instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserPpapiHostImpl::IsThrottled(PP_Instance instance) const {
auto it = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (it != instance_map_.end())
return it->second->is_throttled;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 135,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sd_shutdown(struct device *dev)
{
struct scsi_disk *sdkp = scsi_disk_get_from_dev(dev);
if (!sdkp)
return; /* this can happen */
if (pm_runtime_suspended(dev))
goto exit;
if (sdkp->WCE) {
sd_printk(KERN_NOTICE, sdkp, "Synchronizing SCSI cache\n");
sd_sync_cache(sdkp);
}
if (system_state != SYSTEM_RESTART && sdkp->device->manage_start_stop) {
sd_printk(KERN_NOTICE, sdkp, "Stopping disk\n");
sd_start_stop_device(sdkp, 0);
}
exit:
scsi_disk_put(sdkp);
}
Commit Message: block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Linux allows executing the SG_IO ioctl on a partition or LVM volume, and
will pass the command to the underlying block device. This is
well-known, but it is also a large security problem when (via Unix
permissions, ACLs, SELinux or a combination thereof) a program or user
needs to be granted access only to part of the disk.
This patch lets partitions forward a small set of harmless ioctls;
others are logged with printk so that we can see which ioctls are
actually sent. In my tests only CDROM_GET_CAPABILITY actually occurred.
Of course it was being sent to a (partition on a) hard disk, so it would
have failed with ENOTTY and the patch isn't changing anything in
practice. Still, I'm treating it specially to avoid spamming the logs.
In principle, this restriction should include programs running with
CAP_SYS_RAWIO. If for example I let a program access /dev/sda2 and
/dev/sdb, it still should not be able to read/write outside the
boundaries of /dev/sda2 independent of the capabilities. However, for
now programs with CAP_SYS_RAWIO will still be allowed to send the
ioctls. Their actions will still be logged.
This patch does not affect the non-libata IDE driver. That driver
however already tests for bd != bd->bd_contains before issuing some
ioctl; it could be restricted further to forbid these ioctls even for
programs running with CAP_SYS_ADMIN/CAP_SYS_RAWIO.
Cc: linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@parallels.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Make it also print the command name when warning - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 94,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void irq_exit(void)
{
#ifndef __ARCH_IRQ_EXIT_IRQS_DISABLED
local_irq_disable();
#else
lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
#endif
account_irq_exit_time(current);
preempt_count_sub(HARDIRQ_OFFSET);
if (!in_interrupt() && local_softirq_pending())
invoke_softirq();
tick_irq_exit();
rcu_irq_exit();
trace_hardirq_exit(); /* must be last! */
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageHelperDOMArrayBufferView(
TexImageFunctionID function_id,
GLenum target,
GLint level,
GLint internalformat,
GLsizei width,
GLsizei height,
GLsizei depth,
GLint border,
GLenum format,
GLenum type,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
GLint zoffset,
DOMArrayBufferView* pixels,
NullDisposition null_disposition,
GLuint src_offset) {
const char* func_name = GetTexImageFunctionName(function_id);
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (!ValidateTexImageBinding(func_name, function_id, target))
return;
TexImageFunctionType function_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexImage3D)
function_type = kTexImage;
else
function_type = kTexSubImage;
if (!ValidateTexFunc(func_name, function_type, kSourceArrayBufferView, target,
level, internalformat, width, height, depth, border,
format, type, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset))
return;
TexImageDimension source_type;
if (function_id == kTexImage2D || function_id == kTexSubImage2D)
source_type = kTex2D;
else
source_type = kTex3D;
if (!ValidateTexFuncData(func_name, source_type, level, width, height, depth,
format, type, pixels, null_disposition, src_offset))
return;
uint8_t* data = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(
pixels ? pixels->BaseAddressMaybeShared() : nullptr);
if (src_offset) {
DCHECK(pixels);
data += src_offset * pixels->TypeSize();
}
Vector<uint8_t> temp_data;
bool change_unpack_params = false;
if (data && width && height &&
(unpack_flip_y_ || unpack_premultiply_alpha_)) {
DCHECK_EQ(kTex2D, source_type);
WebGLImageConversion::PixelStoreParams unpack_params =
GetUnpackPixelStoreParams(kTex2D);
GLint data_store_width =
unpack_params.row_length ? unpack_params.row_length : width;
if (unpack_params.skip_pixels + width > data_store_width) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"Invalid unpack params combination.");
return;
}
if (!WebGLImageConversion::ExtractTextureData(
width, height, format, type, unpack_params, unpack_flip_y_,
unpack_premultiply_alpha_, data, temp_data)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"Invalid format/type combination.");
return;
}
data = temp_data.data();
change_unpack_params = true;
}
if (function_id == kTexImage3D) {
ContextGL()->TexImage3D(target, level,
ConvertTexInternalFormat(internalformat, type),
width, height, depth, border, format, type, data);
return;
}
if (function_id == kTexSubImage3D) {
ContextGL()->TexSubImage3D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, zoffset, width,
height, depth, format, type, data);
return;
}
ScopedUnpackParametersResetRestore temporary_reset_unpack(
this, change_unpack_params);
if (function_id == kTexImage2D)
TexImage2DBase(target, level, internalformat, width, height, border, format,
type, data);
else if (function_id == kTexSubImage2D)
ContextGL()->TexSubImage2D(target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height,
format, type, data);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,290 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool fulltest(const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *target)
{
uint32_t *hash32 = (uint32_t *)hash;
uint32_t *target32 = (uint32_t *)target;
bool rc = true;
int i;
for (i = 28 / 4; i >= 0; i--) {
uint32_t h32tmp = le32toh(hash32[i]);
uint32_t t32tmp = le32toh(target32[i]);
if (h32tmp > t32tmp) {
rc = false;
break;
}
if (h32tmp < t32tmp) {
rc = true;
break;
}
}
if (opt_debug) {
unsigned char hash_swap[32], target_swap[32];
char *hash_str, *target_str;
swab256(hash_swap, hash);
swab256(target_swap, target);
hash_str = bin2hex(hash_swap, 32);
target_str = bin2hex(target_swap, 32);
applog(LOG_DEBUG, " Proof: %s\nTarget: %s\nTrgVal? %s",
hash_str,
target_str,
rc ? "YES (hash <= target)" :
"no (false positive; hash > target)");
free(hash_str);
free(target_str);
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 36,592 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf14_update_device_color_procs(gx_device *dev,
gs_transparency_color_t group_color,
int64_t icc_hashcode, gs_gstate *pgs,
cmm_profile_t *iccprofile, bool is_mask)
{
pdf14_device *pdevproto = NULL;
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
const pdf14_procs_t *new_14procs = NULL;
pdf14_parent_color_t *parent_color_info;
gx_color_polarity_t new_polarity;
uchar new_num_comps;
bool new_additive;
gx_device_clist_reader *pcrdev;
byte comp_bits[GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS];
byte comp_shift[GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS];
int k;
bool has_tags = dev->graphics_type_tag & GS_DEVICE_ENCODES_TAGS;
gsicc_rendering_param_t render_cond;
cmm_dev_profile_t *dev_profile;
if (pdev->ctx->stack != NULL){
parent_color_info = pdev->ctx->stack->parent_color_info_procs;
} else {
/* This should not occur */
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
}
if_debug0m('v', dev->memory, "[v]pdf14_update_device_color_procs\n");
memset(comp_bits, 0, GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS);
memset(comp_shift, 0, GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS);
/* Update the device procs at this stage. Many of the procs are based upon
the color space of the device. We want to remain in the color space
defined by the color space of the soft mask or transparency group as
opposed to the device color space. Later, when we pop the softmask we will
collapse it to a single band and then compose with it to the device color
space (or the parent layer space). In the case where we pop an isolated
transparency group, we will do the blending in the proper color space and
then transform the data when we pop the group. Remember that only isolated
groups can have color spaces that are different than their parent.
Separation devices that have to maintain separate spot color planes need
special handling here */
parent_color_info->get_cmap_procs = NULL;
parent_color_info->parent_color_mapping_procs = NULL;
parent_color_info->parent_color_comp_index = NULL;
switch (group_color) {
case GRAY_SCALE:
new_polarity = GX_CINFO_POLARITY_ADDITIVE;
new_num_comps = 1;
pdevproto = (pdf14_device *)&gs_pdf14_Gray_device;
new_additive = true;
new_14procs = &gray_pdf14_procs;
comp_bits[0] = 8;
comp_shift[0] = 0;
break;
case DEVICE_RGB:
case CIE_XYZ:
new_polarity = GX_CINFO_POLARITY_ADDITIVE;
new_num_comps = 3;
pdevproto = (pdf14_device *)&gs_pdf14_RGB_device;
new_additive = true;
new_14procs = &rgb_pdf14_procs;
for (k = 0; k < 3; k++) {
comp_bits[k] = 8;
comp_shift[k] = (2 - k) * 8;
}
break;
case DEVICE_CMYK:
new_polarity = GX_CINFO_POLARITY_SUBTRACTIVE;
new_num_comps = 4;
pdevproto = (pdf14_device *)&gs_pdf14_CMYK_device;
new_additive = false;
/* This is needed due to the mismatched compressed encode decode
between the device procs and the pdf14 procs */
if (dev->color_info.num_components > 4){
new_14procs = &cmykspot_pdf14_procs;
} else {
new_14procs = &cmyk_pdf14_procs;
}
for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) {
comp_bits[k] = 8;
comp_shift[k] = (3 - k) * 8;
}
break;
case ICC:
/* If we are coming from the clist reader, then we need to get
the ICC data now */
if (iccprofile == NULL && pdev->pclist_device != NULL) {
/* Get the serialized data from the clist. Not the whole
profile. */
pcrdev = (gx_device_clist_reader *)(pdev->pclist_device);
iccprofile = gsicc_read_serial_icc((gx_device *) pcrdev,
icc_hashcode);
if (iccprofile == NULL)
return gs_throw(gs_error_unknownerror, "ICC data not found in clist");
/* Keep a pointer to the clist device */
iccprofile->dev = (gx_device *) pcrdev;
} else {
/* Go ahead and rc increment right now. This way when
we pop, we will make sure to decrement and avoid a
leak for the above profile that we just created */
if (iccprofile == NULL)
return gs_throw(gs_error_unknownerror, "ICC data unknown");
rc_increment(iccprofile);
}
new_num_comps = iccprofile->num_comps;
if (new_num_comps == 4) {
new_additive = false;
new_polarity = GX_CINFO_POLARITY_SUBTRACTIVE;
} else {
new_additive = true;
new_polarity = GX_CINFO_POLARITY_ADDITIVE;
}
switch (new_num_comps) {
case 1:
if (pdev->sep_device && !is_mask) {
pdevproto = (pdf14_device *)&gs_pdf14_Grayspot_device;
new_14procs = &grayspot_pdf14_procs;
} else {
pdevproto = (pdf14_device *)&gs_pdf14_Gray_device;
new_14procs = &gray_pdf14_procs;
}
comp_bits[0] = 8;
comp_shift[0] = 0;
break;
case 3:
if (pdev->sep_device) {
pdevproto = (pdf14_device *)&gs_pdf14_RGBspot_device;
new_14procs = &rgbspot_pdf14_procs;
}
else {
pdevproto = (pdf14_device *)&gs_pdf14_RGB_device;
new_14procs = &rgb_pdf14_procs;
}
for (k = 0; k < 3; k++) {
comp_bits[k] = 8;
comp_shift[k] = (2 - k) * 8;
}
break;
case 4:
if (pdev->sep_device) {
pdevproto = (pdf14_device *)&gs_pdf14_CMYKspot_device;
new_14procs = &cmykspot_pdf14_procs;
} else {
pdevproto = (pdf14_device *)&gs_pdf14_CMYK_device;
new_14procs = &cmyk_pdf14_procs;
}
for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) {
comp_bits[k] = 8;
comp_shift[k] = (3 - k) * 8;
}
break;
default:
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
break;
}
break;
default:
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
break;
}
if_debug2m('v', pdev->memory,
"[v]pdf14_update_device_color_procs,num_components_old = %d num_components_new = %d\n",
pdev->color_info.num_components,new_num_comps);
/* Save the old information */
parent_color_info->get_cmap_procs = pgs->get_cmap_procs;
parent_color_info->parent_color_mapping_procs =
pdev->procs.get_color_mapping_procs;
parent_color_info->parent_color_comp_index =
pdev->procs.get_color_comp_index;
parent_color_info->parent_blending_procs = pdev->blend_procs;
parent_color_info->polarity = pdev->color_info.polarity;
parent_color_info->num_components = pdev->color_info.num_components;
parent_color_info->isadditive = pdev->ctx->additive;
parent_color_info->unpack_procs = pdev->pdf14_procs;
parent_color_info->depth = pdev->color_info.depth;
parent_color_info->max_color = pdev->color_info.max_color;
parent_color_info->max_gray = pdev->color_info.max_gray;
parent_color_info->encode = pdev->procs.encode_color;
parent_color_info->decode = pdev->procs.decode_color;
memcpy(&(parent_color_info->comp_bits), &(pdev->color_info.comp_bits),
GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS);
memcpy(&(parent_color_info->comp_shift), &(pdev->color_info.comp_shift),
GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS);
/* Don't increment the space since we are going to remove it from the
ICC manager anyway. */
if (group_color == ICC && iccprofile != NULL) {
dev_proc(dev, get_profile)(dev, &dev_profile);
gsicc_extract_profile(GS_UNKNOWN_TAG, dev_profile,
&(parent_color_info->icc_profile), &render_cond);
}
/* Set new information */
/* If we are a sep device and this is not a softmask, ensure we maintain the
spot colorants and know how to index into them */
if (pdev->sep_device && !is_mask) {
int num_spots = parent_color_info->num_components -
parent_color_info->icc_profile->num_comps;
if (num_spots > 0) {
new_num_comps += num_spots;
for (k = 0; k < new_num_comps; k++) {
comp_bits[k] = 8;
comp_shift[k] = (new_num_comps - k - 1) * 8;
}
}
}
pdev->procs.get_color_mapping_procs =
pdevproto->static_procs->get_color_mapping_procs;
pdev->procs.get_color_comp_index =
pdevproto->static_procs->get_color_comp_index;
pdev->blend_procs = pdevproto->blend_procs;
pdev->color_info.polarity = new_polarity;
pdev->color_info.num_components = new_num_comps;
pdev->ctx->additive = new_additive;
pdev->pdf14_procs = new_14procs;
pdev->color_info.depth = new_num_comps * 8;
if (has_tags) {
pdev->color_info.depth += 8;
}
memset(&(pdev->color_info.comp_bits), 0, GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS);
memset(&(pdev->color_info.comp_shift), 0, GX_DEVICE_COLOR_MAX_COMPONENTS);
memcpy(&(pdev->color_info.comp_bits), comp_bits, 4);
memcpy(&(pdev->color_info.comp_shift), comp_shift, 4);
pdev->color_info.max_color = 255;
pdev->color_info.max_gray = 255;
/* If the CS was ICC based, we need to update the device ICC profile
in the ICC manager, since that is the profile that is used for the
PDF14 device */
if (group_color == ICC && iccprofile != NULL) {
/* iccprofile was incremented above if we had not just created it.
