instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 241k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChromeClientImpl::CloseWindowSoon() {
if (web_view_->Client())
web_view_->Client()->CloseWidgetSoon();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 148,129 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SafeBrowsingBlockingPage::OnDontProceed() {
RecordUserReactionTime(kNavigatedAwayMetaCommand);
if (proceeded_)
return;
RecordUserAction(DONT_PROCEED);
FinishMalwareDetails(0); // No delay
NotifySafeBrowsingUIManager(ui_manager_, unsafe_resources_, false);
UnsafeResourceMap* unsafe_resource_map = GetUnsafeResourcesMap();
UnsafeResourceMap::iterator iter = unsafe_resource_map->find(web_contents_);
if (iter != unsafe_resource_map->end() && !iter->second.empty()) {
NotifySafeBrowsingUIManager(ui_manager_, iter->second, false);
unsafe_resource_map->erase(iter);
}
int last_committed_index =
web_contents_->GetController().GetLastCommittedEntryIndex();
if (navigation_entry_index_to_remove_ != -1 &&
navigation_entry_index_to_remove_ != last_committed_index &&
!web_contents_->IsBeingDestroyed()) {
web_contents_->GetController().RemoveEntryAtIndex(
navigation_entry_index_to_remove_);
navigation_entry_index_to_remove_ = -1;
}
}
Commit Message: Check for a negative integer properly.
BUG=169966
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11892002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176879 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 115,137 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool IsPreLollipopAndroid() {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
return (base::android::BuildInfo::GetInstance()->sdk_int() <
base::android::SDK_VERSION_LOLLIPOP);
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature.
Fixing names of password_manager kEnableManualFallbacksFilling feature
as per the naming convention.
Bug: 785953
Change-Id: I4a4baa1649fe9f02c3783a5e4c40bc75e717cc03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/900566
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <vabr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: NIKHIL SAHNI <nikhil.sahni@samsung.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#534923}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,618 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int countValidCursors(BtShared *pBt, int wrOnly){
BtCursor *pCur;
int r = 0;
for(pCur=pBt->pCursor; pCur; pCur=pCur->pNext){
if( (wrOnly==0 || (pCur->curFlags & BTCF_WriteFlag)!=0)
&& pCur->eState!=CURSOR_FAULT ) r++;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 136,450 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftVPXEncoder::internalGetParameter(OMX_INDEXTYPE index,
OMX_PTR param) {
const int32_t indexFull = index;
switch (indexFull) {
case OMX_IndexParamVideoPortFormat: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)param;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex == kInputPortIndex) {
if (formatParams->nIndex >= kNumberOfSupportedColorFormats) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex == 0) {
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420Planar;
} else if (formatParams->nIndex == 1) {
formatParams->eColorFormat =
OMX_COLOR_FormatYUV420SemiPlanar;
} else {
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatAndroidOpaque;
}
formatParams->eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingUnused;
formatParams->xFramerate = mFramerate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
} else if (formatParams->nPortIndex == kOutputPortIndex) {
formatParams->eCompressionFormat = OMX_VIDEO_CodingVP8;
formatParams->eColorFormat = OMX_COLOR_FormatUnused;
formatParams->xFramerate = 0;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorBadPortIndex;
}
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoBitrate: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *bitrate =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_BITRATETYPE *)param;
if (!isValidOMXParam(bitrate)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (bitrate->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
bitrate->nTargetBitrate = mBitrate;
if (mBitrateControlMode == VPX_VBR) {
bitrate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateVariable;
} else if (mBitrateControlMode == VPX_CBR) {
bitrate->eControlRate = OMX_Video_ControlRateConstant;
} else {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedSetting;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoVp8: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE *vp8Params =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_VP8TYPE *)param;
if (!isValidOMXParam(vp8Params)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (vp8Params->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
vp8Params->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_VP8ProfileMain;
vp8Params->eLevel = mLevel;
vp8Params->nDCTPartitions = mDCTPartitions;
vp8Params->bErrorResilientMode = mErrorResilience;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoAndroidVp8Encoder: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *vp8AndroidParams =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_ANDROID_VP8ENCODERTYPE *)param;
if (!isValidOMXParam(vp8AndroidParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (vp8AndroidParams->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
vp8AndroidParams->nKeyFrameInterval = mKeyFrameInterval;
vp8AndroidParams->eTemporalPattern = mTemporalPatternType;
vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerCount = mTemporalLayers;
vp8AndroidParams->nMinQuantizer = mMinQuantizer;
vp8AndroidParams->nMaxQuantizer = mMaxQuantizer;
memcpy(vp8AndroidParams->nTemporalLayerBitrateRatio,
mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio, sizeof(mTemporalLayerBitrateRatio));
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profileAndLevel =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *)param;
if (!isValidOMXParam(profileAndLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (profileAndLevel->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
switch (profileAndLevel->nProfileIndex) {
case 0:
profileAndLevel->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_VP8Level_Version0;
break;
case 1:
profileAndLevel->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_VP8Level_Version1;
break;
case 2:
profileAndLevel->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_VP8Level_Version2;
break;
case 3:
profileAndLevel->eLevel = OMX_VIDEO_VP8Level_Version3;
break;
default:
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
profileAndLevel->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_VP8ProfileMain;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelCurrent: {
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *profileAndLevel =
(OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE *)param;
if (!isValidOMXParam(profileAndLevel)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (profileAndLevel->nPortIndex != kOutputPortIndex) {
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
profileAndLevel->eLevel = mLevel;
profileAndLevel->eProfile = OMX_VIDEO_VP8ProfileMain;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, param);
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: handle onReset() for a few encoders
Test: Run PoC binaries
Bug: 34749392
Bug: 34705519
Change-Id: I3356eb615b0e79272d71d72578d363671038c6dd
CWE ID: | 0 | 162,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ParamTraits<LOGFONT>::Log(const param_type& p, std::string* l) {
l->append(StringPrintf("<LOGFONT>"));
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 117,382 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile)
{
DH *ret = NULL;
BIO *bio;
if ((bio = BIO_new_file(dhfile, "r")) == NULL)
goto err;
ret = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
err:
if (bio != NULL)
BIO_free(bio);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 13,635 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: LayerTreeHost::OnCreateAndInitializeOutputSurfaceAttempted(bool success) {
TRACE_EVENT1("cc",
"LayerTreeHost::OnCreateAndInitializeOutputSurfaceAttempted",
"success",
success);
DCHECK(output_surface_lost_);
if (success) {
output_surface_lost_ = false;
if (!contents_texture_manager_ && !settings_.impl_side_painting) {
contents_texture_manager_ =
PrioritizedResourceManager::Create(proxy_.get());
surface_memory_placeholder_ =
contents_texture_manager_->CreateTexture(gfx::Size(), RGBA_8888);
}
if (root_layer()) {
LayerTreeHostCommon::CallFunctionForSubtree(
root_layer(),
base::Bind(&LayerTreeHostOnOutputSurfaceCreatedCallback));
}
client_->DidInitializeOutputSurface(true);
return CreateSucceeded;
}
client_->DidFailToInitializeOutputSurface();
++num_failed_recreate_attempts_;
if (num_failed_recreate_attempts_ >= 5) {
output_surface_can_be_initialized_ = false;
client_->DidInitializeOutputSurface(false);
return CreateFailedAndGaveUp;
}
return CreateFailedButTryAgain;
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 111,986 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t version_show(struct kobject *kobj,
struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buff)
{
return snprintf(buff, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", ECRYPTFS_VERSIONING_MASK);
}
Commit Message: Ecryptfs: Add mount option to check uid of device being mounted = expect uid
Close a TOCTOU race for mounts done via ecryptfs-mount-private. The mount
source (device) can be raced when the ownership test is done in userspace.
Provide Ecryptfs a means to force the uid check at mount time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 27,372 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void comps_mrtree_print(COMPS_HSList * hl, unsigned deep) {
COMPS_HSListItem * it;
for (it = hl->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
printf("%d %s\n",deep, (((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key));
comps_mrtree_print(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes, deep+1);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,751 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: put_uLong(uLong val)
{
putchar(val >> 24);
putchar(val >> 16);
putchar(val >> 8);
putchar(val >> 0);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,817 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::HandleRendererDebugURL(
FrameTreeNode* frame_tree_node,
const GURL& url) {
if (!frame_tree_node->current_frame_host()->IsRenderFrameLive()) {
if (!IsInitialNavigation()) {
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
return;
}
frame_tree_node->render_manager()->InitializeRenderFrameIfNecessary(
frame_tree_node->current_frame_host());
}
frame_tree_node->current_frame_host()->HandleRendererDebugURL(url);
}
Commit Message: Preserve renderer-initiated bit when reloading in a new process.
