instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderLayerScrollableArea::hasVerticalOverflow() const
{
ASSERT(!m_scrollDimensionsDirty);
return pixelSnappedScrollHeight() > box().pixelSnappedClientHeight();
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 119,986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PDFiumEngine::DrawPageShadow(const pp::Rect& page_rc,
const pp::Rect& shadow_rc,
const pp::Rect& clip_rc,
pp::ImageData* image_data) {
pp::Rect page_rect(page_rc);
page_rect.Offset(page_offset_);
pp::Rect shadow_rect(shadow_rc);
shadow_rect.Offset(page_offset_);
pp::Rect clip_rect(clip_rc);
clip_rect.Offset(page_offset_);
const double factor = 0.5;
uint32_t depth =
std::max(std::max(page_rect.x() - shadow_rect.x(),
page_rect.y() - shadow_rect.y()),
std::max(shadow_rect.right() - page_rect.right(),
shadow_rect.bottom() - page_rect.bottom()));
depth = static_cast<uint32_t>(depth * 1.5) + 1;
if (!page_shadow_.get() || page_shadow_->depth() != depth)
page_shadow_.reset(new ShadowMatrix(depth, factor,
client_->GetBackgroundColor()));
DCHECK(!image_data->is_null());
DrawShadow(image_data, shadow_rect, page_rect, clip_rect, *page_shadow_);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 140,273 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xsltApplyImportsComp(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemApplyImportsPtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp = (xsltStyleItemApplyImportsPtr) xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_APPLYIMPORTS);
#else
comp = xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_APPLYIMPORTS);
#endif
if (comp == NULL)
return;
inst->psvi = comp;
comp->inst = inst;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 156,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cancel_deep_counts_for_file (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFile *file)
{
if (directory->details->deep_count_file == file)
{
deep_count_cancel (directory);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 60,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static size_t phar_dir_read(php_stream *stream, char *buf, size_t count TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
size_t to_read;
HashTable *data = (HashTable *)stream->abstract;
phar_zstr key;
char *str_key;
uint keylen;
ulong unused;
if (FAILURE == zend_hash_has_more_elements(data)) {
return 0;
}
if (HASH_KEY_NON_EXISTENT == zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(data, &key, &keylen, &unused, 0, NULL)) {
return 0;
}
PHAR_STR(key, str_key);
zend_hash_move_forward(data);
to_read = MIN(keylen, count);
if (to_read == 0 || count < keylen) {
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
return 0;
}
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(php_stream_dirent));
memcpy(((php_stream_dirent *) buf)->d_name, str_key, to_read);
PHAR_STR_FREE(str_key);
((php_stream_dirent *) buf)->d_name[to_read + 1] = '\0';
return sizeof(php_stream_dirent);
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: copy_move_file (CopyMoveJob *copy_job,
GFile *src,
GFile *dest_dir,
gboolean same_fs,
gboolean unique_names,
char **dest_fs_type,
SourceInfo *source_info,
TransferInfo *transfer_info,
GHashTable *debuting_files,
GdkPoint *position,
gboolean overwrite,
gboolean *skipped_file,
gboolean readonly_source_fs)
{
GFile *dest, *new_dest;
g_autofree gchar *dest_uri = NULL;
GError *error;
GFileCopyFlags flags;
char *primary, *secondary, *details;
int response;
ProgressData pdata;
gboolean would_recurse, is_merge;
CommonJob *job;
gboolean res;
int unique_name_nr;
gboolean handled_invalid_filename;
job = (CommonJob *) copy_job;
if (should_skip_file (job, src))
{
*skipped_file = TRUE;
return;
}
unique_name_nr = 1;
/* another file in the same directory might have handled the invalid
* filename condition for us
*/
handled_invalid_filename = *dest_fs_type != NULL;
if (unique_names)
{
dest = get_unique_target_file (src, dest_dir, same_fs, *dest_fs_type, unique_name_nr++);
}
else if (copy_job->target_name != NULL)
{
dest = get_target_file_with_custom_name (src, dest_dir, *dest_fs_type, same_fs,
copy_job->target_name);
}
else
{
dest = get_target_file (src, dest_dir, *dest_fs_type, same_fs);
}
/* Don't allow recursive move/copy into itself.
* (We would get a file system error if we proceeded but it is nicer to
* detect and report it at this level) */
if (test_dir_is_parent (dest_dir, src))
{
if (job->skip_all_error)
{
goto out;
}
/* the run_warning() frees all strings passed in automatically */
primary = copy_job->is_move ? g_strdup (_("You cannot move a folder into itself."))
: g_strdup (_("You cannot copy a folder into itself."));
secondary = g_strdup (_("The destination folder is inside the source folder."));
response = run_cancel_or_skip_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
NULL,
source_info->num_files,
source_info->num_files - transfer_info->num_files);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1) /* skip all */
{
job->skip_all_error = TRUE;
}
else if (response == 2) /* skip */
{ /* do nothing */
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
goto out;
}
/* Don't allow copying over the source or one of the parents of the source.
*/
if (test_dir_is_parent (src, dest))
{
if (job->skip_all_error)
{
goto out;
}
/* the run_warning() frees all strings passed in automatically */
primary = copy_job->is_move ? g_strdup (_("You cannot move a file over itself."))
: g_strdup (_("You cannot copy a file over itself."));
secondary = g_strdup (_("The source file would be overwritten by the destination."));
response = run_cancel_or_skip_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
NULL,
source_info->num_files,
source_info->num_files - transfer_info->num_files);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1) /* skip all */
{
job->skip_all_error = TRUE;
}
else if (response == 2) /* skip */
{ /* do nothing */
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
goto out;
}
retry:
error = NULL;
flags = G_FILE_COPY_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS;
if (overwrite)
{
flags |= G_FILE_COPY_OVERWRITE;
}
if (readonly_source_fs)
{
flags |= G_FILE_COPY_TARGET_DEFAULT_PERMS;
}
pdata.job = copy_job;
pdata.last_size = 0;
pdata.source_info = source_info;
pdata.transfer_info = transfer_info;
if (copy_job->is_move)
{
res = g_file_move (src, dest,
flags,
job->cancellable,
copy_file_progress_callback,
&pdata,
&error);
}
else
{
res = g_file_copy (src, dest,
flags,
job->cancellable,
copy_file_progress_callback,
&pdata,
&error);
}
if (res)
{
GFile *real;
real = map_possibly_volatile_file_to_real (dest, job->cancellable, &error);
if (real == NULL)
{
res = FALSE;
}
else
{
g_object_unref (dest);
dest = real;
}
}
if (res)
{
transfer_info->num_files++;
report_copy_progress (copy_job, source_info, transfer_info);
if (debuting_files)
{
dest_uri = g_file_get_uri (dest);
if (position)
{
nautilus_file_changes_queue_schedule_position_set (dest, *position, job->screen_num);
}
else if (eel_uri_is_desktop (dest_uri))
{
nautilus_file_changes_queue_schedule_position_remove (dest);
}
g_hash_table_replace (debuting_files, g_object_ref (dest), GINT_TO_POINTER (TRUE));
}
if (copy_job->is_move)
{
nautilus_file_changes_queue_file_moved (src, dest);
}
else
{
nautilus_file_changes_queue_file_added (dest);
}
/* If copying a trusted desktop file to the desktop,
* mark it as trusted. */
if (copy_job->desktop_location != NULL &&
g_file_equal (copy_job->desktop_location, dest_dir) &&
is_trusted_desktop_file (src, job->cancellable))
{
mark_desktop_file_trusted (job,
job->cancellable,
dest,
FALSE);
}
if (job->undo_info != NULL)
{
nautilus_file_undo_info_ext_add_origin_target_pair (NAUTILUS_FILE_UNDO_INFO_EXT (job->undo_info),
src, dest);
}
g_object_unref (dest);
return;
}
if (!handled_invalid_filename &&
IS_IO_ERROR (error, INVALID_FILENAME))
{
handled_invalid_filename = TRUE;
g_assert (*dest_fs_type == NULL);
*dest_fs_type = query_fs_type (dest_dir, job->cancellable);
if (unique_names)
{
new_dest = get_unique_target_file (src, dest_dir, same_fs, *dest_fs_type, unique_name_nr);
}
else
{
new_dest = get_target_file (src, dest_dir, *dest_fs_type, same_fs);
}
if (!g_file_equal (dest, new_dest))
{
g_object_unref (dest);
dest = new_dest;
g_error_free (error);
goto retry;
}
else
{
g_object_unref (new_dest);
}
}
/* Conflict */
if (!overwrite &&
IS_IO_ERROR (error, EXISTS))
{
gboolean is_merge;
FileConflictResponse *response;
g_error_free (error);
if (unique_names)
{
g_object_unref (dest);
dest = get_unique_target_file (src, dest_dir, same_fs, *dest_fs_type, unique_name_nr++);
goto retry;
}
is_merge = FALSE;
if (is_dir (dest) && is_dir (src))
{
is_merge = TRUE;
}
if ((is_merge && job->merge_all) ||
(!is_merge && job->replace_all))
{
overwrite = TRUE;
goto retry;
}
if (job->skip_all_conflict)
{
goto out;
}
response = handle_copy_move_conflict (job, src, dest, dest_dir);
if (response->id == GTK_RESPONSE_CANCEL ||
response->id == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
file_conflict_response_free (response);
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response->id == CONFLICT_RESPONSE_SKIP)
{
if (response->apply_to_all)
{
job->skip_all_conflict = TRUE;
}
file_conflict_response_free (response);
}
else if (response->id == CONFLICT_RESPONSE_REPLACE) /* merge/replace */
{
if (response->apply_to_all)
{
if (is_merge)
{
job->merge_all = TRUE;
}
else
{
job->replace_all = TRUE;
}
}
overwrite = TRUE;
file_conflict_response_free (response);
goto retry;
}
else if (response->id == CONFLICT_RESPONSE_RENAME)
{
g_object_unref (dest);
dest = get_target_file_for_display_name (dest_dir,
response->new_name);
file_conflict_response_free (response);
goto retry;
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
}
else if (overwrite &&
IS_IO_ERROR (error, IS_DIRECTORY))
{
gboolean existing_file_deleted;
DeleteExistingFileData data;
g_error_free (error);
data.job = job;
data.source = src;
existing_file_deleted =
delete_file_recursively (dest,
job->cancellable,
existing_file_removed_callback,
&data);
if (existing_file_deleted)
{
goto retry;
}
}
/* Needs to recurse */
else if (IS_IO_ERROR (error, WOULD_RECURSE) ||
IS_IO_ERROR (error, WOULD_MERGE))
{
is_merge = error->code == G_IO_ERROR_WOULD_MERGE;
would_recurse = error->code == G_IO_ERROR_WOULD_RECURSE;
g_error_free (error);
if (overwrite && would_recurse)
{
error = NULL;
/* Copying a dir onto file, first remove the file */
if (!g_file_delete (dest, job->cancellable, &error) &&
!IS_IO_ERROR (error, NOT_FOUND))
{
if (job->skip_all_error)
{
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
if (copy_job->is_move)
{
primary = f (_("Error while moving “%B”."), src);
}
else
{
primary = f (_("Error while copying “%B”."), src);
}
secondary = f (_("Could not remove the already existing file with the same name in %F."), dest_dir);
details = error->message;
/* setting TRUE on show_all here, as we could have
* another error on the same file later.
*/
response = run_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
details,
TRUE,
CANCEL, SKIP_ALL, SKIP,
NULL);
g_error_free (error);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1) /* skip all */
{
job->skip_all_error = TRUE;
}
else if (response == 2) /* skip */
{ /* do nothing */
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
goto out;
}
if (error)
{
g_error_free (error);
error = NULL;
}
nautilus_file_changes_queue_file_removed (dest);
}
if (is_merge)
{
/* On merge we now write in the target directory, which may not
* be in the same directory as the source, even if the parent is
* (if the merged directory is a mountpoint). This could cause
* problems as we then don't transcode filenames.
