instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sc_asn1_decode_utf8string(const u8 *inbuf, size_t inlen,
u8 *out, size_t *outlen)
{
if (inlen+1 > *outlen)
return SC_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
*outlen = inlen+1;
memcpy(out, inbuf, inlen);
out[inlen] = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool InputType::ShouldSaveAndRestoreFormControlState() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,244 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: basic_authentication_encode (const char *user, const char *passwd)
{
char *t1, *t2;
int len1 = strlen (user) + 1 + strlen (passwd);
t1 = (char *)alloca (len1 + 1);
sprintf (t1, "%s:%s", user, passwd);
t2 = (char *)alloca (BASE64_LENGTH (len1) + 1);
wget_base64_encode (t1, len1, t2);
return concat_strings ("Basic ", t2, (char *) 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 15,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadProtectionService::DownloadCheckResult verdict() const {
return verdict_;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RELOC_PTRS_BEGIN(pattern2_instance_reloc_ptrs) {
RELOC_PREFIX(st_pattern_instance);
RELOC_SUPER(gs_pattern2_instance_t, st_pattern2_template, templat);
} RELOC_PTRS_END
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 1,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gray_split_cubic( FT_Vector* base )
{
TPos a, b, c, d;
base[6].x = base[3].x;
c = base[1].x;
d = base[2].x;
base[1].x = a = ( base[0].x + c ) / 2;
base[5].x = b = ( base[3].x + d ) / 2;
c = ( c + d ) / 2;
base[2].x = a = ( a + c ) / 2;
base[4].x = b = ( b + c ) / 2;
base[3].x = ( a + b ) / 2;
base[6].y = base[3].y;
c = base[1].y;
d = base[2].y;
base[1].y = a = ( base[0].y + c ) / 2;
base[5].y = b = ( base[3].y + d ) / 2;
c = ( c + d ) / 2;
base[2].y = a = ( a + c ) / 2;
base[4].y = b = ( b + c ) / 2;
base[3].y = ( a + b ) / 2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 10,318 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: QuotaManager::~QuotaManager() {
proxy_->manager_ = NULL;
std::for_each(clients_.begin(), clients_.end(),
std::mem_fun(&QuotaClient::OnQuotaManagerDestroyed));
if (database_.get())
db_thread_->DeleteSoon(FROM_HERE, database_.release());
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,237 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sctp_chunk *sctp_assoc_lookup_asconf_ack(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__be32 serial)
{
struct sctp_chunk *ack;
/* Walk through the list of cached ASCONF-ACKs and find the
* ack chunk whose serial number matches that of the request.
*/
list_for_each_entry(ack, &asoc->asconf_ack_list, transmitted_list) {
if (sctp_chunk_pending(ack))
continue;
if (ack->subh.addip_hdr->serial == serial) {
sctp_chunk_hold(ack);
return ack;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free on INIT collisions
When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as
already described in detail in commit 1be9a950c646 ("net: sctp: inherit
auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally
still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to
have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950c646 ...
[ 533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
[ 533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230
[ 533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0
[ 533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...]
[ 534.939704] Call Trace:
[ 534.951833] [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
[ 534.984213] [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
[ 535.015025] [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170
[ 535.045661] [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0
[ 535.074593] [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50
[ 535.105239] [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp]
[ 535.138606] [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0
[ 535.166848] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
... or depending on the the application, for example this one:
[ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
[ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0
[ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0
[ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...]
[ 1370.963431] Call Trace:
[ 1370.974632] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
[ 1371.000863] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
[ 1371.027154] [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170
[ 1371.054679] [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
[ 1371.080183] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten:
[ 669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G W ): Poison overwritten
[ 669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
[ 669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494
[ 669.826424] __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566
[ 669.826433] __kmalloc+0x280/0x310
[ 669.826453] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
[ 669.826471] sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp]
[ 669.826488] sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp]
[ 669.826505] sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...]
[ 669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494
[ 669.826635] __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8
[ 669.826643] kfree+0x1d6/0x230
[ 669.826650] kzfree+0x31/0x40
[ 669.826666] sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp]
[ 669.826681] sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp]
[ 669.826695] sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp]
Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at
heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice
when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again
from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on
the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation
of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected
at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation).
Reference counting of auth keys revisited:
Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations
in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being
added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached
and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds
a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which
keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc
or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and
the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped.
User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct
sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or
adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes
with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old
sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt()
on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either
endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places)
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key().
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's
and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key
directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops
the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we
eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with
intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in
sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to
set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret
material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track
of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a79a76
("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of
this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures
being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly
on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are
being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount
of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is
to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 44,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: initialize_realms(krb5_context kcontext, int argc, char **argv)
{
int c;
char *db_name = (char *) NULL;
char *lrealm = (char *) NULL;
char *mkey_name = (char *) NULL;
krb5_error_code retval;
krb5_enctype menctype = ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
kdc_realm_t *rdatap = NULL;
krb5_boolean manual = FALSE;
krb5_boolean def_restrict_anon;
char *default_udp_ports = 0;
char *default_tcp_ports = 0;
krb5_pointer aprof;
const char *hierarchy[3];
char *no_refrls = NULL;
char *host_based_srvcs = NULL;
int db_args_size = 0;
char **db_args = NULL;
extern char *optarg;
if (!krb5_aprof_init(DEFAULT_KDC_PROFILE, KDC_PROFILE_ENV, &aprof)) {
hierarchy[0] = KRB5_CONF_KDCDEFAULTS;
hierarchy[1] = KRB5_CONF_KDC_PORTS;
hierarchy[2] = (char *) NULL;
if (krb5_aprof_get_string(aprof, hierarchy, TRUE, &default_udp_ports))
default_udp_ports = 0;
hierarchy[1] = KRB5_CONF_KDC_TCP_PORTS;
if (krb5_aprof_get_string(aprof, hierarchy, TRUE, &default_tcp_ports))
default_tcp_ports = 0;
hierarchy[1] = KRB5_CONF_MAX_DGRAM_REPLY_SIZE;
if (krb5_aprof_get_int32(aprof, hierarchy, TRUE, &max_dgram_reply_size))
max_dgram_reply_size = MAX_DGRAM_SIZE;
hierarchy[1] = KRB5_CONF_RESTRICT_ANONYMOUS_TO_TGT;
if (krb5_aprof_get_boolean(aprof, hierarchy, TRUE, &def_restrict_anon))
def_restrict_anon = FALSE;
hierarchy[1] = KRB5_CONF_NO_HOST_REFERRAL;
if (krb5_aprof_get_string_all(aprof, hierarchy, &no_refrls))
no_refrls = 0;
if (!no_refrls ||
krb5_match_config_pattern(no_refrls, KRB5_CONF_ASTERISK) == FALSE) {
hierarchy[1] = KRB5_CONF_HOST_BASED_SERVICES;
if (krb5_aprof_get_string_all(aprof, hierarchy, &host_based_srvcs))
host_based_srvcs = 0;
}
krb5_aprof_finish(aprof);
}
if (default_udp_ports == 0) {
default_udp_ports = strdup(DEFAULT_KDC_UDP_PORTLIST);
if (default_udp_ports == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _(" KDC cannot initialize. Not enough memory\n"));
exit(1);
}
}
if (default_tcp_ports == 0) {
default_tcp_ports = strdup(DEFAULT_KDC_TCP_PORTLIST);
if (default_tcp_ports == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _(" KDC cannot initialize. Not enough memory\n"));
exit(1);
}
}
/*
* Loop through the option list. Each time we encounter a realm name,
* use the previously scanned options to fill in for defaults.
*/
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "x:r:d:mM:k:R:e:P:p:s:nw:4:X3")) != -1) {
switch(c) {
case 'x':
db_args_size++;
{
char **temp = realloc( db_args, sizeof(char*) * (db_args_size+1)); /* one for NULL */
if( temp == NULL )
{
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: KDC cannot initialize. Not enough "
"memory\n"), argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
db_args = temp;
}
db_args[db_args_size-1] = optarg;
db_args[db_args_size] = NULL;
break;
case 'r': /* realm name for db */
if (!find_realm_data(optarg, (krb5_ui_4) strlen(optarg))) {
if ((rdatap = (kdc_realm_t *) malloc(sizeof(kdc_realm_t)))) {
if ((retval = init_realm(rdatap, optarg, mkey_name,
menctype, default_udp_ports,
default_tcp_ports, manual,
def_restrict_anon, db_args,
no_refrls, host_based_srvcs))) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: cannot initialize realm %s - "
"see log file for details\n"),
argv[0], optarg);
exit(1);
}
kdc_realmlist[kdc_numrealms] = rdatap;
kdc_numrealms++;
free(db_args), db_args=NULL, db_args_size = 0;
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: cannot initialize realm %s. Not "
"enough memory\n"), argv[0], optarg);
exit(1);
}
}
break;
case 'd': /* pathname for db */
/* now db_name is not a seperate argument.
* It has to be passed as part of the db_args
*/
if( db_name == NULL ) {
if (asprintf(&db_name, "dbname=%s", optarg) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: KDC cannot initialize. Not enough "
"memory\n"), argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
}
db_args_size++;
{
char **temp = realloc( db_args, sizeof(char*) * (db_args_size+1)); /* one for NULL */
if( temp == NULL )
{
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: KDC cannot initialize. Not enough "
"memory\n"), argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
db_args = temp;
}
db_args[db_args_size-1] = db_name;
db_args[db_args_size] = NULL;
break;
case 'm': /* manual type-in of master key */
manual = TRUE;
if (menctype == ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN)
menctype = ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC;
break;
case 'M': /* master key name in DB */
mkey_name = optarg;
break;
case 'n':
nofork++; /* don't detach from terminal */
break;
case 'w': /* create multiple worker processes */
workers = atoi(optarg);
if (workers <= 0)
usage(argv[0]);
break;
case 'k': /* enctype for master key */
if (krb5_string_to_enctype(optarg, &menctype))
com_err(argv[0], 0, _("invalid enctype %s"), optarg);
break;
case 'R':
/* Replay cache name; defunct since we don't use a replay cache. */
break;
case 'P':
pid_file = optarg;
break;
case 'p':
if (default_udp_ports)
free(default_udp_ports);
default_udp_ports = strdup(optarg);
if (!default_udp_ports) {
fprintf(stderr, _(" KDC cannot initialize. Not enough "
"memory\n"));
exit(1);
}
#if 0 /* not yet */
if (default_tcp_ports)
free(default_tcp_ports);
default_tcp_ports = strdup(optarg);
#endif
break;
case '4':
break;
case 'X':
break;
case '?':
default:
usage(argv[0]);
}
}
/*
* Check to see if we processed any realms.
*/
if (kdc_numrealms == 0) {
/* no realm specified, use default realm */
if ((retval = krb5_get_default_realm(kcontext, &lrealm))) {
com_err(argv[0], retval,
_("while attempting to retrieve default realm"));
fprintf (stderr,
_("%s: %s, attempting to retrieve default realm\n"),
argv[0], krb5_get_error_message(kcontext, retval));
exit(1);
}
if ((rdatap = (kdc_realm_t *) malloc(sizeof(kdc_realm_t)))) {
if ((retval = init_realm(rdatap, lrealm, mkey_name, menctype,
default_udp_ports, default_tcp_ports,
manual, def_restrict_anon, db_args,
no_refrls, host_based_srvcs))) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: cannot initialize realm %s - see log "
"file for details\n"), argv[0], lrealm);
exit(1);
}
kdc_realmlist[0] = rdatap;
kdc_numrealms++;
}
krb5_free_default_realm(kcontext, lrealm);
}
/* Ensure that this is set for our first request. */
kdc_active_realm = kdc_realmlist[0];
if (default_udp_ports)
free(default_udp_ports);
if (default_tcp_ports)
free(default_tcp_ports);
if (db_args)
free(db_args);
if (db_name)
free(db_name);
if (host_based_srvcs)
free(host_based_srvcs);
if (no_refrls)
free(no_refrls);
return;
}
Commit Message: Multi-realm KDC null deref [CVE-2013-1418]
If a KDC serves multiple realms, certain requests can cause
setup_server_realm() to dereference a null pointer, crashing the KDC.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
A related but more minor vulnerability requires authentication to
exploit, and is only present if a third-party KDC database module can
dereference a null pointer under certain conditions.
