(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Node> source, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
EventQueueScope scope;
switch (source->nodeType()) {
case DOCUMENT_NODE:
exceptionState.throwDOMException(NotSupportedError, "The node provided is of type '" + source->nodeName() + "', which may not be adopted.");
return nullptr;
case ATTRIBUTE_NODE: {
Attr* attr = toAttr(source.get());
if (RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> ownerElement = attr->ownerElement())
ownerElement->removeAttributeNode(attr, exceptionState);
break;
}
default:
if (source->isShadowRoot()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(HierarchyRequestError, "The node provided is a shadow root, which may not be adopted.");
return nullptr;
}
if (source->isFrameOwnerElement()) {
HTMLFrameOwnerElement* frameOwnerElement = toHTMLFrameOwnerElement(source.get());
if (frame() && frame()->tree().isDescendantOf(toLocalFrameTemporary(frameOwnerElement->contentFrame()))) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(HierarchyRequestError, "The node provided is a frame which contains this document.");
return nullptr;
}
}
if (source->parentNode()) {
source->parentNode()->removeChild(source.get(), exceptionState);
if (exceptionState.hadException())
return nullptr;
}
}
this->adoptIfNeeded(*source);
return source;
}
Commit Message: Don't change Document load progress in any page dismissal events.
This can confuse the logic for blocking modal dialogs.
BUG=536652
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1373113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351419}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 125,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int compute_score2(struct sock *sk, struct net *net,
__be32 saddr, __be16 sport,
__be32 daddr, unsigned int hnum, int dif)
{
int score;
struct inet_sock *inet;
if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net) ||
ipv6_only_sock(sk))
return -1;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
if (inet->inet_rcv_saddr != daddr ||
inet->inet_num != hnum)
return -1;
score = (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) ? 2 : 1;
if (inet->inet_daddr) {
if (inet->inet_daddr != saddr)
return -1;
score += 4;
}
if (inet->inet_dport) {
if (inet->inet_dport != sport)
return -1;
score += 4;
}
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if != dif)
return -1;
score += 4;
}
return score;
}
Commit Message: udp: fix behavior of wrong checksums
We have two problems in UDP stack related to bogus checksums :
1) We return -EAGAIN to application even if receive queue is not empty.
This breaks applications using edge trigger epoll()
2) Under UDP flood, we can loop forever without yielding to other
processes, potentially hanging the host, especially on non SMP.
This patch is an attempt to make things better.
We might in the future add extra support for rt applications
wanting to better control time spent doing a recv() in a hostile
environment. For example we could validate checksums before queuing
packets in socket receive queue.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool V8ValueConverter::Strategy::FromV8Undefined(base::Value** out) const {
return false;
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nested_svm_uninit_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.mmu;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport void UnregisterVIPSImage(void)
{
(void) UnregisterMagickInfo("VIPS");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int dev_change_name(struct net_device *dev, const char *newname)
{
char oldname[IFNAMSIZ];
int err = 0;
int ret;
struct net *net;
ASSERT_RTNL();
BUG_ON(!dev_net(dev));
net = dev_net(dev);
if (dev->flags & IFF_UP)
return -EBUSY;
if (strncmp(newname, dev->name, IFNAMSIZ) == 0)
return 0;
memcpy(oldname, dev->name, IFNAMSIZ);
err = dev_get_valid_name(dev, newname, 1);
if (err < 0)
return err;
rollback:
ret = device_rename(&dev->dev, dev->name);
if (ret) {
memcpy(dev->name, oldname, IFNAMSIZ);
return ret;
}
write_lock_bh(&dev_base_lock);
hlist_del(&dev->name_hlist);
write_unlock_bh(&dev_base_lock);
synchronize_rcu();
write_lock_bh(&dev_base_lock);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&dev->name_hlist, dev_name_hash(net, dev->name));
write_unlock_bh(&dev_base_lock);
ret = call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_CHANGENAME, dev);
ret = notifier_to_errno(ret);
if (ret) {
/* err >= 0 after dev_alloc_name() or stores the first errno */
if (err >= 0) {
err = ret;
memcpy(dev->name, oldname, IFNAMSIZ);
goto rollback;
} else {
printk(KERN_ERR
"%s: name change rollback failed: %d.\n",
dev->name, ret);
}
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,241 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ConflictResolver::ProcessSimpleConflict(WriteTransaction* trans,
const Id& id,
const Cryptographer* cryptographer,
StatusController* status) {
MutableEntry entry(trans, syncable::GET_BY_ID, id);
CHECK(entry.good());
if (!entry.Get(syncable::IS_UNAPPLIED_UPDATE) ||
!entry.Get(syncable::IS_UNSYNCED)) {
return NO_SYNC_PROGRESS;
}
if (entry.Get(syncable::IS_DEL) && entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_IS_DEL)) {
entry.Put(syncable::IS_UNSYNCED, false);
entry.Put(syncable::IS_UNAPPLIED_UPDATE, false);
return NO_SYNC_PROGRESS;
}
if (!entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_IS_DEL)) {
bool name_matches = entry.Get(syncable::NON_UNIQUE_NAME) ==
entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_NON_UNIQUE_NAME);
bool parent_matches = entry.Get(syncable::PARENT_ID) ==
entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_PARENT_ID);
bool entry_deleted = entry.Get(syncable::IS_DEL);
syncable::Id server_prev_id = entry.ComputePrevIdFromServerPosition(
entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_PARENT_ID));
bool needs_reinsertion = !parent_matches ||
server_prev_id != entry.Get(syncable::PREV_ID);
DVLOG_IF(1, needs_reinsertion) << "Insertion needed, server prev id "
<< " is " << server_prev_id << ", local prev id is "
<< entry.Get(syncable::PREV_ID);
const sync_pb::EntitySpecifics& specifics =
entry.Get(syncable::SPECIFICS);
const sync_pb::EntitySpecifics& server_specifics =
entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_SPECIFICS);
const sync_pb::EntitySpecifics& base_server_specifics =
entry.Get(syncable::BASE_SERVER_SPECIFICS);
std::string decrypted_specifics, decrypted_server_specifics;
bool specifics_match = false;
bool server_encrypted_with_default_key = false;
if (specifics.has_encrypted()) {
DCHECK(cryptographer->CanDecryptUsingDefaultKey(specifics.encrypted()));
decrypted_specifics = cryptographer->DecryptToString(
specifics.encrypted());
} else {
decrypted_specifics = specifics.SerializeAsString();
}
if (server_specifics.has_encrypted()) {
server_encrypted_with_default_key =
cryptographer->CanDecryptUsingDefaultKey(
server_specifics.encrypted());
decrypted_server_specifics = cryptographer->DecryptToString(
server_specifics.encrypted());
} else {
decrypted_server_specifics = server_specifics.SerializeAsString();
}
if (decrypted_server_specifics == decrypted_specifics &&
server_encrypted_with_default_key == specifics.has_encrypted()) {
specifics_match = true;
}
bool base_server_specifics_match = false;
if (server_specifics.has_encrypted() &&
IsRealDataType(GetModelTypeFromSpecifics(base_server_specifics))) {
std::string decrypted_base_server_specifics;
if (!base_server_specifics.has_encrypted()) {
decrypted_base_server_specifics =
base_server_specifics.SerializeAsString();
} else {
decrypted_base_server_specifics = cryptographer->DecryptToString(
base_server_specifics.encrypted());
}
if (decrypted_server_specifics == decrypted_base_server_specifics)
base_server_specifics_match = true;
}
if (entry.GetModelType() == syncable::NIGORI) {
sync_pb::EntitySpecifics specifics =
entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_SPECIFICS);
sync_pb::NigoriSpecifics* server_nigori = specifics.mutable_nigori();
cryptographer->UpdateNigoriFromEncryptedTypes(server_nigori);
if (cryptographer->is_ready()) {
cryptographer->GetKeys(server_nigori->mutable_encrypted());
server_nigori->set_using_explicit_passphrase(
entry.Get(syncable::SPECIFICS).nigori().
