instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: node_get_platform(const node_t *node)
{
/* If we wanted, we could record the version in the routerstatus_t, since
* the consensus lists it. We don't, though, so this function just won't
* work with microdescriptors. */
if (node->ri)
return node->ri->platform;
else
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 69,786 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ext3_blkdev_remove(struct ext3_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct block_device *bdev;
int ret = -ENODEV;
bdev = sbi->journal_bdev;
if (bdev) {
ret = ext3_blkdev_put(bdev);
sbi->journal_bdev = NULL;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 32,913 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ip_vs_stats_percpu_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct net *net = seq_file_single_net(seq);
struct ip_vs_stats *tot_stats = &net_ipvs(net)->tot_stats;
struct ip_vs_cpu_stats *cpustats = tot_stats->cpustats;
struct ip_vs_stats_user rates;
int i;
/* 01234567 01234567 01234567 0123456701234567 0123456701234567 */
seq_puts(seq,
" Total Incoming Outgoing Incoming Outgoing\n");
seq_printf(seq,
"CPU Conns Packets Packets Bytes Bytes\n");
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct ip_vs_cpu_stats *u = per_cpu_ptr(cpustats, i);
unsigned int start;
__u64 inbytes, outbytes;
do {
start = u64_stats_fetch_begin_bh(&u->syncp);
inbytes = u->ustats.inbytes;
outbytes = u->ustats.outbytes;
} while (u64_stats_fetch_retry_bh(&u->syncp, start));
seq_printf(seq, "%3X %8X %8X %8X %16LX %16LX\n",
i, u->ustats.conns, u->ustats.inpkts,
u->ustats.outpkts, (__u64)inbytes,
(__u64)outbytes);
}
spin_lock_bh(&tot_stats->lock);
seq_printf(seq, " ~ %8X %8X %8X %16LX %16LX\n\n",
tot_stats->ustats.conns, tot_stats->ustats.inpkts,
tot_stats->ustats.outpkts,
(unsigned long long) tot_stats->ustats.inbytes,
(unsigned long long) tot_stats->ustats.outbytes);
ip_vs_read_estimator(&rates, tot_stats);
spin_unlock_bh(&tot_stats->lock);
/* 01234567 01234567 01234567 0123456701234567 0123456701234567 */
seq_puts(seq,
" Conns/s Pkts/s Pkts/s Bytes/s Bytes/s\n");
seq_printf(seq, " %8X %8X %8X %16X %16X\n",
rates.cps,
rates.inpps,
rates.outpps,
rates.inbps,
rates.outbps);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 34,229 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CLASS ahd_interpolate()
{
int i, j, k, top, left, row, col, tr, tc, c, d, val, hm[2];
ushort (*pix)[4], (*rix)[3];
static const int dir[4] = { -1, 1, -TS, TS };
unsigned ldiff[2][4], abdiff[2][4], leps, abeps;
float r, cbrt[0x10000], xyz[3], xyz_cam[3][4];
ushort (*rgb)[TS][TS][3];
short (*lab)[TS][TS][3], (*lix)[3];
char (*homo)[TS][TS], *buffer;
dcraw_message (DCRAW_VERBOSE,_("AHD interpolation...\n"));
for (i=0; i < 0x10000; i++) {
r = i / 65535.0;
cbrt[i] = r > 0.008856 ? pow(r, (float) (1/3.0)) : 7.787*r + 16/116.0;
}
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
for (j=0; j < colors; j++)
for (xyz_cam[i][j] = k=0; k < 3; k++)
xyz_cam[i][j] += xyz_rgb[i][k] * rgb_cam[k][j] / d65_white[i];
border_interpolate(5);
buffer = (char *) malloc (26*TS*TS); /* 1664 kB */
merror (buffer, "ahd_interpolate()");
rgb = (ushort(*)[TS][TS][3]) buffer;
lab = (short (*)[TS][TS][3])(buffer + 12*TS*TS);
homo = (char (*)[TS][TS]) (buffer + 24*TS*TS);
for (top=2; top < height-5; top += TS-6)
for (left=2; left < width-5; left += TS-6) {
/* Interpolate green horizontally and vertically: */
for (row = top; row < top+TS && row < height-2; row++) {
col = left + (FC(row,left) & 1);
for (c = FC(row,col); col < left+TS && col < width-2; col+=2) {
pix = image + row*width+col;
val = ((pix[-1][1] + pix[0][c] + pix[1][1]) * 2
- pix[-2][c] - pix[2][c]) >> 2;
rgb[0][row-top][col-left][1] = ULIM(val,pix[-1][1],pix[1][1]);
val = ((pix[-width][1] + pix[0][c] + pix[width][1]) * 2
- pix[-2*width][c] - pix[2*width][c]) >> 2;
rgb[1][row-top][col-left][1] = ULIM(val,pix[-width][1],pix[width][1]);
}
}
/* Interpolate red and blue, and convert to CIELab: */
for (d=0; d < 2; d++)
for (row=top+1; row < top+TS-1 && row < height-3; row++)
for (col=left+1; col < left+TS-1 && col < width-3; col++) {
pix = image + row*width+col;
rix = &rgb[d][row-top][col-left];
lix = &lab[d][row-top][col-left];
if ((c = 2 - FC(row,col)) == 1) {
c = FC(row+1,col);
val = pix[0][1] + (( pix[-1][2-c] + pix[1][2-c]
- rix[-1][1] - rix[1][1] ) >> 1);
rix[0][2-c] = CLIP(val);
val = pix[0][1] + (( pix[-width][c] + pix[width][c]
- rix[-TS][1] - rix[TS][1] ) >> 1);
} else
val = rix[0][1] + (( pix[-width-1][c] + pix[-width+1][c]
+ pix[+width-1][c] + pix[+width+1][c]
- rix[-TS-1][1] - rix[-TS+1][1]
- rix[+TS-1][1] - rix[+TS+1][1] + 1) >> 2);
rix[0][c] = CLIP(val);
c = FC(row,col);
rix[0][c] = pix[0][c];
xyz[0] = xyz[1] = xyz[2] = 0.5;
FORCC {
xyz[0] += xyz_cam[0][c] * rix[0][c];
xyz[1] += xyz_cam[1][c] * rix[0][c];
xyz[2] += xyz_cam[2][c] * rix[0][c];
}
xyz[0] = cbrt[CLIP((int) xyz[0])];
xyz[1] = cbrt[CLIP((int) xyz[1])];
xyz[2] = cbrt[CLIP((int) xyz[2])];
lix[0][0] = 64 * (116 * xyz[1] - 16);
lix[0][1] = 64 * 500 * (xyz[0] - xyz[1]);
lix[0][2] = 64 * 200 * (xyz[1] - xyz[2]);
}
/* Build homogeneity maps from the CIELab images: */
memset (homo, 0, 2*TS*TS);
for (row=top+2; row < top+TS-2 && row < height-4; row++) {
tr = row-top;
for (col=left+2; col < left+TS-2 && col < width-4; col++) {
tc = col-left;
for (d=0; d < 2; d++) {
lix = &lab[d][tr][tc];
for (i=0; i < 4; i++) {
ldiff[d][i] = ABS(lix[0][0]-lix[dir[i]][0]);
abdiff[d][i] = SQR(lix[0][1]-lix[dir[i]][1])
+ SQR(lix[0][2]-lix[dir[i]][2]);
}
}
leps = MIN(MAX(ldiff[0][0],ldiff[0][1]),
MAX(ldiff[1][2],ldiff[1][3]));
abeps = MIN(MAX(abdiff[0][0],abdiff[0][1]),
MAX(abdiff[1][2],abdiff[1][3]));
for (d=0; d < 2; d++)
for (i=0; i < 4; i++)
if (ldiff[d][i] <= leps && abdiff[d][i] <= abeps)
homo[d][tr][tc]++;
}
}
/* Combine the most homogenous pixels for the final result: */
for (row=top+3; row < top+TS-3 && row < height-5; row++) {
tr = row-top;
for (col=left+3; col < left+TS-3 && col < width-5; col++) {
tc = col-left;
for (d=0; d < 2; d++)
for (hm[d]=0, i=tr-1; i <= tr+1; i++)
for (j=tc-1; j <= tc+1; j++)
hm[d] += homo[d][i][j];
if (hm[0] != hm[1])
FORC3 image[row*width+col][c] = rgb[hm[1] > hm[0]][tr][tc][c];
else
FORC3 image[row*width+col][c] =
(rgb[0][tr][tc][c] + rgb[1][tr][tc][c]) >> 1;
}
}
}
free (buffer);
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void sched_setnuma(struct task_struct *p, int nid)
{
bool queued, running;
struct rq_flags rf;
struct rq *rq;
rq = task_rq_lock(p, &rf);
queued = task_on_rq_queued(p);
running = task_current(rq, p);
if (queued)
dequeue_task(rq, p, DEQUEUE_SAVE);
if (running)
put_prev_task(rq, p);
p->numa_preferred_nid = nid;
if (running)
p->sched_class->set_curr_task(rq);
if (queued)
enqueue_task(rq, p, ENQUEUE_RESTORE);
task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &rf);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,629 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool __init sparc64_has_aes_opcode(void)
{
unsigned long cfr;
if (!(sparc64_elf_hwcap & HWCAP_SPARC_CRYPTO))
return false;
__asm__ __volatile__("rd %%asr26, %0" : "=r" (cfr));
if (!(cfr & CFR_AES))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 46,737 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ofproto_get_n_tables(const struct ofproto *ofproto)
{
return ofproto->n_tables;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 77,315 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool ExecuteMoveToLeftEndOfLineAndModifySelection(LocalFrame& frame,
Event*,
EditorCommandSource,
const String&) {
frame.Selection().Modify(
SelectionModifyAlteration::kExtend, SelectionModifyDirection::kLeft,
TextGranularity::kLineBoundary, SetSelectionBy::kUser);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Move Editor::Transpose() out of Editor class
This patch moves |Editor::Transpose()| out of |Editor| class as preparation of
expanding it into |ExecutTranspose()| in "EditorCommand.cpp" to make |Editor|
class simpler for improving code health.
Following patch will expand |Transpose()| into |ExecutTranspose()|.
Bug: 672405
Change-Id: Icde253623f31813d2b4517c4da7d4798bd5fadf6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/583880
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#489518}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int f2fs_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int sync)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_SB(sb);
int err = 0;
trace_f2fs_sync_fs(sb, sync);
if (unlikely(is_sbi_flag_set(sbi, SBI_POR_DOING)))
return -EAGAIN;
if (sync) {
struct cp_control cpc;
cpc.reason = __get_cp_reason(sbi);
mutex_lock(&sbi->gc_mutex);
err = write_checkpoint(sbi, &cpc);
mutex_unlock(&sbi->gc_mutex);
}
f2fs_trace_ios(NULL, 1);
return err;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 86,061 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: search_sprinc(kdc_realm_t *kdc_active_realm, krb5_kdc_req *req,
krb5_flags flags, krb5_db_entry **server, const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_principal princ = req->server;
krb5_principal reftgs = NULL;
krb5_boolean allow_referral;
/* Do not allow referrals for u2u or ticket modification requests, because
* the server is supposed to match an already-issued ticket. */
allow_referral = !(req->kdc_options & NO_REFERRAL_OPTION);
if (!allow_referral)
flags &= ~KRB5_KDB_FLAG_CANONICALIZE;
ret = db_get_svc_princ(kdc_context, princ, flags, server, status);
if (ret == 0 || ret != KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY || !allow_referral)
goto cleanup;
if (!is_cross_tgs_principal(req->server)) {
ret = find_referral_tgs(kdc_active_realm, req, &reftgs);
if (ret != 0)
goto cleanup;
ret = db_get_svc_princ(kdc_context, reftgs, flags, server, status);
if (ret == 0 || ret != KRB5_KDB_NOENTRY)
goto cleanup;
princ = reftgs;
}
ret = find_alternate_tgs(kdc_active_realm, princ, server, status);
cleanup:
if (ret != 0 && ret != KRB5KDC_ERR_SVC_UNAVAILABLE) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
if (*status == NULL)
*status = "LOOKING_UP_SERVER";
}
krb5_free_principal(kdc_context, reftgs);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-617 | 0 | 63,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GLint WebGLRenderingContextBase::GetMaxTextureLevelForTarget(GLenum target) {
switch (target) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
return max_texture_level_;
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_X:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_X:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_Y:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_Y:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_POSITIVE_Z:
case GL_TEXTURE_CUBE_MAP_NEGATIVE_Z:
return max_cube_map_texture_level_;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void apply_window_int16_c(int16_t *output, const int16_t *input,
const int16_t *window, unsigned int len)
{
int i;
int len2 = len >> 1;
for (i = 0; i < len2; i++) {
int16_t w = window[i];
output[i] = (MUL16(input[i], w) + (1 << 14)) >> 15;
output[len-i-1] = (MUL16(input[len-i-1], w) + (1 << 14)) >> 15;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 28,097 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void OmniboxViewViews::SelectAllForUserGesture() {
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(omnibox::kOneClickUnelide) &&
UnapplySteadyStateElisions(UnelisionGesture::OTHER)) {
TextChanged();
}
SelectAll(true);
}
Commit Message: omnibox: experiment with restoring placeholder when caret shows
Shows the "Search Google or type a URL" omnibox placeholder even when
the caret (text edit cursor) is showing / when focused. views::Textfield
works this way, as does <input placeholder="">. Omnibox and the NTP's
"fakebox" are exceptions in this regard and this experiment makes this
more consistent.