BUG=847718
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Change-Id: I6c3461793fbb23f1a4d731dc27b4e77312f29227
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1080235
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563312}
CWE ID: | 0 | 153,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: path_close(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
PATH *path = PG_GETARG_PATH_P_COPY(0);
path->closed = TRUE;
PG_RETURN_PATH_P(path);
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 38,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int emulator_pio_out_emulated(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
int size, unsigned short port,
const void *val, unsigned int count)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
memcpy(vcpu->arch.pio_data, val, size * count);
return emulator_pio_in_out(vcpu, size, port, (void *)val, count, false);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,679 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PageSerializerTest()
: m_folder(WebString::fromUTF8("pageserializer/"))
, m_baseUrl(toKURL("http://www.test.com"))
{
}
Commit Message: Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> R=abarth@chromium.org
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
TBR=tiger@opera.com
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 118,880 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct buffer_head *udf_getblk(struct inode *inode, long block,
int create, int *err)
{
struct buffer_head *bh;
struct buffer_head dummy;
dummy.b_state = 0;
dummy.b_blocknr = -1000;
*err = udf_get_block(inode, block, &dummy, create);
if (!*err && buffer_mapped(&dummy)) {
bh = sb_getblk(inode->i_sb, dummy.b_blocknr);
if (buffer_new(&dummy)) {
lock_buffer(bh);
memset(bh->b_data, 0x00, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
mark_buffer_dirty_inode(bh, inode);
}
return bh;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 36,053 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void start_multicast(void)
{
FFServerStream *stream;
char session_id[32];
HTTPContext *rtp_c;
struct sockaddr_in dest_addr = {0};
int default_port, stream_index;
unsigned int random0, random1;
default_port = 6000;
for(stream = config.first_stream; stream; stream = stream->next) {
if (!stream->is_multicast)
continue;
random0 = av_lfg_get(&random_state);
random1 = av_lfg_get(&random_state);
/* open the RTP connection */
snprintf(session_id, sizeof(session_id), "%08x%08x", random0, random1);
/* choose a port if none given */
if (stream->multicast_port == 0) {
stream->multicast_port = default_port;
default_port += 100;
}
dest_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
dest_addr.sin_addr = stream->multicast_ip;
dest_addr.sin_port = htons(stream->multicast_port);
rtp_c = rtp_new_connection(&dest_addr, stream, session_id,
RTSP_LOWER_TRANSPORT_UDP_MULTICAST);
if (!rtp_c)
continue;
if (open_input_stream(rtp_c, "") < 0) {
http_log("Could not open input stream for stream '%s'\n",
stream->filename);
continue;
}
/* open each RTP stream */
for(stream_index = 0; stream_index < stream->nb_streams;
stream_index++) {
dest_addr.sin_port = htons(stream->multicast_port +
2 * stream_index);
if (rtp_new_av_stream(rtp_c, stream_index, &dest_addr, NULL) >= 0)
continue;
http_log("Could not open output stream '%s/streamid=%d'\n",
stream->filename, stream_index);
exit(1);
}
rtp_c->state = HTTPSTATE_SEND_DATA;
}
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 70,836 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: make_named_pipe ()
{
char *tname;
tname = sh_mktmpname ("sh-np", MT_USERANDOM|MT_USETMPDIR);
if (mkfifo (tname, 0600) < 0)
{
free (tname);
return ((char *)NULL);
}
add_fifo_list (tname);
return (tname);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,296 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::InitContentSecurityPolicy(
ContentSecurityPolicy* csp,
const ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(csp ? csp : ContentSecurityPolicy::Create());
if (policy_to_inherit) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
} else if (frame_) {
Frame* inherit_from = frame_->Tree().Parent() ? frame_->Tree().Parent()
: frame_->Client()->Opener();
if (inherit_from && frame_ != inherit_from) {
DCHECK(inherit_from->GetSecurityContext() &&
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
policy_to_inherit =
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
if (url_.IsEmpty() || url_.ProtocolIsAbout() || url_.ProtocolIsData() ||
url_.ProtocolIs("blob") || url_.ProtocolIs("filesystem")) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
}
}
if (policy_to_inherit && IsPluginDocument())
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyPluginTypesFrom(policy_to_inherit);
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->BindToExecutionContext(this);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 1 | 172,683 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AppLayerProtoDetectSupportedAppProtocols(AppProto *alprotos)
{
SCEnter();
memset(alprotos, 0, ALPROTO_MAX * sizeof(AppProto));
int alproto;
for (alproto = 0; alproto != ALPROTO_MAX; alproto++) {
if (alpd_ctx.alproto_names[alproto] != NULL)
alprotos[alproto] = 1;
}
SCReturn;
}
Commit Message: proto/detect: workaround dns misdetected as dcerpc
The DCERPC UDP detection would misfire on DNS with transaction
ID 0x0400. This would happen as the protocol detection engine
gives preference to pattern based detection over probing parsers for
performance reasons.
This hack/workaround fixes this specific case by still running the
probing parser if DCERPC has been detected on UDP. The probing
parser result will take precedence.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 96,510 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ConsumeEventHandler() {}
Commit Message: cros: Enable some tests in //ash/wm in ash_unittests --mash
For the ones that fail, disable them via filter file instead of in the
code, per our disablement policy.
Bug: 698085, 695556, 698878, 698888, 698093, 698894
Test: ash_unittests --mash
Change-Id: Ic145ab6a95508968d6884d14fac2a3ca08888d26
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/752423
Commit-Queue: James Cook <jamescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Bennetts <stevenjb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513836}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 133,177 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int cma_accept_iw(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv,
struct rdma_conn_param *conn_param)
{
struct iw_cm_conn_param iw_param;
int ret;
ret = cma_modify_qp_rtr(id_priv, conn_param);
if (ret)
return ret;
iw_param.ord = conn_param->initiator_depth;
iw_param.ird = conn_param->responder_resources;
iw_param.private_data = conn_param->private_data;
iw_param.private_data_len = conn_param->private_data_len;
if (id_priv->id.qp) {
iw_param.qpn = id_priv->qp_num;
} else
iw_param.qpn = conn_param->qp_num;
return iw_cm_accept(id_priv->cm_id.iw, &iw_param);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 38,446 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int bond_check_dev_link(struct bonding *bond,
struct net_device *slave_dev, int reporting)
{
const struct net_device_ops *slave_ops = slave_dev->netdev_ops;
int (*ioctl)(struct net_device *, struct ifreq *, int);
struct ifreq ifr;
struct mii_ioctl_data *mii;
if (!reporting && !netif_running(slave_dev))
return 0;
if (bond->params.use_carrier)
return netif_carrier_ok(slave_dev) ? BMSR_LSTATUS : 0;
/* Try to get link status using Ethtool first. */
if (slave_dev->ethtool_ops) {
if (slave_dev->ethtool_ops->get_link) {
u32 link;
link = slave_dev->ethtool_ops->get_link(slave_dev);
return link ? BMSR_LSTATUS : 0;
}
}
/* Ethtool can't be used, fallback to MII ioctls. */
ioctl = slave_ops->ndo_do_ioctl;
if (ioctl) {
/* TODO: set pointer to correct ioctl on a per team member */
/* bases to make this more efficient. that is, once */
/* we determine the correct ioctl, we will always */
/* call it and not the others for that team */
/* member. */
/*
* We cannot assume that SIOCGMIIPHY will also read a
* register; not all network drivers (e.g., e100)
* support that.
*/
/* Yes, the mii is overlaid on the ifreq.ifr_ifru */
strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, slave_dev->name, IFNAMSIZ);
mii = if_mii(&ifr);
if (IOCTL(slave_dev, &ifr, SIOCGMIIPHY) == 0) {
mii->reg_num = MII_BMSR;
if (IOCTL(slave_dev, &ifr, SIOCGMIIREG) == 0)
return mii->val_out & BMSR_LSTATUS;
}
}
/*
* If reporting, report that either there's no dev->do_ioctl,
* or both SIOCGMIIREG and get_link failed (meaning that we
* cannot report link status). If not reporting, pretend
* we're ok.
*/
return reporting ? -1 : BMSR_LSTATUS;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 23,696 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static RList *r_bin_wasm_get_import_entries (RBinWasmObj *bin, RBinWasmSection *sec) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinWasmImportEntry *ptr = NULL;
if (!(ret = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return NULL;
}
ut8* buf = bin->buf->buf + (ut32)sec->payload_data;
ut32 len = sec->payload_len;
ut32 count = sec->count;
ut32 i = 0, r = 0;
while (i < len && r < count) {
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinWasmImportEntry))) {
return ret;
}
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->module_len, &i))) {
goto culvert;
}
if (!(consume_str (buf + i, buf + len, ptr->module_len, ptr->module_str, &i))) {
goto culvert;
}
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->field_len, &i))) {
goto culvert;
}
if (!(consume_str (buf + i, buf + len, ptr->field_len, ptr->field_str, &i))) {
goto culvert;
}
if (!(consume_u8 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->kind, &i))) {
goto culvert;
}
switch (ptr->kind) {
case 0: // Function
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->type_f, &i))) {
goto sewer;
}
break;
case 1: // Table
if (!(consume_u8 (buf + i, buf + len, (ut8*)&ptr->type_t.elem_type, &i))) {
goto sewer; // varint7
}
if (!(consume_limits (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->type_t.limits, &i))) {
goto sewer;
}
break;
case 2: // Memory
if (!(consume_limits (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->type_m.limits, &i))) {
goto sewer;
}
break;
case 3: // Global
if (!(consume_u8 (buf + i, buf + len, (ut8*)&ptr->type_g.content_type, &i))) {
goto sewer; // varint7
}
if (!(consume_u8 (buf + i, buf + len, (ut8*)&ptr->type_g.mutability, &i))) {
goto sewer; // varuint1
}
break;
default:
goto sewer;
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
r++;
}
return ret;
sewer:
ret = NULL;
culvert:
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 67,081 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PasswordAutofillAgent::WillSendSubmitEvent(
const blink::WebFormElement& form) {
std::unique_ptr<PasswordForm> password_form = CreatePasswordFormFromWebForm(
form, &nonscript_modified_values_, &form_predictions_);
ProvisionallySavePassword(std::move(password_form),
RESTRICTION_NON_EMPTY_PASSWORD);
}
Commit Message: Remove WeakPtrFactory from PasswordAutofillAgent
Unlike in AutofillAgent, the factory is no longer used in PAA.
R=dvadym@chromium.org
BUG=609010,609007,608100,608101,433486
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1945723003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391475}
CWE ID: | 0 | 157,000 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfsd4_layoutget(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_layoutget *lgp)
{
struct svc_fh *current_fh = &cstate->current_fh;
const struct nfsd4_layout_ops *ops;
struct nfs4_layout_stateid *ls;
__be32 nfserr;
int accmode;
switch (lgp->lg_seg.iomode) {
case IOMODE_READ:
accmode = NFSD_MAY_READ;
break;
case IOMODE_RW:
accmode = NFSD_MAY_READ | NFSD_MAY_WRITE;
break;
default:
dprintk("%s: invalid iomode %d\n",
__func__, lgp->lg_seg.iomode);
nfserr = nfserr_badiomode;
goto out;
}
nfserr = fh_verify(rqstp, current_fh, 0, accmode);
if (nfserr)
goto out;
nfserr = nfserr_layoutunavailable;
ops = nfsd4_layout_verify(current_fh->fh_export, lgp->lg_layout_type);
if (!ops)
goto out;
/*
* Verify minlength and range as per RFC5661:
* o If loga_length is less than loga_minlength,
* the metadata server MUST return NFS4ERR_INVAL.
