instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xps_draw_linear_gradient(xps_document *doc, const fz_matrix *ctm, const fz_rect *area,
struct stop *stops, int count,
fz_xml *root, int spread)
{
float x0, y0, x1, y1;
int i, mi, ma;
float dx, dy, x, y, k;
fz_point p1, p2;
fz_matrix inv;
fz_rect local_area = *area;
char *start_point_att = fz_xml_att(root, "StartPoint");
char *end_point_att = fz_xml_att(root, "EndPoint");
x0 = y0 = 0;
x1 = y1 = 1;
if (start_point_att)
xps_parse_point(start_point_att, &x0, &y0);
if (end_point_att)
xps_parse_point(end_point_att, &x1, &y1);
p1.x = x0; p1.y = y0; p2.x = x1; p2.y = y1;
fz_transform_rect(&local_area, fz_invert_matrix(&inv, ctm));
x = p2.x - p1.x; y = p2.y - p1.y;
k = ((local_area.x0 - p1.x) * x + (local_area.y0 - p1.y) * y) / (x * x + y * y);
mi = floorf(k); ma = ceilf(k);
k = ((local_area.x1 - p1.x) * x + (local_area.y0 - p1.y) * y) / (x * x + y * y);
mi = fz_mini(mi, floorf(k)); ma = fz_maxi(ma, ceilf(k));
k = ((local_area.x0 - p1.x) * x + (local_area.y1 - p1.y) * y) / (x * x + y * y);
mi = fz_mini(mi, floorf(k)); ma = fz_maxi(ma, ceilf(k));
k = ((local_area.x1 - p1.x) * x + (local_area.y1 - p1.y) * y) / (x * x + y * y);
mi = fz_mini(mi, floorf(k)); ma = fz_maxi(ma, ceilf(k));
dx = x1 - x0; dy = y1 - y0;
if (spread == SPREAD_REPEAT)
{
for (i = mi; i < ma; i++)
xps_draw_one_linear_gradient(doc, ctm, stops, count, 0, x0 + i * dx, y0 + i * dy, x1 + i * dx, y1 + i * dy);
}
else if (spread == SPREAD_REFLECT)
{
if ((mi % 2) != 0)
mi--;
for (i = mi; i < ma; i += 2)
{
xps_draw_one_linear_gradient(doc, ctm, stops, count, 0, x0 + i * dx, y0 + i * dy, x1 + i * dx, y1 + i * dy);
xps_draw_one_linear_gradient(doc, ctm, stops, count, 0, x0 + (i + 2) * dx, y0 + (i + 2) * dy, x1 + i * dx, y1 + i * dy);
}
}
else
{
xps_draw_one_linear_gradient(doc, ctm, stops, count, 1, x0, y0, x1, y1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 13,173 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __xml_accept_changes(xmlNode * xml)
{
xmlNode *cIter = NULL;
xmlAttr *pIter = NULL;
xml_private_t *p = xml->_private;
p->flags = xpf_none;
pIter = crm_first_attr(xml);
while (pIter != NULL) {
const xmlChar *name = pIter->name;
p = pIter->_private;
pIter = pIter->next;
if(p->flags & xpf_deleted) {
xml_remove_prop(xml, (const char *)name);
} else {
p->flags = xpf_none;
}
}
for (cIter = __xml_first_child(xml); cIter != NULL; cIter = __xml_next(cIter)) {
__xml_accept_changes(cIter);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 43,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pvscsi_request_cancelled(SCSIRequest *req)
{
PVSCSIRequest *pvscsi_req = req->hba_private;
PVSCSIState *s = pvscsi_req->dev;
if (pvscsi_req->completed) {
return;
}
if (pvscsi_req->dev->resetting) {
pvscsi_req->cmp.hostStatus = BTSTAT_BUSRESET;
} else {
pvscsi_req->cmp.hostStatus = BTSTAT_ABORTQUEUE;
}
pvscsi_complete_request(s, pvscsi_req);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 8,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteMoveToEndOfLineAndModifySelection(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Modify(
SelectionModifyAlteration::kExtend, SelectionModifyDirection::kForward,
TextGranularity::kLineBoundary, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXObject::notifyIfIgnoredValueChanged() {
bool isIgnored = accessibilityIsIgnored();
if (lastKnownIsIgnoredValue() != isIgnored) {
axObjectCache().childrenChanged(parentObject());
setLastKnownIsIgnoredValue(isIgnored);
}
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,288 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PopupType AutofillManager::GetPopupType(const FormData& form,
const FormFieldData& field) {
const AutofillField* autofill_field = GetAutofillField(form, field);
if (!autofill_field)
return PopupType::kUnspecified;
switch (autofill_field->Type().group()) {
case NO_GROUP:
case PASSWORD_FIELD:
case TRANSACTION:
case USERNAME_FIELD:
case UNFILLABLE:
return PopupType::kUnspecified;
case CREDIT_CARD:
return PopupType::kCreditCards;
case ADDRESS_HOME:
case ADDRESS_BILLING:
return PopupType::kAddresses;
case NAME:
case NAME_BILLING:
case EMAIL:
case COMPANY:
case PHONE_HOME:
case PHONE_BILLING:
return FormHasAddressField(form) ? PopupType::kAddresses
: PopupType::kPersonalInformation;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID: | 0 | 154,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ResourcePtr<CSSStyleSheetResource> ResourceFetcher::fetchCSSStyleSheet(FetchRequest& request)
{
return toCSSStyleSheetResource(requestResource(Resource::CSSStyleSheet, request));
}
Commit Message: Enforce SVG image security rules
SVG images have unique security rules that prevent them from loading
any external resources. This patch enforces these rules in
ResourceFetcher::canRequest for all non-data-uri resources. This locks
down our SVG resource handling and fixes two security bugs.
In the case of SVG images that reference other images, we had a bug
where a cached subresource would be used directly from the cache.
This has been fixed because the canRequest check occurs before we use
cached resources.
In the case of SVG images that use CSS imports, we had a bug where
imports were blindly requested. This has been fixed by stopping all
non-data-uri requests in SVG images.
With this patch we now match Gecko's behavior on both testcases.
BUG=380885, 382296
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/320763002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@176084 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 121,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NO_INLINE bool jspeFunctionDefinitionInternal(JsVar *funcVar, bool expressionOnly) {
if (expressionOnly) {
if (funcVar)
funcVar->flags = (funcVar->flags & ~JSV_VARTYPEMASK) | JSV_FUNCTION_RETURN;
} else {
JSP_MATCH('{');
#ifndef SAVE_ON_FLASH
if (lex->tk==LEX_STR && !strcmp(jslGetTokenValueAsString(lex), "compiled")) {
jsWarn("Function marked with \"compiled\" uploaded in source form");
}
#endif
/* If the function starts with return, treat it specially -
* we don't want to store the 'return' part of it
*/
if (funcVar && lex->tk==LEX_R_RETURN) {
funcVar->flags = (funcVar->flags & ~JSV_VARTYPEMASK) | JSV_FUNCTION_RETURN;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(LEX_R_RETURN);
}
}
JsVarInt lineNumber = 0;
if (funcVar && lex->lineNumberOffset) {
lineNumber = (JsVarInt)jslGetLineNumber(lex) + (JsVarInt)lex->lineNumberOffset - 1;
}
JslCharPos funcBegin = jslCharPosClone(&lex->tokenStart);
int lastTokenEnd = -1;
if (!expressionOnly) {
int brackets = 0;
while (lex->tk && (brackets || lex->tk != '}')) {
if (lex->tk == '{') brackets++;
if (lex->tk == '}') brackets--;
lastTokenEnd = (int)jsvStringIteratorGetIndex(&lex->it)-1;
JSP_ASSERT_MATCH(lex->tk);
}
} else {
JsExecFlags oldExec = execInfo.execute;
execInfo.execute = EXEC_NO;
jsvUnLock(jspeAssignmentExpression());
execInfo.execute = oldExec;
lastTokenEnd = (int)jsvStringIteratorGetIndex(&lex->tokenStart.it)-1;
}
if (funcVar && lastTokenEnd>0) {
JsVar *funcCodeVar;
if (jsvIsNativeString(lex->sourceVar)) {
/* If we're parsing from a Native String (eg. E.memoryArea, E.setBootCode) then
use another Native String to load function code straight from flash */
int s = (int)jsvStringIteratorGetIndex(&funcBegin.it) - 1;
funcCodeVar = jsvNewNativeString(lex->sourceVar->varData.nativeStr.ptr + s, (unsigned int)(lastTokenEnd - s));
} else {
if (jsfGetFlag(JSF_PRETOKENISE)) {
funcCodeVar = jslNewTokenisedStringFromLexer(&funcBegin, (size_t)lastTokenEnd);
} else {
funcCodeVar = jslNewStringFromLexer(&funcBegin, (size_t)lastTokenEnd);
}
}
jsvUnLock2(jsvAddNamedChild(funcVar, funcCodeVar, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_CODE_NAME), funcCodeVar);
JsVar *funcScopeVar = jspeiGetScopesAsVar();
if (funcScopeVar) {
jsvUnLock2(jsvAddNamedChild(funcVar, funcScopeVar, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_SCOPE_NAME), funcScopeVar);
}
if (lineNumber) {
JsVar *funcLineNumber = jsvNewFromInteger(lineNumber);
if (funcLineNumber) {
jsvUnLock2(jsvAddNamedChild(funcVar, funcLineNumber, JSPARSE_FUNCTION_LINENUMBER_NAME), funcLineNumber);
}
}
}
jslCharPosFree(&funcBegin);
if (!expressionOnly) JSP_MATCH('}');
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 82,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Location* Document::location() const
{
if (!frame())
return 0;
return domWindow()->location();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::ExecuteEditCommand(const std::string& command,
const std::string& value) {
Send(new ViewMsg_ExecuteEditCommand(GetRoutingID(), command, value));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void hwsim_check_chanctx_magic(struct ieee80211_chanctx_conf *c)
{
struct hwsim_chanctx_priv *cp = (void *)c->drv_priv;
WARN_ON(cp->magic != HWSIM_CHANCTX_MAGIC);
}
Commit Message: mac80211_hwsim: fix possible memory leak in hwsim_new_radio_nl()
'hwname' is malloced in hwsim_new_radio_nl() and should be freed
before leaving from the error handling cases, otherwise it will cause
memory leak.
Fixes: ff4dd73dd2b4 ("mac80211_hwsim: check HWSIM_ATTR_RADIO_NAME length")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 83,782 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void swevent_hlist_release(struct swevent_htable *swhash)
{
struct swevent_hlist *hlist = swevent_hlist_deref(swhash);
if (!hlist)
return;
rcu_assign_pointer(swhash->swevent_hlist, NULL);
kfree_rcu(hlist, rcu_head);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 26,205 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadOneMNGImage(MngInfo* mng_info, const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
page_geometry[MagickPathExtent];
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
logging;
volatile int
first_mng_object,
object_id,
term_chunk_found,
skip_to_iend;
volatile ssize_t
image_count=0;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
MngBox
default_fb,
fb,
previous_fb;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
PixelInfo
mng_background_color;
#endif
register unsigned char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
count;
ssize_t
loop_level;
volatile short
skipping_loop;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
unsigned int
mandatory_back=0;
#endif
volatile unsigned int
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
mng_background_object=0,
#endif
mng_type=0; /* 0: PNG or JNG; 1: MNG; 2: MNG-LC; 3: MNG-VLC */
size_t
default_frame_timeout,
frame_timeout,
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
image_height,
image_width,
#endif
length;
/* These delays are all measured in image ticks_per_second,
* not in MNG ticks_per_second
*/
volatile size_t
default_frame_delay,
final_delay,
final_image_delay,
frame_delay,
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
insert_layers,
#endif
mng_iterations=1,
simplicity=0,
subframe_height=0,
subframe_width=0;
previous_fb.top=0;
previous_fb.bottom=0;
previous_fb.left=0;
previous_fb.right=0;
default_fb.top=0;
default_fb.bottom=0;
default_fb.left=0;
default_fb.right=0;
logging=LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Enter ReadOneMNGImage()");
image=mng_info->image;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
char
magic_number[MagickPathExtent];
/* Verify MNG signature. */
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,8,(unsigned char *) magic_number);
if (memcmp(magic_number,"\212MNG\r\n\032\n",8) != 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
/* Initialize some nonzero members of the MngInfo structure. */
for (i=0; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
{
mng_info->object_clip[i].right=(ssize_t) PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
mng_info->object_clip[i].bottom=(ssize_t) PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
}
mng_info->exists[0]=MagickTrue;
}
skipping_loop=(-1);
first_mng_object=MagickTrue;
mng_type=0;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
insert_layers=MagickFalse; /* should be False during convert or mogrify */
#endif
default_frame_delay=0;
default_frame_timeout=0;
frame_delay=0;
final_delay=1;
mng_info->ticks_per_second=1UL*image->ticks_per_second;
object_id=0;
skip_to_iend=MagickFalse;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
mng_info->framing_mode=1;
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
mandatory_back=MagickFalse;
#endif
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
mng_background_color=image->background_color;
#endif
default_fb=mng_info->frame;
previous_fb=mng_info->frame;
do
{
char
type[MagickPathExtent];
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0)
{
unsigned char
*chunk;
/*
Read a new chunk.
*/
type[0]='\0';
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(type,"errr",MagickPathExtent);
length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
count=(size_t) ReadBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) type);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Reading MNG chunk type %c%c%c%c, length: %.20g",
type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3],(double) length);
if (length > PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
{
status=MagickFalse;
break;
}
if (count == 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
p=NULL;
chunk=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (length != 0)
{
if (length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
chunk=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*chunk));
if (chunk == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
int
c;
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
if (c == EOF)
break;
chunk[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
p=chunk;
}
(void) ReadBlobMSBLong(image); /* read crc word */
#if !defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
if (memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->jhdr_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"JNGCompressNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->jhdr_warning++;
}
#endif
if (memcmp(type,mng_DHDR,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->dhdr_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"DeltaPNGNotSupported","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->dhdr_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MEND,4) == 0)
break;
if (skip_to_iend)
{
if (memcmp(type,mng_IEND,4) == 0)
skip_to_iend=MagickFalse;
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skip to IEND.");
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MHDR,4) == 0)
{
if (length != 28)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
mng_info->mng_width=(unsigned long) (((png_uint_32) p[0] << 24) |
((png_uint_32) p[1] << 16) | ((png_uint_32) p[2] << 8) |
(png_uint_32) p[3]);
mng_info->mng_height=(unsigned long) (((png_uint_32) p[4] << 24) |
((png_uint_32) p[5] << 16) | ((png_uint_32) p[6] << 8) |
(png_uint_32) p[7]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MNG width: %.20g",(double) mng_info->mng_width);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" MNG height: %.20g",(double) mng_info->mng_height);
}
p+=8;
mng_info->ticks_per_second=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second == 0)
default_frame_delay=0;
else
default_frame_delay=1UL*image->ticks_per_second/
mng_info->ticks_per_second;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
simplicity=0;
p+=16;
simplicity=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
mng_type=1; /* Full MNG */
if ((simplicity != 0) && ((simplicity | 11) == 11))
mng_type=2; /* LC */
if ((simplicity != 0) && ((simplicity | 9) == 9))
mng_type=3; /* VLC */
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (mng_type != 3)
insert_layers=MagickTrue;
#endif
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
mng_info->image=image;
}
if ((mng_info->mng_width > 65535L) ||
(mng_info->mng_height > 65535L))
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(ImageError,"WidthOrHeightExceedsLimit");
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g+0+0",(double) mng_info->mng_width,(double)
mng_info->mng_height);
mng_info->frame.left=0;
mng_info->frame.right=(ssize_t) mng_info->mng_width;
mng_info->frame.top=0;
mng_info->frame.bottom=(ssize_t) mng_info->mng_height;
mng_info->clip=default_fb=previous_fb=mng_info->frame;
for (i=0; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
mng_info->object_clip[i]=mng_info->frame;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_TERM,4) == 0)
{
int
repeat=0;
if (length != 0)
repeat=p[0];
if (repeat == 3 && length > 8)
{
final_delay=(png_uint_32) mng_get_long(&p[2]);
mng_iterations=(png_uint_32) mng_get_long(&p[6]);
if (mng_iterations == PNG_UINT_31_MAX)
mng_iterations=0;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickTrue;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" repeat=%d, final_delay=%.20g, iterations=%.20g",
repeat,(double) final_delay, (double) image->iterations);
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_DEFI,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_type == 3)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"DEFI chunk found in MNG-VLC datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (length < 2)
{
if (chunk)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage");
}
object_id=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
if (mng_type == 2 && object_id != 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Nonzero object_id in MNG-LC datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (object_id > MNG_MAX_OBJECTS)
{
/*
Instead of using a warning we should allocate a larger
MngInfo structure and continue.
*/
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"object id too large","`%s'",image->filename);
object_id=MNG_MAX_OBJECTS;
}
if (mng_info->exists[object_id])
if (mng_info->frozen[object_id])
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"DEFI cannot redefine a frozen MNG object","`%s'",
image->filename);
continue;
}
mng_info->exists[object_id]=MagickTrue;
if (length > 2)
mng_info->invisible[object_id]=p[2];
/*
Extract object offset info.