(back ported from commit 5d2d9a1abe46a2c1a8614d4672d08d9d30a5f8bf)
ticket: 7757 (new)
version_fixed: 1.10.7
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 28,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DevToolsWindow::~DevToolsWindow() {
content::DevToolsManager::GetInstance()->ClientHostClosing(
frontend_host_.get());
UpdateBrowserToolbar();
DevToolsWindows* instances = &g_instances.Get();
DevToolsWindows::iterator it(
std::find(instances->begin(), instances->end(), this));
DCHECK(it != instances->end());
instances->erase(it);
for (IndexingJobsMap::const_iterator jobs_it(indexing_jobs_.begin());
jobs_it != indexing_jobs_.end(); ++jobs_it) {
jobs_it->second->Stop();
}
indexing_jobs_.clear();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 113,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mac80211_hwsim_change_chanctx(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
struct ieee80211_chanctx_conf *ctx,
u32 changed)
{
hwsim_check_chanctx_magic(ctx);
wiphy_dbg(hw->wiphy,
"change channel context control: %d MHz/width: %d/cfreqs:%d/%d MHz\n",
ctx->def.chan->center_freq, ctx->def.width,
ctx->def.center_freq1, ctx->def.center_freq2);
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,834 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void run_posix_cpu_timers(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
LIST_HEAD(firing);
struct k_itimer *timer, *next;
unsigned long flags;
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
/*
* The fast path checks that there are no expired thread or thread
* group timers. If that's so, just return.
*/
if (!fastpath_timer_check(tsk))
return;
if (!lock_task_sighand(tsk, &flags))
return;
/*
* Here we take off tsk->signal->cpu_timers[N] and
* tsk->cpu_timers[N] all the timers that are firing, and
* put them on the firing list.
*/
check_thread_timers(tsk, &firing);
check_process_timers(tsk, &firing);
/*
* We must release these locks before taking any timer's lock.
* There is a potential race with timer deletion here, as the
* siglock now protects our private firing list. We have set
* the firing flag in each timer, so that a deletion attempt
* that gets the timer lock before we do will give it up and
* spin until we've taken care of that timer below.
*/
unlock_task_sighand(tsk, &flags);
/*
* Now that all the timers on our list have the firing flag,
* no one will touch their list entries but us. We'll take
* each timer's lock before clearing its firing flag, so no
* timer call will interfere.
*/
list_for_each_entry_safe(timer, next, &firing, it.cpu.entry) {
int cpu_firing;
spin_lock(&timer->it_lock);
list_del_init(&timer->it.cpu.entry);
cpu_firing = timer->it.cpu.firing;
timer->it.cpu.firing = 0;
/*
* The firing flag is -1 if we collided with a reset
* of the timer, which already reported this
* almost-firing as an overrun. So don't generate an event.
*/
if (likely(cpu_firing >= 0))
cpu_timer_fire(timer);
spin_unlock(&timer->it_lock);
}
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 81,125 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cirrus_vga_read_palette(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
int val;
if ((s->vga.sr[0x12] & CIRRUS_CURSOR_HIDDENPEL)) {
val = s->cirrus_hidden_palette[(s->vga.dac_read_index & 0x0f) * 3 +
s->vga.dac_sub_index];
} else {
val = s->vga.palette[s->vga.dac_read_index * 3 + s->vga.dac_sub_index];
}
if (++s->vga.dac_sub_index == 3) {
s->vga.dac_sub_index = 0;
s->vga.dac_read_index++;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_btc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
emulate_2op_SrcV_nobyte(ctxt, "btc");
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _kdc_is_anon_request(const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
{
/* some versions of heimdal use bit 14 instead of 16 for
request_anonymous, as indicated in the anonymous draft prior to
version 11. Bit 14 is assigned to S4U2Proxy, but all S4U2Proxy
requests will have a second ticket; don't consider those anonymous */
return (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous ||
(b->kdc_options.constrained_delegation && !b->additional_tickets));
}
Commit Message: Security: Avoid NULL structure pointer member dereference
This can happen in the error path when processing malformed AS
requests with a NULL client name. Bug originally introduced on
Fri Feb 13 09:26:01 2015 +0100 in commit:
a873e21d7c06f22943a90a41dc733ae76799390d
kdc: base _kdc_fast_mk_error() on krb5_mk_error_ext()
Original patch by Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@secure-endpoints.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 59,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofputil_put_phy_port(enum ofp_version ofp_version,
const struct ofputil_phy_port *pp, struct ofpbuf *b)
{
switch (ofp_version) {
case OFP10_VERSION: {
struct ofp10_phy_port *opp = ofpbuf_put_uninit(b, sizeof *opp);
ofputil_encode_ofp10_phy_port(pp, opp);
break;
}
case OFP11_VERSION:
case OFP12_VERSION:
case OFP13_VERSION: {
struct ofp11_port *op = ofpbuf_put_uninit(b, sizeof *op);
ofputil_encode_ofp11_port(pp, op);
break;
}
case OFP14_VERSION:
case OFP15_VERSION:
case OFP16_VERSION:
ofputil_put_ofp14_port(pp, b);
break;
default:
OVS_NOT_REACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <pkusunyifeng@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::DidCommitProvisionalLoad(
const blink::WebHistoryItem& item,
blink::WebHistoryCommitType commit_type,
blink::WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy) {
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation,rail", "RenderFrameImpl::didCommitProvisionalLoad",
"id", routing_id_,
"url", GetLoadingUrl().possibly_invalid_spec());
if (!committed_first_load_ && !current_history_item_.IsNull()) {
if (!IsMainFrame()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_BOOLEAN(
"SessionRestore.SubFrameUniqueNameChangedBeforeFirstCommit",
name_changed_before_first_commit_);
}
committed_first_load_ = true;
}
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDocumentLoader(frame_->GetDocumentLoader());
NavigationStateImpl* navigation_state =
static_cast<NavigationStateImpl*>(document_state->navigation_state());
const WebURLResponse& web_url_response =
frame_->GetDocumentLoader()->GetResponse();
WebURLResponseExtraDataImpl* extra_data =
GetExtraDataFromResponse(web_url_response);
if (is_main_frame_ && !navigation_state->WasWithinSameDocument()) {
previews_state_ = PREVIEWS_OFF;
if (extra_data) {
previews_state_ = extra_data->previews_state();
effective_connection_type_ =
EffectiveConnectionTypeToWebEffectiveConnectionType(
extra_data->effective_connection_type());
}
}
if (proxy_routing_id_ != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
if (!SwapIn())
return;
}
if (is_main_frame_ && !navigation_state->WasWithinSameDocument()) {
GetRenderWidget()->DidNavigate();
if (GetRenderWidget()->compositor())
GetRenderWidget()->compositor()->SetURLForUkm(GetLoadingUrl());
}
SendUpdateState();
service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderRequest
remote_interface_provider_request;
if (!navigation_state->WasWithinSameDocument() &&
global_object_reuse_policy !=
blink::WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting) {
service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderPtr interfaces_provider;
remote_interface_provider_request = mojo::MakeRequest(&interfaces_provider);
remote_interfaces_.Close();
remote_interfaces_.Bind(std::move(interfaces_provider));
if (auto* factory = AudioOutputIPCFactory::get()) {
factory->MaybeDeregisterRemoteFactory(GetRoutingID());
factory->MaybeRegisterRemoteFactory(GetRoutingID(),
GetRemoteInterfaces());
}
audio_input_stream_factory_.reset();
}
if (media_permission_dispatcher_ &&
!navigation_state->WasWithinSameDocument()) {
media_permission_dispatcher_->OnNavigation();
}
UpdateStateForCommit(item, commit_type);
GetFrameHost()->DidCommitProvisionalLoad(
MakeDidCommitProvisionalLoadParams(commit_type),
std::move(remote_interface_provider_request));
navigation_state->set_transition_type(ui::PAGE_TRANSITION_LINK);
UpdateEncoding(frame_, frame_->View()->PageEncoding().Utf8());
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static char *createTableStmt(sqlite3 *db, Table *p){
int i, k, n;
char *zStmt;
char *zSep, *zSep2, *zEnd;
Column *pCol;
n = 0;
for(pCol = p->aCol, i=0; i<p->nCol; i++, pCol++){
n += identLength(pCol->zName) + 5;
}
n += identLength(p->zName);
if( n<50 ){
zSep = "";
zSep2 = ",";
zEnd = ")";
}else{
zSep = "\n ";
zSep2 = ",\n ";
zEnd = "\n)";
}
n += 35 + 6*p->nCol;
zStmt = sqlite3DbMallocRaw(0, n);
if( zStmt==0 ){
sqlite3OomFault(db);
return 0;
}
sqlite3_snprintf(n, zStmt, "CREATE TABLE ");
k = sqlite3Strlen30(zStmt);
identPut(zStmt, &k, p->zName);
zStmt[k++] = '(';
for(pCol=p->aCol, i=0; i<p->nCol; i++, pCol++){
static const char * const azType[] = {
/* SQLITE_AFF_BLOB */ "",
/* SQLITE_AFF_TEXT */ " TEXT",
/* SQLITE_AFF_NUMERIC */ " NUM",
/* SQLITE_AFF_INTEGER */ " INT",
/* SQLITE_AFF_REAL */ " REAL"
};
int len;
const char *zType;
sqlite3_snprintf(n-k, &zStmt[k], zSep);
k += sqlite3Strlen30(&zStmt[k]);
zSep = zSep2;
identPut(zStmt, &k, pCol->zName);
assert( pCol->affinity-SQLITE_AFF_BLOB >= 0 );
assert( pCol->affinity-SQLITE_AFF_BLOB < ArraySize(azType) );
testcase( pCol->affinity==SQLITE_AFF_BLOB );
testcase( pCol->affinity==SQLITE_AFF_TEXT );
testcase( pCol->affinity==SQLITE_AFF_NUMERIC );
testcase( pCol->affinity==SQLITE_AFF_INTEGER );
testcase( pCol->affinity==SQLITE_AFF_REAL );
zType = azType[pCol->affinity - SQLITE_AFF_BLOB];
len = sqlite3Strlen30(zType);
assert( pCol->affinity==SQLITE_AFF_BLOB
|| pCol->affinity==sqlite3AffinityType(zType, 0) );
memcpy(&zStmt[k], zType, len);
k += len;
assert( k<=n );
}
sqlite3_snprintf(n-k, &zStmt[k], "%s", zEnd);
return zStmt;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int apply_cb(struct findall_data *data, void* rock)
{
if (!data) return 0;
struct apply_rock *arock = (struct apply_rock *)rock;
annotate_state_t *state = arock->state;
int r;
/* Suppress any output of a partial match */
if (!data->mbname)
return 0;
strlcpy(arock->lastname, mbname_intname(data->mbname), sizeof(arock->lastname));
/* NOTE: this is a fricking horrible abuse of layers. We'll be passing the
* extname less horribly one day */
const char *extname = mbname_extname(data->mbname, &imapd_namespace, imapd_userid);
mbentry_t *backdoor = (mbentry_t *)data->mbentry;
backdoor->ext_name = xmalloc(strlen(extname)+1);
strcpy(backdoor->ext_name, extname);
r = annotate_state_set_mailbox_mbe(state, data->mbentry);
if (r) return r;
r = arock->proc(state, arock->data);
arock->nseen++;
return r;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 95,118 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_TRACE(WebLocalFrameImpl) {
visitor->Trace(local_frame_client_);
visitor->Trace(frame_);
visitor->Trace(dev_tools_agent_);
visitor->Trace(frame_widget_);
visitor->Trace(text_finder_);
visitor->Trace(print_context_);
visitor->Trace(context_menu_node_);
visitor->Trace(input_method_controller_);
visitor->Trace(text_checker_client_);
WebLocalFrameBase::Trace(visitor);
WebFrame::TraceFrames(visitor, this);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleMapBufferRange(
uint32_t immediate_data_size, const volatile void* cmd_data) {
if (!feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context()) {
return error::kUnknownCommand;
}
const char* func_name = "glMapBufferRange";
const volatile gles2::cmds::MapBufferRange& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::MapBufferRange*>(cmd_data);
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLbitfield access = static_cast<GLbitfield>(c.access);
GLintptr offset = static_cast<GLintptr>(c.offset);
GLsizeiptr size = static_cast<GLsizeiptr>(c.size);
uint32_t data_shm_id = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.data_shm_id);
uint32_t data_shm_offset = static_cast<uint32_t>(c.data_shm_offset);
typedef cmds::MapBufferRange::Result Result;
Result* result = GetSharedMemoryAs<Result*>(
c.result_shm_id, c.result_shm_offset, sizeof(*result));
if (!result) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (*result != 0) {
*result = 0;
return error::kInvalidArguments;
}
if (!validators_->buffer_target.IsValid(target)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM(func_name, target, "target");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (size == 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name, "length is zero");
return error::kNoError;
}
Buffer* buffer = buffer_manager()->RequestBufferAccess(
&state_, target, offset, size, func_name);
if (!buffer) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (state_.bound_transform_feedback->active() &&
!state_.bound_transform_feedback->paused()) {
size_t used_binding_count =
state_.current_program->effective_transform_feedback_varyings().size();
if (state_.bound_transform_feedback->UsesBuffer(
used_binding_count, buffer)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"active transform feedback is using this buffer");
return error::kNoError;
}
}
int8_t* mem =
GetSharedMemoryAs<int8_t*>(data_shm_id, data_shm_offset, size);
if (!mem) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
if (AnyOtherBitsSet(access, (GL_MAP_READ_BIT |
GL_MAP_WRITE_BIT |
GL_MAP_INVALIDATE_RANGE_BIT |
GL_MAP_INVALIDATE_BUFFER_BIT |
GL_MAP_FLUSH_EXPLICIT_BIT |
GL_MAP_UNSYNCHRONIZED_BIT))) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name, "invalid access bits");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!AnyBitsSet(access, GL_MAP_READ_BIT | GL_MAP_WRITE_BIT)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"neither MAP_READ_BIT nor MAP_WRITE_BIT is set");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (AllBitsSet(access, GL_MAP_READ_BIT) &&
AnyBitsSet(access, (GL_MAP_INVALIDATE_RANGE_BIT |
GL_MAP_INVALIDATE_BUFFER_BIT |
GL_MAP_UNSYNCHRONIZED_BIT))) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"incompatible access bits with MAP_READ_BIT");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (AllBitsSet(access, GL_MAP_FLUSH_EXPLICIT_BIT) &&
!AllBitsSet(access, GL_MAP_WRITE_BIT)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"MAP_FLUSH_EXPLICIT_BIT set without MAP_WRITE_BIT");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLbitfield filtered_access = access;
if (AllBitsSet(filtered_access, GL_MAP_INVALIDATE_BUFFER_BIT)) {
filtered_access = (filtered_access & ~GL_MAP_INVALIDATE_BUFFER_BIT);
filtered_access = (filtered_access | GL_MAP_INVALIDATE_RANGE_BIT);
}
filtered_access = (filtered_access & ~GL_MAP_UNSYNCHRONIZED_BIT);
if (AllBitsSet(filtered_access, GL_MAP_WRITE_BIT) &&
!AllBitsSet(filtered_access, GL_MAP_INVALIDATE_RANGE_BIT)) {
filtered_access = (filtered_access | GL_MAP_READ_BIT);
}
void* ptr = api()->glMapBufferRangeFn(target, offset, size, filtered_access);
if (ptr == nullptr) {
LOCAL_COPY_REAL_GL_ERRORS_TO_WRAPPER(func_name);
return error::kNoError;
}
buffer->SetMappedRange(offset, size, access, ptr,
GetSharedMemoryBuffer(data_shm_id),
static_cast<unsigned int>(data_shm_offset));
if ((filtered_access & GL_MAP_INVALIDATE_RANGE_BIT) == 0) {
memcpy(mem, ptr, size);
}
*result = 1;
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 145,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs4_acl_bytes(int entries)
{
return sizeof(struct nfs4_acl) + entries * sizeof(struct nfs4_ace);
}
Commit Message: nfsd: check permissions when setting ACLs
Use set_posix_acl, which includes proper permission checks, instead of
calling ->set_acl directly. Without this anyone may be able to grant
themselves permissions to a file by setting the ACL.