* o If the sum of loga_offset and loga_minlength exceeds
* NFS4_UINT64_MAX, and loga_minlength is not
* NFS4_UINT64_MAX, the error NFS4ERR_INVAL MUST result.
* o If the sum of loga_offset and loga_length exceeds
* NFS4_UINT64_MAX, and loga_length is not NFS4_UINT64_MAX,
* the error NFS4ERR_INVAL MUST result.
*/
nfserr = nfserr_inval;
if (lgp->lg_seg.length < lgp->lg_minlength ||
(lgp->lg_minlength != NFS4_MAX_UINT64 &&
lgp->lg_minlength > NFS4_MAX_UINT64 - lgp->lg_seg.offset) ||
(lgp->lg_seg.length != NFS4_MAX_UINT64 &&
lgp->lg_seg.length > NFS4_MAX_UINT64 - lgp->lg_seg.offset))
goto out;
if (lgp->lg_seg.length == 0)
goto out;
nfserr = nfsd4_preprocess_layout_stateid(rqstp, cstate, &lgp->lg_sid,
true, lgp->lg_layout_type, &ls);
if (nfserr) {
trace_layout_get_lookup_fail(&lgp->lg_sid);
goto out;
}
nfserr = nfserr_recallconflict;
if (atomic_read(&ls->ls_stid.sc_file->fi_lo_recalls))
goto out_put_stid;
nfserr = ops->proc_layoutget(d_inode(current_fh->fh_dentry),
current_fh, lgp);
if (nfserr)
goto out_put_stid;
nfserr = nfsd4_insert_layout(lgp, ls);
out_put_stid:
mutex_unlock(&ls->ls_mutex);
nfs4_put_stid(&ls->ls_stid);
out:
return nfserr;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,338 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline void finish_lock_switch(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *prev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK
/* this is a valid case when another task releases the spinlock */
rq->lock.owner = current;
#endif
/*
* If we are tracking spinlock dependencies then we have to
* fix up the runqueue lock - which gets 'carried over' from
* prev into current:
*/
spin_acquire(&rq->lock.dep_map, 0, 0, _THIS_IP_);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&rq->lock);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,422 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void set_page_huge_active(struct page *page)
{
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageHeadHuge(page), page);
SetPagePrivate(&page[1]);
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 86,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: scanval (const char *string)
{
gpg_err_code_t rc;
gcry_mpi_t val;
rc = _gcry_mpi_scan (&val, GCRYMPI_FMT_HEX, string, 0, NULL);
if (rc)
log_fatal ("scanning ECC parameter failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 5,610 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void AutocompleteEditModel::ClearPopupKeywordMode() const {
if (popup_->IsOpen() &&
popup_->selected_line_state() == AutocompletePopupModel::KEYWORD)
popup_->SetSelectedLineState(AutocompletePopupModel::NORMAL);
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 103,829 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void format_init(format_list *pf)
{
int i;
for (i=0; i<FORMAT_SET_COUNT; ++i)
pf->bits[i] = 0; /* All off */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 159,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vmxnet3_dump_rx_descr(struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc *descr)
{
VMW_PKPRN("RX DESCR: addr %" PRIx64 ", len: %d, gen: %d, rsvd: %d, "
"dtype: %d, ext1: %d, btype: %d",
le64_to_cpu(descr->addr), descr->len, descr->gen,
descr->rsvd, descr->dtype, descr->ext1, descr->btype);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 8,985 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: validGlxScreen(ClientPtr client, int screen, __GLXscreen **pGlxScreen, int *err)
{
/*
** Check if screen exists.
*/
if (screen >= screenInfo.numScreens) {
client->errorValue = screen;
*err = BadValue;
return FALSE;
}
*pGlxScreen = glxGetScreen(screenInfo.screens[screen]);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 1 | 165,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long long Cluster::GetPosition() const {
const long long pos = m_element_start - m_pSegment->m_start;
assert(pos >= 0);
return pos;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,792 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void xen_netbk_add_xenvif(struct xenvif *vif)
{
int i;
int min_netfront_count;
int min_group = 0;
struct xen_netbk *netbk;
min_netfront_count = atomic_read(&xen_netbk[0].netfront_count);
for (i = 0; i < xen_netbk_group_nr; i++) {
int netfront_count = atomic_read(&xen_netbk[i].netfront_count);
if (netfront_count < min_netfront_count) {
min_group = i;
min_netfront_count = netfront_count;
}
}
netbk = &xen_netbk[min_group];
vif->netbk = netbk;
atomic_inc(&netbk->netfront_count);
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 34,001 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: virtual ~RendererMainThread() {
Stop();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,580 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared, union futex_key *key, int rw)
{
unsigned long address = (unsigned long)uaddr;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct page *page, *page_head;
int err, ro = 0;
/*
* The futex address must be "naturally" aligned.
*/
key->both.offset = address % PAGE_SIZE;
if (unlikely((address % sizeof(u32)) != 0))
return -EINVAL;
address -= key->both.offset;
/*
* PROCESS_PRIVATE futexes are fast.
* As the mm cannot disappear under us and the 'key' only needs
* virtual address, we dont even have to find the underlying vma.
* Note : We do have to check 'uaddr' is a valid user address,
* but access_ok() should be faster than find_vma()
*/
if (!fshared) {
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uaddr, sizeof(u32))))
return -EFAULT;
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
get_futex_key_refs(key);
return 0;
}
again:
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 1, &page);
/*
* If write access is not required (eg. FUTEX_WAIT), try
* and get read-only access.
*/
if (err == -EFAULT && rw == VERIFY_READ) {
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 0, &page);
ro = 1;
}
if (err < 0)
return err;
else
err = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
page_head = page;
if (unlikely(PageTail(page))) {
put_page(page);
/* serialize against __split_huge_page_splitting() */
local_irq_disable();
if (likely(__get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 1, &page) == 1)) {
page_head = compound_head(page);
/*
* page_head is valid pointer but we must pin
* it before taking the PG_lock and/or
* PG_compound_lock. The moment we re-enable
* irqs __split_huge_page_splitting() can
* return and the head page can be freed from
* under us. We can't take the PG_lock and/or
* PG_compound_lock on a page that could be
* freed from under us.
*/
if (page != page_head) {
get_page(page_head);
put_page(page);
}
local_irq_enable();
} else {
local_irq_enable();
goto again;
}
}
#else
page_head = compound_head(page);
if (page != page_head) {
get_page(page_head);
put_page(page);
}
#endif
lock_page(page_head);
/*
* If page_head->mapping is NULL, then it cannot be a PageAnon
* page; but it might be the ZERO_PAGE or in the gate area or
* in a special mapping (all cases which we are happy to fail);
* or it may have been a good file page when get_user_pages_fast
* found it, but truncated or holepunched or subjected to
* invalidate_complete_page2 before we got the page lock (also
* cases which we are happy to fail). And we hold a reference,
* so refcount care in invalidate_complete_page's remove_mapping
* prevents drop_caches from setting mapping to NULL beneath us.
*
* The case we do have to guard against is when memory pressure made
* shmem_writepage move it from filecache to swapcache beneath us:
* an unlikely race, but we do need to retry for page_head->mapping.
*/
if (!page_head->mapping) {
int shmem_swizzled = PageSwapCache(page_head);
unlock_page(page_head);
put_page(page_head);
if (shmem_swizzled)
goto again;
return -EFAULT;
}
/*
* Private mappings are handled in a simple way.
*
* NOTE: When userspace waits on a MAP_SHARED mapping, even if
* it's a read-only handle, it's expected that futexes attach to
* the object not the particular process.
*/
if (PageAnon(page_head)) {
/*
* A RO anonymous page will never change and thus doesn't make
* sense for futex operations.
*/
if (ro) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_MMSHARED; /* ref taken on mm */
key->private.mm = mm;
key->private.address = address;
} else {
key->both.offset |= FUT_OFF_INODE; /* inode-based key */
key->shared.inode = page_head->mapping->host;
key->shared.pgoff = page_head->index;
}
get_futex_key_refs(key);
out:
unlock_page(page_head);
put_page(page_head);
return err;
}
Commit Message: futex: Forbid uaddr == uaddr2 in futex_wait_requeue_pi()
If uaddr == uaddr2, then we have broken the rule of only requeueing
from a non-pi futex to a pi futex with this call. If we attempt this,
as the trinity test suite manages to do, we miss early wakeups as
q.key is equal to key2 (because they are the same uaddr). We will then
attempt to dereference the pi_mutex (which would exist had the futex_q
been properly requeued to a pi futex) and trigger a NULL pointer
dereference.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ad82bfe7f7d130247fbe2b5b4275654807774227.1342809673.git.dvhart@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 41,089 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void perContextEnabledVoidMethodMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
imp->perContextEnabledVoidMethod();
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 122,498 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLFrameOwnerElement::IsKeyboardFocusable() const {
return content_frame_ && HTMLElement::IsKeyboardFocusable();
}
Commit Message: Resource Timing: Do not report subsequent navigations within subframes
We only want to record resource timing for the load that was initiated
by parent document. We filter out subsequent navigations for <iframe>,
but we should do it for other types of subframes too.