*/
if (length > 11)
{
mng_info->x_off[object_id]=(ssize_t)
(((png_uint_32) p[4] << 24) | ((png_uint_32) p[5] << 16) |
((png_uint_32) p[6] << 8) | (png_uint_32) p[7]);
mng_info->y_off[object_id]=(ssize_t)
(((png_uint_32) p[8] << 24) | ((png_uint_32) p[9] << 16) |
((png_uint_32) p[10] << 8) | (png_uint_32) p[11]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" x_off[%d]: %.20g, y_off[%d]: %.20g",
object_id,(double) mng_info->x_off[object_id],
object_id,(double) mng_info->y_off[object_id]);
}
}
/*
Extract object clipping info.
*/
if (length > 27)
mng_info->object_clip[object_id]=mng_read_box(mng_info->frame,0,
&p[12]);
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_bKGD,4) == 0)
{
mng_info->have_global_bkgd=MagickFalse;
if (length > 5)
{
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[0] << 8) | p[1]));
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[2] << 8) | p[3]));
mng_info->mng_global_bkgd.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[4] << 8) | p[5]));
mng_info->have_global_bkgd=MagickTrue;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_BACK,4) == 0)
{
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (length > 6)
mandatory_back=p[6];
else
mandatory_back=0;
if (mandatory_back && length > 5)
{
mng_background_color.red=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[0] << 8) | p[1]));
mng_background_color.green=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[2] << 8) | p[3]));
mng_background_color.blue=
ScaleShortToQuantum((unsigned short) ((p[4] << 8) | p[5]));
mng_background_color.alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (length > 8)
mng_background_object=(p[7] << 8) | p[8];
#endif
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_PLTE,4) == 0)
{
/* Read global PLTE. */
if (length && (length < 769))
{
if (mng_info->global_plte == (png_colorp) NULL)
mng_info->global_plte=(png_colorp) AcquireQuantumMemory(256,
sizeof(*mng_info->global_plte));
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length/3); i++)
{
mng_info->global_plte[i].red=p[3*i];
mng_info->global_plte[i].green=p[3*i+1];
mng_info->global_plte[i].blue=p[3*i+2];
}
mng_info->global_plte_length=(unsigned int) (length/3);
}
#ifdef MNG_LOOSE
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
{
mng_info->global_plte[i].red=i;
mng_info->global_plte[i].green=i;
mng_info->global_plte[i].blue=i;
}
if (length != 0)
mng_info->global_plte_length=256;
#endif
else
mng_info->global_plte_length=0;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_tRNS,4) == 0)
{
/* read global tRNS */
if (length > 0 && length < 257)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
mng_info->global_trns[i]=p[i];
#ifdef MNG_LOOSE
for ( ; i < 256; i++)
mng_info->global_trns[i]=255;
#endif
mng_info->global_trns_length=(unsigned int) length;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_gAMA,4) == 0)
{
if (length == 4)
{
ssize_t
igamma;
igamma=mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_gamma=((float) igamma)*0.00001;
mng_info->have_global_gama=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_gama=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_cHRM,4) == 0)
{
/* Read global cHRM */
if (length == 32)
{
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_chrm.white_point.y=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[4]);
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.x=0.00001*mng_get_long(&p[8]);
mng_info->global_chrm.red_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[12]);
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.x=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[16]);
mng_info->global_chrm.green_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[20]);
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.x=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[24]);
mng_info->global_chrm.blue_primary.y=0.00001*
mng_get_long(&p[28]);
mng_info->have_global_chrm=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_chrm=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sRGB,4) == 0)
{
/*
Read global sRGB.
*/
if (length != 0)
{
mng_info->global_srgb_intent=
Magick_RenderingIntent_from_PNG_RenderingIntent(p[0]);
mng_info->have_global_srgb=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_srgb=MagickFalse;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_iCCP,4) == 0)
{
/* To do: */
/*
Read global iCCP.
*/
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_FRAM,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_type == 3)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"FRAM chunk found in MNG-VLC datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
if ((mng_info->framing_mode == 2) || (mng_info->framing_mode == 4))
image->delay=frame_delay;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
frame_timeout=default_frame_timeout;
fb=default_fb;
if (length != 0)
if (p[0])
mng_info->framing_mode=p[0];
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_mode=%d",mng_info->framing_mode);
if (length > 6)
{
/* Note the delay and frame clipping boundaries. */
p++; /* framing mode */
while (*p && ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) length))
p++; /* frame name */
p++; /* frame name terminator */
if ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4))
{
int
change_delay,
change_timeout,
change_clipping;
change_delay=(*p++);
change_timeout=(*p++);
change_clipping=(*p++);
p++; /* change_sync */
if (change_delay && ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4)))
{
frame_delay=1UL*image->ticks_per_second*
mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second != 0)
frame_delay/=mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
frame_delay=PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
if (change_delay == 2)
default_frame_delay=frame_delay;
p+=4;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_delay=%.20g",(double) frame_delay);
}
if (change_timeout && ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-4)))
{
frame_timeout=1UL*image->ticks_per_second*
mng_get_long(p);
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second != 0)
frame_timeout/=mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
frame_timeout=PNG_UINT_31_MAX;
if (change_timeout == 2)
default_frame_timeout=frame_timeout;
p+=4;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Framing_timeout=%.20g",(double) frame_timeout);
}
if (change_clipping && ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-16)))
{
fb=mng_read_box(previous_fb,(char) p[0],&p[1]);
p+=16;
previous_fb=fb;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Frame_clip: L=%.20g R=%.20g T=%.20g B=%.20g",
(double) fb.left,(double) fb.right,(double) fb.top,
(double) fb.bottom);
if (change_clipping == 2)
default_fb=fb;
}
}
}
mng_info->clip=fb;
mng_info->clip=mng_minimum_box(fb,mng_info->frame);
subframe_width=(size_t) (mng_info->clip.right
-mng_info->clip.left);
subframe_height=(size_t) (mng_info->clip.bottom
-mng_info->clip.top);
/*
Insert a background layer behind the frame if framing_mode is 4.
*/
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" subframe_width=%.20g, subframe_height=%.20g",(double)
subframe_width,(double) subframe_height);
if (insert_layers && (mng_info->framing_mode == 4) &&
(subframe_width) && (subframe_height))
{
/* Allocate next image structure. */
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
image->columns=subframe_width;
image->rows=subframe_height;
image->page.width=subframe_width;
image->page.height=subframe_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->clip.left;
image->page.y=mng_info->clip.top;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->delay=0;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Insert backgd layer, L=%.20g, R=%.20g T=%.20g, B=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->clip.left,
(double) mng_info->clip.right,
(double) mng_info->clip.top,
(double) mng_info->clip.bottom);
}
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_CLIP,4) == 0)
{
unsigned int
first_object,
last_object;
/*
Read CLIP.
*/
if (length > 3)
{
first_object=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
last_object=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
p+=4;
for (i=(int) first_object; i <= (int) last_object; i++)
{
if ((i < 0) || (i >= MNG_MAX_OBJECTS))
continue;
if (mng_info->exists[i] && !mng_info->frozen[i])
{
MngBox
box;
box=mng_info->object_clip[i];
if ((p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-17))
mng_info->object_clip[i]=
mng_read_box(box,(char) p[0],&p[1]);
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_SAVE,4) == 0)
{
for (i=1; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
if (mng_info->exists[i])
{
mng_info->frozen[i]=MagickTrue;
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (mng_info->ob[i] != (MngBuffer *) NULL)
mng_info->ob[i]->frozen=MagickTrue;
#endif
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if ((memcmp(type,mng_DISC,4) == 0) || (memcmp(type,mng_SEEK,4) == 0))
{
/* Read DISC or SEEK. */
if ((length == 0) || !memcmp(type,mng_SEEK,4))
{
for (i=1; i < MNG_MAX_OBJECTS; i++)
MngInfoDiscardObject(mng_info,i);
}
else
{
register ssize_t
j;
for (j=1; j < (ssize_t) length; j+=2)
{
i=p[j-1] << 8 | p[j];
MngInfoDiscardObject(mng_info,i);
}
}
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MOVE,4) == 0)
{
size_t
first_object,
last_object;
/* read MOVE */
if (length > 3)
{
first_object=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
last_object=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
p+=4;
for (i=(ssize_t) first_object; i <= (ssize_t) last_object; i++)
{
if ((i < 0) || (i >= MNG_MAX_OBJECTS))
continue;
if (mng_info->exists[i] && !mng_info->frozen[i] &&
(p-chunk) < (ssize_t) (length-8))
{
MngPair
new_pair;
MngPair
old_pair;
old_pair.a=mng_info->x_off[i];
old_pair.b=mng_info->y_off[i];
new_pair=mng_read_pair(old_pair,(int) p[0],&p[1]);
mng_info->x_off[i]=new_pair.a;
mng_info->y_off[i]=new_pair.b;
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_LOOP,4) == 0)
{
ssize_t loop_iters=1;
if (length > 4)
{
loop_level=chunk[0];
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=1; /* mark loop active */
/* Record starting point. */
loop_iters=mng_get_long(&chunk[1]);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" LOOP level %.20g has %.20g iterations ",
(double) loop_level, (double) loop_iters);
if (loop_iters == 0)
skipping_loop=loop_level;
else
{
mng_info->loop_jump[loop_level]=TellBlob(image);
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]=loop_iters;
}
mng_info->loop_iteration[loop_level]=0;
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_ENDL,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 0)
{
loop_level=chunk[0];
if (skipping_loop > 0)
{
if (skipping_loop == loop_level)
{
/*
Found end of zero-iteration loop.
*/
skipping_loop=(-1);
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=0;
}
}
else
{
if (mng_info->loop_active[loop_level] == 1)
{
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]--;
mng_info->loop_iteration[loop_level]++;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" ENDL: LOOP level %.20g has %.20g remaining iters",
(double) loop_level,(double)
mng_info->loop_count[loop_level]);
if (mng_info->loop_count[loop_level] != 0)
{
offset=
SeekBlob(image,mng_info->loop_jump[loop_level],
SEEK_SET);
if (offset < 0)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImproperImageHeader");
}
}
else
{
short
last_level;
/*
Finished loop.
*/
mng_info->loop_active[loop_level]=0;
last_level=(-1);
for (i=0; i < loop_level; i++)
if (mng_info->loop_active[i] == 1)
last_level=(short) i;
loop_level=last_level;
}
}
}
}
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_CLON,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->clon_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"CLON is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->clon_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_MAGN,4) == 0)
{
png_uint_16
magn_first,
magn_last,
magn_mb,
magn_ml,
magn_mr,
magn_mt,
magn_mx,
magn_my,
magn_methx,
magn_methy;
if (length > 1)
magn_first=(p[0] << 8) | p[1];
else
magn_first=0;
if (length > 3)
magn_last=(p[2] << 8) | p[3];
else
magn_last=magn_first;
#ifndef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
if (magn_first || magn_last)
if (mng_info->magn_warning == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"MAGN is not implemented yet for nonzero objects",
"`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->magn_warning++;
}
#endif
if (length > 4)
magn_methx=p[4];
else
magn_methx=0;
if (length > 6)
magn_mx=(p[5] << 8) | p[6];
else
magn_mx=1;
if (magn_mx == 0)
magn_mx=1;
if (length > 8)
magn_my=(p[7] << 8) | p[8];
else
magn_my=magn_mx;
if (magn_my == 0)
magn_my=1;
if (length > 10)
magn_ml=(p[9] << 8) | p[10];
else
magn_ml=magn_mx;
if (magn_ml == 0)
magn_ml=1;
if (length > 12)
magn_mr=(p[11] << 8) | p[12];
else
magn_mr=magn_mx;
if (magn_mr == 0)
magn_mr=1;
if (length > 14)
magn_mt=(p[13] << 8) | p[14];
else
magn_mt=magn_my;
if (magn_mt == 0)
magn_mt=1;
if (length > 16)
magn_mb=(p[15] << 8) | p[16];
else
magn_mb=magn_my;
if (magn_mb == 0)
magn_mb=1;
if (length > 17)
magn_methy=p[17];
else
magn_methy=magn_methx;
if (magn_methx > 5 || magn_methy > 5)
if (mng_info->magn_warning == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,
GetMagickModule(),CoderError,
"Unknown MAGN method in MNG datastream","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->magn_warning++;
}
#ifdef MNG_OBJECT_BUFFERS
/* Magnify existing objects in the range magn_first to magn_last */
#endif
if (magn_first == 0 || magn_last == 0)
{
/* Save the magnification factors for object 0 */
mng_info->magn_mb=magn_mb;
mng_info->magn_ml=magn_ml;
mng_info->magn_mr=magn_mr;
mng_info->magn_mt=magn_mt;
mng_info->magn_mx=magn_mx;
mng_info->magn_my=magn_my;
mng_info->magn_methx=magn_methx;
mng_info->magn_methy=magn_methy;
}
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_PAST,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->past_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"PAST is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->past_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_SHOW,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->show_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"SHOW is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->show_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_sBIT,4) == 0)
{
if (length < 4)
mng_info->have_global_sbit=MagickFalse;
else
{
mng_info->global_sbit.gray=p[0];
mng_info->global_sbit.red=p[0];
mng_info->global_sbit.green=p[1];
mng_info->global_sbit.blue=p[2];
mng_info->global_sbit.alpha=p[3];
mng_info->have_global_sbit=MagickTrue;
}
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYs,4) == 0)
{
if (length > 8)
{
mng_info->global_x_pixels_per_unit=
(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
mng_info->global_y_pixels_per_unit=
(size_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
mng_info->global_phys_unit_type=p[8];
mng_info->have_global_phys=MagickTrue;
}
else
mng_info->have_global_phys=MagickFalse;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_pHYg,4) == 0)
{
if (mng_info->phyg_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"pHYg is not implemented.","`%s'",image->filename);
mng_info->phyg_warning++;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_BASI,4) == 0)
{
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->basi_warning == 0)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"BASI is not implemented yet","`%s'",
image->filename);
mng_info->basi_warning++;
#ifdef MNG_BASI_SUPPORTED
basi_width=(unsigned long) (((png_uint_32) p[0] << 24) |
((png_uint_32) p[1] << 16) | ((png_uint_32) p[2] << 8) |
(png_uint_32) p[3]);
basi_height=(unsigned long) (((png_uint_32) p[4] << 24) |
((png_uint_32) p[5] << 16) | ((png_uint_32) p[6] << 8) |
(png_uint_32) p[7]);
basi_color_type=p[8];
basi_compression_method=p[9];
basi_filter_type=p[10];
basi_interlace_method=p[11];
if (length > 11)
basi_red=((png_uint_32) p[12] << 8) & (png_uint_32) p[13];
else
basi_red=0;
if (length > 13)
basi_green=((png_uint_32) p[14] << 8) & (png_uint_32) p[15];
else
basi_green=0;
if (length > 15)
basi_blue=((png_uint_32) p[16] << 8) & (png_uint_32) p[17];
else
basi_blue=0;
if (length > 17)
basi_alpha=((png_uint_32) p[18] << 8) & (png_uint_32) p[19];
else
{
if (basi_sample_depth == 16)
basi_alpha=65535L;
else
basi_alpha=255;
}
if (length > 19)
basi_viewable=p[20];
else
basi_viewable=0;
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
if (memcmp(type,mng_IHDR,4)
#if defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
&& memcmp(type,mng_JHDR,4)
#endif
)
{
/* Not an IHDR or JHDR chunk */
if (length != 0)
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
/* Process IHDR */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Processing %c%c%c%c chunk",type[0],type[1],type[2],type[3]);
mng_info->exists[object_id]=MagickTrue;
mng_info->viewable[object_id]=MagickTrue;
if (mng_info->invisible[object_id])
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Skipping invisible object");
skip_to_iend=MagickTrue;
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
continue;
}
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (length < 8)
{
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
image_width=(size_t) mng_get_long(p);
image_height=(size_t) mng_get_long(&p[4]);
#endif
chunk=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(chunk);
/*
Insert a transparent background layer behind the entire animation
if it is not full screen.
*/
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (insert_layers && mng_type && first_mng_object)
{
if ((mng_info->clip.left > 0) || (mng_info->clip.top > 0) ||
(image_width < mng_info->mng_width) ||
(mng_info->clip.right < (ssize_t) mng_info->mng_width) ||
(image_height < mng_info->mng_height) ||
(mng_info->clip.bottom < (ssize_t) mng_info->mng_height))
{
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
/* Make a background rectangle. */
image->delay=0;
image->columns=mng_info->mng_width;
image->rows=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Inserted transparent background layer, W=%.20g, H=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->mng_width,(double) mng_info->mng_height);
}
}
/*
Insert a background layer behind the upcoming image if
framing_mode is 3, and we haven't already inserted one.