using_explicit_passphrase());
}
if (entry.Get(syncable::SPECIFICS).nigori().sync_tabs()) {
server_nigori->set_sync_tabs(true);
}
entry.Put(syncable::SPECIFICS, specifics);
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, merging nigori nodes: " << entry;
status->increment_num_server_overwrites();
OverwriteServerChanges(trans, &entry);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
NIGORI_MERGE,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
} else if (!entry_deleted && name_matches && parent_matches &&
specifics_match && !needs_reinsertion) {
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, everything matches, ignoring "
<< "changes for: " << entry;
OverwriteServerChanges(trans, &entry);
IgnoreLocalChanges(&entry);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
CHANGES_MATCH,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
} else if (base_server_specifics_match) {
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, ignoring server encryption "
<< " changes for: " << entry;
status->increment_num_server_overwrites();
OverwriteServerChanges(trans, &entry);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
IGNORE_ENCRYPTION,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
} else if (entry_deleted || !name_matches || !parent_matches) {
OverwriteServerChanges(trans, &entry);
status->increment_num_server_overwrites();
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, overwriting server changes "
<< "for: " << entry;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
OVERWRITE_SERVER,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
} else {
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, ignoring local changes for: "
<< entry;
IgnoreLocalChanges(&entry);
status->increment_num_local_overwrites();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
OVERWRITE_LOCAL,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
}
entry.Put(syncable::BASE_SERVER_SPECIFICS, sync_pb::EntitySpecifics());
return SYNC_PROGRESS;
} else { // SERVER_IS_DEL is true
if (entry.Get(syncable::IS_DIR)) {
Directory::ChildHandles children;
trans->directory()->GetChildHandlesById(trans,
entry.Get(syncable::ID),
&children);
if (0 != children.size()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Entry is a server deleted directory with local contents, "
<< "should be a hierarchy conflict. (race condition).";
return NO_SYNC_PROGRESS;
}
}
if (!entry.Get(syncable::UNIQUE_CLIENT_TAG).empty()) {
DCHECK_EQ(entry.Get(syncable::SERVER_VERSION), 0) << "For the server to "
"know to re-create, client-tagged items should revert to version 0 "
"when server-deleted.";
OverwriteServerChanges(trans, &entry);
status->increment_num_server_overwrites();
DVLOG(1) << "Resolving simple conflict, undeleting server entry: "
<< entry;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
OVERWRITE_SERVER,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
entry.Put(syncable::SERVER_VERSION, 0);
entry.Put(syncable::BASE_VERSION, 0);
} else {
SyncerUtil::SplitServerInformationIntoNewEntry(trans, &entry);
MutableEntry server_update(trans, syncable::GET_BY_ID, id);
CHECK(server_update.good());
CHECK(server_update.Get(syncable::META_HANDLE) !=
entry.Get(syncable::META_HANDLE))
<< server_update << entry;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Sync.ResolveSimpleConflict",
UNDELETE,
CONFLICT_RESOLUTION_SIZE);
}
return SYNC_PROGRESS;
}
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 170,791 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnReloadPrintersList() {
web_ui()->CallJavascriptFunction("reloadPrintersList");
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 105,847 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MojoResult Core::CreateSharedBufferWrapper(
base::SharedMemoryHandle shared_memory_handle,
size_t num_bytes,
bool read_only,
MojoHandle* mojo_wrapper_handle) {
DCHECK(num_bytes);
scoped_refptr<PlatformSharedBuffer> platform_buffer =
PlatformSharedBuffer::CreateFromSharedMemoryHandle(num_bytes, read_only,
shared_memory_handle);
if (!platform_buffer)
return MOJO_RESULT_UNKNOWN;
scoped_refptr<SharedBufferDispatcher> dispatcher;
MojoResult result = SharedBufferDispatcher::CreateFromPlatformSharedBuffer(
platform_buffer, &dispatcher);
if (result != MOJO_RESULT_OK)
return result;
MojoHandle h = AddDispatcher(dispatcher);
if (h == MOJO_HANDLE_INVALID)
return MOJO_RESULT_RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED;
*mojo_wrapper_handle = h;
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,586 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: is_in_line(netdissect_options *ndo, int indent)
{
return indent - 1 >= ndo->ndo_vflag && ndo->ndo_vflag < 3;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13044/HNCP: add DHCPv4-Data bounds checks
dhcpv4_print() in print-hncp.c had the same bug as dhcpv6_print(), apply
a fix along the same lines.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __weak ftrace_replace_code(int enable)
{
struct dyn_ftrace *rec;
struct ftrace_page *pg;
int failed;
if (unlikely(ftrace_disabled))
return;
do_for_each_ftrace_rec(pg, rec) {
failed = __ftrace_replace_code(rec, enable);
if (failed) {
ftrace_bug(failed, rec->ip);
/* Stop processing */
return;
}
} while_for_each_ftrace_rec();
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,217 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SyncConfigInfo::SyncConfigInfo()
: encrypt_all(false),
sync_everything(false),
payments_integration_enabled(false),
set_new_passphrase(false) {}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,221 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ip_vs_add_dest(struct ip_vs_service *svc, struct ip_vs_dest_user_kern *udest)
{
struct ip_vs_dest *dest;
union nf_inet_addr daddr;
__be16 dport = udest->port;
int ret;
EnterFunction(2);
if (udest->weight < 0) {
pr_err("%s(): server weight less than zero\n", __func__);
return -ERANGE;
}
if (udest->l_threshold > udest->u_threshold) {
pr_err("%s(): lower threshold is higher than upper threshold\n",
__func__);
return -ERANGE;
}
ip_vs_addr_copy(svc->af, &daddr, &udest->addr);
/*
* Check if the dest already exists in the list
*/
dest = ip_vs_lookup_dest(svc, &daddr, dport);
if (dest != NULL) {
IP_VS_DBG(1, "%s(): dest already exists\n", __func__);
return -EEXIST;
}
/*
* Check if the dest already exists in the trash and
* is from the same service
*/
dest = ip_vs_trash_get_dest(svc, &daddr, dport);
if (dest != NULL) {
IP_VS_DBG_BUF(3, "Get destination %s:%u from trash, "
"dest->refcnt=%d, service %u/%s:%u\n",
IP_VS_DBG_ADDR(svc->af, &daddr), ntohs(dport),
atomic_read(&dest->refcnt),
dest->vfwmark,
IP_VS_DBG_ADDR(svc->af, &dest->vaddr),
ntohs(dest->vport));
__ip_vs_update_dest(svc, dest, udest);
/*
* Get the destination from the trash
*/
list_del(&dest->n_list);
ip_vs_new_estimator(&dest->stats);
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
/*
* Wait until all other svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 1);
list_add(&dest->n_list, &svc->destinations);
svc->num_dests++;
/* call the update_service function of its scheduler */
if (svc->scheduler->update_service)
svc->scheduler->update_service(svc);
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
return 0;
}
/*
* Allocate and initialize the dest structure
*/
ret = ip_vs_new_dest(svc, udest, &dest);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
/*
* Add the dest entry into the list
*/
atomic_inc(&dest->refcnt);
write_lock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
/*
* Wait until all other svc users go away.
*/
IP_VS_WAIT_WHILE(atomic_read(&svc->usecnt) > 1);
list_add(&dest->n_list, &svc->destinations);
svc->num_dests++;
/* call the update_service function of its scheduler */
if (svc->scheduler->update_service)
svc->scheduler->update_service(svc);
write_unlock_bh(&__ip_vs_svc_lock);
LeaveFunction(2);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 29,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rend_check_authorization(rend_service_t *service,
const char *descriptor_cookie,
size_t cookie_len)
{
rend_authorized_client_t *auth_client = NULL;
tor_assert(service);
tor_assert(descriptor_cookie);
if (!service->clients) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't check authorization for a service that has no "
"authorized clients configured.");
return 0;
}
if (cookie_len != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Descriptor cookie is %lu bytes, but we expected "
"%lu bytes. Dropping cell.",
(unsigned long)cookie_len, (unsigned long)REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN);
return 0;
}
/* Look up client authorization by descriptor cookie. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, client, {
if (tor_memeq(client->descriptor_cookie, descriptor_cookie,
REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN)) {
auth_client = client;
break;
}
});
if (!auth_client) {
char descriptor_cookie_base64[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64];
base64_encode(descriptor_cookie_base64, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_base64),
descriptor_cookie, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN, 0);
log_info(LD_REND, "No authorization found for descriptor cookie '%s'! "
"Dropping cell!",
descriptor_cookie_base64);
return 0;
}
/* Allow the request. */
log_info(LD_REND, "Client %s authorized for service %s.",
auth_client->client_name, service->service_id);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 69,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SyncConfigInfo::~SyncConfigInfo() {}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 143,226 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int csnmp_oid_compare(oid_t const *left, oid_t const *right) {
return (
snmp_oid_compare(left->oid, left->oid_len, right->oid, right->oid_len));
}
Commit Message: snmp plugin: Fix double free of request PDU
snmp_sess_synch_response() always frees request PDU, in both case of request
error and success. If error condition occurs inside of `while (status == 0)`
loop, double free of `req` happens.
Issue: #2291
Signed-off-by: Florian Forster <octo@collectd.org>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 59,677 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int handle_mm_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long address, unsigned int flags)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *pte;
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
count_vm_event(PGFAULT);
mem_cgroup_count_vm_event(mm, PGFAULT);
/* do counter updates before entering really critical section. */
check_sync_rss_stat(current);
if (unlikely(is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma)))
return hugetlb_fault(mm, vma, address, flags);
retry:
pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
pud = pud_alloc(mm, pgd, address);
if (!pud)
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
pmd = pmd_alloc(mm, pud, address);
if (!pmd)
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma)) {
if (!vma->vm_ops)
return do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page(mm, vma, address,
pmd, flags);
} else {
pmd_t orig_pmd = *pmd;
int ret;
barrier();
if (pmd_trans_huge(orig_pmd)) {
unsigned int dirty = flags & FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
/*
* If the pmd is splitting, return and retry the
* the fault. Alternative: wait until the split
* is done, and goto retry.
*/
if (pmd_trans_splitting(orig_pmd))
return 0;
if (pmd_numa(orig_pmd))
return do_huge_pmd_numa_page(mm, vma, address,
orig_pmd, pmd);
if (dirty && !pmd_write(orig_pmd)) {
ret = do_huge_pmd_wp_page(mm, vma, address, pmd,
orig_pmd);
/*
* If COW results in an oom, the huge pmd will
* have been split, so retry the fault on the
* pte for a smaller charge.
*/
if (unlikely(ret & VM_FAULT_OOM))
goto retry;
return ret;
} else {
huge_pmd_set_accessed(mm, vma, address, pmd,
orig_pmd, dirty);
}
return 0;
}
}
if (pmd_numa(*pmd))
return do_pmd_numa_page(mm, vma, address, pmd);
/*
* Use __pte_alloc instead of pte_alloc_map, because we can't
* run pte_offset_map on the pmd, if an huge pmd could
* materialize from under us from a different thread.
*/
if (unlikely(pmd_none(*pmd)) &&
unlikely(__pte_alloc(mm, vma, pmd, address)))
return VM_FAULT_OOM;
/* if an huge pmd materialized from under us just retry later */
if (unlikely(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)))
return 0;
/*
* A regular pmd is established and it can't morph into a huge pmd
* from under us anymore at this point because we hold the mmap_sem
* read mode and khugepaged takes it in write mode. So now it's
* safe to run pte_offset_map().
*/
pte = pte_offset_map(pmd, address);
return handle_pte_fault(mm, vma, address, pte, pmd, flags);
}
Commit Message: vm: add vm_iomap_memory() helper function
Various drivers end up replicating the code to mmap() their memory
buffers into user space, and our core memory remapping function may be
very flexible but it is unnecessarily complicated for the common cases
to use.