* We just set same_fs to FALSE which is safe but a bit slower. */
same_fs = FALSE;
}
if (!copy_move_directory (copy_job, src, &dest, same_fs,
would_recurse, dest_fs_type,
source_info, transfer_info,
debuting_files, skipped_file,
readonly_source_fs))
{
/* destination changed, since it was an invalid file name */
g_assert (*dest_fs_type != NULL);
handled_invalid_filename = TRUE;
goto retry;
}
g_object_unref (dest);
return;
}
else if (IS_IO_ERROR (error, CANCELLED))
{
g_error_free (error);
}
/* Other error */
else
{
if (job->skip_all_error)
{
g_error_free (error);
goto out;
}
primary = f (_("Error while copying “%B”."), src);
secondary = f (_("There was an error copying the file into %F."), dest_dir);
details = error->message;
response = run_cancel_or_skip_warning (job,
primary,
secondary,
details,
source_info->num_files,
source_info->num_files - transfer_info->num_files);
g_error_free (error);
if (response == 0 || response == GTK_RESPONSE_DELETE_EVENT)
{
abort_job (job);
}
else if (response == 1) /* skip all */
{
job->skip_all_error = TRUE;
}
else if (response == 2) /* skip */
{ /* do nothing */
}
else
{
g_assert_not_reached ();
}
}
out:
*skipped_file = TRUE; /* Or aborted, but same-same */
g_object_unref (dest);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 167,747 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType load_tile(Image *image,Image *tile_image,
XCFDocInfo *inDocInfo,XCFLayerInfo *inLayerInfo,size_t data_length)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
ssize_t
y;
register ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
size_t
extent;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
*graydata;
XCFPixelPacket
*xcfdata,
*xcfodata;
extent=0;
if (inDocInfo->image_type == GIMP_GRAY)
extent=tile_image->columns*tile_image->rows*sizeof(*graydata);
else
if (inDocInfo->image_type == GIMP_RGB)
extent=tile_image->columns*tile_image->rows*sizeof(*xcfdata);
if (extent > data_length)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"NotEnoughPixelData",
image->filename);
xcfdata=(XCFPixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(MagickMax(data_length,
tile_image->columns*tile_image->rows),sizeof(*xcfdata));
if (xcfdata == (XCFPixelPacket *) NULL)
ThrowBinaryException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed",
image->filename);
xcfodata=xcfdata;
graydata=(unsigned char *) xcfdata; /* used by gray and indexed */
count=ReadBlob(image,data_length,(unsigned char *) xcfdata);
if (count != (ssize_t) data_length)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"NotEnoughPixelData",
image->filename);
exception=(&image->exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) tile_image->rows; y++)
{
q=GetAuthenticPixels(tile_image,0,y,tile_image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
if (inDocInfo->image_type == GIMP_GRAY)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*graydata));
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelRed(q));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelRed(q));
SetPixelAlpha(q,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
inLayerInfo->alpha));
graydata++;
q++;
}
}
else
if (inDocInfo->image_type == GIMP_RGB)
{
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) tile_image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(xcfdata->red));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(xcfdata->green));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(xcfdata->blue));
SetPixelAlpha(q,xcfdata->alpha == 255U ? TransparentOpacity :
ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char) inLayerInfo->alpha));
xcfdata++;
q++;
}
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(tile_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
xcfodata=(XCFPixelPacket *) RelinquishMagickMemory(xcfodata);
return MagickTrue;
}
Commit Message: Check for image list before we destroy the last image in XCF coder (patch sent privately by Андрей Черный)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 68,006 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterPNGImage(void)
{
char
version[MaxTextExtent];
MagickInfo
*entry;
static const char
*PNGNote=
{
"See http://www.libpng.org/ for details about the PNG format."
},
*JNGNote=
{
"See http://www.libpng.org/pub/mng/ for details about the JNG\n"
"format."
},
*MNGNote=
{
"See http://www.libpng.org/pub/mng/ for details about the MNG\n"
"format."
};
*version='\0';
#if defined(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING)
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(version,"libpng ",MaxTextExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(version,PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,MaxTextExtent);
if (LocaleCompare(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,png_get_header_ver(NULL)) != 0)
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(version,",",MaxTextExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(version,png_get_libpng_ver(NULL),
MaxTextExtent);
}
#endif
entry=SetMagickInfo("MNG");
entry->seekable_stream=MagickTrue; /* To do: eliminate this. */
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_PNG_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadMNGImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteMNGImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsMNG;
entry->description=ConstantString("Multiple-image Network Graphics");
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("video/x-mng");
entry->module=ConstantString("PNG");
entry->note=ConstantString(MNGNote);
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PNG");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_PNG_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPNGImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePNGImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPNG;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("Portable Network Graphics");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/png");
entry->module=ConstantString("PNG");
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
entry->note=ConstantString(PNGNote);
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PNG8");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_PNG_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPNGImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePNGImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPNG;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"8-bit indexed with optional binary transparency");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/png");
entry->module=ConstantString("PNG");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PNG24");
*version='\0';
#if defined(ZLIB_VERSION)
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(version,"zlib ",MaxTextExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(version,ZLIB_VERSION,MaxTextExtent);
if (LocaleCompare(ZLIB_VERSION,zlib_version) != 0)
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(version,",",MaxTextExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(version,zlib_version,MaxTextExtent);
}
#endif
if (*version != '\0')
entry->version=ConstantString(version);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_PNG_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPNGImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePNGImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPNG;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("opaque or binary transparent 24-bit RGB");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/png");
entry->module=ConstantString("PNG");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PNG32");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_PNG_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPNGImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePNGImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPNG;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("opaque or transparent 32-bit RGBA");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/png");
entry->module=ConstantString("PNG");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PNG48");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_PNG_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPNGImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePNGImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPNG;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("opaque or binary transparent 48-bit RGB");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/png");
entry->module=ConstantString("PNG");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PNG64");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_PNG_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPNGImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePNGImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPNG;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("opaque or transparent 64-bit RGBA");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/png");
entry->module=ConstantString("PNG");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("PNG00");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_PNG_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadPNGImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WritePNGImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsPNG;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString(
"PNG inheriting bit-depth, color-type from original if possible");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/png");
entry->module=ConstantString("PNG");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
entry=SetMagickInfo("JNG");
#if defined(JNG_SUPPORTED)
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_PNG_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadJNGImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteJNGImage;
#endif
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsJNG;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("JPEG Network Graphics");
entry->mime_type=ConstantString("image/x-jng");
entry->module=ConstantString("PNG");
entry->note=ConstantString(JNGNote);
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
#ifdef IMPNG_SETJMP_NOT_THREAD_SAFE
ping_semaphore=AllocateSemaphoreInfo();
#endif
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 1 | 167,813 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SendAlternatePaste() {
if (TestingNativeMac())
SendKeyEvent(ui::VKEY_V, false, true);
else
SendKeyEvent(ui::VKEY_INSERT, true, false);
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DevToolsWindow::InspectElement(
content::RenderFrameHost* inspected_frame_host,
int x,
int y) {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> agent(
DevToolsAgentHost::GetOrCreateFor(inspected_frame_host));
bool should_measure_time = FindDevToolsWindow(agent.get()) == NULL;
base::TimeTicks start_time = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (agent->GetType() == content::DevToolsAgentHost::kTypePage) {
OpenDevToolsWindow(agent->GetWebContents(),
DevToolsToggleAction::ShowElementsPanel());
} else {
OpenDevToolsWindowForFrame(Profile::FromBrowserContext(
agent->GetBrowserContext()), agent);
}
DevToolsWindow* window = FindDevToolsWindow(agent.get());
if (window) {
agent->InspectElement(window->bindings_, x, y);
if (should_measure_time)
window->inspect_element_start_time_ = start_time;
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 138,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err hdlr_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_HandlerBox *ptr = (GF_HandlerBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_full_box_write(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->reserved1);
gf_bs_write_u32(bs, ptr->handlerType);
gf_bs_write_data(bs, (char*)ptr->reserved2, 12);
if (ptr->nameUTF8) {
u32 len = (u32)strlen(ptr->nameUTF8);
if (ptr->store_counted_string) {
gf_bs_write_u8(bs, len);
gf_bs_write_data(bs, ptr->nameUTF8, len);
} else {
gf_bs_write_data(bs, ptr->nameUTF8, len);
gf_bs_write_u8(bs, 0);
}
} else {
gf_bs_write_u8(bs, 0);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BookmarkEventRouter::ExtensiveBookmarkChangesEnded(BookmarkModel* model) {
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args(new ListValue());
DispatchEvent(model->profile(),
keys::kOnBookmarkImportEnded,
args.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free in BookmarksIOFunction::ShowSelectFileDialog.
BUG=177410
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12326086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 115,676 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xmlCtxtReset(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
xmlParserInputPtr input;
xmlDictPtr dict;
if (ctxt == NULL)
return;
dict = ctxt->dict;
while ((input = inputPop(ctxt)) != NULL) { /* Non consuming */
xmlFreeInputStream(input);
}
ctxt->inputNr = 0;
ctxt->input = NULL;
ctxt->spaceNr = 0;
if (ctxt->spaceTab != NULL) {
ctxt->spaceTab[0] = -1;
ctxt->space = &ctxt->spaceTab[0];
} else {
ctxt->space = NULL;
}
ctxt->nodeNr = 0;
ctxt->node = NULL;
ctxt->nameNr = 0;
ctxt->name = NULL;
DICT_FREE(ctxt->version);
ctxt->version = NULL;
DICT_FREE(ctxt->encoding);
ctxt->encoding = NULL;
DICT_FREE(ctxt->directory);
ctxt->directory = NULL;
DICT_FREE(ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->extSubURI = NULL;
DICT_FREE(ctxt->extSubSystem);
ctxt->extSubSystem = NULL;
if (ctxt->myDoc != NULL)
xmlFreeDoc(ctxt->myDoc);
ctxt->myDoc = NULL;
ctxt->standalone = -1;
ctxt->hasExternalSubset = 0;
ctxt->hasPErefs = 0;
ctxt->html = 0;
ctxt->external = 0;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START;
ctxt->token = 0;
ctxt->wellFormed = 1;
ctxt->nsWellFormed = 1;
ctxt->disableSAX = 0;
ctxt->valid = 1;
#if 0
ctxt->vctxt.userData = ctxt;
ctxt->vctxt.error = xmlParserValidityError;
ctxt->vctxt.warning = xmlParserValidityWarning;
#endif
ctxt->record_info = 0;
ctxt->nbChars = 0;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
ctxt->errNo = XML_ERR_OK;
ctxt->depth = 0;
ctxt->charset = XML_CHAR_ENCODING_UTF8;
ctxt->catalogs = NULL;
ctxt->nbentities = 0;
ctxt->sizeentities = 0;
ctxt->sizeentcopy = 0;
xmlInitNodeInfoSeq(&ctxt->node_seq);
if (ctxt->attsDefault != NULL) {
xmlHashFree(ctxt->attsDefault, (xmlHashDeallocator) xmlFree);
ctxt->attsDefault = NULL;
}
if (ctxt->attsSpecial != NULL) {
xmlHashFree(ctxt->attsSpecial, NULL);
ctxt->attsSpecial = NULL;
}
#ifdef LIBXML_CATALOG_ENABLED
if (ctxt->catalogs != NULL)
xmlCatalogFreeLocal(ctxt->catalogs);
#endif
if (ctxt->lastError.code != XML_ERR_OK)
xmlResetError(&ctxt->lastError);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 163,403 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void fwnet_make_uf_hdr(struct rfc2734_header *hdr,
unsigned ether_type)
{
hdr->w0 = fwnet_set_hdr_lf(RFC2374_HDR_UNFRAG)
| fwnet_set_hdr_ether_type(ether_type);
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: server_send_real (server *serv, char *buf, int len)
{
fe_add_rawlog (serv, buf, len, TRUE);
url_check_line (buf, len);
return tcp_send_real (serv->ssl, serv->sok, serv->encoding, serv->using_irc,
buf, len);
}
Commit Message: ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 58,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct ip_tunnel *ipip6_tunnel_locate(struct net *net,
struct ip_tunnel_parm *parms, int create)
{
__be32 remote = parms->iph.daddr;
__be32 local = parms->iph.saddr;
struct ip_tunnel *t, *nt;
struct ip_tunnel __rcu **tp;
struct net_device *dev;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
struct sit_net *sitn = net_generic(net, sit_net_id);
for (tp = __ipip6_bucket(sitn, parms);
(t = rtnl_dereference(*tp)) != NULL;
tp = &t->next) {
if (local == t->parms.iph.saddr &&
remote == t->parms.iph.daddr &&
parms->link == t->parms.link) {
if (create)
return NULL;
else
return t;
}
}
if (!create)
goto failed;
if (parms->name[0]) {
if (!dev_valid_name(parms->name))
goto failed;
strlcpy(name, parms->name, IFNAMSIZ);
} else {
strcpy(name, "sit%d");
}
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*t), name, NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
ipip6_tunnel_setup);
if (!dev)
return NULL;
dev_net_set(dev, net);
nt = netdev_priv(dev);
nt->parms = *parms;
if (ipip6_tunnel_create(dev) < 0)
goto failed_free;
return nt;
failed_free:
free_netdev(dev);
failed:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: net: sit: fix memory leak in sit_init_net()
If register_netdev() is failed to register sitn->fb_tunnel_dev,
it will go to err_reg_dev and forget to free netdev(sitn->fb_tunnel_dev).