*/
if (insert_layers && (mng_info->framing_mode == 3) &&
(subframe_width) && (subframe_height) && (simplicity == 0 ||
(simplicity & 0x08)))
{
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
image->delay=0;
image->columns=subframe_width;
image->rows=subframe_height;
image->page.width=subframe_width;
image->page.height=subframe_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->clip.left;
image->page.y=mng_info->clip.top;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Insert background layer, L=%.20g, R=%.20g T=%.20g, B=%.20g",
(double) mng_info->clip.left,(double) mng_info->clip.right,
(double) mng_info->clip.top,(double) mng_info->clip.bottom);
}
#endif /* MNG_INSERT_LAYERS */
first_mng_object=MagickFalse;
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
mng_info->image=image;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
if (term_chunk_found)
{
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
term_chunk_found=MagickFalse;
}
else
image->start_loop=MagickFalse;
if (mng_info->framing_mode == 1 || mng_info->framing_mode == 3)
{
image->delay=frame_delay;
frame_delay=default_frame_delay;
}
else
image->delay=0;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=mng_info->x_off[object_id];
image->page.y=mng_info->y_off[object_id];
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
/*
Seek back to the beginning of the IHDR or JHDR chunk's length field.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Seeking back to beginning of %c%c%c%c chunk",type[0],type[1],
type[2],type[3]);
offset=SeekBlob(image,-((ssize_t) length+12),SEEK_CUR);
if (offset < 0)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
mng_info->image=image;
mng_info->mng_type=mng_type;
mng_info->object_id=object_id;
if (memcmp(type,mng_IHDR,4) == 0)
image=ReadOnePNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
#if defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
else
image=ReadOneJNGImage(mng_info,image_info,exception);
#endif
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"exit ReadJNGImage() with error");
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (image->columns == 0 || image->rows == 0)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
mng_info->image=image;
if (mng_type)
{
MngBox
crop_box;
if (mng_info->magn_methx || mng_info->magn_methy)
{
png_uint_32
magnified_height,
magnified_width;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Processing MNG MAGN chunk");
if (mng_info->magn_methx == 1)
{
magnified_width=mng_info->magn_ml;
if (image->columns > 1)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_mr;
if (image->columns > 2)
magnified_width += (png_uint_32)
((image->columns-2)*(mng_info->magn_mx));
}
else
{
magnified_width=(png_uint_32) image->columns;
if (image->columns > 1)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_ml-1;
if (image->columns > 2)
magnified_width += mng_info->magn_mr-1;
if (image->columns > 3)
magnified_width += (png_uint_32)
((image->columns-3)*(mng_info->magn_mx-1));
}
if (mng_info->magn_methy == 1)
{
magnified_height=mng_info->magn_mt;
if (image->rows > 1)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mb;
if (image->rows > 2)
magnified_height += (png_uint_32)
((image->rows-2)*(mng_info->magn_my));
}
else
{
magnified_height=(png_uint_32) image->rows;
if (image->rows > 1)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mt-1;
if (image->rows > 2)
magnified_height += mng_info->magn_mb-1;
if (image->rows > 3)
magnified_height += (png_uint_32)
((image->rows-3)*(mng_info->magn_my-1));
}
if (magnified_height > image->rows ||
magnified_width > image->columns)
{
Image
*large_image;
int
yy;
Quantum
*next,
*prev;
png_uint_16
magn_methx,
magn_methy;
ssize_t
m,
y;
register Quantum
*n,
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
/* Allocate next image structure. */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Allocate magnified image");
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
large_image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
large_image->columns=magnified_width;
large_image->rows=magnified_height;
magn_methx=mng_info->magn_methx;
magn_methy=mng_info->magn_methy;
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
#define QM unsigned short
if (magn_methx != 1 || magn_methy != 1)
{
/*
Scale pixels to unsigned shorts to prevent
overflow of intermediate values of interpolations
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelRed(image,q)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelGreen(image,q)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelBlue(image,q)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleQuantumToShort(
GetPixelAlpha(image,q)),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#else
#define QM Quantum
#endif
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(large_image,exception);
else
{
large_image->background_color.alpha=OpaqueAlpha;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(large_image,exception);
if (magn_methx == 4)
magn_methx=2;
if (magn_methx == 5)
magn_methx=3;
if (magn_methy == 4)
magn_methy=2;
if (magn_methy == 5)
magn_methy=3;
}
/* magnify the rows into the right side of the large image */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Magnify the rows to %.20g",
(double) large_image->rows);
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;
yy=0;
length=(size_t) GetPixelChannels(image)*image->columns;
next=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*next));
prev=(Quantum *) AcquireQuantumMemory(length,sizeof(*prev));
if ((prev == (Quantum *) NULL) ||
(next == (Quantum *) NULL))
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,0,image->columns,1,exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(next,n,length);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
if (y == 0)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mt;
else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-2)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;
else if (magn_methy <= 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mb;
else if (magn_methy > 1 && y == (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
m=1;
else
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_my;
n=prev;
prev=next;
next=n;
if (y < (ssize_t) image->rows-1)
{
n=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y+1,image->columns,1,
exception);
(void) CopyMagickMemory(next,n,length);
}
for (i=0; i < m; i++, yy++)
{
register Quantum
*pixels;
assert(yy < (ssize_t) large_image->rows);
pixels=prev;
n=next;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(large_image,0,yy,large_image->columns,
1,exception);
q+=(large_image->columns-image->columns)*
GetPixelChannels(large_image);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
/* To do: get color as function of indexes[x] */
/*
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
}
*/
if (magn_methy <= 1)
{
/* replicate previous */
SetPixelRed(large_image,GetPixelRed(image,pixels),q);
SetPixelGreen(large_image,GetPixelGreen(image,
pixels),q);
SetPixelBlue(large_image,GetPixelBlue(image,
pixels),q);
SetPixelAlpha(large_image,GetPixelAlpha(image,
pixels),q);
}
else if (magn_methy == 2 || magn_methy == 4)
{
if (i == 0)
{
SetPixelRed(large_image,GetPixelRed(image,
pixels),q);
SetPixelGreen(large_image,GetPixelGreen(image,
pixels),q);
SetPixelBlue(large_image,GetPixelBlue(image,
pixels),q);
SetPixelAlpha(large_image,GetPixelAlpha(image,
pixels),q);
}
else
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelRed(large_image,((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelRed(image,n)
-GetPixelRed(image,pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelRed(image,pixels)))),q);
SetPixelGreen(large_image,((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelGreen(image,n)
-GetPixelGreen(image,pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelGreen(image,pixels)))),q);
SetPixelBlue(large_image,((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelBlue(image,n)
-GetPixelBlue(image,pixels)+m))/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelBlue(image,pixels)))),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(large_image, ((QM) (((ssize_t)
(2*i*(GetPixelAlpha(image,n)
-GetPixelAlpha(image,pixels)+m))
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelAlpha(image,pixels)))),q);
}
if (magn_methy == 4)
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
SetPixelAlpha(large_image,GetPixelAlpha(image,
pixels),q);
else
SetPixelAlpha(large_image,GetPixelAlpha(image,
n),q);
}
}
else /* if (magn_methy == 3 || magn_methy == 5) */
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelRed(large_image,GetPixelRed(image,
pixels),q);
SetPixelGreen(large_image,GetPixelGreen(image,
pixels),q);
SetPixelBlue(large_image,GetPixelBlue(image,
pixels),q);
SetPixelAlpha(large_image,GetPixelAlpha(image,
pixels),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(large_image,GetPixelRed(image,n),q);
SetPixelGreen(large_image,GetPixelGreen(image,n),
q);
SetPixelBlue(large_image,GetPixelBlue(image,n),
q);
SetPixelAlpha(large_image,GetPixelAlpha(image,n),
q);
}
if (magn_methy == 5)
{
SetPixelAlpha(large_image,(QM) (((ssize_t) (2*i*
(GetPixelAlpha(image,n)
-GetPixelAlpha(image,pixels))
+m))/((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelAlpha(image,pixels)),q);
}
}
n+=GetPixelChannels(image);
q+=GetPixelChannels(large_image);
pixels+=GetPixelChannels(image);
} /* x */
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(large_image,exception) == 0)
break;
} /* i */
} /* y */
prev=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(prev);
next=(Quantum *) RelinquishMagickMemory(next);
length=image->columns;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Delete original image");
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
image=large_image;
mng_info->image=image;
/* magnify the columns */
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Magnify the columns to %.20g",
(double) image->columns);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*pixels;
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
pixels=q+(image->columns-length)*GetPixelChannels(image);
n=pixels+GetPixelChannels(image);
for (x=(ssize_t) (image->columns-length);
x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
/* To do: Rewrite using Get/Set***PixelChannel() */
if (x == (ssize_t) (image->columns-length))
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_ml;
else if (magn_methx > 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-2)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mr;
else if (magn_methx <= 1 &&
x == (ssize_t) image->columns-1)
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mr;
else if (magn_methx > 1 && x == (ssize_t) image->columns-1)
m=1;
else
m=(ssize_t) mng_info->magn_mx;
for (i=0; i < m; i++)
{
if (magn_methx <= 1)
{
/* replicate previous */
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(image,pixels),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(image,pixels),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(image,pixels),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(image,pixels),q);
}
else if (magn_methx == 2 || magn_methx == 4)
{
if (i == 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(image,pixels),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(image,pixels),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(image,pixels),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(image,pixels),q);
}
/* To do: Rewrite using Get/Set***PixelChannel() */
else
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelRed(image,(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelRed(image,n)
-GetPixelRed(image,pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelRed(image,pixels)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelGreen(image,n)
-GetPixelGreen(image,pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelGreen(image,pixels)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelBlue(image,n)
-GetPixelBlue(image,pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelBlue(image,pixels)),q);
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,(QM) ((2*i*(
GetPixelAlpha(image,n)
-GetPixelAlpha(image,pixels))+m)
/((ssize_t) (m*2))+
GetPixelAlpha(image,pixels)),q);
}
if (magn_methx == 4)
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,
GetPixelAlpha(image,pixels)+0,q);
}
else
{
SetPixelAlpha(image,
GetPixelAlpha(image,n)+0,q);
}
}
}
else /* if (magn_methx == 3 || magn_methx == 5) */
{
/* Replicate nearest */
if (i <= ((m+1) << 1))
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(image,pixels),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(image,
pixels),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(image,pixels),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(image,
pixels),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,GetPixelRed(image,n),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,GetPixelGreen(image,n),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,GetPixelBlue(image,n),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,GetPixelAlpha(image,n),q);
}
if (magn_methx == 5)
{
/* Interpolate */
SetPixelAlpha(image,
(QM) ((2*i*( GetPixelAlpha(image,n)
-GetPixelAlpha(image,pixels))+m)/
((ssize_t) (m*2))
+GetPixelAlpha(image,pixels)),q);
}
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
n+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
if (magn_methx != 1 || magn_methy != 1)
{
/*
Rescale pixels to Quantum
*/
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,
exception);
for (x=(ssize_t) image->columns-1; x >= 0; x--)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelRed(image,q)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelGreen(image,q)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelBlue(image,q)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
GetPixelAlpha(image,q)),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
#endif
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished MAGN processing");
}
}
/*
Crop_box is with respect to the upper left corner of the MNG.
*/
crop_box.left=mng_info->image_box.left+mng_info->x_off[object_id];
crop_box.right=mng_info->image_box.right+mng_info->x_off[object_id];
crop_box.top=mng_info->image_box.top+mng_info->y_off[object_id];
crop_box.bottom=mng_info->image_box.bottom+mng_info->y_off[object_id];
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->clip);
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->frame);
crop_box=mng_minimum_box(crop_box,mng_info->object_clip[object_id]);
if ((crop_box.left != (mng_info->image_box.left
+mng_info->x_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.right != (mng_info->image_box.right
+mng_info->x_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.top != (mng_info->image_box.top
+mng_info->y_off[object_id])) ||
(crop_box.bottom != (mng_info->image_box.bottom
+mng_info->y_off[object_id])))
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Crop the PNG image");
if ((crop_box.left < crop_box.right) &&
(crop_box.top < crop_box.bottom))
{
Image
*im;
RectangleInfo
crop_info;
/*
Crop_info is with respect to the upper left corner of
the image.
*/
crop_info.x=(crop_box.left-mng_info->x_off[object_id]);
crop_info.y=(crop_box.top-mng_info->y_off[object_id]);
crop_info.width=(size_t) (crop_box.right-crop_box.left);
crop_info.height=(size_t) (crop_box.bottom-crop_box.top);
image->page.width=image->columns;
image->page.height=image->rows;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
im=CropImage(image,&crop_info,exception);
if (im != (Image *) NULL)
{
image->columns=im->columns;
image->rows=im->rows;
im=DestroyImage(im);
image->page.width=image->columns;
image->page.height=image->rows;
image->page.x=crop_box.left;
image->page.y=crop_box.top;
}
}
else
{
/*
No pixels in crop area. The MNG spec still requires
a layer, though, so make a single transparent pixel in
the top left corner.
*/
image->columns=1;
image->rows=1;
image->colors=2;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
image->page.width=1;
image->page.height=1;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
}
}
#ifndef PNG_READ_EMPTY_PLTE_SUPPORTED
image=mng_info->image;
#endif
}
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 16)
/* PNG does not handle depths greater than 16 so reduce it even
* if lossy.
*/
if (image->depth > 16)
image->depth=16;
#endif
#if (MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH > 8)
if (image->depth > 8)
{
/* To do: fill low byte properly */
image->depth=16;
}
if (LosslessReduceDepthOK(image,exception) != MagickFalse)
image->depth = 8;
#endif
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
if (mng_info->scenes_found >
(ssize_t) (image_info->first_scene+image_info->number_scenes))
break;
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished reading image datastream.");
} while (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"MNG") == 0);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Finished reading all image datastreams.");
#if defined(MNG_INSERT_LAYERS)
if (insert_layers && !mng_info->image_found && (mng_info->mng_width) &&
(mng_info->mng_height))
{
/*
Insert a background layer if nothing else was found.
*/
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No images found. Inserting a background layer.");
if (GetAuthenticPixelQueue(image) != (Quantum *) NULL)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Allocation failed, returning NULL.");
return(DestroyImageList(image));;
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
}
image->columns=mng_info->mng_width;
image->rows=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
image->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
image->page.x=0;
image->page.y=0;
image->background_color=mng_background_color;
image->alpha_trait=UndefinedPixelTrait;
if (image_info->ping == MagickFalse)
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(image,exception);
mng_info->image_found++;
}
#endif
image->iterations=mng_iterations;
if (mng_iterations == 1)
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
while (GetPreviousImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image_count++;
if (image_count > 10*mng_info->image_found)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," No beginning");
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Linked list is corrupted, beginning of list not found",
"`%s'",image_info->filename);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
image=GetPreviousImageInList(image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule()," Corrupt list");
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"Linked list is corrupted; next_image is NULL","`%s'",
image_info->filename);
}
}
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second && mng_info->image_found > 1 &&
GetNextImageInList(image) ==
(Image *) NULL)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" First image null");
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"image->next for first image is NULL but shouldn't be.",
"`%s'",image_info->filename);
}
if (mng_info->image_found == 0)
{
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" No visible images found.");
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CoderError,"No visible images in file","`%s'",image_info->filename);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
if (mng_info->ticks_per_second)
final_delay=1UL*MagickMax(image->ticks_per_second,1L)*
final_delay/mng_info->ticks_per_second;
else
image->start_loop=MagickTrue;
/* Find final nonzero image delay */
final_image_delay=0;
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (image->delay)
final_image_delay=image->delay;
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
}
if (final_delay < final_image_delay)
final_delay=final_image_delay;
image->delay=final_delay;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" image->delay=%.20g, final_delay=%.20g",(double) image->delay,
(double) final_delay);
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
int
scene;
scene=0;
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Before coalesce:");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene 0 delay=%.20g",(double) image->delay);
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene %.20g delay=%.20g",(double) scene++,
(double) image->delay);
}
}
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
#ifdef MNG_COALESCE_LAYERS
if (insert_layers)
{
Image
*next_image,
*next;
size_t
scene;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" Coalesce Images");
scene=image->scene;
next_image=CoalesceImages(image,exception);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
image=DestroyImageList(image);
image=next_image;
for (next=image; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next_image)
{
next->page.width=mng_info->mng_width;
next->page.height=mng_info->mng_height;
next->page.x=0;
next->page.y=0;
next->scene=scene++;
next_image=GetNextImageInList(next);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
if (next->delay == 0)
{
scene--;
next_image->previous=GetPreviousImageInList(next);
if (GetPreviousImageInList(next) == (Image *) NULL)
image=next_image;
else
next->previous->next=next_image;
next=DestroyImage(next);
}
}
}
#endif
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
image->dispose=BackgroundDispose;
if (logging != MagickFalse)
{
int
scene;
scene=0;
image=GetFirstImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" After coalesce:");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene 0 delay=%.20g dispose=%.20g",(double) image->delay,
(double) image->dispose);
while (GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL)
{
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" scene %.20g delay=%.20g dispose=%.20g",(double) scene++,
(double) image->delay,(double) image->dispose);
}
}
if (logging != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
" exit ReadOneMNGImage();");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/58
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 63,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ieee80211_setup_sdata(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
enum nl80211_iftype type)
{
/* clear type-dependent union */
memset(&sdata->u, 0, sizeof(sdata->u));
/* and set some type-dependent values */
sdata->vif.type = type;
sdata->vif.p2p = false;
sdata->dev->netdev_ops = &ieee80211_dataif_ops;
sdata->wdev.iftype = type;
sdata->control_port_protocol = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_PAE);
sdata->control_port_no_encrypt = false;
/* only monitor differs */
sdata->dev->type = ARPHRD_ETHER;
skb_queue_head_init(&sdata->skb_queue);
INIT_WORK(&sdata->work, ieee80211_iface_work);
switch (type) {
case NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO:
type = NL80211_IFTYPE_AP;
sdata->vif.type = type;
sdata->vif.p2p = true;
/* fall through */
case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP:
skb_queue_head_init(&sdata->u.ap.ps_bc_buf);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sdata->u.ap.vlans);
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_CLIENT:
type = NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION;
sdata->vif.type = type;
sdata->vif.p2p = true;
/* fall through */
case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION:
ieee80211_sta_setup_sdata(sdata);
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC:
ieee80211_ibss_setup_sdata(sdata);
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT:
if (ieee80211_vif_is_mesh(&sdata->vif))
ieee80211_mesh_init_sdata(sdata);
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_MONITOR:
sdata->dev->type = ARPHRD_IEEE80211_RADIOTAP;
sdata->dev->netdev_ops = &ieee80211_monitorif_ops;
sdata->u.mntr_flags = MONITOR_FLAG_CONTROL |
MONITOR_FLAG_OTHER_BSS;
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_WDS:
case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN:
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_UNSPECIFIED:
case NUM_NL80211_IFTYPES:
BUG();
break;
}
ieee80211_debugfs_add_netdev(sdata);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SessionService::WindowClosed(const SessionID& window_id) {
if (!ShouldTrackChangesToWindow(window_id))
return;
windows_tracking_.erase(window_id.id());
if (window_closing_ids_.find(window_id.id()) != window_closing_ids_.end()) {
window_closing_ids_.erase(window_id.id());
ScheduleCommand(CreateWindowClosedCommand(window_id.id()));
} else if (pending_window_close_ids_.find(window_id.id()) ==
pending_window_close_ids_.end()) {
has_open_trackable_browsers_ = HasOpenTrackableBrowsers(window_id);
if (should_record_close_as_pending())
pending_window_close_ids_.insert(window_id.id());
else
ScheduleCommand(CreateWindowClosedCommand(window_id.id()));
}
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,853 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gs_makepixmappattern(
gs_client_color * pcc,
const gs_depth_bitmap * pbitmap,
bool mask,
const gs_matrix * pmat,
long id,
gs_color_space * pcspace,
uint white_index,
gs_gstate * pgs,
gs_memory_t * mem
)
{
gs_pattern1_template_t pat;
pixmap_info *ppmap;
gs_matrix mat, smat;
int code;
/* check that the data is legitimate */
if ((mask) || (pcspace == 0)) {
if (pbitmap->pix_depth != 1)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
pcspace = 0;
} else if (gs_color_space_get_index(pcspace) != gs_color_space_index_Indexed)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
if (pbitmap->num_comps != 1)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
/* allocate and initialize a pixmap_info structure for the paint proc */
if (mem == 0)
mem = gs_gstate_memory(pgs);
ppmap = gs_alloc_struct(mem,
pixmap_info,
&st_pixmap_info,
"makepximappattern"
);
if (ppmap == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
ppmap->bitmap = *pbitmap;
ppmap->pcspace = pcspace;
ppmap->white_index = white_index;
/* set up the client pattern structure */
gs_pattern1_init(&pat);
uid_set_UniqueID(&pat.uid, (id == no_UniqueID) ? gs_next_ids(mem, 1) : id);
pat.PaintType = (mask ? 2 : 1);
pat.TilingType = 1;
pat.BBox.p.x = 0;
pat.BBox.p.y = 0;
pat.BBox.q.x = pbitmap->size.x;
pat.BBox.q.y = pbitmap->size.y;
pat.XStep = (float)pbitmap->size.x;
pat.YStep = (float)pbitmap->size.y;
pat.PaintProc = (mask ? pixmap_remap_mask_pattern : pixmap_remap_image_pattern);
pat.client_data = ppmap;
/* set the ctm to be the identity */
gs_currentmatrix(pgs, &smat);
gs_make_identity(&mat);
gs_setmatrix(pgs, &mat);
/* build the pattern, restore the previous matrix */
if (pmat == NULL)
pmat = &mat;
if ((code = gs_makepattern(pcc, &pat, pmat, pgs, mem)) != 0)
gs_free_object(mem, ppmap, "makebitmappattern_xform");
else {
/*
* If this is not a masked pattern and if the white pixel index
* is outside of the representable range, we don't need to go to
* the trouble of accumulating a mask that will just be all 1s.