Our internal VM uses pfn's ("page frame numbers") which simplifies
things for the VM, and allows us to pass physical addresses around in a
denser and more efficient format than passing a "phys_addr_t" around,
and having to shift it up and down by the page size. But it just means
that drivers end up doing that shifting instead at the interface level.
It also means that drivers end up mucking around with internal VM things
like the vma details (vm_pgoff, vm_start/end) way more than they really
need to.
So this just exports a function to map a certain physical memory range
into user space (using a phys_addr_t based interface that is much more
natural for a driver) and hides all the complexity from the driver.
Some drivers will still end up tweaking the vm_page_prot details for
things like prefetching or cacheability etc, but that's actually
relevant to the driver, rather than caring about what the page offset of
the mapping is into the particular IO memory region.
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 94,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_error_for_thread()
{
int *err_ptr;
pthread_once(&key_once, create_tls_key);
err_ptr = (int *)pthread_getspecific(key);
if (err_ptr == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return *err_ptr;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 16,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutomationProvider::HandleFindRequest(
int handle,
const AutomationMsg_Find_Params& params,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (!tab_tracker_->ContainsHandle(handle)) {
AutomationMsg_Find::WriteReplyParams(reply_message, -1, -1);
Send(reply_message);
return;
}
NavigationController* nav = tab_tracker_->GetResource(handle);
TabContents* tab_contents = nav->tab_contents();
SendFindRequest(tab_contents,
false,
params.search_string,
params.forward,
params.match_case,
params.find_next,
reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HeadlessPrintManager::OnPrintingFailed(int cookie) {
ReleaseJob(PRINTING_FAILED);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 149,831 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct redisCommand *lookupCommandOrOriginal(sds name) {
struct redisCommand *cmd = dictFetchValue(server.commands, name);
if (!cmd) cmd = dictFetchValue(server.orig_commands,name);
return cmd;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 70,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload;
path_put(path);
} else {
kfree(prep->payload[0]);
}
}
Commit Message: KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 69,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::AddedToWidget() {
views::Textfield::AddedToWidget();
scoped_observer_.Add(GetWidget()->GetCompositor());
}
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <jdonnelly@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 150,614 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *oidc_get_browser_state_hash(request_rec *r, const char *nonce) {
oidc_debug(r, "enter");
/* helper to hold to header values */
const char *value = NULL;
/* the hash context */
apr_sha1_ctx_t sha1;
/* Initialize the hash context */
apr_sha1_init(&sha1);
/* get the X_FORWARDED_FOR header value */
value = (char *) apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "X_FORWARDED_FOR");
/* if we have a value for this header, concat it to the hash input */
if (value != NULL)
apr_sha1_update(&sha1, value, strlen(value));
/* get the USER_AGENT header value */
value = (char *) apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "USER_AGENT");
/* if we have a value for this header, concat it to the hash input */
if (value != NULL)
apr_sha1_update(&sha1, value, strlen(value));
/* get the remote client IP address or host name */
/*
int remotehost_is_ip;
value = ap_get_remote_host(r->connection, r->per_dir_config,
REMOTE_NOLOOKUP, &remotehost_is_ip);
apr_sha1_update(&sha1, value, strlen(value));
*/
/* concat the nonce parameter to the hash input */
apr_sha1_update(&sha1, nonce, strlen(nonce));
/* finalize the hash input and calculate the resulting hash output */
unsigned char hash[OIDC_SHA1_LEN];
apr_sha1_final(hash, &sha1);
/* base64url-encode the resulting hash and return it */
char *result = NULL;
oidc_base64url_encode(r, &result, (const char *) hash, OIDC_SHA1_LEN, TRUE);
return result;
}
Commit Message: release 2.1.6 : security fix: scrub headers for "AuthType oauth20"
Signed-off-by: Hans Zandbelt <hans.zandbelt@zmartzone.eu>
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 68,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DictionaryValue* ClientToServerMessageToValue(
const sync_pb::ClientToServerMessage& proto,
bool include_specifics) {
DictionaryValue* value = new DictionaryValue();
SET_STR(share);
SET_INT32(protocol_version);
if (proto.has_commit()) {
value->Set("commit",
CommitMessageToValue(proto.commit(), include_specifics));
}
SET(get_updates, GetUpdatesMessageToValue);
SET_STR(store_birthday);
SET_BOOL(sync_problem_detected);
return value;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cine_read_packet(AVFormatContext *avctx, AVPacket *pkt)
{
CineDemuxContext *cine = avctx->priv_data;
AVStream *st = avctx->streams[0];
AVIOContext *pb = avctx->pb;
int n, size, ret;
if (cine->pts >= st->duration)
return AVERROR_EOF;
avio_seek(pb, st->index_entries[cine->pts].pos, SEEK_SET);
n = avio_rl32(pb);
if (n < 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avio_skip(pb, n - 8);
size = avio_rl32(pb);
ret = av_get_packet(pb, pkt, size);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
pkt->pts = cine->pts++;
pkt->stream_index = 0;
pkt->flags |= AV_PKT_FLAG_KEY;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/cinedec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.cine
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLFormControlElement::IsAutofocusable() const {
return FastHasAttribute(kAutofocusAttr) && SupportsAutofocus();
}
Commit Message: autofocus: Fix a crash with an autofocus element in a document without browsing context.
ShouldAutofocus() should check existence of the browsing context.
Otherwise, doc.TopFrameOrigin() returns null.
Before crrev.com/695830, ShouldAutofocus() was called only for
rendered elements. That is to say, the document always had
browsing context.
Bug: 1003228
Change-Id: I2a941c34e9707d44869a6d7585dc7fb9f06e3bf4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1800902
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#696291}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 136,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_yesno(BOOL skipping, BOOL yes, uschar *save_lookup, uschar **sptr,
uschar **yieldptr, int *sizeptr, int *ptrptr, uschar *type, BOOL *resetok)
{
int rc = 0;
uschar *s = *sptr; /* Local value */
uschar *sub1, *sub2;
/* If there are no following strings, we substitute the contents of $value for
lookups and for extractions in the success case. For the ${if item, the string
"true" is substituted. In the fail case, nothing is substituted for all three
items. */
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s == '}')
{
if (type[0] == 'i')
{
if (yes) *yieldptr = string_cat(*yieldptr, sizeptr, ptrptr, US"true", 4);
}
else
{
if (yes && lookup_value != NULL)
*yieldptr = string_cat(*yieldptr, sizeptr, ptrptr, lookup_value,
Ustrlen(lookup_value));
lookup_value = save_lookup;
}
s++;
goto RETURN;
}
/* The first following string must be braced. */
if (*s++ != '{') goto FAILED_CURLY;
/* Expand the first substring. Forced failures are noticed only if we actually
want this string. Set skipping in the call in the fail case (this will always
be the case if we were already skipping). */
sub1 = expand_string_internal(s, TRUE, &s, !yes, TRUE, resetok);
if (sub1 == NULL && (yes || !expand_string_forcedfail)) goto FAILED;
expand_string_forcedfail = FALSE;
if (*s++ != '}') goto FAILED_CURLY;
/* If we want the first string, add it to the output */
if (yes)
*yieldptr = string_cat(*yieldptr, sizeptr, ptrptr, sub1, Ustrlen(sub1));
/* If this is called from a lookup or an extract, we want to restore $value to
what it was at the start of the item, so that it has this value during the
second string expansion. For the call from "if" or "run" to this function,
save_lookup is set to lookup_value, so that this statement does nothing. */
lookup_value = save_lookup;
/* There now follows either another substring, or "fail", or nothing. This
time, forced failures are noticed only if we want the second string. We must
set skipping in the nested call if we don't want this string, or if we were
already skipping. */
while (isspace(*s)) s++;
if (*s == '{')
{
sub2 = expand_string_internal(s+1, TRUE, &s, yes || skipping, TRUE, resetok);
if (sub2 == NULL && (!yes || !expand_string_forcedfail)) goto FAILED;
expand_string_forcedfail = FALSE;
if (*s++ != '}') goto FAILED_CURLY;
/* If we want the second string, add it to the output */
if (!yes)
*yieldptr = string_cat(*yieldptr, sizeptr, ptrptr, sub2, Ustrlen(sub2));
}
/* If there is no second string, but the word "fail" is present when the use of
the second string is wanted, set a flag indicating it was a forced failure
rather than a syntactic error. Swallow the terminating } in case this is nested
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 12,668 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void serpent_encrypt(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
{
struct serpent_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
__serpent_encrypt(ctx, dst, src);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,343 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr3_leaf_add_work(
struct xfs_buf *bp,
struct xfs_attr3_icleaf_hdr *ichdr,
struct xfs_da_args *args,
int mapindex)
{
struct xfs_attr_leafblock *leaf;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_entry *entry;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_local *name_loc;
struct xfs_attr_leaf_name_remote *name_rmt;
struct xfs_mount *mp;
int tmp;
int i;
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_add_work(args);
leaf = bp->b_addr;
ASSERT(mapindex >= 0 && mapindex < XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAPSIZE);
ASSERT(args->index >= 0 && args->index <= ichdr->count);
/*
* Force open some space in the entry array and fill it in.
*/
entry = &xfs_attr3_leaf_entryp(leaf)[args->index];
if (args->index < ichdr->count) {
tmp = ichdr->count - args->index;
tmp *= sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t);
memmove(entry + 1, entry, tmp);
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, entry, tmp + sizeof(*entry)));
}
ichdr->count++;
/*
* Allocate space for the new string (at the end of the run).