When we do the pop we will decrement and if we just created it, it
will be destroyed */
dev->icc_struct->device_profile[0] = iccprofile;
rc_increment(parent_color_info->icc_profile);
}
return 1; /* Lets us detect that we did do an update */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 13,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserPolicyConnector::InitializeDevicePolicy() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
device_cloud_policy_subsystem_.reset();
device_data_store_.reset();
CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDevicePolicy)) {
device_data_store_.reset(CloudPolicyDataStore::CreateForDevicePolicies());
chromeos::CryptohomeLibrary* cryptohome = NULL;
if (chromeos::CrosLibrary::Get()->EnsureLoaded())
cryptohome = chromeos::CrosLibrary::Get()->GetCryptohomeLibrary();
install_attributes_.reset(new EnterpriseInstallAttributes(cryptohome));
DevicePolicyCache* device_policy_cache =
new DevicePolicyCache(device_data_store_.get(),
install_attributes_.get());
managed_cloud_provider_->AppendCache(device_policy_cache);
recommended_cloud_provider_->AppendCache(device_policy_cache);
device_cloud_policy_subsystem_.reset(new CloudPolicySubsystem(
device_data_store_.get(),
device_policy_cache));
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(
&BrowserPolicyConnector::InitializeDevicePolicySubsystem));
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,735 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: data(const scoped_refptr<media::VideoFrame>& input) {
return media::mojom::VideoFrameDataPtr(MakeVideoFrameData(input));
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 149,526 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static uint64_t megasas_sgl_get_addr(MegasasCmd *cmd,
union mfi_sgl *sgl)
{
uint64_t addr;
if (megasas_frame_is_ieee_sgl(cmd)) {
addr = le64_to_cpu(sgl->sg_skinny->addr);
} else if (megasas_frame_is_sgl64(cmd)) {
addr = le64_to_cpu(sgl->sg64->addr);
} else {
addr = le32_to_cpu(sgl->sg32->addr);
}
return addr;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 10,477 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ti_vsend_sync(struct usb_device *dev, u8 request, u16 value,
u16 index, u8 *data, int size, int timeout)
{
int status;
status = usb_control_msg(dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev, 0), request,
(USB_TYPE_VENDOR | USB_RECIP_DEVICE | USB_DIR_OUT),
value, index, data, size, timeout);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (status != size) {
dev_dbg(&dev->dev, "%s - wanted to write %d, but only wrote %d\n",
__func__, size, status);
return -ECOMM;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191 | 0 | 66,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TIFFReadEXIFDirectory(TIFF* tif, toff_t diroff)
{
const TIFFFieldArray* exifFieldArray;
exifFieldArray = _TIFFGetExifFields();
return TIFFReadCustomDirectory(tif, diroff, exifFieldArray);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_dirread.c: modify ChopUpSingleUncompressedStrip() to
instanciate compute ntrips as TIFFhowmany_32(td->td_imagelength, rowsperstrip),
instead of a logic based on the total size of data. Which is faulty is
the total size of data is not sufficient to fill the whole image, and thus
results in reading outside of the StripByCounts/StripOffsets arrays when
using TIFFReadScanline().
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2608.
* libtiff/tif_strip.c: revert the change in TIFFNumberOfStrips() done
for http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2587 / CVE-2016-9273 since
the above change is a better fix that makes it unnecessary.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 70,206 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::SetVirtualTimePauser(
WebScopedVirtualTimePauser virtual_time_pauser) {
virtual_time_pauser_ = std::move(virtual_time_pauser);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int idx;
kvm_pmu_destroy(vcpu);
kfree(vcpu->arch.mce_banks);
kvm_free_lapic(vcpu);
idx = srcu_read_lock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu);
kvm_mmu_destroy(vcpu);
srcu_read_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->srcu, idx);
free_page((unsigned long)vcpu->arch.pio_data);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,749 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TestWebKitPlatformSupport::prefetchHostName(const WebKit::WebString&) {
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 108,637 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int get_vp9_frame_buffer(void *user_priv, size_t min_size,
vpx_codec_frame_buffer_t *fb) {
ExternalFrameBufferList *const fb_list =
reinterpret_cast<ExternalFrameBufferList*>(user_priv);
return fb_list->GetFreeFrameBuffer(min_size, fb);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,444 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void lodepng_encoder_settings_init(LodePNGEncoderSettings* settings)
{
lodepng_compress_settings_init(&settings->zlibsettings);
settings->filter_palette_zero = 1;
settings->filter_strategy = LFS_MINSUM;
settings->auto_convert = 1;
settings->force_palette = 0;
settings->predefined_filters = 0;
#ifdef LODEPNG_COMPILE_ANCILLARY_CHUNKS
settings->add_id = 0;
settings->text_compression = 1;
#endif /*LODEPNG_COMPILE_ANCILLARY_CHUNKS*/
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,545 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool WebContext::setDefaultVideoCaptureDeviceId(const QString& id) {
if (IsInitialized()) {
return MediaCaptureDevicesContext::Get(context_.get())
->SetDefaultVideoDeviceId(id.toStdString());
}
construct_props_->default_video_capture_device_id = id.toStdString();
client_->DefaultVideoCaptureDeviceChanged();
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 17,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xscale2pmu_write_int_enable(u32 val)
{
asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c4, c1, 0" : : "r" (val));
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,306 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SetTestMemoryLimits() {
BlobStorageLimits limits;
limits.max_ipc_memory_size = kTestBlobStorageIPCThresholdBytes;
limits.max_shared_memory_size = kTestBlobStorageMaxSharedMemoryBytes;
limits.max_blob_in_memory_space = kTestBlobStorageMaxBlobMemorySize;
limits.desired_max_disk_space = kTestBlobStorageMaxDiskSpace;
limits.effective_max_disk_space = kTestBlobStorageMaxDiskSpace;
limits.min_page_file_size = kTestBlobStorageMinFileSizeBytes;
limits.max_file_size = kTestBlobStorageMaxFileSizeBytes;
context_->mutable_memory_controller()->set_limits_for_testing(limits);
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 150,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void account_system_time(struct task_struct *p, int hardirq_offset,
cputime_t cputime, cputime_t cputime_scaled)
{
struct cpu_usage_stat *cpustat = &kstat_this_cpu.cpustat;
cputime64_t tmp;
if ((p->flags & PF_VCPU) && (irq_count() - hardirq_offset == 0)) {
account_guest_time(p, cputime, cputime_scaled);
return;
}
/* Add system time to process. */
p->stime = cputime_add(p->stime, cputime);
p->stimescaled = cputime_add(p->stimescaled, cputime_scaled);
account_group_system_time(p, cputime);
/* Add system time to cpustat. */
tmp = cputime_to_cputime64(cputime);
if (hardirq_count() - hardirq_offset)
cpustat->irq = cputime64_add(cpustat->irq, tmp);
else if (in_serving_softirq())
cpustat->softirq = cputime64_add(cpustat->softirq, tmp);
else
cpustat->system = cputime64_add(cpustat->system, tmp);
cpuacct_update_stats(p, CPUACCT_STAT_SYSTEM, cputime);
/* Account for system time used */
acct_update_integrals(p);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,328 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int process_backlog(struct napi_struct *napi, int quota)
{
struct softnet_data *sd = container_of(napi, struct softnet_data, backlog);
bool again = true;
int work = 0;
/* Check if we have pending ipi, its better to send them now,
* not waiting net_rx_action() end.
*/
if (sd_has_rps_ipi_waiting(sd)) {
local_irq_disable();
net_rps_action_and_irq_enable(sd);
}
napi->weight = dev_rx_weight;
while (again) {
struct sk_buff *skb;
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&sd->process_queue))) {
rcu_read_lock();
__netif_receive_skb(skb);
rcu_read_unlock();
input_queue_head_incr(sd);
if (++work >= quota)
return work;
}
local_irq_disable();
rps_lock(sd);
if (skb_queue_empty(&sd->input_pkt_queue)) {
/*
* Inline a custom version of __napi_complete().
* only current cpu owns and manipulates this napi,
* and NAPI_STATE_SCHED is the only possible flag set
* on backlog.
* We can use a plain write instead of clear_bit(),
* and we dont need an smp_mb() memory barrier.