* Also, patterns that use transparency don't need a mask since
* the alpha plane of the transparency buffers will be used.
*/
gs_pattern1_instance_t *pinst =
(gs_pattern1_instance_t *)pcc->pattern;
if (!mask && (white_index >= (1 << pbitmap->pix_depth)))
pinst->uses_mask = false;
/* overwrite the free procedure for the pattern instance */
ppmap->free_proc = pinst->rc.free;
pinst->rc.free = free_pixmap_pattern;
/*
* Since the PaintProcs don't reference the saved color space or
* color, clear these so that there isn't an extra retained
* reference to the Pattern object.
*/
code = gs_setgray(pinst->saved, 0.0);
}
gs_setmatrix(pgs, &smat);
return code;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 1,659 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void activityLoggingForAllWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
V8PerContextData* contextData = V8PerContextData::from(info.GetIsolate()->GetCurrentContext());
if (contextData && contextData->activityLogger()) {
Vector<v8::Handle<v8::Value> > loggerArgs = toNativeArguments<v8::Handle<v8::Value> >(info, 0);
contextData->activityLogger()->log("TestObjectPython.activityLoggingForAllWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethod", info.Length(), loggerArgs.data(), "Method");
}
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::activityLoggingForAllWorldsPerWorldBindingsVoidMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,100 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ProcUnmapWindow(ClientPtr client)
{
WindowPtr pWin;
REQUEST(xResourceReq);
int rc;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xResourceReq);
rc = dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->id, client, DixHideAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
UnmapWindow(pWin, FALSE);
/* update cache to say it is mapped */
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 15,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int entersafe_match_card(sc_card_t *card)
{
int i;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
i = _sc_match_atr(card, entersafe_atrs, &card->type);
if (i < 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,347 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kadm5_rename_principal(void *server_handle,
krb5_principal source, krb5_principal target)
{
krb5_db_entry *kdb;
osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
krb5_error_code ret;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
krb5_int16 stype, i;
krb5_data *salt = NULL;
CHECK_HANDLE(server_handle);
krb5_clear_error_message(handle->context);
if (source == NULL || target == NULL)
return EINVAL;
if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, target, &kdb, &adb)) == 0) {
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return(KADM5_DUP);
}
if ((ret = kdb_get_entry(handle, source, &kdb, &adb)))
return ret;
/* Transform salts as necessary. */
for (i = 0; i < kdb->n_key_data; i++) {
ret = krb5_dbe_compute_salt(handle->context, &kdb->key_data[i],
kdb->princ, &stype, &salt);
if (ret == KRB5_KDB_BAD_SALTTYPE)
ret = KADM5_NO_RENAME_SALT;
if (ret)
goto done;
kdb->key_data[i].key_data_type[1] = KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_SPECIAL;
free(kdb->key_data[i].key_data_contents[1]);
kdb->key_data[i].key_data_contents[1] = (krb5_octet *)salt->data;
kdb->key_data[i].key_data_length[1] = salt->length;
kdb->key_data[i].key_data_ver = 2;
free(salt);
salt = NULL;
}
kadm5_free_principal(handle->context, kdb->princ);
ret = kadm5_copy_principal(handle->context, target, &kdb->princ);
if (ret) {
kdb->princ = NULL; /* so freeing the dbe doesn't lose */
goto done;
}
if ((ret = kdb_put_entry(handle, kdb, &adb)))
goto done;
ret = kdb_delete_entry(handle, source);
done:
krb5_free_data(handle->context, salt);
kdb_free_entry(handle, kdb, &adb);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Null pointer deref in kadmind [CVE-2012-1013]
The fix for #6626 could cause kadmind to dereference a null pointer if
a create-principal request contains no password but does contain the
KRB5_KDB_DISALLOW_ALL_TIX flag (e.g. "addprinc -randkey -allow_tix
name"). Only clients authorized to create principals can trigger the
bug. Fix the bug by testing for a null password in check_1_6_dummy.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: Minor style change and commit message]
ticket: 7152
target_version: 1.10.2
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mr6_msgsize(bool unresolved, int maxvif)
{
size_t len =
NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct rtmsg))
+ nla_total_size(4) /* RTA_TABLE */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct in6_addr)) /* RTA_SRC */
+ nla_total_size(sizeof(struct in6_addr)) /* RTA_DST */
;
if (!unresolved)
len = len
+ nla_total_size(4) /* RTA_IIF */
+ nla_total_size(0) /* RTA_MULTIPATH */
+ maxvif * NLA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct rtnexthop))
/* RTA_MFC_STATS */
+ nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(struct rta_mfc_stats))
;
return len;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,568 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_some_characters(checkfp_command *co, checkfp_control c,
const char *tests)
{
int i;
--(c.limit);
if (c.cnumber+4 < sizeof co->number && c.limit >= 0)
{
if (c.limit > 0) for (i=0; tests[i]; ++i)
{
if (!check_one_character(co, c, tests[i]))
return 0;
}
/* At the end check all the characters. */
else
return check_all_characters(co, c);
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,090 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8TestObject::CSSAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(
const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_cssAttribute_Setter");
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value = info[0];
test_object_v8_internal::CSSAttributeAttributeSetter(v8_value, info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 134,558 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: history_tree_free(OnigCaptureTreeNode* node)
{
history_tree_clear(node);
xfree(node);
}
Commit Message: fix #59 : access to invalid address by reg->dmax value
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 64,658 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void rpc_exit_task(struct rpc_task *task)
{
task->tk_action = NULL;
if (task->tk_ops->rpc_call_done != NULL) {
task->tk_ops->rpc_call_done(task, task->tk_calldata);
if (task->tk_action != NULL) {
WARN_ON(RPC_ASSASSINATED(task));
/* Always release the RPC slot and buffer memory */
xprt_release(task);
}
}
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,957 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::DidHandleMouseEvent(const WebKit::WebMouseEvent& event) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_, DidHandleMouseEvent(event));
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Chunk::Chunk(Container* parent, XMP_Uns32 tag)
: parent(parent), tag(tag)
{
this->needsRewrite = true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 9,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s)
{
if (s == NULL)
return (0);
return (s->timeout);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 12,790 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int wait_consider_task(struct wait_opts *wo, int ptrace,
struct task_struct *p)
{
int ret = eligible_child(wo, p);
if (!ret)
return ret;
ret = security_task_wait(p);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
/*
* If we have not yet seen any eligible child,
* then let this error code replace -ECHILD.
* A permission error will give the user a clue
* to look for security policy problems, rather
* than for mysterious wait bugs.
*/
if (wo->notask_error)
wo->notask_error = ret;
return 0;
}
if (likely(!ptrace) && unlikely(task_ptrace(p))) {
/*
* This child is hidden by ptrace.
* We aren't allowed to see it now, but eventually we will.
*/
wo->notask_error = 0;
return 0;
}
if (p->exit_state == EXIT_DEAD)
return 0;
/*
* We don't reap group leaders with subthreads.
*/
if (p->exit_state == EXIT_ZOMBIE && !delay_group_leader(p))
return wait_task_zombie(wo, p);
/*
* It's stopped or running now, so it might
* later continue, exit, or stop again.
*/
wo->notask_error = 0;
if (task_stopped_code(p, ptrace))
return wait_task_stopped(wo, ptrace, p);
return wait_task_continued(wo, p);
}
Commit Message: block: Fix io_context leak after failure of clone with CLONE_IO
With CLONE_IO, parent's io_context->nr_tasks is incremented, but never
decremented whenever copy_process() fails afterwards, which prevents
exit_io_context() from calling IO schedulers exit functions.
Give a task_struct to exit_io_context(), and call exit_io_context() instead of
put_io_context() in copy_process() cleanup path.
Signed-off-by: Louis Rilling <louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 94,337 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int orinoco_ioctl_get_auth(struct net_device *dev,
struct iw_request_info *info,
union iwreq_data *wrqu, char *extra)
{
struct orinoco_private *priv = ndev_priv(dev);
struct iw_param *param = &wrqu->param;
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
if (orinoco_lock(priv, &flags) != 0)
return -EBUSY;
switch (param->flags & IW_AUTH_INDEX) {
case IW_AUTH_KEY_MGMT:
param->value = priv->key_mgmt;
break;
case IW_AUTH_TKIP_COUNTERMEASURES:
param->value = priv->tkip_cm_active;
break;
case IW_AUTH_80211_AUTH_ALG:
if (priv->wep_restrict)
param->value = IW_AUTH_ALG_SHARED_KEY;
else
param->value = IW_AUTH_ALG_OPEN_SYSTEM;
break;
case IW_AUTH_WPA_ENABLED:
param->value = priv->wpa_enabled;
break;
default:
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
orinoco_unlock(priv, &flags);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: orinoco: fix TKIP countermeasure behaviour
Enable the port when disabling countermeasures, and disable it on
enabling countermeasures.
This bug causes the response of the system to certain attacks to be
ineffective.
It also prevents wpa_supplicant from getting scan results, as
wpa_supplicant disables countermeasures on startup - preventing the
hardware from scanning.
wpa_supplicant works with ap_mode=2 despite this bug because the commit
handler re-enables the port.
The log tends to look like:
State: DISCONNECTED -> SCANNING
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=0) - scan timeout 5 seconds
EAPOL: disable timer tick
EAPOL: Supplicant port status: Unauthorized
Scan timeout - try to get results
Failed to get scan results
Failed to get scan results - try scanning again
Setting scan request: 1 sec 0 usec
Starting AP scan for wildcard SSID
Scan requested (ret=-1) - scan timeout 5 seconds
Failed to initiate AP scan.
Reported by: Giacomo Comes <comes@naic.edu>
Signed-off by: David Kilroy <kilroyd@googlemail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 27,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AppCacheStatus AppCacheHost::GetStatus() {
AppCache* cache = associated_cache();
if (!cache)
return APPCACHE_STATUS_UNCACHED;
if (!cache->owning_group())
return APPCACHE_STATUS_DOWNLOADING;
if (cache->owning_group()->is_obsolete())
return APPCACHE_STATUS_OBSOLETE;
if (cache->owning_group()->update_status() == AppCacheGroup::CHECKING)
return APPCACHE_STATUS_CHECKING;
if (cache->owning_group()->update_status() == AppCacheGroup::DOWNLOADING)
return APPCACHE_STATUS_DOWNLOADING;
if (swappable_cache_.get())
return APPCACHE_STATUS_UPDATE_READY;
return APPCACHE_STATUS_IDLE;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: StackingController::~StackingController() {
}
Commit Message: Removed requirement for ash::Window::transient_parent() presence for system modal dialogs.
BUG=130420
TEST=SystemModalContainerLayoutManagerTest.ModalTransientAndNonTransient
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10514012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@140647 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 105,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cib_replace_notify(const char *origin, xmlNode * update, int result, xmlNode * diff)
{
xmlNode *replace_msg = NULL;
int add_updates = 0;
int add_epoch = 0;
int add_admin_epoch = 0;
int del_updates = 0;
int del_epoch = 0;
int del_admin_epoch = 0;
if (diff == NULL) {
return;
}
cib_diff_version_details(diff, &add_admin_epoch, &add_epoch, &add_updates,
&del_admin_epoch, &del_epoch, &del_updates);
if(del_updates < 0) {
crm_log_xml_debug(diff, "Bad replace diff");
}
if (add_updates != del_updates) {
crm_info("Replaced: %d.%d.%d -> %d.%d.%d from %s",
del_admin_epoch, del_epoch, del_updates,
add_admin_epoch, add_epoch, add_updates, crm_str(origin));
} else if (diff != NULL) {
crm_info("Local-only Replace: %d.%d.%d from %s",
add_admin_epoch, add_epoch, add_updates, crm_str(origin));
}
replace_msg = create_xml_node(NULL, "notify-replace");
crm_xml_add(replace_msg, F_TYPE, T_CIB_NOTIFY);
crm_xml_add(replace_msg, F_SUBTYPE, T_CIB_REPLACE_NOTIFY);
crm_xml_add(replace_msg, F_CIB_OPERATION, CIB_OP_REPLACE);
crm_xml_add_int(replace_msg, F_CIB_RC, result);
attach_cib_generation(replace_msg, "cib-replace-generation", update);
crm_log_xml_trace(replace_msg, "CIB Replaced");
g_hash_table_foreach_remove(client_list, cib_notify_client, replace_msg);
free_xml(replace_msg);
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 33,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_unsync_pages(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
struct kvm_mmu_page *s;
for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(vcpu->kvm, s, gfn) {
if (s->unsync)
continue;
WARN_ON(s->role.level != PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL);
__kvm_unsync_page(vcpu, s);
}
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 37,508 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_push_have_info(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr)
{
if (png_ptr->info_fn != NULL)
(*(png_ptr->info_fn))(png_ptr, info_ptr);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PDFiumEngine::FormFillTimerData::FormFillTimerData(base::TimeDelta period,
TimerCallback callback)
: timer_period(period), timer_callback(callback) {}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 146,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _tiffMapProc(thandle_t fd, void** pbase, toff_t* psize)
{
uint64 size;
tmsize_t sizem;
HANDLE hMapFile;
size = _tiffSizeProc(fd);
sizem = (tmsize_t)size;
if ((uint64)sizem!=size)
return (0);
/* By passing in 0 for the maximum file size, it specifies that we
create a file mapping object for the full file size. */
hMapFile = CreateFileMapping(fd, NULL, PAGE_READONLY, 0, 0, NULL);
if (hMapFile == NULL)
return (0);
*pbase = MapViewOfFile(hMapFile, FILE_MAP_READ, 0, 0, 0);
CloseHandle(hMapFile);
if (*pbase == NULL)
return (0);
*psize = size;
return(1);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_{unix,vms,win32}.c (_TIFFmalloc): ANSI C does not
require malloc() to return NULL pointer if requested allocation
size is zero. Assure that _TIFFmalloc does.