R=tommycli@chromium.org
BUG=955585
Change-Id: I23c299c0973f2feb43f7a2be3bd3425a80b06c2d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1582315
Commit-Queue: Dan Beam <dbeam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Li <tommycli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654279}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 142,469 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int invlpg_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS))
return emulate_instruction(&svm->vcpu, 0) == EMULATE_DONE;
kvm_mmu_invlpg(&svm->vcpu, svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1);
skip_emulated_instruction(&svm->vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 37,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: sk_sp<PaintRecord> MakeRecord(const FloatRect& rect, Color color) {
rect_ = rect;
PaintRecorder recorder;
PaintCanvas* canvas = recorder.beginRecording(rect);
PaintFlags flags;
flags.setColor(color.Rgb());
canvas->drawRect(rect, flags);
return recorder.finishRecordingAsPicture();
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,717 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: crm_ipc_connect(crm_ipc_t * client)
{
client->need_reply = FALSE;
client->ipc = qb_ipcc_connect(client->name, client->buf_size);
if (client->ipc == NULL) {
crm_debug("Could not establish %s connection: %s (%d)", client->name, pcmk_strerror(errno), errno);
return FALSE;
}
client->pfd.fd = crm_ipc_get_fd(client);
if (client->pfd.fd < 0) {
crm_debug("Could not obtain file descriptor for %s connection: %s (%d)", client->name, pcmk_strerror(errno), errno);
return FALSE;
}
qb_ipcc_context_set(client->ipc, client);
#ifdef HAVE_IPCS_GET_BUFFER_SIZE
client->max_buf_size = qb_ipcc_get_buffer_size(client->ipc);
if (client->max_buf_size > client->buf_size) {
free(client->buffer);
client->buffer = calloc(1, client->max_buf_size);
client->buf_size = client->max_buf_size;
}
#endif
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: High: libcrmcommon: fix CVE-2016-7035 (improper IPC guarding)
It was discovered that at some not so uncommon circumstances, some
pacemaker daemons could be talked to, via libqb-facilitated IPC, by
unprivileged clients due to flawed authorization decision. Depending
on the capabilities of affected daemons, this might equip unauthorized
user with local privilege escalation or up to cluster-wide remote
execution of possibly arbitrary commands when such user happens to
reside at standard or remote/guest cluster node, respectively.
The original vulnerability was introduced in an attempt to allow
unprivileged IPC clients to clean up the file system materialized
leftovers in case the server (otherwise responsible for the lifecycle
of these files) crashes. While the intended part of such behavior is
now effectively voided (along with the unintended one), a best-effort
fix to address this corner case systemically at libqb is coming along
(https://github.com/ClusterLabs/libqb/pull/231).
Affected versions: 1.1.10-rc1 (2013-04-17) - 1.1.15 (2016-06-21)
Impact: Important
CVSSv3 ranking: 8.8 : AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Credits for independent findings, in chronological order:
Jan "poki" Pokorný, of Red Hat
Alain Moulle, of ATOS/BULL
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 86,575 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoundPool::autoPause()
{
ALOGV("autoPause()");
Mutex::Autolock lock(&mLock);
for (int i = 0; i < mMaxChannels; ++i) {
SoundChannel* channel = &mChannelPool[i];
channel->autoPause();
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE SoundPool: add lock for findSample access from SoundPoolThread
Sample decoding still occurs in SoundPoolThread
without holding the SoundPool lock.
Bug: 25781119
Change-Id: I11fde005aa9cf5438e0390a0d2dfe0ec1dd282e8
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,891 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __init reserve_standard_io_resources(void)
{
int i;
/* request I/O space for devices used on all i[345]86 PCs */
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(standard_io_resources); i++)
request_resource(&ioport_resource, &standard_io_resources[i]);
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,805 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int crypto_ccm_base_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
struct rtattr **tb)
{
const char *ctr_name;
const char *cipher_name;
char full_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
ctr_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
if (IS_ERR(ctr_name))
return PTR_ERR(ctr_name);
cipher_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]);
if (IS_ERR(cipher_name))
return PTR_ERR(cipher_name);
if (snprintf(full_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "ccm_base(%s,%s)",
ctr_name, cipher_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
return -ENAMETOOLONG;
return crypto_ccm_create_common(tmpl, tb, full_name, ctr_name,
cipher_name);
}
Commit Message: crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violates the
SG constraints when the stack is virtually mapped.
So move idata/odata back to the request ctx struct, of which we can
reasonably expect that it has been allocated using kmalloc() et al.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 66,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HTMLIFrameElement::ConstructContainerPolicy(Vector<String>* messages,
bool* old_syntax) const {
scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> src_origin = GetOriginForFeaturePolicy();
scoped_refptr<SecurityOrigin> self_origin = GetDocument().GetSecurityOrigin();
Vector<WebParsedFeaturePolicyDeclaration> container_policy =
ParseFeaturePolicyAttribute(allow_, self_origin, src_origin, messages,
old_syntax);
if (AllowFullscreen()) {
bool has_fullscreen_policy = false;
for (const auto& declaration : container_policy) {
if (declaration.feature == WebFeaturePolicyFeature::kFullscreen) {
has_fullscreen_policy = true;
if (messages) {
messages->push_back(
"allow attribute is overriding 'allowfullscreen'.");
}
break;
}
}
if (!has_fullscreen_policy) {
WebParsedFeaturePolicyDeclaration whitelist;
whitelist.feature = WebFeaturePolicyFeature::kFullscreen;
whitelist.matches_all_origins = true;
whitelist.origins = Vector<WebSecurityOrigin>(0UL);
container_policy.push_back(whitelist);
}
}
if (AllowPaymentRequest()) {
bool has_payment_policy = false;
for (const auto& declaration : container_policy) {
if (declaration.feature == WebFeaturePolicyFeature::kPayment) {
has_payment_policy = true;
if (messages) {
messages->push_back(
"allow attribute is overriding 'allowpaymentrequest'.");
}
break;
}
}
if (!has_payment_policy) {
WebParsedFeaturePolicyDeclaration whitelist;
whitelist.feature = WebFeaturePolicyFeature::kPayment;
whitelist.matches_all_origins = true;
whitelist.origins = Vector<WebSecurityOrigin>(0UL);
container_policy.push_back(whitelist);
}
}
return container_policy;
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 150,340 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::AttachToOuterWebContentsFrame(
WebContents* outer_web_contents,
RenderFrameHost* outer_contents_frame) {
CHECK(BrowserPluginGuestMode::UseCrossProcessFramesForGuests());
node_.reset(new WebContentsTreeNode());
node_->ConnectToOuterWebContents(
static_cast<WebContentsImpl*>(outer_web_contents),
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(outer_contents_frame));
DCHECK(outer_contents_frame);
GetRenderManager()->CreateOuterDelegateProxy(
outer_contents_frame->GetSiteInstance(),
static_cast<RenderFrameHostImpl*>(outer_contents_frame));
GetRenderManager()->SetRWHViewForInnerContents(
GetRenderManager()->GetRenderWidgetHostView());
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void testInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::testInterfaceEmptyAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,706 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RenderViewHostImplTestHarness::RenderViewHostImplTestHarness() {
std::vector<ui::ScaleFactor> scale_factors;
scale_factors.push_back(ui::SCALE_FACTOR_100P);
scoped_set_supported_scale_factors_.reset(
new ui::test::ScopedSetSupportedScaleFactors(scale_factors));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,942 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void S_AL_SrcShutup( void )
{
int i;
for(i = 0; i < srcCount; i++)
S_AL_SrcKill(i);
}
Commit Message: Don't open .pk3 files as OpenAL drivers.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,552 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Bool PVDecodeVopHeader(VideoDecControls *decCtrl, uint8 *buffer[],
uint32 timestamp[], int32 buffer_size[], VopHeaderInfo *header_info, uint use_ext_timestamp [], uint8 *currYUV)
{
VideoDecData *video = (VideoDecData *) decCtrl->videoDecoderData;
Vol *currVol;
Vop *currVop = video->currVop;
Vop **vopHeader = video->vopHeader;
BitstreamDecVideo *stream;
int target_layer;
#ifdef PV_SUPPORT_TEMPORAL_SCALABILITY
PV_STATUS status = PV_FAIL;
int idx;
int32 display_time;
/* decide which frame to decode next */
if (decCtrl->nLayers > 1)
{
display_time = target_layer = -1;
for (idx = 0; idx < decCtrl->nLayers; idx++)
{
/* do we have data for this layer? */
if (buffer_size[idx] <= 0)
{
timestamp[idx] = -1;
continue;
}
/* did the application provide a timestamp for this vop? */
if (timestamp[idx] < 0)
{
if (vopHeader[idx]->timeStamp < 0)
{
/* decode the timestamp in the bitstream */
video->currLayer = idx;
stream = video->vol[idx]->bitstream;
BitstreamReset(stream, buffer[idx], buffer_size[idx]);
while ((status = DecodeVOPHeader(video, vopHeader[idx], FALSE)) != PV_SUCCESS)
{
/* Try to find a VOP header in the buffer. 08/30/2000. */
if (PVSearchNextM4VFrame(stream) != PV_SUCCESS)
{
/* if we don't have data for enhancement layer, */
/* don't just stop. 09/07/2000. */
buffer_size[idx] = 0;
break;
}
}
if (status == PV_SUCCESS)
{
vopHeader[idx]->timeStamp =
timestamp[idx] = CalcVopDisplayTime(video->vol[idx], vopHeader[idx], video->shortVideoHeader);
if (idx == 0) vopHeader[idx]->refSelectCode = 1;
}
}
else
{
/* We've decoded this vop header in the previous run already. */
timestamp[idx] = vopHeader[idx]->timeStamp;
}
}
/* Use timestamps to select the next VOP to be decoded */
if (timestamp[idx] >= 0 && (display_time < 0 || display_time > timestamp[idx]))
{
display_time = timestamp[idx];
target_layer = idx;
}
else if (display_time == timestamp[idx])
{
/* we have to handle either SNR or spatial scalability here. */
}
}
if (target_layer < 0) return PV_FALSE;
/* set up for decoding the target layer */
video->currLayer = target_layer;
currVol = video->vol[target_layer];
video->bitstream = stream = currVol->bitstream;
/* We need to decode the vop header if external timestamp */
/* is provided. 10/04/2000 */
if (vopHeader[target_layer]->timeStamp < 0)
{
stream = video->vol[target_layer]->bitstream;
BitstreamReset(stream, buffer[target_layer], buffer_size[target_layer]);
while (DecodeVOPHeader(video, vopHeader[target_layer], TRUE) != PV_SUCCESS)
{
/* Try to find a VOP header in the buffer. 08/30/2000. */
if (PVSearchNextM4VFrame(stream) != PV_SUCCESS)
{
/* if we don't have data for enhancement layer, */
/* don't just stop. 09/07/2000. */
buffer_size[target_layer] = 0;
break;
}
}
video->vol[target_layer]->timeInc_offset = vopHeader[target_layer]->timeInc;
video->vol[target_layer]->moduloTimeBase = timestamp[target_layer];
vopHeader[target_layer]->timeStamp = timestamp[target_layer];
if (target_layer == 0) vopHeader[target_layer]->refSelectCode = 1;
}
}
else /* base layer only decoding */
{
#endif
video->currLayer = target_layer = 0;
currVol = video->vol[0];
video->bitstream = stream = currVol->bitstream;
if (buffer_size[0] <= 0) return PV_FALSE;
BitstreamReset(stream, buffer[0], buffer_size[0]);
if (video->shortVideoHeader)
{
while (DecodeShortHeader(video, vopHeader[0]) != PV_SUCCESS)
{
if (PVSearchNextH263Frame(stream) != PV_SUCCESS)
{
/* There is no vop header in the buffer, */
/* clean bitstream buffer. 2/5/2001 */
buffer_size[0] = 0;
if (video->initialized == PV_FALSE)
{
video->displayWidth = video->width = 0;
video->displayHeight = video->height = 0;
}
return PV_FALSE;
}
}
if (use_ext_timestamp[0])
{
/* MTB for H263 is absolute TR */
/* following line is equivalent to round((timestamp[0]*30)/1001); 11/13/2001 */
video->vol[0]->moduloTimeBase = 30 * ((timestamp[0] + 17) / 1001) + (30 * ((timestamp[0] + 17) % 1001) / 1001);
vopHeader[0]->timeStamp = timestamp[0];
}
else
vopHeader[0]->timeStamp = CalcVopDisplayTime(currVol, vopHeader[0], video->shortVideoHeader);
}
else
{
while (DecodeVOPHeader(video, vopHeader[0], FALSE) != PV_SUCCESS)
{
/* Try to find a VOP header in the buffer. 08/30/2000. */
if (PVSearchNextM4VFrame(stream) != PV_SUCCESS)