*/
mp = args->trans->t_mountp;
ASSERT(ichdr->freemap[mapindex].base < args->geo->blksize);
ASSERT((ichdr->freemap[mapindex].base & 0x3) == 0);
ASSERT(ichdr->freemap[mapindex].size >=
xfs_attr_leaf_newentsize(args, NULL));
ASSERT(ichdr->freemap[mapindex].size < args->geo->blksize);
ASSERT((ichdr->freemap[mapindex].size & 0x3) == 0);
ichdr->freemap[mapindex].size -= xfs_attr_leaf_newentsize(args, &tmp);
entry->nameidx = cpu_to_be16(ichdr->freemap[mapindex].base +
ichdr->freemap[mapindex].size);
entry->hashval = cpu_to_be32(args->hashval);
entry->flags = tmp ? XFS_ATTR_LOCAL : 0;
entry->flags |= XFS_ATTR_NSP_ARGS_TO_ONDISK(args->flags);
if (args->op_flags & XFS_DA_OP_RENAME) {
entry->flags |= XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE;
if ((args->blkno2 == args->blkno) &&
(args->index2 <= args->index)) {
args->index2++;
}
}
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, entry, sizeof(*entry)));
ASSERT((args->index == 0) ||
(be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) >= be32_to_cpu((entry-1)->hashval)));
ASSERT((args->index == ichdr->count - 1) ||
(be32_to_cpu(entry->hashval) <= be32_to_cpu((entry+1)->hashval)));
/*
* For "remote" attribute values, simply note that we need to
* allocate space for the "remote" value. We can't actually
* allocate the extents in this transaction, and we can't decide
* which blocks they should be as we might allocate more blocks
* as part of this transaction (a split operation for example).
*/
if (entry->flags & XFS_ATTR_LOCAL) {
name_loc = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_local(leaf, args->index);
name_loc->namelen = args->namelen;
name_loc->valuelen = cpu_to_be16(args->valuelen);
memcpy((char *)name_loc->nameval, args->name, args->namelen);
memcpy((char *)&name_loc->nameval[args->namelen], args->value,
be16_to_cpu(name_loc->valuelen));
} else {
name_rmt = xfs_attr3_leaf_name_remote(leaf, args->index);
name_rmt->namelen = args->namelen;
memcpy((char *)name_rmt->name, args->name, args->namelen);
entry->flags |= XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE;
/* just in case */
name_rmt->valuelen = 0;
name_rmt->valueblk = 0;
args->rmtblkno = 1;
args->rmtblkcnt = xfs_attr3_rmt_blocks(mp, args->valuelen);
args->rmtvaluelen = args->valuelen;
}
xfs_trans_log_buf(args->trans, bp,
XFS_DA_LOGRANGE(leaf, xfs_attr3_leaf_name(leaf, args->index),
xfs_attr_leaf_entsize(leaf, args->index)));
/*
* Update the control info for this leaf node
*/
if (be16_to_cpu(entry->nameidx) < ichdr->firstused)
ichdr->firstused = be16_to_cpu(entry->nameidx);
ASSERT(ichdr->firstused >= ichdr->count * sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t)
+ xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_size(leaf));
tmp = (ichdr->count - 1) * sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t)
+ xfs_attr3_leaf_hdr_size(leaf);
for (i = 0; i < XFS_ATTR_LEAF_MAPSIZE; i++) {
if (ichdr->freemap[i].base == tmp) {
ichdr->freemap[i].base += sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t);
ichdr->freemap[i].size -= sizeof(xfs_attr_leaf_entry_t);
}
}
ichdr->usedbytes += xfs_attr_leaf_entsize(leaf, args->index);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp
xfs_attr3_leaf_create may have errored out before instantiating a buffer,
for example if the blkno is out of range. In that case there is no work
to do to remove it, and in fact xfs_da_shrink_inode will lead to an oops
if we try.
This also seems to fix a flaw where the original error from
xfs_attr3_leaf_create gets overwritten in the cleanup case, and it
removes a pointless assignment to bp which isn't used after this.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199969
Reported-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Xu, Wen <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodSequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodSequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArg", "TestObjectPython", ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length())), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(Vector<RefPtr<TestInterfaceEmpty> >, sequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArg, (toRefPtrNativeArray<TestInterfaceEmpty, V8TestInterfaceEmpty>(info[0], 1, info.GetIsolate())));
imp->voidMethodSequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArg(sequenceTestInterfaceEmptyArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,878 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::ShowPasswordGenerationBubble(
const gfx::Rect& rect,
const content::PasswordForm& form,
autofill::PasswordGenerator* password_generator) {
WebContents* web_contents = chrome::GetActiveWebContents(browser_.get());
if (!web_contents || !web_contents->GetContentNativeView()) {
return;
}
TabContents* tab_contents = TabContents::FromWebContents(web_contents);
if (!tab_contents)
return;
new PasswordGenerationBubbleGtk(rect, form, tab_contents, password_generator);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 118,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PluginModule::PluginCrashed() {
DCHECK(!is_crashed_); // Should only get one notification.
is_crashed_ = true;
for (PluginInstanceSet::iterator i = instances_.begin();
i != instances_.end(); ++i)
(*i)->InstanceCrashed();
if (lifetime_delegate_)
lifetime_delegate_->PluginModuleDead(this);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,439 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void udf_write_aext(struct inode *inode, struct extent_position *epos,
struct kernel_lb_addr *eloc, uint32_t elen, int inc)
{
int adsize;
uint8_t *ptr;
struct short_ad *sad;
struct long_ad *lad;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
if (!epos->bh)
ptr = iinfo->i_ext.i_data + epos->offset -
udf_file_entry_alloc_offset(inode) +
iinfo->i_lenEAttr;
else
ptr = epos->bh->b_data + epos->offset;
switch (iinfo->i_alloc_type) {
case ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_SHORT:
sad = (struct short_ad *)ptr;
sad->extLength = cpu_to_le32(elen);
sad->extPosition = cpu_to_le32(eloc->logicalBlockNum);
adsize = sizeof(struct short_ad);
break;
case ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_LONG:
lad = (struct long_ad *)ptr;
lad->extLength = cpu_to_le32(elen);
lad->extLocation = cpu_to_lelb(*eloc);
memset(lad->impUse, 0x00, sizeof(lad->impUse));
adsize = sizeof(struct long_ad);
break;
default:
return;
}
if (epos->bh) {
if (!UDF_QUERY_FLAG(inode->i_sb, UDF_FLAG_STRICT) ||
UDF_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_udfrev >= 0x0201) {
struct allocExtDesc *aed =
(struct allocExtDesc *)epos->bh->b_data;
udf_update_tag(epos->bh->b_data,
le32_to_cpu(aed->lengthAllocDescs) +
sizeof(struct allocExtDesc));
}
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(epos->bh, inode);
} else {
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
}
if (inc)
epos->offset += adsize;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 36,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _pam_parse (const pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
const char **argv, const char **maildir, size_t *hashcount)
{
int ctrl=0;
if (flags & PAM_SILENT) {
ctrl |= PAM_MAIL_SILENT;
}
*hashcount = 0;
/* step through arguments */
for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
/* generic options */
if (!strcmp(*argv,"debug"))
ctrl |= PAM_DEBUG_ARG;
else if (!strcmp(*argv,"quiet"))
ctrl |= PAM_QUIET_MAIL;
else if (!strcmp(*argv,"standard"))
ctrl |= PAM_STANDARD_MAIL | PAM_EMPTY_TOO;
else if (!strncmp(*argv,"dir=",4)) {
*maildir = 4 + *argv;
if (**maildir != '\0') {
D(("new mail directory: %s", *maildir));
ctrl |= PAM_NEW_MAIL_DIR;
} else {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
"dir= specification missing argument - ignored");
}
} else if (!strncmp(*argv,"hash=",5)) {
char *ep = NULL;
*hashcount = strtoul(*argv+5,&ep,10);
if (!ep) {
*hashcount = 0;
}
} else if (!strcmp(*argv,"close")) {
ctrl |= PAM_LOGOUT_TOO;
} else if (!strcmp(*argv,"nopen")) {
ctrl |= PAM_NO_LOGIN;
} else if (!strcmp(*argv,"noenv")) {
ctrl |= PAM_NO_ENV;
} else if (!strcmp(*argv,"empty")) {
ctrl |= PAM_EMPTY_TOO;
} else {
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unknown option: %s", *argv);
}
}
if ((*hashcount != 0) && !(ctrl & PAM_NEW_MAIL_DIR)) {
*maildir = DEFAULT_MAIL_DIRECTORY;
ctrl |= PAM_NEW_MAIL_DIR;
}
return ctrl;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,416 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CompositorImpl::SetVisible(bool visible) {
TRACE_EVENT1("cc", "CompositorImpl::SetVisible", "visible", visible);
if (!visible) {
DCHECK(host_->IsVisible());
CompositorDependencies::Get().OnCompositorHidden(this);
TearDownDisplayAndUnregisterRootFrameSink();
host_->SetVisible(false);
host_->ReleaseLayerTreeFrameSink();
has_layer_tree_frame_sink_ = false;
pending_frames_ = 0;
} else {
DCHECK(!host_->IsVisible());
CompositorDependencies::Get().OnCompositorVisible(this);
RegisterRootFrameSink();
host_->SetVisible(true);
has_submitted_frame_since_became_visible_ = false;
if (layer_tree_frame_sink_request_pending_)
HandlePendingLayerTreeFrameSinkRequest();
}
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID: | 0 | 130,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool handle_abnormal_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, gfn_t gfn,
pfn_t pfn, unsigned access, int *ret_val)
{
bool ret = true;
/* The pfn is invalid, report the error! */
if (unlikely(is_error_pfn(pfn))) {
*ret_val = kvm_handle_bad_page(vcpu, gfn, pfn);
goto exit;
}
if (unlikely(is_noslot_pfn(pfn)))
vcpu_cache_mmio_info(vcpu, gva, gfn, access);
ret = false;
exit:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,425 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void unsignedLongLongAttrAttrSetter(v8::Local<v8::String> name, v8::Local<v8::Value> value, const v8::AccessorInfo& info)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.unsignedLongLongAttr._set");
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(info.Holder());
unsigned long long v = toInt64(value);
imp->setUnsignedLongLongAttr(WTF::getPtr(v));
return;
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 109,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int arg_match(struct arg *arg_, const struct arg_def *def, char **argv) {
struct arg arg;
if (!argv[0] || argv[0][0] != '-')
return 0;
arg = arg_init(argv);
if (def->short_name
&& strlen(arg.argv[0]) == strlen(def->short_name) + 1
&& !strcmp(arg.argv[0] + 1, def->short_name)) {
arg.name = arg.argv[0] + 1;
arg.val = def->has_val ? arg.argv[1] : NULL;
arg.argv_step = def->has_val ? 2 : 1;
} else if (def->long_name) {
const size_t name_len = strlen(def->long_name);