Bug: 780312
Change-Id: I3a7b9e1a365c99e24bb8dac190e88c7099fc3da5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/750487
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513665}
CWE ID: CWE-601 | 0 | 150,325 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoVertexAttribIPointer(
GLuint indx,
GLint size,
GLenum type,
GLsizei stride,
const void* ptr) {
api()->glVertexAttribIPointerFn(indx, size, type, stride, ptr);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 142,191 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserEventRouter::DispatchTabUpdatedEvent(
WebContents* contents, DictionaryValue* changed_properties) {
DCHECK(changed_properties);
DCHECK(contents);
scoped_ptr<ListValue> args_base(new ListValue());
args_base->AppendInteger(ExtensionTabUtil::GetTabId(contents));
args_base->Append(changed_properties);
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(contents->GetBrowserContext());
scoped_ptr<Event> event(new Event(events::kOnTabUpdated, args_base.Pass()));
event->restrict_to_profile = profile;
event->user_gesture = EventRouter::USER_GESTURE_NOT_ENABLED;
event->will_dispatch_callback =
base::Bind(&WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent, contents);
ExtensionSystem::Get(profile)->event_router()->BroadcastEvent(event.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 171,449 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter::MaybeCreateThrottle(
NavigationHandle* handle) {
DCHECK(content::MimeHandlerViewMode::UsesCrossProcessFrame());
if (!handle->GetParentFrame()) {
return nullptr;
}
int32_t parent_process_id = handle->GetParentFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID();
auto& map = *GetProcessIdToFilterMap();
if (!base::ContainsKey(map, parent_process_id) || !map[parent_process_id]) {
return nullptr;
}
for (auto& pair : map[parent_process_id]->frame_navigation_helpers_) {
if (!pair.second->ShouldCancelAndIgnore(handle))
continue;
return std::make_unique<CancelAndIgnoreNavigationForPluginFrameThrottle>(
handle);
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 1 | 173,044 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int posix_cpu_timer_del(struct k_itimer *timer)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned long flags;
struct sighand_struct *sighand;
struct task_struct *p = timer->it.cpu.task;
WARN_ON_ONCE(p == NULL);
/*
* Protect against sighand release/switch in exit/exec and process/
* thread timer list entry concurrent read/writes.
*/
sighand = lock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
if (unlikely(sighand == NULL)) {
/*
* We raced with the reaping of the task.
* The deletion should have cleared us off the list.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&timer->it.cpu.entry));
} else {
if (timer->it.cpu.firing)
ret = TIMER_RETRY;
else
list_del(&timer->it.cpu.entry);
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
}
if (!ret)
put_task_struct(p);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: posix-timers: Sanitize overrun handling
The posix timer overrun handling is broken because the forwarding functions
can return a huge number of overruns which does not fit in an int. As a
consequence timer_getoverrun(2) and siginfo::si_overrun can turn into
random number generators.
The k_clock::timer_forward() callbacks return a 64 bit value now. Make
k_itimer::ti_overrun[_last] 64bit as well, so the kernel internal
accounting is correct. 3Remove the temporary (int) casts.
Add a helper function which clamps the overrun value returned to user space
via timer_getoverrun(2) or siginfo::si_overrun limited to a positive value
between 0 and INT_MAX. INT_MAX is an indicator for user space that the
overrun value has been clamped.
Reported-by: Team OWL337 <icytxw@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180626132705.018623573@linutronix.de
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 81,115 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err co64_Read(GF_Box *s,GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 entries;
GF_ChunkLargeOffsetBox *ptr = (GF_ChunkLargeOffsetBox *) s;
ptr->nb_entries = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4)
if (ptr->nb_entries > ptr->size / 8) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Invalid number of entries %d in co64\n", ptr->nb_entries));
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
}
ptr->offsets = (u64 *) gf_malloc(ptr->nb_entries * sizeof(u64) );
if (ptr->offsets == NULL) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
ptr->alloc_size = ptr->nb_entries;
for (entries = 0; entries < ptr->nb_entries; entries++) {
ptr->offsets[entries] = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,016 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void ndisc_fill_addr_option(struct sk_buff *skb, int type, void *data)
{
int pad = ndisc_addr_option_pad(skb->dev->type);
int data_len = skb->dev->addr_len;
int space = ndisc_opt_addr_space(skb->dev);
u8 *opt = skb_put(skb, space);
opt[0] = type;
opt[1] = space>>3;
memset(opt + 2, 0, pad);
opt += pad;
space -= pad;
memcpy(opt+2, data, data_len);
data_len += 2;
opt += data_len;
space -= data_len;
if (space > 0)
memset(opt, 0, space);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: Don't reduce hop limit for an interface
A local route may have a lower hop_limit set than global routes do.
RFC 3756, Section 4.2.7, "Parameter Spoofing"
> 1. The attacker includes a Current Hop Limit of one or another small
> number which the attacker knows will cause legitimate packets to
> be dropped before they reach their destination.
> As an example, one possible approach to mitigate this threat is to
> ignore very small hop limits. The nodes could implement a
> configurable minimum hop limit, and ignore attempts to set it below
> said limit.
Signed-off-by: D.S. Ljungmark <ljungmark@modio.se>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 43,701 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void _dbus_global_unlock (HANDLE mutex)
{
ReleaseMutex (mutex);
CloseHandle (mutex);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,804 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned int poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
poll_table *wait)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
u32 mask = 0;
sock_poll_wait(file, sk_sleep(sk), wait);
switch ((int)sock->state) {
case SS_UNCONNECTED:
if (!tipc_sk_port(sk)->congested)
mask |= POLLOUT;
break;
case SS_READY:
case SS_CONNECTED:
if (!tipc_sk_port(sk)->congested)
mask |= POLLOUT;
/* fall thru' */
case SS_CONNECTING:
case SS_LISTENING:
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
mask |= (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
break;
case SS_DISCONNECTING:
mask = (POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLHUP);
break;
}
return mask;
}
Commit Message: tipc: fix info leaks via msg_name in recv_msg/recv_stream
The code in set_orig_addr() does not initialize all of the members of
struct sockaddr_tipc when filling the sockaddr info -- namely the union
is only partly filled. This will make recv_msg() and recv_stream() --
the only users of this function -- leak kernel stack memory as the
msg_name member is a local variable in net/socket.c.
Additionally to that both recv_msg() and recv_stream() fail to update
the msg_namelen member to 0 while otherwise returning with 0, i.e.
"success". This is the case for, e.g., non-blocking sockets. This will
lead to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory of the union with
memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early as it
will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Allan Stephens <allan.stephens@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,457 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Browser::SelectNumberedTab(int index) {
if (index < tab_count()) {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("SelectNumberedTab"),
profile_);
tab_handler_->GetTabStripModel()->SelectTabContentsAt(index, true);
}
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 102,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagegd2)
{
_php_image_output(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU, PHP_GDIMG_TYPE_GD2, "GD2", gdImageGd2);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 15,127 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderBox::setScrollTop(int newTop)
{
DisableCompositingQueryAsserts disabler;
if (hasOverflowClip())
layer()->scrollableArea()->scrollToYOffset(newTop, ScrollOffsetClamped);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 116,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Element::updateFocusAppearance(bool /*restorePreviousSelection*/)
{
if (isRootEditableElement()) {
Frame* frame = document()->frame();
if (!frame)
return;
if (this == frame->selection()->rootEditableElement())
return;
VisibleSelection newSelection = VisibleSelection(firstPositionInOrBeforeNode(this), DOWNSTREAM);
if (frame->selection()->shouldChangeSelection(newSelection)) {
frame->selection()->setSelection(newSelection);
frame->selection()->revealSelection();
}
} else if (renderer() && !renderer()->isWidget())
renderer()->scrollRectToVisible(boundingBox());
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 112,421 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void mark_umount_candidates(struct mount *mnt)
{
struct mount *parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
struct mount *m;
BUG_ON(parent == mnt);
for (m = propagation_next(parent, parent); m;
m = propagation_next(m, parent)) {
struct mount *child = __lookup_mnt_last(&m->mnt,
mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
if (child && (!IS_MNT_LOCKED(child) || IS_MNT_MARKED(m))) {
SET_MNT_MARK(child);
}
}
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 50,981 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool HTMLInputElement::rendererIsNeeded(const RenderStyle& style)
{
return m_inputType->rendererIsNeeded() && HTMLTextFormControlElement::rendererIsNeeded(style);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 113,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void remote_device_properties_callback(bt_status_t status, bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr,
int num_properties, bt_property_t *properties) {
if (!checkCallbackThread()) {
ALOGE("Callback: '%s' is not called on the correct thread", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
ALOGV("%s: Status is: %d, Properties: %d", __FUNCTION__, status, num_properties);
if (status != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("%s: Status %d is incorrect", __FUNCTION__, status);
return;
}
callbackEnv->PushLocalFrame(ADDITIONAL_NREFS);
jobjectArray props;
jbyteArray addr;
jintArray types;
jbyteArray val;
jclass mclass;
val = (jbyteArray) callbackEnv->NewByteArray(num_properties);
if (val == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: Error allocating byteArray", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
mclass = callbackEnv->GetObjectClass(val);
/* Initialize the jobjectArray and jintArray here itself and send the
initialized array pointers alone to get_properties */
props = callbackEnv->NewObjectArray(num_properties, mclass,
NULL);
if (props == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: Error allocating object Array for properties", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
types = (jintArray)callbackEnv->NewIntArray(num_properties);
if (types == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: Error allocating int Array for values", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(mclass);
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(val);
addr = callbackEnv->NewByteArray(sizeof(bt_bdaddr_t));
if (addr == NULL) goto Fail;
if (addr) callbackEnv->SetByteArrayRegion(addr, 0, sizeof(bt_bdaddr_t), (jbyte*)bd_addr);
if (get_properties(num_properties, properties, &types, &props) < 0) {
if (props) callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(props);
if (types) callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(types);
callbackEnv->PopLocalFrame(NULL);
return;
}
callbackEnv->CallVoidMethod(sJniCallbacksObj, method_devicePropertyChangedCallback, addr,
types, props);
checkAndClearExceptionFromCallback(callbackEnv, __FUNCTION__);
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(props);
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(types);
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(addr);
callbackEnv->PopLocalFrame(NULL);
return;
Fail:
ALOGE("Error while allocation byte array in %s", __FUNCTION__);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 163,698 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int firm_set_rts(struct usb_serial_port *port, __u8 onoff)
{
struct whiteheat_set_rdb rts_command;
rts_command.port = port->port_number + 1;
rts_command.state = onoff;
return firm_send_command(port, WHITEHEAT_SET_RTS,
(__u8 *)&rts_command, sizeof(rts_command));
}
Commit Message: USB: whiteheat: Added bounds checking for bulk command response
This patch fixes a potential security issue in the whiteheat USB driver
which might allow a local attacker to cause kernel memory corrpution. This
is due to an unchecked memcpy into a fixed size buffer (of 64 bytes). On
EHCI and XHCI busses it's possible to craft responses greater than 64
bytes leading a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: James Forshaw <forshaw@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,091 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigationController::RendererDidNavigateToSamePage(
const ViewHostMsg_FrameNavigate_Params& params) {
NavigationEntry* existing_entry = GetEntryWithPageID(
tab_contents_->GetSiteInstance(),
params.page_id);
existing_entry->set_unique_id(pending_entry_->unique_id());
if (existing_entry->update_virtual_url_with_url())
UpdateVirtualURLToURL(existing_entry, params.url);
existing_entry->set_url(params.url);
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
}
Commit Message: Ensure URL is updated after a cross-site navigation is pre-empted by
an "ignored" navigation.