*/
napi->state = 0;
again = false;
} else {
skb_queue_splice_tail_init(&sd->input_pkt_queue,
&sd->process_queue);
}
rps_unlock(sd);
local_irq_enable();
}
return work;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 93,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ip6mr_get_route(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, struct rtmsg *rtm,
u32 portid)
{
int err;
struct mr6_table *mrt;
struct mfc6_cache *cache;
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb);
mrt = ip6mr_get_table(net, RT6_TABLE_DFLT);
if (!mrt)
return -ENOENT;
read_lock(&mrt_lock);
cache = ip6mr_cache_find(mrt, &rt->rt6i_src.addr, &rt->rt6i_dst.addr);
if (!cache && skb->dev) {
int vif = ip6mr_find_vif(mrt, skb->dev);
if (vif >= 0)
cache = ip6mr_cache_find_any(mrt, &rt->rt6i_dst.addr,
vif);
}
if (!cache) {
struct sk_buff *skb2;
struct ipv6hdr *iph;
struct net_device *dev;
int vif;
dev = skb->dev;
if (!dev || (vif = ip6mr_find_vif(mrt, dev)) < 0) {
read_unlock(&mrt_lock);
return -ENODEV;
}
/* really correct? */
skb2 = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb2) {
read_unlock(&mrt_lock);
return -ENOMEM;
}
NETLINK_CB(skb2).portid = portid;
skb_reset_transport_header(skb2);
skb_put(skb2, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr));
skb_reset_network_header(skb2);
iph = ipv6_hdr(skb2);
iph->version = 0;
iph->priority = 0;
iph->flow_lbl[0] = 0;
iph->flow_lbl[1] = 0;
iph->flow_lbl[2] = 0;
iph->payload_len = 0;
iph->nexthdr = IPPROTO_NONE;
iph->hop_limit = 0;
iph->saddr = rt->rt6i_src.addr;
iph->daddr = rt->rt6i_dst.addr;
err = ip6mr_cache_unresolved(mrt, vif, skb2);
read_unlock(&mrt_lock);
return err;
}
if (rtm->rtm_flags & RTM_F_NOTIFY)
cache->mfc_flags |= MFC_NOTIFY;
err = __ip6mr_fill_mroute(mrt, skb, cache, rtm);
read_unlock(&mrt_lock);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: check sk sk_type and protocol early in ip_mroute_set/getsockopt
Commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr: various fixes and cleanups") fixed
the issue for ipv4 ipmr:
ip_mroute_setsockopt() & ip_mroute_getsockopt() should not
access/set raw_sk(sk)->ipmr_table before making sure the socket
is a raw socket, and protocol is IGMP
The same fix should be done for ipv6 ipmr as well.
This patch can fix the panic caused by overwriting the same offset
as ipmr_table as in raw_sk(sk) when accessing other type's socket
by ip_mroute_setsockopt().
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 93,531 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderView::LoadNavigationErrorPage(WebFrame* frame,
const WebURLRequest& failed_request,
const WebURLError& error,
const std::string& html,
bool replace) {
std::string alt_html = !html.empty() ? html :
content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->GetNavigationErrorHtml(
failed_request, error);
frame->loadHTMLString(alt_html,
GURL(chrome::kUnreachableWebDataURL),
error.unreachableURL,
replace);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,921 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline u32 netlink_hash(const void *data, u32 len, u32 seed)
{
const struct netlink_sock *nlk = data;
struct netlink_compare_arg arg;
netlink_compare_arg_init(&arg, sock_net(&nlk->sk), nlk->portid);
return jhash2((u32 *)&arg, netlink_compare_arg_len / sizeof(u32), seed);
}
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 47,750 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response ServiceWorkerHandler::Unregister(const std::string& scope_url) {
if (!enabled_)
return CreateDomainNotEnabledErrorResponse();
if (!context_)
return CreateContextErrorResponse();
context_->UnregisterServiceWorker(GURL(scope_url), base::Bind(&ResultNoOp));
return Response::OK();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xfs_attr_leaf_removename(xfs_da_args_t *args)
{
xfs_inode_t *dp;
struct xfs_buf *bp;
int error, committed, forkoff;
trace_xfs_attr_leaf_removename(args);
/*
* Remove the attribute.
*/
dp = args->dp;
args->blkno = 0;
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_read(args->trans, args->dp, args->blkno, -1, &bp);
if (error)
return error;
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_lookup_int(bp, args);
if (error == ENOATTR) {
xfs_trans_brelse(args->trans, bp);
return error;
}
xfs_attr3_leaf_remove(bp, args);
/*
* If the result is small enough, shrink it all into the inode.
*/
if ((forkoff = xfs_attr_shortform_allfit(bp, dp))) {
xfs_bmap_init(args->flist, args->firstblock);
error = xfs_attr3_leaf_to_shortform(bp, args, forkoff);
/* bp is gone due to xfs_da_shrink_inode */
if (!error) {
error = xfs_bmap_finish(&args->trans, args->flist,
&committed);
}
if (error) {
ASSERT(committed);
args->trans = NULL;
xfs_bmap_cancel(args->flist);
return error;
}
/*
* bmap_finish() may have committed the last trans and started
* a new one. We need the inode to be in all transactions.
*/
if (committed)
xfs_trans_ijoin(args->trans, dp, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: xfs: remote attribute overwrite causes transaction overrun
Commit e461fcb ("xfs: remote attribute lookups require the value
length") passes the remote attribute length in the xfs_da_args
structure on lookup so that CRC calculations and validity checking
can be performed correctly by related code. This, unfortunately has
the side effect of changing the args->valuelen parameter in cases
where it shouldn't.
That is, when we replace a remote attribute, the incoming
replacement stores the value and length in args->value and
args->valuelen, but then the lookup which finds the existing remote
attribute overwrites args->valuelen with the length of the remote
attribute being replaced. Hence when we go to create the new
attribute, we create it of the size of the existing remote
attribute, not the size it is supposed to be. When the new attribute
is much smaller than the old attribute, this results in a
transaction overrun and an ASSERT() failure on a debug kernel:
XFS: Assertion failed: tp->t_blk_res_used <= tp->t_blk_res, file: fs/xfs/xfs_trans.c, line: 331
Fix this by keeping the remote attribute value length separate to
the attribute value length in the xfs_da_args structure. The enables
us to pass the length of the remote attribute to be removed without
overwriting the new attribute's length.
Also, ensure that when we save remote block contexts for a later
rename we zero the original state variables so that we don't confuse
the state of the attribute to be removes with the state of the new
attribute that we just added. [Spotted by Brain Foster.]
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | 0 | 44,915 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int userfaultfd_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct userfaultfd_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
struct mm_struct *mm = ctx->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
/* len == 0 means wake all */
struct userfaultfd_wake_range range = { .len = 0, };
unsigned long new_flags;
WRITE_ONCE(ctx->released, true);
if (!mmget_not_zero(mm))
goto wakeup;
/*
* Flush page faults out of all CPUs. NOTE: all page faults
* must be retried without returning VM_FAULT_SIGBUS if
* userfaultfd_ctx_get() succeeds but vma->vma_userfault_ctx
* changes while handle_userfault released the mmap_sem. So
* it's critical that released is set to true (above), before
* taking the mmap_sem for writing.
*/
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
prev = NULL;
for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
cond_resched();
BUG_ON(!!vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx ^
!!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP)));
if (vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx != ctx) {
prev = vma;
continue;
}
new_flags = vma->vm_flags & ~(VM_UFFD_MISSING | VM_UFFD_WP);
prev = vma_merge(mm, prev, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
new_flags, vma->anon_vma,
vma->vm_file, vma->vm_pgoff,
vma_policy(vma),
NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX);
if (prev)
vma = prev;
else
prev = vma;
vma->vm_flags = new_flags;
vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx = NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX;
}
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
mmput(mm);
wakeup:
/*
* After no new page faults can wait on this fault_*wqh, flush
* the last page faults that may have been already waiting on
* the fault_*wqh.
*/
spin_lock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
__wake_up_locked_key(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh, TASK_NORMAL, &range);
__wake_up(&ctx->fault_wqh, TASK_NORMAL, 1, &range);
spin_unlock(&ctx->fault_pending_wqh.lock);
/* Flush pending events that may still wait on event_wqh */
wake_up_all(&ctx->event_wqh);
wake_up_poll(&ctx->fd_wqh, EPOLLHUP);
userfaultfd_ctx_put(ctx);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 169,688 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm_notify_sa(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct km_event *c)
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p;
struct xfrm_usersa_id *id;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int len = xfrm_sa_len(x);
int headlen, err;
headlen = sizeof(*p);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
len += nla_total_size(headlen);
headlen = sizeof(*id);
len += nla_total_size(sizeof(struct xfrm_mark));
}
len += NLMSG_ALIGN(headlen);
skb = nlmsg_new(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, c->pid, c->seq, c->event, headlen, 0);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (nlh == NULL)
goto out_free_skb;
p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
if (c->event == XFRM_MSG_DELSA) {
struct nlattr *attr;
id = nlmsg_data(nlh);
memcpy(&id->daddr, &x->id.daddr, sizeof(id->daddr));
id->spi = x->id.spi;
id->family = x->props.family;
id->proto = x->id.proto;
attr = nla_reserve(skb, XFRMA_SA, sizeof(*p));
err = -EMSGSIZE;
if (attr == NULL)
goto out_free_skb;
p = nla_data(attr);
}
err = copy_to_user_state_extra(x, p, skb);
if (err)
goto out_free_skb;
nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
return nlmsg_multicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, skb, 0, XFRMNLGRP_SA, GFP_ATOMIC);
out_free_skb:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
Commit Message: xfrm_user: return error pointer instead of NULL
When dump_one_state() returns an error, e.g. because of a too small
buffer to dump the whole xfrm state, xfrm_state_netlink() returns NULL
instead of an error pointer. But its callers expect an error pointer
and therefore continue to operate on a NULL skbuff.
This could lead to a privilege escalation (execution of user code in
kernel context) if the attacker has CAP_NET_ADMIN and is able to map
address 0.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Response TargetHandler::SetRemoteLocations(
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Array<Target::RemoteLocation>>) {
return Response::Error("Not supported");
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 148,674 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static NETJOIN_REC *netjoin_find(IRC_SERVER_REC *server, const char *nick)
{
NETJOIN_SERVER_REC *srec;
GSList *tmp;
g_return_val_if_fail(server != NULL, NULL);
g_return_val_if_fail(nick != NULL, NULL);
srec = netjoin_find_server(server);
if (srec == NULL) return NULL;
for (tmp = srec->netjoins; tmp != NULL; tmp = tmp->next) {
NETJOIN_REC *rec = tmp->data;
if (g_ascii_strcasecmp(rec->nick, nick) == 0)
return rec;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'netjoin-timeout' into 'master'
fe-netjoin: remove irc servers on "server disconnected" signal
Closes #7
See merge request !10
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 67,788 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void session_clear_tty(struct pid *session)
{
struct task_struct *p;
do_each_pid_task(session, PIDTYPE_SID, p) {
proc_clear_tty(p);
} while_each_pid_task(session, PIDTYPE_SID, p);
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 55,883 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rb_cpu_notify(struct notifier_block *self,
unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
{
struct ring_buffer *buffer =
container_of(self, struct ring_buffer, cpu_notify);
long cpu = (long)hcpu;
long nr_pages_same;
int cpu_i;
unsigned long nr_pages;
switch (action) {
case CPU_UP_PREPARE:
case CPU_UP_PREPARE_FROZEN:
if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask))
return NOTIFY_OK;
nr_pages = 0;
nr_pages_same = 1;
/* check if all cpu sizes are same */
for_each_buffer_cpu(buffer, cpu_i) {
/* fill in the size from first enabled cpu */
if (nr_pages == 0)
nr_pages = buffer->buffers[cpu_i]->nr_pages;
if (nr_pages != buffer->buffers[cpu_i]->nr_pages) {
nr_pages_same = 0;
break;
}
}
/* allocate minimum pages, user can later expand it */
if (!nr_pages_same)
nr_pages = 2;
buffer->buffers[cpu] =
rb_allocate_cpu_buffer(buffer, nr_pages, cpu);
if (!buffer->buffers[cpu]) {
WARN(1, "failed to allocate ring buffer on CPU %ld\n",
cpu);
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
smp_wmb();
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, buffer->cpumask);
break;
case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE:
case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE_FROZEN:
/*
* Do nothing.
* If we were to free the buffer, then the user would
* lose any trace that was in the buffer.
*/
break;
default:
break;
}
return NOTIFY_OK;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,525 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_write_disk_set_skip_file(struct archive *_a, int64_t d, int64_t i)
{
struct archive_write_disk *a = (struct archive_write_disk *)_a;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_DISK_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_ANY, "archive_write_disk_set_skip_file");
a->skip_file_set = 1;
a->skip_file_dev = d;
a->skip_file_ino = i;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Add ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS option
This fixes a directory traversal in the cpio tool.