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888378daad00 (size 512):
comm "syz-executor.1", pid 4006, jiffies 4295121142 (age 16.115s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 e6 ed c0 83 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:577 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] kvzalloc include/linux/mm.h:585 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] netif_alloc_netdev_queues net/core/dev.c:8380 [inline]
[<00000000d6dcb63e>] alloc_netdev_mqs+0x600/0xcc0 net/core/dev.c:8970
[<00000000867e172f>] sit_init_net+0x295/0xa40 net/ipv6/sit.c:1848
[<00000000871019fa>] ops_init+0xad/0x3e0 net/core/net_namespace.c:129
[<00000000319507f6>] setup_net+0x2ba/0x690 net/core/net_namespace.c:314
[<0000000087db4f96>] copy_net_ns+0x1dc/0x330 net/core/net_namespace.c:437
[<0000000057efc651>] create_new_namespaces+0x382/0x730 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
[<00000000676f83de>] copy_namespaces+0x2ed/0x3d0 kernel/nsproxy.c:165
[<0000000030b74bac>] copy_process.part.27+0x231e/0x6db0 kernel/fork.c:1919
[<00000000fff78746>] copy_process kernel/fork.c:1713 [inline]
[<00000000fff78746>] _do_fork+0x1bc/0xe90 kernel/fork.c:2224
[<000000001c2e0d1c>] do_syscall_64+0xc8/0x580 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000ec48bd44>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<0000000039acff8a>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_bind_addr *bp,
gfp_t gfp, int vparam_len)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = asoc->ep;
sctp_inithdr_t init;
union sctp_params addrs;
size_t chunksize;
struct sctp_chunk *retval = NULL;
int num_types, addrs_len = 0;
struct sctp_sock *sp;
sctp_supported_addrs_param_t sat;
__be16 types[2];
sctp_adaptation_ind_param_t aiparam;
sctp_supported_ext_param_t ext_param;
int num_ext = 0;
__u8 extensions[3];
sctp_paramhdr_t *auth_chunks = NULL,
*auth_hmacs = NULL;
/* RFC 2960 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
*
* Note 1: The INIT chunks can contain multiple addresses that
* can be IPv4 and/or IPv6 in any combination.
*/
retval = NULL;
/* Convert the provided bind address list to raw format. */
addrs = sctp_bind_addrs_to_raw(bp, &addrs_len, gfp);
init.init_tag = htonl(asoc->c.my_vtag);
init.a_rwnd = htonl(asoc->rwnd);
init.num_outbound_streams = htons(asoc->c.sinit_num_ostreams);
init.num_inbound_streams = htons(asoc->c.sinit_max_instreams);
init.initial_tsn = htonl(asoc->c.initial_tsn);
/* How many address types are needed? */
sp = sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk);
num_types = sp->pf->supported_addrs(sp, types);
chunksize = sizeof(init) + addrs_len;
chunksize += WORD_ROUND(SCTP_SAT_LEN(num_types));
chunksize += sizeof(ecap_param);
if (net->sctp.prsctp_enable)
chunksize += sizeof(prsctp_param);
/* ADDIP: Section 4.2.7:
* An implementation supporting this extension [ADDIP] MUST list
* the ASCONF,the ASCONF-ACK, and the AUTH chunks in its INIT and
* INIT-ACK parameters.
*/
if (net->sctp.addip_enable) {
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF;
extensions[num_ext+1] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK;
num_ext += 2;
}
if (sp->adaptation_ind)
chunksize += sizeof(aiparam);
chunksize += vparam_len;
/* Account for AUTH related parameters */
if (ep->auth_enable) {
/* Add random parameter length*/
chunksize += sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random);
/* Add HMACS parameter length if any were defined */
auth_hmacs = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_hmacs;
if (auth_hmacs->length)
chunksize += WORD_ROUND(ntohs(auth_hmacs->length));
else
auth_hmacs = NULL;
/* Add CHUNKS parameter length */
auth_chunks = (sctp_paramhdr_t *)asoc->c.auth_chunks;
if (auth_chunks->length)
chunksize += WORD_ROUND(ntohs(auth_chunks->length));
else
auth_chunks = NULL;
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_AUTH;
num_ext += 1;
}
/* If we have any extensions to report, account for that */
if (num_ext)
chunksize += WORD_ROUND(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) +
num_ext);
/* RFC 2960 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
*
* Note 3: An INIT chunk MUST NOT contain more than one Host
* Name address parameter. Moreover, the sender of the INIT
* MUST NOT combine any other address types with the Host Name
* address in the INIT. The receiver of INIT MUST ignore any
* other address types if the Host Name address parameter is
* present in the received INIT chunk.
*
* PLEASE DO NOT FIXME [This version does not support Host Name.]
*/
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_INIT, 0, chunksize);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
retval->subh.init_hdr =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(init), &init);
retval->param_hdr.v =
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, addrs_len, addrs.v);
/* RFC 2960 3.3.2 Initiation (INIT) (1)
*
* Note 4: This parameter, when present, specifies all the
* address types the sending endpoint can support. The absence
* of this parameter indicates that the sending endpoint can
* support any address type.
*/
sat.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES;
sat.param_hdr.length = htons(SCTP_SAT_LEN(num_types));
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sat), &sat);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, num_types * sizeof(__u16), &types);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(ecap_param), &ecap_param);
/* Add the supported extensions parameter. Be nice and add this
* fist before addiding the parameters for the extensions themselves
*/
if (num_ext) {
ext_param.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT;
ext_param.param_hdr.length =
htons(sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t) + num_ext);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sctp_supported_ext_param_t),
&ext_param);
sctp_addto_param(retval, num_ext, extensions);
}
if (net->sctp.prsctp_enable)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(prsctp_param), &prsctp_param);
if (sp->adaptation_ind) {
aiparam.param_hdr.type = SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND;
aiparam.param_hdr.length = htons(sizeof(aiparam));
aiparam.adaptation_ind = htonl(sp->adaptation_ind);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(aiparam), &aiparam);
}
/* Add SCTP-AUTH chunks to the parameter list */
if (ep->auth_enable) {
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(asoc->c.auth_random),
asoc->c.auth_random);
if (auth_hmacs)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_hmacs->length),
auth_hmacs);
if (auth_chunks)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, ntohs(auth_chunks->length),
auth_chunks);
}
nodata:
kfree(addrs.v);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int acpi_resources_are_enforced(void)
{
return acpi_enforce_resources == ENFORCE_RESOURCES_STRICT;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,890 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ldm_get_vstr (const u8 *block, u8 *buffer, int buflen)
{
int length;
BUG_ON (!block || !buffer);
length = block[0];
if (length >= buflen) {
ldm_error ("Truncating string %d -> %d.", length, buflen);
length = buflen - 1;
}
memcpy (buffer, block + 1, length);
buffer[length] = 0;
return length;
}
Commit Message: Fix for buffer overflow in ldm_frag_add not sufficient
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequent fragments,
previously allocated memory is used.
[1] http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/5/6/407
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int findintfep(struct usb_device *dev, unsigned int ep)
{
unsigned int i, j, e;
struct usb_interface *intf;
struct usb_host_interface *alts;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpt;
if (ep & ~(USB_DIR_IN|0xf))
return -EINVAL;
if (!dev->actconfig)
return -ESRCH;
for (i = 0; i < dev->actconfig->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++) {
intf = dev->actconfig->interface[i];
for (j = 0; j < intf->num_altsetting; j++) {
alts = &intf->altsetting[j];
for (e = 0; e < alts->desc.bNumEndpoints; e++) {
endpt = &alts->endpoint[e].desc;
if (endpt->bEndpointAddress == ep)
return alts->desc.bInterfaceNumber;
}
}
}
return -ENOENT;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 53,207 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::Init() {
ResumeBlockedRequestsForFrame();
if (!waiting_for_init_)
return;
waiting_for_init_ = false;
if (pending_navigate_) {
frame_tree_node()->navigator()->OnBeginNavigation(
frame_tree_node(), pending_navigate_->common_params,
std::move(pending_navigate_->begin_navigation_params),
std::move(pending_navigate_->blob_url_loader_factory),
std::move(pending_navigate_->navigation_client),
std::move(pending_navigate_->navigation_initiator));
pending_navigate_.reset();
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,305 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutofillDialogViews::OnWidgetDestroying(views::Widget* widget) {
if (widget == window_)
window_->GetRootView()->RemovePostTargetHandler(event_handler_.get());
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 110,030 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: unsigned long AudioHandler::ChannelCount() {
return channel_count_;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 148,793 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AffineTransform GraphicsContext::getCTM() const
{
#if USE(WXGC)
wxGraphicsContext* gc = m_data->context->GetGraphicsContext();
if (gc) {
wxGraphicsMatrix matrix = gc->GetTransform();
double a, b, c, d, e, f;
matrix.Get(&a, &b, &c, &d, &e, &f);
return AffineTransform(a, b, c, d, e, f);
}
#endif
return AffineTransform();
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t OMX::createInputSurface(
node_id node, OMX_U32 port_index,
sp<IGraphicBufferProducer> *bufferProducer, MetadataBufferType *type) {
return findInstance(node)->createInputSurface(
port_index, bufferProducer, type);
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 160,967 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoGetUniformBlockIndex(
GLuint program,
const char* name,
GLint* index) {
*index = api()->glGetUniformBlockIndexFn(
GetProgramServiceID(program, resources_), name);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,023 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 cookie_hash(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 sport, __be16 dport,
u32 count, int c)
{
__u32 *tmp = __get_cpu_var(ipv4_cookie_scratch);
memcpy(tmp + 4, syncookie_secret[c], sizeof(syncookie_secret[c]));
tmp[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
tmp[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
tmp[2] = ((__force u32)sport << 16) + (__force u32)dport;
tmp[3] = count;
sha_transform(tmp + 16, (__u8 *)tmp, tmp + 16 + 5);
return tmp[17];
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,982 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: asn1_expand_any_defined_by (asn1_node definitions, asn1_node * element)
{
char name[2 * ASN1_MAX_NAME_SIZE + 1],
value[ASN1_MAX_NAME_SIZE];
int retCode = ASN1_SUCCESS, result;
int len, len2, len3;
asn1_node p, p2, p3, aux = NULL;
char errorDescription[ASN1_MAX_ERROR_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
const char *definitionsName;
if ((definitions == NULL) || (*element == NULL))
return ASN1_ELEMENT_NOT_FOUND;
definitionsName = definitions->name;
p = *element;
while (p)
{
switch (type_field (p->type))
{
case ASN1_ETYPE_ANY:
if ((p->type & CONST_DEFINED_BY) && (p->value))
{
/* search the "DEF_BY" element */
p2 = p->down;
while ((p2) && (type_field (p2->type) != ASN1_ETYPE_CONSTANT))
p2 = p2->right;
if (!p2)
{
retCode = ASN1_ERROR_TYPE_ANY;
break;
}
p3 = _asn1_find_up (p);
if (!p3)
{
retCode = ASN1_ERROR_TYPE_ANY;
break;
}
p3 = p3->down;
while (p3)
{
if (!(strcmp (p3->name, p2->name)))
break;