BUG=77507
TEST=NavigationControllerTest.LoadURL_IgnorePreemptsPending
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6826015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@81307 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 99,894 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int AXObject::indexInParent() const {
if (!parentObject())
return 0;
const auto& siblings = parentObject()->children();
int childCount = siblings.size();
for (int index = 0; index < childCount; ++index) {
if (siblings[index].get() == this) {
return index;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,263 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: float AudioParam::value()
{
if (context() && context()->isAudioThread()) {
bool hasValue;
float timelineValue = m_timeline.valueForContextTime(context(), narrowPrecisionToFloat(m_value), hasValue);
if (hasValue)
m_value = timelineValue;
}
return narrowPrecisionToFloat(m_value);
}
Commit Message: Initialize value since calculateFinalValues may fail to do so.
Fix threading issue where updateCoefficientsIfNecessary was not always
called from the audio thread. This causes the value not to be
initialized.
Thus,
o Initialize the variable to some value, just in case.
o Split updateCoefficientsIfNecessary into two functions with the code
that sets the coefficients pulled out in to the new function
updateCoefficients.
o Simplify updateCoefficientsIfNecessary since useSmoothing was always
true, and forceUpdate is not longer needed.
o Add process lock to prevent the audio thread from updating the
coefficients while they are being read in the main thread. The audio
thread will update them the next time around.
o Make getFrequencyResponse set the lock while reading the
coefficients of the biquad in preparation for computing the
frequency response.
BUG=389219
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/354213002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@177250 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,085 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void multi_break_ctl(struct sb_uart_port *port, int break_state)
{
struct mp_port *mtpt = (struct mp_port *)port;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&mtpt->port.lock, flags);
if (break_state == -1)
mtpt->lcr |= UART_LCR_SBC;
else
mtpt->lcr &= ~UART_LCR_SBC;
serial_out(mtpt, UART_LCR, mtpt->lcr);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mtpt->port.lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 29,418 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: InputHandlerProxy::EventDisposition InputHandlerProxy::HandleGestureScrollBegin(
const WebGestureEvent& gesture_event) {
TRACE_EVENT0("input", "InputHandlerProxy::HandleGestureScrollBegin");
if (scroll_predictor_)
scroll_predictor_->ResetOnGestureScrollBegin(gesture_event);
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
expect_scroll_update_end_ = true;
#endif
cc::ScrollState scroll_state = CreateScrollStateForGesture(gesture_event);
cc::InputHandler::ScrollStatus scroll_status;
if (gesture_event.data.scroll_begin.delta_hint_units ==
ui::input_types::ScrollGranularity::kScrollByPage) {
scroll_status.thread = cc::InputHandler::SCROLL_ON_MAIN_THREAD;
scroll_status.main_thread_scrolling_reasons =
cc::MainThreadScrollingReason::kContinuingMainThreadScroll;
} else if (gesture_event.data.scroll_begin.target_viewport) {
scroll_status = input_handler_->RootScrollBegin(
&scroll_state, GestureScrollInputType(gesture_event.SourceDevice()));
} else if (ShouldAnimate(
gesture_event.data.scroll_begin.delta_hint_units !=
ui::input_types::ScrollGranularity::kScrollByPixel)) {
DCHECK(!scroll_state.is_in_inertial_phase());
scroll_status = input_handler_->ScrollAnimatedBegin(&scroll_state);
} else {
scroll_status = input_handler_->ScrollBegin(
&scroll_state, GestureScrollInputType(gesture_event.SourceDevice()));
}
RecordMainThreadScrollingReasons(gesture_event.SourceDevice(),
scroll_status.main_thread_scrolling_reasons);
InputHandlerProxy::EventDisposition result = DID_NOT_HANDLE;
scroll_sequence_ignored_ = false;
in_inertial_scrolling_ = false;
switch (scroll_status.thread) {
case cc::InputHandler::SCROLL_ON_IMPL_THREAD:
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("input", "Handle On Impl", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
gesture_scroll_on_impl_thread_ = true;
if (input_handler_->IsCurrentlyScrollingViewport())
client_->DidStartScrollingViewport();
if (scroll_status.bubble)
result = DID_HANDLE_SHOULD_BUBBLE;
else
result = DID_HANDLE;
break;
case cc::InputHandler::SCROLL_UNKNOWN:
case cc::InputHandler::SCROLL_ON_MAIN_THREAD:
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("input", "Handle On Main", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
result = DID_NOT_HANDLE;
break;
case cc::InputHandler::SCROLL_IGNORED:
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("input", "Ignore Scroll", TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
scroll_sequence_ignored_ = true;
result = DROP_EVENT;
break;
}
if (scroll_elasticity_controller_ && result != DID_NOT_HANDLE)
HandleScrollElasticityOverscroll(gesture_event,
cc::InputHandlerScrollResult());
return result;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures"
This reverts commit d9a56afcbdf9850bc39bb3edb56d07d11a1eb2b2.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 669086 as the
culprit for flakes in the build cycles as shown on:
https://analysis.chromium.org/p/chromium/flake-portal/analysis/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyQwsSDEZsYWtlQ3VscHJpdCIxY2hyb21pdW0vZDlhNTZhZmNiZGY5ODUwYmMzOWJiM2VkYjU2ZDA3ZDExYTFlYjJiMgw
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.chromiumos/linux-chromeos-rel/25818
Sample Failed Step: content_browsertests on Ubuntu-16.04
Sample Flaky Test: ScrollLatencyScrollbarBrowserTest.ScrollbarThumbDragLatency
Original change's description:
> Add explicit flag for compositor scrollbar injected gestures
>
> The original change to enable scrollbar latency for the composited
> scrollbars incorrectly used an existing member to try and determine
> whether a GestureScrollUpdate was the first one in an injected sequence
> or not. is_first_gesture_scroll_update_ was incorrect because it is only
> updated when input is actually dispatched to InputHandlerProxy, and the
> flag is cleared for all GSUs before the location where it was being
> read.
>
> This bug was missed because of incorrect tests. The
> VerifyRecordedSamplesForHistogram method doesn't actually assert or
> expect anything - the return value must be inspected.
>
> As part of fixing up the tests, I made a few other changes to get them
> passing consistently across all platforms:
> - turn on main thread scrollbar injection feature (in case it's ever
> turned off we don't want the tests to start failing)
> - enable mock scrollbars
> - disable smooth scrolling
> - don't run scrollbar tests on Android
>
> The composited scrollbar button test is disabled due to a bug in how
> the mock theme reports its button sizes, which throws off the region
> detection in ScrollbarLayerImplBase::IdentifyScrollbarPart (filed
> crbug.com/974063 for this issue).
>
> Change-Id: Ie1a762a5f6ecc264d22f0256db68f141fc76b950
>
> Bug: 954007
> Change-Id: Ib258e08e083e79da90ba2e4e4216e4879cf00cf7
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1652741
> Commit-Queue: Daniel Libby <dlibby@microsoft.com>
> Reviewed-by: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669086}
Change-Id: Icc743e48fa740fe27f0cb0cfa21b209a696f518c
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 954007
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1660114
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#669150}
CWE ID: CWE-281 | 0 | 137,968 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ExtensionAppItem::Move(const ExtensionAppItem* prev,
const ExtensionAppItem* next) {
if (!prev && !next)
return; // No reordering necessary
extensions::ExtensionPrefs* prefs = extensions::ExtensionPrefs::Get(profile_);
extensions::AppSorting* sorting = GetAppSorting(profile_);
syncer::StringOrdinal page;
std::string prev_id, next_id;
if (!prev) {
next_id = next->extension_id();
page = sorting->GetPageOrdinal(next_id);
} else if (!next) {
prev_id = prev->extension_id();
page = sorting->GetPageOrdinal(prev_id);
} else {
prev_id = prev->extension_id();
page = sorting->GetPageOrdinal(prev_id);
if (page.Equals(sorting->GetPageOrdinal(next->extension_id())))
next_id = next->extension_id();
}
prefs->SetAppDraggedByUser(extension_id_);
sorting->SetPageOrdinal(extension_id_, page);
sorting->OnExtensionMoved(extension_id_, prev_id, next_id);
UpdatePositionFromExtensionOrdering();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,952 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ModuleSystem::LazyFieldGetter(
v8::Local<v8::Name> property,
const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
LazyFieldGetterInner(property.As<v8::String>(), info, &ModuleSystem::Require);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 133,057 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ssize_t host_features_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct vbg_dev *gdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
return sprintf(buf, "%#x\n", gdev->host_features);
}
Commit Message: virt: vbox: Only copy_from_user the request-header once
In vbg_misc_device_ioctl(), the header of the ioctl argument is copied from
the userspace pointer 'arg' and saved to the kernel object 'hdr'. Then the
'version', 'size_in', and 'size_out' fields of 'hdr' are verified.