{
/* There is no vop header in the buffer, */
/* clean bitstream buffer. 2/5/2001 */
buffer_size[0] = 0;
return PV_FALSE;
}
}
if (use_ext_timestamp[0])
{
video->vol[0]->timeInc_offset = vopHeader[0]->timeInc;
video->vol[0]->moduloTimeBase = timestamp[0]; /* 11/12/2001 */
vopHeader[0]->timeStamp = timestamp[0];
}
else
{
vopHeader[0]->timeStamp = CalcVopDisplayTime(currVol, vopHeader[0], video->shortVideoHeader);
}
}
/* set up some base-layer only parameters */
vopHeader[0]->refSelectCode = 1;
#ifdef PV_SUPPORT_TEMPORAL_SCALABILITY
}
#endif
timestamp[target_layer] = video->currTimestamp = vopHeader[target_layer]->timeStamp;
#ifdef PV_MEMORY_POOL
vopHeader[target_layer]->yChan = (PIXEL *)currYUV;
vopHeader[target_layer]->uChan = (PIXEL *)currYUV + decCtrl->size;
vopHeader[target_layer]->vChan = (PIXEL *)(vopHeader[target_layer]->uChan) + (decCtrl->size >> 2);
#else
vopHeader[target_layer]->yChan = currVop->yChan;
vopHeader[target_layer]->uChan = currVop->uChan;
vopHeader[target_layer]->vChan = currVop->vChan;
#endif
oscl_memcpy(currVop, vopHeader[target_layer], sizeof(Vop));
#ifdef PV_SUPPORT_TEMPORAL_SCALABILITY
vopHeader[target_layer]->timeStamp = -1;
#endif
/* put header info into the structure */
header_info->currLayer = target_layer;
header_info->timestamp = video->currTimestamp;
header_info->frameType = (MP4FrameType)currVop->predictionType;
header_info->refSelCode = vopHeader[target_layer]->refSelectCode;
header_info->quantizer = currVop->quantizer;
/***************************************/
return PV_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix NPDs in h263 decoder
Bug: 35269635
Test: decoded PoC with and without patch
Change-Id: I636a14360c7801cc5bca63c9cb44d1d235df8fd8
(cherry picked from commit 2ad2a92318a3b9daf78ebcdc597085adbf32600d)
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,441 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct lxc_list *idmap_add_id(struct lxc_conf *conf,
uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
int hostuid_mapped = mapped_hostid(uid, conf, ID_TYPE_UID);
int hostgid_mapped = mapped_hostid(gid, conf, ID_TYPE_GID);
struct lxc_list *new = NULL, *tmp, *it, *next;
struct id_map *entry;
new = malloc(sizeof(*new));
if (!new) {
ERROR("Out of memory building id map");
return NULL;
}
lxc_list_init(new);
if (hostuid_mapped < 0) {
hostuid_mapped = find_unmapped_nsuid(conf, ID_TYPE_UID);
if (hostuid_mapped < 0)
goto err;
tmp = malloc(sizeof(*tmp));
if (!tmp)
goto err;
entry = malloc(sizeof(*entry));
if (!entry) {
free(tmp);
goto err;
}
tmp->elem = entry;
entry->idtype = ID_TYPE_UID;
entry->nsid = hostuid_mapped;
entry->hostid = (unsigned long) uid;
entry->range = 1;
lxc_list_add_tail(new, tmp);
}
if (hostgid_mapped < 0) {
hostgid_mapped = find_unmapped_nsuid(conf, ID_TYPE_GID);
if (hostgid_mapped < 0)
goto err;
tmp = malloc(sizeof(*tmp));
if (!tmp)
goto err;
entry = malloc(sizeof(*entry));
if (!entry) {
free(tmp);
goto err;
}
tmp->elem = entry;
entry->idtype = ID_TYPE_GID;
entry->nsid = hostgid_mapped;
entry->hostid = (unsigned long) gid;
entry->range = 1;
lxc_list_add_tail(new, tmp);
}
lxc_list_for_each_safe(it, &conf->id_map, next) {
tmp = malloc(sizeof(*tmp));
if (!tmp)
goto err;
entry = malloc(sizeof(*entry));
if (!entry) {
free(tmp);
goto err;
}
memset(entry, 0, sizeof(*entry));
memcpy(entry, it->elem, sizeof(*entry));
tmp->elem = entry;
lxc_list_add_tail(new, tmp);
}
return new;
err:
ERROR("Out of memory building a new uid/gid map");
if (new)
lxc_free_idmap(new);
free(new);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,570 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableNotifications(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetNotificationsEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 154,647 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int readfull(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb, uint8_t *dst, int n) {
int ret = avio_read(pb, dst, n);
if (ret != n) {
if (ret >= 0) memset(dst + ret, 0, n - ret);
else memset(dst , 0, n);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Failed to fully read block\n");
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.ivr
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,851 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FS_Rename( const char *from, const char *to ) {
char *from_ospath, *to_ospath;
if ( !fs_searchpaths ) {
Com_Error( ERR_FATAL, "Filesystem call made without initialization" );
}
from_ospath = FS_BuildOSPath( fs_homepath->string, fs_gamedir, from );
to_ospath = FS_BuildOSPath( fs_homepath->string, fs_gamedir, to );
if ( fs_debug->integer ) {
Com_Printf( "FS_Rename: %s --> %s\n", from_ospath, to_ospath );
}
FS_CheckFilenameIsMutable( to_ospath, __func__ );
if ( rename( from_ospath, to_ospath ) ) {
FS_Remove( to_ospath );
if ( rename( from_ospath, to_ospath ) ) {
FS_CopyFile( from_ospath, to_ospath );
FS_Remove( from_ospath );
}
}
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,926 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool GLES2Implementation::GetIntegervHelper(GLenum pname, GLint* params) {
return GetHelper(pname, params);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int __glXDisp_CreateGLXPixmapWithConfigSGIX(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXCreateGLXPixmapWithConfigSGIXReq *req =
(xGLXCreateGLXPixmapWithConfigSGIXReq *) pc;
__GLXconfig *config;
__GLXscreen *pGlxScreen;
int err;
if (!validGlxScreen(cl->client, req->screen, &pGlxScreen, &err))
return err;
if (!validGlxFBConfig(cl->client, pGlxScreen, req->fbconfig, &config, &err))
return err;
return DoCreateGLXPixmap(cl->client, pGlxScreen,
config, req->pixmap, req->glxpixmap);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,149 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: png_get_hIST(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr, png_uint_16p *hist)
{
png_debug1(1, "in %s retrieval function", "hIST");
if (png_ptr != NULL && info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_hIST)
&& hist != NULL)
{
*hist = info_ptr->hist;
return (PNG_INFO_hIST);
}
return (0);
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 131,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AXObject* AXObjectCacheImpl::root() {
return getOrCreate(m_document);
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ChromeContentBrowserClient::CheckDesktopNotificationPermission(
const GURL& source_url,
const content::ResourceContext& context) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
ProfileIOData* io_data =
reinterpret_cast<ProfileIOData*>(context.GetUserData(NULL));
const Extension* extension =
io_data->GetExtensionInfoMap()->extensions().GetByURL(source_url);
if (extension &&
extension->HasAPIPermission(ExtensionAPIPermission::kNotification)) {
return WebKit::WebNotificationPresenter::PermissionAllowed;
}
return io_data->GetNotificationService() ?
io_data->GetNotificationService()->HasPermission(source_url.GetOrigin()) :
WebKit::WebNotificationPresenter::PermissionNotAllowed;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 98,727 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_add_timecode_metadata(AVDictionary **pm, const char *key, AVTimecode *tc)
{
char buf[AV_TIMECODE_STR_SIZE];
av_dict_set(pm, key, av_timecode_make_string(tc, buf, 0), 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,564 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SoftAACEncoder2::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
if (!mSentCodecSpecificData) {
if (outQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
if (AACENC_OK != aacEncEncode(mAACEncoder, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
ALOGE("Unable to initialize encoder for profile / sample-rate / bit-rate / channels");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
OMX_U32 actualBitRate = aacEncoder_GetParam(mAACEncoder, AACENC_BITRATE);
if (mBitRate != actualBitRate) {
ALOGW("Requested bitrate %u unsupported, using %u", mBitRate, actualBitRate);
}
AACENC_InfoStruct encInfo;
if (AACENC_OK != aacEncInfo(mAACEncoder, &encInfo)) {
ALOGE("Failed to get AAC encoder info");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
outHeader->nFilledLen = encInfo.confSize;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_CODECCONFIG;
uint8_t *out = outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
memcpy(out, encInfo.confBuf, encInfo.confSize);
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
mSentCodecSpecificData = true;
}
size_t numBytesPerInputFrame =
mNumChannels * kNumSamplesPerFrame * sizeof(int16_t);
if (mAACProfile == OMX_AUDIO_AACObjectELD && numBytesPerInputFrame > 512) {
numBytesPerInputFrame = 512;
}
for (;;) {
while (mInputSize < numBytesPerInputFrame) {
if (mSawInputEOS || inQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
const void *inData = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
size_t copy = numBytesPerInputFrame - mInputSize;
if (copy > inHeader->nFilledLen) {
copy = inHeader->nFilledLen;
}
if (mInputFrame == NULL) {
mInputFrame = new int16_t[numBytesPerInputFrame / sizeof(int16_t)];
}
if (mInputSize == 0) {
mInputTimeUs = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
}
memcpy((uint8_t *)mInputFrame + mInputSize, inData, copy);
mInputSize += copy;
inHeader->nOffset += copy;
inHeader->nFilledLen -= copy;
inHeader->nTimeStamp +=
(copy * 1000000ll / mSampleRate)
/ (mNumChannels * sizeof(int16_t));
if (inHeader->nFilledLen == 0) {
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mSawInputEOS = true;
memset((uint8_t *)mInputFrame + mInputSize,
0,
numBytesPerInputFrame - mInputSize);
mInputSize = numBytesPerInputFrame;
}
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inData = NULL;
inHeader = NULL;
inInfo = NULL;
}
}
if (outQueue.empty()) {
return;
}
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
uint8_t *outPtr = (uint8_t *)outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset;
size_t outAvailable = outHeader->nAllocLen - outHeader->nOffset;
AACENC_InArgs inargs;
AACENC_OutArgs outargs;
memset(&inargs, 0, sizeof(inargs));
memset(&outargs, 0, sizeof(outargs));
inargs.numInSamples = numBytesPerInputFrame / sizeof(int16_t);
void* inBuffer[] = { (unsigned char *)mInputFrame };
INT inBufferIds[] = { IN_AUDIO_DATA };
INT inBufferSize[] = { (INT)numBytesPerInputFrame };
INT inBufferElSize[] = { sizeof(int16_t) };
AACENC_BufDesc inBufDesc;
inBufDesc.numBufs = sizeof(inBuffer) / sizeof(void*);
inBufDesc.bufs = (void**)&inBuffer;
inBufDesc.bufferIdentifiers = inBufferIds;
inBufDesc.bufSizes = inBufferSize;
inBufDesc.bufElSizes = inBufferElSize;
void* outBuffer[] = { outPtr };
INT outBufferIds[] = { OUT_BITSTREAM_DATA };
INT outBufferSize[] = { 0 };
INT outBufferElSize[] = { sizeof(UCHAR) };
AACENC_BufDesc outBufDesc;
outBufDesc.numBufs = sizeof(outBuffer) / sizeof(void*);
outBufDesc.bufs = (void**)&outBuffer;
outBufDesc.bufferIdentifiers = outBufferIds;
outBufDesc.bufSizes = outBufferSize;
outBufDesc.bufElSizes = outBufferElSize;
AACENC_ERROR encoderErr = AACENC_OK;
size_t nOutputBytes = 0;
do {
memset(&outargs, 0, sizeof(outargs));
outBuffer[0] = outPtr;
outBufferSize[0] = outAvailable - nOutputBytes;
encoderErr = aacEncEncode(mAACEncoder,
&inBufDesc,
&outBufDesc,
&inargs,
&outargs);
if (encoderErr == AACENC_OK) {
outPtr += outargs.numOutBytes;
nOutputBytes += outargs.numOutBytes;
if (outargs.numInSamples > 0) {
int numRemainingSamples = inargs.numInSamples - outargs.numInSamples;
if (numRemainingSamples > 0) {
memmove(mInputFrame,
&mInputFrame[outargs.numInSamples],
sizeof(int16_t) * numRemainingSamples);
}
inargs.numInSamples -= outargs.numInSamples;
}
}
} while (encoderErr == AACENC_OK && inargs.numInSamples > 0);
outHeader->nFilledLen = nOutputBytes;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_ENDOFFRAME;
if (mSawInputEOS) {
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
}
outHeader->nTimeStamp = mInputTimeUs;
#if 0
ALOGI("sending %d bytes of data (time = %lld us, flags = 0x%08lx)",
nOutputBytes, mInputTimeUs, outHeader->nFlags);
hexdump(outHeader->pBuffer + outHeader->nOffset, outHeader->nFilledLen);
#endif
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
outInfo = NULL;
mInputSize = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jas_iccattrval_t *jas_iccattrval_create(jas_iccuint32_t type)
{
jas_iccattrval_t *attrval;
jas_iccattrvalinfo_t *info;
if (!(info = jas_iccattrvalinfo_lookup(type)))
goto error;
if (!(attrval = jas_iccattrval_create0()))
goto error;
attrval->ops = &info->ops;
attrval->type = type;
++attrval->refcnt;
memset(&attrval->data, 0, sizeof(attrval->data));
return attrval;
error:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 72,685 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: person_call_default(const person_t* person, person_op_t op, const person_t* acting_person)