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 43,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void DestroyImagePixelCache(Image *image)
{
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->cache == (void *) NULL)
return;
image->cache=DestroyPixelCache(image->cache);
}
Commit Message: Set pixel cache to undefined if any resource limit is exceeded
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,769 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::activeChainNodeDetached(Node* node)
{
if (!m_activeElement)
return;
if (node != m_activeElement && (!m_activeElement->isTextNode() || node != NodeRenderingTraversal::parent(m_activeElement.get())))
return;
Node* activeNode = NodeRenderingTraversal::parent(node);
while (activeNode && activeNode->isElementNode() && !activeNode->renderer())
activeNode = NodeRenderingTraversal::parent(activeNode);
m_activeElement = activeNode && activeNode->isElementNode() ? toElement(activeNode) : 0;
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,609 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int btrfs_check_dio_repairable(struct inode *inode,
struct bio *failed_bio,
struct io_failure_record *failrec,
int failed_mirror)
{
int num_copies;
num_copies = btrfs_num_copies(BTRFS_I(inode)->root->fs_info,
failrec->logical, failrec->len);
if (num_copies == 1) {
/*
* we only have a single copy of the data, so don't bother with
* all the retry and error correction code that follows. no
* matter what the error is, it is very likely to persist.
*/
pr_debug("Check DIO Repairable: cannot repair, num_copies=%d, next_mirror %d, failed_mirror %d\n",
num_copies, failrec->this_mirror, failed_mirror);
return 0;
}
failrec->failed_mirror = failed_mirror;
failrec->this_mirror++;
if (failrec->this_mirror == failed_mirror)
failrec->this_mirror++;
if (failrec->this_mirror > num_copies) {
pr_debug("Check DIO Repairable: (fail) num_copies=%d, next_mirror %d, failed_mirror %d\n",
num_copies, failrec->this_mirror, failed_mirror);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 41,619 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err AVC_HEVC_UpdateESD(GF_MPEGVisualSampleEntryBox *avc, GF_ESD *esd)
{
GF_BitRateBox *btrt = gf_isom_sample_entry_get_bitrate((GF_SampleEntryBox *)avc, GF_TRUE);
if (avc->descr) gf_isom_box_del((GF_Box *) avc->descr);
avc->descr = NULL;
btrt->avgBitrate = esd->decoderConfig->avgBitrate;
btrt->maxBitrate = esd->decoderConfig->maxBitrate;
btrt->bufferSizeDB = esd->decoderConfig->bufferSizeDB;
if (gf_list_count(esd->IPIDataSet)
|| gf_list_count(esd->IPMPDescriptorPointers)
|| esd->langDesc
|| gf_list_count(esd->extensionDescriptors)
|| esd->ipiPtr || esd->qos || esd->RegDescriptor) {
avc->descr = (GF_MPEG4ExtensionDescriptorsBox *)gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_M4DS);
if (esd->RegDescriptor) {
gf_list_add(avc->descr->descriptors, esd->RegDescriptor);
esd->RegDescriptor = NULL;
}
if (esd->qos) {
gf_list_add(avc->descr->descriptors, esd->qos);
esd->qos = NULL;
}
if (esd->ipiPtr) {
gf_list_add(avc->descr->descriptors, esd->ipiPtr);
esd->ipiPtr= NULL;
}
while (gf_list_count(esd->IPIDataSet)) {
GF_Descriptor *desc = (GF_Descriptor *)gf_list_get(esd->IPIDataSet, 0);
gf_list_rem(esd->IPIDataSet, 0);
gf_list_add(avc->descr->descriptors, desc);
}
while (gf_list_count(esd->IPMPDescriptorPointers)) {
GF_Descriptor *desc = (GF_Descriptor *)gf_list_get(esd->IPMPDescriptorPointers, 0);
gf_list_rem(esd->IPMPDescriptorPointers, 0);
gf_list_add(avc->descr->descriptors, desc);
}
if (esd->langDesc) {
gf_list_add(avc->descr->descriptors, esd->langDesc);
esd->langDesc = NULL;
}
while (gf_list_count(esd->extensionDescriptors)) {
GF_Descriptor *desc = (GF_Descriptor *)gf_list_get(esd->extensionDescriptors, 0);
gf_list_rem(esd->extensionDescriptors, 0);
gf_list_add(avc->descr->descriptors, desc);
}
}
if (!avc->lhvc_config && (esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication==GPAC_OTI_VIDEO_HEVC)) {
if (!avc->hevc_config) avc->hevc_config = (GF_HEVCConfigurationBox *)gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HVCC);
if (esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo && esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->data) {
if (avc->hevc_config->config) gf_odf_hevc_cfg_del(avc->hevc_config->config);
avc->hevc_config->config = gf_odf_hevc_cfg_read(esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->data, esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->dataLength, GF_FALSE);
}
}
else if (!avc->svc_config && !avc->mvc_config && (esd->decoderConfig->objectTypeIndication==GPAC_OTI_VIDEO_AVC)) {
if (!avc->avc_config) avc->avc_config = (GF_AVCConfigurationBox *)gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AVCC);
if (esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo && esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->data) {
if (avc->avc_config->config) gf_odf_avc_cfg_del(avc->avc_config->config);
avc->avc_config->config = gf_odf_avc_cfg_read(esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->data, esd->decoderConfig->decoderSpecificInfo->dataLength);
}
}
gf_odf_desc_del((GF_Descriptor *)esd);
if (avc->hevc_config) {
HEVC_RewriteESDescriptor(avc);
} else {
AVC_RewriteESDescriptor(avc);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fix some exploitable overflows (#994, #997)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 83,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_xattrcreate(void *opaque)
{
int flags;
int32_t fid;
int64_t size;
ssize_t err = 0;
V9fsString name;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsFidState *file_fidp;
V9fsFidState *xattr_fidp;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
v9fs_string_init(&name);
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dsqd", &fid, &name, &size, &flags);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
trace_v9fs_xattrcreate(pdu->tag, pdu->id, fid, name.data, size, flags);
file_fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (file_fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
/* Make the file fid point to xattr */
xattr_fidp = file_fidp;
xattr_fidp->fid_type = P9_FID_XATTR;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.copied_len = 0;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.len = size;
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.flags = flags;
v9fs_string_init(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name);
v9fs_string_copy(&xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.name, &name);
xattr_fidp->fs.xattr.value = g_malloc(size);
err = offset;
put_fid(pdu, file_fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
v9fs_string_free(&name);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 164,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_init(codec_t *ps_codec)
{
WORD32 status = IV_SUCCESS;
WORD32 i;
/* Free any dynamic buffers that are allocated */
ihevcd_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_codec);
ps_codec->u4_allocate_dynamic_done = 0;
ps_codec->i4_num_disp_bufs = 1;
ps_codec->i4_flush_mode = 0;
ps_codec->i4_ht = ps_codec->i4_disp_ht = 0;
ps_codec->i4_wd = ps_codec->i4_disp_wd = 0;
ps_codec->i4_strd = 0;
ps_codec->i4_disp_strd = 0;
ps_codec->i4_num_cores = 1;
ps_codec->u4_pic_cnt = 0;
ps_codec->u4_disp_cnt = 0;
ps_codec->i4_header_mode = 0;
ps_codec->i4_header_in_slice_mode = 0;
ps_codec->i4_sps_done = 0;
ps_codec->i4_pps_done = 0;
ps_codec->i4_init_done = 1;
ps_codec->i4_first_pic_done = 0;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_first_pic_init = 0;
ps_codec->i4_error_code = 0;
ps_codec->i4_reset_flag = 0;
ps_codec->i4_cra_as_first_pic = 1;
ps_codec->i4_rasl_output_flag = 0;
ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_msb = 0;
ps_codec->i4_prev_poc_lsb = -1;
ps_codec->i4_max_prev_poc_lsb = -1;
ps_codec->s_parse.i4_abs_pic_order_cnt = -1;
/* Set ref chroma format by default to 420SP UV interleaved */
ps_codec->e_ref_chroma_fmt = IV_YUV_420SP_UV;
/* If the codec is in shared mode and required format is 420 SP VU interleaved then change
* reference buffers chroma format
*/
if(IV_YUV_420SP_VU == ps_codec->e_chroma_fmt)
{
ps_codec->e_ref_chroma_fmt = IV_YUV_420SP_VU;
}
ps_codec->i4_disable_deblk_pic = 0;
ps_codec->i4_degrade_pic_cnt = 0;
ps_codec->i4_degrade_pics = 0;
ps_codec->i4_degrade_type = 0;
ps_codec->i4_disable_sao_pic = 0;
ps_codec->i4_fullpel_inter_pred = 0;
ps_codec->u4_enable_fmt_conv_ahead = 0;
ps_codec->i4_share_disp_buf_cnt = 0;
{
sps_t *ps_sps = ps_codec->ps_sps_base;
pps_t *ps_pps = ps_codec->ps_pps_base;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_SPS_CNT; i++)
{
ps_sps->i1_sps_valid = 0;
ps_sps++;
}
for(i = 0; i < MAX_PPS_CNT; i++)
{
ps_pps->i1_pps_valid = 0;
ps_pps++;
}
}
ihevcd_set_default_params(ps_codec);
/* Initialize MV Bank buffer manager */
ihevc_buf_mgr_init((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_mv_buf_mgr);
/* Initialize Picture buffer manager */
ihevc_buf_mgr_init((buf_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_mgr);
ps_codec->ps_pic_buf = (pic_buf_t *)ps_codec->pv_pic_buf_base;
memset(ps_codec->ps_pic_buf, 0, BUF_MGR_MAX_CNT * sizeof(pic_buf_t));
/* Initialize display buffer manager */
ihevc_disp_mgr_init((disp_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_disp_buf_mgr);
/* Initialize dpb manager */
ihevc_dpb_mgr_init((dpb_mgr_t *)ps_codec->pv_dpb_mgr);
ps_codec->e_processor_soc = SOC_GENERIC;
/* The following can be over-ridden using soc parameter as a hack */
ps_codec->u4_nctb = 0x7FFFFFFF;
ihevcd_init_arch(ps_codec);
ihevcd_init_function_ptr(ps_codec);
ihevcd_update_function_ptr(ps_codec);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
CWE ID: CWE-770 | 0 | 163,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kick_delayed_jobs(tube t, unsigned int n)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; (i < n) && kick_delayed_job(t); ++i);
return i;
}
Commit Message: Discard job body bytes if the job is too big.
Previously, a malicious user could craft a job payload and inject
beanstalk commands without the client application knowing. (An
extra-careful client library could check the size of the job body before
sending the put command, but most libraries do not do this, nor should
they have to.)
Reported by Graham Barr.
CWE ID: | 0 | 18,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _gcry_cipher_gcm_setiv (gcry_cipher_hd_t c, const byte *iv, size_t ivlen)
{
c->marks.iv = 0;
c->marks.tag = 0;
c->u_mode.gcm.disallow_encryption_because_of_setiv_in_fips_mode = 0;
if (fips_mode ())
{
/* Direct invocation of GCM setiv in FIPS mode disables encryption. */
c->u_mode.gcm.disallow_encryption_because_of_setiv_in_fips_mode = 1;
}
return _gcry_cipher_gcm_initiv (c, iv, ivlen);
}
Commit Message: GCM: move look-up table to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
(gcmR): Move to 'gcm_table' structure.
(gcm_table): New structure for look-up table with counters before and
after.
(gcmR): New macro.
(prefetch_table): Handle input with length not multiple of 256.