if (strlen(arg.argv[0]) >= name_len + 2
&& arg.argv[0][1] == '-'
&& !strncmp(arg.argv[0] + 2, def->long_name, name_len)
&& (arg.argv[0][name_len + 2] == '='
|| arg.argv[0][name_len + 2] == '\0')) {
arg.name = arg.argv[0] + 2;
arg.val = arg.name[name_len] == '=' ? arg.name + name_len + 1 : NULL;
arg.argv_step = 1;
}
}
if (arg.name && !arg.val && def->has_val)
die("Error: option %s requires argument.\n", arg.name);
if (arg.name && arg.val && !def->has_val)
die("Error: option %s requires no argument.\n", arg.name);
if (arg.name
&& (arg.val || !def->has_val)) {
arg.def = def;
*arg_ = arg;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,334 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_opendata_put(struct nfs4_opendata *p)
{
if (p != NULL)
kref_put(&p->kref, nfs4_opendata_free);
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::SetQueryCallback(unsigned int query_client_id,
base::OnceClosure callback) {
QueryManager::Query* query = query_manager_->GetQuery(query_client_id);
if (query) {
query->AddCallback(std::move(callback));
} else {
VLOG(1) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::SetQueryCallback: No query with ID "
<< query_client_id << ". Running the callback immediately.";
std::move(callback).Run();
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform4fv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
const FlexibleFloat32ArrayView& v) {
WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform4fv(location, v);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_vm_shutdown(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
{
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintViewManager::OnSetupScriptedPrintPreview(
content::RenderFrameHost* rfh,
IPC::Message* reply_msg) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
auto& map = g_scripted_print_preview_closure_map.Get();
content::RenderProcessHost* rph = rfh->GetProcess();
if (base::ContainsKey(map, rph)) {
rfh->Send(reply_msg);
return;
}
if (print_preview_state_ != NOT_PREVIEWING) {
rfh->Send(reply_msg);
return;
}
PrintPreviewDialogController* dialog_controller =
PrintPreviewDialogController::GetInstance();
if (!dialog_controller) {
rfh->Send(reply_msg);
return;
}
DCHECK(!print_preview_rfh_);
print_preview_rfh_ = rfh;
print_preview_state_ = SCRIPTED_PREVIEW;
map[rph] = base::Bind(&PrintViewManager::OnScriptedPrintPreviewReply,
base::Unretained(this), reply_msg);
scripted_print_preview_rph_ = rph;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,613 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gama_modification_init(gama_modification *me, png_modifier *pm, double gammad)
{
double g;
modification_init(&me->this);
me->this.chunk = CHUNK_gAMA;
me->this.modify_fn = gama_modify;
me->this.add = CHUNK_PLTE;
g = fix(gammad);
me->gamma = (png_fixed_point)g;
me->this.next = pm->modifications;
pm->modifications = &me->this;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gchar *get_malloced_string_from_text_view(GtkTextView *tv)
{
GtkTextBuffer *buffer = gtk_text_view_get_buffer(tv);
GtkTextIter start;
GtkTextIter end;
gtk_text_buffer_get_start_iter(buffer, &start);
gtk_text_buffer_get_end_iter(buffer, &end);
return gtk_text_buffer_get_text(buffer, &start, &end, FALSE);
}
Commit Message: wizard: fix save users changes after reviewing dump dir files
If the user reviewed the dump dir's files during reporting the crash, the
changes was thrown away and original data was passed to the bugzilla bug
report.
report-gtk saves the first text view buffer and then reloads data from the
reported problem directory, which causes that the changes made to those text
views are thrown away.
Function save_text_if_changed(), except of saving text, also reload the files
from dump dir and update gui state from the dump dir. The commit moves the
reloading and updating gui functions away from this function.
Related to rhbz#1270235
Signed-off-by: Matej Habrnal <mhabrnal@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 42,815 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void js_copy(js_State *J, int idx)
{
CHECKSTACK(1);
STACK[TOP] = *stackidx(J, idx);
++TOP;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,417 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vhost_net_flush(struct vhost_net *n)
{
vhost_net_flush_vq(n, VHOST_NET_VQ_TX);
vhost_net_flush_vq(n, VHOST_NET_VQ_RX);
if (n->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX].ubufs) {
mutex_lock(&n->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX].vq.mutex);
n->tx_flush = true;
mutex_unlock(&n->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX].vq.mutex);
/* Wait for all lower device DMAs done. */
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(n->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX].ubufs);
mutex_lock(&n->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX].vq.mutex);
n->tx_flush = false;
atomic_set(&n->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX].ubufs->refcount, 1);
mutex_unlock(&n->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX].vq.mutex);
}
}
Commit Message: vhost: fix total length when packets are too short
When mergeable buffers are disabled, and the
incoming packet is too large for the rx buffer,
get_rx_bufs returns success.
This was intentional in order for make recvmsg
truncate the packet and then handle_rx would
detect err != sock_len and drop it.
Unfortunately we pass the original sock_len to
recvmsg - which means we use parts of iov not fully
validated.
Fix this up by detecting this overrun and doing packet drop
immediately.
CVE-2014-0077
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,948 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int finish_automount(struct vfsmount *m, struct path *path)
{
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(m);
int err;
/* The new mount record should have at least 2 refs to prevent it being
* expired before we get a chance to add it
*/
BUG_ON(mnt_get_count(mnt) < 2);
if (m->mnt_sb == path->mnt->mnt_sb &&
m->mnt_root == path->dentry) {
err = -ELOOP;
goto fail;
}
err = do_add_mount(mnt, path, path->mnt->mnt_flags | MNT_SHRINKABLE);
if (!err)
return 0;
fail:
/* remove m from any expiration list it may be on */
if (!list_empty(&mnt->mnt_expire)) {
namespace_lock();
list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_expire);
namespace_unlock();
}
mntput(m);
mntput(m);
return err;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dgram_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags)
{
struct dgram_sock *ro = dgram_sk(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
ro->dst_addr.addr_type = IEEE802154_ADDR_LONG;
memset(&ro->dst_addr.hwaddr, 0xff, sizeof(ro->dst_addr.hwaddr));
release_sock(sk);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <mpb.mail@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 40,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_mux_hrtimer_restart(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx)
{
struct hrtimer *timer = &cpuctx->hrtimer;
struct pmu *pmu = cpuctx->ctx.pmu;
unsigned long flags;
/* not for SW PMU */
if (pmu->task_ctx_nr == perf_sw_context)
return 0;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpuctx->hrtimer_lock, flags);
if (!cpuctx->hrtimer_active) {
cpuctx->hrtimer_active = 1;
hrtimer_forward_now(timer, cpuctx->hrtimer_interval);
hrtimer_start_expires(timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS_PINNED);
}
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpuctx->hrtimer_lock, flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ExtensionApiTest::RunExtensionSubtest(const std::string& extension_name,
const std::string& page_url) {
return RunExtensionSubtest(extension_name, page_url, kFlagEnableFileAccess);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: addConstraint( const char *constraint )
{
static bool has_clause = false;
if( has_clause ) {
global_constraint += " && (";
} else {
global_constraint += "(";
}
global_constraint += constraint;
global_constraint += ")";
has_clause = true;
has_constraint = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,300 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ApplyLayoutTestDefaultPreferences(WebPreferences* prefs) {
const base::CommandLine& command_line =
*base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
prefs->allow_universal_access_from_file_urls = true;
prefs->dom_paste_enabled = true;
prefs->javascript_can_access_clipboard = true;
prefs->xslt_enabled = true;
prefs->xss_auditor_enabled = false;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
prefs->editing_behavior = EDITING_BEHAVIOR_MAC;
#else
prefs->editing_behavior = EDITING_BEHAVIOR_WIN;
#endif
prefs->java_enabled = false;
prefs->application_cache_enabled = true;
prefs->tabs_to_links = false;
prefs->hyperlink_auditing_enabled = false;
prefs->allow_displaying_insecure_content = true;
prefs->allow_running_insecure_content = false;
prefs->disable_reading_from_canvas = false;
prefs->strict_mixed_content_checking = false;
prefs->strict_powerful_feature_restrictions = false;
prefs->webgl_errors_to_console_enabled = false;
base::string16 serif;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
prefs->cursive_font_family_map[kCommonScript] =
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Apple Chancery");
prefs->fantasy_font_family_map[kCommonScript] = base::ASCIIToUTF16("Papyrus");
serif = base::ASCIIToUTF16("Times");
#else
prefs->cursive_font_family_map[kCommonScript] =
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Comic Sans MS");
prefs->fantasy_font_family_map[kCommonScript] = base::ASCIIToUTF16("Impact");
serif = base::ASCIIToUTF16("times new roman");
#endif
prefs->serif_font_family_map[kCommonScript] = serif;
prefs->standard_font_family_map[kCommonScript] = serif;
prefs->fixed_font_family_map[kCommonScript] = base::ASCIIToUTF16("Courier");
prefs->sans_serif_font_family_map[kCommonScript] =
base::ASCIIToUTF16("Helvetica");
prefs->minimum_logical_font_size = 9;
prefs->asynchronous_spell_checking_enabled = false;
prefs->accelerated_2d_canvas_enabled =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableAccelerated2DCanvas);
prefs->mock_scrollbars_enabled = false;
prefs->smart_insert_delete_enabled = true;
prefs->minimum_accelerated_2d_canvas_size = 0;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
prefs->text_autosizing_enabled = false;
#endif
prefs->viewport_enabled = false;
prefs->default_minimum_page_scale_factor = 1.f;
prefs->default_maximum_page_scale_factor = 4.f;
}
Commit Message: content: Rename webkit_test_helpers.{cc,h} to blink_test_helpers.{cc,h}
Now that webkit/ is gone, we are preparing ourselves for the merge of
third_party/WebKit into //blink.