p3 = p3->right;
}
if ((!p3) || (type_field (p3->type) != ASN1_ETYPE_OBJECT_ID) ||
(p3->value == NULL))
{
p3 = _asn1_find_up (p);
p3 = _asn1_find_up (p3);
if (!p3)
{
retCode = ASN1_ERROR_TYPE_ANY;
break;
}
p3 = p3->down;
while (p3)
{
if (!(strcmp (p3->name, p2->name)))
break;
p3 = p3->right;
}
if ((!p3) || (type_field (p3->type) != ASN1_ETYPE_OBJECT_ID)
|| (p3->value == NULL))
{
retCode = ASN1_ERROR_TYPE_ANY;
break;
}
}
/* search the OBJECT_ID into definitions */
p2 = definitions->down;
while (p2)
{
if ((type_field (p2->type) == ASN1_ETYPE_OBJECT_ID) &&
(p2->type & CONST_ASSIGN))
{
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s.%s", definitionsName, p2->name);
len = ASN1_MAX_NAME_SIZE;
result =
asn1_read_value (definitions, name, value, &len);
if ((result == ASN1_SUCCESS)
&& (!_asn1_strcmp (p3->value, value)))
{
p2 = p2->right; /* pointer to the structure to
use for expansion */
while ((p2) && (p2->type & CONST_ASSIGN))
p2 = p2->right;
if (p2)
{
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s.%s", definitionsName, p2->name);
result =
asn1_create_element (definitions, name, &aux);
if (result == ASN1_SUCCESS)
{
_asn1_cpy_name (aux, p);
len2 =
asn1_get_length_der (p->value,
p->value_len, &len3);
if (len2 < 0)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
result =
asn1_der_decoding (&aux, p->value + len3,
len2,
errorDescription);
if (result == ASN1_SUCCESS)
{
_asn1_set_right (aux, p->right);
_asn1_set_right (p, aux);
result = asn1_delete_structure (&p);
if (result == ASN1_SUCCESS)
{
p = aux;
aux = NULL;
break;
}
else
{ /* error with asn1_delete_structure */
asn1_delete_structure (&aux);
retCode = result;
break;
}
}
else
{ /* error with asn1_der_decoding */
retCode = result;
break;
}
}
else
{ /* error with asn1_create_element */
retCode = result;
break;
}
}
else
{ /* error with the pointer to the structure to exapand */
retCode = ASN1_ERROR_TYPE_ANY;
break;
}
}
}
p2 = p2->right;
} /* end while */
if (!p2)
{
retCode = ASN1_ERROR_TYPE_ANY;
break;
}
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (p->down)
{
p = p->down;
}
else if (p == *element)
{
p = NULL;
break;
}
else if (p->right)
p = p->right;
else
{
while (1)
{
p = _asn1_find_up (p);
if (p == *element)
{
p = NULL;
break;
}
if (p->right)
{
p = p->right;
break;
}
}
}
}
return retCode;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 11,285 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::DeviceFound(const std::string& adapter_id,
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device) {
VLOG(2) << "Device found on " << adapter_id;
DCHECK(device);
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction(
"options.SystemOptions.addBluetoothDevice", device->AsDictionary());
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 170,965 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::addResource(const AtomicString& id, RenderSVGResourceContainer* resource)
{
ASSERT(resource);
if (id.isEmpty())
return;
m_resources.set(id, resource);
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_proc_readlink(struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
unsigned int pgbase, unsigned int pglen)
{
struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
int err;
do {
err = nfs4_handle_exception(NFS_SERVER(inode),
_nfs4_proc_readlink(inode, page, pgbase, pglen),
&exception);
} while (exception.retry);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void local_flush_tlb_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned long flags;
unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
if (cpu_context(cpu, mm) == NO_CONTEXT)
return;
local_irq_save(flags);
cpu_context(cpu, mm) = NO_CONTEXT;
if (mm == current->mm)
activate_context(mm, cpu);
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,630 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perf_pmu_start_txn(struct pmu *pmu, unsigned int flags)
{
__this_cpu_write(nop_txn_flags, flags);
if (flags & ~PERF_PMU_TXN_ADD)
return;
perf_pmu_disable(pmu);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,130 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int string2ull(const char *s, unsigned long long *value) {
long long ll;
if (string2ll(s,strlen(s),&ll)) {
if (ll < 0) return 0; /* Negative values are out of range. */
*value = ll;
return 1;
}
errno = 0;
char *endptr = NULL;
*value = strtoull(s,&endptr,10);
if (errno == EINVAL || errno == ERANGE || !(*s != '\0' && *endptr == '\0'))
return 0; /* strtoull() failed. */
return 1; /* Conversion done! */
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 81,811 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnFrameClosed() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
UpdatePlayState();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadItemImpl::GetResponseHeaders() const {
return response_headers_;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 146,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int atl2_sw_init(struct atl2_adapter *adapter)
{
struct atl2_hw *hw = &adapter->hw;
struct pci_dev *pdev = adapter->pdev;
/* PCI config space info */
hw->vendor_id = pdev->vendor;
hw->device_id = pdev->device;
hw->subsystem_vendor_id = pdev->subsystem_vendor;
hw->subsystem_id = pdev->subsystem_device;
hw->revision_id = pdev->revision;
pci_read_config_word(pdev, PCI_COMMAND, &hw->pci_cmd_word);
adapter->wol = 0;
adapter->ict = 50000; /* ~100ms */
adapter->link_speed = SPEED_0; /* hardware init */
adapter->link_duplex = FULL_DUPLEX;
hw->phy_configured = false;
hw->preamble_len = 7;
hw->ipgt = 0x60;
hw->min_ifg = 0x50;
hw->ipgr1 = 0x40;
hw->ipgr2 = 0x60;
hw->retry_buf = 2;
hw->max_retry = 0xf;
hw->lcol = 0x37;
hw->jam_ipg = 7;
hw->fc_rxd_hi = 0;
hw->fc_rxd_lo = 0;
hw->max_frame_size = adapter->netdev->mtu;
spin_lock_init(&adapter->stats_lock);
set_bit(__ATL2_DOWN, &adapter->flags);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <jyackoski@crypto-nite.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 55,350 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void unregister_pernet_subsys(struct pernet_operations *ops)
{
down_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
unregister_pernet_operations(ops);
up_write(&pernet_ops_rwsem);
}
Commit Message: netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <benny@pinkas.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 91,108 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PermissionsRequestFunction::~PermissionsRequestFunction() {}
Commit Message: Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
R=mpcomplete@chromium.org
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,918 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZSTD_CDict* ZSTD_createCDict(const void* dict, size_t dictSize, int compressionLevel)
{
ZSTD_compressionParameters cParams = ZSTD_getCParams(compressionLevel, 0, dictSize);
return ZSTD_createCDict_advanced(dict, dictSize,
ZSTD_dlm_byCopy, ZSTD_dct_auto,
cParams, ZSTD_defaultCMem);
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 90,043 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetProgramiv(GLuint program_id,
GLenum pname,
GLint* params,
GLsizei params_size) {
Program* program = GetProgramInfoNotShader(program_id, "glGetProgramiv");
if (!program) {
return;
}
program->GetProgramiv(pname, params);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int snd_msnd_write_cfg_io1(int cfg, int num, u16 io)
{
if (snd_msnd_write_cfg(cfg, IREG_LOGDEVICE, num))
return -EIO;
if (snd_msnd_write_cfg(cfg, IREG_IO1_BASEHI, HIBYTE(io)))
return -EIO;
if (snd_msnd_write_cfg(cfg, IREG_IO1_BASELO, LOBYTE(io)))
return -EIO;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: msnd: Optimize / harden DSP and MIDI loops
The ISA msnd drivers have loops fetching the ring-buffer head, tail
and size values inside the loops. Such codes are inefficient and
fragile.
This patch optimizes it, and also adds the sanity check to avoid the
endless loops.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196131
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196133
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 64,132 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virDomainPinVcpuFlags(virDomainPtr domain, unsigned int vcpu,
unsigned char *cpumap, int maplen, unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "vcpu=%u, cpumap=%p, maplen=%d, flags=%x",
vcpu, cpumap, maplen, flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(cpumap, error);
virCheckPositiveArgGoto(maplen, error);
if (conn->driver->domainPinVcpuFlags) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainPinVcpuFlags(domain, vcpu, cpumap, maplen, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 93,897 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: reportComment(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *start,
const char *end) {
XML_Char *data;
if (! parser->m_commentHandler) {
if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, start, end);
return 1;
}
data = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc,
start + enc->minBytesPerChar * 4,
end - enc->minBytesPerChar * 3);
if (! data)
return 0;
normalizeLines(data);
parser->m_commentHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, data);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611 | 0 | 88,303 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MagickBooleanType SyncExifProfile(Image *image,StringInfo *profile)
{
#define MaxDirectoryStack 16
#define EXIF_DELIMITER "\n"
#define EXIF_NUM_FORMATS 12
#define TAG_EXIF_OFFSET 0x8769
#define TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET 0xa005
typedef struct _DirectoryInfo
{
unsigned char
*directory;
size_t
entry;
} DirectoryInfo;
DirectoryInfo
directory_stack[MaxDirectoryStack];
EndianType
endian;
size_t
entry,
length,
number_entries;
ssize_t
id,
level,
offset;
static int
format_bytes[] = {0, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 1, 1, 2, 4, 8, 4, 8};
unsigned char
*directory,
*exif;
/*
Set EXIF resolution tag.
*/
length=GetStringInfoLength(profile);
exif=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
if ((id != 0x4949) && (id != 0x4D4D))
{
while (length != 0)
{
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x45)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x78)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x69)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x66)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
if (ReadProfileByte(&exif,&length) != 0x00)
continue;
break;
}
if (length < 16)
return(MagickFalse);
id=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(LSBEndian,exif);
}
endian=LSBEndian;
if (id == 0x4949)
endian=LSBEndian;
else
if (id == 0x4D4D)
endian=MSBEndian;
else
return(MagickFalse);
if (ReadProfileShort(endian,exif+2) != 0x002a)
return(MagickFalse);
/*
This the offset to the first IFD.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,exif+4);
if ((offset < 0) || (size_t) offset >= length)
return(MagickFalse);
directory=exif+offset;
level=0;
entry=0;
do
{
if (level > 0)
{
level--;
directory=directory_stack[level].directory;
entry=directory_stack[level].entry;
}
if ((directory < exif) || (directory > (exif+length-2)))
break;
/*
Determine how many entries there are in the current IFD.
*/
number_entries=ReadProfileShort(endian,directory);
for ( ; entry < number_entries; entry++)
{
int
components;
register unsigned char
*p,
*q;
size_t
number_bytes;
ssize_t
format,
tag_value;
q=(unsigned char *) (directory+2+(12*entry));
tag_value=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q);
format=(ssize_t) ReadProfileShort(endian,q+2);
if ((format-1) >= EXIF_NUM_FORMATS)
break;
components=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+4);
number_bytes=(size_t) components*format_bytes[format];
if ((ssize_t) number_bytes < components)
break; /* prevent overflow */
if (number_bytes <= 4)
p=q+8;
else
{
/*
The directory entry contains an offset.