{
const person_t* last_acting;
const person_t* last_current;
last_acting = s_acting_person;
last_current = s_current_person;
s_acting_person = acting_person;
s_current_person = person;
script_run(s_def_person_scripts[op], false);
s_acting_person = last_acting;
s_current_person = last_current;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,069 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mrb_obj_methods_m(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value self)
{
mrb_bool recur = TRUE;
mrb_get_args(mrb, "|b", &recur);
return mrb_obj_methods(mrb, recur, self, (mrb_method_flag_t)0); /* everything but private */
}
Commit Message: Allow `Object#clone` to copy frozen status only; fix #4036
Copying all flags from the original object may overwrite the clone's
flags e.g. the embedded flag.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 82,202 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int container_mem_lock(struct lxc_container *c)
{
return lxclock(c->privlock, 0);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than /run/lock/lxc
This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file
on the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,761 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t tun_chr_aio_write(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iv,
unsigned long count, loff_t pos)
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct tun_struct *tun = tun_get(file);
ssize_t result;
if (!tun)
return -EBADFD;
tun_debug(KERN_INFO, tun, "tun_chr_write %ld\n", count);
result = tun_get_user(tun, iv, iov_length(iv, count),
file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
tun_put(tun);
return result;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,844 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void addColorBits(unsigned char* out, size_t index, unsigned bits, unsigned in)
{
unsigned m = bits == 1 ? 7 : bits == 2 ? 3 : 1; /*8 / bits - 1*/
/*p = the partial index in the byte, e.g. with 4 palettebits it is 0 for first half or 1 for second half*/
unsigned p = index & m;
in &= (1u << bits) - 1u; /*filter out any other bits of the input value*/
in = in << (bits * (m - p));
if(p == 0) out[index * bits / 8] = in;
else out[index * bits / 8] |= in;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772 | 0 | 87,452 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rb_simple_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct trace_array *tr = filp->private_data;
struct ring_buffer *buffer = tr->trace_buffer.buffer;
unsigned long val;
int ret;
ret = kstrtoul_from_user(ubuf, cnt, 10, &val);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (buffer) {
mutex_lock(&trace_types_lock);
if (!!val == tracer_tracing_is_on(tr)) {
val = 0; /* do nothing */
} else if (val) {
tracer_tracing_on(tr);
if (tr->current_trace->start)
tr->current_trace->start(tr);
} else {
tracer_tracing_off(tr);
if (tr->current_trace->stop)
tr->current_trace->stop(tr);
}
mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
}
(*ppos)++;
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 96,908 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FileReaderLoader::didFail(const ResourceError&)
{
if (m_errorCode == FileError::ABORT_ERR)
return;
failed(FileError::NOT_READABLE_ERR);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | 0 | 102,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PlatformSensorProviderWin::CreateSensorReader(mojom::SensorType type) {
DCHECK(sensor_thread_->task_runner()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!sensor_thread_->sensor_manager())
return nullptr;
return PlatformSensorReaderWin::Create(type,
sensor_thread_->sensor_manager());
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 149,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::NotifyLayoutTreeOfSubtreeChanges() {
if (!GetLayoutViewItem().WasNotifiedOfSubtreeChange())
return;
lifecycle_.AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kInLayoutSubtreeChange);
GetLayoutViewItem().HandleSubtreeModifications();
DCHECK(!GetLayoutViewItem().WasNotifiedOfSubtreeChange());
lifecycle_.AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kLayoutSubtreeChangeClean);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 134,122 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pump_data_until_message(LoadContext *lc,Image *image) /* ddjvu_context_t *context, type ddjvu_document_type_t */
{
size_t blocksize = BLOCKSIZE;
unsigned char data[BLOCKSIZE];
size_t size;
ddjvu_message_t *message;
/* i might check for a condition! */
size=0;
while (!(message = ddjvu_message_peek(lc->context))
&& (size = (size_t) ReadBlob(image,(size_t) blocksize,data)) == blocksize) {
ddjvu_stream_write(lc->document, lc->streamid, (char *) data, size);
}
if (message)
return message;
if (size)
ddjvu_stream_write(lc->document, lc->streamid, (char *) data, size);
ddjvu_stream_close(lc->document, lc->streamid, 0);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 71,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int copy_page_range(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, struct mm_struct *src_mm,
struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
pgd_t *src_pgd, *dst_pgd;
unsigned long next;
unsigned long addr = vma->vm_start;
unsigned long end = vma->vm_end;
unsigned long mmun_start; /* For mmu_notifiers */
unsigned long mmun_end; /* For mmu_notifiers */
bool is_cow;
int ret;
/*
* Don't copy ptes where a page fault will fill them correctly.
* Fork becomes much lighter when there are big shared or private
* readonly mappings. The tradeoff is that copy_page_range is more
* efficient than faulting.
*/
if (!(vma->vm_flags & (VM_HUGETLB | VM_PFNMAP | VM_MIXEDMAP)) &&
!vma->anon_vma)
return 0;
if (is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma))
return copy_hugetlb_page_range(dst_mm, src_mm, vma);
if (unlikely(vma->vm_flags & VM_PFNMAP)) {
/*
* We do not free on error cases below as remove_vma
* gets called on error from higher level routine
*/
ret = track_pfn_copy(vma);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
/*
* We need to invalidate the secondary MMU mappings only when
* there could be a permission downgrade on the ptes of the
* parent mm. And a permission downgrade will only happen if
* is_cow_mapping() returns true.
*/
is_cow = is_cow_mapping(vma->vm_flags);
mmun_start = addr;
mmun_end = end;
if (is_cow)
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(src_mm, mmun_start,
mmun_end);
ret = 0;
dst_pgd = pgd_offset(dst_mm, addr);
src_pgd = pgd_offset(src_mm, addr);
do {
next = pgd_addr_end(addr, end);
if (pgd_none_or_clear_bad(src_pgd))
continue;
if (unlikely(copy_pud_range(dst_mm, src_mm, dst_pgd, src_pgd,
vma, addr, next))) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
} while (dst_pgd++, src_pgd++, addr = next, addr != end);
if (is_cow)
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end(src_mm, mmun_start, mmun_end);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 57,862 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SyncBackendHost::GetAutofillMigrationState() {
return core_->syncapi()->GetAutofillMigrationState();
}
Commit Message: Enable HistoryModelWorker by default, now that bug 69561 is fixed.
BUG=69561
TEST=Run sync manually and run integration tests, sync should not crash.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7016007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85211 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 101,443 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _server_handle_qTfV(libgdbr_t *g, int (*cmd_cb) (void*, const char*, char*, size_t), void *core_ptr) {
if (send_ack (g) < 0) {
return -1;
}
return send_msg (g, "");
}
Commit Message: Fix ext2 buffer overflow in r2_sbu_grub_memmove
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,146 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LocalFrame::IsUsingDataSavingPreview() const {
if (!Client())
return false;
WebURLRequest::PreviewsState previews_state =
Client()->GetPreviewsStateForFrame();
return previews_state &
(WebURLRequest::kServerLoFiOn | WebURLRequest::kClientLoFiOn |
WebURLRequest::kNoScriptOn);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,858 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: argv_idx(const GArray *a, const guint idx) { return g_array_index(a, gchar*, idx); }
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 18,324 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int vsock_dgram_recvmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
{
return transport->dgram_dequeue(kiocb, vsock_sk(sock->sk), msg, len,
flags);
}
Commit Message: VSOCK: Fix missing msg_namelen update in vsock_stream_recvmsg()
The code misses to update the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore
makes net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage
variable to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Cc: Andy King <acking@vmware.com>
Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@vmware.com>
Cc: George Zhang <georgezhang@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,336 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cfm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *pptr, register u_int length)
{
const struct cfm_common_header_t *cfm_common_header;
const struct cfm_tlv_header_t *cfm_tlv_header;
const uint8_t *tptr, *tlv_ptr;
const uint8_t *namesp;
u_int names_data_remaining;
uint8_t md_nameformat, md_namelength;
const uint8_t *md_name;
uint8_t ma_nameformat, ma_namelength;
const uint8_t *ma_name;
u_int hexdump, tlen, cfm_tlv_len, cfm_tlv_type, ccm_interval;
union {
const struct cfm_ccm_t *cfm_ccm;
const struct cfm_lbm_t *cfm_lbm;
const struct cfm_ltm_t *cfm_ltm;
const struct cfm_ltr_t *cfm_ltr;
} msg_ptr;
tptr=pptr;
cfm_common_header = (const struct cfm_common_header_t *)pptr;
if (length < sizeof(*cfm_common_header))
goto tooshort;
ND_TCHECK(*cfm_common_header);
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (CFM_EXTRACT_VERSION(cfm_common_header->mdlevel_version) != CFM_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CFMv%u not supported, length %u",
CFM_EXTRACT_VERSION(cfm_common_header->mdlevel_version), length));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CFMv%u %s, MD Level %u, length %u",
CFM_EXTRACT_VERSION(cfm_common_header->mdlevel_version),
tok2str(cfm_opcode_values, "unknown (%u)", cfm_common_header->opcode),
CFM_EXTRACT_MD_LEVEL(cfm_common_header->mdlevel_version),
length));
/*
* In non-verbose mode just print the opcode and md-level.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tFirst TLV offset %u", cfm_common_header->first_tlv_offset));
tptr += sizeof(const struct cfm_common_header_t);
tlen = length - sizeof(struct cfm_common_header_t);
/*
* Sanity check the first TLV offset.
*/
if (cfm_common_header->first_tlv_offset > tlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too large, must be <= %u)", tlen));
return;
}
switch (cfm_common_header->opcode) {
case CFM_OPCODE_CCM:
msg_ptr.cfm_ccm = (const struct cfm_ccm_t *)tptr;
if (cfm_common_header->first_tlv_offset < sizeof(*msg_ptr.cfm_ccm)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too small 1, must be >= %lu)",
(unsigned long) sizeof(*msg_ptr.cfm_ccm)));
return;
}
if (tlen < sizeof(*msg_ptr.cfm_ccm))
goto tooshort;
ND_TCHECK(*msg_ptr.cfm_ccm);
ccm_interval = CFM_EXTRACT_CCM_INTERVAL(cfm_common_header->flags);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [CCM Interval %u%s]",
ccm_interval,
cfm_common_header->flags & CFM_CCM_RDI_FLAG ?
", RDI" : ""));
/*
* Resolve the CCM interval field.
*/
if (ccm_interval) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t CCM Interval %.3fs"
", min CCM Lifetime %.3fs, max CCM Lifetime %.3fs",
ccm_interval_base[ccm_interval],
ccm_interval_base[ccm_interval] * CCM_INTERVAL_MIN_MULTIPLIER,
ccm_interval_base[ccm_interval] * CCM_INTERVAL_MAX_MULTIPLIER));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sequence Number 0x%08x, MA-End-Point-ID 0x%04x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(msg_ptr.cfm_ccm->sequence),
EXTRACT_16BITS(msg_ptr.cfm_ccm->ma_epi)));
namesp = msg_ptr.cfm_ccm->names;
names_data_remaining = sizeof(msg_ptr.cfm_ccm->names);
/*
* Resolve the MD fields.
*/
md_nameformat = *namesp;
namesp++;
names_data_remaining--; /* We know this is != 0 */
if (md_nameformat != CFM_CCM_MD_FORMAT_NONE) {
md_namelength = *namesp;
namesp++;
names_data_remaining--; /* We know this is !=0 */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MD Name Format %s (%u), MD Name length %u",
tok2str(cfm_md_nameformat_values, "Unknown",
md_nameformat),
md_nameformat,
md_namelength));
/*
* -3 for the MA short name format and length and one byte
* of MA short name.