BUG=None
BUG=content_shell && content_unittests
R=avi@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1118183003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#328202}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,539 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WebContentsImpl* WebContentsImpl::CreateWithOpener(
const WebContents::CreateParams& params,
FrameTreeNode* opener) {
TRACE_EVENT0("browser", "WebContentsImpl::CreateWithOpener");
WebContentsImpl* new_contents = new WebContentsImpl(params.browser_context);
FrameTreeNode* new_root = new_contents->GetFrameTree()->root();
if (!params.opener_suppressed && opener) {
new_root->SetOpener(opener);
new_contents->created_with_opener_ = true;
}
if (opener) {
blink::WebSandboxFlags opener_flags = opener->effective_sandbox_flags();
const blink::WebSandboxFlags inherit_flag =
blink::WebSandboxFlags::PropagatesToAuxiliaryBrowsingContexts;
if ((opener_flags & inherit_flag) == inherit_flag) {
new_root->SetPendingSandboxFlags(opener_flags);
new_root->CommitPendingSandboxFlags();
}
}
if (params.created_with_opener)
new_contents->created_with_opener_ = true;
if (params.guest_delegate) {
BrowserPluginGuest::Create(new_contents, params.guest_delegate);
new_contents->is_subframe_ = true;
}
new_contents->Init(params);
return new_contents;
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::absoluteRects(Vector<IntRect>& rects, const LayoutPoint& accumulatedOffset) const
{
rects.append(pixelSnappedIntRect(accumulatedOffset, size()));
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: poppler_rectangle_copy (PopplerRectangle *rectangle)
{
PopplerRectangle *new_rectangle;
g_return_val_if_fail (rectangle != NULL, NULL);
new_rectangle = g_new (PopplerRectangle, 1);
*new_rectangle = *rectangle;
return new_rectangle;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::paintBoxDecorations(PaintInfo& paintInfo, const LayoutPoint& paintOffset)
{
if (!paintInfo.shouldPaintWithinRoot(this))
return;
LayoutRect paintRect = borderBoxRect();
paintRect.moveBy(paintOffset);
paintBoxDecorationsWithRect(paintInfo, paintOffset, paintRect);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,567 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void release_pebs_buffer(int cpu)
{
struct debug_store *ds = per_cpu(cpu_hw_events, cpu).ds;
if (!ds || !x86_pmu.pebs)
return;
kfree((void *)(unsigned long)ds->pebs_buffer_base);
ds->pebs_buffer_base = 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Location::reload(LocalDOMWindow* current_window) {
if (!IsAttached())
return;
if (GetDocument()->Url().ProtocolIsJavaScript())
return;
ToLocalDOMWindow(dom_window_)
->GetFrame()
->Reload(WebFrameLoadType::kReload,
ClientRedirectPolicy::kClientRedirect);
}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vc4_reset(struct drm_device *dev)
{
struct vc4_dev *vc4 = to_vc4_dev(dev);
DRM_INFO("Resetting GPU.\n");
mutex_lock(&vc4->power_lock);
if (vc4->power_refcount) {
/* Power the device off and back on the by dropping the
* reference on runtime PM.
*/
pm_runtime_put_sync_suspend(&vc4->v3d->pdev->dev);
pm_runtime_get_sync(&vc4->v3d->pdev->dev);
}
mutex_unlock(&vc4->power_lock);
vc4_irq_reset(dev);
/* Rearm the hangcheck -- another job might have been waiting
* for our hung one to get kicked off, and vc4_irq_reset()
* would have started it.
*/
vc4_queue_hangcheck(dev);
}
Commit Message: drm/vc4: Return -EINVAL on the overflow checks failing.
By failing to set the errno, we'd continue on to trying to set up the
RCL, and then oops on trying to dereference the tile_bo that binning
validation should have set up.
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Fixes: d5b1a78a772f ("drm/vc4: Add support for drawing 3D frames.")
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 68,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arcmsr_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct Scsi_Host *host = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
struct AdapterControlBlock *acb =
(struct AdapterControlBlock *) host->hostdata;
int poll_count = 0;
arcmsr_free_sysfs_attr(acb);
scsi_remove_host(host);
flush_work(&acb->arcmsr_do_message_isr_bh);
del_timer_sync(&acb->eternal_timer);
arcmsr_disable_outbound_ints(acb);
arcmsr_stop_adapter_bgrb(acb);
arcmsr_flush_adapter_cache(acb);
acb->acb_flags |= ACB_F_SCSISTOPADAPTER;
acb->acb_flags &= ~ACB_F_IOP_INITED;
for (poll_count = 0; poll_count < ARCMSR_MAX_OUTSTANDING_CMD; poll_count++){
if (!atomic_read(&acb->ccboutstandingcount))
break;
arcmsr_interrupt(acb);/* FIXME: need spinlock */
msleep(25);
}
if (atomic_read(&acb->ccboutstandingcount)) {
int i;
arcmsr_abort_allcmd(acb);
arcmsr_done4abort_postqueue(acb);
for (i = 0; i < ARCMSR_MAX_FREECCB_NUM; i++) {
struct CommandControlBlock *ccb = acb->pccb_pool[i];
if (ccb->startdone == ARCMSR_CCB_START) {
ccb->startdone = ARCMSR_CCB_ABORTED;
ccb->pcmd->result = DID_ABORT << 16;
arcmsr_ccb_complete(ccb);
}
}
}
arcmsr_free_irq(pdev, acb);
arcmsr_free_ccb_pool(acb);
arcmsr_free_mu(acb);
arcmsr_unmap_pciregion(acb);
pci_release_regions(pdev);
scsi_host_put(host);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: syncer::SyncData GetSyncDataFromSyncItem(
const AppListSyncableService::SyncItem* item) {
sync_pb::EntitySpecifics specifics;
GetSyncSpecificsFromSyncItem(item, specifics.mutable_app_list());
return syncer::SyncData::CreateLocalData(item->item_id,
item->item_id,
specifics);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static TT_F26Dot6 Project_y( EXEC_OPS TT_F26Dot6 Vx, TT_F26Dot6 Vy )
{ (void)exc; (void)Vx;
return Vy;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnPrintPreviewFailed(int document_cookie) {
StopWorker(document_cookie);
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
print_preview_ui->OnPrintPreviewFailed();
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __comps_objmrtree_set(COMPS_ObjMRTree *rt, char *key,
size_t len, COMPS_Object *ndata) {
static COMPS_HSListItem *it;
COMPS_HSList *subnodes;
COMPS_ObjMRTreeData *rtd;
static COMPS_ObjMRTreeData *rtdata;
size_t _len, offset=0;
unsigned x, found = 0;
char ended;//, tmpch;
if (rt->subnodes == NULL)
return;
subnodes = rt->subnodes;
while (offset != len)
{
found = 0;
for (it = subnodes->first; it != NULL; it = it->next) {
if (((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key[0] == key[offset]) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) { // not found in subnodes; create new subnode
rtd = comps_objmrtree_data_create(key+offset, ndata);
comps_hslist_append(subnodes, rtd, 0);
rt->len++;
return;
} else {
rtdata = (COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data;
ended = 0;
for (x=1; ;x++) {
if (rtdata->key[x] == 0) ended += 1;
if (x == len - offset) ended += 2;
if (ended != 0) break;
if (key[offset+x] != rtdata->key[x]) break;
}
if (ended == 3) { //keys equals; append new data
comps_objlist_append_x(rtdata->data, ndata);
rt->len++;
return;
} else if (ended == 2) { //global key ends first; make global leaf
comps_hslist_remove(subnodes, it);
it->next = NULL;
rtd = comps_objmrtree_data_create(key+offset, ndata);
comps_hslist_append(subnodes, rtd, 0);
((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)subnodes->last->data)->subnodes->last = it;
((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)subnodes->last->data)->subnodes->first = it;
_len = strlen(key + offset);
memmove(rtdata->key,rtdata->key + _len,
strlen(rtdata->key) - _len);
rtdata->key[strlen(rtdata->key) - _len] = 0;
rtdata->key = realloc(rtdata->key,
sizeof(char)* (strlen(rtdata->key)+1));
rt->len++;
return;
} else if (ended == 1) { //local key ends first; go deeper
subnodes = rtdata->subnodes;
offset += x;
} else { /* keys differ */
COMPS_ObjList *tmpdata = rtdata->data;
COMPS_HSList *tmphslist = rtdata->subnodes;
rtdata->subnodes = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(rtdata->subnodes, NULL, NULL,
&comps_objmrtree_data_destroy_v);
int cmpret = strcmp(key+offset+x, rtdata->key+x);
rtdata->data = COMPS_OBJECT_CREATE(COMPS_ObjList, NULL);
if (cmpret > 0) {
rtd = comps_objmrtree_data_create(rtdata->key+x,
(COMPS_Object*)tmpdata);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtd->subnodes);
rtd->subnodes = tmphslist;
comps_hslist_append(rtdata->subnodes, rtd, 0);
rtd = comps_objmrtree_data_create(key+offset+x,
(COMPS_Object*)ndata);
comps_hslist_append(rtdata->subnodes, rtd, 0);
} else {
rtd = comps_objmrtree_data_create(key+offset+x,
(COMPS_Object*)ndata);
comps_hslist_append(rtdata->subnodes, rtd, 0);
rtd = comps_objmrtree_data_create(rtdata->key+x,
(COMPS_Object*)tmpdata);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtd->subnodes);
rtd->subnodes = tmphslist;
comps_hslist_append(rtdata->subnodes, rtd, 0);
}
rtdata->key = realloc(rtdata->key, sizeof(char)*(x+1));
rtdata->key[x] = 0;
rt->len++;
return;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void SetMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "set");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
ScriptState* script_state = ScriptState::ForRelevantRealm(info);
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 2)) {
exception_state.ThrowTypeError(ExceptionMessages::NotEnoughArguments(2, info.Length()));
return;
}
int32_t key;
StringOrDouble value;
key = NativeValueTraits<IDLLongEnforceRange>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
V8StringOrDouble::ToImpl(info.GetIsolate(), info[1], value, UnionTypeConversionMode::kNotNullable, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
TestObject* result = impl->setForBinding(script_state, key, value, exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException()) {
return;
}
V8SetReturnValue(info, result);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int pmcraid_reset_enable_ioa(struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance)
{
u32 intrs;
pmcraid_reinit_buffers(pinstance);
intrs = pmcraid_read_interrupts(pinstance);
pmcraid_enable_interrupts(pinstance, PMCRAID_PCI_INTERRUPTS);
if (intrs & INTRS_TRANSITION_TO_OPERATIONAL) {
if (!pinstance->interrupt_mode) {
iowrite32(INTRS_TRANSITION_TO_OPERATIONAL,
pinstance->int_regs.