*/
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,q+8);
if ((size_t) (offset+number_bytes) > length)
continue;
if (~length < number_bytes)
continue; /* prevent overflow */
p=(unsigned char *) (exif+offset);
}
switch (tag_value)
{
case 0x011a:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->resolution.x+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x011b:
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->resolution.y+0.5),p);
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,1UL,p+4);
break;
}
case 0x0112:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) image->orientation,p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) image->orientation,
p);
break;
}
case 0x0128:
{
if (number_bytes == 4)
{
(void) WriteProfileLong(endian,(size_t) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
(void) WriteProfileShort(endian,(unsigned short) (image->units+1),p);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if ((tag_value == TAG_EXIF_OFFSET) || (tag_value == TAG_INTEROP_OFFSET))
{
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,p);
if (((size_t) offset < length) && (level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=directory;
entry++;
directory_stack[level].entry=entry;
level++;
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
if ((directory+2+(12*number_entries)) > (exif+length))
break;
offset=(ssize_t) ReadProfileLong(endian,directory+2+(12*
number_entries));
if ((offset != 0) && ((size_t) offset < length) &&
(level < (MaxDirectoryStack-2)))
{
directory_stack[level].directory=exif+offset;
directory_stack[level].entry=0;
level++;
}
}
break;
}
}
} while (level > 0);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Improve checking of EXIF profile to prevent integer overflow (bug report from Ibrahim el-sayed)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 169,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::CancelRequest(int child_id,
int request_id,
bool from_renderer) {
if (from_renderer) {
if (IsTransferredNavigation(GlobalRequestID(child_id, request_id)))
return;
}
ResourceLoader* loader = GetLoader(child_id, request_id);
if (!loader) {
DVLOG(1) << "Canceling a request that wasn't found";
return;
}
loader->CancelRequest(from_renderer);
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,370 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: megasas_make_sgl_skinny(struct megasas_instance *instance,
struct scsi_cmnd *scp, union megasas_sgl *mfi_sgl)
{
int i;
int sge_count;
struct scatterlist *os_sgl;
sge_count = scsi_dma_map(scp);
if (sge_count) {
scsi_for_each_sg(scp, os_sgl, sge_count, i) {
mfi_sgl->sge_skinny[i].length =
cpu_to_le32(sg_dma_len(os_sgl));
mfi_sgl->sge_skinny[i].phys_addr =
cpu_to_le64(sg_dma_address(os_sgl));
mfi_sgl->sge_skinny[i].flag = cpu_to_le32(0);
}
}
return sge_count;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 90,379 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btif_hl_send_disconnecting_cb(UINT8 app_idx, UINT8 mcl_idx, UINT8 mdl_idx){
btif_hl_mdl_cb_t *p_dcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CB_PTR( app_idx, mcl_idx, mdl_idx);
btif_hl_soc_cb_t *p_scb = p_dcb->p_scb;
bt_bdaddr_t bd_addr;
int app_id = (int) btif_hl_get_app_id(p_scb->channel_id);
btif_hl_copy_bda(&bd_addr, p_scb->bd_addr);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s",__FUNCTION__);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("call channel state callback channel_id=0x%08x mdep_cfg_idx=%d, state=%d fd=%d",p_scb->channel_id,
p_scb->mdep_cfg_idx, BTHL_CONN_STATE_DISCONNECTING, p_scb->socket_id[0]);
btif_hl_display_bt_bda(&bd_addr);
BTIF_HL_CALL_CBACK(bt_hl_callbacks, channel_state_cb, app_id,
&bd_addr, p_scb->mdep_cfg_idx,
p_scb->channel_id, BTHL_CONN_STATE_DISCONNECTING, p_scb->socket_id[0] );
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,748 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s)
{
/*-
* With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
*
* s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
* s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
*
* So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
* handle version.
*/
int server_version = s->method->version;
int client_version = s->client_version;
const version_info *vent;
const version_info *table;
int disabled = 0;
switch (server_version) {
default:
if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
/*
* If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
* (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
* that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
* versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
* ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
*/
return 0;
case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
table = tls_version_table;
break;
case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
table = dtls_version_table;
break;
}
for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
const SSL_METHOD *method;
if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
continue;
method = vent->smeth();
if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
s->version = vent->version;
s->method = method;
return 0;
}
disabled = 1;
}
return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 12,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int SocketStream::DoSSLHandleCertErrorComplete(int result) {
DCHECK_EQ(STATE_NONE, next_state_);
if (result == OK) {
if (!socket_->IsConnectedAndIdle())
return AllowCertErrorForReconnection(&server_ssl_config_);
result = DidEstablishConnection();
} else {
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void autoIncStep(Parse *pParse, int memId, int regRowid){
if( memId>0 ){
sqlite3VdbeAddOp2(pParse->pVdbe, OP_MemMax, memId, regRowid);
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,313 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ass_pre_blur3_vert_c(int16_t *dst, const int16_t *src,
uintptr_t src_width, uintptr_t src_height)
{
uintptr_t dst_height = src_height + 6;
uintptr_t step = STRIPE_WIDTH * src_height;
for (uintptr_t x = 0; x < src_width; x += STRIPE_WIDTH) {
uintptr_t offs = 0;
for (uintptr_t y = 0; y < dst_height; ++y) {
const int16_t *p3 = get_line(src, offs - 6 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *p2 = get_line(src, offs - 5 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *p1 = get_line(src, offs - 4 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *z0 = get_line(src, offs - 3 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *n1 = get_line(src, offs - 2 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *n2 = get_line(src, offs - 1 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
const int16_t *n3 = get_line(src, offs - 0 * STRIPE_WIDTH, step);
for (int k = 0; k < STRIPE_WIDTH; ++k)
dst[k] = pre_blur3_func(p3[k], p2[k], p1[k], z0[k], n1[k], n2[k], n3[k]);
dst += STRIPE_WIDTH;
offs += STRIPE_WIDTH;
}
src += step;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix blur coefficient calculation buffer overflow
Found by fuzzer test case id:000082,sig:11,src:002579,op:havoc,rep:8.
Correctness should be checked, but this fixes the overflow for good.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 73,321 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Node* HTMLSelectElement::namedItem(const AtomicString& name)
{
return options()->namedItem(name);
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 103,083 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool Document::NeedsFullLayoutTreeUpdate() const {
if (!IsActive() || !View())
return false;
if (style_engine_->NeedsActiveStyleUpdate())
return true;
if (style_engine_->NeedsWhitespaceReattachment())
return true;
if (!use_elements_needing_update_.IsEmpty())
return true;
if (NeedsStyleRecalc())
return true;
if (NeedsStyleInvalidation())
return true;
if (ChildNeedsDistributionRecalc())
return true;
if (DocumentAnimations::NeedsAnimationTimingUpdate(*this))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID: | 0 | 144,003 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: user_extension_get_property (User *user,
Daemon *daemon,
GDBusInterfaceInfo *interface,
GDBusMethodInvocation *invocation)
{
const GDBusPropertyInfo *property = g_dbus_method_invocation_get_property_info (invocation);
g_autoptr(GVariant) value = NULL;
value = user_extension_get_value (user, interface, property);
if (value) {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value (invocation, g_variant_new ("(v)", value));
}
else {
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_error (invocation, G_DBUS_ERROR, G_DBUS_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS,
"Key '%s' is not set and has no default value",
property->name);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 4,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetSelectionControllerClientForTest(
std::unique_ptr<TouchSelectionControllerClientAura> client) {
selection_controller_client_.swap(client);
CreateSelectionController();
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 132,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserView::IsAcceleratorRegistered(const ui::Accelerator& accelerator) {
return accelerator_table_.find(accelerator) != accelerator_table_.end();
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 155,213 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: irc_server_outqueue_free (struct t_irc_server *server,
int priority,
struct t_irc_outqueue *outqueue)
{
struct t_irc_outqueue *new_outqueue;
/* remove outqueue message */
if (server->last_outqueue[priority] == outqueue)
server->last_outqueue[priority] = outqueue->prev_outqueue;
if (outqueue->prev_outqueue)
{
(outqueue->prev_outqueue)->next_outqueue = outqueue->next_outqueue;
new_outqueue = server->outqueue[priority];
}
else
new_outqueue = outqueue->next_outqueue;
if (outqueue->next_outqueue)
(outqueue->next_outqueue)->prev_outqueue = outqueue->prev_outqueue;
/* free data */
if (outqueue->command)
free (outqueue->command);
if (outqueue->message_before_mod)
free (outqueue->message_before_mod);
if (outqueue->message_after_mod)
free (outqueue->message_after_mod);
if (outqueue->tags)
free (outqueue->tags);
free (outqueue);
server->outqueue[priority] = new_outqueue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AddColumnWithSideMargin(GridLayout* layout, int margin, int id) {
views::ColumnSet* column_set = layout->AddColumnSet(id);
column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, margin);
column_set->AddColumn(GridLayout::FILL, GridLayout::FILL, 1,
GridLayout::USE_PREF, 0, 0);
column_set->AddPaddingColumn(0, margin);
}
Commit Message: Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <patricialor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 133,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static BROTLI_INLINE int ReadCommandInternal(int safe,
BrotliState* s, BrotliBitReader* br, int* insert_length) {
uint32_t cmd_code;
uint32_t insert_len_extra = 0;
uint32_t copy_length;
CmdLutElement v;
BrotliBitReaderState memento;
if (!safe) {
cmd_code = ReadSymbol(s->htree_command, br);
} else {
BrotliBitReaderSaveState(br, &memento);
if (!SafeReadSymbol(s->htree_command, br, &cmd_code)) {
return 0;
}
}
v = kCmdLut[cmd_code];
s->distance_code = v.distance_code;
s->distance_context = v.context;
s->dist_htree_index = s->dist_context_map_slice[s->distance_context];
*insert_length = v.insert_len_offset;
if (!safe) {
if (PREDICT_FALSE(v.insert_len_extra_bits != 0)) {
insert_len_extra = BrotliReadBits(br, v.insert_len_extra_bits);
}
copy_length = BrotliReadBits(br, v.copy_len_extra_bits);
} else {
if (!SafeReadBits(br, v.insert_len_extra_bits, &insert_len_extra) ||
!SafeReadBits(br, v.copy_len_extra_bits, ©_length)) {
BrotliBitReaderRestoreState(br, &memento);
return 0;
}
}
s->copy_length = (int)copy_length + v.copy_len_offset;
--s->block_length[1];
*insert_length += (int)insert_len_extra;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Cherry pick underflow fix.
BUG=583607
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1662313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373736}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,121 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NTPInfoObserver::OnTopSitesReceived(
const history::MostVisitedURLList& visited_list) {
if (!automation_) {
delete this;
return;
}
ListValue* list_value = new ListValue;
for (size_t i = 0; i < visited_list.size(); ++i) {
const history::MostVisitedURL& visited = visited_list[i];
if (visited.url.spec().empty())
break; // This is the signal that there are no more real visited sites.