(do_prefetch_tables): Modify pre- and post-table counters to unshare
look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 89,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_delete_gap_frm_mmco(dpb_manager_t *ps_dpb_mgr,
WORD32 i4_frame_num,
UWORD8 *pu1_del_node)
{
WORD8 i, j;
WORD32 *pi4_start, *pi4_end;
WORD32 i4_start_frm_num, i4_end_frm_num, i4_max_frm_num;
/* find the least frame num from gaps and current DPB node */
/* Delete the gaps */
*pu1_del_node = 1;
pi4_start = ps_dpb_mgr->ai4_gaps_start_frm_num;
pi4_end = ps_dpb_mgr->ai4_gaps_end_frm_num;
i4_max_frm_num = ps_dpb_mgr->i4_max_frm_num;
if(0 == ps_dpb_mgr->u1_num_gaps)
return OK;
if(i4_frame_num < 0)
i4_frame_num += i4_max_frm_num;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_FRAMES; i++)
{
i4_start_frm_num = pi4_start[i];
if(i4_start_frm_num < 0)
i4_start_frm_num += i4_max_frm_num;
if(INVALID_FRAME_NUM != i4_start_frm_num)
{
i4_end_frm_num = pi4_end[i];
if(i4_end_frm_num < 0)
i4_end_frm_num += i4_max_frm_num;
if((i4_frame_num >= i4_start_frm_num)
&& (i4_frame_num <= i4_end_frm_num))
{
break;
}
else
{
if(((i4_frame_num + i4_max_frm_num) >= i4_start_frm_num)
&& ((i4_frame_num + i4_max_frm_num)
<= i4_end_frm_num))
{
UWORD32 i4_error_code;
i4_error_code = ERROR_DBP_MANAGER_T;
return i4_error_code;
}
}
}
}
/* find frame_num index, in the poc_map which needs to be deleted */
for(j = 0; j < MAX_FRAMES; j++)
{
if(i4_frame_num == ps_dpb_mgr->ai4_poc_buf_id_map[j][2])
break;
}
if(MAX_FRAMES != i)
{
if(j == MAX_FRAMES)
{
UWORD32 i4_error_code;
i4_error_code = ERROR_DBP_MANAGER_T;
return i4_error_code;
}
ps_dpb_mgr->ai4_poc_buf_id_map[j][0] = -1;
ps_dpb_mgr->ai4_poc_buf_id_map[j][1] = 0x7fffffff;
ps_dpb_mgr->ai4_poc_buf_id_map[j][2] = GAP_FRAME_NUM;
ps_dpb_mgr->i1_gaps_deleted++;
ps_dpb_mgr->ai1_gaps_per_seq[i]--;
ps_dpb_mgr->u1_num_gaps--;
*pu1_del_node = 0;
if(0 == ps_dpb_mgr->ai1_gaps_per_seq[i])
{
ps_dpb_mgr->ai4_gaps_start_frm_num[i] = INVALID_FRAME_NUM;
ps_dpb_mgr->ai4_gaps_end_frm_num[i] = 0;
}
}
else
{
UWORD32 i4_error_code;
i4_error_code = ERROR_DBP_MANAGER_T;
return i4_error_code;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Return error when there are more mmco params than allocated size
Bug: 25818142
Change-Id: I5c1b23985eeca5192b42703c627ca3d060e4e13d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,501 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jboolean WebContentsAndroid::IsShowingInterstitialPage(JNIEnv* env,
jobject obj) {
return web_contents_->ShowingInterstitialPage();
}
Commit Message: Revert "Load web contents after tab is created."
This reverts commit 4c55f398def3214369aefa9f2f2e8f5940d3799d.
BUG=432562
TBR=tedchoc@chromium.org,jbudorick@chromium.org,sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/894003005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#314469}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PasswordAutofillManager::DidSelectSuggestion(const base::string16& value,
int identifier) {
ClearPreviewedForm();
if (identifier == autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_HTTP_NOT_SECURE_WARNING_MESSAGE ||
identifier == autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_ALL_SAVED_PASSWORDS_ENTRY ||
identifier == autofill::POPUP_ITEM_ID_GENERATE_PASSWORD_ENTRY)
return;
bool success =
PreviewSuggestion(form_data_key_, GetUsernameFromSuggestion(value));
DCHECK(success);
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,595 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MD5_Final(unsigned char digest[16], MD5_CTX *ctx) {
unsigned count;
unsigned char *p;
uint32_t *a;
count = (ctx->bits[0] >> 3) & 0x3F;
p = ctx->in + count;
*p++ = 0x80;
count = 64 - 1 - count;
if (count < 8) {
memset(p, 0, count);
byteReverse(ctx->in, 16);
MD5Transform(ctx->buf, (uint32_t *) ctx->in);
memset(ctx->in, 0, 56);
} else {
memset(p, 0, count - 8);
}
byteReverse(ctx->in, 14);
a = (uint32_t *) ctx->in;
a[14] = ctx->bits[0];
a[15] = ctx->bits[1];
MD5Transform(ctx->buf, (uint32_t *) ctx->in);
byteReverse((unsigned char *) ctx->buf, 4);
memcpy(digest, ctx->buf, 16);
memset((char *) ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in multipart handling
Close cesanta/dev#6974
PUBLISHED_FROM=4d4e4a46eceba10aec8dacb7f8f58bd078c92307
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 67,800 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool credtype_match(git_http_auth_scheme *scheme, void *data)
{
unsigned int credtype = *(unsigned int *)data;
return !!(scheme->credtypes & credtype);
}
Commit Message: http: check certificate validity before clobbering the error variable
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 71,319 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void print_ip_ins(const char *fmt, unsigned char *p)
{
int i;
printk(KERN_CONT "%s", fmt);
for (i = 0; i < MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE; i++)
printk(KERN_CONT "%s%02x", i ? ":" : "", p[i]);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 30,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void runtimeEnabledVoidMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::runtimeEnabledVoidMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void InputConnectionImpl::CommitText(const base::string16& text,
int new_cursor_pos) {
StartStateUpdateTimer();
std::string error;
if (!ime_engine_->ClearComposition(input_context_id_, &error))
LOG(ERROR) << "ClearComposition failed: error=\"" << error << "\"";
if (IsControlChar(text)) {
SendControlKeyEvent(text);
return;
}
if (!ime_engine_->CommitText(input_context_id_,
base::UTF16ToUTF8(text).c_str(), &error))
LOG(ERROR) << "CommitText failed: error=\"" << error << "\"";
}
Commit Message: Clear |composing_text_| after CommitText() is called.
|composing_text_| of InputConnectionImpl should be cleared after
CommitText() is called. Otherwise, FinishComposingText() will commit the
same text twice.
Bug: 899736
Test: unit_tests
Change-Id: Idb22d968ffe95d946789fbe62454e8e79cb0b384
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1304773
Commit-Queue: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yusuke Sato <yusukes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#603518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 173,333 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int tun_flags(struct tun_struct *tun)
{
int flags = 0;
if (tun->flags & TUN_TUN_DEV)
flags |= IFF_TUN;
else
flags |= IFF_TAP;
if (tun->flags & TUN_NO_PI)
flags |= IFF_NO_PI;
if (tun->flags & TUN_ONE_QUEUE)
flags |= IFF_ONE_QUEUE;
if (tun->flags & TUN_VNET_HDR)
flags |= IFF_VNET_HDR;
return flags;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,854 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int save_dev(blkid_dev dev, FILE *file)
{
struct list_head *p;
if (!dev || dev->bid_name[0] != '/')
return 0;
DBG(SAVE, ul_debug("device %s, type %s", dev->bid_name, dev->bid_type ?
dev->bid_type : "(null)"));
fprintf(file, "<device DEVNO=\"0x%04lx\" TIME=\"%ld.%ld\"",
(unsigned long) dev->bid_devno,
(long) dev->bid_time,
(long) dev->bid_utime);
if (dev->bid_pri)
fprintf(file, " PRI=\"%d\"", dev->bid_pri);
list_for_each(p, &dev->bid_tags) {
blkid_tag tag = list_entry(p, struct blkid_struct_tag, bit_tags);
fprintf(file, " %s=\"%s\"", tag->bit_name,tag->bit_val);
}
fprintf(file, ">%s</device>\n", dev->bid_name);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | 1 | 168,910 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType IsBlobTemporary(const Image *image)
{
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
return(image->blob->temporary);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,530 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const char* PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::StateName() const {
if (scheduled_raster_task_count_)
return "rasterizing";
if (PendingRasterTaskCount())
return "throttled";
if (!tasks_with_pending_upload_.empty())
return "waiting_for_uploads";
return "finishing";
}
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 112,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned generateFixedLitLenTree(HuffmanTree* tree)
{
unsigned i, error = 0;
unsigned* bitlen = (unsigned*)calloc(NUM_DEFLATE_CODE_SYMBOLS, sizeof(unsigned));
if(!bitlen) return 83; /*alloc fail*/
/*288 possible codes: 0-255=literals, 256=endcode, 257-285=lengthcodes, 286-287=unused*/
for(i = 0; i <= 143; i++) bitlen[i] = 8;
for(i = 144; i <= 255; i++) bitlen[i] = 9;
for(i = 256; i <= 279; i++) bitlen[i] = 7;
for(i = 280; i <= 287; i++) bitlen[i] = 8;
error = HuffmanTree_makeFromLengths(tree, bitlen, NUM_DEFLATE_CODE_SYMBOLS, 15);
free(bitlen);
return error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,482 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void reset()
{
m_didScrollMainFrame = false;
m_wasProgrammaticScroll = false;
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,279 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::CloseFrameAfterDragSession() {
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_LINUX)
MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, method_factory_.NewRunnableMethod(&Browser::CloseFrame));
#endif
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,203 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int GetWindowId(base::DictionaryValue* window) {
int id = kUndefinedId;
if (window)
window->GetInteger(keys::kIdKey, &id);
return id;
}
Commit Message: Change TemporaryAddressSpoof test to not depend on PDF OpenActions.
OpenActions that navigate to URIs are going to be blocked when
https://pdfium-review.googlesource.com/c/pdfium/+/42731 relands.
It was reverted because this test was breaking and blocking the
pdfium roll into chromium.
The test will now click on a link in the PDF that navigates to the
URI.