ioa_host_interrupt_mask_reg);
iowrite32(INTRS_TRANSITION_TO_OPERATIONAL,
pinstance->int_regs.ioa_host_interrupt_clr_reg);
}
return 1;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 26,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_io_bus_destroy(struct kvm_io_bus *bus)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < bus->dev_count; i++) {
struct kvm_io_device *pos = bus->range[i].dev;
kvm_iodevice_destructor(pos);
}
kfree(bus);
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
{
int i;
debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid);
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
return s;
}
error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 14,404 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __be32 flow_get_u32_src(const struct flow_keys *flow)
{
switch (flow->control.addr_type) {
case FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS:
return flow->addrs.v4addrs.src;
case FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV6_ADDRS:
return (__force __be32)ipv6_addr_hash(
&flow->addrs.v6addrs.src);
case FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_TIPC_ADDRS:
return flow->addrs.tipcaddrs.srcnode;
default:
return 0;
}
}
Commit Message: flow_dissector: Jump to exit code in __skb_flow_dissect
Instead of returning immediately (on a parsing failure for instance) we
jump to cleanup code. This always sets protocol values in key_control
(even on a failure there is still valid information in the key_tags that
was set before the problem was hit).
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,959 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::threadedParsingEnabledForTesting()
{
return s_threadedParsingEnabledForTesting;
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btif_remote_properties_evt(bt_status_t status, bt_bdaddr_t *remote_addr,
uint32_t num_props, bt_property_t *p_props)
{
HAL_CBACK(bt_hal_cbacks, remote_device_properties_cb,
status, remote_addr, num_props, p_props);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int if6_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp = (struct inet6_ifaddr *)v;
seq_printf(seq, "%pi6 %02x %02x %02x %02x %8s\n",
&ifp->addr,
ifp->idev->dev->ifindex,
ifp->prefix_len,
ifp->scope,
(u8) ifp->flags,
ifp->idev->dev->name);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,820 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ProfileSyncService::FirstSetupInProgress() const {
return !HasSyncSetupCompleted() && setup_in_progress_;
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 104,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_openssl_parse_config(struct php_x509_request * req, zval * optional_args) /* {{{ */
{
char * str;
zval * item;
SET_OPTIONAL_STRING_ARG("config", req->config_filename, default_ssl_conf_filename);
SET_OPTIONAL_STRING_ARG("config_section_name", req->section_name, "req");
req->global_config = CONF_load(NULL, default_ssl_conf_filename, NULL);
if (req->global_config == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
req->req_config = CONF_load(NULL, req->config_filename, NULL);
if (req->req_config == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
return FAILURE;
}
/* read in the oids */
str = CONF_get_string(req->req_config, NULL, "oid_file");
if (str == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
} else if (!php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(str)) {
BIO *oid_bio = BIO_new_file(str, "r");
if (oid_bio) {
OBJ_create_objects(oid_bio);
BIO_free(oid_bio);
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
}
if (add_oid_section(req) == FAILURE) {
return FAILURE;
}
SET_OPTIONAL_STRING_ARG("digest_alg", req->digest_name,
CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "default_md"));
SET_OPTIONAL_STRING_ARG("x509_extensions", req->extensions_section,
CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "x509_extensions"));
SET_OPTIONAL_STRING_ARG("req_extensions", req->request_extensions_section,
CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "req_extensions"));
SET_OPTIONAL_LONG_ARG("private_key_bits", req->priv_key_bits,
CONF_get_number(req->req_config, req->section_name, "default_bits"));
SET_OPTIONAL_LONG_ARG("private_key_type", req->priv_key_type, OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DEFAULT);
if (optional_args && (item = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(optional_args), "encrypt_key", sizeof("encrypt_key")-1)) != NULL) {
req->priv_key_encrypt = Z_TYPE_P(item) == IS_TRUE ? 1 : 0;
} else {
str = CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "encrypt_rsa_key");
if (str == NULL) {
str = CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "encrypt_key");
/* it is sure that there are some errrors as str was NULL for encrypt_rsa_key */
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
if (str != NULL && strcmp(str, "no") == 0) {
req->priv_key_encrypt = 0;
} else {
req->priv_key_encrypt = 1;
}
}
if (req->priv_key_encrypt && optional_args && (item = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(optional_args), "encrypt_key_cipher", sizeof("encrypt_key_cipher")-1)) != NULL
&& Z_TYPE_P(item) == IS_LONG) {
zend_long cipher_algo = Z_LVAL_P(item);
const EVP_CIPHER* cipher = php_openssl_get_evp_cipher_from_algo(cipher_algo);
if (cipher == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown cipher algorithm for private key.");
return FAILURE;
} else {
req->priv_key_encrypt_cipher = cipher;
}
} else {
req->priv_key_encrypt_cipher = NULL;
}
/* digest alg */
if (req->digest_name == NULL) {
req->digest_name = CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "default_md");
}
if (req->digest_name != NULL) {
req->digest = req->md_alg = EVP_get_digestbyname(req->digest_name);
} else {
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
if (req->md_alg == NULL) {
req->md_alg = req->digest = EVP_sha1();
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
PHP_SSL_CONFIG_SYNTAX_CHECK(extensions_section);
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_EC
/* set the ec group curve name */
req->curve_name = NID_undef;
if (optional_args && (item = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(optional_args), "curve_name", sizeof("curve_name")-1)) != NULL
&& Z_TYPE_P(item) == IS_STRING) {
req->curve_name = OBJ_sn2nid(Z_STRVAL_P(item));
if (req->curve_name == NID_undef) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unknown elliptic curve (short) name %s", Z_STRVAL_P(item));
return FAILURE;
}
}
#endif
/* set the string mask */
str = CONF_get_string(req->req_config, req->section_name, "string_mask");
if (str == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
} else if (!ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(str)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid global string mask setting %s", str);
return FAILURE;
}
PHP_SSL_CONFIG_SYNTAX_CHECK(request_extensions_section);
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfnl_err_del(struct nfnl_err *nfnl_err)
{
list_del(&nfnl_err->head);
kfree(nfnl_err);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nfnetlink: correctly validate length of batch messages
If nlh->nlmsg_len is zero then an infinite loop is triggered because
'skb_pull(skb, msglen);' pulls zero bytes.
The calculation in nlmsg_len() underflows if 'nlh->nlmsg_len <
NLMSG_HDRLEN' which bypasses the length validation and will later
trigger an out-of-bound read.
If the length validation does fail then the malformed batch message is
copied back to userspace. However, we cannot do this because the
nlh->nlmsg_len can be invalid. This leads to an out-of-bounds read in
netlink_ack:
[ 41.455421] ==================================================================
[ 41.456431] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy+0x1d/0x40 at addr ffff880119e79340
[ 41.456431] Read of size 4294967280 by task a.out/987
[ 41.456431] =============================================================================
[ 41.456431] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
[ 41.456431] -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
...
[ 41.456431] Bytes b4 ffff880119e79310: 00 00 00 00 d5 03 00 00 b0 fb fe ff 00 00 00 00 ................
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79320: 20 00 00 00 10 00 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...............
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79330: 14 00 0a 00 01 03 fc 40 45 56 11 22 33 10 00 05 .......@EV."3...
[ 41.456431] Object ffff880119e79340: f0 ff ff ff 88 99 aa bb 00 14 00 0a 00 06 fe fb ................
^^ start of batch nlmsg with
nlmsg_len=4294967280
...
[ 41.456431] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 41.456431] >ffff880119e79500: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 41.456431] ^
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 41.456431] ffff880119e79600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 41.456431] ==================================================================
Fix this with better validation of nlh->nlmsg_len and by setting
NFNL_BATCH_FAILURE if any batch message fails length validation.
CAP_NET_ADMIN is required to trigger the bugs.