Before this commit, after the checks a buffer for the entire request would
be allocated and then all data including the verified header would be
copied from the userspace 'arg' pointer again.
Given that the 'arg' pointer resides in userspace, a malicious userspace
process can race to change the data pointed to by 'arg' between the two
copies. By doing so, the user can bypass the verifications on the ioctl
argument.
This commit fixes this by using the already checked copy of the header
to fill the header part of the allocated buffer and only copying the
remainder of the data from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 81,687 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: _dbus_parse_uid (const DBusString *uid_str,
dbus_uid_t *uid)
{
int end;
long val;
if (_dbus_string_get_length (uid_str) == 0)
{
_dbus_verbose ("UID string was zero length\n");
return FALSE;
}
val = -1;
end = 0;
if (!_dbus_string_parse_int (uid_str, 0, &val,
&end))
{
_dbus_verbose ("could not parse string as a UID\n");
return FALSE;
}
if (end != _dbus_string_get_length (uid_str))
{
_dbus_verbose ("string contained trailing stuff after UID\n");
return FALSE;
}
*uid = val;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 3,754 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static bool nfs4_clear_cap_atomic_open_v1(struct nfs_server *server,
int err, struct nfs4_exception *exception)
{
if (err != -EINVAL)
return false;
if (!(server->caps & NFS_CAP_ATOMIC_OPEN_V1))
return false;
server->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_ATOMIC_OPEN_V1;
exception->retry = 1;
return true;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
{
unsigned int mask;
poll_wait(file, &random_read_wait, wait);
poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
mask = 0;
if (input_pool.entropy_count >= random_read_wakeup_thresh)
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh)
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
return mask;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 25,049 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void impeg2d_dec_grp_of_pic_hdr(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
UWORD32 u4_bits_to_flush;
u4_bits_to_flush = GROUP_OF_PICTURE_LEN;
while(u4_bits_to_flush >= 32 )
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,32);
u4_bits_to_flush = u4_bits_to_flush - 32;
}
if(u4_bits_to_flush > 0)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,u4_bits_to_flush);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for handling streams which resulted in negative num_mbs_left
Bug: 26070014
Change-Id: Id9f063a2c72a802d991b92abaf00ec687db5bb0f
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 161,591 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void kvm_init_tsc_catchup(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 this_tsc_khz)
{
/* Compute a scale to convert nanoseconds in TSC cycles */
kvm_get_time_scale(this_tsc_khz, NSEC_PER_SEC / 1000,
&vcpu->arch.tsc_catchup_shift,
&vcpu->arch.tsc_catchup_mult);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 20,780 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int PermissionsBubbleDialogDelegateView::GetDefaultDialogButton() const {
return ui::DIALOG_BUTTON_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Elide the permission bubble title from the head of the string.
Long URLs can be used to spoof other origins in the permission bubble
title. This CL customises the title to be elided from the head, which
ensures that the maximal amount of the URL host is displayed in the case
where the URL is too long and causes the string to overflow.
Implementing the ellision means that the title cannot be multiline
(where elision is not well supported). Note that in English, the
window title is a string "$ORIGIN wants to", so the non-origin
component will not be elided. In other languages, the non-origin
component may appear fully or partly before the origin (e.g. in
Filipino, "Gusto ng $ORIGIN na"), so it may be elided there if the
URL is sufficiently long. This is not optimal, but the URLs that are
sufficiently long to trigger the elision are probably malicious, and
displaying the most relevant component of the URL is most important
for security purposes.
BUG=774438
Change-Id: I75c2364b10bf69bf337c7f4970481bf1809f6aae
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/768312
Reviewed-by: Ben Wells <benwells@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lucas Garron <lgarron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Giuca <mgiuca@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516921}
CWE ID: | 0 | 146,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad(void)
{
return &aes_128_wrap_pad;
}
Commit Message: crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 69,310 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static ImageEventSender& errorEventSender() {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(ImageEventSender, sender,
(ImageEventSender::create(EventTypeNames::error)));
return sender;
}
Commit Message: Move ImageLoader timer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
Move ImageLoader timer m_derefElementTimer to frame-specific TaskRunnerTimer.
This associates it with the frame's Networking timer task queue.
BUG=624694
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2642103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#444927}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,124 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void V8HeapStatsObserver::Observe(
int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
DCHECK(type == chrome::NOTIFICATION_RENDERER_V8_HEAP_STATS_COMPUTED);
base::ProcessId updated_renderer_id =
*(content::Source<base::ProcessId>(source).ptr());
if (renderer_id_ != updated_renderer_id)
return;
ChromeRenderMessageFilter::V8HeapStatsDetails* v8_heap_details =
content::Details<ChromeRenderMessageFilter::V8HeapStatsDetails>(details)
.ptr();
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> return_value(new DictionaryValue);
return_value->SetInteger("renderer_id", updated_renderer_id);
return_value->SetInteger("v8_memory_allocated",
v8_heap_details->v8_memory_allocated());
return_value->SetInteger("v8_memory_used",
v8_heap_details->v8_memory_used());
if (automation_) {
AutomationJSONReply(automation_, reply_message_.release())
.SendSuccess(return_value.get());
}
delete this;
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,589 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LocalFrameClientImpl::DidEnforceInsecureRequestPolicy(
WebInsecureRequestPolicy policy) {
if (!web_frame_->Client())
return;
web_frame_->Client()->DidEnforceInsecureRequestPolicy(policy);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 145,242 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void TemplateURL::ResetKeywordIfNecessary(
const SearchTermsData& search_terms_data,
bool force) {
if (IsGoogleSearchURLWithReplaceableKeyword(search_terms_data) || force) {
DCHECK_NE(OMNIBOX_API_EXTENSION, type_);
GURL url(GenerateSearchURL(search_terms_data));
if (url.is_valid())
data_.SetKeyword(GenerateKeyword(url));
}
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Text> Document::createEditingTextNode(const String& text)
{
return Text::createEditingText(*this, text);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 124,314 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len)
{
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
int mode = ctxt->mode;
int def_op_bytes, def_ad_bytes, goffset, simd_prefix;
bool op_prefix = false;
bool has_seg_override = false;
struct opcode opcode;
ctxt->memop.type = OP_NONE;
ctxt->memopp = NULL;
ctxt->_eip = ctxt->eip;
ctxt->fetch.ptr = ctxt->fetch.data;
ctxt->fetch.end = ctxt->fetch.data + insn_len;
ctxt->opcode_len = 1;
if (insn_len > 0)
memcpy(ctxt->fetch.data, insn, insn_len);
else {
rc = __do_insn_fetch_bytes(ctxt, 1);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
}
switch (mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL:
case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 2;
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 4;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
def_op_bytes = 4;
def_ad_bytes = 8;
break;
#endif
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes;
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes;
/* Legacy prefixes. */
for (;;) {
switch (ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt)) {
case 0x66: /* operand-size override */
op_prefix = true;
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x67: /* address-size override */
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
/* switch between 4/8 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 12;
else
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x26: /* ES override */
case 0x2e: /* CS override */
case 0x36: /* SS override */
case 0x3e: /* DS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = (ctxt->b >> 3) & 3;
break;
case 0x64: /* FS override */
case 0x65: /* GS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->b & 7;
break;
case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* REX */
if (mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
goto done_prefixes;
ctxt->rex_prefix = ctxt->b;
continue;
case 0xf0: /* LOCK */
ctxt->lock_prefix = 1;
break;
case 0xf2: /* REPNE/REPNZ */
case 0xf3: /* REP/REPE/REPZ */
ctxt->rep_prefix = ctxt->b;
break;
default:
goto done_prefixes;
}
/* Any legacy prefix after a REX prefix nullifies its effect. */
ctxt->rex_prefix = 0;
}
done_prefixes:
/* REX prefix. */
if (ctxt->rex_prefix & 8)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8; /* REX.W */
/* Opcode byte(s). */
opcode = opcode_table[ctxt->b];
/* Two-byte opcode? */
if (ctxt->b == 0x0f) {
ctxt->opcode_len = 2;
ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
opcode = twobyte_table[ctxt->b];
/* 0F_38 opcode map */
if (ctxt->b == 0x38) {
ctxt->opcode_len = 3;
ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
opcode = opcode_map_0f_38[ctxt->b];
}
}
ctxt->d = opcode.flags;
if (ctxt->d & ModRM)
ctxt->modrm = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
/* vex-prefix instructions are not implemented */
if (ctxt->opcode_len == 1 && (ctxt->b == 0xc5 || ctxt->b == 0xc4) &&
(mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 ||
(mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (ctxt->modrm & 0x80)))) {
ctxt->d = NotImpl;
}
while (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
switch (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
case Group:
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case GroupDual:
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
if ((ctxt->modrm >> 6) == 3)
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod3[goffset];
else
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod012[goffset];
break;
case RMExt:
goffset = ctxt->modrm & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case Prefix:
if (ctxt->rep_prefix && op_prefix)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
simd_prefix = op_prefix ? 0x66 : ctxt->rep_prefix;
switch (simd_prefix) {
case 0x00: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_no; break;
case 0x66: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_66; break;
case 0xf2: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f2; break;
case 0xf3: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f3; break;
}
break;
case Escape:
if (ctxt->modrm > 0xbf)
opcode = opcode.u.esc->high[ctxt->modrm - 0xc0];
else
opcode = opcode.u.esc->op[(ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7];
break;
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->d &= ~(u64)GroupMask;
ctxt->d |= opcode.flags;
}
/* Unrecognised? */
if (ctxt->d == 0)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
ctxt->execute = opcode.u.execute;
if (unlikely(ctxt->ud) && likely(!(ctxt->d & EmulateOnUD)))
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (unlikely(ctxt->d &
(NotImpl|Stack|Op3264|Sse|Mmx|Intercept|CheckPerm))) {
/*
* These are copied unconditionally here, and checked unconditionally
* in x86_emulate_insn.