Lock the inode to make the new checks atomic with respect to set_acl.
(Also, nfsd was the only caller of set_acl not locking the inode, so I
suspect this may fix other races.)
This also simplifies the code, and ensures our ACLs are checked by
posix_acl_valid.
The permission checks and the inode locking were lost with commit
4ac7249e, which changed nfsd to use the set_acl inode operation directly
instead of going through xattr handlers.
Reported-by: David Sinquin <david@sinquin.eu>
[agreunba@redhat.com: use set_posix_acl]
Fixes: 4ac7249e
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 55,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Gfx::opSetCharWidth(Object args[], int numArgs) {
out->type3D0(state, args[0].getNum(), args[1].getNum());
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,139 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void smp_br_check_authorization_request(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s rcvs i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x (i-initiator r-responder)",
__func__, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
/* In LE SC mode LK field is ignored when BR/EDR transport is used */
p_cb->local_i_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
p_cb->local_r_key &= ~SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_LK;
/* In LE SC mode only IRK, IAI, CSRK are exchanged with the peer.
** Set local_r_key on master to expect only these keys. */
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
p_cb->local_r_key &= (SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_ID | SMP_SEC_KEY_TYPE_CSRK);
}
/* Check if H7 function needs to be used for key derivation*/
if ((p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_H7_SUPPORT_BIT) &&
(p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_H7_SUPPORT_BIT)) {
p_cb->key_derivation_h7_used = TRUE;
}
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: use h7 = %d", __func__, p_cb->key_derivation_h7_used);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG(
"%s rcvs upgrades: i_keys=0x%x r_keys=0x%x (i-initiator r-responder)",
__func__, p_cb->local_i_key, p_cb->local_r_key);
if (/*((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND) ||
(p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BOND)) &&*/
(p_cb->local_i_key || p_cb->local_r_key)) {
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_BOND_REQ_EVT, NULL);
/* if no peer key is expected, start master key distribution */
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER && p_cb->local_r_key == 0)
smp_key_distribution_by_transport(p_cb, NULL);
} else {
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_SUCCESS;
smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
}
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,731 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zval *zend_read_static_property(zend_class_entry *scope, const char *name, int name_length, zend_bool silent TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval **property;
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = scope;
property = zend_std_get_static_property(scope, name, name_length, silent, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
return property?*property:NULL;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,824 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GfxPath::close() {
if (justMoved) {
if (n >= size) {
size += 16;
subpaths = (GfxSubpath **)
greallocn(subpaths, size, sizeof(GfxSubpath *));
}
subpaths[n] = new GfxSubpath(firstX, firstY);
++n;
justMoved = gFalse;
}
subpaths[n-1]->close();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ax25_destroy_socket(ax25_cb *ax25)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
ax25_cb_del(ax25);
ax25_stop_heartbeat(ax25);
ax25_stop_t1timer(ax25);
ax25_stop_t2timer(ax25);
ax25_stop_t3timer(ax25);
ax25_stop_idletimer(ax25);
ax25_clear_queues(ax25); /* Flush the queues */
if (ax25->sk != NULL) {
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&ax25->sk->sk_receive_queue)) != NULL) {
if (skb->sk != ax25->sk) {
/* A pending connection */
ax25_cb *sax25 = ax25_sk(skb->sk);
/* Queue the unaccepted socket for death */
sock_orphan(skb->sk);
/* 9A4GL: hack to release unaccepted sockets */
skb->sk->sk_state = TCP_LISTEN;
ax25_start_heartbeat(sax25);
sax25->state = AX25_STATE_0;
}
kfree_skb(skb);
}
skb_queue_purge(&ax25->sk->sk_write_queue);
}
if (ax25->sk != NULL) {
if (sk_has_allocations(ax25->sk)) {
/* Defer: outstanding buffers */
setup_timer(&ax25->dtimer, ax25_destroy_timer,
(unsigned long)ax25);
ax25->dtimer.expires = jiffies + 2 * HZ;
add_timer(&ax25->dtimer);
} else {
struct sock *sk=ax25->sk;
ax25->sk=NULL;
sock_put(sk);
}
} else {
ax25_cb_put(ax25);
}
}
Commit Message: ax25: fix info leak via msg_name in ax25_recvmsg()
When msg_namelen is non-zero the sockaddr info gets filled out, as
requested, but the code fails to initialize the padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_ax25 inserted by the compiler for alignment. Additionally the
msg_namelen value is updated to sizeof(struct full_sockaddr_ax25) but is
not always filled up to this size.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix both issues by initializing the memory with memset(0).
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageChannelDepth(Image *image,
const ChannelType channel,const size_t depth)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
MagickBooleanType
status;
QuantumAny
range;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"...");
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (depth >= MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH)
{
image->depth=depth;
return(MagickTrue);
}
range=GetQuantumRange(depth);
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
register ssize_t
i;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(image,image,1,1)
#endif
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
if ((channel & RedChannel) != 0)
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleAnyToQuantum(ScaleQuantumToAny(
ClampPixel(image->colormap[i].red),range),range);
if ((channel & GreenChannel) != 0)
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleAnyToQuantum(ScaleQuantumToAny(
ClampPixel(image->colormap[i].green),range),range);
if ((channel & BlueChannel) != 0)
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleAnyToQuantum(ScaleQuantumToAny(
ClampPixel(image->colormap[i].blue),range),range);
if ((channel & OpacityChannel) != 0)
image->colormap[i].opacity=ScaleAnyToQuantum(ScaleQuantumToAny(
ClampPixel(image->colormap[i].opacity),range),range);
}
}
status=MagickTrue;
exception=(&image->exception);
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_HDRI_SUPPORT)
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (QuantumRange <= MaxMap)
RestoreMSCWarning
{
Quantum
*depth_map;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Scale pixels to desired (optimized with depth map).
*/
depth_map=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MaxMap+1,sizeof(*depth_map));
if (depth_map == (Quantum *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i <= (ssize_t) MaxMap; i++)
depth_map[i]=ScaleAnyToQuantum(ScaleQuantumToAny((Quantum) i,range),
range);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((channel & RedChannel) != 0)
SetPixelRed(q,depth_map[ScaleQuantumToMap(GetPixelRed(q))]);
if ((channel & GreenChannel) != 0)
SetPixelGreen(q,depth_map[ScaleQuantumToMap(GetPixelGreen(q))]);
if ((channel & BlueChannel) != 0)
SetPixelBlue(q,depth_map[ScaleQuantumToMap(GetPixelBlue(q))]);
if (((channel & OpacityChannel) != 0) &&
(image->matte != MagickFalse))
SetPixelOpacity(q,depth_map[ScaleQuantumToMap(GetPixelOpacity(q))]);
q++;
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
depth_map=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(depth_map);
if (status != MagickFalse)
image->depth=depth;
return(status);
}
#endif
/*
Scale pixels to desired depth.
*/
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static,4) shared(status) \
magick_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict q;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((channel & RedChannel) != 0)
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleAnyToQuantum(ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampPixel(
GetPixelRed(q)),range),range));
if ((channel & GreenChannel) != 0)
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleAnyToQuantum(ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampPixel(
GetPixelGreen(q)),range),range));
if ((channel & BlueChannel) != 0)
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleAnyToQuantum(ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampPixel(
GetPixelBlue(q)),range),range));
if (((channel & OpacityChannel) != 0) && (image->matte != MagickFalse))
SetPixelOpacity(q,ScaleAnyToQuantum(ScaleQuantumToAny(ClampPixel(
GetPixelOpacity(q)),range),range));
q++;
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
if (status != MagickFalse)
image->depth=depth;
return(status);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/281
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 73,386 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rdma_read_chunks(struct svcxprt_rdma *xprt,
struct rpcrdma_msg *rmsgp,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *head)
{
int page_no, ret;
struct rpcrdma_read_chunk *ch;
u32 handle, page_offset, byte_count;
u32 position;
u64 rs_offset;
bool last;
/* If no read list is present, return 0 */
ch = svc_rdma_get_read_chunk(rmsgp);
if (!ch)
return 0;
if (rdma_rcl_chunk_count(ch) > RPCSVC_MAXPAGES)
return -EINVAL;
/* The request is completed when the RDMA_READs complete. The
* head context keeps all the pages that comprise the
* request.