DictionaryValue* dict = new DictionaryValue;
dict->SetString("url", visited.url.spec());
dict->SetString("title", visited.title);
list_value->Append(dict);
}
ntp_info_->Set("most_visited", list_value);
AutomationJSONReply(automation_,
reply_message_.release()).SendSuccess(ntp_info_.get());
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,616 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkey_get_details)
{
zval *key;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
BIO *out;
unsigned int pbio_len;
char *pbio;
long ktype;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r", &key) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pkey, EVP_PKEY *, &key, -1, "OpenSSL key", le_key);
if (!pkey) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey);
pbio_len = BIO_get_mem_data(out, &pbio);
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "bits", EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey));
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, "key", pbio, pbio_len, 1);
/*TODO: Use the real values once the openssl constants are used
* See the enum at the top of this file
*/
switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
case EVP_PKEY_RSA2:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_RSA;
if (pkey->pkey.rsa != NULL) {
zval *rsa;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(rsa);
array_init(rsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, n);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, e);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, d);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, dmp1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, dmq1);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(rsa, iqmp);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "rsa", rsa);
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA2:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA3:
case EVP_PKEY_DSA4:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DSA;
if (pkey->pkey.dsa != NULL) {
zval *dsa;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(dsa);
array_init(dsa);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dsa, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dsa, q);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dsa, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dsa, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dsa, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dsa", dsa);
}
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_DH;
if (pkey->pkey.dh != NULL) {
zval *dh;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(dh);
array_init(dh);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dh, p);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dh, g);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dh, priv_key);
OPENSSL_PKEY_GET_BN(dh, pub_key);
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "dh", dh);
}
break;
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_EC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
ktype = OPENSSL_KEYTYPE_EC;
if (pkey->pkey.ec != NULL) {
zval *ec;
const EC_GROUP *ec_group;
int nid;
char *crv_sn;
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
char oir_buf[80];
ec_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey));
nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(ec_group);
if (nid == NID_undef) {
break;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(ec);
array_init(ec);
crv_sn = (char*) OBJ_nid2sn(nid);
if (crv_sn != NULL) {
add_assoc_string(ec, "curve_name", crv_sn, 1);
}
obj = OBJ_nid2obj(nid);
if (obj != NULL) {
int oir_len = OBJ_obj2txt(oir_buf, sizeof(oir_buf), obj, 1);
add_assoc_stringl(ec, "curve_oid", (char*)oir_buf, oir_len, 1);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj);
}
add_assoc_zval(return_value, "ec", ec);
}
break;
#endif
default:
ktype = -1;
break;
}
add_assoc_long(return_value, "type", ktype);
BIO_free(out);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754 | 0 | 4,664 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mime_application_hash (GAppInfo *app)
{
const char *id;
id = g_app_info_get_id (app);
if (id == NULL)
{
return GPOINTER_TO_UINT (app);
}
return g_str_hash (id);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HeadlessTabSocket* HeadlessWebContentsImpl::GetHeadlessTabSocket() const {
return headless_tab_socket_.get();
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 126,856 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebMediaPlayerMS::RepaintInternal() {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
get_client()->Repaint();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,186 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool DefaultBrowserInfoBarDelegate::Accept() {
action_taken_ = true;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS("DefaultBrowserWarning.SetAsDefault", 1);
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::FILE,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(base::IgnoreResult(&ShellIntegration::SetAsDefaultBrowser)));
return true;
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 109,349 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterVICARImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=SetMagickInfo("VICAR");
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadVICARImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteVICARImage;
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsVICAR;
entry->adjoin=MagickFalse;
entry->description=ConstantString("VICAR rasterfile format");
entry->module=ConstantString("VICAR");
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,779 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DestroyTooltip(HWND hControl)
{
int i;
if (hControl == NULL) return;
for (i=0; i<MAX_TOOLTIPS; i++) {
if (ttlist[i].hCtrl == hControl) break;
}
if (i >= MAX_TOOLTIPS) return;
DestroyWindow(ttlist[i].hTip);
safe_free(ttlist[i].wstring);
ttlist[i].original_proc = NULL;
ttlist[i].hTip = NULL;
ttlist[i].hCtrl = NULL;
}
Commit Message: [pki] fix https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768
* This commit effectively fixes https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/403768 (CVE-2017-13083) as
it is described per its revision 11, which is the latest revision at the time of this commit,
by disabling Windows prompts, enacted during signature validation, that allow the user to
bypass the intended signature verification checks.
* It needs to be pointed out that the vulnerability ("allow(ing) the use of a self-signed
certificate"), which relies on the end-user actively ignoring a Windows prompt that tells
them that the update failed the signature validation whilst also advising against running it,
is being fully addressed, even as the update protocol remains HTTP.
* It also need to be pointed out that the extended delay (48 hours) between the time the
vulnerability was reported and the moment it is fixed in our codebase has to do with
the fact that the reporter chose to deviate from standard security practices by not
disclosing the details of the vulnerability with us, be it publicly or privately,
before creating the cert.org report. The only advance notification we received was a
generic note about the use of HTTP vs HTTPS, which, as have established, is not
immediately relevant to addressing the reported vulnerability.
* Closes #1009
* Note: The other vulnerability scenario described towards the end of #1009, which
doesn't have to do with the "lack of CA checking", will be addressed separately.
CWE ID: CWE-494 | 0 | 62,183 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const char *register_lua_inherit(cmd_parms *cmd,
void *_cfg,
const char *arg)
{
ap_lua_dir_cfg *cfg = (ap_lua_dir_cfg *) _cfg;
if (strcasecmp("none", arg) == 0) {
cfg->inherit = AP_LUA_INHERIT_NONE;
}
else if (strcasecmp("parent-first", arg) == 0) {
cfg->inherit = AP_LUA_INHERIT_PARENT_FIRST;
}
else if (strcasecmp("parent-last", arg) == 0) {
cfg->inherit = AP_LUA_INHERIT_PARENT_LAST;
}
else {
return apr_psprintf(cmd->pool,
"LuaInherit type of '%s' not recognized, valid "
"options are 'none', 'parent-first', and 'parent-last'",
arg);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 35,729 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: base::string16 ExtensionInstallPrompt::Prompt::GetPermissionsDetails(
size_t index,
PermissionsType permissions_type) const {
const InstallPromptPermissions& install_permissions =
GetPermissionsForType(permissions_type);
CHECK_LT(index, install_permissions.details.size());
return install_permissions.details[index];
}
Commit Message: Make the webstore inline install dialog be tab-modal
Also clean up a few minor lint errors while I'm in here.
BUG=550047
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1496033003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#363925}
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 131,691 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ar6000_lqThresholdEvent_rx(void *devt, WMI_LQ_THRESHOLD_VAL newThreshold, u8 lq)
{
AR_DEBUG_PRINTF(ATH_DEBUG_INFO,("lq threshold range %d, lq %d\n", newThreshold, lq));
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,199 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::ScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::ScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM*>(
cmd_data);
GLuint filter = c.filter;
if (filter != GL_NEAREST && filter != GL_LINEAR) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM",
"invalid filter");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!dc_layer_shared_state_) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM",
"glScheduleDCLayerSharedStateCHROMIUM has not been called");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei num_textures = c.num_textures;
if (num_textures < 0 || num_textures > 4) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM",
"number of textures greater than maximum of 4");
return error::kNoError;
}
size_t textures_size = num_textures * sizeof(GLuint);
base::CheckedNumeric<uint32_t> data_size = textures_size;
const uint32_t kRectDataSize = 8 * sizeof(GLfloat);
data_size += kRectDataSize;
if (!data_size.IsValid())
return error::kOutOfBounds;
const void* data =
GetAddressAndCheckSize(c.shm_id, c.shm_offset, data_size.ValueOrDie());
if (!data) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
const GLfloat* mem = reinterpret_cast<const GLfloat*>(data);
gfx::RectF contents_rect(mem[0], mem[1], mem[2], mem[3]);
gfx::RectF bounds_rect(mem[4], mem[5], mem[6], mem[7]);
const volatile GLuint* texture_ids = reinterpret_cast<const volatile GLuint*>(
static_cast<const volatile char*>(data) + kRectDataSize);
std::vector<scoped_refptr<gl::GLImage>> images;
for (int i = 0; i < num_textures; ++i) {
GLuint contents_texture_id = texture_ids[i];
scoped_refptr<gl::GLImage> image;
if (contents_texture_id) {
TextureRef* ref = texture_manager()->GetTexture(contents_texture_id);
if (!ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM",
"unknown texture");
return error::kNoError;
}
Texture::ImageState image_state;
image = ref->texture()->GetLevelImage(ref->texture()->target(), 0,
&image_state);
if (!image) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM",
"unsupported texture format");
return error::kNoError;
}
}
images.push_back(image);
}
ui::DCRendererLayerParams params = ui::DCRendererLayerParams(
dc_layer_shared_state_->is_clipped, dc_layer_shared_state_->clip_rect,
dc_layer_shared_state_->z_order, dc_layer_shared_state_->transform,
images, contents_rect, gfx::ToEnclosingRect(bounds_rect),
c.background_color, c.edge_aa_mask, dc_layer_shared_state_->opacity,
filter, c.is_protected_video);
if (!surface_->ScheduleDCLayer(params)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "glScheduleDCLayerCHROMIUM",
"failed to schedule DCLayer");
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 145,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AuthenticatorTouchIdIncognitoBumpSheetModel::GetAcceptButtonLabel() const {
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_WEBAUTHN_TOUCH_ID_INCOGNITO_BUMP_CONTINUE);
#else
return base::string16();
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
}
Commit Message: chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <nsatragno@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 142,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::Replace(const string16& word) {
Send(new ViewMsg_Replace(routing_id_, word));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,692 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void advance()
{
ASSERT(hasMore());
m_colIndex--;
update();
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,145 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: process_rename(u_int32_t id)
{
char *oldpath, *newpath;
int r, status;
struct stat sb;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: rename", id);
logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
/* Race-free rename of regular files */
if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) {
if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP) {
struct stat st;
/*
* fs doesn't support links, so fall back to
* stat+rename. This is racy.
*/
if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) {
if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
status =
errno_to_portable(errno);
else
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
} else {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
}
} else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) {
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
/* clean spare link */
unlink(newpath);
} else
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
} else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) {
if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
status = errno_to_portable(errno);
else
status = SSH2_FX_OK;
}
send_status(id, status);
free(oldpath);
free(newpath);
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 60,367 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void fx_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
fpstate_init(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state);
if (cpu_has_xsaves)
vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state.xsave.header.xcomp_bv =
host_xcr0 | XSTATE_COMPACTION_ENABLED;
/*
* Ensure guest xcr0 is valid for loading
*/
vcpu->arch.xcr0 = XFEATURE_MASK_FP;
vcpu->arch.cr0 |= X86_CR0_ET;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataDirectory::RemoveChildren() {
for (GDataFileCollection::const_iterator iter = child_files_.begin();
iter != child_files_.end(); ++iter) {
if (root_)
root_->RemoveEntryFromResourceMap(iter->second);
}
STLDeleteValues(&child_files_);
child_files_.clear();
for (GDataDirectoryCollection::iterator iter = child_directories_.begin();
iter != child_directories_.end(); ++iter) {
GDataDirectory* dir = iter->second;
dir->RemoveChildren();
if (root_)
root_->RemoveEntryFromResourceMap(dir);
}
STLDeleteValues(&child_directories_);
child_directories_.clear();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 104,704 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ScrollbarTheme& GetScrollbarTheme() {
return GetDocument().GetPage()->GetScrollbarTheme();
}
Commit Message: Reset virtual time state in scrollbar tests
This prevents ScrollbarTestWithVirtualTimer from polluting global state
for tests following it.
Bug: 791742
Change-Id: Iae3440451833408a6a5bd24b3319b307cd6d3547
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/969582
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Clarke <alexclarke@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544691}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 132,187 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void cdc_ncm_update_rxtx_max(struct usbnet *dev, u32 new_rx, u32 new_tx)
{
struct cdc_ncm_ctx *ctx = (struct cdc_ncm_ctx *)dev->data[0];
u8 iface_no = ctx->control->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber;
u32 val;
val = cdc_ncm_check_rx_max(dev, new_rx);
/* inform device about NTB input size changes */
if (val != ctx->rx_max) {
__le32 dwNtbInMaxSize = cpu_to_le32(val);
dev_info(&dev->intf->dev, "setting rx_max = %u\n", val);
/* tell device to use new size */
if (usbnet_write_cmd(dev, USB_CDC_SET_NTB_INPUT_SIZE,
USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_OUT
| USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
0, iface_no, &dwNtbInMaxSize, 4) < 0)
dev_dbg(&dev->intf->dev, "Setting NTB Input Size failed\n");
else
ctx->rx_max = val;
}
/* usbnet use these values for sizing rx queues */
if (dev->rx_urb_size != ctx->rx_max) {
dev->rx_urb_size = ctx->rx_max;
if (netif_running(dev->net))
usbnet_unlink_rx_urbs(dev);
}
val = cdc_ncm_check_tx_max(dev, new_tx);
if (val != ctx->tx_max)
dev_info(&dev->intf->dev, "setting tx_max = %u\n", val);
/* Adding a pad byte here if necessary simplifies the handling
* in cdc_ncm_fill_tx_frame, making tx_max always represent
* the real skb max size.