*/
ctxt->check_perm = opcode.check_perm;
ctxt->intercept = opcode.intercept;
if (ctxt->d & NotImpl)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 && (ctxt->d & Stack))
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
if (ctxt->d & Op3264) {
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
else
ctxt->op_bytes = 4;
}
if (ctxt->d & Sse)
ctxt->op_bytes = 16;
else if (ctxt->d & Mmx)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
}
/* ModRM and SIB bytes. */
if (ctxt->d & ModRM) {
rc = decode_modrm(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (!has_seg_override) {
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->modrm_seg;
}
} else if (ctxt->d & MemAbs)
rc = decode_abs(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
if (!has_seg_override)
ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_DS;
ctxt->memop.addr.mem.seg = ctxt->seg_override;
/*
* Decode and fetch the source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src, (ctxt->d >> SrcShift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/*
* Decode and fetch the second source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src2, (ctxt->d >> Src2Shift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/* Decode and fetch the destination operand: register or memory. */
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->dst, (ctxt->d >> DstShift) & OpMask);
done:
if (ctxt->rip_relative)
ctxt->memopp->addr.mem.ea += ctxt->_eip;
return (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) ? EMULATION_FAILED : EMULATION_OK;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 1 | 166,243 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: HttpBridge::~HttpBridge() {
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,140 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Document::SetAnnotatedRegions(
const Vector<AnnotatedRegionValue>& regions) {
annotated_regions_ = regions;
SetAnnotatedRegionsDirty(false);
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,850 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RunLengthStream::RunLengthStream(Stream *strA):
FilterStream(strA) {
bufPtr = bufEnd = buf;
eof = gFalse;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,912 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void btif_hh_tmr_hdlr(TIMER_LIST_ENT *tle)
{
btif_hh_device_t *p_dev;
UINT8 i;
tBTA_HH_EVT event;
tBTA_HH p_data;
int param_len = 0;
memset(&p_data, 0, sizeof(tBTA_HH));
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s timer_in_use=%d", __FUNCTION__, tle->in_use );
for (i = 0; i < BTIF_HH_MAX_HID; i++) {
if (btif_hh_cb.devices[i].dev_status == BTHH_CONN_STATE_CONNECTED)
{
p_dev = &btif_hh_cb.devices[i];
if (p_dev->vup_timer_active)
{
p_dev->vup_timer_active = FALSE;
event = BTA_HH_VC_UNPLUG_EVT;
p_data.dev_status.status = BTHH_ERR;
p_data.dev_status.handle = p_dev->dev_handle;
param_len = sizeof(tBTA_HH_CBDATA);
/* switch context to btif task context */
btif_transfer_context(btif_hh_upstreams_evt, (uint16_t)event, (void*)&p_data,
param_len, NULL);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 158,643 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::HandleRendererDebugURL(const GURL& url) {
DCHECK(IsRendererDebugURL(url));
base::WeakPtr<RenderFrameImpl> weak_this = weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr();
if (url.SchemeIs(url::kJavaScriptScheme)) {
frame_->LoadJavaScriptURL(url);
} else {
HandleChromeDebugURL(url);
}
if (weak_this && frame_ && !frame_->IsLoading())
Send(new FrameHostMsg_DidStopLoading(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,700 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SProcRenderComposite (ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
REQUEST(xRenderCompositeReq);
swaps(&stuff->length, n);
swapl(&stuff->src, n);
swapl(&stuff->mask, n);
swapl(&stuff->dst, n);
swaps(&stuff->xSrc, n);
swaps(&stuff->ySrc, n);
swaps(&stuff->xMask, n);
swaps(&stuff->yMask, n);
swaps(&stuff->xDst, n);
swaps(&stuff->yDst, n);
swaps(&stuff->width, n);
swaps(&stuff->height, n);
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 14,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: xar_read_data_skip(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct xar *xar;
int64_t bytes_skipped;
xar = (struct xar *)(a->format->data);
if (xar->end_of_file)
return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
bytes_skipped = __archive_read_consume(a, xar->entry_remaining +
xar->entry_unconsumed);
if (bytes_skipped < 0)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
xar->offset += bytes_skipped;
xar->entry_unconsumed = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Do something sensible for empty strings to make fuzzers happy.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 61,665 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ocfs2_prepare_page_for_write(struct inode *inode, u64 *p_blkno,
struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc,
struct page *page, u32 cpos,
loff_t user_pos, unsigned user_len,
int new)
{
int ret;
unsigned int map_from = 0, map_to = 0;
unsigned int cluster_start, cluster_end;
unsigned int user_data_from = 0, user_data_to = 0;
ocfs2_figure_cluster_boundaries(OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb), cpos,
&cluster_start, &cluster_end);
/* treat the write as new if the a hole/lseek spanned across
* the page boundary.
*/
new = new | ((i_size_read(inode) <= page_offset(page)) &&
(page_offset(page) <= user_pos));
if (page == wc->w_target_page) {
map_from = user_pos & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
map_to = map_from + user_len;
if (new)
ret = ocfs2_map_page_blocks(page, p_blkno, inode,
cluster_start, cluster_end,
new);
else
ret = ocfs2_map_page_blocks(page, p_blkno, inode,
map_from, map_to, new);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
user_data_from = map_from;
user_data_to = map_to;
if (new) {
map_from = cluster_start;
map_to = cluster_end;
}
} else {
/*
* If we haven't allocated the new page yet, we
* shouldn't be writing it out without copying user
* data. This is likely a math error from the caller.
*/
BUG_ON(!new);
map_from = cluster_start;
map_to = cluster_end;
ret = ocfs2_map_page_blocks(page, p_blkno, inode,
cluster_start, cluster_end, new);
if (ret) {
mlog_errno(ret);
goto out;
}
}
/*
* Parts of newly allocated pages need to be zero'd.
*
* Above, we have also rewritten 'to' and 'from' - as far as
* the rest of the function is concerned, the entire cluster
* range inside of a page needs to be written.
*
* We can skip this if the page is up to date - it's already
* been zero'd from being read in as a hole.
*/
if (new && !PageUptodate(page))
ocfs2_clear_page_regions(page, OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb),
cpos, user_data_from, user_data_to);
flush_dcache_page(page);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block()
ip_alloc_sem should be taken in ocfs2_get_block() when reading file in
DIRECT mode to prevent concurrent access to extent tree with
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), which may cause BUGON in the following
situation:
read file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A'
vfs_read
__vfs_read
ocfs2_file_read_iter
generic_file_read_iter
ocfs2_direct_IO
__blockdev_direct_IO
do_blockdev_direct_IO
do_direct_IO
get_more_blocks
ocfs2_get_block
ocfs2_extent_map_get_blocks
ocfs2_get_clusters
ocfs2_get_clusters_nocache()
ocfs2_search_extent_list
return the index of record which
contains the v_cluster, that is
v_cluster > rec[i]->e_cpos.
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
down_write(&oi->ip_alloc_sem);
ocfs2_mark_extent_written
ocfs2_change_extent_flag
ocfs2_split_extent
...
--> modify the rec[i]->e_cpos, resulting
in v_cluster < rec[i]->e_cpos.
BUG_ON(v_cluster < le32_to_cpu(rec->e_cpos))
[alex.chen@huawei.com: v3]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59EF3614.6050008@huawei.com
Fixes: c15471f79506 ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,500 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
short version;
unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
size_t extra;
unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
sess = s->session;
if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
else
extra = 0;
if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
/*
* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
* ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
*/
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
again:
/* check if we have the header */
if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
if (n <= 0)
return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
p = s->packet;
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
rr->type = *(p++);
ssl_major = *(p++);
ssl_minor = *(p++);
version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
n2s(p, rr->length);
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
#endif
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet) {
if (version != s->version) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
&& !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
/*
* The record is using an incorrect version number, but
* what we've got appears to be an alert. We haven't
* read the body yet to check whether its a fatal or
* not - but chances are it is. We probably shouldn't
* send a fatal alert back. We'll just end.
*/
goto err;
}
/*
* Send back error using their minor version number :-)
*/
s->version = (unsigned short)version;
}
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto f_err;
}
}
if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
goto err;
}
if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i = rr->length;
n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
if (n <= 0)
return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
/*
* now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
* + rr->length
*/
}
s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
/*
* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
* and we have that many bytes in s->packet
*/
rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
/*
* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
* at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
* the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
* the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
*/
/*
* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
* bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
*/
/* check is not needed I believe */
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data = rr->input;
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
/*-
* enc_err is:
* 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
* 1: if the padding is valid
* -1: if the padding is invalid
*/
if (enc_err == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
{
unsigned int z;
for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("\n");
#endif
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
if ((sess != NULL) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
/*
* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type
*/
orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
/*
* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
* removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
* of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
*/
if (orig_len < mac_size ||
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
/*
* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
* constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
* constant time from within the record, without leaking the
* contents of the padding bytes.
*/
mac = mac_tmp;
ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
rr->length -= mac_size;
} else {
/*
* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| equals
* |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
* |mac_size| above.
*/
rr->length -= mac_size;
mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
}
i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
enc_err = -1;
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
enc_err = -1;
}
if (enc_err < 0) {
/*
* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
* SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
* failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
* not reveal which kind of error occured -- this might become
* visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
*/
al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
goto f_err;
}
/* r->length is now just compressed */
if (s->expand != NULL) {
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
rr->off = 0;
/*-
* So at this point the following is true
* ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
* ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
* ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
* ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
* after use :-).
*/
/* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
s->packet_length = 0;
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0) {
empty_record_count++;
if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
goto f_err;
}
goto again;
}
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type,
rr->length);
#endif
return (1);
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return (ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 11,987 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: resolve_symlinks_in_ops (void)
{
SetupOp *op;
for (op = ops; op != NULL; op = op->next)
{
const char *old_source;
switch (op->type)
{
case SETUP_RO_BIND_MOUNT:
case SETUP_DEV_BIND_MOUNT:
case SETUP_BIND_MOUNT:
old_source = op->source;
op->source = realpath (old_source, NULL);
if (op->source == NULL)
{
if (op->flags & ALLOW_NOTEXIST && errno == ENOENT)
op->source = old_source;
else
die_with_error("Can't find source path %s", old_source);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Don't create our own temporary mount point for pivot_root
An attacker could pre-create /tmp/.bubblewrap-$UID and make it a
non-directory, non-symlink (in which case mounting our tmpfs would fail,
causing denial of service), or make it a symlink under their control
(potentially allowing bad things if the protected_symlinks sysctl is
not enabled).