*/
head->arg.head[0] = rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
head->arg.tail[0] = rqstp->rq_arg.tail[0];
head->hdr_count = head->count;
head->arg.page_base = 0;
head->arg.page_len = 0;
head->arg.len = rqstp->rq_arg.len;
head->arg.buflen = rqstp->rq_arg.buflen;
/* RDMA_NOMSG: RDMA READ data should land just after RDMA RECV data */
position = be32_to_cpu(ch->rc_position);
if (position == 0) {
head->arg.pages = &head->pages[0];
page_offset = head->byte_len;
} else {
head->arg.pages = &head->pages[head->count];
page_offset = 0;
}
ret = 0;
page_no = 0;
for (; ch->rc_discrim != xdr_zero; ch++) {
if (be32_to_cpu(ch->rc_position) != position)
goto err;
handle = be32_to_cpu(ch->rc_target.rs_handle),
byte_count = be32_to_cpu(ch->rc_target.rs_length);
xdr_decode_hyper((__be32 *)&ch->rc_target.rs_offset,
&rs_offset);
while (byte_count > 0) {
last = (ch + 1)->rc_discrim == xdr_zero;
ret = xprt->sc_reader(xprt, rqstp, head,
&page_no, &page_offset,
handle, byte_count,
rs_offset, last);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
byte_count -= ret;
rs_offset += ret;
head->arg.buflen += ret;
}
}
/* Read list may need XDR round-up (see RFC 5666, s. 3.7) */
if (page_offset & 3) {
u32 pad = 4 - (page_offset & 3);
head->arg.tail[0].iov_len += pad;
head->arg.len += pad;
head->arg.buflen += pad;
page_offset += pad;
}
ret = 1;
if (position && position < head->arg.head[0].iov_len)
ret = rdma_copy_tail(rqstp, head, position,
byte_count, page_offset, page_no);
head->arg.head[0].iov_len = position;
head->position = position;
err:
/* Detach arg pages. svc_recv will replenish them */
for (page_no = 0;
&rqstp->rq_pages[page_no] < rqstp->rq_respages; page_no++)
rqstp->rq_pages[page_no] = NULL;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,976 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void OverloadedMethodN1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
TestInterfaceImplementation* test_interface_arg;
test_interface_arg = V8TestInterface::ToImplWithTypeCheck(info.GetIsolate(), info[0]);
if (!test_interface_arg) {
V8ThrowException::ThrowTypeError(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionMessages::FailedToExecute("overloadedMethodN", "TestObject", ExceptionMessages::ArgumentNotOfType(0, "TestInterface")));
return;
}
impl->overloadedMethodN(test_interface_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,980 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static PositionWithAffinity positionForPointRespectingEditingBoundaries(RenderBlock* parent, RenderBox* child, const LayoutPoint& pointInParentCoordinates)
{
LayoutPoint childLocation = child->location();
if (child->isInFlowPositioned())
childLocation += child->offsetForInFlowPosition();
LayoutPoint pointInChildCoordinates(toLayoutPoint(pointInParentCoordinates - childLocation));
Node* childNode = child->nonPseudoNode();
if (!childNode)
return child->positionForPoint(pointInChildCoordinates);
RenderObject* ancestor = parent;
while (ancestor && !ancestor->nonPseudoNode())
ancestor = ancestor->parent();
if (isEditingBoundary(ancestor, child))
return child->positionForPoint(pointInChildCoordinates);
LayoutUnit childMiddle = parent->logicalWidthForChild(child) / 2;
LayoutUnit logicalLeft = parent->isHorizontalWritingMode() ? pointInChildCoordinates.x() : pointInChildCoordinates.y();
if (logicalLeft < childMiddle)
return ancestor->createPositionWithAffinity(childNode->nodeIndex(), DOWNSTREAM);
return ancestor->createPositionWithAffinity(childNode->nodeIndex() + 1, UPSTREAM);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool alwaysRequiresLineBox(RenderObject* flow)
{
return isEmptyInline(flow) && toRenderInline(flow)->hasInlineDirectionBordersPaddingOrMargin();
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GetUsageInfoTask(
QuotaManager* manager,
const GetUsageInfoCallback& callback)
: QuotaTask(manager),
callback_(callback),
weak_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)) {
}
Commit Message: Wipe out QuotaThreadTask.
This is a one of a series of refactoring patches for QuotaManager.
http://codereview.chromium.org/10872054/
http://codereview.chromium.org/10917060/
BUG=139270
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10919070
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@154987 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 102,196 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct vdagent_file_xfers *vdagent_file_xfers_create(
struct udscs_connection *vdagentd, const char *save_dir,
int open_save_dir, int debug)
{
struct vdagent_file_xfers *xfers;
xfers = g_malloc(sizeof(*xfers));
xfers->xfers = g_hash_table_new_full(g_direct_hash, g_direct_equal,
NULL, vdagent_file_xfer_task_free);
xfers->vdagentd = vdagentd;
xfers->save_dir = g_strdup(save_dir);
xfers->open_save_dir = open_save_dir;
xfers->debug = debug;
return xfers;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 17,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mm_weights_unmap( FT_Fixed* weights,
FT_Fixed* axiscoords,
FT_UInt axis_count )
{
FT_ASSERT( axis_count <= T1_MAX_MM_AXIS );
if ( axis_count == 1 )
axiscoords[0] = weights[1];
else if ( axis_count == 2 )
{
axiscoords[0] = weights[3] + weights[1];
axiscoords[1] = weights[3] + weights[2];
}
else if ( axis_count == 3 )
{
axiscoords[0] = weights[7] + weights[5] + weights[3] + weights[1];
axiscoords[1] = weights[7] + weights[6] + weights[3] + weights[2];
axiscoords[2] = weights[7] + weights[6] + weights[5] + weights[4];
}
else
{
axiscoords[0] = weights[15] + weights[13] + weights[11] + weights[9] +
weights[7] + weights[5] + weights[3] + weights[1];
axiscoords[1] = weights[15] + weights[14] + weights[11] + weights[10] +
weights[7] + weights[6] + weights[3] + weights[2];
axiscoords[2] = weights[15] + weights[14] + weights[13] + weights[12] +
weights[7] + weights[6] + weights[5] + weights[4];
axiscoords[3] = weights[15] + weights[14] + weights[13] + weights[12] +
weights[11] + weights[10] + weights[9] + weights[8];
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: directory_post_to_hs_dir(rend_service_descriptor_t *renddesc,
smartlist_t *descs, smartlist_t *hs_dirs,
const char *service_id, int seconds_valid)
{
int i, j, failed_upload = 0;
smartlist_t *responsible_dirs = smartlist_new();
smartlist_t *successful_uploads = smartlist_new();
routerstatus_t *hs_dir;
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(descs); i++) {
rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t *desc = smartlist_get(descs, i);
/** If any HSDirs are specified, they should be used instead of
* the responsible directories */
if (hs_dirs && smartlist_len(hs_dirs) > 0) {
smartlist_add_all(responsible_dirs, hs_dirs);
} else {
/* Determine responsible dirs. */
if (hid_serv_get_responsible_directories(responsible_dirs,
desc->desc_id) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not determine the responsible hidden service "
"directories to post descriptors to.");
control_event_hs_descriptor_upload(service_id,
"UNKNOWN",
"UNKNOWN");
goto done;
}
}
for (j = 0; j < smartlist_len(responsible_dirs); j++) {
char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
char *hs_dir_ip;
const node_t *node;
rend_data_t *rend_data;
hs_dir = smartlist_get(responsible_dirs, j);
if (smartlist_contains_digest(renddesc->successful_uploads,
hs_dir->identity_digest))
/* Don't upload descriptor if we succeeded in doing so last time. */
continue;
node = node_get_by_id(hs_dir->identity_digest);
if (!node || !node_has_descriptor(node)) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Not launching upload for for v2 descriptor to "
"hidden service directory %s; we don't have its "
"router descriptor. Queuing for later upload.",
safe_str_client(routerstatus_describe(hs_dir)));
failed_upload = -1;
continue;
}
/* Send publish request. */
/* We need the service ID to identify which service did the upload
* request. Lookup is made in rend_service_desc_has_uploaded(). */
rend_data = rend_data_client_create(service_id, desc->desc_id, NULL,
REND_NO_AUTH);
directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(hs_dir,
DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC_V2,
ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
DIRIND_ANONYMOUS, NULL,
desc->desc_str,
strlen(desc->desc_str),
0, rend_data, NULL);
rend_data_free(rend_data);
base32_encode(desc_id_base32, sizeof(desc_id_base32),
desc->desc_id, DIGEST_LEN);
hs_dir_ip = tor_dup_ip(hs_dir->addr);
log_info(LD_REND, "Launching upload for v2 descriptor for "
"service '%s' with descriptor ID '%s' with validity "
"of %d seconds to hidden service directory '%s' on "
"%s:%d.",
safe_str_client(service_id),
safe_str_client(desc_id_base32),
seconds_valid,
hs_dir->nickname,
hs_dir_ip,
hs_dir->or_port);
control_event_hs_descriptor_upload(service_id,
hs_dir->identity_digest,
desc_id_base32);
tor_free(hs_dir_ip);
/* Remember successful upload to this router for next time. */
if (!smartlist_contains_digest(successful_uploads,
hs_dir->identity_digest))
smartlist_add(successful_uploads, hs_dir->identity_digest);
}
smartlist_clear(responsible_dirs);
}
if (!failed_upload) {
if (renddesc->successful_uploads) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(renddesc->successful_uploads, char *, c, tor_free(c););
smartlist_free(renddesc->successful_uploads);
renddesc->successful_uploads = NULL;
}
renddesc->all_uploads_performed = 1;
} else {
/* Remember which routers worked this time, so that we don't upload the
* descriptor to them again. */
if (!renddesc->successful_uploads)
renddesc->successful_uploads = smartlist_new();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(successful_uploads, const char *, c, {
if (!smartlist_contains_digest(renddesc->successful_uploads, c)) {
char *hsdir_id = tor_memdup(c, DIGEST_LEN);
smartlist_add(renddesc->successful_uploads, hsdir_id);
}
});
}
done:
smartlist_free(responsible_dirs);
smartlist_free(successful_uploads);
}
Commit Message: Fix log-uninitialized-stack bug in rend_service_intro_established.
Fixes bug 23490; bugfix on 0.2.7.2-alpha.
TROVE-2017-008
CVE-2017-0380
CWE ID: CWE-532 | 0 | 69,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int nfs4_proc_bind_conn_to_session(struct nfs_client *clp, struct rpc_cred *cred)
{
int status;
struct nfs41_bind_conn_to_session_args args = {
.client = clp,
.dir = NFS4_CDFC4_FORE_OR_BOTH,
};
struct nfs41_bind_conn_to_session_res res;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc =
&nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
.rpc_cred = cred,
};
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
nfs4_copy_sessionid(&args.sessionid, &clp->cl_session->sess_id);
if (!(clp->cl_session->flags & SESSION4_BACK_CHAN))
args.dir = NFS4_CDFC4_FORE;
status = rpc_call_sync(clp->cl_rpcclient, &msg, RPC_TASK_TIMEOUT);
trace_nfs4_bind_conn_to_session(clp, status);
if (status == 0) {
if (memcmp(res.sessionid.data,
clp->cl_session->sess_id.data, NFS4_MAX_SESSIONID_LEN)) {
dprintk("NFS: %s: Session ID mismatch\n", __func__);
status = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if ((res.dir & args.dir) != res.dir || res.dir == 0) {
dprintk("NFS: %s: Unexpected direction from server\n",
__func__);
status = -EIO;
goto out;
}
if (res.use_conn_in_rdma_mode != args.use_conn_in_rdma_mode) {
dprintk("NFS: %s: Server returned RDMA mode = true\n",
__func__);
status = -EIO;
goto out;
}
}
out:
dprintk("<-- %s status= %d\n", __func__, status);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::GenFramebuffersHelper(
GLsizei n, const GLuint* client_ids) {
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
if (GetFramebufferInfo(client_ids[ii])) {
return false;
}
}
scoped_array<GLuint> service_ids(new GLuint[n]);
glGenFramebuffersEXT(n, service_ids.get());
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
CreateFramebufferInfo(client_ids[ii], service_ids[ii]);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderWidgetHostInputEventRouter* WebContentsImpl::GetInputEventRouter() {
if (!is_being_destroyed_ && GetOuterWebContents())
return GetOuterWebContents()->GetInputEventRouter();
if (!rwh_input_event_router_.get() && !is_being_destroyed_)
rwh_input_event_router_.reset(new RenderWidgetHostInputEventRouter);
return rwh_input_event_router_.get();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,848 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: UserActivityDetector::UserActivityDetector() {
}
Commit Message: ash: Make UserActivityDetector ignore synthetic mouse events
This may have been preventing us from suspending (e.g.
mouse event is synthesized in response to lock window being
shown so Chrome tells powerd that the user is active).