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 86,809 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void *rfcomm_cback(tBTA_JV_EVT event, tBTA_JV *p_data, void *user_data) {
void *new_user_data = NULL;
switch (event) {
case BTA_JV_RFCOMM_START_EVT:
on_srv_rfc_listen_started(&p_data->rfc_start, (uintptr_t)user_data);
break;
case BTA_JV_RFCOMM_CL_INIT_EVT:
on_cl_rfc_init(&p_data->rfc_cl_init, (uintptr_t)user_data);
break;
case BTA_JV_RFCOMM_OPEN_EVT:
BTA_JvSetPmProfile(p_data->rfc_open.handle,BTA_JV_PM_ID_1,BTA_JV_CONN_OPEN);
on_cli_rfc_connect(&p_data->rfc_open, (uintptr_t)user_data);
break;
case BTA_JV_RFCOMM_SRV_OPEN_EVT:
BTA_JvSetPmProfile(p_data->rfc_srv_open.handle,BTA_JV_PM_ALL,BTA_JV_CONN_OPEN);
new_user_data = (void *)(uintptr_t)on_srv_rfc_connect(&p_data->rfc_srv_open, (uintptr_t)user_data);
break;
case BTA_JV_RFCOMM_CLOSE_EVT:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("BTA_JV_RFCOMM_CLOSE_EVT: user_data:%d", (uintptr_t)user_data);
on_rfc_close(&p_data->rfc_close, (uintptr_t)user_data);
break;
case BTA_JV_RFCOMM_WRITE_EVT:
on_rfc_write_done(&p_data->rfc_write, (uintptr_t)user_data);
break;
case BTA_JV_RFCOMM_CONG_EVT:
on_rfc_outgoing_congest(&p_data->rfc_cong, (uintptr_t)user_data);
break;
case BTA_JV_RFCOMM_READ_EVT:
case BTA_JV_RFCOMM_DATA_IND_EVT:
break;
default:
LOG_ERROR("%s unhandled event %d, slot id: %zi", __func__, event, (uintptr_t)user_data);
break;
}
return new_user_data;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long SegmentInfo::Parse() {
assert(m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8 == NULL);
assert(m_pWritingAppAsUTF8 == NULL);
assert(m_pTitleAsUTF8 == NULL);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
m_timecodeScale = 1000000;
m_duration = -1;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0AD7B1) { // Timecode Scale
m_timecodeScale = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_timecodeScale <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0489) { // Segment duration
const long status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, m_duration);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (m_duration < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0D80) { // MuxingApp
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x1741) { // WritingApp
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_pWritingAppAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x3BA9) { // Title
const long status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_pTitleAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 173,842 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Box *subs_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_SubSampleInformationBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SUBS);
tmp->Samples = gf_list_new();
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,506 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: config_nic_rules(
config_tree *ptree
)
{
nic_rule_node * curr_node;
sockaddr_u addr;
nic_rule_match match_type;
nic_rule_action action;
char * if_name;
char * pchSlash;
int prefixlen;
int addrbits;
curr_node = HEAD_PFIFO(ptree->nic_rules);
if (curr_node != NULL
&& (HAVE_OPT( NOVIRTUALIPS ) || HAVE_OPT( INTERFACE ))) {
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
"interface/nic rules are not allowed with --interface (-I) or --novirtualips (-L)%s",
(input_from_file) ? ", exiting" : "");
if (input_from_file)
exit(1);
else
return;
}
for (; curr_node != NULL; curr_node = curr_node->link) {
prefixlen = -1;
if_name = curr_node->if_name;
if (if_name != NULL)
if_name = estrdup(if_name);
switch (curr_node->match_class) {
default:
/*
* this assignment quiets a gcc "may be used
* uninitialized" warning and is here for no
* other reason.
*/
match_type = MATCH_ALL;
NTP_INSIST(0);
break;
case 0:
/*
* 0 is out of range for valid token T_...
* and in a nic_rules_node indicates the
* interface descriptor is either a name or
* address, stored in if_name in either case.
*/
NTP_INSIST(if_name != NULL);
pchSlash = strchr(if_name, '/');
if (pchSlash != NULL)
*pchSlash = '\0';
if (is_ip_address(if_name, AF_UNSPEC, &addr)) {
match_type = MATCH_IFADDR;
if (pchSlash != NULL) {
sscanf(pchSlash + 1, "%d",
&prefixlen);
addrbits = 8 *
SIZEOF_INADDR(AF(&addr));
prefixlen = max(-1, prefixlen);
prefixlen = min(prefixlen,
addrbits);
}
} else {
match_type = MATCH_IFNAME;
if (pchSlash != NULL)
*pchSlash = '/';
}
break;
case T_All:
match_type = MATCH_ALL;
break;
case T_Ipv4:
match_type = MATCH_IPV4;
break;
case T_Ipv6:
match_type = MATCH_IPV6;
break;
case T_Wildcard:
match_type = MATCH_WILDCARD;
break;
}
switch (curr_node->action) {
default:
/*
* this assignment quiets a gcc "may be used
* uninitialized" warning and is here for no
* other reason.
*/
action = ACTION_LISTEN;
NTP_INSIST(0);
break;
case T_Listen:
action = ACTION_LISTEN;
break;
case T_Ignore:
action = ACTION_IGNORE;
break;
case T_Drop:
action = ACTION_DROP;
break;
}
add_nic_rule(match_type, if_name, prefixlen,
action);
timer_interfacetimeout(current_time + 2);
if (if_name != NULL)
free(if_name);
}
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 74,134 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void Bitmap_setHasMipMap(JNIEnv* env, jobject, jlong bitmapHandle,
jboolean hasMipMap) {
SkBitmap* bitmap = reinterpret_cast<SkBitmap*>(bitmapHandle);
bitmap->setHasHardwareMipMap(hasMipMap);
}
Commit Message: Make Bitmap_createFromParcel check the color count. DO NOT MERGE
When reading from the parcel, if the number of colors is invalid, early
exit.
Add two more checks: setInfo must return true, and Parcel::readInplace
must return non-NULL. The former ensures that the previously read values
(width, height, etc) were valid, and the latter checks that the Parcel
had enough data even if the number of colors was reasonable.
Also use an auto-deleter to handle deletion of the SkBitmap.
Cherry pick from change-Id: Icbd562d6d1f131a723724883fd31822d337cf5a6
BUG=19666945
Change-Id: Iab0d218c41ae0c39606e333e44cda078eef32291
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBlitFramebufferEXT(
GLint srcX0, GLint srcY0, GLint srcX1, GLint srcY1,
GLint dstX0, GLint dstY0, GLint dstX1, GLint dstY1,
GLbitfield mask, GLenum filter) {
if (!feature_info_->feature_flags().chromium_framebuffer_multisample) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glBlitFramebufferEXT: function not available");
}
if (IsAngle()) {
glBlitFramebufferANGLE(
srcX0, srcY0, srcX1, srcY1, dstX0, dstY0, dstX1, dstY1, mask, filter);
} else {
glBlitFramebufferEXT(
srcX0, srcY0, srcX1, srcY1, dstX0, dstY0, dstX1, dstY1, mask, filter);
}
UNSHIPPED_TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1("test_gpu", "DoBlit", "width", srcX1 - srcX0);
}
Commit Message: Always write data to new buffer in SimulateAttrib0
This is to work around linux nvidia driver bug.
TEST=asan
BUG=118970
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/10019003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 tsk_peer_port(struct tipc_sock *tsk)
{
return msg_destport(&tsk->phdr);
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 52,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InterstitialPageImpl::UpdateDeviceScaleFactor(double device_scale_factor) {
WebContentsImpl* web_contents_impl =
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(web_contents_);
if (!web_contents_impl)
return;
web_contents_impl->UpdateDeviceScaleFactor(device_scale_factor);
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int reset_airo_card( struct net_device *dev )
{
int i;
struct airo_info *ai = dev->ml_priv;
if (reset_card (dev, 1))
return -1;
if ( setup_card(ai, dev->dev_addr, 1 ) != SUCCESS ) {
airo_print_err(dev->name, "MAC could not be enabled");
return -1;
}
airo_print_info(dev->name, "MAC enabled %pM", dev->dev_addr);
/* Allocate the transmit buffers if needed */
if (!test_bit(FLAG_MPI,&ai->flags))
for( i = 0; i < MAX_FIDS; i++ )
ai->fids[i] = transmit_allocate (ai,AIRO_DEF_MTU,i>=MAX_FIDS/2);
enable_interrupts( ai );
netif_wake_queue(dev);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,074 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int __sock_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
int err = security_socket_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
return err ?: __sock_sendmsg_nosec(iocb, sock, msg, size);
}
Commit Message: Fix order of arguments to compat_put_time[spec|val]
Commit 644595f89620 ("compat: Handle COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in
net/socket.c") introduced a bug where the helper functions to take
either a 64-bit or compat time[spec|val] got the arguments in the wrong
order, passing the kernel stack pointer off as a user pointer (and vice
versa).
Because of the user address range check, that in turn then causes an
EFAULT due to the user pointer range checking failing for the kernel
address. Incorrectly resuling in a failed system call for 32-bit
processes with a 64-bit kernel.
On odder architectures like HP-PA (with separate user/kernel address
spaces), it can be used read kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 18,634 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CancelLock() {
if (!root_window_)
return;
UnlockCompositor();
root_window_->ReleaseMouseMoves();
root_window_ = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::captureScreenshot(ErrorString*, const String*, const int*, const int*, const int*, String*, RefPtr<TypeBuilder::Page::ScreencastFrameMetadata>&)
{
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 115,255 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct sock *dccp_v6_request_recv_sock(const struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct dst_entry *dst,
struct request_sock *req_unhash,
bool *own_req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *newnp;
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
struct inet_sock *newinet;
struct dccp6_sock *newdp6;
struct sock *newsk;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
/*
* v6 mapped
*/
newsk = dccp_v4_request_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, dst,
req_unhash, own_req);
if (newsk == NULL)
return NULL;
newdp6 = (struct dccp6_sock *)newsk;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newinet->pinet6 = &newdp6->inet6;
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newnp->saddr = newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_af_ops = &dccp_ipv6_mapped;
newsk->sk_backlog_rcv = dccp_v4_do_rcv;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks count
* here, dccp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the comment in
* that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
/* It is tricky place. Until this moment IPv4 tcp
worked with IPv6 icsk.icsk_af_ops.
Sync it now.
*/
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
return newsk;
}
if (sk_acceptq_is_full(sk))
goto out_overflow;
if (!dst) {
struct flowi6 fl6;
dst = inet6_csk_route_req(sk, &fl6, req, IPPROTO_DCCP);
if (!dst)
goto out;
}
newsk = dccp_create_openreq_child(sk, req, skb);
if (newsk == NULL)
goto out_nonewsk;
/*
* No need to charge this sock to the relevant IPv6 refcnt debug socks
* count here, dccp_create_openreq_child now does this for us, see the
* comment in that function for the gory details. -acme
*/
ip6_dst_store(newsk, dst, NULL, NULL);
newsk->sk_route_caps = dst->dev->features & ~(NETIF_F_IP_CSUM |
NETIF_F_TSO);
newdp6 = (struct dccp6_sock *)newsk;
newinet = inet_sk(newsk);
newinet->pinet6 = &newdp6->inet6;
newnp = inet6_sk(newsk);
memcpy(newnp, np, sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo));
newsk->sk_v6_daddr = ireq->ir_v6_rmt_addr;
newnp->saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = ireq->ir_v6_loc_addr;
newsk->sk_bound_dev_if = ireq->ir_iif;
/* Now IPv6 options...
First: no IPv4 options.
*/
newinet->inet_opt = NULL;
/* Clone RX bits */
newnp->rxopt.all = np->rxopt.all;
newnp->pktoptions = NULL;
newnp->opt = NULL;
newnp->mcast_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
newnp->mcast_hops = ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit;
/*
* Clone native IPv6 options from listening socket (if any)
*
* Yes, keeping reference count would be much more clever, but we make
* one more one thing there: reattach optmem to newsk.
*/
opt = ireq->ipv6_opt;
if (!opt)
opt = rcu_dereference(np->opt);
if (opt) {
opt = ipv6_dup_options(newsk, opt);
RCU_INIT_POINTER(newnp->opt, opt);
}
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = 0;
if (opt)
inet_csk(newsk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_nflen +
opt->opt_flen;
dccp_sync_mss(newsk, dst_mtu(dst));
newinet->inet_daddr = newinet->inet_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
newinet->inet_rcv_saddr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
if (__inet_inherit_port(sk, newsk) < 0) {
inet_csk_prepare_forced_close(newsk);
dccp_done(newsk);
goto out;
}
*own_req = inet_ehash_nolisten(newsk, req_to_sk(req_unhash));
/* Clone pktoptions received with SYN, if we own the req */
if (*own_req && ireq->pktopts) {
newnp->pktoptions = skb_clone(ireq->pktopts, GFP_ATOMIC);
consume_skb(ireq->pktopts);
ireq->pktopts = NULL;
if (newnp->pktoptions)
skb_set_owner_r(newnp->pktoptions, newsk);
}
return newsk;
out_overflow:
__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENOVERFLOWS);
out_nonewsk:
dst_release(dst);
out:
__NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_LISTENDROPS);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ipv6/dccp: do not inherit ipv6_mc_list from parent
Like commit 657831ffc38e ("dccp/tcp: do not inherit mc_list from parent")
we should clear ipv6_mc_list etc. for IPv6 sockets too.
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 1 | 168,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vldb_reply_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, int length, int32_t opcode)
{
const struct rx_header *rxh;
unsigned long i;
if (length < (int)sizeof(struct rx_header))
return;
rxh = (const struct rx_header *) bp;
/*
* Print out the afs call we're invoking. The table used here was
* gleaned from vlserver/vldbint.xg. Check to see if it's a
* Ubik call, however.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " vldb"));
if (is_ubik(opcode)) {
ubik_reply_print(ndo, bp, length, opcode);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " reply %s", tok2str(vldb_req, "op#%d", opcode)));
bp += sizeof(struct rx_header);
/*
* If it was a data packet, interpret the response
*/
if (rxh->type == RX_PACKET_TYPE_DATA)
switch (opcode) {
case 510: /* List entry */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " count"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nextindex"));
INTOUT();
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case 503: /* Get entry by id */
case 504: /* Get entry by name */
{ unsigned long nservers, j;
VECOUT(VLNAMEMAX);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " numservers"));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
nservers = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", nservers));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " servers"));
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
if (i < nservers)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s",
intoa(((const struct in_addr *) bp)->s_addr)));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " partitions"));
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
if (i < nservers && j <= 26)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %c", 'a' + (int)j));
else if (i < nservers)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", j));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 8 * sizeof(int32_t));
bp += 8 * sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rwvol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rovol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " backup"));
UINTOUT();
}
break;
case 505: /* Get new volume ID */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " newvol"));
UINTOUT();
break;
case 521: /* List entry */
case 529: /* List entry U */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " count"));
INTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nextindex"));
INTOUT();
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case 518: /* Get entry by ID N */
case 519: /* Get entry by name N */
{ unsigned long nservers, j;
VECOUT(VLNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " numservers"));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
nservers = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", nservers));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " servers"));
for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
if (i < nservers)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s",
intoa(((const struct in_addr *) bp)->s_addr)));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " partitions"));
for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
if (i < nservers && j <= 26)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %c", 'a' + (int)j));
else if (i < nservers)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", j));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 13 * sizeof(int32_t));
bp += 13 * sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rwvol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rovol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " backup"));
UINTOUT();
}
break;
case 526: /* Get entry by ID U */
case 527: /* Get entry by name U */
{ unsigned long nservers, j;
VECOUT(VLNAMEMAX);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " numservers"));
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
nservers = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", nservers));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " servers"));
for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) {
if (i < nservers) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " afsuuid"));
AFSUUIDOUT();
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 44);
bp += 44;
}
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4 * 13);
bp += 4 * 13;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " partitions"));
for (i = 0; i < 13; i++) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], sizeof(int32_t));
j = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
if (i < nservers && j <= 26)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %c", 'a' + (int)j));
else if (i < nservers)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %lu", j));
bp += sizeof(int32_t);
}
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 13 * sizeof(int32_t));
bp += 13 * sizeof(int32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rwvol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " rovol"));
UINTOUT();
ND_PRINT((ndo, " backup"));
UINTOUT();
}
default:
;
}
else {
/*
* Otherwise, just print out the return code
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " errcode"));
INTOUT();
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|vldb]"));
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14466/Rx: fix an over-read bug
In rx_cache_insert() and rx_cache_find() properly read the serviceId
field of the rx_header structure as a 16-bit integer. When those
functions tried to read 32 bits the extra 16 bits could be outside of
the bounds checked in rx_print() for the rx_header structure, as
serviceId is the last field in that structure.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 93,251 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: update_max_tr_single(struct trace_array *tr, struct task_struct *tsk, int cpu)
{
int ret;
if (tr->stop_count)
return;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
if (!tr->allocated_snapshot) {
/* Only the nop tracer should hit this when disabling */
WARN_ON_ONCE(tr->current_trace != &nop_trace);
return;
}
arch_spin_lock(&tr->max_lock);
ret = ring_buffer_swap_cpu(tr->max_buffer.buffer, tr->trace_buffer.buffer, cpu);
if (ret == -EBUSY) {
/*
* We failed to swap the buffer due to a commit taking
* place on this CPU. We fail to record, but we reset
* the max trace buffer (no one writes directly to it)
* and flag that it failed.