Instead, temporarily mount the tmpfs on a directory that we are sure
exists and is not attacker-controlled. /tmp (the directory itself, not
a subdirectory) will do.
Fixes: #304
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=923557
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <smcv@debian.org>
Closes: #305
Approved by: cgwalters
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 89,785 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: smb_ofile_getcred(smb_ofile_t *of)
{
return (of->f_cr);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 73,757 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: add_options(opt)
option_t *opt;
{
struct option_list *list;
list = malloc(sizeof(*list));
if (list == 0)
novm("option list entry");
list->options = opt;
list->next = extra_options;
extra_options = list;
}
Commit Message: pppd: Eliminate potential integer overflow in option parsing
When we are reading in a word from an options file, we maintain a count
of the length we have seen so far in 'len', which is an int. When len
exceeds MAXWORDLEN - 1 (i.e. 1023) we cease storing characters in the
buffer but we continue to increment len. Since len is an int, it will
wrap around to -2147483648 after it reaches 2147483647. At that point
our test of (len < MAXWORDLEN-1) will succeed and we will start writing
characters to memory again.
This may enable an attacker to overwrite the heap and thereby corrupt
security-relevant variables. For this reason it has been assigned a
CVE identifier, CVE-2014-3158.
This fixes the bug by ceasing to increment len once it reaches MAXWORDLEN.
Reported-by: Lee Campbell <leecam@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 38,153 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: XvMCSurfaceInfo * XvMCListSurfaceTypes(Display *dpy, XvPortID port, int *num)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = xvmc_find_display(dpy);
xvmcListSurfaceTypesReply rep;
xvmcListSurfaceTypesReq *req;
XvMCSurfaceInfo *surface_info = NULL;
*num = 0;
XvMCCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
LockDisplay (dpy);
XvMCGetReq (ListSurfaceTypes, req);
req->port = port;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
if(rep.num > 0) {
if (rep.num < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo)))
surface_info = Xmalloc(rep.num * sizeof(XvMCSurfaceInfo));
if(surface_info) {
xvmcSurfaceInfo sinfo;
int i;
*num = rep.num;
for(i = 0; i < rep.num; i++) {
_XRead(dpy, (char*)&sinfo, sizeof(xvmcSurfaceInfo));
surface_info[i].surface_type_id = sinfo.surface_type_id;
surface_info[i].chroma_format = sinfo.chroma_format;
surface_info[i].max_width = sinfo.max_width;
surface_info[i].max_height = sinfo.max_height;
surface_info[i].subpicture_max_width =
sinfo.subpicture_max_width;
surface_info[i].subpicture_max_height =
sinfo.subpicture_max_height;
surface_info[i].mc_type = sinfo.mc_type;
surface_info[i].flags = sinfo.flags;
}
} else
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
}
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return surface_info;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 8,250 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: String Notification::dir() const
{
switch (m_data.direction) {
case WebNotificationData::DirectionLeftToRight:
return "ltr";
case WebNotificationData::DirectionRightToLeft:
return "rtl";
case WebNotificationData::DirectionAuto:
return "auto";
}
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return String();
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID: | 0 | 119,773 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RE_FIBER* _yr_re_fiber_kill(
RE_FIBER_LIST* fiber_list,
RE_FIBER_POOL* fiber_pool,
RE_FIBER* fiber)
{
RE_FIBER* next_fiber = fiber->next;
if (fiber->prev != NULL)
fiber->prev->next = next_fiber;
if (next_fiber != NULL)
next_fiber->prev = fiber->prev;
if (fiber_pool->fibers.tail != NULL)
fiber_pool->fibers.tail->next = fiber;
if (fiber_list->tail == fiber)
fiber_list->tail = fiber->prev;
if (fiber_list->head == fiber)
fiber_list->head = next_fiber;
fiber->next = NULL;
fiber->prev = fiber_pool->fibers.tail;
fiber_pool->fibers.tail = fiber;
if (fiber_pool->fibers.head == NULL)
fiber_pool->fibers.head = fiber;
return next_fiber;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer overrun (issue #678). Add assert for detecting this kind of issues earlier.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 64,560 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static u32 cp2112_functionality(struct i2c_adapter *adap)
{
return I2C_FUNC_I2C |
I2C_FUNC_SMBUS_BYTE |
I2C_FUNC_SMBUS_BYTE_DATA |
I2C_FUNC_SMBUS_WORD_DATA |
I2C_FUNC_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA |
I2C_FUNC_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK |
I2C_FUNC_SMBUS_PROC_CALL |
I2C_FUNC_SMBUS_BLOCK_PROC_CALL;
}
Commit Message: HID: cp2112: fix gpio-callback error handling
In case of a zero-length report, the gpio direction_input callback would
currently return success instead of an errno.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 66,442 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: DownloadItemImpl::GetExternalData(const void* key) const {
std::map<const void*, ExternalData*>::const_iterator it =
external_data_map_.find(key);
return (it == external_data_map_.end()) ? NULL : it->second;
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 106,086 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: vrrp_compute_timer(const sock_t *sock)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp;
static timeval_t timer = { .tv_sec = TIMER_DISABLED };
/* The sock won't exist if there isn't a vrrp instance on it,
* so rb_first will always exist. */
vrrp = rb_entry(rb_first_cached(&sock->rb_sands), vrrp_t, rb_sands);
if (vrrp)
return &vrrp->sands;
return &timer;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,071 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void __destroy_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
BUG_ON(inode_has_buffers(inode));
security_inode_free(inode);
fsnotify_inode_delete(inode);
if (!inode->i_nlink) {
WARN_ON(atomic_long_read(&inode->i_sb->s_remove_count) == 0);
atomic_long_dec(&inode->i_sb->s_remove_count);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (inode->i_acl && inode->i_acl != ACL_NOT_CACHED)
posix_acl_release(inode->i_acl);
if (inode->i_default_acl && inode->i_default_acl != ACL_NOT_CACHED)
posix_acl_release(inode->i_default_acl);
#endif
this_cpu_dec(nr_inodes);
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 36,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void PerformXhrInFrame(content::RenderFrameHost* frame,
const std::string& host,
int port,
const std::string& page) {
bool success = false;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScriptAndExtractBool(
frame,
base::StringPrintf(kPerformXhrJs, host.c_str(), port, page.c_str()),
&success));
EXPECT_TRUE(success);
}
Commit Message: Hide DevTools frontend from webRequest API
Prevent extensions from observing requests for remote DevTools frontends
and add regression tests.
And update ExtensionTestApi to support initializing the embedded test
server and port from SetUpCommandLine (before SetUpOnMainThread).
BUG=797497,797500
TEST=browser_test --gtest_filter=DevToolsFrontendInWebRequestApiTest.HiddenRequests
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: Ic8f44b5771f2d5796f8c3de128f0a7ab88a77735
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/844316
Commit-Queue: Rob Wu <rob@robwu.nl>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528187}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 146,554 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserCommandController::UpdateCommandsForBookmarkEditing() {
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_BOOKMARK_PAGE,
CanBookmarkCurrentPage(browser_));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_BOOKMARK_ALL_TABS,
CanBookmarkAllTabs(browser_));
command_updater_.UpdateCommandEnabled(IDC_PIN_TO_START_SCREEN,
true);
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 117,877 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GDataFileSystem::StartFileUploadOnUIThreadAfterGetEntryInfo(
const StartFileUploadParams& params,
int64 file_size,
std::string content_type,
GDataFileError error,
scoped_ptr<GDataEntryProto> entry_proto) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
if (entry_proto.get() && !entry_proto->file_info().is_directory())
error = GDATA_FILE_ERROR_NOT_A_DIRECTORY;
if (error != GDATA_FILE_OK) {
if (!params.callback.is_null())
params.callback.Run(error);
return;
}
DCHECK(entry_proto.get());
scoped_ptr<UploadFileInfo> upload_file_info(new UploadFileInfo);
upload_file_info->file_path = params.local_file_path;
upload_file_info->file_size = file_size;
upload_file_info->gdata_path = params.remote_file_path;
upload_file_info->title = params.remote_file_path.BaseName().value();
upload_file_info->content_length = file_size;
upload_file_info->all_bytes_present = true;
upload_file_info->content_type = content_type;
upload_file_info->initial_upload_location = GURL(entry_proto->upload_url());
upload_file_info->completion_callback =
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnTransferCompleted,
ui_weak_ptr_,
params.callback);
uploader_->UploadNewFile(upload_file_info.Pass());
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 117,052 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::FastShutdownIfPossible() {
if (run_renderer_in_process())
return false; // Single process mode never shutdown the renderer.
if (!GetContentClient()->browser()->IsFastShutdownPossible())
return false;
if (!child_process_launcher_.get() ||
child_process_launcher_->IsStarting() ||
!GetHandle())
return false; // Render process hasn't started or is probably crashed.
if (!SuddenTerminationAllowed())
return false;
ProcessDied(false /* already_dead */);
fast_shutdown_started_ = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,518 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ReadableByteStreamReader* ReadableByteStream::getBytesReader(ExecutionContext* executionContext, ExceptionState& es)
{
ReadableStreamReader* reader = getReader(executionContext, es);
if (es.hadException())
return nullptr;
return new ReadableByteStreamReader(reader);
}
Commit Message: Remove blink::ReadableStream
This CL removes two stable runtime enabled flags
- ResponseConstructedWithReadableStream
- ResponseBodyWithV8ExtraStream
and related code including blink::ReadableStream.
BUG=613435
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2227403002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#411014}
CWE ID: | 0 | 120,328 |
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