*/
if (md_namelength > names_data_remaining - 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too large, must be <= %u)", names_data_remaining - 2));
return;
}
md_name = namesp;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MD Name: "));
switch (md_nameformat) {
case CFM_CCM_MD_FORMAT_DNS:
case CFM_CCM_MD_FORMAT_CHAR:
safeputs(ndo, md_name, md_namelength);
break;
case CFM_CCM_MD_FORMAT_MAC:
if (md_namelength == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MAC %s", etheraddr_string(ndo,
md_name)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MAC (length invalid)"));
}
break;
/* FIXME add printers for those MD formats - hexdump for now */
case CFM_CCM_MA_FORMAT_8021:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, md_name, "\n\t ",
md_namelength);
}
namesp += md_namelength;
names_data_remaining -= md_namelength;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MD Name Format %s (%u)",
tok2str(cfm_md_nameformat_values, "Unknown",
md_nameformat),
md_nameformat));
}
/*
* Resolve the MA fields.
*/
ma_nameformat = *namesp;
namesp++;
names_data_remaining--; /* We know this is != 0 */
ma_namelength = *namesp;
namesp++;
names_data_remaining--; /* We know this is != 0 */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MA Name-Format %s (%u), MA name length %u",
tok2str(cfm_ma_nameformat_values, "Unknown",
ma_nameformat),
ma_nameformat,
ma_namelength));
if (ma_namelength > names_data_remaining) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too large, must be <= %u)", names_data_remaining));
return;
}
ma_name = namesp;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MA Name: "));
switch (ma_nameformat) {
case CFM_CCM_MA_FORMAT_CHAR:
safeputs(ndo, ma_name, ma_namelength);
break;
/* FIXME add printers for those MA formats - hexdump for now */
case CFM_CCM_MA_FORMAT_8021:
case CFM_CCM_MA_FORMAT_VID:
case CFM_CCM_MA_FORMAT_INT:
case CFM_CCM_MA_FORMAT_VPN:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, ma_name, "\n\t ", ma_namelength);
}
break;
case CFM_OPCODE_LTM:
msg_ptr.cfm_ltm = (const struct cfm_ltm_t *)tptr;
if (cfm_common_header->first_tlv_offset < sizeof(*msg_ptr.cfm_ltm)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too small 4, must be >= %lu)",
(unsigned long) sizeof(*msg_ptr.cfm_ltm)));
return;
}
if (tlen < sizeof(*msg_ptr.cfm_ltm))
goto tooshort;
ND_TCHECK(*msg_ptr.cfm_ltm);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(cfm_ltm_flag_values, "none", cfm_common_header->flags)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Transaction-ID 0x%08x, ttl %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(msg_ptr.cfm_ltm->transaction_id),
msg_ptr.cfm_ltm->ttl));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Original-MAC %s, Target-MAC %s",
etheraddr_string(ndo, msg_ptr.cfm_ltm->original_mac),
etheraddr_string(ndo, msg_ptr.cfm_ltm->target_mac)));
break;
case CFM_OPCODE_LTR:
msg_ptr.cfm_ltr = (const struct cfm_ltr_t *)tptr;
if (cfm_common_header->first_tlv_offset < sizeof(*msg_ptr.cfm_ltr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too small 5, must be >= %lu)",
(unsigned long) sizeof(*msg_ptr.cfm_ltr)));
return;
}
if (tlen < sizeof(*msg_ptr.cfm_ltr))
goto tooshort;
ND_TCHECK(*msg_ptr.cfm_ltr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(cfm_ltr_flag_values, "none", cfm_common_header->flags)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Transaction-ID 0x%08x, ttl %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(msg_ptr.cfm_ltr->transaction_id),
msg_ptr.cfm_ltr->ttl));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Replay-Action %s (%u)",
tok2str(cfm_ltr_replay_action_values,
"Unknown",
msg_ptr.cfm_ltr->replay_action),
msg_ptr.cfm_ltr->replay_action));
break;
/*
* No message decoder yet.
* Hexdump everything up until the start of the TLVs
*/
case CFM_OPCODE_LBR:
case CFM_OPCODE_LBM:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ",
tlen - cfm_common_header->first_tlv_offset);
break;
}
tptr += cfm_common_header->first_tlv_offset;
tlen -= cfm_common_header->first_tlv_offset;
while (tlen > 0) {
cfm_tlv_header = (const struct cfm_tlv_header_t *)tptr;
/* Enough to read the tlv type ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 1);
cfm_tlv_type=cfm_tlv_header->type;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t%s TLV (0x%02x)",
tok2str(cfm_tlv_values, "Unknown", cfm_tlv_type),
cfm_tlv_type));
if (cfm_tlv_type == CFM_TLV_END) {
/* Length is "Not present if the Type field is 0." */
return;
}
/* do we have the full tlv header ? */
if (tlen < sizeof(struct cfm_tlv_header_t))
goto tooshort;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct cfm_tlv_header_t));
cfm_tlv_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(&cfm_tlv_header->length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", cfm_tlv_len));
tptr += sizeof(struct cfm_tlv_header_t);
tlen -= sizeof(struct cfm_tlv_header_t);
tlv_ptr = tptr;
/* do we have the full tlv ? */
if (tlen < cfm_tlv_len)
goto tooshort;
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, cfm_tlv_len);
hexdump = FALSE;
switch(cfm_tlv_type) {
case CFM_TLV_PORT_STATUS:
if (cfm_tlv_len < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too short, must be >= 1)"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Status: %s (%u)",
tok2str(cfm_tlv_port_status_values, "Unknown", *tptr),
*tptr));
break;
case CFM_TLV_INTERFACE_STATUS:
if (cfm_tlv_len < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too short, must be >= 1)"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Status: %s (%u)",
tok2str(cfm_tlv_interface_status_values, "Unknown", *tptr),
*tptr));
break;
case CFM_TLV_PRIVATE:
if (cfm_tlv_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too short, must be >= 4)"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Vendor: %s (%u), Sub-Type %u",
tok2str(oui_values,"Unknown", EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr)),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr),
*(tptr + 3)));
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
case CFM_TLV_SENDER_ID:
{
u_int chassis_id_type, chassis_id_length;
u_int mgmt_addr_length;
if (cfm_tlv_len < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (too short, must be >= 1)"));
return;
}
/*
* Get the Chassis ID length and check it.
*/
chassis_id_length = *tptr;
tptr++;
tlen--;
cfm_tlv_len--;
if (chassis_id_length) {
if (cfm_tlv_len < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (TLV too short)"));
return;
}
chassis_id_type = *tptr;
cfm_tlv_len--;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Chassis-ID Type %s (%u), Chassis-ID length %u",
tok2str(cfm_tlv_senderid_chassisid_values,
"Unknown",
chassis_id_type),
chassis_id_type,
chassis_id_length));
if (cfm_tlv_len < chassis_id_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (TLV too short)"));
return;
}
switch (chassis_id_type) {
case CFM_CHASSIS_ID_MAC_ADDRESS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MAC %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, tptr + 1)));
break;
case CFM_CHASSIS_ID_NETWORK_ADDRESS:
hexdump |= cfm_network_addr_print(ndo, tptr);
break;
case CFM_CHASSIS_ID_INTERFACE_NAME: /* fall through */
case CFM_CHASSIS_ID_INTERFACE_ALIAS:
case CFM_CHASSIS_ID_LOCAL:
case CFM_CHASSIS_ID_CHASSIS_COMPONENT:
case CFM_CHASSIS_ID_PORT_COMPONENT:
safeputs(ndo, tptr + 1, chassis_id_length);
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
cfm_tlv_len -= chassis_id_length;
tptr += 1 + chassis_id_length;
tlen -= 1 + chassis_id_length;
}
/*
* Check if there is a Management Address.
*/
if (cfm_tlv_len == 0) {
/* No, there isn't; we're done. */
return;
}
mgmt_addr_length = *tptr;
tptr++;
tlen--;
cfm_tlv_len--;
if (mgmt_addr_length) {
if (cfm_tlv_len < mgmt_addr_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (TLV too short)"));
return;
}
cfm_tlv_len -= mgmt_addr_length;
/*
* XXX - this is an OID; print it as such.
*/
tptr += mgmt_addr_length;
tlen -= mgmt_addr_length;
if (cfm_tlv_len < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (TLV too short)"));
return;
}
mgmt_addr_length = *tptr;
tptr++;
tlen--;
cfm_tlv_len--;
if (mgmt_addr_length) {
if (cfm_tlv_len < mgmt_addr_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (TLV too short)"));
return;
}
cfm_tlv_len -= mgmt_addr_length;
/*
* XXX - this is a TransportDomain; print it as such.
*/
tptr += mgmt_addr_length;
tlen -= mgmt_addr_length;
}
}
break;
}
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case CFM_TLV_DATA:
case CFM_TLV_REPLY_INGRESS:
case CFM_TLV_REPLY_EGRESS:
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additional hexdump ? */
if (hexdump || ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tlv_ptr, "\n\t ", cfm_tlv_len);
tptr+=cfm_tlv_len;
tlen-=cfm_tlv_len;
}
return;
tooshort:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet is too short"));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13052/CFM: refine decoding of the Sender ID TLV
In cfm_network_addr_print() add a length argument and use it to validate
the input buffer.
In cfm_print() add a length check for MAC address chassis ID. Supply
cfm_network_addr_print() with the length of its buffer and a correct
pointer to the buffer (it was off-by-one before). Change some error
handling blocks to skip to the next TLV in the current PDU rather than to
stop decoding the PDU. Print the management domain and address contents,
although in hex only so far.
Add some comments to clarify the code flow and to tell exact sections in
IEEE standard documents. Add new error messages and make some existing
messages more specific.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 167,822 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nested_ept_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct x86_exception *fault)
{
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason;
unsigned long exit_qualification = vcpu->arch.exit_qualification;
if (vmx->nested.pml_full) {
exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL;
vmx->nested.pml_full = false;
exit_qualification &= INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI;
} else if (fault->error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK)
exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG;
else
exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION;
nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason, 0, exit_qualification);
vmcs12->guest_physical_address = fault->address;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 62,993 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void enforcedRangeOctetAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::enforcedRangeOctetAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 121,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CStarter::Remove( ) {
bool jobRunning = false;
UserProc *job;
dprintf( D_ALWAYS, "Remove all jobs\n" );
if ( this->deferral_tid != -1 ) {
this->removeDeferredJobs();
}
m_job_list.Rewind();
while( (job = m_job_list.Next()) != NULL ) {
if( job->Remove() ) {
m_job_list.DeleteCurrent();
delete job;
} else {
jobRunning = true;
}
}
ShuttingDown = TRUE;
return ( !jobRunning );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134 | 0 | 16,400 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init efx_init_module(void)
{
int rc;
printk(KERN_INFO "Solarflare NET driver v" EFX_DRIVER_VERSION "\n");
rc = register_netdevice_notifier(&efx_netdev_notifier);
if (rc)
goto err_notifier;
reset_workqueue = create_singlethread_workqueue("sfc_reset");
if (!reset_workqueue) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto err_reset;
}
rc = pci_register_driver(&efx_pci_driver);
if (rc < 0)
goto err_pci;
return 0;
err_pci:
destroy_workqueue(reset_workqueue);
err_reset:
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&efx_netdev_notifier);
err_notifier:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <bhutchings@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 19,380 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int khugepaged_enter_vma_merge(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long hstart, hend;
if (!vma->anon_vma)
/*
* Not yet faulted in so we will register later in the
* page fault if needed.
*/
return 0;
if (vma->vm_file || vma->vm_ops)
/* khugepaged not yet working on file or special mappings */
return 0;
VM_BUG_ON(is_linear_pfn_mapping(vma) || is_pfn_mapping(vma));
hstart = (vma->vm_start + ~HPAGE_PMD_MASK) & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
hend = vma->vm_end & HPAGE_PMD_MASK;
if (hstart < hend)
return khugepaged_enter(vma);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE and vm_flags cleanups
The huge_memory.c THP page fault was allowed to run if vm_ops was null
(which would succeed for /dev/zero MAP_PRIVATE, as the f_op->mmap wouldn't
setup a special vma->vm_ops and it would fallback to regular anonymous
memory) but other THP logics weren't fully activated for vmas with vm_file
not NULL (/dev/zero has a not NULL vma->vm_file).
So this removes the vm_file checks so that /dev/zero also can safely use
THP (the other albeit safer approach to fix this bug would have been to
prevent the THP initial page fault to run if vm_file was set).
After removing the vm_file checks, this also makes huge_memory.c stricter
in khugepaged for the DEBUG_VM=y case. It doesn't replace the vm_file
check with a is_pfn_mapping check (but it keeps checking for VM_PFNMAP
under VM_BUG_ON) because for a is_cow_mapping() mapping VM_PFNMAP should
only be allowed to exist before the first page fault, and in turn when
vma->anon_vma is null (so preventing khugepaged registration). So I tend
to think the previous comment saying if vm_file was set, VM_PFNMAP might
have been set and we could still be registered in khugepaged (despite
anon_vma was not NULL to be registered in khugepaged) was too paranoid.