Bug: 851821
Change-Id: I49853e99de7b989858b1962ad4a92a4168d4c2db
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1244367
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <hnakashima@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#596011}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 144,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZSTD_CDict* ZSTD_createCDict_advanced(const void* dictBuffer, size_t dictSize,
ZSTD_dictLoadMethod_e dictLoadMethod,
ZSTD_dictContentType_e dictContentType,
ZSTD_compressionParameters cParams, ZSTD_customMem customMem)
{
DEBUGLOG(3, "ZSTD_createCDict_advanced, mode %u", (U32)dictContentType);
if (!customMem.customAlloc ^ !customMem.customFree) return NULL;
{ ZSTD_CDict* const cdict = (ZSTD_CDict*)ZSTD_malloc(sizeof(ZSTD_CDict), customMem);
size_t const workspaceSize = HUF_WORKSPACE_SIZE + ZSTD_sizeof_matchState(&cParams, /* forCCtx */ 0);
void* const workspace = ZSTD_malloc(workspaceSize, customMem);
if (!cdict || !workspace) {
ZSTD_free(cdict, customMem);
ZSTD_free(workspace, customMem);
return NULL;
}
cdict->customMem = customMem;
cdict->workspace = workspace;
cdict->workspaceSize = workspaceSize;
if (ZSTD_isError( ZSTD_initCDict_internal(cdict,
dictBuffer, dictSize,
dictLoadMethod, dictContentType,
cParams) )) {
ZSTD_freeCDict(cdict);
return NULL;
}
return cdict;
}
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void net_inc_ingress_queue(void)
{
static_key_slow_inc(&ingress_needed);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 48,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int jpc_ppm_putparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jpc_ppm_t *ppm = &ms->parms.ppm;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
cstate = 0;
if (JAS_CAST(uint, jas_stream_write(out, (char *) ppm->data, ppm->len)) != ppm->len) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 1 | 168,718 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int asepcos_get_current_df_path(sc_card_t *card, sc_path_t *path)
{
int r;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 rbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE];
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xca, 0x01, 0x83);
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.resplen = sizeof(rbuf);
apdu.le = 256;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
SC_TEST_RET(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r, "APDU transmit failed");
if (apdu.sw1 != 0x90 || apdu.sw2 != 0x00)
return sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
return asepcos_tlvpath_to_scpath(path, apdu.resp, apdu.resplen);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,160 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GpuChannelHost::MessageFilter::OnMessageReceived(
const IPC::Message& message) {
DCHECK(parent_->factory_->IsIOThread());
if (message.is_reply())
return false;
DCHECK(message.routing_id() != MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL);
ListenerMap::iterator it = listeners_.find(message.routing_id());
if (it != listeners_.end()) {
const GpuListenerInfo& info = it->second;
info.loop->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
base::IgnoreResult(&IPC::Channel::Listener::OnMessageReceived),
info.listener,
message));
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,759 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutofillPopupSuggestionView* AutofillPopupSuggestionView::Create(
AutofillPopupViewNativeViews* popup_view,
int line_number,
int frontend_id) {
AutofillPopupSuggestionView* result =
new AutofillPopupSuggestionView(popup_view, line_number, frontend_id);
result->Init();
return result;
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,532 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::deleteTexture(WebGLTexture* texture) {
if (!DeleteObject(texture))
return;
int max_bound_texture_index = -1;
for (wtf_size_t i = 0; i < one_plus_max_non_default_texture_unit_; ++i) {
if (texture == texture_units_[i].texture2d_binding_) {
texture_units_[i].texture2d_binding_ = nullptr;
max_bound_texture_index = i;
}
if (texture == texture_units_[i].texture_cube_map_binding_) {
texture_units_[i].texture_cube_map_binding_ = nullptr;
max_bound_texture_index = i;
}
if (IsWebGL2OrHigher()) {
if (texture == texture_units_[i].texture3d_binding_) {
texture_units_[i].texture3d_binding_ = nullptr;
max_bound_texture_index = i;
}
if (texture == texture_units_[i].texture2d_array_binding_) {
texture_units_[i].texture2d_array_binding_ = nullptr;
max_bound_texture_index = i;
}
}
}
if (framebuffer_binding_)
framebuffer_binding_->RemoveAttachmentFromBoundFramebuffer(GL_FRAMEBUFFER,
texture);
if (GetFramebufferBinding(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER))
GetFramebufferBinding(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER)
->RemoveAttachmentFromBoundFramebuffer(GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER, texture);
if (one_plus_max_non_default_texture_unit_ ==
static_cast<wtf_size_t>(max_bound_texture_index + 1)) {
FindNewMaxNonDefaultTextureUnit();
}
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,332 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AXNodeObject::updateAccessibilityRole() {
bool ignoredStatus = accessibilityIsIgnored();
m_role = determineAccessibilityRole();
if (ignoredStatus != accessibilityIsIgnored())
childrenChanged();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,216 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: TestDidCreateFrameWebFrameClient() : m_frameCount(0), m_parent(0)
{
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,249 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smp_fetch_url(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct http_txn *txn = l7;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
smp->type = SMP_T_STR;
smp->data.str.len = txn->req.sl.rq.u_l;
smp->data.str.str = txn->req.chn->buf->p + txn->req.sl.rq.u;
smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_1ST | SMP_F_CONST;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 9,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AutofillPopupChildView* AutofillPopupViewViews::GetChildRow(
size_t child_index) const {
DCHECK_LT(child_index, static_cast<size_t>(child_count()));
return static_cast<AutofillPopupChildView*>(
const_cast<views::View*>(child_at(child_index)));
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 130,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct mount *__lookup_mnt(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct hlist_head *head = m_hash(mnt, dentry);
struct mount *p;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(p, head, mnt_hash)
if (&p->mnt_parent->mnt == mnt && p->mnt_mountpoint == dentry)
return p;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Correct permission checks in do_remount
While invesgiating the issue where in "mount --bind -oremount,ro ..."
would result in later "mount --bind -oremount,rw" succeeding even if
the mount started off locked I realized that there are several
additional mount flags that should be locked and are not.
In particular MNT_NOSUID, MNT_NODEV, MNT_NOEXEC, and the atime
flags in addition to MNT_READONLY should all be locked. These
flags are all per superblock, can all be changed with MS_BIND,
and should not be changable if set by a more privileged user.
The following additions to the current logic are added in this patch.
- nosuid may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- nodev may not be clearable by a less privielged user.
- noexec may not be clearable by a less privileged user.
- atime flags may not be changeable by a less privileged user.
The logic with atime is that always setting atime on access is a
global policy and backup software and auditing software could break if
atime bits are not updated (when they are configured to be updated),
and serious performance degradation could result (DOS attack) if atime
updates happen when they have been explicitly disabled. Therefore an
unprivileged user should not be able to mess with the atime bits set
by a more privileged user.
The additional restrictions are implemented with the addition of
MNT_LOCK_NOSUID, MNT_LOCK_NODEV, MNT_LOCK_NOEXEC, and MNT_LOCK_ATIME
mnt flags.
Taken together these changes and the fixes for MNT_LOCK_READONLY
should make it safe for an unprivileged user to create a user
namespace and to call "mount --bind -o remount,... ..." without
the danger of mount flags being changed maliciously.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mcs_send_dpu(unsigned short reason)
{
STREAM s, contents;
logger(Protocol, Debug, "mcs_send_dpu(), reason=%d", reason);
contents = malloc(sizeof(struct stream));
memset(contents, 0, sizeof(struct stream));
s_realloc(contents, 6);
s_reset(contents);
ber_out_integer(contents, reason); /* Reason */
ber_out_sequence(contents, NULL); /* SEQUENCE OF NonStandradParameters OPTIONAL */
s_mark_end(contents);
s = iso_init(8);
ber_out_sequence(s, contents);
s_free(contents);
s_mark_end(s);
iso_send(s);
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 92,955 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PostScript_MetaHandler::FindLastPacket()
{
size_t bufPos, bufLen;
XMP_IO* fileRef = this->parent->ioRef;
XMP_Int64 fileLen = fileRef->Length();
XMP_PacketInfo & packetInfo = this->packetInfo;
XMPScanner scanner ( fileLen );
enum { kBufferSize = 64*1024 };
XMP_Uns8 buffer [kBufferSize];
XMP_AbortProc abortProc = this->parent->abortProc;
void * abortArg = this->parent->abortArg;
const bool checkAbort = (abortProc != 0);
fileRef->Rewind(); // Seek back to the beginning of the file.
for ( bufPos = 0; bufPos < (size_t)fileLen; bufPos += bufLen )
{
if ( checkAbort && abortProc(abortArg) )
{
XMP_Throw ( "PostScript_MetaHandler::FindLastPacket - User abort", kXMPErr_UserAbort );
}
bufLen = fileRef->Read ( buffer, kBufferSize );
if ( bufLen == 0 ) XMP_Throw ( "PostScript_MetaHandler::FindLastPacket: Read failure", kXMPErr_ExternalFailure );
scanner.Scan ( buffer, bufPos, bufLen );
}
int snipCount = scanner.GetSnipCount();
XMPScanner::SnipInfoVector snips ( snipCount );
scanner.Report ( snips );
bool lastfound=false;
for ( int i = 0; i < snipCount; ++i )
{
if ( snips[i].fState == XMPScanner::eValidPacketSnip )
{
if (!lastfound)
{
if ( snips[i].fLength > 0x7FFFFFFF ) XMP_Throw ( "PostScript_MetaHandler::FindLastPacket: Oversize packet", kXMPErr_BadXMP );
packetInfo.offset = snips[i].fOffset;
packetInfo.length = (XMP_Int32)snips[i].fLength;
packetInfo.charForm = snips[i].fCharForm;
packetInfo.writeable = (snips[i].fAccess == 'w');
firstPacketInfo=packetInfo;
lastPacketInfo=packetInfo;
lastfound=true;
}
else
{
lastPacketInfo.offset = snips[i].fOffset;
lastPacketInfo.length = (XMP_Int32)snips[i].fLength;
lastPacketInfo.charForm = snips[i].fCharForm;
lastPacketInfo.writeable = (snips[i].fAccess == 'w');
packetInfo=lastPacketInfo;
}
}
}
return lastfound;
} // PostScript_MetaHandler::FindLastPacket
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 9,969 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: radeon_atombios_encoder_dpms_scratch_regs(struct drm_encoder *encoder, bool on)
{
struct drm_device *dev = encoder->dev;
struct radeon_device *rdev = dev->dev_private;
struct radeon_encoder *radeon_encoder = to_radeon_encoder(encoder);
uint32_t bios_2_scratch;
if (rdev->family >= CHIP_R600)
bios_2_scratch = RREG32(R600_BIOS_2_SCRATCH);
else
bios_2_scratch = RREG32(RADEON_BIOS_2_SCRATCH);
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_TV1_SUPPORT) {
if (on)
bios_2_scratch &= ~ATOM_S2_TV1_DPMS_STATE;
else
bios_2_scratch |= ATOM_S2_TV1_DPMS_STATE;
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_CV_SUPPORT) {
if (on)
bios_2_scratch &= ~ATOM_S2_CV_DPMS_STATE;
else
bios_2_scratch |= ATOM_S2_CV_DPMS_STATE;
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_CRT1_SUPPORT) {
if (on)
bios_2_scratch &= ~ATOM_S2_CRT1_DPMS_STATE;
else
bios_2_scratch |= ATOM_S2_CRT1_DPMS_STATE;
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_CRT2_SUPPORT) {
if (on)
bios_2_scratch &= ~ATOM_S2_CRT2_DPMS_STATE;
else
bios_2_scratch |= ATOM_S2_CRT2_DPMS_STATE;
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_LCD1_SUPPORT) {
if (on)
bios_2_scratch &= ~ATOM_S2_LCD1_DPMS_STATE;
else
bios_2_scratch |= ATOM_S2_LCD1_DPMS_STATE;
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_DFP1_SUPPORT) {
if (on)
bios_2_scratch &= ~ATOM_S2_DFP1_DPMS_STATE;
else
bios_2_scratch |= ATOM_S2_DFP1_DPMS_STATE;
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_DFP2_SUPPORT) {
if (on)
bios_2_scratch &= ~ATOM_S2_DFP2_DPMS_STATE;
else
bios_2_scratch |= ATOM_S2_DFP2_DPMS_STATE;
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_DFP3_SUPPORT) {
if (on)
bios_2_scratch &= ~ATOM_S2_DFP3_DPMS_STATE;
else
bios_2_scratch |= ATOM_S2_DFP3_DPMS_STATE;
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_DFP4_SUPPORT) {
if (on)
bios_2_scratch &= ~ATOM_S2_DFP4_DPMS_STATE;
else
bios_2_scratch |= ATOM_S2_DFP4_DPMS_STATE;
}
if (radeon_encoder->devices & ATOM_DEVICE_DFP5_SUPPORT) {
if (on)
bios_2_scratch &= ~ATOM_S2_DFP5_DPMS_STATE;
else
bios_2_scratch |= ATOM_S2_DFP5_DPMS_STATE;
}
if (rdev->family >= CHIP_R600)
WREG32(R600_BIOS_2_SCRATCH, bios_2_scratch);
else
WREG32(RADEON_BIOS_2_SCRATCH, bios_2_scratch);
}
Commit Message: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_atombios.c: range check issues
This change makes the array larger, "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING_V1_2" is 3
and the original size "MAX_SUPPORTED_TV_TIMING" is 2.