*
* We cannot use dev->maxpacket here because this is called from
* .bind which is called before usbnet sets up dev->maxpacket
*/
if (val != le32_to_cpu(ctx->ncm_parm.dwNtbOutMaxSize) &&
val % usb_maxpacket(dev->udev, dev->out, 1) == 0)
val++;
/* we might need to flush any pending tx buffers if running */
if (netif_running(dev->net) && val > ctx->tx_max) {
netif_tx_lock_bh(dev->net);
usbnet_start_xmit(NULL, dev->net);
/* make sure tx_curr_skb is reallocated if it was empty */
if (ctx->tx_curr_skb) {
dev_kfree_skb_any(ctx->tx_curr_skb);
ctx->tx_curr_skb = NULL;
}
ctx->tx_max = val;
netif_tx_unlock_bh(dev->net);
} else {
ctx->tx_max = val;
}
dev->hard_mtu = ctx->tx_max;
/* max qlen depend on hard_mtu and rx_urb_size */
usbnet_update_max_qlen(dev);
/* never pad more than 3 full USB packets per transfer */
ctx->min_tx_pkt = clamp_t(u16, ctx->tx_max - 3 * usb_maxpacket(dev->udev, dev->out, 1),
CDC_NCM_MIN_TX_PKT, ctx->tx_max);
}
Commit Message: cdc_ncm: do not call usbnet_link_change from cdc_ncm_bind
usbnet_link_change will call schedule_work and should be
avoided if bind is failing. Otherwise we will end up with
scheduled work referring to a netdev which has gone away.
Instead of making the call conditional, we can just defer
it to usbnet_probe, using the driver_info flag made for
this purpose.
Fixes: 8a34b0ae8778 ("usbnet: cdc_ncm: apply usbnet_link_change")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,646 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void virtio_queue_set_rings(VirtIODevice *vdev, int n, hwaddr desc,
hwaddr avail, hwaddr used)
{
vdev->vq[n].vring.desc = desc;
vdev->vq[n].vring.avail = avail;
vdev->vq[n].vring.used = used;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,238 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int em_sbb(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
emulate_2op_SrcV(ctxt, "sbb");
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 21,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void IRCView::appendBacklogMessage(const QString& firstColumn,const QString& rawMessage)
{
QString time;
QString message = rawMessage;
QString nick = firstColumn;
QString backlogColor = Preferences::self()->color(Preferences::BacklogMessage).name();
m_tabNotification = Konversation::tnfNone;
int eot = nick.lastIndexOf(' ');
time = nick.left(eot);
nick = nick.mid(eot+1);
if(!nick.isEmpty() && !nick.startsWith('<') && !nick.startsWith('*'))
{
nick = '|' + nick + '|';
}
nick.replace('<',"<");
nick.replace('>',">");
QString line;
QChar::Direction dir;
QString text(filter(message, backlogColor, NULL, false, false, false, &dir));
bool rtl = (dir == QChar::DirR);
if(rtl)
{
line = RLE;
line += LRE;
line += "<font color=\"" + backlogColor + "\">%2 %1" + PDF + " %3</font>";
}
else
{
if (!QApplication::isLeftToRight())
line += LRE;
line += "<font color=\"" + backlogColor + "\">%1 %2 %3</font>";
}
line = line.arg(time, nick, text);
doAppend(line, rtl);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 1,736 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: fbCombineDisjointGeneralU (CARD32 *dest, const CARD32 *src, int width, CARD8 combine)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 s = READ(src + i);
CARD32 d = READ(dest + i);
CARD32 m,n,o,p;
CARD16 Fa, Fb, t, u, v;
CARD8 sa = s >> 24;
CARD8 da = d >> 24;
switch (combine & CombineA) {
default:
Fa = 0;
break;
case CombineAOut:
Fa = fbCombineDisjointOutPart (sa, da);
break;
case CombineAIn:
Fa = fbCombineDisjointInPart (sa, da);
break;
case CombineA:
Fa = 0xff;
break;
}
switch (combine & CombineB) {
default:
Fb = 0;
break;
case CombineBOut:
Fb = fbCombineDisjointOutPart (da, sa);
break;
case CombineBIn:
Fb = fbCombineDisjointInPart (da, sa);
break;
case CombineB:
Fb = 0xff;
break;
}
m = FbGen (s,d,0,Fa,Fb,t, u, v);
n = FbGen (s,d,8,Fa,Fb,t, u, v);
o = FbGen (s,d,16,Fa,Fb,t, u, v);
p = FbGen (s,d,24,Fa,Fb,t, u, v);
s = m|n|o|p;
WRITE(dest + i, s);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 11,364 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int ok = 0, n;
X509 *xs, *xi;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb = ctx->verify_cb;
n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
n--;
xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
xs = xi;
else {
if (n <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
ctx->current_cert = xi;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
goto end;
} else {
n--;
ctx->error_depth = n;
xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
}
}
/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
while (n >= 0) {
ctx->error_depth = n;
/*
* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
* explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes
* time.
*/
if (!xs->valid
&& (xs != xi
|| (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
ctx->current_cert = xi;
ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
} else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ctx->current_cert = xs;
ok = (*cb) (0, ctx);
if (!ok) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
goto end;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
}
xs->valid = 1;
ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
if (!ok)
goto end;
/* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
ctx->current_issuer = xi;
ctx->current_cert = xs;
ok = (*cb) (1, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
n--;
if (n >= 0) {
xi = xs;
xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
}
}
ok = 1;
end:
return ok;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 5,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool range_within(struct bpf_reg_state *old,
struct bpf_reg_state *cur)
{
return old->umin_value <= cur->umin_value &&
old->umax_value >= cur->umax_value &&
old->smin_value <= cur->smin_value &&
old->smax_value >= cur->smax_value;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix branch pruning logic
when the verifier detects that register contains a runtime constant
and it's compared with another constant it will prune exploration
of the branch that is guaranteed not to be taken at runtime.
This is all correct, but malicious program may be constructed
in such a way that it always has a constant comparison and
the other branch is never taken under any conditions.
In this case such path through the program will not be explored
by the verifier. It won't be taken at run-time either, but since
all instructions are JITed the malicious program may cause JITs
to complain about using reserved fields, etc.
To fix the issue we have to track the instructions explored by
the verifier and sanitize instructions that are dead at run time
with NOPs. We cannot reject such dead code, since llvm generates
it for valid C code, since it doesn't do as much data flow
analysis as the verifier does.
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 59,159 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: standard_palette_init(standard_display *dp)
{
store_palette_entry *palette = store_current_palette(dp->ps, &dp->npalette);
/* The remaining entries remain white/opaque. */
if (dp->npalette > 0)
{
int i = dp->npalette;
memcpy(dp->palette, palette, i * sizeof *palette);
/* Check for a non-opaque palette entry: */
while (--i >= 0)
if (palette[i].alpha < 255)
break;
# ifdef __GNUC__
/* GCC can't handle the more obviously optimizable version. */
if (i >= 0)
dp->is_transparent = 1;
else
dp->is_transparent = 0;
# else
dp->is_transparent = (i >= 0);
# endif
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,045 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_twarp_context(struct kvec *iov, unsigned int *num_iovec, __u64 timewarp)
{
struct smb2_create_req *req = iov[0].iov_base;
unsigned int num = *num_iovec;
iov[num].iov_base = create_twarp_buf(timewarp);
if (iov[num].iov_base == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
iov[num].iov_len = sizeof(struct crt_twarp_ctxt);
if (!req->CreateContextsOffset)
req->CreateContextsOffset = cpu_to_le32(
sizeof(struct smb2_create_req) +
iov[num - 1].iov_len);
le32_add_cpu(&req->CreateContextsLength, sizeof(struct crt_twarp_ctxt));
*num_iovec = num + 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cifs: Fix use-after-free in SMB2_read
There is a KASAN use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in SMB2_read+0x1136/0x1190
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880b4e45e50 by task ln/1009
Should not release the 'req' because it will use in the trace.
Fixes: eccb4422cf97 ("smb3: Add ftrace tracepoints for improved SMB3 debugging")
Signed-off-by: ZhangXiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> 4.18+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 88,112 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: NavigatorVibration::VibrationPattern Notification::vibrate(bool& isNull) const
{
NavigatorVibration::VibrationPattern pattern;
pattern.appendRange(m_data.vibrate.begin(), m_data.vibrate.end());
if (!pattern.size())
isNull = true;
return pattern;
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | 0 | 119,794 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool valid_arg_len(struct linux_binprm *bprm, long len)
{
return len <= MAX_ARG_STRLEN;
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 30,930 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void sdp_copy_raw_data(tCONN_CB* p_ccb, bool offset) {
unsigned int cpy_len, rem_len;
uint32_t list_len;
uint8_t* p;
uint8_t type;
#if (SDP_DEBUG_RAW == TRUE)
uint8_t num_array[SDP_MAX_LIST_BYTE_COUNT];
uint32_t i;
for (i = 0; i < p_ccb->list_len; i++) {
snprintf((char*)&num_array[i * 2], sizeof(num_array) - i * 2, "%02X",
(uint8_t)(p_ccb->rsp_list[i]));
}
SDP_TRACE_WARNING("result :%s", num_array);
#endif
if (p_ccb->p_db->raw_data) {
cpy_len = p_ccb->p_db->raw_size - p_ccb->p_db->raw_used;
list_len = p_ccb->list_len;
p = &p_ccb->rsp_list[0];
if (offset) {
type = *p++;
p = sdpu_get_len_from_type(p, type, &list_len);
}
if (list_len < cpy_len) {
cpy_len = list_len;
}
rem_len = SDP_MAX_LIST_BYTE_COUNT - (unsigned int)(p - &p_ccb->rsp_list[0]);
if (cpy_len > rem_len) {
SDP_TRACE_WARNING("rem_len :%d less than cpy_len:%d", rem_len, cpy_len);
cpy_len = rem_len;
}
SDP_TRACE_WARNING(
"%s: list_len:%d cpy_len:%d p:%p p_ccb:%p p_db:%p raw_size:%d "
"raw_used:%d raw_data:%p",
__func__, list_len, cpy_len, p, p_ccb, p_ccb->p_db,
p_ccb->p_db->raw_size, p_ccb->p_db->raw_used, p_ccb->p_db->raw_data);
memcpy(&p_ccb->p_db->raw_data[p_ccb->p_db->raw_used], p, cpy_len);
p_ccb->p_db->raw_used += cpy_len;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix copy length calculation in sdp_copy_raw_data
Test: compilation
Bug: 110216176
Change-Id: Ic4a19c9f0fe8cd592bc6c25dcec7b1da49ff7459
(cherry picked from commit 23aa15743397b345f3d948289fe90efa2a2e2b3e)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 1 | 174,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
char buf[256];
u_int i, envsize;
char **env, *laddr;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
char *path = NULL;
#endif
/* Initialize the environment. */
envsize = 100;
env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
env[0] = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* The Windows environment contains some setting which are
* important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
*/
{
char **p;
p = fetch_windows_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_windows_environment(p);
}
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
* the childs environment as they see fit
*/
ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
#endif
if (!options.use_login) {
/* Set basic environment. */
for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name,
s->env[i].val);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
#ifdef _AIX
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
#endif
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
else
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
* important components pointing to the system directories,
* needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
* remains intact here.
*/
# ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
# endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ?
SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
}
# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
_PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
/* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
}
if (getenv("TZ"))
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
/* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */
if (!options.use_login) {
while (custom_environment) {
struct envstring *ce = custom_environment;
char *str = ce->s;
for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++)
;
if (str[i] == '=') {
str[i] = 0;
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1);
}
custom_environment = ce->next;
free(ce->s);
free(ce);
}
}
/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
ssh_local_port(ssh));
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
free(laddr);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
if (s->term)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
if (s->display)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
if (original_command)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
original_command);
#ifdef _UNICOS
if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0')
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir);
#endif /* _UNICOS */
/*
* Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
* must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
* SIA), so copy it to the child.
*/
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
}
#ifdef _AIX
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment");
}
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* Pull in any environment variables that may have
* been set by PAM.