BUG=133419
TEST=added
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10574044
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143437 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 103,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_select_file(struct sc_card *card, const struct sc_path *path,
struct sc_file **file_out)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct sc_path lpath;
int cache_valid = card->cache.valid, df_from_cache = 0;
int rv, ii;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
memcpy(&lpath, path, sizeof(struct sc_path));
if (file_out)
*file_out = NULL;
sc_log(ctx,
"iasecc_select_file(card:%p) path.len %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u; path.type %i; aid_len %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
card, path->len, path->type, path->aid.len);
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_select_file() path:%s", sc_print_path(path));
sc_print_cache(card);
if (lpath.len >= 2 && lpath.value[0] == 0x3F && lpath.value[1] == 0x00) {
sc_log(ctx, "EF.ATR(aid:'%s')", card->ef_atr ? sc_dump_hex(card->ef_atr->aid.value, card->ef_atr->aid.len) : "");
rv = iasecc_select_mf(card, file_out);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "MF selection error");
if (lpath.len >= 2 && lpath.value[0] == 0x3F && lpath.value[1] == 0x00) {
memmove(&lpath.value[0], &lpath.value[2], lpath.len - 2);
lpath.len -= 2;
}
}
if (lpath.aid.len) {
struct sc_file *file = NULL;
struct sc_path ppath;
sc_log(ctx,
"iasecc_select_file() select parent AID:%p/%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
lpath.aid.value, lpath.aid.len);
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_select_file() select parent AID:%s", sc_dump_hex(lpath.aid.value, lpath.aid.len));
memset(&ppath, 0, sizeof(ppath));
memcpy(ppath.value, lpath.aid.value, lpath.aid.len);
ppath.len = lpath.aid.len;
ppath.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME;
if (card->cache.valid && card->cache.current_df
&& card->cache.current_df->path.len == lpath.aid.len
&& !memcmp(card->cache.current_df->path.value, lpath.aid.value, lpath.aid.len))
df_from_cache = 1;
rv = iasecc_select_file(card, &ppath, &file);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "select AID path failed");
if (file_out)
*file_out = file;
else
sc_file_free(file);
if (lpath.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME)
lpath.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_FROM_CURRENT;
}
if (lpath.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_PATH)
lpath.type = SC_PATH_TYPE_FROM_CURRENT;
if (!lpath.len)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
sc_print_cache(card);
if (card->cache.valid && card->cache.current_df && lpath.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME
&& card->cache.current_df->path.len == lpath.len
&& !memcmp(card->cache.current_df->path.value, lpath.value, lpath.len)) {
sc_log(ctx, "returns current DF path %s", sc_print_path(&card->cache.current_df->path));
if (file_out) {
sc_file_free(*file_out);
sc_file_dup(file_out, card->cache.current_df);
}
sc_print_cache(card);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
do {
struct sc_apdu apdu;
struct sc_file *file = NULL;
unsigned char rbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
int pathlen = lpath.len;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT, 0xA4, 0x00, 0x00);
if (card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_GEMALTO
&& card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_OBERTHUR
&& card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_SAGEM
&& card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_AMOS
&& card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_MI
&& card->type != SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_MI2)
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "Unsupported card");
if (lpath.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_FILE_ID) {
apdu.p1 = 0x02;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_OBERTHUR) {
apdu.p1 = 0x01;
apdu.p2 = 0x04;
}
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_AMOS)
apdu.p2 = 0x04;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_MI)
apdu.p2 = 0x04;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_MI2)
apdu.p2 = 0x04;
}
else if (lpath.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_FROM_CURRENT) {
apdu.p1 = 0x09;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_OBERTHUR)
apdu.p2 = 0x04;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_AMOS)
apdu.p2 = 0x04;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_MI)
apdu.p2 = 0x04;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_MI2)
apdu.p2 = 0x04;
}
else if (lpath.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_PARENT) {
apdu.p1 = 0x03;
pathlen = 0;
apdu.cse = SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT;
}
else if (lpath.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME) {
apdu.p1 = 0x04;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_AMOS)
apdu.p2 = 0x04;
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_IASECC_MI2)
apdu.p2 = 0x04;
}
else {
sc_log(ctx, "Invalid PATH type: 0x%X", lpath.type);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, SC_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, "iasecc_select_file() invalid PATH type");
}
for (ii=0; ii<2; ii++) {
apdu.lc = pathlen;
apdu.data = lpath.value;
apdu.datalen = pathlen;
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 256;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
if (rv == SC_ERROR_INCORRECT_PARAMETERS &&
lpath.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME && apdu.p2 == 0x00) {
apdu.p2 = 0x0C;
continue;
}
if (ii) {
/* 'SELECT AID' do not returned FCP. Try to emulate. */
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
rv = iasecc_emulate_fcp(ctx, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "Failed to emulate DF FCP");
}
break;
}
/*
* Using of the cached DF and EF can cause problems in the multi-thread environment.
* FIXME: introduce config. option that invalidates this cache outside the locked card session,
* (or invent something else)
*/
if (rv == SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND && cache_valid && df_from_cache) {
sc_invalidate_cache(card);
sc_log(ctx, "iasecc_select_file() file not found, retry without cached DF");
if (file_out) {
sc_file_free(*file_out);
*file_out = NULL;
}
rv = iasecc_select_file(card, path, file_out);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
}
LOG_TEST_RET(ctx, rv, "iasecc_select_file() check SW failed");
sc_log(ctx,
"iasecc_select_file() apdu.resp %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
apdu.resplen);
if (apdu.resplen) {
sc_log(ctx, "apdu.resp %02X:%02X:%02X...", apdu.resp[0], apdu.resp[1], apdu.resp[2]);
switch (apdu.resp[0]) {
case 0x62:
case 0x6F:
file = sc_file_new();
if (file == NULL)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
file->path = lpath;
rv = iasecc_process_fci(card, file, apdu.resp, apdu.resplen);
if (rv)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, rv);
break;
default:
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_DATA_RECEIVED);
}
sc_log(ctx, "FileType %i", file->type);
if (file->type == SC_FILE_TYPE_DF) {
if (card->cache.valid)
sc_file_free(card->cache.current_df);
card->cache.current_df = NULL;
if (card->cache.valid)
sc_file_free(card->cache.current_ef);
card->cache.current_ef = NULL;
sc_file_dup(&card->cache.current_df, file);
card->cache.valid = 1;
}
else {
if (card->cache.valid)
sc_file_free(card->cache.current_ef);
card->cache.current_ef = NULL;
sc_file_dup(&card->cache.current_ef, file);
}
if (file_out) {
sc_file_free(*file_out);
*file_out = file;
}
else {
sc_file_free(file);
}
}
else if (lpath.type == SC_PATH_TYPE_DF_NAME) {
sc_file_free(card->cache.current_df);
card->cache.current_df = NULL;
sc_file_free(card->cache.current_ef);
card->cache.current_ef = NULL;
card->cache.valid = 1;
}
} while(0);
sc_print_cache(card);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,524 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParseTestVideoData(FilePath::StringType data,
FilePath::StringType* file_name,
int* width, int* height,
int* num_frames,
int* num_NALUs,
int* min_fps_render,
int* min_fps_no_render,
int* profile) {
std::vector<FilePath::StringType> elements;
base::SplitString(data, ':', &elements);
CHECK_GE(elements.size(), 1U) << data;
CHECK_LE(elements.size(), 8U) << data;
*file_name = elements[0];
*width = *height = *num_frames = *num_NALUs = -1;
*min_fps_render = *min_fps_no_render = -1;
*profile = -1;
if (!elements[1].empty())
CHECK(base::StringToInt(elements[1], width));
if (!elements[2].empty())
CHECK(base::StringToInt(elements[2], height));
if (!elements[3].empty())
CHECK(base::StringToInt(elements[3], num_frames));
if (!elements[4].empty())
CHECK(base::StringToInt(elements[4], num_NALUs));
if (!elements[5].empty())
CHECK(base::StringToInt(elements[5], min_fps_render));
if (!elements[6].empty())
CHECK(base::StringToInt(elements[6], min_fps_no_render));
if (!elements[7].empty())
CHECK(base::StringToInt(elements[7], profile));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,977 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int hfsplus_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct hfsplus_sb_info *sbi = HFSPLUS_SB(dir->i_sb);
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
int res;
if (inode->i_size != 2)
return -ENOTEMPTY;
mutex_lock(&sbi->vh_mutex);
res = hfsplus_delete_cat(inode->i_ino, dir, &dentry->d_name);
if (res)
goto out;
clear_nlink(inode);
inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME_SEC;
hfsplus_delete_inode(inode);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
out:
mutex_unlock(&sbi->vh_mutex);
return res;
}
Commit Message: hfsplus: Fix potential buffer overflows
Commit ec81aecb2966 ("hfs: fix a potential buffer overflow") fixed a few
potential buffer overflows in the hfs filesystem. But as Timo Warns
pointed out, these changes also need to be made on the hfsplus
filesystem as well.
Reported-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Acked-by: WANG Cong <amwang@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Khoroshilov <khoroshilov@ispras.ru>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Cc: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
Cc: Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Anderson <anderson@redhat.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 20,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnCommitNavigation(
const ResourceResponseHead& response,
const GURL& stream_url,
const CommonNavigationParams& common_params,
const RequestNavigationParams& request_params) {
CHECK(base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableBrowserSideNavigation));
scoped_ptr<StreamOverrideParameters> stream_override(
new StreamOverrideParameters());
stream_override->stream_url = stream_url;
stream_override->response = response;
NavigateInternal(common_params, StartNavigationParams(), request_params,
stream_override.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,156 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_cgroup_exit(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, struct cgroup *cgrp,
struct cgroup *old_cgrp, struct task_struct *task)
{
/*
* cgroup_exit() is called in the copy_process() failure path.
* Ignore this case since the task hasn't ran yet, this avoids
* trying to poke a half freed task state from generic code.
*/
if (!(task->flags & PF_EXITING))
return;
perf_cgroup_attach_task(cgrp, task);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,033 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static __always_inline u16 vmcs_read16(unsigned long field)
{
vmcs_check16(field);
return __vmcs_readl(field);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 48,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestObjCONST_VALUE_10(ExecState* exec, JSValue, const Identifier&)
{
return jsStringOrNull(exec, String("my constant string"));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned long segment_base(u16 selector)
{
struct desc_ptr *gdt = this_cpu_ptr(&host_gdt);
struct desc_struct *d;
unsigned long table_base;
unsigned long v;
if (!(selector & ~3))
return 0;
table_base = gdt->address;
if (selector & 4) { /* from ldt */
u16 ldt_selector = kvm_read_ldt();
if (!(ldt_selector & ~3))
return 0;
table_base = segment_base(ldt_selector);
}
d = (struct desc_struct *)(table_base + (selector & ~7));
v = get_desc_base(d);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (d->s == 0 && (d->type == 2 || d->type == 9 || d->type == 11))
v |= ((unsigned long)((struct ldttss_desc64 *)d)->base3) << 32;
#endif
return v;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void l2cap_cleanup_sockets(void)
{
if (bt_sock_unregister(BTPROTO_L2CAP) < 0)
BT_ERR("L2CAP socket unregistration failed");
proto_unregister(&l2cap_proto);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: L2CAP - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The L2CAP code fails to initialize the l2_bdaddr_type member of struct
sockaddr_l2 and the padding byte added for alignment. It that for leaks
two bytes kernel stack via the getsockname() syscall. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 94,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderFrameImpl::CreateApplicationCacheHost(
blink::WebApplicationCacheHostClient* client) {
if (!frame_ || !frame_->View())
return nullptr;
NavigationState* navigation_state = NavigationState::FromDocumentLoader(
frame_->GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()
? frame_->GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()
: frame_->GetDocumentLoader());
return std::make_unique<RendererWebApplicationCacheHostImpl>(
RenderViewImpl::FromWebView(frame_->View()), client,
RenderThreadImpl::current()->appcache_dispatcher()->backend_proxy(),
navigation_state->request_params().appcache_host_id, routing_id_);
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes in RenderFrameImpl::OnSelectPopupMenuItem(s)
ExternalPopupMenu::DidSelectItem(s) can delete the RenderFrameImpl.
We need to reset external_popup_menu_ before calling it.