Also there were checks that were off by one.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexdeucher@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 94,192 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void mdiobus_free(struct mii_bus *bus)
{
/* For compatibility with error handling in drivers. */
if (bus->state == MDIOBUS_ALLOCATED) {
kfree(bus);
return;
}
BUG_ON(bus->state != MDIOBUS_UNREGISTERED);
bus->state = MDIOBUS_RELEASED;
put_device(&bus->dev);
}
Commit Message: mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init,
commit 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call
put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device()
while device_register() fails,give up the last reference
to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed
,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free
be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails.
use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch
revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524
CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
__mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 89,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int php_zip_status(struct zip *za) /* {{{ */
{
#if LIBZIP_VERSION_MAJOR < 1
int zep, syp;
zip_error_get(za, &zep, &syp);
#else
int zep;
zip_error_t *err;
err = zip_get_error(za);
zep = zip_error_code_zip(err);
zip_error_fini(err);
#endif
return zep;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom*
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 54,438 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ipv6_chk_home_addr(struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *addr)
{
int ret = 0;
struct inet6_ifaddr *ifp = NULL;
unsigned int hash = inet6_addr_hash(addr);
rcu_read_lock_bh();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(ifp, &inet6_addr_lst[hash], addr_lst) {
if (!net_eq(dev_net(ifp->idev->dev), net))
continue;
if (ipv6_addr_equal(&ifp->addr, addr) &&
(ifp->flags & IFA_F_HOMEADDRESS)) {
ret = 1;
break;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OfflinePageModelTaskified::DeleteCachedPagesByURLPredicate(
const UrlPredicate& predicate,
const DeletePageCallback& callback) {
auto task = DeletePageTask::CreateTaskMatchingUrlPredicateForCachedPages(
store_.get(),
base::BindOnce(&OfflinePageModelTaskified::OnDeleteDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), callback),
policy_controller_.get(), predicate);
task_queue_.AddTask(std::move(task));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 155,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WriteDataFormat(SAVESTREAM* fp, cmsIT8* it8)
{
int i, nSamples;
TABLE* t = GetTable(it8);
if (!t -> DataFormat) return;
WriteStr(fp, "BEGIN_DATA_FORMAT\n");
WriteStr(fp, " ");
nSamples = atoi(cmsIT8GetProperty(it8, "NUMBER_OF_FIELDS"));
for (i = 0; i < nSamples; i++) {
WriteStr(fp, t->DataFormat[i]);
WriteStr(fp, ((i == (nSamples-1)) ? "\n" : "\t"));
}
WriteStr (fp, "END_DATA_FORMAT\n");
}
Commit Message: Upgrade Visual studio 2017 15.8
- Upgrade to 15.8
- Add check on CGATS memory allocation (thanks to Quang Nguyen for
pointing out this)
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 78,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_bin_get_or_touch(conn *c) {
item *it;
protocol_binary_response_get* rsp = (protocol_binary_response_get*)c->wbuf;
char* key = binary_get_key(c);
size_t nkey = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
int should_touch = (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_TOUCH ||
c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GAT ||
c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GATK);
int should_return_key = (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GETK ||
c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_GATK);
int should_return_value = (c->cmd != PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_TOUCH);
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "<%d %s ", c->sfd, should_touch ? "TOUCH" : "GET");
if (fwrite(key, 1, nkey, stderr)) {}
fputc('\n', stderr);
}
if (should_touch) {
protocol_binary_request_touch *t = binary_get_request(c);
time_t exptime = ntohl(t->message.body.expiration);
it = item_touch(key, nkey, realtime(exptime), c);
} else {
it = item_get(key, nkey, c, DO_UPDATE);
}
if (it) {
/* the length has two unnecessary bytes ("\r\n") */
uint16_t keylen = 0;
uint32_t bodylen = sizeof(rsp->message.body) + (it->nbytes - 2);
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (should_touch) {
c->thread->stats.touch_cmds++;
c->thread->stats.slab_stats[ITEM_clsid(it)].touch_hits++;
} else {
c->thread->stats.get_cmds++;
c->thread->stats.slab_stats[ITEM_clsid(it)].get_hits++;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (should_touch) {
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_TOUCH(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
it->nbytes, ITEM_get_cas(it));
} else {
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_GET(c->sfd, ITEM_key(it), it->nkey,
it->nbytes, ITEM_get_cas(it));
}
if (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_TOUCH) {
bodylen -= it->nbytes - 2;
} else if (should_return_key) {
bodylen += nkey;
keylen = nkey;
}
add_bin_header(c, 0, sizeof(rsp->message.body), keylen, bodylen);
rsp->message.header.response.cas = htonll(ITEM_get_cas(it));
if (settings.inline_ascii_response) {
rsp->message.body.flags = htonl(strtoul(ITEM_suffix(it), NULL, 10));
} else {
rsp->message.body.flags = htonl(*((uint32_t *)ITEM_suffix(it)));
}
add_iov(c, &rsp->message.body, sizeof(rsp->message.body));
if (should_return_key) {
add_iov(c, ITEM_key(it), nkey);
}
if (should_return_value) {
/* Add the data minus the CRLF */
if ((it->it_flags & ITEM_CHUNKED) == 0) {
add_iov(c, ITEM_data(it), it->nbytes - 2);
} else {
add_chunked_item_iovs(c, it, it->nbytes - 2);
}
}
conn_set_state(c, conn_mwrite);
c->write_and_go = conn_new_cmd;
/* Remember this command so we can garbage collect it later */
c->item = it;
} else {
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (should_touch) {
c->thread->stats.touch_cmds++;
c->thread->stats.touch_misses++;
} else {
c->thread->stats.get_cmds++;
c->thread->stats.get_misses++;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
if (should_touch) {
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_TOUCH(c->sfd, key, nkey, -1, 0);
} else {
MEMCACHED_COMMAND_GET(c->sfd, key, nkey, -1, 0);
}
if (c->noreply) {
conn_set_state(c, conn_new_cmd);
} else {
if (should_return_key) {
char *ofs = c->wbuf + sizeof(protocol_binary_response_header);
add_bin_header(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_KEY_ENOENT,
0, nkey, nkey);
memcpy(ofs, key, nkey);
add_iov(c, ofs, nkey);
conn_set_state(c, conn_mwrite);
c->write_and_go = conn_new_cmd;
} else {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_KEY_ENOENT,
NULL, 0);
}
}
}
if (settings.detail_enabled) {
stats_prefix_record_get(key, nkey, NULL != it);
}
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,190 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: archive_write_open(struct archive *_a, void *client_data,
archive_open_callback *opener, archive_write_callback *writer,
archive_close_callback *closer)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
struct archive_write_filter *client_filter;
int ret, r1;
archive_check_magic(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_WRITE_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_NEW, "archive_write_open");
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
a->client_writer = writer;
a->client_opener = opener;
a->client_closer = closer;
a->client_data = client_data;
client_filter = __archive_write_allocate_filter(_a);
client_filter->open = archive_write_client_open;
client_filter->write = archive_write_client_write;
client_filter->close = archive_write_client_close;
ret = __archive_write_open_filter(a->filter_first);
if (ret < ARCHIVE_WARN) {
r1 = __archive_write_close_filter(a->filter_first);
return (r1 < ret ? r1 : ret);
}
a->archive.state = ARCHIVE_STATE_HEADER;
if (a->format_init)
ret = (a->format_init)(a);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 34,064 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_PUSHB( INS_ARG )
{
FT_UShort L, K;
L = (FT_UShort)( CUR.opcode - 0xB0 + 1 );
if ( BOUNDS( L, CUR.stackSize + 1 - CUR.top ) )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Stack_Overflow;
return;
}
for ( K = 1; K <= L; K++ )
args[K - 1] = CUR.code[CUR.IP + K];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 10,147 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err fiin_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
FDItemInformationBox *ptr = (FDItemInformationBox *) a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "FDItemInformationBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
if (ptr->partition_entries)
gf_isom_box_array_dump(ptr->partition_entries, trace);
if (ptr->session_info)
gf_isom_box_dump(ptr->session_info, trace);
if (ptr->group_id_to_name)
gf_isom_box_dump(ptr->group_id_to_name, trace);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("FDItemInformationBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResetState() {
nav_handle1_.reset();
nav_handle2_.reset();
nav_handle3_.reset();
throttle1_.reset();
throttle2_.reset();
throttle3_.reset();
contents1_.reset();
contents2_.reset();
contents3_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | 1 | 172,231 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: __xmlKeepBlanksDefaultValue(void) {
if (IS_MAIN_THREAD)
return (&xmlKeepBlanksDefaultValue);
else
return (&xmlGetGlobalState()->xmlKeepBlanksDefaultValue);
}
Commit Message: Attempt to address libxml crash.
BUG=129930
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10458051
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@142822 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 107,299 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: kg_unseal_v1_iov(krb5_context context,
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx,
gss_iov_buffer_desc *iov,
int iov_count,
size_t token_wrapper_len,
int *conf_state,
gss_qop_t *qop_state,
int toktype)
{
OM_uint32 code;
gss_iov_buffer_t header;
gss_iov_buffer_t trailer;
unsigned char *ptr;
int sealalg;
int signalg;
krb5_checksum cksum;
krb5_checksum md5cksum;
size_t cksum_len = 0;
size_t conflen = 0;
int direction;
krb5_ui_4 seqnum;
OM_uint32 retval;
size_t sumlen;
krb5_keyusage sign_usage = KG_USAGE_SIGN;
md5cksum.length = cksum.length = 0;
md5cksum.contents = cksum.contents = NULL;
header = kg_locate_header_iov(iov, iov_count, toktype);
assert(header != NULL);
trailer = kg_locate_iov(iov, iov_count, GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER);
if (trailer != NULL && trailer->buffer.length != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (header->buffer.length < token_wrapper_len + 14) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
ptr = (unsigned char *)header->buffer.value + token_wrapper_len;
signalg = ptr[0];
signalg |= ptr[1] << 8;
sealalg = ptr[2];
sealalg |= ptr[3] << 8;
if (ptr[4] != 0xFF || ptr[5] != 0xFF) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG && sealalg != 0xFFFF) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &&
!(sealalg == 0xFFFF || sealalg == ctx->sealalg)) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if ((ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_NONE && signalg > 1) ||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_1 && signalg != SGN_ALG_3) ||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_DES3KD &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD)||
(ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4 &&
signalg != SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5)) {
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
cksum_len = 8;
if (toktype != KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG)
sign_usage = 15;
break;
case SGN_ALG_3:
cksum_len = 16;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
cksum_len = 20;
break;
default:
*minor_status = 0;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
/* get the token parameters */
code = kg_get_seq_num(context, ctx->seq, ptr + 14, ptr + 6, &direction,
&seqnum);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
/* decode the message, if SEAL */
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG) {
if (sealalg != 0xFFFF) {
if (ctx->sealalg == SEAL_ALG_MICROSOFT_RC4) {
unsigned char bigend_seqnum[4];
krb5_keyblock *enc_key;
size_t i;
store_32_be(seqnum, bigend_seqnum);
code = krb5_k_key_keyblock(context, ctx->enc, &enc_key);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
assert(enc_key->length == 16);
for (i = 0; i < enc_key->length; i++)
((char *)enc_key->contents)[i] ^= 0xF0;
code = kg_arcfour_docrypt_iov(context, enc_key, 0,
&bigend_seqnum[0], 4,
iov, iov_count);
krb5_free_keyblock(context, enc_key);
} else {
code = kg_decrypt_iov(context, 0,
((ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) != 0),
0 /*EC*/, 0 /*RRC*/,
ctx->enc, KG_USAGE_SEAL, NULL,
iov, iov_count);
}
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
}
conflen = kg_confounder_size(context, ctx->enc->keyblock.enctype);
}
if (header->buffer.length != token_wrapper_len + 14 + cksum_len + conflen) {
retval = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
/* compute the checksum of the message */
/* initialize the checksum */
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_MD2_5:
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC:
case SGN_ALG_3:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_RSA_MD5;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR;
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
md5cksum.checksum_type = CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_SHA1_DES3;
break;
default:
abort();
}
code = krb5_c_checksum_length(context, md5cksum.checksum_type, &sumlen);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
md5cksum.length = sumlen;
/* compute the checksum of the message */
code = kg_make_checksum_iov_v1(context, md5cksum.checksum_type,
cksum_len, ctx->seq, ctx->enc,
sign_usage, iov, iov_count, toktype,
&md5cksum);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
switch (signalg) {
case SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5:
case SGN_ALG_3:
code = kg_encrypt_inplace(context, ctx->seq, KG_USAGE_SEAL,
(g_OID_equal(ctx->mech_used,
gss_mech_krb5_old) ?
ctx->seq->keyblock.contents : NULL),
md5cksum.contents, 16);
if (code != 0) {
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
cksum.length = cksum_len;
cksum.contents = md5cksum.contents + 16 - cksum.length;
code = k5_bcmp(cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum.length);
break;
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_SHA1_DES3_KD:
case SGN_ALG_HMAC_MD5:
code = k5_bcmp(md5cksum.contents, ptr + 14, cksum_len);
break;
default:
code = 0;
retval = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
break;
}
if (code != 0) {
code = 0;
retval = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* For GSS_C_DCE_STYLE, the caller manages the padding, because the
* pad length is in the RPC PDU. The value of the padding may be
* uninitialized. For normal GSS, the last bytes of the decrypted
* data contain the pad length. kg_fixup_padding_iov() will find
* this and fixup the last data IOV appropriately.