*/
trace_array_printk_buf(tr->max_buffer.buffer, _THIS_IP_,
"Failed to swap buffers due to commit in progress\n");
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(ret && ret != -EAGAIN && ret != -EBUSY);
__update_max_tr(tr, tsk, cpu);
arch_spin_unlock(&tr->max_lock);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VideoHeap::VideoHeap(int fd, size_t size, void* base)
{
init(dup(fd), base, size, 0 , MEM_DEVICE);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 159,148 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nested_get_vmcs12_pages(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct page *page;
u64 hpa;
if (nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)) {
/*
* Translate L1 physical address to host physical
* address for vmcs02. Keep the page pinned, so this
* physical address remains valid. We keep a reference
* to it so we can release it later.
*/
if (vmx->nested.apic_access_page) { /* shouldn't happen */
kvm_release_page_dirty(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
vmx->nested.apic_access_page = NULL;
}
page = kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page(vcpu, vmcs12->apic_access_addr);
/*
* If translation failed, no matter: This feature asks
* to exit when accessing the given address, and if it
* can never be accessed, this feature won't do
* anything anyway.
*/
if (!is_error_page(page)) {
vmx->nested.apic_access_page = page;
hpa = page_to_phys(vmx->nested.apic_access_page);
vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, hpa);
} else {
vmcs_clear_bits(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES);
}
}
if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)) {
if (vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page) { /* shouldn't happen */
kvm_release_page_dirty(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page = NULL;
}
page = kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page(vcpu, vmcs12->virtual_apic_page_addr);
/*
* If translation failed, VM entry will fail because
* prepare_vmcs02 set VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR to -1ull.
* Failing the vm entry is _not_ what the processor
* does but it's basically the only possibility we
* have. We could still enter the guest if CR8 load
* exits are enabled, CR8 store exits are enabled, and
* virtualize APIC access is disabled; in this case
* the processor would never use the TPR shadow and we
* could simply clear the bit from the execution
* control. But such a configuration is useless, so
* let's keep the code simple.
*/
if (!is_error_page(page)) {
vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page = page;
hpa = page_to_phys(vmx->nested.virtual_apic_page);
vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, hpa);
}
}
if (nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(vmcs12)) {
if (vmx->nested.pi_desc_page) { /* shouldn't happen */
kunmap(vmx->nested.pi_desc_page);
kvm_release_page_dirty(vmx->nested.pi_desc_page);
vmx->nested.pi_desc_page = NULL;
}
page = kvm_vcpu_gpa_to_page(vcpu, vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr);
if (is_error_page(page))
return;
vmx->nested.pi_desc_page = page;
vmx->nested.pi_desc = kmap(vmx->nested.pi_desc_page);
vmx->nested.pi_desc =
(struct pi_desc *)((void *)vmx->nested.pi_desc +
(unsigned long)(vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr &
(PAGE_SIZE - 1)));
vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR,
page_to_phys(vmx->nested.pi_desc_page) +
(unsigned long)(vmcs12->posted_intr_desc_addr &
(PAGE_SIZE - 1)));
}
if (nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap(vcpu, vmcs12))
vmcs_set_bits(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS);
else
vmcs_clear_bits(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 80,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DEFINE_TRACE(ImageBitmap) {}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 140,182 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const ResourceRequest& DocumentLoader::GetRequest() const {
return request_;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 125,746 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType ModifyImage(Image **image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*clone_image;
assert(image != (Image **) NULL);
assert(*image != (Image *) NULL);
assert((*image)->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if ((*image)->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",(*image)->filename);
if (GetImageReferenceCount(*image) <= 1)
return(MagickTrue);
clone_image=CloneImage(*image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
LockSemaphoreInfo((*image)->semaphore);
(*image)->reference_count--;
UnlockSemaphoreInfo((*image)->semaphore);
*image=clone_image;
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelImpl::RetryDbInitialization(
const base::TimeTicks& start_time,
int init_attempts_spent) {
store_->Initialize(base::Bind(&OfflinePageModelImpl::OnStoreInitialized,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), start_time,
init_attempts_spent));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,925 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadWPGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
typedef struct
{
size_t FileId;
MagickOffsetType DataOffset;
unsigned int ProductType;
unsigned int FileType;
unsigned char MajorVersion;
unsigned char MinorVersion;
unsigned int EncryptKey;
unsigned int Reserved;
} WPGHeader;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char RecType;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPGRecord;
typedef struct
{
unsigned char Class;
unsigned char RecType;
size_t Extension;
size_t RecordLength;
} WPG2Record;
typedef struct
{
unsigned HorizontalUnits;
unsigned VerticalUnits;
unsigned char PosSizePrecision;
} WPG2Start;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned char Depth;
unsigned char Compression;
} WPG2BitmapType1;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int RotAngle;
unsigned int LowLeftX;
unsigned int LowLeftY;
unsigned int UpRightX;
unsigned int UpRightY;
unsigned int Width;
unsigned int Height;
unsigned int Depth;
unsigned int HorzRes;
unsigned int VertRes;
} WPGBitmapType2;
typedef struct
{
unsigned int StartIndex;
unsigned int NumOfEntries;
} WPGColorMapRec;
/*
typedef struct {
size_t PS_unknown1;
unsigned int PS_unknown2;
unsigned int PS_unknown3;
} WPGPSl1Record;
*/
Image
*image;
unsigned int
status;
WPGHeader
Header;
WPGRecord
Rec;
WPG2Record
Rec2;
WPG2Start StartWPG;
WPGBitmapType1
BitmapHeader1;
WPG2BitmapType1
Bitmap2Header1;
WPGBitmapType2
BitmapHeader2;
WPGColorMapRec
WPG_Palette;
int
i,
bpp,
WPG2Flags;
ssize_t
ldblk;
size_t
one;
unsigned char
*BImgBuff;
tCTM CTM; /*current transform matrix*/
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
one=1;
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
image->depth=8;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read WPG image.
*/
Header.FileId=ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.DataOffset=(MagickOffsetType) ReadBlobLSBLong(image);
Header.ProductType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.FileType=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.MajorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.MinorVersion=ReadBlobByte(image);
Header.EncryptKey=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Header.Reserved=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if (Header.FileId!=0x435057FF || (Header.ProductType>>8)!=0x16)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if (Header.EncryptKey!=0)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"EncryptedWPGImageFileNotSupported");
image->columns = 1;
image->rows = 1;
image->colors = 0;
bpp=0;
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=0;
switch(Header.FileType)
{
case 1: /* WPG level 1 */
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec.RecordLength;
switch(Rec.RecType)
{
case 0x0B: /* bitmap type 1 */
BitmapHeader1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader1.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader1.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader1.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(BitmapHeader1.HorzRes && BitmapHeader1.VertRes)
{
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader1.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader1.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader1.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader1.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader1.Depth;
goto UnpackRaster;
case 0x0E: /*Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
}
break;
case 0x11: /* Start PS l1 */
if(Rec.RecordLength > 8)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+8, /* skip PS header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-8,exception);
break;
case 0x14: /* bitmap type 2 */
BitmapHeader2.RotAngle=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.LowLeftY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightX=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.UpRightY=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((BitmapHeader2.Width == 0) || (BitmapHeader2.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
BitmapHeader2.Depth=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.HorzRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
BitmapHeader2.VertRes=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
image->page.width=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightX)/470.0);
image->page.height=(unsigned int)
((BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX-BitmapHeader2.UpRightY)/470.0);
image->page.x=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
image->page.y=(int) (BitmapHeader2.LowLeftX/470.0);
if(BitmapHeader2.HorzRes && BitmapHeader2.VertRes)
{
image->resolution.x=BitmapHeader2.HorzRes/470.0;
image->resolution.y=BitmapHeader2.VertRes/470.0;
}
image->columns=BitmapHeader2.Width;
image->rows=BitmapHeader2.Height;
bpp=BitmapHeader2.Depth;
UnpackRaster:
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
{
NoMemory:
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
/* printf("Load default colormap \n"); */
for (i=0; (i < (int) image->colors) && (i < 256); i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Red);
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Green);
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum(WPG1_Palette[i].Blue);
}
}
else
{
if (bpp < 24)
if ( (image->colors < (one << bpp)) && (bpp != 24) )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
if (bpp == 1)
{
if(image->colormap[0].red==0 &&
image->colormap[0].green==0 &&
image->colormap[0].blue==0 &&
image->colormap[1].red==0 &&
image->colormap[1].green==0 &&
image->colormap[1].blue==0)
{ /* fix crippled monochrome palette */
image->colormap[1].red =
image->colormap[1].green =
image->colormap[1].blue = QuantumRange;
}
}
if(UnpackWPGRaster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
/* The raster cannot be unpacked */
{
DecompressionFailed:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToDecompressImage");
}
if(Rec.RecType==0x14 && BitmapHeader2.RotAngle!=0 && !image_info->ping)
{
/* flop command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x8000)
{
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
}
/* flip command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x2000)
{
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
}
/* rotate command */
if(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle & 0x0FFF)
{
Image
*rotate_image;
rotate_image=RotateImage(image,(BitmapHeader2.RotAngle &
0x0FFF), exception);
if (rotate_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(rotate_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,rotate_image);
}
}
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x1B: /* Postscript l2 */
if(Rec.RecordLength>0x3C)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+0x3C, /* skip PS l2 header in the wpg */
(ssize_t) Rec.RecordLength-0x3C,exception);
break;
}
}
break;
case 2: /* WPG level 2 */
(void) memset(CTM,0,sizeof(CTM));
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision = 0;
while(!EOFBlob(image)) /* object parser loop */
{
(void) SeekBlob(image,Header.DataOffset,SEEK_SET);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Rec2.Class=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rec2.RecType=(i=ReadBlobByte(image));
if(i==EOF)
break;
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.Extension);
Rd_WP_DWORD(image,&Rec2.RecordLength);
if(EOFBlob(image))
break;
Header.DataOffset=TellBlob(image)+Rec2.RecordLength;
switch(Rec2.RecType)
{
case 1:
StartWPG.HorizontalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.VerticalUnits=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
StartWPG.PosSizePrecision=ReadBlobByte(image);
break;
case 0x0C: /* Color palette */
WPG_Palette.StartIndex=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
image->colors=WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,
"MemoryAllocationFailed");
for (i=WPG_Palette.StartIndex;
i < (int)WPG_Palette.NumOfEntries; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].green=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
image->colormap[i].blue=ScaleCharToQuantum((char)
ReadBlobByte(image));
(void) ReadBlobByte(image); /*Opacity??*/
}
break;
case 0x0E:
Bitmap2Header1.Width=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Height=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if ((Bitmap2Header1.Width == 0) || (Bitmap2Header1.Height == 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
Bitmap2Header1.Depth=ReadBlobByte(image);
Bitmap2Header1.Compression=ReadBlobByte(image);
if(Bitmap2Header1.Compression > 1)
continue; /*Unknown compression method */
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Depth)
{
case 1:
bpp=1;
break;
case 2:
bpp=2;
break;
case 3:
bpp=4;
break;
case 4:
bpp=8;
break;
case 8:
bpp=24;
break;
default:
continue; /*Ignore raster with unknown depth*/
}
image->columns=Bitmap2Header1.Width;
image->rows=Bitmap2Header1.Height;
if ((image->colors == 0) && (bpp != 24))
{
size_t
one;
one=1;
image->colors=one << bpp;
if (!AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception))
goto NoMemory;
}
else
{
if(bpp < 24)
if( image->colors<(one << bpp) && bpp!=24 )
image->colormap=(PixelInfo *) ResizeQuantumMemory(
image->colormap,(size_t) (one << bpp),
sizeof(*image->colormap));
}
switch(Bitmap2Header1.Compression)
{
case 0: /*Uncompressed raster*/
{
ldblk=(ssize_t) ((bpp*image->columns+7)/8);
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t)
ldblk+1,sizeof(*BImgBuff));
if (BImgBuff == (unsigned char *) NULL)
goto NoMemory;
for(i=0; i< (ssize_t) image->rows; i++)
{
(void) ReadBlob(image,ldblk,BImgBuff);
InsertRow(image,BImgBuff,i,bpp,exception);
}
if(BImgBuff)
BImgBuff=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(BImgBuff);
break;
}
case 1: /*RLE for WPG2 */
{
if( UnpackWPG2Raster(image,bpp,exception) < 0)
goto DecompressionFailed;
break;
}
}
if(CTM[0][0]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flop_image;
flop_image = FlopImage(image, exception);
if (flop_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flop_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flop_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
Tx(0,0)=-1; Tx(1,0)=0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)=(WPG._2Rect.X_ur+WPG._2Rect.X_ll);
Tx(1,2)=0; Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
if(CTM[1][1]<0 && !image_info->ping)
{ /*?? RotAngle=360-RotAngle;*/
Image
*flip_image;
flip_image = FlipImage(image, exception);
if (flip_image != (Image *) NULL) {
DuplicateBlob(flip_image,image);
(void) RemoveLastImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,flip_image);
}
/* Try to change CTM according to Flip - I am not sure, must be checked.
float_matrix Tx(3,3);
Tx(0,0)= 1; Tx(1,0)= 0; Tx(2,0)=0;
Tx(0,1)= 0; Tx(1,1)=-1; Tx(2,1)=0;
Tx(0,2)= 0; Tx(1,2)=(WPG._2Rect.Y_ur+WPG._2Rect.Y_ll);
Tx(2,2)=1; */
}
/* Allocate next image structure. */
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
image->depth=8;
if (image->next == (Image *) NULL)
goto Finish;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
image->columns=image->rows=1;
image->colors=0;
break;
case 0x12: /* Postscript WPG2*/
i=ReadBlobLSBShort(image);
if(Rec2.RecordLength > (unsigned int) i)
image=ExtractPostscript(image,image_info,
TellBlob(image)+i, /*skip PS header in the wpg2*/
(ssize_t) (Rec2.RecordLength-i-2),exception);
break;
case 0x1B: /*bitmap rectangle*/
WPG2Flags = LoadWPG2Flags(image,StartWPG.PosSizePrecision,NULL,&CTM);
(void) WPG2Flags;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
{
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"DataEncodingSchemeIsNotSupported");
}
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
Finish:
(void) CloseBlob(image);
{
Image
*p;
ssize_t
scene=0;
/*
Rewind list, removing any empty images while rewinding.
*/
p=image;
image=NULL;
while (p != (Image *) NULL)
{
Image *tmp=p;
if ((p->rows == 0) || (p->columns == 0)) {
p=p->previous;
DeleteImageFromList(&tmp);
} else {
image=p;
p=p->previous;
}
}
/*
Fix scene numbers.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
p->scene=(size_t) scene++;
}
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,
"ImageFileDoesNotContainAnyImageData");
return(image);
}
Commit Message: Ensure image extent does not exceed maximum
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 169,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 tcm_loop_get_inst_index(struct se_portal_group *se_tpg)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,136 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fdctrl_external_reset_sysbus(DeviceState *d)
{
FDCtrlSysBus *sys = SYSBUS_FDC(d);
FDCtrl *s = &sys->state;
fdctrl_reset(s, 0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_capture_req_method(const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw, void *private)
{
struct chunk *temp;
struct http_txn *txn = smp->strm->txn;
char *ptr;
if (!txn || !txn->uri)
return 0;
ptr = txn->uri;
while (*ptr != ' ' && *ptr != '\0') /* find first space */
ptr++;
temp = get_trash_chunk();
temp->str = txn->uri;
temp->len = ptr - txn->uri;
smp->data.u.str = *temp;
smp->data.type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->flags = SMP_F_CONST;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 6,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodVariadicTestInterfaceWillBeGarbageCollectedArgMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
WillBeHeapVector<RefPtrWillBeMember<TestInterfaceWillBeGarbageCollected> > variadicTestInterfaceWillBeGarbageCollectedArg;
for (int i = 0; i < info.Length(); ++i) {
if (!V8TestInterfaceWillBeGarbageCollected::hasInstance(info[i], info.GetIsolate())) {
throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::failedToExecute("voidMethodVariadicTestInterfaceWillBeGarbageCollectedArg", "TestObjectPython", "parameter 1 is not of type 'TestInterfaceWillBeGarbageCollected'."), info.GetIsolate());
return;
}
variadicTestInterfaceWillBeGarbageCollectedArg.append(V8TestInterfaceWillBeGarbageCollected::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(info[i])));
}
imp->voidMethodVariadicTestInterfaceWillBeGarbageCollectedArg(variadicTestInterfaceWillBeGarbageCollectedArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void key_search_validate(struct extent_buffer *b,
struct btrfs_key *key,
int level)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT
struct btrfs_disk_key disk_key;
btrfs_cpu_key_to_disk(&disk_key, key);
if (level == 0)
ASSERT(!memcmp_extent_buffer(b, &disk_key,
offsetof(struct btrfs_leaf, items[0].key),
sizeof(disk_key)));
else
ASSERT(!memcmp_extent_buffer(b, &disk_key,
offsetof(struct btrfs_node, ptrs[0].key),
sizeof(disk_key)));
#endif
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: make xattr replace operations atomic
Replacing a xattr consists of doing a lookup for its existing value, delete
the current value from the respective leaf, release the search path and then
finally insert the new value. This leaves a time window where readers (getxattr,
listxattrs) won't see any value for the xattr. Xattrs are used to store ACLs,
so this has security implications.