Bug: 912211
Change-Id: Ia9a628e144464a2ebb14ab77d3a693fd5cead6fc
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381325
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618026}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(inotify_init1, int, flags)
{
struct fsnotify_group *group;
struct user_struct *user;
int ret;
/* Check the IN_* constants for consistency. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_CLOEXEC != O_CLOEXEC);
BUILD_BUG_ON(IN_NONBLOCK != O_NONBLOCK);
if (flags & ~(IN_CLOEXEC | IN_NONBLOCK))
return -EINVAL;
user = get_current_user();
if (unlikely(atomic_read(&user->inotify_devs) >=
inotify_max_user_instances)) {
ret = -EMFILE;
goto out_free_uid;
}
/* fsnotify_obtain_group took a reference to group, we put this when we kill the file in the end */
group = inotify_new_group(user, inotify_max_queued_events);
if (IS_ERR(group)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(group);
goto out_free_uid;
}
atomic_inc(&user->inotify_devs);
ret = anon_inode_getfd("inotify", &inotify_fops, group,
O_RDONLY | flags);
if (ret >= 0)
return ret;
fsnotify_put_group(group);
atomic_dec(&user->inotify_devs);
out_free_uid:
free_uid(user);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: inotify: fix double free/corruption of stuct user
On an error path in inotify_init1 a normal user can trigger a double
free of struct user. This is a regression introduced by a2ae4cc9a16e
("inotify: stop kernel memory leak on file creation failure").
We fix this by making sure that if a group exists the user reference is
dropped when the group is cleaned up. We should not explictly drop the
reference on error and also drop the reference when the group is cleaned
up.
The new lifetime rules are that an inotify group lives from
inotify_new_group to the last fsnotify_put_group. Since the struct user
and inotify_devs are directly tied to this lifetime they are only
changed/updated in those two locations. We get rid of all special
casing of struct user or user->inotify_devs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org (2.6.37 and up)
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 165,887 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_ellipse2(STREAM s, ELLIPSE2_ORDER * os, uint32 present, RD_BOOL delta)
{
BRUSH brush;
if (present & 0x0001)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->left, delta);
if (present & 0x0002)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->top, delta);
if (present & 0x0004)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->right, delta);
if (present & 0x0008)
rdp_in_coord(s, &os->bottom, delta);
if (present & 0x0010)
in_uint8(s, os->opcode);
if (present & 0x0020)
in_uint8(s, os->fillmode);
if (present & 0x0040)
rdp_in_colour(s, &os->bgcolour);
if (present & 0x0080)
rdp_in_colour(s, &os->fgcolour);
rdp_parse_brush(s, &os->brush, present >> 8);
logger(Graphics, Debug,
"process_ellipse2(), l=%d, t=%d, r=%d, b=%d, op=0x%x, fm=%d, bs=%d, bg=0x%x, fg=0x%x",
os->left, os->top, os->right, os->bottom, os->opcode, os->fillmode, os->brush.style,
os->bgcolour, os->fgcolour);
setup_brush(&brush, &os->brush);
ui_ellipse(os->opcode - 1, os->fillmode, os->left, os->top, os->right - os->left,
os->bottom - os->top, &brush, os->bgcolour, os->fgcolour);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void doWriteKeyUsages(const blink::WebCryptoKeyUsageMask usages, bool extractable)
{
COMPILE_ASSERT(blink::EndOfWebCryptoKeyUsage == (1 << 7) + 1, UpdateMe);
uint32_t value = 0;
if (extractable)
value |= ExtractableUsage;
if (usages & blink::WebCryptoKeyUsageEncrypt)
value |= EncryptUsage;
if (usages & blink::WebCryptoKeyUsageDecrypt)
value |= DecryptUsage;
if (usages & blink::WebCryptoKeyUsageSign)
value |= SignUsage;
if (usages & blink::WebCryptoKeyUsageVerify)
value |= VerifyUsage;
if (usages & blink::WebCryptoKeyUsageDeriveKey)
value |= DeriveKeyUsage;
if (usages & blink::WebCryptoKeyUsageWrapKey)
value |= WrapKeyUsage;
if (usages & blink::WebCryptoKeyUsageUnwrapKey)
value |= UnwrapKeyUsage;
if (usages & blink::WebCryptoKeyUsageDeriveBits)
value |= DeriveBitsUsage;
doWriteUint32(value);
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,470 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType Get8BIMProperty(const Image *image,const char *key,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*attribute,
format[MagickPathExtent],
name[MagickPathExtent],
*resource;
const StringInfo
*profile;
const unsigned char
*info;
long
start,
stop;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
ssize_t
count,
id,
sub_number;
size_t
length;
/*
There are no newlines in path names, so it's safe as terminator.
*/
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(key,"8BIM:%ld,%ld:%1024[^\n]\n%1024[^\n]",&start,&stop,
name,format);
if ((count != 2) && (count != 3) && (count != 4))
return(MagickFalse);
if (count < 4)
(void) CopyMagickString(format,"SVG",MagickPathExtent);
if (count < 3)
*name='\0';
sub_number=1;
if (*name == '#')
sub_number=(ssize_t) StringToLong(&name[1]);
sub_number=MagickMax(sub_number,1L);
resource=(char *) NULL;
status=MagickFalse;
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
info=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
while ((length > 0) && (status == MagickFalse))
{
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) '8')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'B')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'I')
continue;
if (ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length) != (unsigned char) 'M')
continue;
id=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBShort(&info,&length);
if (id < (ssize_t) start)
continue;
if (id > (ssize_t) stop)
continue;
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
if ((count != 0) && ((size_t) count <= length))
{
resource=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
resource=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+
MagickPathExtent,sizeof(*resource));
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
{
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) count; i++)
resource[i]=(char) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
resource[count]='\0';
}
}
if ((count & 0x01) == 0)
(void) ReadPropertyByte(&info,&length);
count=(ssize_t) ReadPropertyMSBLong(&info,&length);
if ((*name != '\0') && (*name != '#'))
if ((resource == (char *) NULL) || (LocaleCompare(name,resource) != 0))
{
/*
No name match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
if ((*name == '#') && (sub_number != 1))
{
/*
No numbered match, scroll forward and try next.
*/
sub_number--;
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
continue;
}
/*
We have the resource of interest.
*/
attribute=(char *) NULL;
if (~((size_t) count) >= (MagickPathExtent-1))
attribute=(char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) count+MagickPathExtent,
sizeof(*attribute));
if (attribute != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) CopyMagickMemory(attribute,(char *) info,(size_t) count);
attribute[count]='\0';
info+=count;
length-=MagickMin(count,(ssize_t) length);
if ((id <= 1999) || (id >= 2999))
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *)
attribute,exception);
else
{
char
*path;
if (LocaleCompare(format,"svg") == 0)
path=TraceSVGClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count,
image->columns,image->rows);
else
path=TracePSClippath((unsigned char *) attribute,(size_t) count);
(void) SetImageProperty((Image *) image,key,(const char *) path,
exception);
path=DestroyString(path);
}
attribute=DestroyString(attribute);
status=MagickTrue;
}
}
if (resource != (char *) NULL)
resource=DestroyString(resource);
return(status);
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 94,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API zval* ZEND_FASTCALL zend_hash_index_find(const HashTable *ht, zend_ulong h)
{
Bucket *p;
IS_CONSISTENT(ht);
if (ht->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PACKED) {
if (h < ht->nNumUsed) {
p = ht->arData + h;
if (Z_TYPE(p->val) != IS_UNDEF) {
return &p->val;
}
}
return NULL;
}
p = zend_hash_index_find_bucket(ht, h);
return p ? &p->val : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 69,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len)
{
const unsigned char *p;
if (len < 2)
return 0;
p = *in;
if (!p[0] && !p[1]) {
*in += 2;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 12,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_command_exec (struct t_gui_buffer *buffer, int any_plugin,
struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *string)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
struct t_hook *hook_for_plugin, *hook_for_other_plugin;
char **argv, **argv_eol, *ptr_command_name;
int argc, rc, number_for_other_plugin;
if (!buffer || !string || !string[0])
return -1;
rc = hook_command_run_exec (buffer, string);
if (rc == WEECHAT_RC_OK_EAT)
return 1;
rc = -1;
argv = string_split (string, " ", 0, 0, &argc);
if (argc == 0)
{
string_free_split (argv);
return -1;
}
argv_eol = string_split (string, " ", 1, 0, NULL);
ptr_command_name = utf8_next_char (argv[0]);
hook_exec_start ();
hook_for_plugin = NULL;
hook_for_other_plugin = NULL;
number_for_other_plugin = 0;
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_COMMAND];
while (ptr_hook)
{
next_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& (string_strcasecmp (ptr_command_name,
HOOK_COMMAND(ptr_hook, command)) == 0))
{
if (ptr_hook->plugin == plugin)
{
if (!hook_for_plugin)
hook_for_plugin = ptr_hook;
}
else
{
if (any_plugin)
{
if (!hook_for_other_plugin)
hook_for_other_plugin = ptr_hook;
number_for_other_plugin++;
}
}
}
ptr_hook = next_hook;
}
if (!hook_for_plugin && !hook_for_other_plugin)
{
/* command not found */
rc = -1;
}
else
{
if (!hook_for_plugin && (number_for_other_plugin > 1))
{
/*
* ambiguous: no command for current plugin, but more than one
* command was found for other plugins, we don't know which one to
* run!
*/
rc = -2;
}
else
{
ptr_hook = (hook_for_plugin) ?
hook_for_plugin : hook_for_other_plugin;
if (ptr_hook->running >= HOOK_COMMAND_MAX_CALLS)
rc = -3;
else
{
ptr_hook->running++;
rc = (int) (HOOK_COMMAND(ptr_hook, callback))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, buffer, argc, argv, argv_eol);
ptr_hook->running--;
if (rc == WEECHAT_RC_ERROR)
rc = 0;
else
rc = 1;
}
}
}
string_free_split (argv);
string_free_split (argv_eol);
hook_exec_end ();
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,281 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: node_exit_policy_is_exact(const node_t *node, sa_family_t family)
{
if (family == AF_UNSPEC) {
return 1; /* Rejecting an address but not telling us what address
* is a bad sign. */
} else if (family == AF_INET) {
return node->ri != NULL;
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
return 0;
}
tor_fragile_assert();
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cmsBool Type_vcgt_Write(struct _cms_typehandler_struct* self, cmsIOHANDLER* io, void* Ptr, cmsUInt32Number nItems)
{
cmsToneCurve** Curves = (cmsToneCurve**) Ptr;
cmsUInt32Number i, j;
if (cmsGetToneCurveParametricType(Curves[0]) == 5 &&
cmsGetToneCurveParametricType(Curves[1]) == 5 &&
cmsGetToneCurveParametricType(Curves[2]) == 5) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, cmsVideoCardGammaFormulaType)) return FALSE;
for (i=0; i < 3; i++) {
_cmsVCGTGAMMA v;
v.Gamma = Curves[i] ->Segments[0].Params[0];
v.Min = Curves[i] ->Segments[0].Params[5];
v.Max = pow(Curves[i] ->Segments[0].Params[1], v.Gamma) + v.Min;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, v.Gamma)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, v.Min)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWrite15Fixed16Number(io, v.Max)) return FALSE;
}
}
else {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt32Number(io, cmsVideoCardGammaTableType)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 3)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 256)) return FALSE;
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, 2)) return FALSE;
for (i=0; i < 3; i++) {
for (j=0; j < 256; j++) {
cmsFloat32Number v = cmsEvalToneCurveFloat(Curves[i], (cmsFloat32Number) (j / 255.0));
cmsUInt16Number n = _cmsQuickSaturateWord(v * 65535.0);
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, n)) return FALSE;
}
}
}
return TRUE;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(self);
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(nItems);
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 71,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoShaderBinary(GLsizei n,
const GLuint* shaders,
GLenum binaryformat,
const void* binary,
GLsizei length) {
std::vector<GLuint> service_shaders(n, 0);
for (GLsizei i = 0; i < n; i++) {
service_shaders[i] = GetShaderServiceID(shaders[i], resources_);
}
api()->glShaderBinaryFn(n, service_shaders.data(), binaryformat, binary,
length);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_device (u2fh_devs * devs, unsigned id)
{
struct u2fdevice *dev;
for (dev = devs->first; dev != NULL; dev = dev->next)
{
if (dev->id == id)
{
return dev;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: fix filling out of initresp
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 91,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static gboolean webkit_web_view_motion_event(GtkWidget* widget, GdkEventMotion* event)
{
WebKitWebView* webView = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(widget);
Frame* frame = core(webView)->mainFrame();
if (!frame->view())
return FALSE;
return frame->eventHandler()->mouseMoved(PlatformMouseEvent(event));
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,597 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sctp_inet_af_supported(sa_family_t family, struct sctp_sock *sp)
{
/* PF_INET only supports AF_INET addresses. */
return AF_INET == family;
}
Commit Message: sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 42,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ether_hdr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
register const struct ether_header *ep;
uint16_t length_type;
ep = (const struct ether_header *)bp;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s",
etheraddr_string(ndo, ESRC(ep)),
etheraddr_string(ndo, EDST(ep))));
length_type = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ep->ether_length_type);
if (!ndo->ndo_qflag) {
if (length_type <= ETHERMTU) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", 802.3"));
length = length_type;
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ethertype %s (0x%04x)",
tok2str(ethertype_values,"Unknown", length_type),
length_type));
} else {
if (length_type <= ETHERMTU) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", 802.3"));
length = length_type;
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s", tok2str(ethertype_values,"Unknown Ethertype (0x%04x)", length_type)));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u: ", length));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseFile(const char *filename) {
return(xmlSAXParseFile(NULL, filename, 0));
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 59,494 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void js_getglobal(js_State *J, const char *name)
{
jsR_getproperty(J, J->G, name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,431 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void setupSignalHandlers(void) {
struct sigaction act;
/* When the SA_SIGINFO flag is set in sa_flags then sa_sigaction is used.