The is_linear_pfn_mapping check is also I think superfluous (as described
by comment) but under DEBUG_VM it is safe to stay.
Addresses https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33682
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Caspar Zhang <bugs@casparzhang.com>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.38.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,227 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: hook_modifier_exec (struct t_weechat_plugin *plugin, const char *modifier,
const char *modifier_data, const char *string)
{
struct t_hook *ptr_hook, *next_hook;
char *new_msg, *message_modified;
/* make C compiler happy */
(void) plugin;
if (!modifier || !modifier[0])
return NULL;
new_msg = NULL;
message_modified = strdup (string);
if (!message_modified)
return NULL;
hook_exec_start ();
ptr_hook = weechat_hooks[HOOK_TYPE_MODIFIER];
while (ptr_hook)
{
next_hook = ptr_hook->next_hook;
if (!ptr_hook->deleted
&& !ptr_hook->running
&& (string_strcasecmp (HOOK_MODIFIER(ptr_hook, modifier),
modifier) == 0))
{
ptr_hook->running = 1;
new_msg = (HOOK_MODIFIER(ptr_hook, callback))
(ptr_hook->callback_data, modifier, modifier_data,
message_modified);
ptr_hook->running = 0;
/* empty string returned => message dropped */
if (new_msg && !new_msg[0])
{
free (message_modified);
hook_exec_end ();
return new_msg;
}
/* new message => keep it as base for next modifier */
if (new_msg)
{
free (message_modified);
message_modified = new_msg;
}
}
ptr_hook = next_hook;
}
hook_exec_end ();
return message_modified;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 7,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: gsicc_set_profile(gsicc_manager_t *icc_manager, const char* pname, int namelen,
gsicc_profile_t defaulttype)
{
cmm_profile_t *icc_profile;
cmm_profile_t **manager_default_profile = NULL; /* quite compiler */
stream *str;
gs_memory_t *mem_gc = icc_manager->memory;
int code;
int k;
int num_comps = 0;
gsicc_colorbuffer_t default_space; /* Used to verify that we have the correct type */
/* We need to check for the smask swapped profile condition. If we are in
that state, then any requests for setting the profile will be ignored.
This is valid, since we are in the middle of drawing right now and this
only would occur if we are doing a vmreclaim while in the middle of
soft mask rendering */
default_space = gsUNDEFINED;
if (icc_manager->smask_profiles !=NULL &&
icc_manager->smask_profiles->swapped == true) {
return 0;
} else {
switch(defaulttype) {
case DEFAULT_GRAY:
manager_default_profile = &(icc_manager->default_gray);
default_space = gsGRAY;
num_comps = 1;
break;
case DEFAULT_RGB:
manager_default_profile = &(icc_manager->default_rgb);
default_space = gsRGB;
num_comps = 3;
break;
case DEFAULT_CMYK:
manager_default_profile = &(icc_manager->default_cmyk);
default_space = gsCMYK;
num_comps = 4;
break;
case NAMED_TYPE:
manager_default_profile = &(icc_manager->device_named);
default_space = gsNAMED;
break;
case LAB_TYPE:
manager_default_profile = &(icc_manager->lab_profile);
num_comps = 3;
default_space = gsCIELAB;
break;
case DEVICEN_TYPE:
manager_default_profile = NULL;
default_space = gsNCHANNEL;
break;
case DEFAULT_NONE:
default:
return 0;
break;
}
}
/* If it is not NULL then it has already been set. If it is different than
what we already have then we will want to free it. Since other
gs_gstates could have different default profiles, this is done via reference
counting. If it is the same as what we already have then we DONT
increment, since that is done when the gs_gstate is duplicated. It
could be the same, due to a resetting of the user params. To avoid
recreating the profile data, we compare the string names. */
if (defaulttype != DEVICEN_TYPE && (*manager_default_profile) != NULL) {
/* Check if this is what we already have. Also check if it is the
output intent profile. */
icc_profile = *manager_default_profile;
if ( namelen == icc_profile->name_length ) {
if( memcmp(pname, icc_profile->name, namelen) == 0)
return 0;
}
if (strncmp(icc_profile->name, OI_PROFILE,
strlen(icc_profile->name)) == 0) {
return 0;
}
rc_decrement(icc_profile,"gsicc_set_profile");
}
/* We need to do a special check for DeviceN since we have a linked list of
profiles and we can have multiple specifications */
if (defaulttype == DEVICEN_TYPE) {
if (icc_manager->device_n != NULL) {
gsicc_devicen_entry_t *current_entry = icc_manager->device_n->head;
for (k = 0; k < icc_manager->device_n->count; k++) {
if (current_entry->iccprofile != NULL) {
icc_profile = current_entry->iccprofile;
if (namelen == icc_profile->name_length)
if (memcmp(pname, icc_profile->name, namelen) == 0)
return 0;
}
current_entry = current_entry->next;
}
}
/* An entry was not found. We need to create a new one to use */
code = gsicc_new_devicen(icc_manager);
if (code < 0)
return code;
manager_default_profile = &(icc_manager->device_n->final->iccprofile);
}
code = gsicc_open_search(pname, namelen, mem_gc, mem_gc->gs_lib_ctx->profiledir,
mem_gc->gs_lib_ctx->profiledir_len, &str);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (str != NULL) {
icc_profile = gsicc_profile_new(str, mem_gc, pname, namelen);
/* Add check so that we detect cases where we are loading a named
color structure that is not a standard profile type */
if (icc_profile == NULL && defaulttype == NAMED_TYPE) {
/* Failed to load the named color profile. Just load the file
into the buffer as it is. The profile_handle member
variable can then be used to hold the named color
structure that is actually search. This is created later
when needed. */
char *nameptr;
icc_profile = gsicc_profile_new(NULL, mem_gc, NULL, 0);
if (icc_profile == NULL)
return gs_throw(gs_error_VMerror, "Creation of ICC profile failed");
icc_profile->data_cs = gsNAMED;
code = gsicc_load_namedcolor_buffer(icc_profile, str, mem_gc);
if (code < 0) return gs_throw1(-1, "problems with profile %s", pname);
*manager_default_profile = icc_profile;
nameptr = (char*) gs_alloc_bytes(icc_profile->memory, namelen+1,
"gsicc_set_profile");
if (nameptr == NULL)
return gs_throw(gs_error_VMerror, "Insufficient memory for profile name");
memcpy(nameptr, pname, namelen);
nameptr[namelen] = '\0';
icc_profile->name = nameptr;
icc_profile->name_length = namelen;
return 0; /* Done now, since this is not a standard ICC profile */
}
code = sfclose(str);
if (icc_profile == NULL) {
return gs_throw1(-1, "problems with profile %s",pname);
}
*manager_default_profile = icc_profile;
icc_profile->default_match = defaulttype;
if (defaulttype == LAB_TYPE)
icc_profile->islab = true;
if ( defaulttype == DEVICEN_TYPE ) {
/* Lets get the name information out of the profile.
The names are contained in the icSigNamedColor2Tag
item. The table is in the A2B0Tag item.
The names are in the order such that the fastest
index in the table is the first name */
gsicc_get_devicen_names(icc_profile, icc_manager->memory);
/* Init this profile now */
code = gsicc_init_profile_info(icc_profile);
if (code < 0) return gs_throw1(-1, "problems with profile %s", pname);
} else {
/* Delay the loading of the handle buffer until we need the profile.
But set some basic stuff that we need. Take care of DeviceN
profile now, since we don't know the number of components etc */
icc_profile->num_comps = num_comps;
icc_profile->num_comps_out = 3;
gscms_set_icc_range(&icc_profile);
icc_profile->data_cs = default_space;
}
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::ClearFocusedElement() {
SetFocusedElement(nullptr, FocusParams(SelectionBehaviorOnFocus::kNone,
kWebFocusTypeNone, nullptr));
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,615 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void impeg2d_fill_mem_rec(impeg2d_fill_mem_rec_ip_t *ps_ip,
impeg2d_fill_mem_rec_op_t *ps_op)
{
UWORD32 u4_i;
UWORD8 u1_no_rec = 0;
UWORD32 max_frm_width,max_frm_height,max_frm_size;
iv_mem_rec_t *ps_mem_rec = ps_ip->s_ivd_fill_mem_rec_ip_t.pv_mem_rec_location;
WORD32 i4_num_threads;
WORD32 i4_share_disp_buf, i4_chroma_format;
WORD32 i4_chroma_size;
UWORD32 u4_deinterlace;
UNUSED(u4_deinterlace);
max_frm_width = ALIGN16(ps_ip->s_ivd_fill_mem_rec_ip_t.u4_max_frm_wd);
max_frm_height = ALIGN16(ps_ip->s_ivd_fill_mem_rec_ip_t.u4_max_frm_ht);
max_frm_size = (max_frm_width * max_frm_height * 3) >> 1;/* 420 P */
i4_chroma_size = max_frm_width * max_frm_height / 4;
if(ps_ip->s_ivd_fill_mem_rec_ip_t.u4_size > offsetof(impeg2d_fill_mem_rec_ip_t, u4_share_disp_buf))
{
#ifndef LOGO_EN
i4_share_disp_buf = ps_ip->u4_share_disp_buf;
#else
i4_share_disp_buf = 0;
#endif
}
else
{
i4_share_disp_buf = 0;
}
if(ps_ip->s_ivd_fill_mem_rec_ip_t.u4_size > offsetof(impeg2d_fill_mem_rec_ip_t, e_output_format))
{
i4_chroma_format = ps_ip->e_output_format;
}
else
{
i4_chroma_format = -1;
}
if(ps_ip->s_ivd_fill_mem_rec_ip_t.u4_size > offsetof(impeg2d_fill_mem_rec_ip_t, u4_deinterlace))
{
u4_deinterlace = ps_ip->u4_deinterlace;
}
else
{
u4_deinterlace = 0;
}
if( (i4_chroma_format != IV_YUV_420P) &&
(i4_chroma_format != IV_YUV_420SP_UV) &&
(i4_chroma_format != IV_YUV_420SP_VU))
{
i4_share_disp_buf = 0;
}
/* Disable deinterlacer in shared mode */
if(i4_share_disp_buf)
{
u4_deinterlace = 0;
}
/*************************************************************************/
/* Fill the memory requirement XDM Handle */
/*************************************************************************/
/* ! */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128 /* 128 byte alignment*/;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_PERSISTENT_MEM;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = sizeof(iv_obj_t);
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
{
/*************************************************************************/
/* Fill the memory requirement for threads context */
/*************************************************************************/
/* ! */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128 /* 128 byte alignment*/;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_PERSISTENT_MEM;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = sizeof(dec_state_multi_core_t);
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
}
for(i4_num_threads = 0; i4_num_threads < MAX_THREADS; i4_num_threads++)
{
/*************************************************************************/
/* Fill the memory requirement for MPEG2 Decoder Context */
/*************************************************************************/
/* ! */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128 /* 128 byte alignment*/;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_PERSISTENT_MEM;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = sizeof(dec_state_t);
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
/* To store thread handle */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128 /* 128 byte alignment*/;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_PERSISTENT_MEM;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = ithread_get_handle_size();
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
/*************************************************************************/
/* Fill the memory requirement for Motion Compensation Buffers */
/*************************************************************************/
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128 /* 128 byte alignment*/;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_SCRATCH_MEM;
/* for mc_fw_buf.pu1_y */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = MB_LUMA_MEM_SIZE;
/* for mc_fw_buf.pu1_u */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size += MB_CHROMA_MEM_SIZE;
/* for mc_fw_buf.pu1_v */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size += MB_CHROMA_MEM_SIZE;
/* for mc_bk_buf.pu1_y */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size += MB_LUMA_MEM_SIZE;
/* for mc_bk_buf.pu1_u */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size += MB_CHROMA_MEM_SIZE;
/* for mc_bk_buf.pu1_v */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size += MB_CHROMA_MEM_SIZE;
/* for mc_buf.pu1_y */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size += MB_LUMA_MEM_SIZE;
/* for mc_buf.pu1_u */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size += MB_CHROMA_MEM_SIZE;
/* for mc_buf.pu1_v */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size += MB_CHROMA_MEM_SIZE;
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
/*************************************************************************/
/* Fill the memory requirement Stack Context */
/*************************************************************************/
/* ! */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128 /* 128 byte alignment*/;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_PERSISTENT_MEM;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = 392;
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
}
{
/*************************************************************************/
/* Fill the memory requirement for Picture Buffer Manager */
/*************************************************************************/
/* ! */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128 /* 128 byte alignment*/;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_PERSISTENT_MEM;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = sizeof(buf_mgr_t) + sizeof(pic_buf_t) * BUF_MGR_MAX_CNT;
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
}
/*************************************************************************/
/* Internal Frame Buffers */
/*************************************************************************/
/* ! */
{
for(u4_i = 0; u4_i < NUM_INT_FRAME_BUFFERS; u4_i++)
{
/* ! */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128 /* 128 byte alignment*/;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_PERSISTENT_MEM;
if(0 == i4_share_disp_buf)
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = max_frm_size;
else if(IV_YUV_420P != i4_chroma_format)
{
/* If color format is not 420P and it is shared, then allocate for chroma */
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = i4_chroma_size * 2;
}
else
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = 64;
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
}
}
{
WORD32 i4_job_queue_size;
WORD32 i4_num_jobs;
/* One job per row of MBs */
i4_num_jobs = max_frm_height >> 4;
/* One format convert/frame copy job per row of MBs for non-shared mode*/
i4_num_jobs += max_frm_height >> 4;
i4_job_queue_size = impeg2_jobq_ctxt_size();