This change also fixes 2 other existing issues which were:
*) Deleting the old xattr value without verifying first if the new xattr will
fit in the existing leaf item (in case multiple xattrs are packed in the
same item due to name hash collision);
*) Returning -EEXIST when the flag XATTR_CREATE is given and the xattr doesn't
exist but we have have an existing item that packs muliple xattrs with
the same name hash as the input xattr. In this case we should return ENOSPC.
A test case for xfstests follows soon.
Thanks to Alexandre Oliva for reporting the non-atomicity of the xattr replace
implementation.
Reported-by: Alexandre Oliva <oliva@gnu.org>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 45,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool ldb_dn_add_base_fmt(struct ldb_dn *dn, const char *base_fmt, ...)
{
struct ldb_dn *base;
char *base_str;
va_list ap;
bool ret;
if ( !dn || dn->invalid) {
return false;
}
va_start(ap, base_fmt);
base_str = talloc_vasprintf(dn, base_fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (base_str == NULL) {
return false;
}
base = ldb_dn_new(base_str, dn->ldb, base_str);
ret = ldb_dn_add_base(dn, base);
talloc_free(base_str);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 2,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_ADD( FT_Long* args )
{
args[0] = ADD_LONG( args[0], args[1] );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,577 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PSOutputDev::addCustomColor(GfxSeparationColorSpace *sepCS) {
PSOutCustomColor *cc;
GfxColor color;
GfxCMYK cmyk;
for (cc = customColors; cc; cc = cc->next) {
if (!cc->name->cmp(sepCS->getName())) {
return;
}
}
color.c[0] = gfxColorComp1;
sepCS->getCMYK(&color, &cmyk);
cc = new PSOutCustomColor(colToDbl(cmyk.c), colToDbl(cmyk.m),
colToDbl(cmyk.y), colToDbl(cmyk.k),
sepCS->getName()->copy());
cc->next = customColors;
customColors = cc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 1,219 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::StartWizard(OobeScreen first_screen) {
DisableKeyboardOverscroll();
TryToPlayOobeStartupSound();
restore_path_ = RESTORE_WIZARD;
first_screen_ = first_screen;
is_showing_login_ = false;
if (waiting_for_wallpaper_load_ && !initialize_webui_hidden_) {
VLOG(1) << "Login WebUI >> wizard postponed";
return;
}
VLOG(1) << "Login WebUI >> wizard";
if (!login_window_)
LoadURL(GURL(kOobeURL));
DVLOG(1) << "Starting wizard, first_screen: "
<< GetOobeScreenName(first_screen);
wizard_controller_.reset();
wizard_controller_.reset(CreateWizardController());
oobe_progress_bar_visible_ = !StartupUtils::IsDeviceRegistered();
SetOobeProgressBarVisible(oobe_progress_bar_visible_);
wizard_controller_->Init(first_screen);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip6_local_out(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err;
err = __ip6_local_out(net, sk, skb);
if (likely(err == 1))
err = dst_output(net, sk, skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options
The KASAN warning repoted below was discovered with a syzkaller
program. The reproducer is basically:
int s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, NEXTHDR_HOP);
send(s, &one_byte_of_data, 1, MSG_MORE);
send(s, &more_than_mtu_bytes_data, 2000, 0);
The socket() call sets the nexthdr field of the v6 header to
NEXTHDR_HOP, the first send call primes the payload with a non zero
byte of data, and the second send call triggers the fragmentation path.
The fragmentation code tries to parse the header options in order
to figure out where to insert the fragment option. Since nexthdr points
to an invalid option, the calculation of the size of the network header
can made to be much larger than the linear section of the skb and data
is read outside of it.
This fix makes ip6_find_1stfrag return an error if it detects
running out-of-bounds.
[ 42.361487] ==================================================================
[ 42.364412] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.365471] Read of size 840 at addr ffff88000969e798 by task ip6_fragment-oo/3789
[ 42.366469]
[ 42.366696] CPU: 1 PID: 3789 Comm: ip6_fragment-oo Not tainted 4.11.0+ #41
[ 42.367628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.1-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 42.368824] Call Trace:
[ 42.369183] dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b
[ 42.369664] print_address_description+0x73/0x290
[ 42.370325] kasan_report+0x252/0x370
[ 42.370839] ? ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.371396] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
[ 42.371978] memcpy+0x23/0x50
[ 42.372395] ip6_fragment+0x11c8/0x3730
[ 42.372920] ? nf_ct_expect_unregister_notifier+0x110/0x110
[ 42.373681] ? ip6_copy_metadata+0x7f0/0x7f0
[ 42.374263] ? ip6_forward+0x2e30/0x2e30
[ 42.374803] ip6_finish_output+0x584/0x990
[ 42.375350] ip6_output+0x1b7/0x690
[ 42.375836] ? ip6_finish_output+0x990/0x990
[ 42.376411] ? ip6_fragment+0x3730/0x3730
[ 42.376968] ip6_local_out+0x95/0x160
[ 42.377471] ip6_send_skb+0xa1/0x330
[ 42.377969] ip6_push_pending_frames+0xb3/0xe0
[ 42.378589] rawv6_sendmsg+0x2051/0x2db0
[ 42.379129] ? rawv6_bind+0x8b0/0x8b0
[ 42.379633] ? _copy_from_user+0x84/0xe0
[ 42.380193] ? debug_check_no_locks_freed+0x290/0x290
[ 42.380878] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x162/0x930
[ 42.381427] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa3/0x120
[ 42.382074] ? sock_has_perm+0x1f6/0x290
[ 42.382614] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x167/0x930
[ 42.383173] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.383727] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384226] ? inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.384748] ? inet_recvmsg+0x540/0x540
[ 42.385263] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.385758] SYSC_sendto+0x217/0x380
[ 42.386249] ? SYSC_connect+0x310/0x310
[ 42.386783] ? __might_fault+0x110/0x1d0
[ 42.387324] ? lock_downgrade+0x660/0x660
[ 42.387880] ? __fget_light+0xa1/0x1f0
[ 42.388403] ? __fdget+0x18/0x20
[ 42.388851] ? sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0
[ 42.389472] ? SyS_setsockopt+0x17f/0x260
[ 42.390021] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x5/0xbe
[ 42.390650] SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50
[ 42.391103] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.391731] RIP: 0033:0x7fbbb711e383
[ 42.392217] RSP: 002b:00007ffff4d34f28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
[ 42.393235] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fbbb711e383
[ 42.394195] RDX: 0000000000001000 RSI: 00007ffff4d34f60 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 42.395145] RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: 00007ffff4d34f40 R09: 0000000000000018
[ 42.396056] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400aad
[ 42.396598] R13: 0000000000000066 R14: 00007ffff4d34ee0 R15: 00007fbbb717af00
[ 42.397257]
[ 42.397411] Allocated by task 3789:
[ 42.397702] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.398005] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.398267] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 42.398548] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 42.398848] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xcb/0x380
[ 42.399224] __kmalloc_reserve.isra.32+0x41/0xe0
[ 42.399654] __alloc_skb+0xf8/0x580
[ 42.400003] sock_wmalloc+0xab/0xf0
[ 42.400346] __ip6_append_data.isra.41+0x2472/0x33d0
[ 42.400813] ip6_append_data+0x1a8/0x2f0
[ 42.401122] rawv6_sendmsg+0x11ee/0x2db0
[ 42.401505] inet_sendmsg+0x123/0x500
[ 42.401860] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110
[ 42.402209] ___sys_sendmsg+0x7cb/0x930
[ 42.402582] __sys_sendmsg+0xd9/0x190
[ 42.402941] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.403273] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.403718]
[ 42.403871] Freed by task 1794:
[ 42.404146] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 42.404515] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 42.404827] kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0
[ 42.405167] kfree+0xe8/0x2b0
[ 42.405462] skb_free_head+0x74/0xb0
[ 42.405806] skb_release_data+0x30e/0x3a0
[ 42.406198] skb_release_all+0x4a/0x60
[ 42.406563] consume_skb+0x113/0x2e0
[ 42.406910] skb_free_datagram+0x1a/0xe0
[ 42.407288] netlink_recvmsg+0x60d/0xe40
[ 42.407667] sock_recvmsg+0xd7/0x110
[ 42.408022] ___sys_recvmsg+0x25c/0x580
[ 42.408395] __sys_recvmsg+0xd6/0x190
[ 42.408753] SyS_recvmsg+0x2d/0x50
[ 42.409086] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
[ 42.409513]
[ 42.409665] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88000969e780
[ 42.409665] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[ 42.410846] The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
[ 42.410846] 512-byte region [ffff88000969e780, ffff88000969e980)
[ 42.411941] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 42.412405] page:ffffea000025a780 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping: (null) index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 42.413298] flags: 0x100000000008100(slab|head)
[ 42.413729] raw: 0100000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800c000c
[ 42.414387] raw: ffffea00002a9500 0000000900000007 ffff88000c401280 0000000000000000
[ 42.415074] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 42.415604]
[ 42.415757] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 42.416222] ffff88000969e880: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.416904] ffff88000969e900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 42.417591] >ffff88000969e980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 42.418273] ^
[ 42.418588] ffff88000969ea00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419273] ffff88000969ea80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 42.419882] ==================================================================
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 65,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldCompleteDownloadInternal(
int download_id,
const base::Closure& user_complete_callback) {
DownloadItem* item = download_manager_->GetDownload(download_id);
if (!item)
return;
if (IsDownloadReadyForCompletion(item, base::Bind(
&ChromeDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldCompleteDownloadInternal, this,
download_id, user_complete_callback)))
user_complete_callback.Run();
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,021 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoProduceTextureCHROMIUM(GLenum target,
const GLbyte* mailbox) {
TextureManager::TextureInfo* info = GetTextureInfoForTarget(target);
if (!info) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glProduceTextureCHROMIUM", "unknown texture for target");
return;
}
TextureDefinition* definition = texture_manager()->Save(info);
if (!definition) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glProduceTextureCHROMIUM", "invalid texture");
return;
}
if (!group_->mailbox_manager()->ProduceTexture(
target,
*reinterpret_cast<const MailboxName*>(mailbox),
definition,
texture_manager())) {
bool success = texture_manager()->Restore(info, definition);
DCHECK(success);
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glProduceTextureCHROMIUM", "invalid mailbox name");
return;
}
BindAndApplyTextureParameters(info);
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 103,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs3svc_decode_createargs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *p,
struct nfsd3_createargs *args)
{
if (!(p = decode_fh(p, &args->fh))
|| !(p = decode_filename(p, &args->name, &args->len)))
return 0;
switch (args->createmode = ntohl(*p++)) {
case NFS3_CREATE_UNCHECKED:
case NFS3_CREATE_GUARDED:
p = decode_sattr3(p, &args->attrs);
break;
case NFS3_CREATE_EXCLUSIVE:
args->verf = p;
p += 2;
break;
default:
return 0;
}
return xdr_argsize_check(rqstp, p);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,267 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int dtls1_preprocess_fragment(SSL *s,struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr,int max)
{
size_t frag_off,frag_len,msg_len;
msg_len = msg_hdr->msg_len;
frag_off = msg_hdr->frag_off;
frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
/* sanity checking */
if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > msg_len)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
}
if ( (frag_off+frag_len) > (unsigned long)max)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
}
if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* first fragment */
{
/* msg_len is limited to 2^24, but is effectively checked
* against max above */
if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf,msg_len+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
return SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_size = msg_len;
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len = msg_len;
s->s3->tmp.message_type = msg_hdr->type;
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.type = msg_hdr->type;
s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = msg_hdr->seq;
}
else if (msg_len != s->d1->r_msg_hdr.msg_len)
{
/* They must be playing with us! BTW, failure to enforce
* upper limit would open possibility for buffer overrun. */
SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT,SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
return SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
}
return 0; /* no error */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 14,357 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeSetterForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::SetterContext, "perWorldBindingsLongAttribute", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, cppValue, toInt32(jsValue, exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->setPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute(cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void gf_sleep(u32 ms)
{
#ifdef WIN32
Sleep(ms);
#else
s32 sel_err;
struct timeval tv;
#ifndef SLEEP_ABS_SELECT
u32 prev, now, elapsed;
#endif
#ifdef SLEEP_ABS_SELECT
tv.tv_sec = ms/1000;
tv.tv_usec = (ms%1000)*1000;
#else
prev = gf_sys_clock();
#endif
do {
errno = 0;
#ifndef SLEEP_ABS_SELECT
now = gf_sys_clock();
elapsed = (now - prev);
if ( elapsed >= ms ) {
break;
}
prev = now;
ms -= elapsed;
tv.tv_sec = ms/1000;
tv.tv_usec = (ms%1000)*1000;
#endif
sel_err = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tv);
} while ( sel_err && (errno == EINTR) );
#endif
}
Commit Message: fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 90,833 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: JSValue jsTestCustomNamedGetterConstructor(ExecState* exec, JSValue slotBase, const Identifier&)
{
JSTestCustomNamedGetter* domObject = jsCast<JSTestCustomNamedGetter*>(asObject(slotBase));
return JSTestCustomNamedGetter::getConstructor(exec, domObject->globalObject());
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,088 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gfx::Rect LauncherView::GetIdealBoundsOfItemIcon(LauncherID id) {
int index = model_->ItemIndexByID(id);
if (index == -1 || index > last_visible_index_)
return gfx::Rect();
const gfx::Rect& ideal_bounds(view_model_->ideal_bounds(index));
DCHECK_NE(TYPE_APP_LIST, model_->items()[index].type);
LauncherButton* button =
static_cast<LauncherButton*>(view_model_->view_at(index));
gfx::Rect icon_bounds = button->GetIconBounds();
return gfx::Rect(ideal_bounds.x() + icon_bounds.x(),
ideal_bounds.y() + icon_bounds.y(),
icon_bounds.width(), icon_bounds.height());
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,236 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int f2fs_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb);
struct f2fs_mount_info org_mount_opt;
unsigned long old_sb_flags;
int err, active_logs;
bool need_restart_gc = false;
bool need_stop_gc = false;
bool no_extent_cache = !test_opt(sbi, EXTENT_CACHE);
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
struct f2fs_fault_info ffi = sbi->fault_info;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
int s_jquota_fmt;
char *s_qf_names[MAXQUOTAS];
int i, j;
#endif
/*
* Save the old mount options in case we
* need to restore them.
*/
org_mount_opt = sbi->mount_opt;
old_sb_flags = sb->s_flags;
active_logs = sbi->active_logs;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
s_jquota_fmt = sbi->s_jquota_fmt;
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) {
if (sbi->s_qf_names[i]) {
s_qf_names[i] = kstrdup(sbi->s_qf_names[i],
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!s_qf_names[i]) {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
kfree(s_qf_names[j]);
return -ENOMEM;
}
} else {
s_qf_names[i] = NULL;
}
}
#endif
/* recover superblocks we couldn't write due to previous RO mount */
if (!(*flags & MS_RDONLY) && is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_NEED_SB_WRITE)) {
err = f2fs_commit_super(sbi, false);
f2fs_msg(sb, KERN_INFO,
"Try to recover all the superblocks, ret: %d", err);
if (!err)
clear_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_NEED_SB_WRITE);
}
default_options(sbi);
/* parse mount options */
err = parse_options(sb, data);
if (err)
goto restore_opts;
/*
* Previous and new state of filesystem is RO,
* so skip checking GC and FLUSH_MERGE conditions.
*/
if (f2fs_readonly(sb) && (*flags & MS_RDONLY))
goto skip;
if (!f2fs_readonly(sb) && (*flags & MS_RDONLY)) {
err = dquot_suspend(sb, -1);
if (err < 0)
goto restore_opts;
} else {
/* dquot_resume needs RW */
sb->s_flags &= ~MS_RDONLY;
dquot_resume(sb, -1);
}
/* disallow enable/disable extent_cache dynamically */
if (no_extent_cache == !!test_opt(sbi, EXTENT_CACHE)) {
err = -EINVAL;
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
"switch extent_cache option is not allowed");
goto restore_opts;
}
/*
* We stop the GC thread if FS is mounted as RO
* or if background_gc = off is passed in mount
* option. Also sync the filesystem.
*/
if ((*flags & MS_RDONLY) || !test_opt(sbi, BG_GC)) {
if (sbi->gc_thread) {
stop_gc_thread(sbi);
need_restart_gc = true;
}
} else if (!sbi->gc_thread) {
err = start_gc_thread(sbi);
if (err)
goto restore_opts;
need_stop_gc = true;
}
if (*flags & MS_RDONLY) {
writeback_inodes_sb(sb, WB_REASON_SYNC);
sync_inodes_sb(sb);
set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_IS_DIRTY);
set_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_IS_CLOSE);
f2fs_sync_fs(sb, 1);
clear_sbi_flag(sbi, SBI_IS_CLOSE);
}
/*
* We stop issue flush thread if FS is mounted as RO
* or if flush_merge is not passed in mount option.