* Otherwise, sa_handler is used. */
sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask);
act.sa_flags = 0;
act.sa_handler = sigShutdownHandler;
sigaction(SIGTERM, &act, NULL);
sigaction(SIGINT, &act, NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_BACKTRACE
sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask);
act.sa_flags = SA_NODEFER | SA_RESETHAND | SA_SIGINFO;
act.sa_sigaction = sigsegvHandler;
sigaction(SIGSEGV, &act, NULL);
sigaction(SIGBUS, &act, NULL);
sigaction(SIGFPE, &act, NULL);
sigaction(SIGILL, &act, NULL);
#endif
return;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 70,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE1(chroot, const char __user *, filename)
{
struct path path;
int error;
unsigned int lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY;
retry:
error = user_path_at(AT_FDCWD, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
if (error)
goto out;
error = inode_permission(path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_CHDIR);
if (error)
goto dput_and_out;
error = -EPERM;
if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_CHROOT))
goto dput_and_out;
error = security_path_chroot(&path);
if (error)
goto dput_and_out;
set_fs_root(current->fs, &path);
error = 0;
dput_and_out:
path_put(&path);
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
goto retry;
}
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 46,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GBool FoFiType1C::parse() {
Type1CIndex fdIdx;
Type1CIndexVal val;
int i;
parsedOk = gTrue;
if (len > 0 && file[0] != '\x01') {
++file;
--len;
}
getIndex(getU8(2, &parsedOk), &nameIdx, &parsedOk);
getIndex(nameIdx.endPos, &topDictIdx, &parsedOk);
getIndex(topDictIdx.endPos, &stringIdx, &parsedOk);
getIndex(stringIdx.endPos, &gsubrIdx, &parsedOk);
if (!parsedOk) {
return gFalse;
}
gsubrBias = (gsubrIdx.len < 1240) ? 107
: (gsubrIdx.len < 33900) ? 1131 : 32768;
getIndexVal(&nameIdx, 0, &val, &parsedOk);
if (!parsedOk) {
return gFalse;
}
name = new GooString((char *)&file[val.pos], val.len);
readTopDict();
if (topDict.firstOp == 0x0c1e) {
if (topDict.fdArrayOffset == 0) {
nFDs = 1;
privateDicts = (Type1CPrivateDict *)gmalloc(sizeof(Type1CPrivateDict));
readPrivateDict(0, 0, &privateDicts[0]);
} else {
getIndex(topDict.fdArrayOffset, &fdIdx, &parsedOk);
if (!parsedOk) {
return gFalse;
}
nFDs = fdIdx.len;
privateDicts = (Type1CPrivateDict *)
gmallocn(nFDs, sizeof(Type1CPrivateDict));
for (i = 0; i < nFDs; ++i) {
getIndexVal(&fdIdx, i, &val, &parsedOk);
if (!parsedOk) {
return gFalse;
}
readFD(val.pos, val.len, &privateDicts[i]);
}
}
} else {
nFDs = 1;
privateDicts = (Type1CPrivateDict *)gmalloc(sizeof(Type1CPrivateDict));
readPrivateDict(topDict.privateOffset, topDict.privateSize,
&privateDicts[0]);
}
if (!parsedOk) {
return gFalse;
}
if (topDict.charStringsOffset <= 0) {
parsedOk = gFalse;
return gFalse;
}
getIndex(topDict.charStringsOffset, &charStringsIdx, &parsedOk);
if (!parsedOk) {
return gFalse;
}
nGlyphs = charStringsIdx.len;
if (topDict.firstOp == 0x0c1e) {
readFDSelect();
if (!parsedOk) {
return gFalse;
}
}
if (!readCharset()) {
parsedOk = gFalse;
return gFalse;
}
if (topDict.firstOp != 0x0c14 && topDict.firstOp != 0x0c1e) {
buildEncoding();
if (!parsedOk) {
return gFalse;
}
}
return parsedOk;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 2,223 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct dentry *proc_task_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
{
struct dentry *error = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
struct inode *inode;
inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
if (!inode)
goto out;
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
inode->i_op = &proc_tid_base_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_tid_base_operations;
inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
inode->i_nlink = 2 + pid_entry_count_dirs(tid_base_stuff,
ARRAY_SIZE(tid_base_stuff));
dentry->d_op = &pid_dentry_operations;
d_add(dentry, inode);
/* Close the race of the process dying before we return the dentry */
if (pid_revalidate(dentry, NULL))
error = NULL;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 39,770 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void portio_release(struct kobject *kobj)
{
struct uio_portio *portio = to_portio(kobj);
kfree(portio);
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int persistent_prepare_merge(struct dm_exception_store *store,
chunk_t *last_old_chunk,
chunk_t *last_new_chunk)
{
struct pstore *ps = get_info(store);
struct core_exception ce;
int nr_consecutive;
int r;
/*
* When current area is empty, move back to preceding area.
*/
if (!ps->current_committed) {
/*
* Have we finished?
*/
if (!ps->current_area)
return 0;
ps->current_area--;
r = area_io(ps, READ);
if (r < 0)
return r;
ps->current_committed = ps->exceptions_per_area;
}
read_exception(ps, ps->current_committed - 1, &ce);
*last_old_chunk = ce.old_chunk;
*last_new_chunk = ce.new_chunk;
/*
* Find number of consecutive chunks within the current area,
* working backwards.
*/
for (nr_consecutive = 1; nr_consecutive < ps->current_committed;
nr_consecutive++) {
read_exception(ps, ps->current_committed - 1 - nr_consecutive,
&ce);
if (ce.old_chunk != *last_old_chunk - nr_consecutive ||
ce.new_chunk != *last_new_chunk - nr_consecutive)
break;
}
return nr_consecutive;
}
Commit Message: dm snapshot: fix data corruption
This patch fixes a particular type of data corruption that has been
encountered when loading a snapshot's metadata from disk.
When we allocate a new chunk in persistent_prepare, we increment
ps->next_free and we make sure that it doesn't point to a metadata area
by further incrementing it if necessary.
When we load metadata from disk on device activation, ps->next_free is
positioned after the last used data chunk. However, if this last used
data chunk is followed by a metadata area, ps->next_free is positioned
erroneously to the metadata area. A newly-allocated chunk is placed at
the same location as the metadata area, resulting in data or metadata
corruption.
This patch changes the code so that ps->next_free skips the metadata
area when metadata are loaded in function read_exceptions.
The patch also moves a piece of code from persistent_prepare_exception
to a separate function skip_metadata to avoid code duplication.
CVE-2013-4299
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 29,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int shmem_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *symname)
{
int error;
int len;
struct inode *inode;
struct page *page;
char *kaddr;
struct shmem_inode_info *info;
len = strlen(symname) + 1;
if (len > PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
inode = shmem_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, S_IFLNK|S_IRWXUGO, 0, VM_NORESERVE);
if (!inode)
return -ENOSPC;
error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, &dentry->d_name,
shmem_initxattrs, NULL);
if (error) {
if (error != -EOPNOTSUPP) {
iput(inode);
return error;
}
error = 0;
}
info = SHMEM_I(inode);
inode->i_size = len-1;
if (len <= SHORT_SYMLINK_LEN) {
info->symlink = kmemdup(symname, len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!info->symlink) {
iput(inode);
return -ENOMEM;
}
inode->i_op = &shmem_short_symlink_operations;
} else {
error = shmem_getpage(inode, 0, &page, SGP_WRITE, NULL);
if (error) {
iput(inode);
return error;
}
inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &shmem_aops;
inode->i_op = &shmem_symlink_inode_operations;
kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(kaddr, symname, len);
kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
SetPageUptodate(page);
set_page_dirty(page);
unlock_page(page);
page_cache_release(page);
}
dir->i_size += BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
dget(dentry);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserRenderProcessHost::WidgetRestored() {
DCHECK_EQ(backgrounded_, (visible_widgets_ == 0));
visible_widgets_++;
SetBackgrounded(false);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned HTMLCanvasElement::GetMSAASampleCountFor2dContext() const {
if (!GetDocument().GetSettings())
return 0;
return GetDocument().GetSettings()->GetAccelerated2dCanvasMSAASampleCount();
}
Commit Message: Clean up CanvasResourceDispatcher on finalizer
We may have pending mojo messages after GC, so we want to drop the
dispatcher as soon as possible.
Bug: 929757,913964
Change-Id: I5789bcbb55aada4a74c67a28758f07686f8911c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1489175
Reviewed-by: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#635833}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 152,082 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool isSetCookieHeader(const AtomicString& name)
{
return equalIgnoringCase(name, "set-cookie") || equalIgnoringCase(name, "set-cookie2");
}
Commit Message: Don't dispatch events when XHR is set to sync mode
Any of readystatechange, progress, abort, error, timeout and loadend
event are not specified to be dispatched in sync mode in the latest
spec. Just an exception corresponding to the failure is thrown.
Clean up for readability done in this CL
- factor out dispatchEventAndLoadEnd calling code
- make didTimeout() private
- give error handling methods more descriptive names
- set m_exceptionCode in failure type specific methods
-- Note that for didFailRedirectCheck, m_exceptionCode was not set
in networkError(), but was set at the end of createRequest()
This CL is prep for fixing crbug.com/292422
BUG=292422
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24225002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158046 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 110,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool AreSwitchesIdenticalToCurrentCommandLine(
const base::CommandLine& new_cmdline,
const base::CommandLine& active_cmdline,
std::set<base::CommandLine::StringType>* out_difference) {
std::set<base::CommandLine::StringType> new_flags =
ExtractFlagsFromCommandLine(new_cmdline);
std::set<base::CommandLine::StringType> active_flags =
ExtractFlagsFromCommandLine(active_cmdline);
bool result = false;
if (new_flags.size() == active_flags.size()) {
result =
std::equal(new_flags.begin(), new_flags.end(), active_flags.begin());
}
if (out_difference && !result) {
std::set_symmetric_difference(
new_flags.begin(),
new_flags.end(),
active_flags.begin(),
active_flags.end(),
std::inserter(*out_difference, out_difference->begin()));
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InlineBox* RenderBox::createInlineBox()
{
return new InlineBox(*this);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,512 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::SetAsDelegate(WebContents* web_contents, bool set_delegate) {
Browser* delegate = set_delegate ? this : nullptr;
web_contents->SetDelegate(delegate);
WebContentsModalDialogManager::FromWebContents(web_contents)->
SetDelegate(delegate);
CoreTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents)->set_delegate(delegate);
translate::ContentTranslateDriver& content_translate_driver =
ChromeTranslateClient::FromWebContents(web_contents)->translate_driver();
if (delegate) {
zoom::ZoomController::FromWebContents(web_contents)->AddObserver(this);
content_translate_driver.AddObserver(this);
BookmarkTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents)->AddObserver(this);
} else {
zoom::ZoomController::FromWebContents(web_contents)->RemoveObserver(this);
content_translate_driver.RemoveObserver(this);
BookmarkTabHelper::FromWebContents(web_contents)->RemoveObserver(this);
}
}
Commit Message: If a dialog is shown, drop fullscreen.
BUG=875066, 817809, 792876, 812769, 813815
TEST=included
Change-Id: Ic3d697fa3c4b01f5d7fea77391857177ada660db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1185208
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586418}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
{
int i=-1;
hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
pitem *item = NULL;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
goto err;
/* Try to find item in queue, to prevent duplicate entries */
memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] = (unsigned char) (msg_hdr->seq>>8);
seq64be[7] = (unsigned char) msg_hdr->seq;
item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be);
/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
* don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
*/
if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
item = NULL;
/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
* too far in the future, already in the queue or if we received
* a FINISHED before the SERVER_HELLO, which then must be a stale
* retransmit.