Fixes: 9ea2aa8b7dba ("netfilter: nfnetlink: validate nfnetlink header from batch")
Signed-off-by: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 49,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sas_ata_task_done(struct sas_task *task)
{
struct ata_queued_cmd *qc = task->uldd_task;
struct domain_device *dev = task->dev;
struct task_status_struct *stat = &task->task_status;
struct ata_task_resp *resp = (struct ata_task_resp *)stat->buf;
struct sas_ha_struct *sas_ha = dev->port->ha;
enum ata_completion_errors ac;
unsigned long flags;
struct ata_link *link;
struct ata_port *ap;
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->done_lock, flags);
if (test_bit(SAS_HA_FROZEN, &sas_ha->state))
task = NULL;
else if (qc && qc->scsicmd)
ASSIGN_SAS_TASK(qc->scsicmd, NULL);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->done_lock, flags);
/* check if libsas-eh got to the task before us */
if (unlikely(!task))
return;
if (!qc)
goto qc_already_gone;
ap = qc->ap;
link = &ap->link;
spin_lock_irqsave(ap->lock, flags);
/* check if we lost the race with libata/sas_ata_post_internal() */
if (unlikely(ap->pflags & ATA_PFLAG_FROZEN)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(ap->lock, flags);
if (qc->scsicmd)
goto qc_already_gone;
else {
/* if eh is not involved and the port is frozen then the
* ata internal abort process has taken responsibility
* for this sas_task
*/
return;
}
}
if (stat->stat == SAS_PROTO_RESPONSE || stat->stat == SAM_STAT_GOOD ||
((stat->stat == SAM_STAT_CHECK_CONDITION &&
dev->sata_dev.class == ATA_DEV_ATAPI))) {
memcpy(dev->sata_dev.fis, resp->ending_fis, ATA_RESP_FIS_SIZE);
if (!link->sactive) {
qc->err_mask |= ac_err_mask(dev->sata_dev.fis[2]);
} else {
link->eh_info.err_mask |= ac_err_mask(dev->sata_dev.fis[2]);
if (unlikely(link->eh_info.err_mask))
qc->flags |= ATA_QCFLAG_FAILED;
}
} else {
ac = sas_to_ata_err(stat);
if (ac) {
SAS_DPRINTK("%s: SAS error %x\n", __func__,
stat->stat);
/* We saw a SAS error. Send a vague error. */
if (!link->sactive) {
qc->err_mask = ac;
} else {
link->eh_info.err_mask |= AC_ERR_DEV;
qc->flags |= ATA_QCFLAG_FAILED;
}
dev->sata_dev.fis[3] = 0x04; /* status err */
dev->sata_dev.fis[2] = ATA_ERR;
}
}
qc->lldd_task = NULL;
ata_qc_complete(qc);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(ap->lock, flags);
qc_already_gone:
sas_free_task(task);
}
Commit Message: scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
CC: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
CC: Ewan Milne <emilne@redhat.com>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
CC: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
CC: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 85,456 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ewk_frame_scroll_set(Evas_Object* ewkFrame, int x, int y)
{
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame, false);
EINA_SAFETY_ON_NULL_RETURN_VAL(smartData->frame->view(), false);
smartData->frame->view()->setScrollPosition(WebCore::IntPoint(x, y));
return true;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 107,699 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(str_replace)
{
php_str_replace_common(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 14,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_cookie_wait_prm_abort(
struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
struct sctp_chunk *abort = arg;
/* Stop T1-init timer */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_TIMER_STOP,
SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_INIT));
if (abort)
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_CLOSED));
SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_ABORTEDS);
/* Even if we can't send the ABORT due to low memory delete the
* TCB. This is a departure from our typical NOMEM handling.
*/
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_SET_SK_ERR,
SCTP_ERROR(ECONNREFUSED));
/* Delete the established association. */
sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_INIT_FAILED,
SCTP_PERR(SCTP_ERROR_USER_ABORT));
return SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT;
}
Commit Message: sctp: validate chunk len before actually using it
Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab
beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the
blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len
only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the
2nd and subsequent ones.
The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the
1st chunk.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 48,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PHP_NAMED_FUNCTION(zif_zip_entry_filesize)
{
php_zip_entry_get_info(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, 2);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72434: ZipArchive class Use After Free Vulnerability in PHP's GC algorithm and unserialize
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 51,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"pngvalid: no low level write support in libpng, all tests skipped\n");
/* So the test is skipped: */
return SKIP;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,991 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Ins_JROT( INS_ARG )
{
if ( args[1] != 0 )
{
CUR.IP += (Int)(args[0]);
CUR.step_ins = FALSE;
/* See JMPR below */
if(CUR.IP > CUR.codeSize ||
(CUR.code[CUR.IP] != 0x2D && CUR.code[CUR.IP - 1] == 0x2D))
CUR.IP -= 1;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 5,401 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static s64 common_hrtimer_forward(struct k_itimer *timr, ktime_t now)
{
struct hrtimer *timer = &timr->it.real.timer;
return hrtimer_forward(timer, now, timr->it_interval);
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 81,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltUnregisterAllExtModules(void)
{
if (xsltExtensionsHash == NULL)
return;
xmlMutexLock(xsltExtMutex);
xmlHashFree(xsltExtensionsHash,
(xmlHashDeallocator) xsltFreeExtModule);
xsltExtensionsHash = NULL;
xmlMutexUnlock(xsltExtMutex);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,721 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
int nArg, count;
int bHTMLTable = 0;
int bBatch = 0;
int cDelimiter = 0;
int bColumnNames = 0;
char *szDSN;
char *szUID;
char *szPWD;
char *szSQL;
char *pEscapeChar;
int buffer_size = 9000;
szDSN = NULL;
szUID = NULL;
szPWD = NULL;
if ( argc < 2 )
{
fputs( szSyntax, stderr );
exit( 1 );
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
/*
* Default locale
*/
setlocale( LC_ALL, "" );
#endif
/****************************
* PARSE ARGS
***************************/
for ( nArg = 1, count = 1 ; nArg < argc; nArg++ )
{
if ( argv[nArg][0] == '-' )
{
/* Options */
switch ( argv[nArg][1] )
{
case 'd':
cDelimiter = argv[nArg][2];
break;
case 's':
buffer_size = atoi( &(argv[nArg][2]) );
break;
case 'w':
bHTMLTable = 1;
break;
case 'b':
bBatch = 1;
break;
case 'c':
bColumnNames = 1;
break;
case 'v':
bVerbose = 1;
break;
case 'e':
buseED = 1;
break;
case '-':
printf( "unixODBC " VERSION "\n" );
exit(0);
#ifdef HAVE_STRTOL
case 'x':
cDelimiter = strtol( argv[nArg]+2, NULL, 0 );
break;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SETLOCALE
case 'l':
if ( !setlocale( LC_ALL, argv[nArg]+2 ))
{
fprintf( stderr, "isql: can't set locale to '%s'\n", argv[nArg]+2 );
exit ( -1 );
}
break;
#endif
default:
fputs( szSyntax, stderr );
exit( 1 );
}
continue;
}
else if ( count == 1 )
szDSN = argv[nArg];
else if ( count == 2 )
szUID = argv[nArg];
else if ( count == 3 )
szPWD = argv[nArg];
count++;
}
szSQL = calloc( 1, buffer_size + 1 );
/****************************
* CONNECT
***************************/
if ( !OpenDatabase( &hEnv, &hDbc, szDSN, szUID, szPWD ) )
exit( 1 );
/****************************
* EXECUTE
***************************/
if ( !bBatch )
{
printf( "+---------------------------------------+\n" );
printf( "| Connected! |\n" );
printf( "| |\n" );
printf( "| sql-statement |\n" );
printf( "| help [tablename] |\n" );
printf( "| quit |\n" );
printf( "| |\n" );
printf( "+---------------------------------------+\n" );
}
do
{
if ( !bBatch )
#ifndef HAVE_READLINE
printf( "SQL> " );
#else
{
char *line;
int malloced;
line=readline("SQL> ");
if ( !line ) /* EOF - ctrl D */
{
malloced = 1;
line = strdup( "quit" );
}
else
{
malloced = 0;
}
strncpy(szSQL, line, buffer_size );
add_history(line);
if ( malloced )
{
free(line);
}
}
else
#endif
{
char *line;
int malloced;
line = fgets( szSQL, buffer_size, stdin );
if ( !line ) /* EOF - ctrl D */
{
malloced = 1;
line = strdup( "quit" );
}
else
{
malloced = 0;
}
strncpy(szSQL, line, buffer_size );
if ( malloced )
{
free(line);
}
}
/* strip away escape chars */
while ( (pEscapeChar=(char*)strchr(szSQL, '\n')) != NULL || (pEscapeChar=(char*)strchr(szSQL, '\r')) != NULL )
*pEscapeChar = ' ';
if ( szSQL[1] != '\0' )
{
if ( strncmp( szSQL, "quit", 4 ) == 0 )
szSQL[1] = '\0';
else if ( strncmp( szSQL, "help", 4 ) == 0 )
ExecuteHelp( hDbc, szSQL, cDelimiter, bColumnNames, bHTMLTable );
else if (memcmp(szSQL, "--", 2) != 0)
ExecuteSQL( hDbc, szSQL, cDelimiter, bColumnNames, bHTMLTable );
}
} while ( szSQL[1] != '\0' );
/****************************
* DISCONNECT
***************************/
CloseDatabase( hEnv, hDbc );
exit( 0 );
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
p_code_block)
{
OPJ_UINT32 l_data_size;
l_data_size = (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
(p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
if (p_code_block->data) {
/* We refer to data - 1 since below we incremented it */
opj_free(p_code_block->data - 1);
}
p_code_block->data = (OPJ_BYTE*) opj_malloc(l_data_size + 1);
if (! p_code_block->data) {
p_code_block->data_size = 0U;
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
p_code_block->data_size = l_data_size;
/* We reserve the initial byte as a fake byte to a non-FF value */
/* and increment the data pointer, so that opj_mqc_init_enc() */
/* can do bp = data - 1, and opj_mqc_byteout() can safely dereference */
/* it. */
p_code_block->data[0] = 0;
p_code_block->data += 1; /*why +1 ?*/
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix write heap buffer overflow in opj_mqc_byteout(). Discovered by Ke Liu of Tencent's Xuanwu LAB (#835)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,458 |
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