*/
if (toktype == KG_TOK_WRAP_MSG &&
(ctx->gss_flags & GSS_C_DCE_STYLE) == 0) {
retval = kg_fixup_padding_iov(&code, iov, iov_count);
if (retval != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
goto cleanup;
}
if (conf_state != NULL)
*conf_state = (sealalg != 0xFFFF);
if (qop_state != NULL)
*qop_state = GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT;
if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
(!ctx->initiate && direction != 0)) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32)G_BAD_DIRECTION;
retval = GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
}
code = 0;
retval = g_order_check(&ctx->seqstate, (gssint_uint64)seqnum);
cleanup:
krb5_free_checksum_contents(context, &md5cksum);
*minor_status = code;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Handle invalid RFC 1964 tokens [CVE-2014-4341...]
Detect the following cases which would otherwise cause invalid memory
accesses and/or integer underflow:
* An RFC 1964 token being processed by an RFC 4121-only context
[CVE-2014-4342]
* A header with fewer than 22 bytes after the token ID or an
incomplete checksum [CVE-2014-4341 CVE-2014-4342]
* A ciphertext shorter than the confounder [CVE-2014-4341]
* A declared padding length longer than the plaintext [CVE-2014-4341]
If we detect a bad pad byte, continue on to compute the checksum to
avoid creating a padding oracle, but treat the checksum as invalid
even if it compares equal.
CVE-2014-4341:
In MIT krb5, an unauthenticated remote attacker with the ability to
inject packets into a legitimately established GSSAPI application
session can cause a program crash due to invalid memory references
when attempting to read beyond the end of a buffer.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
CVE-2014-4342:
In MIT krb5 releases krb5-1.7 and later, an unauthenticated remote
attacker with the ability to inject packets into a legitimately
established GSSAPI application session can cause a program crash due
to invalid memory references when reading beyond the end of a buffer
or by causing a null pointer dereference.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: CVE summaries, CVSS]
(cherry picked from commit fb99962cbd063ac04c9a9d2cc7c75eab73f3533d)
ticket: 7949
version_fixed: 1.12.2
status: resolved
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 166,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void overloadedMethodA1Method(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
ExceptionState exceptionState(ExceptionState::ExecutionContext, "overloadedMethodA", "TestObjectPython", info.Holder(), info.GetIsolate());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() < 1)) {
exceptionState.throwTypeError(ExceptionMessages::notEnoughArguments(1, info.Length()));
exceptionState.throwIfNeeded();
return;
}
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_EXCEPTION_VOID(int, longArg, toInt32(info[0], exceptionState), exceptionState);
imp->overloadedMethodA(longArg);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ossl_cipher_alloc(VALUE klass)
{
return NewCipher(klass);
}
Commit Message: cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 73,406 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PepperMediaDeviceManager::NotifyDeviceOpened(int request_id,
bool succeeded,
const std::string& label) {
OpenCallbackMap::iterator iter = open_callbacks_.find(request_id);
if (iter == open_callbacks_.end()) {
return;
}
OpenDeviceCallback callback = iter->second;
open_callbacks_.erase(iter);
callback.Run(request_id, succeeded, label);
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 119,394 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int close_socket(void)
{
int ret = 0;
struct ifsock *ifs, *tmp;
LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(ifs, &il, link, tmp) {
LIST_REMOVE(ifs, link);
if (ifs->out != -1)
ret |= close(ifs->out);
else
ret |= close(ifs->in);
free(ifs);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 88,787 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IndexedDBConnection::~IndexedDBConnection() {}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 136,663 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaStreamManager::HandleRequestDone(const std::string& label,
DeviceRequest* request) {
DCHECK(RequestDone(*request));
DVLOG(1) << "HandleRequestDone("
<< ", {label = " << label << "})";
switch (request->request_type()) {
case MEDIA_OPEN_DEVICE_PEPPER_ONLY:
FinalizeOpenDevice(label, request);
OnStreamStarted(label);
break;
case MEDIA_GENERATE_STREAM: {
FinalizeGenerateStream(label, request);
break;
}
case MEDIA_DEVICE_UPDATE:
OnStreamStarted(label);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,181 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: WORD32 ih264d_ref_idx_reordering(dec_struct_t *ps_dec, UWORD8 uc_lx)
{
dpb_manager_t *ps_dpb_mgr = ps_dec->ps_dpb_mgr;
UWORD16 u4_cur_pic_num = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice->u2_frame_num;
/*< Maximum Picture Number Minus 1 */
UWORD16 ui_max_frame_num =
ps_dec->ps_cur_sps->u2_u4_max_pic_num_minus1 + 1;
WORD32 i;
UWORD32 ui_remapIdc, ui_nextUev;
WORD16 u2_pred_frame_num = u4_cur_pic_num;
WORD32 i_temp;
UWORD16 u2_def_mod_flag = 0; /* Flag to keep track of which indices have been remapped */
UWORD8 modCount = 0;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_ofst = &ps_dec->ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
dec_slice_params_t *ps_cur_slice = ps_dec->ps_cur_slice;
UWORD8 u1_field_pic_flag = ps_cur_slice->u1_field_pic_flag;
if(u1_field_pic_flag)
{
u4_cur_pic_num = u4_cur_pic_num * 2 + 1;
ui_max_frame_num = ui_max_frame_num * 2;
}
u2_pred_frame_num = u4_cur_pic_num;
ui_remapIdc = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
while(ui_remapIdc != 3)
{
ui_nextUev = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
if(ui_remapIdc != 2)
{
ui_nextUev = ui_nextUev + 1;
if(ui_remapIdc == 0)
{
i_temp = u2_pred_frame_num - ui_nextUev;
if(i_temp < 0)
i_temp += ui_max_frame_num;
}
else
{
i_temp = u2_pred_frame_num + ui_nextUev;
if(i_temp >= ui_max_frame_num)
i_temp -= ui_max_frame_num;
}
/* Find the dpb with the matching picNum (picNum==frameNum for framePic) */
if(i_temp > u4_cur_pic_num)
i_temp = i_temp - ui_max_frame_num;
for(i = 0; i < (ps_cur_slice->u1_initial_list_size[uc_lx]); i++)
{
if(ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[uc_lx][i]->i4_pic_num == i_temp)
break;
}
if(i == (ps_cur_slice->u1_initial_list_size[uc_lx]))
{
UWORD32 i4_error_code;
i4_error_code = ERROR_DBP_MANAGER_T;
return i4_error_code;
}
u2_def_mod_flag |= (1 << i);
ps_dpb_mgr->ps_mod_dpb[uc_lx][modCount++] =
ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[uc_lx][i];
u2_pred_frame_num = i_temp; //update predictor to be the picNum just obtained
}
else //2
{
UWORD8 u1_lt_idx = (UWORD8)ui_nextUev;
for(i = 0; i < (ps_cur_slice->u1_initial_list_size[uc_lx]); i++)
{
if(!ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[uc_lx][i]->u1_is_short)
{
if(ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[uc_lx][i]->u1_long_term_pic_num
== u1_lt_idx)
break;
}
}
if(i == (ps_cur_slice->u1_initial_list_size[uc_lx]))
{
UWORD32 i4_error_code;
i4_error_code = ERROR_DBP_MANAGER_T;
return i4_error_code;
}
u2_def_mod_flag |= (1 << i);
ps_dpb_mgr->ps_mod_dpb[uc_lx][modCount++] =
ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[uc_lx][i];
}
ui_remapIdc = ih264d_uev(pu4_bitstrm_ofst, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
/* Get the remapping_idc - 0/1/2/3 */
}
for(i = 0; i < (ps_cur_slice->u1_num_ref_idx_lx_active[uc_lx]); i++)
{
if(!(u2_def_mod_flag & (1 << i)))
ps_dpb_mgr->ps_mod_dpb[uc_lx][modCount++] =
ps_dpb_mgr->ps_init_dpb[uc_lx][i];
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Return error when there are more mmco params than allocated size
Bug: 25818142
Change-Id: I5c1b23985eeca5192b42703c627ca3d060e4e13d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: file_fmtcheck(struct magic_set *ms, const struct magic *m, const char *def,
const char *file, size_t line)
{
const char *ptr = fmtcheck(m->desc, def);
if (ptr == def)
file_magerror(ms,
"%s, %" SIZE_T_FORMAT "u: format `%s' does not match"
" with `%s'", file, line, m->desc, def);
return ptr;
}
Commit Message: - reduce recursion level from 20 to 10 and make a symbolic constant for it.
- pull out the guts of saving and restoring the output buffer into functions
and take care not to overwrite the error message if an error happened.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void free_saved_cmdlines_buffer(struct saved_cmdlines_buffer *s)
{
kfree(s->saved_cmdlines);
kfree(s->map_cmdline_to_pid);
kfree(s);
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 81,274 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void omx_vdec::allocate_color_convert_buf::set_vdec_client(void *client)
{
omx = reinterpret_cast<omx_vdec*>(client);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline int perf_intr_is_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 22,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Notification::~Notification()
{
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | 0 | 119,795 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DatabaseImpl::CreateObjectStore(int64_t transaction_id,
int64_t object_store_id,
const base::string16& name,
const IndexedDBKeyPath& key_path,
bool auto_increment) {
idb_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&IDBThreadHelper::CreateObjectStore,
base::Unretained(helper_), transaction_id,
object_store_id, name, key_path, auto_increment));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 136,617 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void nullParcelReleaseFunction (const uint8_t* data, size_t dataSize,
const size_t* objects, size_t objectsSize,
void* cookie) {
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE
Fix security vulnerability in pre-O rild code.
Remove wrong code for setup_data_call.
Add check for max address for RIL_DIAL.
Bug: 37896655
Test: Manual.
Change-Id: I05c027140ae828a2653794fcdd94e1b1a130941b
(cherry picked from commit dda24c6557911aa1f4708abbd6b2f20f0e205b9e)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,131 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ObjectBackedNativeHandler::RouteFunction(
const std::string& name,
const std::string& feature_name,
const HandlerFunction& handler_function) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context_->v8_context());
v8::Local<v8::Object> data = v8::Object::New(isolate);
SetPrivate(data, kHandlerFunction,
v8::External::New(isolate, new HandlerFunction(handler_function)));
SetPrivate(data, kFeatureName,
v8_helpers::ToV8StringUnsafe(isolate, feature_name));
v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate> function_template =
v8::FunctionTemplate::New(isolate, Router, data);
v8::Local<v8::ObjectTemplate>::New(isolate, object_template_)
->Set(isolate, name.c_str(), function_template);
router_data_.Append(data);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | 1 | 173,278 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int rds_rdma_extra_size(struct rds_rdma_args *args)
{
struct rds_iovec vec;
struct rds_iovec __user *local_vec;
int tot_pages = 0;
unsigned int nr_pages;
unsigned int i;
local_vec = (struct rds_iovec __user *)(unsigned long) args->local_vec_addr;
/* figure out the number of pages in the vector */
for (i = 0; i < args->nr_local; i++) {
if (copy_from_user(&vec, &local_vec[i],
sizeof(struct rds_iovec)))
return -EFAULT;
nr_pages = rds_pages_in_vec(&vec);
if (nr_pages == 0)
return -EINVAL;
tot_pages += nr_pages;
/*
* nr_pages for one entry is limited to (UINT_MAX>>PAGE_SHIFT)+1,
* so tot_pages cannot overflow without first going negative.
*/
if (tot_pages < 0)
return -EINVAL;
}
return tot_pages * sizeof(struct scatterlist);
}
Commit Message: RDS: Heap OOB write in rds_message_alloc_sgs()
When args->nr_local is 0, nr_pages gets also 0 due some size
calculation via rds_rm_size(), which is later used to allocate
pages for DMA, this bug produces a heap Out-Of-Bound write access
to a specific memory region.
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Ghannam <simo.ghannam@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 169,354 |
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