*/
if (options.use_pam) {
char **p;
p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_pam_environment(p);
p = fetch_pam_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_pam_environment(p);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
auth_sock_name);
/* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : "");
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf);
}
if (debug_flag) {
/* dump the environment */
fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
}
return env;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 165,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jbig2_decode_generic_template3_TPGDON(Jbig2Ctx *ctx,
Jbig2Segment *segment,
const Jbig2GenericRegionParams *params, Jbig2ArithState *as, Jbig2Image *image, Jbig2ArithCx *GB_stats)
{
const int GBW = image->width;
const int GBH = image->height;
uint32_t CONTEXT;
int x, y;
bool bit;
int LTP = 0;
for (y = 0; y < GBH; y++) {
bit = jbig2_arith_decode(as, &GB_stats[0x0195]);
if (bit < 0)
return -1;
LTP ^= bit;
if (!LTP) {
for (x = 0; x < GBW; x++) {
CONTEXT = jbig2_image_get_pixel(image, x - 1, y);
CONTEXT |= jbig2_image_get_pixel(image, x - 2, y) << 1;
CONTEXT |= jbig2_image_get_pixel(image, x - 3, y) << 2;
CONTEXT |= jbig2_image_get_pixel(image, x - 4, y) << 3;
CONTEXT |= jbig2_image_get_pixel(image, x + params->gbat[0], y + params->gbat[1]) << 4;
CONTEXT |= jbig2_image_get_pixel(image, x + 1, y - 1) << 5;
CONTEXT |= jbig2_image_get_pixel(image, x, y - 1) << 6;
CONTEXT |= jbig2_image_get_pixel(image, x - 1, y - 1) << 7;
CONTEXT |= jbig2_image_get_pixel(image, x - 2, y - 1) << 8;
CONTEXT |= jbig2_image_get_pixel(image, x - 3, y - 1) << 9;
bit = jbig2_arith_decode(as, &GB_stats[CONTEXT]);
if (bit < 0)
return -1;
jbig2_image_set_pixel(image, x, y, bit);
}
} else {
copy_prev_row(image, y);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 18,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderInline* RenderBlock::inlineElementContinuation() const
{
RenderBoxModelObject* continuation = this->continuation();
return continuation && continuation->isInline() ? toRenderInline(continuation) : 0;
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,218 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int perf_read_one(struct perf_event *event,
u64 read_format, char __user *buf)
{
u64 enabled, running;
u64 values[4];
int n = 0;
values[n++] = perf_event_read_value(event, &enabled, &running);
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_ENABLED)
values[n++] = enabled;
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_TOTAL_TIME_RUNNING)
values[n++] = running;
if (read_format & PERF_FORMAT_ID)
values[n++] = primary_event_id(event);
if (copy_to_user(buf, values, n * sizeof(u64)))
return -EFAULT;
return n * sizeof(u64);
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 56,135 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int floppy_check_events(struct gendisk *disk,
unsigned int clearing)
{
int drive = (long)disk->private_data;
if (test_bit(FD_DISK_CHANGED_BIT, &UDRS->flags) ||
test_bit(FD_VERIFY_BIT, &UDRS->flags))
return DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE;
if (time_after(jiffies, UDRS->last_checked + UDP->checkfreq)) {
if (lock_fdc(drive))
return 0;
poll_drive(false, 0);
process_fd_request();
}
if (test_bit(FD_DISK_CHANGED_BIT, &UDRS->flags) ||
test_bit(FD_VERIFY_BIT, &UDRS->flags) ||
test_bit(drive, &fake_change) ||
drive_no_geom(drive))
return DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: fix div-by-zero in setup_format_params
This fixes a divide by zero error in the setup_format_params function of
the floppy driver.
Two consecutive ioctls can trigger the bug: The first one should set the
drive geometry with such .sect and .rate values for the F_SECT_PER_TRACK
to become zero. Next, the floppy format operation should be called.
A floppy disk is not required to be inserted. An unprivileged user
could trigger the bug if the device is accessible.
The patch checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK for a non-zero value in the
set_geometry function. The proper check should involve a reasonable
upper limit for the .sect and .rate fields, but it could change the
UAPI.
The patch also checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK in the setup_format_params, and
cancels the formatting operation in case of zero.
The bug was found by syzkaller.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 88,826 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int sctp_assoc_set_bind_addr_from_cookie(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_cookie *cookie,
gfp_t gfp)
{
int var_size2 = ntohs(cookie->peer_init->chunk_hdr.length);
int var_size3 = cookie->raw_addr_list_len;
__u8 *raw = (__u8 *)cookie->peer_init + var_size2;
return sctp_raw_to_bind_addrs(&asoc->base.bind_addr, raw, var_size3,
asoc->ep->base.bind_addr.port, gfp);
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 36,258 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int RefreshProxyThruMyProxy(X509CredentialWrapper * proxy)
{
const char * proxy_filename = proxy->GetStorageName();
char * myproxy_host = NULL;
int status;
if (((X509Credential*)proxy->cred)->GetMyProxyServerHost() == NULL) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Skipping %s\n", proxy->cred->GetName());
return FALSE;
}
time_t now = time(NULL);
if (proxy->get_delegation_pid != GET_DELEGATION_PID_NONE) {
time_t time_started = proxy->get_delegation_proc_start_time;
if (now - time_started > 500) {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "MyProxy refresh process pid=%d still running, "
"sending signal %d\n",
proxy->get_delegation_pid, SIGKILL);
daemonCore->Send_Signal (proxy->get_delegation_pid, SIGKILL);
} else {
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "MyProxy refresh process pid=%d still running, "
"letting it finish\n",
proxy->get_delegation_pid);
}
return FALSE;
}
proxy->get_delegation_proc_start_time = now;
Env myEnv;
MyString strBuff;
if (((X509Credential*)proxy->cred)->GetMyProxyServerDN()) {
strBuff="MYPROXY_SERVER_DN=";
strBuff+= ((X509Credential*)proxy->cred)->GetMyProxyServerDN();
myEnv.SetEnv (strBuff.Value());
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "%s\n", strBuff.Value());
}
strBuff="X509_USER_PROXY=";
strBuff+=proxy->GetStorageName();
dprintf (D_FULLDEBUG, "%s\n", strBuff.Value());
const char * myproxy_password =((X509Credential*)proxy->cred)->GetRefreshPassword();
if (myproxy_password == NULL ) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "No MyProxy password specified for %s:%s\n",
proxy->cred->GetName(),
proxy->cred->GetOwner());
myproxy_password = "";
}
status = pipe (proxy->get_delegation_password_pipe);
if (status == -1) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "get_delegation pipe() failed: %s\n", strerror(errno) );
proxy->get_delegation_reset();
return FALSE;
}
write (proxy->get_delegation_password_pipe[1],
myproxy_password,
strlen (myproxy_password));
write (proxy->get_delegation_password_pipe[1], "\n", 1);
const char * username = proxy->cred->GetOrigOwner();
myproxy_host = getHostFromAddr (((X509Credential*)proxy->cred)->GetMyProxyServerHost());
int myproxy_port = getPortFromAddr (((X509Credential*)proxy->cred)->GetMyProxyServerHost());
ArgList args;
args.AppendArg("--verbose ");
args.AppendArg("--out");
args.AppendArg(proxy_filename);
args.AppendArg("--pshost");
args.AppendArg(myproxy_host);
if ( myproxy_host != NULL ) {
free ( myproxy_host );
}
args.AppendArg("--dn_as_username");
args.AppendArg("--proxy_lifetime"); // hours
args.AppendArg(6);
args.AppendArg("--stdin_pass");
args.AppendArg("--username");
args.AppendArg(username);
if (myproxy_port) {
args.AppendArg("--psport");
args.AppendArg(myproxy_port);
}
if ( ((X509Credential*)proxy->cred)->GetCredentialName() &&
( ((X509Credential*)proxy->cred)->GetCredentialName() )[0] ) {
args.AppendArg("--credname");
args.AppendArg(((X509Credential*)proxy->cred)->GetCredentialName());
}
priv_state priv = set_condor_priv();
proxy->get_delegation_err_filename = create_temp_file();
if (proxy->get_delegation_err_filename == NULL) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "get_delegation create_temp_file() failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno) );
proxy->get_delegation_reset();
return FALSE;
}
status = chmod (proxy->get_delegation_err_filename, 0600);
if (status == -1) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "chmod() get_delegation_err_filename %s failed: %s\n",
proxy->get_delegation_err_filename, strerror(errno) );
proxy->get_delegation_reset();
return FALSE;
}
proxy->get_delegation_err_fd = safe_open_wrapper_follow(proxy->get_delegation_err_filename,O_RDWR);
if (proxy->get_delegation_err_fd == -1) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Error opening get_delegation file %s: %s\n",
proxy->get_delegation_err_filename, strerror(errno) );
proxy->get_delegation_reset();
return FALSE;
}
set_priv (priv);
int arrIO[3];
arrIO[0]=proxy->get_delegation_password_pipe[0]; //stdin
arrIO[1]=-1; //proxy->get_delegation_err_fd;
arrIO[2]=proxy->get_delegation_err_fd; // stderr
char * myproxy_get_delegation_pgm = param ("MYPROXY_GET_DELEGATION");
if (!myproxy_get_delegation_pgm) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "MYPROXY_GET_DELEGATION not defined in config file\n");
return FALSE;
}
MyString args_string;
args.GetArgsStringForDisplay(&args_string);
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Calling %s %s\n", myproxy_get_delegation_pgm, args_string.Value());
int pid = daemonCore->Create_Process (
myproxy_get_delegation_pgm, // name
args, // args
PRIV_USER_FINAL, // priv
myproxyGetDelegationReaperId, // reaper_id
FALSE, // want_command_port
&myEnv, // env
NULL, // cwd
NULL, // family_info
NULL, // sock_inherit_list
arrIO); // in/out/err streams
free (myproxy_get_delegation_pgm);
myproxy_get_delegation_pgm = NULL;
if (pid == FALSE) {
dprintf (D_ALWAYS, "Failed to run myproxy-get-delegation\n");
proxy->get_delegation_reset();
return FALSE;
}
proxy->get_delegation_pid = pid;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: heap_get_entry(struct heap_queue *heap)
{
uint64_t a_id, b_id, c_id;
int a, b, c;
struct xar_file *r, *tmp;
if (heap->used < 1)
return (NULL);
/*
* The first file in the list is the earliest; we'll return this.
*/
r = heap->files[0];
/*
* Move the last item in the heap to the root of the tree
*/
heap->files[0] = heap->files[--(heap->used)];
/*
* Rebalance the heap.
*/
a = 0; /* Starting element and its heap key */
a_id = heap->files[a]->id;
for (;;) {
b = a + a + 1; /* First child */
if (b >= heap->used)
return (r);
b_id = heap->files[b]->id;
c = b + 1; /* Use second child if it is smaller. */
if (c < heap->used) {
c_id = heap->files[c]->id;
if (c_id < b_id) {
b = c;
b_id = c_id;
}
}
if (a_id <= b_id)
return (r);
tmp = heap->files[a];
heap->files[a] = heap->files[b];
heap->files[b] = tmp;
a = b;
}
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 61,654 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rb_buffer_peek(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer, u64 *ts,
unsigned long *lost_events)
{
struct ring_buffer_event *event;
struct buffer_page *reader;
int nr_loops = 0;
again:
/*
* We repeat when a time extend is encountered.
* Since the time extend is always attached to a data event,
* we should never loop more than once.
* (We never hit the following condition more than twice).
*/
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, ++nr_loops > 2))
return NULL;
reader = rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer);
if (!reader)
return NULL;
event = rb_reader_event(cpu_buffer);
switch (event->type_len) {
case RINGBUF_TYPE_PADDING:
if (rb_null_event(event))
RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, 1);
/*
* Because the writer could be discarding every
* event it creates (which would probably be bad)
* if we were to go back to "again" then we may never
* catch up, and will trigger the warn on, or lock
* the box. Return the padding, and we will release
* the current locks, and try again.
*/
return event;
case RINGBUF_TYPE_TIME_EXTEND:
/* Internal data, OK to advance */
rb_advance_reader(cpu_buffer);
goto again;
case RINGBUF_TYPE_TIME_STAMP:
/* FIXME: not implemented */
rb_advance_reader(cpu_buffer);
goto again;
case RINGBUF_TYPE_DATA:
if (ts) {
*ts = cpu_buffer->read_stamp + event->time_delta;
ring_buffer_normalize_time_stamp(cpu_buffer->buffer,
cpu_buffer->cpu, ts);
}
if (lost_events)
*lost_events = rb_lost_events(cpu_buffer);
return event;
default:
BUG();
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,518 |
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