*/
if ((*flags & MS_RDONLY) || !test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
clear_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE);
destroy_flush_cmd_control(sbi, false);
} else {
err = create_flush_cmd_control(sbi);
if (err)
goto restore_gc;
}
skip:
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
/* Release old quota file names */
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++)
kfree(s_qf_names[i]);
#endif
/* Update the POSIXACL Flag */
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_POSIXACL) |
(test_opt(sbi, POSIX_ACL) ? MS_POSIXACL : 0);
return 0;
restore_gc:
if (need_restart_gc) {
if (start_gc_thread(sbi))
f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
"background gc thread has stopped");
} else if (need_stop_gc) {
stop_gc_thread(sbi);
}
restore_opts:
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
sbi->s_jquota_fmt = s_jquota_fmt;
for (i = 0; i < MAXQUOTAS; i++) {
kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]);
sbi->s_qf_names[i] = s_qf_names[i];
}
#endif
sbi->mount_opt = org_mount_opt;
sbi->active_logs = active_logs;
sb->s_flags = old_sb_flags;
#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
sbi->fault_info = ffi;
#endif
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 86,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlParseStringPEReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar **str) {
const xmlChar *ptr;
xmlChar cur;
xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr entity = NULL;
if ((str == NULL) || (*str == NULL)) return(NULL);
ptr = *str;
cur = *ptr;
if (cur != '%')
return(NULL);
ptr++;
name = xmlParseStringName(ctxt, &ptr);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseStringPEReference: no name\n");
*str = ptr;
return(NULL);
}
cur = *ptr;
if (cur != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
xmlFree(name);
*str = ptr;
return(NULL);
}
ptr++;
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Request the entity from SAX
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
entity = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData,
name);
if (entity == NULL) {
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must precede
* any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) && (ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n", name);
} else {
/*
* [ VC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document with an external subset or external
* parameter entities with "standalone='no'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must
* precede any reference to it...
*/
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
} else {
/*
* Internal checking in case the entity quest barfed
*/
if ((entity->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY)) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"%%%s; is not a parameter entity\n",
name, NULL);
}
}
ctxt->hasPErefs = 1;
xmlFree(name);
*str = ptr;
return(entity);
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 171,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS foveon_decoder (unsigned size, unsigned code)
{
static unsigned huff[1024];
struct decode *cur;
unsigned i, len;
if (!code) {
for (i=0; i < size; i++)
huff[i] = get4();
memset (first_decode, 0, sizeof first_decode);
free_decode = first_decode;
}
cur = free_decode++;
if (free_decode > first_decode+2048) {
dcraw_message (DCRAW_ERROR,_("%s: decoder table overflow\n"), ifname_display);
longjmp (failure, 2);
}
if (code)
for (i=0; i < size; i++)
if (huff[i] == code) {
cur->leaf = i;
return;
}
if ((len = code >> 27) > 26) return;
code = (len+1) << 27 | (code & 0x3ffffff) << 1;
cur->branch[0] = free_decode;
foveon_decoder (size, code);
cur->branch[1] = free_decode;
foveon_decoder (size, code+1);
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void comps_objmrtree_data_destroy(COMPS_ObjMRTreeData * rtd) {
free(rtd->key);
COMPS_OBJECT_DESTROY(rtd->data);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtd->subnodes);
free(rtd);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void arcmsr_wait_firmware_ready(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
uint32_t firmware_state = 0;
switch (acb->adapter_type) {
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_A: {
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
do {
firmware_state = readl(®->outbound_msgaddr1);
} while ((firmware_state & ARCMSR_OUTBOUND_MESG1_FIRMWARE_OK) == 0);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_B: {
struct MessageUnit_B *reg = acb->pmuB;
do {
firmware_state = readl(reg->iop2drv_doorbell);
} while ((firmware_state & ARCMSR_MESSAGE_FIRMWARE_OK) == 0);
writel(ARCMSR_DRV2IOP_END_OF_INTERRUPT, reg->drv2iop_doorbell);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_C: {
struct MessageUnit_C __iomem *reg = acb->pmuC;
do {
firmware_state = readl(®->outbound_msgaddr1);
} while ((firmware_state & ARCMSR_HBCMU_MESSAGE_FIRMWARE_OK) == 0);
}
break;
case ACB_ADAPTER_TYPE_D: {
struct MessageUnit_D *reg = acb->pmuD;
do {
firmware_state = readl(reg->outbound_msgaddr1);
} while ((firmware_state &
ARCMSR_ARC1214_MESSAGE_FIRMWARE_OK) == 0);
}
break;
}
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,835 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: elements_array_element_end(void *state, bool isnull)
{
ElementsState *_state = (ElementsState *) state;
MemoryContext old_cxt;
int len;
text *val;
HeapTuple tuple;
Datum values[1];
bool nulls[1] = {false};
/* skip over nested objects */
if (_state->lex->lex_level != 1)
return;
/* use the tmp context so we can clean up after each tuple is done */
old_cxt = MemoryContextSwitchTo(_state->tmp_cxt);
if (isnull && _state->normalize_results)
{
nulls[0] = true;
values[0] = (Datum) NULL;
}
else if (_state->next_scalar)
{
values[0] = CStringGetTextDatum(_state->normalized_scalar);
_state->next_scalar = false;
}
else
{
len = _state->lex->prev_token_terminator - _state->result_start;
val = cstring_to_text_with_len(_state->result_start, len);
values[0] = PointerGetDatum(val);
}
tuple = heap_form_tuple(_state->ret_tdesc, values, nulls);
tuplestore_puttuple(_state->tuple_store, tuple);
/* clean up and switch back */
MemoryContextSwitchTo(old_cxt);
MemoryContextReset(_state->tmp_cxt);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 2,574 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int match_sys_reg(const void *key, const void *elt)
{
const unsigned long pval = (unsigned long)key;
const struct sys_reg_desc *r = elt;
return pval - reg_to_match_value(r);
}
Commit Message: arm64: KVM: pmu: Fix AArch32 cycle counter access
We're missing the handling code for the cycle counter accessed
from a 32bit guest, leading to unexpected results.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6+
Signed-off-by: Wei Huang <wei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 62,907 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SessionService::RecordSessionUpdateHistogramData(int type,
base::TimeTicks* last_updated_time) {
if (!last_updated_time->is_null()) {
base::TimeDelta delta = base::TimeTicks::Now() - *last_updated_time;
bool use_long_period = false;
if (delta >= save_delay_in_mins_) {
use_long_period = true;
}
switch (type) {
case chrome::NOTIFICATION_SESSION_SERVICE_SAVED :
RecordUpdatedSaveTime(delta, use_long_period);
RecordUpdatedSessionNavigationOrTab(delta, use_long_period);
break;
case content::NOTIFICATION_TAB_CLOSED:
RecordUpdatedTabClosed(delta, use_long_period);
RecordUpdatedSessionNavigationOrTab(delta, use_long_period);
break;
case content::NOTIFICATION_NAV_LIST_PRUNED:
RecordUpdatedNavListPruned(delta, use_long_period);
RecordUpdatedSessionNavigationOrTab(delta, use_long_period);
break;
case content::NOTIFICATION_NAV_ENTRY_COMMITTED:
RecordUpdatedNavEntryCommit(delta, use_long_period);
RecordUpdatedSessionNavigationOrTab(delta, use_long_period);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED() << "Bad type sent to RecordSessionUpdateHistogramData";
break;
}
}
(*last_updated_time) = base::TimeTicks::Now();
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 108,821 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pdf_clear_err(struct pdf_doc *pdf)
{
if (!pdf)
return;
pdf->errstr[0] = '\0';
pdf->errval = 0;
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,005 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecutePasteGlobalSelection(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource source,
const String&) {
if (!CanReadClipboard(frame, source))
return false;
if (!frame.GetEditor().Behavior().SupportsGlobalSelection())
return false;
DCHECK_EQ(source, kCommandFromMenuOrKeyBinding);
bool old_selection_mode = Pasteboard::GeneralPasteboard()->IsSelectionMode();
Pasteboard::GeneralPasteboard()->SetSelectionMode(true);
frame.GetEditor().Paste(source);
Pasteboard::GeneralPasteboard()->SetSelectionMode(old_selection_mode);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,594 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __net_random_once_disable_jump(struct static_key *key)
{
struct __net_random_once_work *w;
w = kmalloc(sizeof(*w), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!w)
return;
INIT_WORK(&w->work, __net_random_once_deferred);
w->key = key;
schedule_work(&w->work);
}
Commit Message: net: avoid dependency of net_get_random_once on nop patching
net_get_random_once depends on the static keys infrastructure to patch up
the branch to the slow path during boot. This was realized by abusing the
static keys api and defining a new initializer to not enable the call
site while still indicating that the branch point should get patched
up. This was needed to have the fast path considered likely by gcc.
The static key initialization during boot up normally walks through all
the registered keys and either patches in ideal nops or enables the jump
site but omitted that step on x86 if ideal nops where already placed at
static_key branch points. Thus net_get_random_once branches not always
became active.
This patch switches net_get_random_once to the ordinary static_key
api and thus places the kernel fast path in the - by gcc considered -
unlikely path. Microbenchmarks on Intel and AMD x86-64 showed that
the unlikely path actually beats the likely path in terms of cycle cost
and that different nop patterns did not make much difference, thus this
switch should not be noticeable.
Fixes: a48e42920ff38b ("net: introduce new macro net_get_random_once")
Reported-by: Tuomas Räsänen <tuomasjjrasanen@tjjr.fi>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 35,924 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::OnRendererVisible() {
blink::MainThreadIsolate()->IsolateInForegroundNotification();
if (!GetContentClient()->renderer()->RunIdleHandlerWhenWidgetsHidden())
return;
renderer_scheduler_->SetRendererHidden(false);
ScheduleIdleHandler(kLongIdleHandlerDelayMs);
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,563 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int nf_hashfn(struct inet_frag_queue *q)
{
const struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *nq;
nq = container_of(q, struct nf_ct_frag6_queue, q);
return inet6_hash_frag(nq->id, &nq->saddr, &nq->daddr, nf_frags.rnd);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <uweber@astaro.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 19,632 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
return 1;
/* Should never happen */
if (!c)
return 0;
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
return 0;
s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,462 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void doWriteRsaHashedKey(const blink::WebCryptoKey& key)
{
ASSERT(key.algorithm().rsaHashedParams());
append(static_cast<uint8_t>(RsaHashedKeyTag));
doWriteAlgorithmId(key.algorithm().id());
switch (key.type()) {
case blink::WebCryptoKeyTypePublic:
doWriteUint32(PublicKeyType);
break;
case blink::WebCryptoKeyTypePrivate:
doWriteUint32(PrivateKeyType);
break;
case blink::WebCryptoKeyTypeSecret:
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
}
const blink::WebCryptoRsaHashedKeyAlgorithmParams* params = key.algorithm().rsaHashedParams();
doWriteUint32(params->modulusLengthBits());
doWriteUint32(params->publicExponent().size());
append(params->publicExponent().data(), params->publicExponent().size());
doWriteAlgorithmId(key.algorithm().rsaHashedParams()->hash().id());
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,472 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ReadUserLogState::GetState( ReadUserLog::FileState &state ) const
{
ReadUserLogFileState fstate( state );
ReadUserLogFileState::FileState *istate = fstate.getRwState();
if ( !istate ) {
return false;
}
if ( strcmp( istate->m_signature, FileStateSignature ) ) {
return false;
}
if ( istate->m_version != FILESTATE_VERSION ) {
return false;
}
if( !strlen( istate->m_base_path ) ) {
memset( istate->m_base_path, 0, sizeof(istate->m_base_path) );
if ( m_base_path.Value() ) {
strncpy( istate->m_base_path,
m_base_path.Value(),
sizeof(istate->m_base_path) - 1 );
}
}
istate->m_rotation = m_cur_rot;
istate->m_log_type = m_log_type;
if( m_uniq_id.Value() ) {
strncpy( istate->m_uniq_id,
m_uniq_id.Value(),
sizeof(istate->m_uniq_id) );
istate->m_uniq_id[sizeof(istate->m_uniq_id) - 1] = '\0';
}
else {
memset( istate->m_uniq_id, 0, sizeof(istate->m_uniq_id) );
}
istate->m_sequence = m_sequence;
istate->m_max_rotations = m_max_rotations;
istate->m_inode = m_stat_buf.st_ino;
istate->m_ctime = m_stat_buf.st_ctime;
istate->m_size.asint = m_stat_buf.st_size;
istate->m_offset.asint = m_offset;
istate->m_event_num.asint = m_event_num;
istate->m_log_position.asint = m_log_position;
istate->m_log_record.asint = m_log_record;
istate->m_update_time = m_update_time;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,623 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int check_http_code(URLContext *h, int http_code, const char *end)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
/* error codes are 4xx and 5xx, but regard 401 as a success, so we
* don't abort until all headers have been parsed. */
if (http_code >= 400 && http_code < 600 &&
(http_code != 401 || s->auth_state.auth_type != HTTP_AUTH_NONE) &&
(http_code != 407 || s->proxy_auth_state.auth_type != HTTP_AUTH_NONE)) {
end += strspn(end, SPACE_CHARS);
av_log(h, AV_LOG_WARNING, "HTTP error %d %s\n", http_code, end);
return ff_http_averror(http_code, AVERROR(EIO));
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int __filemap_fdatawrite(struct address_space *mapping,
int sync_mode)
{
return __filemap_fdatawrite_range(mapping, 0, LLONG_MAX, sync_mode);
}
Commit Message: fix writev regression: pan hanging unkillable and un-straceable
Frederik Himpe reported an unkillable and un-straceable pan process.
Zero length iovecs can go into an infinite loop in writev, because the
iovec iterator does not always advance over them.
The sequence required to trigger this is not trivial. I think it
requires that a zero-length iovec be followed by a non-zero-length iovec
which causes a pagefault in the atomic usercopy. This causes the writev
code to drop back into single-segment copy mode, which then tries to
copy the 0 bytes of the zero-length iovec; a zero length copy looks like
a failure though, so it loops.
Put a test into iov_iter_advance to catch zero-length iovecs. We could
just put the test in the fallback path, but I feel it is more robust to
skip over zero-length iovecs throughout the code (iovec iterator may be
used in filesystems too, so it should be robust).
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 58,778 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: validate_buf(unsigned int offset, unsigned int buffer_length,
struct smb2_hdr *hdr, unsigned int min_buf_size)
{
unsigned int smb_len = be32_to_cpu(hdr->smb2_buf_length);
char *end_of_smb = smb_len + 4 /* RFC1001 length field */ + (char *)hdr;
char *begin_of_buf = 4 /* RFC1001 len field */ + offset + (char *)hdr;
char *end_of_buf = begin_of_buf + buffer_length;
if (buffer_length < min_buf_size) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "buffer length %d smaller than minimum size %d\n",
buffer_length, min_buf_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check if beyond RFC1001 maximum length */
if ((smb_len > 0x7FFFFF) || (buffer_length > 0x7FFFFF)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "buffer length %d or smb length %d too large\n",
buffer_length, smb_len);
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((begin_of_buf > end_of_smb) || (end_of_buf > end_of_smb)) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "illegal server response, bad offset to data\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 36,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const ui::ListSelectionModel& TabStrip::GetSelectionModel() const {
return controller_->GetSelectionModel();
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,712 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMsgShowDisambiguationPopup(
const gfx::Rect& rect,
const gfx::Size& size,
const TransportDIB::Id& id) {
DCHECK(!rect.IsEmpty());
DCHECK(!size.IsEmpty());
TransportDIB* dib = process_->GetTransportDIB(id);
DCHECK(dib->memory());
DCHECK(dib->size() == SkBitmap::ComputeSize(SkBitmap::kARGB_8888_Config,
size.width(), size.height()));
SkBitmap zoomed_bitmap;
zoomed_bitmap.setConfig(SkBitmap::kARGB_8888_Config,
size.width(), size.height());
zoomed_bitmap.setPixels(dib->memory());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (view_)
view_->ShowDisambiguationPopup(rect, zoomed_bitmap);
#else
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
#endif
zoomed_bitmap.setPixels(0);
Send(new ViewMsg_ReleaseDisambiguationPopupDIB(GetRoutingID(),
dib->handle()));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: make_unix_date(const u_char *date_ptr)
{
uint32_t dos_date = 0;
dos_date = EXTRACT_LE_32BITS(date_ptr);
return int_unix_date(dos_date);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12893/SMB/CIFS: Add a bounds check in name_len().
After we advance the pointer by the length value in the buffer, make
sure it points to something in the captured data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 62,611 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalDOMWindow::AddedEventListener(
const AtomicString& event_type,
RegisteredEventListener& registered_listener) {
DOMWindow::AddedEventListener(event_type, registered_listener);
if (GetFrame() && GetFrame()->GetPage())
GetFrame()->GetPage()->GetEventHandlerRegistry().DidAddEventHandler(
*this, event_type, registered_listener.Options());
if (Document* document = this->document())
document->AddListenerTypeIfNeeded(event_type, *this);
for (auto& it : event_listener_observers_) {
it->DidAddEventListener(this, event_type);
}
if (event_type == EventTypeNames::unload) {
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kDocumentUnloadRegistered);
TrackUnloadEventListener(this);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::beforeunload) {
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kDocumentBeforeUnloadRegistered);
TrackBeforeUnloadEventListener(this);
if (GetFrame() && !GetFrame()->IsMainFrame()) {
UseCounter::Count(document(),
WebFeature::kSubFrameBeforeUnloadRegistered);
}
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::pagehide) {
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kDocumentPageHideRegistered);
} else if (event_type == EventTypeNames::pageshow) {
UseCounter::Count(document(), WebFeature::kDocumentPageShowRegistered);
}
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,870 |
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