i4_job_queue_size += i4_num_jobs * sizeof(job_t);
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = i4_job_queue_size;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_PERSISTENT_MEM;
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
}
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_PERSISTENT_MEM;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = impeg2d_deint_ctxt_size();
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_PERSISTENT_MEM;
if(IV_YUV_420P != i4_chroma_format)
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = max_frm_size;
else
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = 64;
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_alignment = 128;
ps_mem_rec->e_mem_type = IV_EXTERNAL_CACHEABLE_PERSISTENT_MEM;
ps_mem_rec->u4_mem_size = sizeof(iv_mem_rec_t) * (NUM_MEM_RECORDS);
ps_mem_rec++;
u1_no_rec++;
ps_op->s_ivd_fill_mem_rec_op_t.u4_num_mem_rec_filled = u1_no_rec;
ps_op->s_ivd_fill_mem_rec_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix in handling header decode errors
If header decode was unsuccessful, do not try decoding a frame
Also, initialize pic_wd, pic_ht for reinitialization when
decoder is created with smaller dimensions
Bug: 28886651
Bug: 35219737
Change-Id: I8c06d9052910e47fce2e6fe25ad318d4c83d2c50
(cherry picked from commit 2b9fa9ace2dbedfbac026fc9b6ab6cdac7f68c27)
(cherry picked from commit c2395cd7cc0c286a66de674032dd2ed26500aef4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 162,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int __init ucma_init(void)
{
int ret;
ret = misc_register(&ucma_misc);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = device_create_file(ucma_misc.this_device, &dev_attr_abi_version);
if (ret) {
pr_err("rdma_ucm: couldn't create abi_version attr\n");
goto err1;
}
ucma_ctl_table_hdr = register_net_sysctl(&init_net, "net/rdma_ucm", ucma_ctl_table);
if (!ucma_ctl_table_hdr) {
pr_err("rdma_ucm: couldn't register sysctl paths\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err2;
}
return 0;
err2:
device_remove_file(ucma_misc.this_device, &dev_attr_abi_version);
err1:
misc_deregister(&ucma_misc);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,849 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Com_FilterPath(char *filter, char *name, int casesensitive)
{
int i;
char new_filter[MAX_QPATH];
char new_name[MAX_QPATH];
for (i = 0; i < MAX_QPATH-1 && filter[i]; i++) {
if ( filter[i] == '\\' || filter[i] == ':' ) {
new_filter[i] = '/';
}
else {
new_filter[i] = filter[i];
}
}
new_filter[i] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < MAX_QPATH-1 && name[i]; i++) {
if ( name[i] == '\\' || name[i] == ':' ) {
new_name[i] = '/';
}
else {
new_name[i] = name[i];
}
}
new_name[i] = '\0';
return Com_Filter(new_filter, new_name, casesensitive);
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,455 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int xfrm_get_spdinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct sk_buff *r_skb;
u32 *flags = nlmsg_data(nlh);
u32 sportid = NETLINK_CB(skb).portid;
u32 seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
r_skb = nlmsg_new(xfrm_spdinfo_msgsize(), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (r_skb == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (build_spdinfo(r_skb, net, sportid, seq, *flags) < 0)
BUG();
return nlmsg_unicast(net->xfrm.nlsk, r_skb, sportid);
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 59,369 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: circle_same(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle1 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
CIRCLE *circle2 = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPeq(circle1->radius, circle2->radius) &&
FPeq(circle1->center.x, circle2->center.x) &&
FPeq(circle1->center.y, circle2->center.y));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,867 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: receive_self_carbon(void **state)
{
prof_input("/carbons on");
prof_connect();
assert_true(stbbr_received(
"<iq id='*' type='set'><enable xmlns='urn:xmpp:carbons:2'/></iq>"
));
stbbr_send(
"<presence to='stabber@localhost' from='buddy1@localhost/mobile'>"
"<priority>10</priority>"
"<status>On my mobile</status>"
"</presence>"
);
assert_true(prof_output_exact("Buddy1 (mobile) is online, \"On my mobile\""));
prof_input("/msg Buddy1");
assert_true(prof_output_exact("unencrypted"));
stbbr_send(
"<message type='chat' to='stabber@localhost/profanity' from='stabber@localhost'>"
"<sent xmlns='urn:xmpp:carbons:2'>"
"<forwarded xmlns='urn:xmpp:forward:0'>"
"<message id='59' xmlns='jabber:client' type='chat' to='buddy1@localhost/mobile' lang='en' from='stabber@localhost/profanity'>"
"<body>self sent carbon</body>"
"</message>"
"</forwarded>"
"</sent>"
"</message>"
);
assert_true(prof_output_regex("me: .+self sent carbon"));
}
Commit Message: Add carbons from check
CWE ID: CWE-346 | 0 | 68,680 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int arpt_register_table(struct net *net,
const struct xt_table *table,
const struct arpt_replace *repl,
const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
struct xt_table **res)
{
int ret;
struct xt_table_info *newinfo;
struct xt_table_info bootstrap = {0};
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct xt_table *new_table;
newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(repl->size);
if (!newinfo)
return -ENOMEM;
loc_cpu_entry = newinfo->entries;
memcpy(loc_cpu_entry, repl->entries, repl->size);
ret = translate_table(newinfo, loc_cpu_entry, repl);
duprintf("arpt_register_table: translate table gives %d\n", ret);
if (ret != 0)
goto out_free;
new_table = xt_register_table(net, table, &bootstrap, newinfo);
if (IS_ERR(new_table)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(new_table);
goto out_free;
}
/* set res now, will see skbs right after nf_register_net_hooks */
WRITE_ONCE(*res, new_table);
ret = nf_register_net_hooks(net, ops, hweight32(table->valid_hooks));
if (ret != 0) {
__arpt_unregister_table(new_table);
*res = NULL;
}
return ret;
out_free:
xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 52,234 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string TestURLLoader::TestUntrustedCorbEligibleRequest() {
std::string cross_origin_url =
GetReachableCrossOriginURL("corb_eligible_resource.json");
pp::URLRequestInfo request(instance_);
request.SetURL(cross_origin_url);
request.SetAllowCrossOriginRequests(true);
std::string response_body;
int32_t rv = OpenUntrusted(request, &response_body);
if (rv != PP_ERROR_NOACCESS) {
return ReportError("Untrusted Javascript URL request restriction failed",
rv);
}
ASSERT_EQ("", response_body);
PASS();
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 156,466 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int regulator_get_current_limit(struct regulator *regulator)
{
return _regulator_get_current_limit(regulator->rdev);
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,503 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _archive_write_filter_count(struct archive *_a)
{
struct archive_write *a = (struct archive_write *)_a;
struct archive_write_filter *p = a->filter_first;
int count = 0;
while(p) {
count++;
p = p->next_filter;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message: Limit write requests to at most INT_MAX.
This prevents a certain common programming error (passing -1 to write)
from leading to other problems deeper in the library.
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 34,055 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GDataFileError GDataFileSystem::UpdateFromFeedForTesting(
const std::vector<DocumentFeed*>& feed_list,
int64 start_changestamp,
int64 root_feed_changestamp) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
return feed_loader_->UpdateFromFeed(feed_list,
start_changestamp,
root_feed_changestamp);
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,065 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void vnc_refresh(DisplayChangeListener *dcl)
{
VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
VncState *vs, *vn;
int has_dirty, rects = 0;
graphic_hw_update(NULL);
if (vnc_trylock_display(vd)) {
update_displaychangelistener(&vd->dcl, VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE);
return;
}
has_dirty = vnc_refresh_server_surface(vd);
vnc_unlock_display(vd);
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(vs, &vd->clients, next, vn) {
rects += vnc_update_client(vs, has_dirty, false);
/* vs might be free()ed here */
}
if (QTAILQ_EMPTY(&vd->clients)) {
update_displaychangelistener(&vd->dcl, VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MAX);
return;
}
if (has_dirty && rects) {
vd->dcl.update_interval /= 2;
if (vd->dcl.update_interval < VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE) {
vd->dcl.update_interval = VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE;
}
} else {
vd->dcl.update_interval += VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_INC;
if (vd->dcl.update_interval > VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MAX) {
vd->dcl.update_interval = VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MAX;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 8,038 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void voidMethodLongArgTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectPythonV8Internal::voidMethodLongArgTestInterfaceEmptyArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,843 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Layer::AddChild(scoped_refptr<Layer> child) {
InsertChild(child, children_.size());
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,841 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dist_cpoly(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
CIRCLE *circle = PG_GETARG_CIRCLE_P(0);
POLYGON *poly = PG_GETARG_POLYGON_P(1);
float8 result;
float8 d;
int i;
LSEG seg;
if (point_inside(&(circle->center), poly->npts, poly->p) != 0)
{
#ifdef GEODEBUG
printf("dist_cpoly- center inside of polygon\n");
#endif
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(0.0);
}
/* initialize distance with segment between first and last points */
seg.p[0].x = poly->p[0].x;
seg.p[0].y = poly->p[0].y;
seg.p[1].x = poly->p[poly->npts - 1].x;
seg.p[1].y = poly->p[poly->npts - 1].y;
result = dist_ps_internal(&circle->center, &seg);
#ifdef GEODEBUG
printf("dist_cpoly- segment 0/n distance is %f\n", result);
#endif
/* check distances for other segments */
for (i = 0; (i < poly->npts - 1); i++)
{
seg.p[0].x = poly->p[i].x;
seg.p[0].y = poly->p[i].y;
seg.p[1].x = poly->p[i + 1].x;
seg.p[1].y = poly->p[i + 1].y;
d = dist_ps_internal(&circle->center, &seg);
#ifdef GEODEBUG
printf("dist_cpoly- segment %d distance is %f\n", (i + 1), d);
#endif
if (d < result)
result = d;
}
result -= circle->radius;
if (result < 0)
result = 0;
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(result);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int Volume_getParameter(EffectContext *pContext,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int bMute = 0;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;;
char *name;
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize != sizeof(int16_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 2 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter unknown param %d", param);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
status = VolumeGetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t *)(pValue));
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
*(int16_t *)pValue = 0;
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
VolumeGetStereoPosition(pContext, (int16_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
status = VolumeGetMute(pContext, (uint32_t *)pValue);
ALOGV("\tVolume_getParameter() VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE Value is %d",
*(uint32_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
*(int32_t *)pValue = pContext->pBundledContext->bStereoPositionEnabled;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Volume_getParameter */
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 157,424 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int sapi_cgi_deactivate(TSRMLS_D)
{
/* flush only when SAPI was started. The reasons are:
1. SAPI Deactivate is called from two places: module init and request shutdown
2. When the first call occurs and the request is not set up, flush fails on FastCGI.
*/
if (SG(sapi_started)) {
if (fcgi_is_fastcgi()) {
if (
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
!parent &&
#endif
!fcgi_finish_request((fcgi_request*)SG(server_context), 0)) {
php_handle_aborted_connection();
}
} else {
sapi_cgi_flush(SG(server_context));
}
}
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 7,262 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceNode::unlock() {
GetMediaElementAudioSourceHandler().unlock();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,641 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static const struct arm_pmu *__init armv7_a9_pmu_init(void)
{
armv7pmu.id = ARM_PERF_PMU_ID_CA9;
armv7pmu.name = "ARMv7 Cortex-A9";
armv7pmu.cache_map = &armv7_a9_perf_cache_map;
armv7pmu.event_map = &armv7_a9_perf_map;
armv7pmu.num_events = armv7_read_num_pmnc_events();
return &armv7pmu;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,257 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void tg3_phy_set_wirespeed(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int ret;
u32 val;
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_NO_ETH_WIRE_SPEED)
return;
ret = tg3_phy_auxctl_read(tp, MII_TG3_AUXCTL_SHDWSEL_MISC, &val);
if (!ret)
tg3_phy_auxctl_write(tp, MII_TG3_AUXCTL_SHDWSEL_MISC,
val | MII_TG3_AUXCTL_MISC_WIRESPD_EN);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 32,667 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CastDetailedView::UpdateReceiverListFromCachedData() {
receiver_activity_map_.clear();
scroll_content()->RemoveAllChildViews(true);
for (auto& it : receivers_and_activities_) {
const CastConfigDelegate::ReceiverAndActivity& receiver_activity =
it.second;
views::View* container = AddToReceiverList(receiver_activity);
receiver_activity_map_[container] = it.first;
}
scroll_content()->SizeToPreferredSize();
static_cast<views::View*>(scroller())->Layout();
}
Commit Message: Allow the cast tray to function as expected when the installed extension is missing API methods.