*/
if (msg_hdr->seq <= s->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
msg_hdr->seq > s->d1->handshake_read_seq + 10 || item != NULL ||
(s->d1->handshake_read_seq == 0 && msg_hdr->type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
{
unsigned char devnull [256];
while (frag_len)
{
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
devnull,
frag_len>sizeof(devnull)?sizeof(devnull):frag_len,0);
if (i<=0) goto err;
frag_len -= i;
}
}
else
{
if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
if ( frag == NULL)
goto err;
memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
if (frag_len)
{
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
goto err;
}
memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
if ( item == NULL)
goto err;
pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
}
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
*ok = 0;
return i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int netif_alloc_rx_queues(struct net_device *dev)
{
unsigned int i, count = dev->num_rx_queues;
struct netdev_rx_queue *rx;
size_t sz = count * sizeof(*rx);
BUG_ON(count < 1);
rx = kzalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_REPEAT);
if (!rx) {
rx = vzalloc(sz);
if (!rx)
return -ENOMEM;
}
dev->_rx = rx;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
rx[i].dev = dev;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cpImage(TIFF* in, TIFF* out, readFunc fin, writeFunc fout,
uint32 imagelength, uint32 imagewidth, tsample_t spp)
{
int status = 0;
tdata_t buf = NULL;
tsize_t scanlinesize = TIFFRasterScanlineSize(in);
tsize_t bytes = scanlinesize * (tsize_t)imagelength;
/*
* XXX: Check for integer overflow.
*/
if (scanlinesize
&& imagelength
&& bytes / (tsize_t)imagelength == scanlinesize) {
buf = _TIFFmalloc(bytes);
if (buf) {
if ((*fin)(in, (uint8*)buf, imagelength,
imagewidth, spp)) {
status = (*fout)(out, (uint8*)buf,
imagelength, imagewidth, spp);
}
_TIFFfree(buf);
} else {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in),
"Error, can't allocate space for image buffer");
}
} else {
TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "Error, no space for image buffer");
}
return status;
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcp.c: fix out-of-bounds write on tiled images with odd
tile width vs image width. Reported as MSVR 35103
by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,209 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int jas_image_writecmpt(jas_image_t *image, int cmptno, jas_image_coord_t x,
jas_image_coord_t y, jas_image_coord_t width, jas_image_coord_t height,
jas_matrix_t *data)
{
jas_image_cmpt_t *cmpt;
jas_image_coord_t i;
jas_image_coord_t j;
jas_seqent_t *d;
jas_seqent_t *dr;
int drs;
jas_seqent_t v;
int k;
int c;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, ("jas_image_writecmpt(%p, %d, %ld, %ld, %ld, %ld, %p)\n",
image, cmptno, JAS_CAST(long, x), JAS_CAST(long, y),
JAS_CAST(long, width), JAS_CAST(long, height), data));
if (cmptno < 0 || cmptno >= image->numcmpts_) {
return -1;
}
cmpt = image->cmpts_[cmptno];
if (x >= cmpt->width_ || y >= cmpt->height_ ||
x + width > cmpt->width_ ||
y + height > cmpt->height_) {
return -1;
}
if (!jas_matrix_numrows(data) || !jas_matrix_numcols(data)) {
return -1;
}
if (jas_matrix_numrows(data) != height ||
jas_matrix_numcols(data) != width) {
return -1;
}
dr = jas_matrix_getref(data, 0, 0);
drs = jas_matrix_rowstep(data);
for (i = 0; i < height; ++i, dr += drs) {
d = dr;
if (jas_stream_seek(cmpt->stream_, (cmpt->width_ * (y + i) + x)
* cmpt->cps_, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
return -1;
}
for (j = width; j > 0; --j, ++d) {
v = inttobits(*d, cmpt->prec_, cmpt->sgnd_);
for (k = cmpt->cps_; k > 0; --k) {
c = (v >> (8 * (cmpt->cps_ - 1))) & 0xff;
if (jas_stream_putc(cmpt->stream_,
(unsigned char) c) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
v <<= 8;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtr<ClientRectList> Range::getClientRects() const
{
if (!m_start.container())
return ClientRectList::create();
m_ownerDocument->updateLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
Vector<FloatQuad> quads;
getBorderAndTextQuads(quads);
return ClientRectList::create(quads);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: explicit TestSafeBrowsingService(const SafeBrowsingTestConfiguration* config)
: test_configuration_(config) {
services_delegate_ =
safe_browsing::ServicesDelegate::CreateForTest(this, this);
}
Commit Message: Disable setxattr calls from quarantine subsystem on Chrome OS.
BUG=733943
Change-Id: I6e743469a8dc91536e180ecf4ff0df0cf427037c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1380571
Commit-Queue: Will Harris <wfh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thiemo Nagel <tnagel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617961}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 153,432 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void btif_hl_proc_dch_close_cfm(tBTA_HL *p_data)
{
btif_hl_mdl_cb_t *p_dcb;
btif_hl_mcl_cb_t *p_mcb;
UINT8 app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx;
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __FUNCTION__);
if (btif_hl_find_mdl_idx_using_handle(p_data->dch_close_cfm.mdl_handle,
&app_idx, &mcl_idx, &mdl_idx ))
{
p_dcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CB_PTR(app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx);
btif_hl_release_socket(app_idx,mcl_idx,mdl_idx);
btif_hl_clean_mdl_cb(p_dcb);
p_mcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MCL_CB_PTR(app_idx,mcl_idx);
if (!btif_hl_num_dchs_in_use(p_mcb->mcl_handle))
btif_hl_start_cch_timer(app_idx, mcl_idx);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG(" local DCH close success mdl_idx=%d", mdl_idx);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void webkitWebViewBaseSizeAllocate(GtkWidget* widget, GtkAllocation* allocation)
{
GTK_WIDGET_CLASS(webkit_web_view_base_parent_class)->size_allocate(widget, allocation);
WebKitWebViewBase* webViewBase = WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW_BASE(widget);
if (!gtk_widget_get_mapped(GTK_WIDGET(webViewBase)) && !webViewBase->priv->pageProxy->drawingArea()->size().isEmpty()) {
webViewBase->priv->needsResizeOnMap = true;
return;
}
resizeWebKitWebViewBaseFromAllocation(webViewBase, allocation);
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,898 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const effect_uuid_t * id_to_uuid(int id)
{
if (id >= NUM_ID)
return EFFECT_UUID_NULL;
return uuid_to_id_table[id];
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix AudioEffect reply overflow
Bug: 28173666
Change-Id: I055af37a721b20c5da0f1ec4b02f630dcd5aee02
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Size size() const {
return size_;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OxideQQuickWebView* OxideQQuickWebViewAttached::view() const {
return view_;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_print (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, struct t_gui_buffer *buffer,
const char *tags, const char *message, int strip_colors,
t_hook_callback_print *callback, void *callback_data)
{
struct t_hook *new_hook;
struct t_hook_print *new_hook_print;
if (!callback)
return NULL;
new_hook = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook));
if (!new_hook)
return NULL;
new_hook_print = malloc (sizeof (*new_hook_print));
if (!new_hook_print)
{
rc = (int) (HOOK_CONNECT(ptr_hook, gnutls_cb))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, tls_session, req_ca, nreq,
pk_algos, pk_algos_len, answer);
break;
}
ptr_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
new_hook->hook_data = new_hook_print;
new_hook_print->callback = callback;
new_hook_print->buffer = buffer;
if (tags)
{
new_hook_print->tags_array = string_split (tags, ",", 0, 0,
&new_hook_print->tags_count);
}
else
{
new_hook_print->tags_count = 0;
new_hook_print->tags_array = NULL;
}
new_hook_print->message = (message) ? strdup (message) : NULL;
new_hook_print->strip_colors = strip_colors;
hook_add_to_list (new_hook);
return new_hook;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 164,711 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned InputType::Width() const {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,271 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void methodWithOptionalStringMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::methodWithOptionalStringMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t port_fops_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
size_t count, loff_t *offp)
{
struct port *port;
struct port_buffer *buf;
ssize_t ret;
bool nonblock;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
/* Userspace could be out to fool us */
if (!count)
return 0;
port = filp->private_data;
nonblock = filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK;
ret = wait_port_writable(port, nonblock);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
count = min((size_t)(32 * 1024), count);
buf = alloc_buf(port->out_vq, count, 0);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = copy_from_user(buf->buf, ubuf, count);
if (ret) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto free_buf;
}
/*
* We now ask send_buf() to not spin for generic ports -- we
* can re-use the same code path that non-blocking file
* descriptors take for blocking file descriptors since the
* wait is already done and we're certain the write will go
* through to the host.
*/
nonblock = true;
sg_init_one(sg, buf->buf, count);
ret = __send_to_port(port, sg, 1, count, buf, nonblock);
if (nonblock && ret > 0)
goto out;
free_buf:
free_buf(buf, true);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: virtio-console: avoid DMA from stack
put_chars() stuffs the buffer it gets into an sg, but that buffer may be
on the stack. This breaks with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y (for me, it
manifested as printks getting turned into NUL bytes).
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NuPlayer::GenericSource::onSeek(sp<AMessage> msg) {
int64_t seekTimeUs;
CHECK(msg->findInt64("seekTimeUs", &seekTimeUs));
sp<AMessage> response = new AMessage;
status_t err = doSeek(seekTimeUs);
response->setInt32("err", err);
sp<AReplyToken> replyID;
CHECK(msg->senderAwaitsResponse(&replyID));
response->postReply(replyID);
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 160,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsGoogleHomePageUrl(const GURL& url) {
if (!IsGoogleDomainUrl(url, DISALLOW_SUBDOMAIN,
DISALLOW_NON_STANDARD_PORTS) &&
!IsGoogleSearchSubdomainUrl(url)) {
return false;
}
base::StringPiece path(url.path_piece());
return IsPathHomePageBase(path) ||
base::StartsWith(path, "/ig", base::CompareCase::INSENSITIVE_ASCII);
}
Commit Message: Fix ChromeResourceDispatcherHostDelegateMirrorBrowserTest.MirrorRequestHeader with network service.
The functionality worked, as part of converting DICE, however the test code didn't work since it
depended on accessing the net objects directly. Switch the tests to use the EmbeddedTestServer, to
better match production, which removes the dependency on net/.
Also:
-make GetFilePathWithReplacements replace strings in the mock headers if they're present
-add a global to google_util to ignore ports; that way other tests can be converted without having
to modify each callsite to google_util
Bug: 881976
Change-Id: Ic52023495c1c98c1248025c11cdf37f433fef058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1328142
Commit-Queue: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ramin Halavati <rhalavati@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607652}
CWE ID: | 0 | 143,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Object> ToEnumObject(v8::Isolate* isolate,
EnumType start_after,
EnumType end_at) {
v8::Local<v8::Object> object = v8::Object::New(isolate);
for (int i = start_after + 1; i <= end_at; ++i) {
v8::Local<v8::String> value = v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, ui::ToString(static_cast<EnumType>(i)).c_str());
object->Set(value, value);
}
return object;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 0 | 156,383 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: iasecc_chv_cache_clean(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_pin_cmd_data *pin_cmd)
{
struct sc_context *ctx = card->ctx;
struct iasecc_pin_status *current = NULL;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
for(current = checked_pins; current; current = current->next)
if (current->reference == pin_cmd->pin_reference)
break;
if (!current)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
if (current->next && current->prev) {
current->prev->next = current->next;
current->next->prev = current->prev;
}
else if (!current->prev) {
checked_pins = current->next;
}
else if (!current->next && current->prev) {
current->prev->next = NULL;
}
free(current);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void bitmap_writer_reuse_bitmaps(struct packing_data *to_pack)
{
if (prepare_bitmap_git() < 0)
return;
writer.reused = kh_init_sha1();
rebuild_existing_bitmaps(to_pack, writer.reused, writer.show_progress);
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,903 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ecb_des_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc,
struct scatterlist *dst, struct scatterlist *src,
unsigned int nbytes)
{
struct s390_des_ctx *ctx = crypto_blkcipher_ctx(desc->tfm);
struct blkcipher_walk walk;
blkcipher_walk_init(&walk, dst, src, nbytes);
return ecb_desall_crypt(desc, KM_DEA_DECRYPT, ctx->key, &walk);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,703 |
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