BUG=489445
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1145833003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#330663}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 119,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void nfs4_opendata_free(struct kref *kref)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *p = container_of(kref,
struct nfs4_opendata, kref);
struct super_block *sb = p->dentry->d_sb;
nfs_free_seqid(p->o_arg.seqid);
if (p->state != NULL)
nfs4_put_open_state(p->state);
nfs4_put_state_owner(p->owner);
nfs4_label_free(p->a_label);
nfs4_label_free(p->f_label);
dput(p->dir);
dput(p->dentry);
nfs_sb_deactive(sb);
nfs_fattr_free_names(&p->f_attr);
kfree(p->f_attr.mdsthreshold);
kfree(p);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: aspath_empty_get (void)
{
struct aspath *aspath;
aspath = aspath_new ();
aspath_make_str_count (aspath);
return aspath;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 1,579 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool BrowserCommandController::ExecuteCommand(int id) {
return ExecuteCommandWithDisposition(id, WindowOpenDisposition::CURRENT_TAB);
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 153,507 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool LayerTreeHostQt::showDebugBorders(const WebCore::GraphicsLayer*) const
{
return m_webPage->corePage()->settings()->showDebugBorders();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 101,860 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int arg_parse_int(const struct arg *arg) {
long int rawval;
char *endptr;
rawval = strtol(arg->val, &endptr, 10);
if (arg->val[0] != '\0' && endptr[0] == '\0') {
if (rawval >= INT_MIN && rawval <= INT_MAX)
return rawval;
die("Option %s: Value %ld out of range for signed int\n",
arg->name, rawval);
}
die("Option %s: Invalid character '%c'\n", arg->name, *endptr);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int digi_startup_device(struct usb_serial *serial)
{
int i, ret = 0;
struct digi_serial *serial_priv = usb_get_serial_data(serial);
struct usb_serial_port *port;
/* be sure this happens exactly once */
spin_lock(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
if (serial_priv->ds_device_started) {
spin_unlock(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
return 0;
}
serial_priv->ds_device_started = 1;
spin_unlock(&serial_priv->ds_serial_lock);
/* start reading from each bulk in endpoint for the device */
/* set USB_DISABLE_SPD flag for write bulk urbs */
for (i = 0; i < serial->type->num_ports + 1; i++) {
port = serial->port[i];
ret = usb_submit_urb(port->read_urb, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret != 0) {
dev_err(&port->dev,
"%s: usb_submit_urb failed, ret=%d, port=%d\n",
__func__, ret, i);
break;
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,171 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void kvm_arch_free_memslot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *free,
struct kvm_memory_slot *dont)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_PAGE_SIZES; ++i) {
if (!dont || free->arch.rmap[i] != dont->arch.rmap[i]) {
kvm_kvfree(free->arch.rmap[i]);
free->arch.rmap[i] = NULL;
}
if (i == 0)
continue;
if (!dont || free->arch.lpage_info[i - 1] !=
dont->arch.lpage_info[i - 1]) {
kvm_kvfree(free->arch.lpage_info[i - 1]);
free->arch.lpage_info[i - 1] = NULL;
}
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 28,837 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool SVGElement::IsAnimatableAttribute(const QualifiedName& name) const {
DEFINE_THREAD_SAFE_STATIC_LOCAL(HashSet<QualifiedName>, animatable_attributes,
({
svg_names::kAmplitudeAttr,
svg_names::kAzimuthAttr,
svg_names::kBaseFrequencyAttr,
svg_names::kBiasAttr,
svg_names::kClipPathUnitsAttr,
svg_names::kCxAttr,
svg_names::kCyAttr,
svg_names::kDiffuseConstantAttr,
svg_names::kDivisorAttr,
svg_names::kDxAttr,
svg_names::kDyAttr,
svg_names::kEdgeModeAttr,
svg_names::kElevationAttr,
svg_names::kExponentAttr,
svg_names::kFilterUnitsAttr,
svg_names::kFxAttr,
svg_names::kFyAttr,
svg_names::kGradientTransformAttr,
svg_names::kGradientUnitsAttr,
svg_names::kHeightAttr,
svg_names::kHrefAttr,
svg_names::kIn2Attr,
svg_names::kInAttr,
svg_names::kInterceptAttr,
svg_names::kK1Attr,
svg_names::kK2Attr,
svg_names::kK3Attr,
svg_names::kK4Attr,
svg_names::kKernelMatrixAttr,
svg_names::kKernelUnitLengthAttr,
svg_names::kLengthAdjustAttr,
svg_names::kLimitingConeAngleAttr,
svg_names::kMarkerHeightAttr,
svg_names::kMarkerUnitsAttr,
svg_names::kMarkerWidthAttr,
svg_names::kMaskContentUnitsAttr,
svg_names::kMaskUnitsAttr,
svg_names::kMethodAttr,
svg_names::kModeAttr,
svg_names::kNumOctavesAttr,
svg_names::kOffsetAttr,
svg_names::kOperatorAttr,
svg_names::kOrderAttr,
svg_names::kOrientAttr,
svg_names::kPathLengthAttr,
svg_names::kPatternContentUnitsAttr,
svg_names::kPatternTransformAttr,
svg_names::kPatternUnitsAttr,
svg_names::kPointsAtXAttr,
svg_names::kPointsAtYAttr,
svg_names::kPointsAtZAttr,
svg_names::kPreserveAlphaAttr,
svg_names::kPreserveAspectRatioAttr,
svg_names::kPrimitiveUnitsAttr,
svg_names::kRadiusAttr,
svg_names::kRAttr,
svg_names::kRefXAttr,
svg_names::kRefYAttr,
svg_names::kResultAttr,
svg_names::kRotateAttr,
svg_names::kRxAttr,
svg_names::kRyAttr,
svg_names::kScaleAttr,
svg_names::kSeedAttr,
svg_names::kSlopeAttr,
svg_names::kSpacingAttr,
svg_names::kSpecularConstantAttr,
svg_names::kSpecularExponentAttr,
svg_names::kSpreadMethodAttr,
svg_names::kStartOffsetAttr,
svg_names::kStdDeviationAttr,
svg_names::kStitchTilesAttr,
svg_names::kSurfaceScaleAttr,
svg_names::kTableValuesAttr,
svg_names::kTargetAttr,
svg_names::kTargetXAttr,
svg_names::kTargetYAttr,
svg_names::kTransformAttr,
svg_names::kTypeAttr,
svg_names::kValuesAttr,
svg_names::kViewBoxAttr,
svg_names::kWidthAttr,
svg_names::kX1Attr,
svg_names::kX2Attr,
svg_names::kXAttr,
svg_names::kXChannelSelectorAttr,
svg_names::kY1Attr,
svg_names::kY2Attr,
svg_names::kYAttr,
svg_names::kYChannelSelectorAttr,
svg_names::kZAttr,
}));
if (name == kClassAttr)
return true;
return animatable_attributes.Contains(name);
}
Commit Message: Fix SVG crash for v0 distribution into foreignObject.
We require a parent element to be an SVG element for non-svg-root
elements in order to create a LayoutObject for them. However, we checked
the light tree parent element, not the flat tree one which is the parent
for the layout tree construction. Note that this is just an issue in
Shadow DOM v0 since v1 does not allow shadow roots on SVG elements.
Bug: 915469
Change-Id: Id81843abad08814fae747b5bc81c09666583f130
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1382494
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Söderquist <fs@opera.com>
Commit-Queue: Rune Lillesveen <futhark@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617487}
CWE ID: CWE-704 | 0 | 152,772 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RunInBackgroundTest() {}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,546 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static jboolean Region_contains(JNIEnv* env, jobject region, jint x, jint y) {
bool result = GetSkRegion(env, region)->contains(x, y);
return boolTojboolean(result);
}
Commit Message: Check that the parcel contained the expected amount of region data. DO NOT MERGE
bug:20883006
Change-Id: Ib47a8ec8696dbc37e958b8dbceb43fcbabf6605b
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 157,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: VirtQueue *virtio_vector_first_queue(VirtIODevice *vdev, uint16_t vector)
{
return QLIST_FIRST(&vdev->vector_queues[vector]);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: MODRET auth_log_pass(cmd_rec *cmd) {
/* Only log, to the syslog, that the login has succeeded here, where we
* know that the login has definitely succeeded.
*/
pr_log_auth(PR_LOG_INFO, "%s %s: Login successful.",
(session.anon_config != NULL) ? "ANON" : C_USER, session.user);
if (cmd->arg != NULL) {
size_t passwd_len;
/* And scrub the memory holding the password sent by the client, for
* safety/security.
*/
passwd_len = strlen(cmd->arg);
pr_memscrub(cmd->arg, passwd_len);
}
return PR_DECLINED(cmd);
}
Commit Message: Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 67,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ui_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
/* nothing to do */
return 0;
}
Commit Message: IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 52,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void CreateRenderbufferInfo(GLuint client_id, GLuint service_id) {
return renderbuffer_manager()->CreateRenderbufferInfo(
client_id, service_id);
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 99,104 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __fuse_put_request(struct fuse_req *req)
{
BUG_ON(atomic_read(&req->count) < 2);
atomic_dec(&req->count);
}
Commit Message: fuse: check size of FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY message
FUSE_NOTIFY_INVAL_ENTRY didn't check the length of the write so the
message processing could overrun and result in a "kernel BUG at
fs/fuse/dev.c:629!"
Reported-by: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwenn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
CC: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 24,583 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static MagickBooleanType MaskPixelCacheNexus(Image *image,NexusInfo *nexus_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
MagickPixelPacket
alpha,
beta;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
NexusInfo
**magick_restrict clip_nexus,
**magick_restrict image_nexus;
register const PixelPacket
*magick_restrict r;
register IndexPacket
*magick_restrict nexus_indexes,
*magick_restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*magick_restrict p,
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Apply clip mask.
*/
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if ((image->mask == (Image *) NULL) || (image->storage_class == PseudoClass))
return(MagickTrue);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
if (cache_info == (Cache) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
image_nexus=AcquirePixelCacheNexus(1);
clip_nexus=AcquirePixelCacheNexus(1);
if ((image_nexus == (NexusInfo **) NULL) ||
(clip_nexus == (NexusInfo **) NULL))
ThrowBinaryException(CacheError,"UnableToGetCacheNexus",image->filename);
p=GetAuthenticPixelCacheNexus(image,nexus_info->region.x,
nexus_info->region.y,nexus_info->region.width,nexus_info->region.height,
image_nexus[0],exception);
indexes=image_nexus[0]->indexes;
q=nexus_info->pixels;
nexus_indexes=nexus_info->indexes;
r=GetVirtualPixelsFromNexus(image->mask,MaskVirtualPixelMethod,
nexus_info->region.x,nexus_info->region.y,nexus_info->region.width,
nexus_info->region.height,clip_nexus[0],&image->exception);
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&alpha);
GetMagickPixelPacket(image,&beta);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) nexus_info->region.width*
nexus_info->region.height;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_pixels; i++)
{
if ((p == (PixelPacket *) NULL) || (r == (const PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,p,indexes+i,&alpha);
SetMagickPixelPacket(image,q,nexus_indexes+i,&beta);
MagickPixelCompositeMask(&beta,GetPixelIntensity(image,r),&alpha,
alpha.opacity,&beta);
SetPixelRed(q,ClampToQuantum(beta.red));
SetPixelGreen(q,ClampToQuantum(beta.green));
SetPixelBlue(q,ClampToQuantum(beta.blue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,ClampToQuantum(beta.opacity));
if (cache_info->active_index_channel != MagickFalse)
SetPixelIndex(nexus_indexes+i,GetPixelIndex(indexes+i));
p++;
q++;
r++;
}
clip_nexus=DestroyPixelCacheNexus(clip_nexus,1);
image_nexus=DestroyPixelCacheNexus(image_nexus,1);
if (i < (ssize_t) number_pixels)
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 73,492 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LogLuvClose(TIFF* tif)
{
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
/*
* For consistency, we always want to write out the same
* bitspersample and sampleformat for our TIFF file,
* regardless of the data format being used by the application.
* Since this routine is called after tags have been set but
* before they have been recorded in the file, we reset them here.
*/
td->td_samplesperpixel =
(td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ? 1 : 3;
td->td_bitspersample = 16;
td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_INT;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 1 | 168,464 |
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